






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
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A TREATISE ON THE LAW

OF

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS,

INCLUDING

BILLS OF EXCHANGE; PROMISSORY NOTES; NEGOTIABLE BONDS
AND COUPONS; CHECKS; BANK NOTES; CERTIFICATES OF
DEPOSIT; CERTIFICATES OF STOCK; BILLS OF CREDIT;
BILLS OF LADING; GUARANTIES; LETTERS OF
CREDIT; AND CIRCULAR NOTES,

BY JOHN W. DANIEL,

OF THE LYNCHBURG (VA.) BAR.

"Out of the old fieldes,
Cometh al this new corne."—CHAUCER.

"Non erit alia lex Romæ, alia Athenis, alia nunc, alia posthac, sed et apud omnes gentes, et
omni tempore, una eademque lex obtinebit."—CICERO.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

SECOND EDITION.

NEW YORK:

BAKER, VOORHIS & CO., PUBLISHERS,
66 NASSAU STREET,
1879.



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TO
CHARLES O'CONOR, Esq.
WHO, AS A LAWYER,
HAS DIGNIFIED HIS PROFESSION BY HIS UPRIGHT CHARACTER,
AND
ILLUSTRATED IT WITH THE TRIUMPHS OF HIS GENIUS
AND
WHO, AS A PATRIOT,
HAS NEVER FAILED IN FIDELITY TO THE PRINCIPLES OF
LIBERTY PROTECTED BY LAW,
THIS WORK
IS WITH HIS PERMISSION
RESPECTFULLY INSCRIBED
BY THE AUTHOR.

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.

THE rapid sale of the first edition of this work has demonstrated the correctness of the opinion expressed by its author, that a treatise on the subject of "Negotiable Instruments" was a desideratum to the legal profession; and the flattering utterances with which it has been received by the bench and bar induce him to hope that he has not altogether failed in his effort to supply it.

In response to continuous demands, a second edition is now put forth, containing one hundred and four pages of new matter, and citations of over a thousand cases not embraced in the first edition. The important adjudications of the English and American courts since the spring of 1876 have been carefully collated, and the text presents, as the author hopes, a faithful record of "The Law of Negotiable Instruments," as it is now interpreted and practiced.

To those who have so generously encouraged and favored his work the author returns his thanks, and to his publishers, Messrs. BAKER, VORHIS & Co., he begs leave to renew the assurances of his highest consideration.

J. W. D.

LYNCHBURG, VA., June, 1879.

PREFACE TO FIRST EDITION.

WHEN LORD HOLT, in the year seventeen hundred and three, indignantly denied that promissory notes payable to bearer were negotiable and inveighed against the "obstinacy and opinionativeness of the merchants who were endeavoring to set the law of Lombard street above the law of Westminster Hall," he had no prophetic vision of the great part which negotiable instruments were to play in the transactions of commerce, and little dreamed that the struggling idea of Lombard street was destined to develop, expand, and diversify itself, until it overspread the civilized globe. From that day to this, negotiable instruments have been a subject of such rapid and continuous growth that the sheets of the various compilations on the subject have scarcely dried from the printer's hand, ere they have successively become historic records rather than mirrors of existing things. It is true that certain general principles permeate the law affecting every variety of negotiable instruments, and that in Malynes, Marius, Molloy, and Beawes, we may yet find the rudiments of that system which in our own day has received ample illustration from the hands of Story and Parsons; but the pioneer who stood on the borders of our western civilization thirty years ago, and who to-day sees the same landscape, then covered with primeval forests, or stretching wide in solitary prairies, now brilliant with gorgeous cities, and teeming with the industries of crowded millions, recognizes a change not more marked than that which has been exhibited in the rapid and diversified development of the subject of our treatise. And the development was scarcely more marked in the long period elapsing between the days of the first commentators to whom we have referred and the last, than it has been since the latter put forth their admirable works. Chancellor Kent remarks, with an evident spirit of congratulation, that "the law of negotiable paper has at length become a science which can be studied with infinite advantage in the various codes, treatises, and judicial decisions, for in them every possible view of the doctrine in all its branches has been considered, its rules established, and its limitations accurately defined." But when Chancellor Kent wrote,

his Commentaries, such a thing as a coupon bond was unknown in the United States. When Story sent forth his treatises on Bills and on Notes from Cambridge, it was yet a feeble adventurer, timidly feeling its way on the stock exchange. And although when Professor Parsons published his work in 1862, it had been recognized as a negotiable instrument, and was becoming familiar to the public eye, the law concerning it was yet in such an inchoate state that a few pages comprehended all that he saw fit to say about it. Now there is no more important figure in financial circles than a coupon bond. There is scarcely a town or county in the United States that has not become interested in it, and the law relating to it has grown into an important title, which would fully justify its embodiment in a separate and independent work. We find, also, an increasing disposition to impart certain negotiable qualities to instruments and documentary evidences of title, which, by the common law, are as devoid of such qualities as any chattel sold behind the counter of a merchant. In some of the States, bonds are placed on the same footing as promissory notes. In some of them deeds to real estate and docketed judgments, are just as negotiable as bills of exchange; and in all of them, so to speak, the spirit of negotiability is enlarging its bounds, extending its influence, and impressing itself upon mercantile transactions.

These reflections have led to the production of this work. It is the first effort to embrace in one treatise a classification of all negotiable instruments, with an exposition of the law touching each variety of them. And this has seemed to us the most convenient and philosophical mode of presenting and expounding the law, notwithstanding the views expressed by that great jurist and author, Justice Story, who followed, as he favored, a different plan. To him it seemed (as he states in the preface to his work on Bills of Exchange), that "great practical inconvenience" would result "from uniting and intermixing the doctrines respecting bills of exchange and promissory notes in one and the same treatise;" and if his idea be accepted, still greater practical inconvenience would result from gathering under one roof all the members of the negotiable family. But his own learned productions, to our mind, rebut his theory. Whole sections and pages—and, indeed, we may almost say chapters—of his treatise on Bills are literally transcribed in the succeeding one on Notes. And while there are certain distinctions always to be observed between the two classes of papers, there are more identities *in*, than differences *between*, them; and the differences can always be readily recognized and defined. To use Tennyson's phrase, they are

“alike in difference.” Indeed, not only may bills and notes be conveniently treated in conjunction with each other (as in fact they have been most successfully treated by Bayley, Byles, Thomson, and Parsons); but their kindred which are “bone of the same bone and flesh of the same flesh,” are like the sciences, which, Lord Bacon says, “dwell sociably together.” Checks, so closely assimilated to bills of exchange that they are sometimes called “peculiar kind of bills,” may be fully treated under the same cover with bills, by simply pointing out their peculiar differences and uses.

Coupon bonds, so nearly identical with promissory notes that they might be fitly termed “peculiar kinds of notes,” may be thoroughly explained by exhibiting their peculiar variations from them in form, and in the functions which they fulfill. And every species of instrument, really or *quasi* negotiable, may be either thoroughly expounded or, at least, aptly illustrated by a delineation of its lines of departure from the general principles which apply to these two great species of the negotiable genus, bills of exchange and promissory notes.

Such, at least, have been the considerations which inspired the undertaking, the fruit of which is now with diffidence submitted to a practical and critical, but liberal profession. Composed in hours snatched from other exacting labors of the office and the bar, the author cannot hope that it will be found free from many crudities of style and other more serious imperfections; but if it contain aught of merit, he feels assured that an enlightened profession will not fail to discern it, nor to apply it as equitable offset to those defects which only the amplest resources of leisure and learning could avoid.

To Mr. P. C. NICHOLAS, Librarian of the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, the author is much indebted for many courtesies extended and many facilities afforded him, while pursuing his investigations in the ample collection of books under his charge; and he begs leave here to acknowledge his obligation and record his thanks. He would be lacking in appreciation and gratitude, did he not also here express to his publishers, Messrs. BAKER, VORHIS & Co., of New York, his sense of the liberal and unremitting kindness with which they have aided and encouraged his work. They have been lacking in nothing that fairness could ask of them, or that an accommodating spirit could suggest to them; and he only trusts that the result may leave them no cause to regret their own generous course.

J. W. D.

LYNCHBURG, VA., April, 1876.

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NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.

BOOK I.

THE MAKING OF THE INSTRUMENT.

CHAPTER I.

NATURE, HISTORY AND USES OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.

SECTION I.

NATURE, ORIGIN AND HISTORY OF BILLS AND NOTES.

§ 1. AN instrument is called negotiable when the legal title to the instrument itself, and to the whole amount of money expressed upon its face, may be transferred from one to another by indorsement and delivery by the holder, or by delivery only. The peculiarities which attach to negotiable paper are the growth of time, and were acceded for the benefit of trade.

It was a rule of the common law of England, that a chose in action—by which is meant a claim which the holder would be driven to his action at law to recover—could not be assigned to a stranger, our forefathers conceiving that if claims and debts could be assigned, “pretended titles might be granted to great men, whereby right might be trodden down and the weak oppressed, which the common law forbiddeth.”¹ The first relaxation of this rule was made in respect to bills of exchange, and was gradually extended to notes and other securities, until the rule itself disappeared.

¹ Coke, Litt. 214a; Chitty on Bills [*7], 9; Edwards on Bills, 55.

But while all choses in action are now transferable, the negotiable instrument is the only species which carries by transfer a clear title and a full measure; and like an instrument under seal imports a consideration. It has, therefore, three peculiar and distinguishing characteristics:

First. Respecting the title. If a horse, or other personal chattel, or a non-negotiable instrument, be stolen, no purchaser, however innocent or ignorant of the theft, can acquire title against the true owner, who may at any place, and at any time, identify his property and reclaim it. But if a negotiable instrument be stolen, and transferred by the thief to a third person in the usual course of business, before maturity, and for a valuable consideration, the person so acquiring it may hold it against the world.

Second. Respecting the amount. If a bond or non-negotiable note be assigned, the assignee steps into the shoes of the assignor, and if the bond or note has been paid, or is subject to any counter-claim or set-off against the original maker, they attach to and incumber it into whosoever hands it may fall. But a negotiable paper carries the right to the whole amount it secures on its face, and is subject to none of the defenses which might have been made between the original or intervening parties, against any one who acquired it in the usual course of business before maturity. It is a circulating credit like the currency of the country, and, before maturity, the genuineness and solvency of the parties are alone to be considered in determining its value. It has been fitly termed "a courier without luggage."¹

Third. Respecting the consideration. By the common law, an instrument under seal imports a consideration, by virtue of the solemn ceremony of its execution; and no other non-negotiable instrument does. A bill of exchange, however, by the usages of merchants, also *prima facie* imports a consideration; and now by statute promissory notes of a certain kind are placed on the same footing. As between im-

¹ *Overton v. Tyler*, 3 Barr, 346, Gibson, C. J.

mediate parties, the true state of the case may be shown, and the presumption of consideration rebutted. But when a bill of exchange or negotiable note has passed to a *bona fide* holder for value, and before maturity, no want or failure of consideration can be shown. Its defects perish with its transfer; while, if the instrument be not a bill of exchange or negotiable note, they adhere to it in whosoever hands it may go.

§ 2. Bills of exchange were probably the first instruments for the payment of money that were accorded a negotiable quality, though promissory notes, being simpler in form, were doubtless used as evidences of debt before bills of exchange came in vogue amongst merchants. Certainly these two securities were recognized as negotiable instruments before any other paper representatives of money or property passed currently from hand to hand in like manner as money; and from them, as fruitful parents, have sprung all the varieties of negotiable instruments now known. Of bills and notes, therefore, we shall first speak, and after they have been sufficiently treated of, the other varieties of negotiable instruments will receive due attention.

§ 3. *As to the origin and history of bills and notes.*—The numerous commentators on the law of bills of exchange and promissory notes have generally enriched their pages with the results of their classic and antiquarian researches into the origin and history of those instruments. But notwithstanding the number and the diligence of the laborers in this interesting field of inquiry, it cannot be now stated, with any degree of certainty, by whom they were invented, or when they were first used. In respect to bills of exchange, it is said by Pothier, that there is no vestige of them among the Romans, or of any contract of exchange; for though it appears that Cicero directed one of his friends at Rome, who had money to receive at Athens, to cause it to be paid to his son at that place, and that friend accordingly wrote to one of his debtors at Athens, and ordered him to pay a sum of

money to Cicero's son, yet, it is observed, that this mode amounted to nothing more than a mere order or mandate, and was not that species of negotiation which is conducted through the medium of a bill of exchange.¹

Chancellor Kent seems to think that a passage in one of the pleadings of Isocrates indicates the use of bills of exchange amongst the Greeks,² but Story considers that the transaction referred to was little more than the very case alluded to by Cicero, and put in the Roman law.³ Sir William Blackstone, remarking upon this subject, says: "This method is said to have been brought into general use by the Jews and Lombards when banished for their usury and other vices, in order the more easily to draw their effects out of France and England into those countries in which they had chosen to reside. But the invention of it was a little earlier; for the Jews were banished out of Guienne in 1287, and out of England in 1290; and in 1236 the use of paper credit was introduced into the Mogul Empire in China."⁴ And Chitty says: "Other authors have attributed the invention to the Florentines when, being driven out of their country by the faction of the Gebelings, they established themselves at Lyons and other towns. On the whole, however, there is no certainty on the subject, though it seems clear foreign bills were in use in the fourteenth century, as appears from a Venetian law of that period; and an inference drawn from the statute 5 Rich. II, st. 1, c. 2, warrants the conclusion that foreign bills were introduced into this country previously to the year 1381."⁵ Macpherson, in his "Annals of Commerce," speaks of letters of credit being employed by King John to procure advancements to his agents in Rome as early as 1202.⁶ And there is reason to believe that bills of exchange were known in England as early as

¹ Pothier de Change, n. 6; Story on Bills, § 6; 1 Bell Com. b. 3, c. 2, § 4, p. 386.

² 3 Kent Com. Lect. 44.

³ Story on Bills, § 6, note 4.

⁴ 2 Black. Com. 467.

⁵ Chitty on Bills [*11], 16.

⁶ P. 181, quoted in 1 Parsons N. & B. 4.

1307, since in that year King Edward I ordered certain money, collected in England for the Pope, not to be remitted to him in coin or bullion, but by way of exchange (*per viam Cambii*).¹

§ 4. The term "bill of exchange," derived from the French phrase "*billet de change*," is suggestive of the use which it subserves—that of perfecting a previous distinct contract of exchange or bargain between A. and B. at one place, that A. would cause money to be paid to B. or his assign at another place, by C., a debtor to A., or supplied by him with value to the amount.² Thus, if A. and B. are in England, and C. in Jamaica be indebted to A. one thousand pounds, and B. be going to Jamaica, B. may pay A. this thousand pounds and take a bill of exchange drawn by A. in England upon C. in Jamaica, and collect the amount from C. when he comes thither; and thereby A. receives his debt, at any distance of place, by transferring it to B., and B. receives back his money at the end of his journey—and the parties are mutually benefited by avoiding the dangers of loss or robbery which would attend the actual transmission of funds to and fro.³

From this primitive use, bills of exchange became, in the expansion of commerce, the evidences of valuable property, and in a great measure the equivalent of money, enlarging the capital stock of wealth in circulation, and thereby facilitating and increasing the operations of trade between communities and nations.⁴

§ 5. Promissory notes have as obscure an origin as bills of exchange. There is no doubt that they were in use among the Romans,⁵ but they seem never to have acquired those negotiable qualities which now impart to them their chief value as instruments of commerce. They were in use upon the continent of Europe before their introduction into England, where they first came in vogue about the middle of

¹ Anderson's History of Commerce, Vol. I, 361.

² Chitty on Bills, 1.

⁴ Gibson v. Minet, 1 H. Bl. 618.

³ 2 Black. Com. 467.

⁵ Story on Notes, § 5.

the 17th century,¹ although it has been thought that they possess a more recent origin.² In the earlier reports the terms "bill" and "note" appear to have been used indiscriminately, and it is difficult to determine in many cases whether the particular suit was brought upon the one instrument or the other.³ It has been a much debated question whether or not the common law of England recognized the negotiability of promissory notes; and most vigorously was the negative advocated by Lord Holt, who declared that the effort to place them on the same footing as bills of exchange, "proceeded from the obstinacy and opinionativeness of the merchants, who were endeavoring to set the law of Lombard street above the law of Westminster Hall."⁴ This controversy was terminated by the passage of the statute 3 & 4 Anne, c. 9 [1705] (made perpetual by the statute 7 Anne, c. 25), which made promissory notes "assignable or indorsable over in the same manner as inland bills of exchange are, or may be, according to the custom of merchants."⁵

This statute has been adopted in some of the States of the United States, or in its lieu other statutes prescribing

¹ Story on Notes, § 6.

² Buller v. Crips, 6 Mod. 29.

³ Grant v. Vaughan, 3 Burr. 1525.

⁴ Clerke v. Martin, 1 Lord Raymond, 757.

⁵ The statute of Anne (3 & 4 Anne, c. 9) provides: "That all notes in writing that shall be made and signed by any person, &c., whereby such person, &c., shall promise to pay to any other person, his, her, or their order, or unto bearer, any sum of money mentioned in such note, shall be taken and construed to be, by virtue thereof, due and payable to any such person, &c., to whom the same is made payable; and also every such note payable to any person, &c., his, her, or their order, shall be assignable or indorsable over, in the same manner as inland bills of exchange are or may be, according to the custom of merchants; and that the persons, &c., to whom such sum of money is or shall be by such note made payable, shall and may maintain an action for the same, in such manner as he, she, or they, might do upon any inland bill of exchange, made or drawn according to the custom of merchants, against the person, &c., who signed the same; and that any person, &c., to whom such note that is made payable to any person, &c., his, her, or their order, is indorsed or assigned, or the money therein mentioned ordered to be paid by indorsement thereon, shall and may maintain his, her, or their action, for such sum of money, either against the person, &c., who signed the note, or against any of the persons that indorsed the same, in like manner as in cases of inland bills of exchange."

the criteria and conditions of negotiability. It is not, therefore, at this time a question of much practical consequence whether at common law promissory notes were negotiable or not; though occasionally the point is presented in States where the statute law on the subject fixes other criteria of negotiability than those established by the statute of Anne. By some authorities it is contended that the statute of Anne was only declaratory of their then existing status,¹ while by others the result of Lord Holt's reasoning is concurred in.² Professor Parsons concludes that "these notes were at the time the statute was made, negotiable by the law merchant of England, which was and is as much a part of the law of England as—to use the strong language of Christian—the laws relating to marriage or murder."³

SECTION II.

FOREIGN AND INLAND BILLS.

§ 6. *Bills of exchange are either foreign or inland,—* foreign when drawn in one state or country, and made payable in another state or country; inland when drawn, and made payable, in the same state or country. Inland bills are of later origin than foreign bills, not having been in use in England at a much earlier period than the reign of Charles II.⁴ The advantages derived from employing foreign bills for remittance of money induced merchants universally to adopt them, and originally deriving their sanction from the custom of merchants, they were subsequently recognized and approved by the judicial tribunals, and the engagements of the various parties to them enforced.⁵ Inland bills, like

¹ *Irvin v. Maury*, 1 Mo. 194; *Dunn v. Adams*, 1 Ala 527; *Edwards on Bills*, 51, 52; 1 *Parsons N. & B.* 10–13.

² *Caton v. Lenox*, 5 Rand. 31; *Davis v. Miller*, 14 Grat. 18; *Norton v. Rose*, 2 Wash. (Va.) 233.

³ 1 *Parsons N. & B.* 13.

⁴ *Chitty on Bills* [*11], 16.

⁵ *Chitty on Bills* [*11], 16; *Martin v. Boure*, Cro. Jac. 6 (1602); *Oaste v. Taylor*, Cro. Jac. 306 (1613); *Hussey v. Jacob*, Lord Raymond, 87 (1696); *Chitty*, Jr. 157, 158, 189.

them, were at first more restricted in their operation than at present, for it was deemed essential to their validity, that a special custom for the drawing and accepting them should exist between the towns in which the drawer and acceptor lived; or if they lived in the same town, that such a custom should exist therein.¹ At first, also, effect was only given to the custom when the parties were merchants, though afterwards extended, as in the case of foreign bills, to all persons whether traders or not.²

§ 7. The chief difference between foreign and inland bills is this: that the former must be protested in order to charge the drawer, while the latter need not be.³ But there are other differences important to be observed. Every contract, as to its validity, nature, interpretation and effect, is governed by the laws of the place where it is made, unless it is to be performed in another place, in which case it is governed by its laws; and as the drawer, acceptor, and each indorser is a several and distinct contracting party, his liabilities are to be ascertained by the law of the place where his engagement is to be performed. This subject, and also the interesting questions which arise when a bill or note is signed or dated in one place and delivered in another, will be discussed elsewhere.⁴

§ 8. In England, whence comes the distinction between foreign and inland bills, a bill drawn in Ireland and payable in England is deemed a foreign bill.⁵ And where a bill was drawn in London upon a merchant in Brussels, payable to the drawer's order in London, it was held an inland bill, Bolland, B., saying: "An inland bill is a bill drawn in and payable in Great Britain, which this bill is."⁶

¹ Buller v. Crips, 6 Mod. 29 (1704); Pinkney v. Hall, Lord Raymond, 175; Chitty on Bills [*11, 12], 16; Chitty, Jr. 222.

² Bromwich v. Lloyd, 2 Lutw. 585; Sarsfield v. Witherly, Carth. 82; Chitty on Bills [*11, 12], 16.

³ See Vol. II, chapter XVIII, on Protest.

⁴ See chapter XXVII, on the Conflict of Laws, § 868 *et seq.*

⁵ Mahoney v. Ashlin, 2 B. & Ad. 478.

⁶ Amner v. Clark, 2 Cromp. M. & R. 468.

§ 9. *States foreign as to each other.*—There is no doubt that the several States of the United States are foreign as to each other; for though in the aggregate they form a confederated government, yet the several States retain (theoretically) their individual sovereignties, and, with respect to their municipal regulations, are foreign to each other.¹ Thus, if a drawer and drawee reside in Kentucky, and the bill be payable in New Orleans, Louisiana, it is a foreign bill;² though if it be drawn in Kentucky on a New Orleans merchant, and be payable in Kentucky, it would be inland.³

§ 10. In the Federal courts of the United States, the decisions are sometimes in conformity with those of the State courts of last resort in respect to the liabilities of parties to bills and notes, but not uniformly. The 34th section of the judiciary act of 1789 provides that “the laws of the several States, except where the Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law, in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply.” But this section has been held to be limited in its application to the laws of the several States of a strictly local character, that is to say, to the positive statutes of the States, and their interpretation by the local tribunals, and the rights and titles to things having a permanent locality, such as real estate, and not to extend to questions of general commercial law. Therefore, where any controversy arises as to the liability of a party to a bill of exchange, promissory note, or other negotiable paper, in one of the Federal courts of the United States, which is not determined by the positive words of a State

¹ *Warder v. Arell*, 2 Wash. (Va.) 298; *Brown v. Ferguson*, 4 Leigh, 37; *Buckner v. Finley*, 2 Peters, 586; *Lonsdale v. Brown*, 4 Wash. C. C. 86, 153; *Chenoweth v. Chamberlin*, 6 B. Monroe, 60; *Duncan v. Course*, 3 Const. R. (So. Car.) 100; *State Bank v. Hayes*, 3 Ind. 400; *Warren v. Coombs*, 20 Me. 139; *Ticonic Bank v. Stackpole*, 41 Me. 302; *Phoenix Bank v. Hussey*, 12 Pick. 483; *Carter v. Union Bank*, 7 Humph. 548; *Carter v. Burley*, 9 N. H. 558; *Wells v. Whitehead*, 15 Wend. 527; *Todd v. Neal's Adm.* 49 Ala. 266; *Donegan v. Wood*, 49 Ala. 242; *contra*, *Miller v. Hackley*, 5 Johns. 375, *Vanness, J.*

² *Buckner v. Finley*, 2 Peters, 586. ³ *Amner v. Clark*, 2 Crompt. M. & R. 468.

statute, or by its meaning as construed by the State courts, the Federal courts will apply to its solution the general principles of the law merchant, regardless of any local decision.¹

§ 11. Whether or not a bill is foreign or inland, and by what laws the liabilities of parties to bills and notes are to be governed, may often be not sufficiently disclosed by the date of place on the instrument itself, as the courts of the several States, as of different countries, upon settled principles, do not take judicial notice of the divisions of foreign States into counties, towns and cities. Thus, in England, the averment that a bill was drawn in Dublin was not considered equivalent to averring that it was an Irish bill. Abbott, C. J., said: "The framer of the declaration has not said that Dublin is in Ireland, and we cannot assume it, whatever may be our belief on the subject;" and Bailey, J., said: "There may be a Dublin in America or Scotland."² So the Supreme Court of Texas have held that they could not judicially know that a note payable in New Orleans was payable in Louisiana,³ or a bill dated there was drawn in Louisiana;⁴ or that a note dated "Philadelphia" was made in Pennsylvania.⁵ So

¹ Swift v. Tyson, 16 Peters, 1, Story, J., saying: "We have not now the slightest difficulty in holding that this section, upon its true intendments and construction, is strictly limited to local statutes and local usages of the character before stated, and does not extend to contracts and other instruments of a commercial nature, the true interpretation and effect whereof are to be sought, not in the decisions of the local tribunals, but in the general principles and doctrines of commercial jurisprudence. Undoubtedly, the decisions of the local tribunals upon such subjects are entitled to and will receive the most deliberate attention and respect of this court; but they cannot furnish positive rules, or conclusive authority, by which our own judgments are to be bound up and governed. The law respecting negotiable instruments may be truly declared, in the language of Cicero, adopted by Lord Mansfield in *Luke v. Lyde*, 2 Burr. R. 882, 887, to be in a great measure, not the law of a single country only, but of the commercial world: "*Non erit alia lex Romæ, alia Athenis, alia nunc, alia posthac, sed et apud omnes gentes, et omni tempore, una eademque lex obtinebit.*" *Mercer County v. Hackett*, 1 Wall. 96; *Township of Pine Grove v. Talcott*, 19 Wall. 667. See on this subject article in *American Law Review* for April, 1875, and *Gelpeke v. Du-buque*, 1 Wall. 175.

² *Kearney v. King*, 18 E. C. L. R. 28.

³ *Andrews v. Hoxie*, 5 Texas, 171.

⁴ *Yale v. Wood*, 30 Texas, 17.

⁵ *Cook v. Crawford*, 4 Texas, 427.

in Missouri, as to New Orleans, the court would not take judicial notice that a bill dated there was foreign.¹

§ 12. It may be difficult sometimes to determine whether a bill is inland or foreign. Thus, suppose a Boston merchant, temporarily in the city of New York, were to draw his bill on a New York merchant, payable in New York, but were to date it in Boston, would it be an inland or a foreign bill? In relation to innocent third parties, who have taken the bill in the belief that it was what its face imported, it would undoubtedly be held foreign.² "As between the original parties and others having notice of the circumstances under which the bill was drawn, the question would be more doubtful; but we think it would, even then, be held to be a foreign bill, especially if it appeared that it was drawn in that form for no wrongful purpose, but only that the bill might conform to the drawer's usual course of business, and be what it would have been had he not happened to be at the time in New York. The converse of this has been decided."³ Such is the language of Professor Parsons on this question, which we adopt as a succinct and judicious view of the law.⁴

§ 13. If a bill be upon its face an inland bill, the fact that it was actually drawn and delivered in a foreign State will not divest it of its inland character. Thus, where a bill was drawn in Wisconsin, but dated East Fork, in Illinois, it was held in the latter State that it must be treated and considered as an inland bill. "Such was the intention and agreement of the parties, as shown on the face of the instrument. That it was competent for the parties, both being citizens of Illinois, to provide for their express agreement that it should be subject to and construed by the laws of this State, is too well established by authority to admit of doubt."⁵

¹ *Riggin v. Collier*, 6 Mo. 568.

² See chapter xxvii on the Conflict of Laws and *Snaith v. Mingay*, 1 Maule & S. 87; *Lennig v. Ralston*, 23 Penn. St. 137.

³ *Strawbridge v. Robinson*, 5 Gilman, 470.

⁴ 1 Parsons N. & B. 57.

⁵ *Strawbridge v. Robinson*, 5 Gilman, 472, Caton, J.

§ 14. The presumption is that a bill purporting to be drawn abroad was really so drawn. But evidence would be admissible to show that a bill purporting to have been drawn abroad was, in fact, drawn within the country where suit is brought, and is therefore void for want of a stamp required by the internal revenue laws of such country.¹ But it has been recently held, in Massachusetts, that the maker or indorser of a note cannot, as against the indorser in that State for value, before maturity and without notice, show that the note which was dated in Boston, with intent that it should be a Massachusetts contract, was actually made in New York, and, on account of illegal interest, was void under the usury laws of the latter State.²

SECTION III.

THE EFFECT OF A BILL OF EXCHANGE. WHETHER OR NOT IT IS AN ASSIGNMENT.

§ 15. As we have already seen heretofore, it was the policy of the common law to interdict the assignment of possibilities, rights, titles and things in action, on the ground, as stated by Lord Coke, that "it would be the occasion of multiplying of contentions and suits, of great oppression of the people, and chiefly of terre-tenants, and the subversion of the due and equal execution of justice."³ Bills of exchange and promissory notes have long been recognized exceptions to this rule; and, by courts of equity, it has long been discredited, and assignments of a mere naked possibility or chose in action for valuable consideration have been held valid and effectuated by them.⁴ And courts of law, following in the footsteps of equity, now recognize and enforce such assign-

¹ *Abraham v. Dubois*, 4 Camp. 269; *Bire v. Moreau*, 2 C. & P. 376 (12 E. C. L. R.); *Jordaine v. Lashbrooke*, 7 T. R. 601; *Steadman v. Duhamel*, 1 C. B. 888. See *post*, § 869 *et seq.*

² *Towne v. Rice*, 122 Mass. 67.

³ Coke's R. Part X, 48a.

⁴ Lead. Cases in Equity [*652] 307; Chitty on Bills [*7, 8], 9, 10.

ments in suits brought in the name of the assignor for the benefit of the assignee, it being necessary for the assignee to assert his rights at law in that form, as the want of privity of contract between himself and the debtor is considered to stand in the way of a suit in his own name,¹ except where expressly allowed by statute.

§ 16. The drawing and transferring of bills of exchange depend upon principles of the law merchant, which apply peculiarly to negotiable instruments. But the effect of the drawing of a bill of exchange, upon the rights and interests of the parties in the fund which is in the hands of the drawee, depends very frequently upon principles derived from the doctrines of courts of equity in respect to equitable assignments. And we shall now consider the effect of a bill or order upon the fund on which it is drawn. This inquiry naturally divides itself into several branches: First. What is the effect of a bill of exchange (a negotiable bill in its commercial sense) drawn for the whole amount of a fund in the drawee's hands? Second. What is the effect of a non-negotiable order for the whole of a fund? Third. What is the effect of a bill of exchange for part of a fund? And fourth. What is the effect of a non-negotiable order for part of a fund?

§ 17. *In the first place, as to the effect of a negotiable bill for the whole of a fund in the drawee's hands.*—The authorities on this question present great contrariety of opinion. By some, it is declared to operate as an equitable assignment of the fund. By others, that the drawing of the bill is an independent transaction, totally disassociated in its legal effect from the funds in the drawee's hands, and does not operate as an assignment of them, but simply as an engagement of the drawer that the drawee shall pay the payee a certain amount. And great confusion has arisen in the adjudicated cases from a failure to discriminate between the par-

¹ Wheatley v. Strobe, 12 Cal. 98; Mandeville v. Welch, 5 Wheat. 227; Chitty on Bills [*9], 10.

ties who may claim that, as to them, it operates as an assignment, and those who can make no such claim.

In an early English case it is said: "The theory of a bill of exchange is that the bill is an assignment to the payee of a debt due from the acceptor to the drawer;"¹ and it is undoubtedly true that the payee has a right to suppose that the drawee has funds of the drawer, upon the faith of which understanding he receives the bill directing them to be paid to him. As between the drawer and payee, then, we think it is clear that the bill is intended to operate, and does operate, as an assignment of the fund in the drawee's hands sufficient to meet it;² and if there be no such funds, and no understanding that the bill will be honored, the drawer commits a fraud upon the payee, and will be absolutely bound upon the bill, without notice of dishonor. And if, after drawing the bill, the drawer should withdraw the funds in the drawee's hands, it would be likewise a fraud upon the payee, and the drawer would be absolutely bound without notice.³

§ 18. As between the payee and the drawee, however, there is no privity of contract, unless the drawee accepts to pay the bill. When he does this, he becomes absolutely bound to pay the debt to the holder of the bill. And any subsequent bill drawn upon him, or transfer or assignment of the fund in his hands, or legal process served upon him by a creditor of the drawer, could create no liability upon him to pay or deliver over the funds of the drawer to any one but

¹ *Gibson v. Minet*, 1 H. Bl. 569; *Story on Bills*, § 18; *Chitty* [*1], 2.

² *Story on Bills*, §§ 13, 18; *Chitty on Bills* [*1], 2.

³ In *Gibson v. Cooke*, 20 Pick. 15, *Dewey, J.*, said: "It seems to be equally well settled that a draft by the creditor on his debtor in the form of a bill of exchange to the amount of the debt, or the whole funds in his hands, is a good and valid assignment of the debt or fund."

In *Robins v. Bacon*, 3 Greenleaf, 349, *Mellen, C. J.*, said: A case which seems directly in point is that of *Mandeville v. Welch*, 5 Wheat. 277. In that case it was decided, as stated by *Story, J.*, in delivering the opinion of the court, that, "where an order is drawn for a particular fund, it amounts to an equitable assignment of the fund; and, after notice to the drawee, it binds the fund in his hands." In these cases the bills were not negotiable; but no distinction in respect to them was taken.

the holder, to whom he has entered into an obligation to pay them.¹

§ 19. When, however, the drawee has not accepted, or assented to pay the amount to the holder, the rights of the parties are more difficult to determine. The holder cannot sue the drawee at law in his own name, for there is no contract on the part of the drawee to pay him.² But we should say that he might sue the drawee in the name of the creditor for the amount of the debt, and offer the bill in evidence to show that it had been assigned to him;³ and although the

¹ *Lambert v. Jones*, 2 Patton & Heath, 144; *Mandeville v. Welch*, 5 Wheat. 277. In *Buckner v. Sayre*, 17 B. Monroe, 754, it appeared that the Lexington Insurance Co. drew a bill on the 5th of August, 1851, on its agent, J. H. Wheeler, at New Orleans, payable at six months, for \$7,182. In November following the company made a general assignment to Buckner, as trustee, to pay its debts; and afterwards, Wheeler, who had accepted the bill, paid over \$3,000, which he had collected from premiums, to Buckner, the trustee. Simpson, J., said: "Sayre, as the holder of the bill of exchange, was entitled to the fund in the hands of the acceptor, which the latter, by his acceptance, had appropriated for his use and benefit." *Harris v. Clark*, 3 Comstock, 117, *Ruggles, J.*; 2 *Parsons N. & B.* 330, 331; *Story on Bills*, § 13.

² *Tiennan v. Jackson*, 5 Peters, 580; *Harris v. Clark*, 3 Comst. 117, *Ruggles, J.*: "It is clearly settled that no action at law will lie in favor of the holder of a bill of exchange against the drawee, unless he accepts the bill." See *post*, § 50, and note. *New York & Va. State Bank v. Gilson*, 5 Duer, 574, *Duer, J.*: "There is no such privity between him (the drawee) and the holder as can entitle the latter to maintain an action against him." *Yates v. Bell*, 3 B. & Ald. 643; *Williams v. Everett*, 14 East, 582. Holder has no action against drawee to whom funds are remitted for money had and received.

³ *Corser v. Craig*, 1 Wash. C. C. 426. In this case suit was brought by the payee and indorser, for the benefit of his indorsee, against the drawee. Action was sustained. This is going farther than any other adjudicated case we know of. Had action been brought in the name of the drawer for the last indorsee's benefit, it would have been unobjectionable, as we think, and the following language of Washington, J., would have been applicable. He said: If the drawee refuse to accept, and pay the bill, the right of the holder to the debt once assigned to him is not thereby impaired; although he may not be entitled to recover the same in his own name, for the want of a promise to pay. But he may sue the drawer, or the drawee in the name of the drawer, for the debt originally due, in consequence of the implied contract of the assignor of a chose in action, that the debtor shall pay, and, on failure, that the assignor will. The bill being retained after protest, by the assignee, is evidence that the amount has not been paid by the drawer or any of the indorsers. I see no possible mischief which can result from this doctrine. For, if after payment refused, and protest

drawee would be protected if he parted with the funds before notice of the bill, yet if it were payable on demand, and after its presentment for payment, he should pay the amount to another, under a subsequent order, he would be still bound to pay it over to the holder of the first bill. And after presentment to the drawee, a subsequent assignment in trust for creditors, or attachment or garnishment process served upon the drawee, would not defeat the equitable claim of the holder to have the funds appropriated to pay the bill.¹

§ 20. This doctrine is controverted by some of the authorities.² And even when the bill has been accepted, it has been declared not to operate as an assignment of the funds

made, the drawee should pay over the funds in his hands to the drawer, or to his order, without notice from the first assignee, that he should retain the bill, and look to him for the amount, so far as he was bound to pay; this would be a good defense against a suit brought in the name of the drawer."

¹ *Wheatley v. Strobe*, 12 Cal. 97. Held that after the presentment of the bill funds could not be reached by attachment at suit of drawer's creditors. Field, J.: "The want of a written acceptance does not affect the right of Howell (the holder) to the money due, but only the mode of enforcing it. With the acceptance he could have sustained the action upon the order; without it he must recover upon the original demand by force of the assignment. Under the old common law practice, the action could only be sustained in the name of the assignor for the benefit of the assignee, but under our system it may be brought in the name of the assignee as the party beneficially interested. Courts of law, equally with courts of equity, gave effect to assignments like the one under consideration, by controlling the proceeds of the judgments recovered for the benefit of the assignee." *Roberts v. Austin*, 26 Iowa, 315; see Vol. II, chapter XLVII, on Checks, § 1635 *et seq.*

² See *Bank of Commerce v. Bogy*, 44 Mo. 15. In this case the bill was drawn for the whole debt due the drawer by the drawee. The payee sued the drawee, and it was held that the bill did not operate *per se* as an assignment, though connected with circumstances it might be evidence of an assignment. The pleadings did not aver an assignment, and were defective in that respect. *Harrison v. Williamson*, 2 Edw. Ch. 438. In *Shand v. De Buisson*, Law. R. 18 Equity Cases, 283 (1874), where the bill was for the exact amount of the funds in the drawee's hands, Sir James Bacon, V. C., said: "It is entirely new to me to hear that a bill of exchange in an ordinary mercantile transaction in the shape in which this appears, can amount to an equitable assignment of the debt. The note might have been indorsed to any individual, or to any number of people, who might have indorsed it in succession. A mercantile instrument it is in its original, and in that shape it remains; and has no other validity or effect, and to call it an assignment of a debt, would be to call it not by its right name."

or property in the drawee's hands.¹ But in both cases, we think that the doctrine of the text is enjoined by principles of good faith and fair dealing. The payee of a bill unaccepted, it is true, has no written obligation but that of the drawer to look to. But in its very nature it imports that the drawee holds the drawer's funds, which he will appropriate to its payment. It is in anticipation and upon the faith of those funds that the payee is, or may be, induced to take it. And it seems just and right that courts of equity, and courts of law, in so far as their rules of procedure will permit, should carry out and enforce the expectation and intention of the parties. It is not sufficient to answer that the drawer's contract is absolute and independent of the fact whether or not he has funds or property in the drawee's hands. It is true, that he is personally bound, whether such be the case or not; but because he is personally bound is no

¹ *Marine and Fire Insurance Bank v. Jauncey*, 3 Sandf. 258. John Wood, having one hundred and five bales of cotton, which he intended to consign to Joseph Wood, drew a bill on him in favor of Walsh at sixty days' sight, for \$3,000, which was discounted by plaintiffs, and the proceeds applied by John Wood to pay for the cotton above mentioned, which he had bought. The bill was dated June 29th, 1846, and accepted by the drawee on July 6th, 1846. The cotton was shipped to the drawee. On the 30th of June Joseph Wood became insolvent, and executed an assignment of all his estate, including a debt due him by John Wood, the drawer, of \$2,200. The cotton was also placed in Jauncey's hands, and its net proceeds were \$2,700, which the plaintiffs sought to reach by their bill in equity. The court said in respect to the bill of exchange, that though accepted, it was not an equitable assignment; and that the drawee, on receiving the funds derived from the cotton, "had a right to apply them to the payment of his general balance, or in any other way that John Wood and he might agree upon." The case was, as we think, rightly decided; but we do not see that the broad doctrine declared was necessary to such decision. There was a superior equity in the drawee, which had priority over the equitable assignment. It does not follow that there was not an equitable assignment (subject to superior equitable rights), or rather an equitable right to follow the proceeds of the cotton.

Cowperthwaite v. Sheffield, 1 Sandf. 416; *Winter v. Drury*, 3 Sandf. 263, note; *Cowperthwaite v. Sheffield*, 3 Comst. 243. Hurlbut, J.: "A proper bill of exchange does not of itself operate as an assignment to the payee of funds of the drawer in the hands of the drawee, and even after an unconditional acceptance, it cannot in strictness be held to have that effect, since the drawee becomes bound by reason of the contract of acceptance, irrespective of the funds in his hands." See *post*, § 50, and note.

reason why the fund upon which the bill obtained additional credit, expressly or impliedly, should not be bound also, as an equitable security for the debt.¹

§ 21. *In the second place, as to an order for the whole of a fund.*—It may be regarded as a settled doctrine, that an order founded upon a good consideration, given for a specific debt or fund owing by or in the hands of a third person, operates as, or rather is evidence of, an equitable assignment of the demand to the holder.² It is clearly an assignment, as between the drawer and the payee, because so intended.³ It is equally so as between them and the drawee, as soon as it is presented to him and he assents;⁴ and whether he assents or not, the holder may in equity recover the debt or fund from him.⁵ And if the debtor be served with garnishment or other process of law after the order has been given, and before he has been compelled to pay the amount to another, the order will take precedence.⁶ An order for a specific

¹ If the circumstances show an intention to assign the fund, the assignment should be enforced. "The intention to assign operates as an equitable assignment." *Kahnweiler v. Anderson*, 78 N. C. 137.

² *Mandeville v. Welch*, 5 Wheat. 277; *Robins v. Bacon*, 3 Greenleaf, 346; *Cowperthwaite v. Sheffield*, 3 Comst. 243; *McMenomy v. Ferrers*, 3 Johns. 72; *Bank of Commerce v. Bogy*, 44 Mo. 18; *Anderson v. De Soer*, 6 Gratt. 364; *Cutts v. Perkins*, 12 Mass. 209; *Morton v. Naylor*, 1 Hill, 583; *Gibson v. Cooke*, 20 Pick. 15; *Parker v. City of Syracuse*, 31 N. Y. 379; *Harris v. Clark*, 3 Comstock, 117.

³ *Morton v. Naylor*, 1 Hill (N. Y.) 583. A landlord gave an order directing his tenant to pay W. the rents accruing during a specified period, which, on its presentment, he said he would do. The landlord subsequently directed the tenant not to pay, but the latter disregarded the notice, and paid the order. It was held that the tenant did right, the order operating as an equitable assignment. Cowen, J., said: "I refer to cases in chancery to show that an order for value is *per se* an equitable assignment to the payee of the debt due from the drawee to the drawer. Our own rules at law as to enforcing such an assignment are well known. We give it the same effect as would a court of chancery."

⁴ *Legro v. Staples*, 16 Maine, 252; *Johnson v. Thayer*, 17 Maine, 403; *Desse v. Napier*, 1 McCord, 106; *Peyton v. Hallet*, 1 Caines, 363. See Story's Eq. Juris. § 1043.

⁵ Story's Eq. Juris. § 1044; *Kahnweiler v. Anderson*, 78 N. C. 136.

⁶ *Anderson v. De Soer*, 6 Gratt. 364. In this case it appeared that a draft for \$10,000, drawn by Grivegne, a legatee, dated Malaga, 20th July, 1819, upon

fund usually contains words indicating an intention to pass or appropriate the whole fund, as, "Pay to A. B., \$——, the amount of your collection from C. D.," or the amount received from such a transaction;¹ which words, unless parenthetically inserted as a mere earmark, characterize the instrument as an unnegotiable order, and deprive it of its qualities as a commercial instrument.

§ 22. *In the third place and fourth place, as to a bill of exchange or an order for part of a fund.*—The doctrine is laid down with emphasis by many authorities that an order, or a bill drawn for part of a fund, does not operate as an assignment of that part, or give a lien as against the drawee, unless he consent to the appropriation by an acceptance of the draft.² And Mr. Justice Story, delivering the opinion of the United States Supreme Court, has said: "The reason of this

the executors of his uncle, at Richmond, Va., who had left him a legacy of \$10,000, directing that when forthcoming, and out of the funds destined for that object by his deceased uncle, they should pay that amount to the order of Messrs. Scholtz & Brothers, for value received of them, noting the same as amount of legacy left him by his uncle, was held to be an assignment of the legacy, and as such to have precedence over an attachment thereupon served four days after the drawing of the draft, and before it was presented.

¹ Bank of Commerce v. Bogy, 44 Mo. 18.

² Harris v. Clark, 3 N. Y. (3 Comstock), 115, 116. Ruggles, J., in speaking of Justice Story's opinion in *Mandeville v. Welch*, 5 Wheat. 286, to the effect that a bill of exchange is "in theory an assignment to the payee of a debt due from the drawer to the drawee," says: "This is undoubtedly true *when the bill has been accepted*, whether it be drawn on general funds, or a specific fund, and whether the bill be in its own nature negotiable or not; for in such case the acceptor, by his assent, binds and appropriates the funds for the use of the payee. But where an order is drawn on a general, or on a particular fund for a part only, it does not amount to an assignment of that part, or give a lien on the drawee unless he consent to an appropriation by an acceptance of the draft." See *Weinstock v. Bellwood*, 12 Bush (Ky.) 139; *Mandeville v. Welch*, 5 Wheat. 277; *Robins v. Bacon*, 3 Greenleaf, 346; *Gibson v. Finley*, 4 Maryland Ch. 75; *Hopkins v. Beebee*, 2 Casey, 85; *Gibson v. Cooke*, 20 Pick. 15; *Poydras v. Delamere*, 13 La. 98 (O. S. 1838), action against drawee; *Cowperthwaite v. Sheffield*, 1 Sandf. 416, *Vanderpoel, J.*: "Where an order is drawn for part of the fund only, it does not amount to an assignment of that part, or give a lien as against the drawee, unless he consent to an appropriation by an acceptance of the draft." And if the drawee pays a part of the order, it does not operate as an assignment as to the residue. *Noe v. Christie*, 51 N. Y. 273.

principle is plain. A creditor shall not be permitted to split up a single cause of action into many actions, without the consent of his debtor, since it may subject him to many embarrassments and responsibilities not contemplated in his original contract. He has a right to stand upon the singleness of his original contract, and to decline any legal or equitable assignments by which it may be broken into fragments. When he undertakes to pay an integral sum to his creditor, it is no part of his contract that he shall be obliged to pay in fragments to any other persons. So that, if the plaintiff could show a partial assignment to the extent of the bills, it would not avail him in support of the present suit."¹

§ 23. This doctrine is clearly correct in so far as it applies to legal assignments. The holder of the bill or order cannot sue the drawee at law in his own name, as he would thus divide the cause of action, and leave a balance due the creditor.² He cannot sue in the creditor's name, except by his consent, as, at best, he is only entitled to a part of the debt due him. But it has been held in numerous cases that a non-negotiable order for part of a fund operates as an equitable assignment *pro tanto*.³ Clearly this is the case when it has

¹ *Mandeville v. Welch*, 5 Wheat. 286.

² *Weinstock v. Bellwood*, 12 Bush (Ky.) 139.

³ *Yeates v. Groves*, 1 Vesey, Jr. 281. Dawson being indebted to Yeates and Brown, upon a note, gave him an order on Groves and Dickinson for the amount of the note, which they surrendered, payable out of an amount due for leasehold property. Before the money was paid, Dawson was thrown into bankruptcy, and Yeates and Brown claimed the fund *pro tanto*, and filed their bill to reach it. Lord Thurlow said: "This is nothing but a direction by a man to pay part of his money to another for a foregone valuable consideration. If he could transfer, he has done it; and it being his own money, he could transfer. The transfer was actually made. They were in the right not to accept, as it was not a bill of exchange. It is not an inchoate business. The order fixed the money the moment it was shown to Groves and Dickinson." See *Bradley v. Root*, 5 Paige Ch. 641, where above case is quoted. *Lett v. Morris*, 4 Simons, 607. In this case, A. having engaged to pay to B. £2,360 by installments, B. signed and gave to C., for value, an order authorizing A. to pay parts of each installment to C., and £460 was to be reserved in A.'s hands out of the balance, and C.'s receipt was to be a discharge to A. A. was served with notice of the order on the day it was signed; but there was no act or expression of consent. Vice-Chancellor Shad-

been accepted or assented to by the drawee.¹ And when it has not been accepted, our own view is this: that a non-negotiable order for part of a fund does operate as an equitable assignment *pro tanto* as between the drawer and payee, because obviously so intended. But as between drawer and payee on the one side, and the drawee on the other, it creates no obligation on the latter to pay it, as he has a right to insist on an integral discharge of his debt. And if the creditor give a subsequent order for the whole amount, he may pay it with impunity, as he thus discharges his whole debt in its entirety at once.² But if the payee goes into equity, or the parties are brought therein by any proceeding, so that all of them are before the court, the holder of the order may enforce it as an equitable assignment as against all subsequent claimants, whether by assignment from the drawer, or by legal process served upon the drawee.³

Mr. Justice Story has stated the principle, as we conceive it, more correctly in his treatise on Equity Jurisprudence than in the cases hitherto cited; and he there declares that, while a draft for part of a fund operates no assignment at law, the same principle applies in equity to a draft for part of a fund that applies to a draft for the whole, and that "in each case a trust would be created in favor of the equitable assignee of the fund, and would constitute an equitable lien upon it."⁴ It is necessary, in order to support the assignment, that it should be upon a valuable consideration.⁵

well said: "I entertain no doubt that the order amounts to an equitable assignment." *Row v. Dawson*, 1 Vesey, 331; *Ex parte South*, 3 Swanston, 391. Order for £417 6s. "as part of the amount due to me for plumber's work, &c." Held, subsequent bankruptcy of drawer did not defeat it, it having been shown to the debtor. *Pope v. Huth*, 14 Cal. 407.

¹ *Desesse v. Napier*, 1 McCord, 107; *Vreeland v. Blunt*, 6 Barb. 182; *Peyton v. Hallet*, 1 Caines, 363; *Pope v. Huth*, 14 Cal. 407; *Cutts v. Perkins*, 12 Mass. 206; *Israel v. Douglas*, 1 H. Bl. 239; *Clark v. Adair*, cited by Buller, J., in *Masters v. Miller*, 4 T. R. 343; *Tatlock v. Harris*, 3 T. R. 180, may sue acceptor for money had and received; *Ex parte Alderson*, 1 Madd. 53.

² 3 Leading Cases in Equity (3 Am. ed.) 356; *Poydras v. Delamere*, 13 La. 98 (O. S. 1838).

³ 3 Leading Cases in Equity, 356; *Field v. Mayor of New York*, 2 Seld. 179 (1852).

⁴ Story's Eq. Juris. § 1044.

⁵ *Alger v. Scott*, 54 N. Y. 14.

SECTION IV.

DONATIO MORTIS CAUSA.

§ 24. A gift made in contemplation of death is termed *donatio mortis causa*, an expression derived, with the law on the subject, from the civil law. As to the character of the article which may be the subject of such a quasi-testamentary disposition, the common law has undergone considerable change. Originally, it was limited to chattels which might be delivered by the hand; and the rule was relaxed slowly and somewhat reluctantly by the courts, under the apprehension that fraud upon persons in dying condition might be encouraged by its extension. Bank notes were next embraced, with lottery tickets, and securities transferable by delivery, such as notes payable to bearer¹ or to order, and indorsed in blank, while notes not so payable were excluded.² Subsequently, it was extended to bonds;³ and the later cases hold that a note not negotiable, or if negotiable not indorsed but delivered, passes by such a donation, with a right to use the name of the personal representative of the promisee, to collect it for the donee's own use, the equitable title passing to him.⁴ In farther extension of the principle, it has been held that, even if the donor indorse a bill or note of a third

¹ *Miller v. Miller*, 3 P. Wms. 356, in which case it was held that bank notes passed, but a note payable to the donor's order did not. *Chitty on Bills* (13 Am. ed.) 3.

² See *Chase v. Redding*, 13 Gray, 420.

³ *Snellgrave v. Bailey*, 3 Atk. 214; *Ward v. Turner*, 2 Vesey, Sr. 431; *Duffield v. Elwes*, 1 Bligh, 409, in which case a bond with mortgage deeds delivered to the donee was held to create a trust in his favor.

⁴ *Chase v. Redding*, 13 Gray, 418, in which case it was held that a gift *mortis causa* of promissory notes, secured by mortgages, with assignments of the mortgages, was valid. *Grover v. Grover*, 24 Pick. 264; *Sessions v. Moseley*, 4 Cush. 87; *Turpin v. Thompson*, 2 Met. (Ky.) 420; *Jones v. Deyer*, 16 Ala. 221; *Borne-man v. Sidlinger*, 15 Me. 429; *Brown v. Brown*, 18 Conn. 410; *McConnell v. McConnell*, 11 Vt. 290; *Parker v. Marston*, 27 Me. 193; *Tillinghast v. Wheaton*, 8 R. I. 536; *Veal v. Veal*, 29 L. J. Ch. 321; s. c. 27 Beav. 303; *Rankin v. Weguelin*, 27 Beav. 309; *Stevens v. Stevens*, 9 N. Y. S. C. (2 Hun), 472; *Byles on Bills* (Sharswood's ed.) 295-6; *Thomson on Bills*, 20, 21; *Redfield on Wills*, 312, 313;

person as *donatio mortis causa*, the donation will be valid, although the estate of the indorser will not be bound upon his indorsement, as it is without consideration. And this seems to us at once a just extension and limitation of the principle.¹ This doctrine obtains in Scotland, where it has been decided in several cases;² and it has been carried even farther in England, where it has been held that bills delivered on death bed, but without consideration, were valid gifts, and authorized the donees, in the first place, to force the donor's executors to indorse the bills, and, in the next place, to recover from the acceptors, the indorsation being regarded as a mere technicality.³ The doctrine has been held in the United States to extend to a bank book containing entries of deposit; and it has been held that the delivery of such a book by a person *in extremis*, with intention to give it as *donatio mortis causa*, constituted a valid gift of the money deposited in the bank.⁴ In Louisiana, where, on the day before he died, plaintiff's testator delivered to defendant the check of another, payable to and indorsed by him in

contra, Bradley v. Hunt, 5 Gill & Johns. 54, in which case it is limited to bank notes and notes payable to bearer.

¹ Weston v. Hight, 17 Me. 287.

² Thomson on Bills, 20. In one case, where a person had indorsed a bill for 1,000 marks to his grandson, then under age, and put it thus indorsed, but without particular instructions, into the hands of his son and general disponent (distributee), the court, in an action for delivery brought by the grandson, decreed (decreed) in his favor. In a later case, where the holder of two promissory notes indorsed them on his death bed, and delivered them to a person, telling him to deliver one to a servant, as a reward for services, and the other to certain parties, as a mark for gratitude for past favors, the court sustained the right of the donees to sue the makers.

³ Veal v. Veal, 29 L. J. Ch. 321; 27 Beav. 303; Rankin v. Weguelin, 27 Beav. 309.

⁴ Hill v. Stevenson, 63 Me. 364; Camp's Appeal, 36 Conn. 88; 4 Am. Rep. 39; Tillingham v. Wheaton, 8 R. I. 536, Durfee, J., saying: "It is true we find no case which is the exact parallel of the case before us, but the principle declared in the cases to which we have referred is broad enough to include the case before us; and therefore whatever, as a matter of wise policy, we may think of the expediency of holding a savings book to be the subject of a gift *mortis causa*, we do not see how, as a matter of law, we can hold otherwise." But see *contra*, McConnell v. Murray, 3 Ir. L. J. 668.

blank, and it was not presented until after the donor's death, it was held a valid gift *causa mortis*.¹

Delivery in all such cases may be to the donee, or to some other person for the donee.² Where a party deposits a sum in bank in his own name as trustee for another, and recognizes it as his, the deposit is considered as a complete gift, irrevocable by the depositor; and if he withdraws it, his personal representative will be liable for the amount.³

§ 25. But the gift of the donor's own note as *donatio mortis causa* would not be valid, as his representatives might prove that it was without consideration; ⁴ and so the draft of the donor on a third person who holds his funds is not an assignment thereof until accepted, and is not a valid mortuary gift.⁵ The theory of the law is to throw the salutary checks which are found in the formal execution of wills around those who are associated with the donor in his dying condition; and to hold these dispositions valid would, in effect, dispense with the guards against fraud and imposition which

¹ *Burke v. Bishop*, 27 La. An. 465 (1875); 27 Am. R. 567.

² *Hill v. Stevenson*, 63 Me. 364; *Dole v. Lincoln*, 31 Me. 422; *Wells v. Tucker*, 3 Bin. 366.

³ *Minor v. Rogers*, 40 Conn. 512 (1873); *Millspaugh v. Putnam*, 16 Abbott's Pr. R. 380. See also *Champney v. Blanchard*, 39 N. Y. 111; *Grover v. Grover*, 24 Pick. 261.

⁴ *Parish v. Stone*, 14 Peck, 198; *Holley v. Adams*, 16 Vt. 206. In *Hamer v. Moore*, 6 Ohio St. 239, the note ran: "For value received I promise to pay to Mrs. Hamer, wife of John Hamer, the sum of \$300, as a small recompense for the kindness shown to me by her. The executors of my last will and testament are hereby directed to pay the above to Mrs. H. or her sons, Moses and John, after my decease." Signed and attested. It was held invalid as a gift *causa mortis*. In *Helfenstein's Estate*, 77 Penn. St. 328, H. made his note for the sum of \$4,000, payable one year after date, to Treasurer of Theological Seminary, and delivered it to the chairman of the seminary library committee; subjoined to it was a statement that it was a donation, the interest of which was to be applied to the purchase of books for the seminary. Shortly afterward the maker died. Held that the note, being without consideration, and not having been accepted by the trustees before the maker's death, was revoked thereby, and a subsequent acceptance of it was ineffective.

⁵ *Harris v. Clark*, 3 Comst. 93; *Craig v. Craig*, 3 Barb. Ch. R. 76, overruling *Wright v. Wright*, 1 Cowen, 598; *Billing v. Devaux*, 3 Man. & Gr. 565; see *Bayley on Bills*, 348, intimating the contrary.

are found in the rules which govern the authentication and probate of last testaments. "The very circumstance," as has been said, "which sometimes renders a will suspicious is the living principle in a *donatio mortis causa*."¹ But it would seem that the payee even of an undelivered bill could recover, in England, if it were attested in terms of the wills act.²

§ 26. The same reasons which prevent a note or bill of the donor from being the subject of a *donatio mortis causa*, apply with equal force to a check.³ If a check be given as an immediate gift, and is collected in the lifetime of the donor, the donee may retain the proceeds; but death operates as a revocation, if it be not collected, or has not passed into the hands of a *bona fide* holder.⁴ A check to the drawer's wife, on which he had written that it was to enable her to buy mourning, and as a temporary provision, was held, under the peculiar circumstances, a valid *donatio mortis causa*;⁵ but the delivery of a note by one brother going into military service, to another, with directions to give it to his mother should he not return, is not so considered.⁶

It is plain that a *donatio mortis causa* cannot prevail against the creditors of the donor when his assets are otherwise insufficient.⁷ Nor can it prevail against the donor's estate unless delivered.⁸

¹ Holley v. Adams, 16 Vt. 206.

² Gough v. Findon, 7 Exch. 48.

³ Tate v. Hilbert, 2 Vesey, Jr. 111; Burke v. Bishop, 27 La. An. 465 (1875).

⁴ Bouts v. Ellis, 17 Beav. 121; 4 De G. M. & G. 249; Hewit v. Kaye, L. R. 6 Eq. 198; Burke v. Bishop, 27 La. An. 465; 21 American R. 567.

⁵ Lawson v. Lawson, 1 P. Wms. 441.

⁶ Irish v. Nutting, 47 Barb. 370; Sheldon v. Button, 12 N. Y. S. C. (5 Hun), 110.

⁷ Chase v. Redding, 13 Gray, 418.

⁸ Ward v. Turner, 2 Ves. Sr. 431. See on this subject Southern Law Review for April, 1875, p. 145.

CHAPTER II.

DEFINITION AND ESSENTIAL REQUISITES OF BILLS AND NOTES.

§ 27. A bill of exchange is an open letter addressed by one person to a second, directing him, in effect, to pay absolutely and at all events, a certain sum of money therein named, to a third person or to any other to whom that third person may order it to be paid; or it may be payable to bearer or to the drawer himself.¹

¹ The definitions of bills and notes are given as follows by various writers:

Blackstone defines a bill of exchange to be "an open letter of request from one man to another, desiring him to pay a sum of money therein named to a third person on his account." 2 Black. Com. 466.

Bayley says: A bill of exchange is a written order or request, and a promissory note a written promise, for the payment of money absolutely and at all events." Bayley on Bills, 1.

Chitty follows Blackstone, and Chancellor Kent follows Bayley. Chitty on Bills, 1; 3 Kent's Com. 74.

Byles says: "A bill of exchange is an unconditional written order from A. to B., directing B. to pay C. a sum of money therein named." Byles (Sharswood's ed.) 1. And that "A promissory note, or as it is frequently called, a note of hand, is an absolute promise in writing, signed but not sealed, to pay a specified sum at a time therein limited, or on demand, or at sight, to a person therein named or designated, or to his order, or to the bearer." Byles (Sharswood's ed.) [*5.]

In Story on Bills, the definition of a bill given by Bayley is commended as concise, clear, and accurate. The learned author adds, however: "But here again its peculiar distinguishing quality in modern times, its negotiability, is omitted, which, although not by our law essential to the instrument; is still that which, practically speaking, among merchants, constitutes its true character. Mr. Kyd has accordingly given the more extended definition, stating it to be "an open letter of request, addressed by one person to a second, desiring him to pay a sum of money to a third, or to any other, to whom that third person shall order it to be paid; or it may be payable to bearer." See Kyd on Bills, p. 3, and Story on Bills, § 3.

In Story on Promissory Notes, it is said: "A promissory note may be defined to be a written engagement by one person to pay another person, therein named, absolutely and unconditionally, a certain sum of money at a time specified therein." Story on Notes, § 1.

Without adopting the precise language of any author, we have given herein definitions which seem to us more accurate than some others, and which, at least, cannot be misleading.

Abram, who draws the bill, is called the drawer; Benjamin, to whom it is directed, is called the drawee, and, upon accepting it, becomes the acceptor. Charles, to whom the bill is made payable, is called the payee.

If the bill be payable to "Charles *only*," it is not negotiable; but if payable to "Charles or order," he may, by indorsing it, direct that it be paid to David, and in that case Charles becomes the indorser, and David the indorsee.

§ 28. A promissory note or note of hand, as it is often called, is an open promise in writing by one person to pay another person therein named, or to his order, or to bearer, a specified sum of money absolutely and at all events. Abram, who makes the note, is called the maker; Benjamin, to whom the promise is made to pay, the payee; and if the note is transferred from Benjamin to Charles by indorsement, they are termed respectively indorser and indorsee. If the transfer from Benjamin to Charles be by delivery merely, they are termed respectively assignor and assignee.

The maker of a note is sometimes termed the drawer, and in accommodation indorsements the indorser frequently writes over his name: "Credit drawer." When the term "drawer" is so used, the maker is of course meant, though not accurately described.

"Holder" is a general word applied to any one in actual or constructive possession of the bill or note, and entitled at law to recover or receive its contents from the parties to it.

§ 29. In their original structure, a bill of exchange and promissory note do not strongly resemble each other. In a bill there are three original parties: drawer, drawee, and payee; in a note only two: maker and payee. In a bill the acceptor is the primary debtor. In a note the maker is the only debtor. But if the note be transferred to a third party by the payee, it becomes strikingly similar to a bill. The indorser becomes then, as it were, the drawer, the maker the acceptor, and the indorsee the payee. The reader, bearing

this similitude in mind, will easily be able to apply to notes the decisions hereinafter cited concerning bills, and *vice versa*.

§ 30. In order to fulfill the definition given, the paper must carry its full history upon its face, and embrace the following requisites: First. It must be open, that is, unsealed. Second. The engagement to pay must be certain. Third. The fact of payment must be certain. Fourth. The amount to be paid must be certain. Fifth. The medium of payment must be money. Sixth. The contract must be only for the payment of money; and Seventh. It is also essential to the operation of the instrument that it should be delivered.

SECTION I.

THE PAPER MUST BE OPEN, THAT IS, UNSEALED.

§ 31. The first requisite of a bill is, that it shall be an "open letter" of direction—and of a note that it shall be an open promise—for the payment of money. By the term "open" is meant "unsealed"; and though the instrument possess all the other requisites of a bill or note, its character as a commercial instrument is destroyed, and it becomes a covenant, governed by the rules affecting common law securities, if it be sealed.¹ Thus in Delaware, where a draft in the form of a bill was drawn by a corporation which attached its corporate seal, it was held not to be a bill of exchange, and to be incapable of indorsement as such by the law merchant.² It has been held, however, that the affixing of a

¹ Edwards on Bills, 208, 210; Chitty on Bills (13 Am. ed.) [*166], 190; Story on Bills, § 62; Story on Notes, § 55.

² Conine v. Junction & B. R. Co. 3 Houston, 289, Gilpin, C. J., saying: "Deeds or sealed instruments are not only of a much higher antiquity than bills of exchange, but they are of a totally different origin. They cannot be said to be made *secundum usum mercatorum*, since they find their recognition and validity in the more ancient rules of the common law. On the other hand, bills of exchange find their origin and sanction in the usage and custom of merchants, the

seal to a bill is a mere superfluity, and does not interfere with its validity or transferability;¹ but the doctrine of the text is supported by the highest authority.

§ 32. *Seals to notes.* In respect to promissory notes, the same rules prevail. If a seal be affixed to a paper in the ordinary form of a note, its character as such is destroyed; and it is thereby converted into the deed or bond of the maker, who is then termed the obligor, and the instrument is not subject to the peculiar doctrines that are applicable to mercantile securities.² And this rule applies to corporations as well as to individuals.³ It appears, indeed, that, anterior to the statute of 3 & 4 Anne, already quoted,⁴ bonds were occasionally transferred by indorsement in like manner as bills and notes, but the practice did not ripen into a settled custom, and by the above mentioned statute they were not included with notes in being declared negotiable.⁵ It is to

lex mercatoria, a particular or peculiar system, which, being in the interest of commerce, became at length gradually engrafted into, and established as a part of the common law itself." * * * * *

"All contracts under seal are specialties, sealing and delivery being the particular form and ceremony which alter the nature and operation of the agreement. Forms, consecrated by time and usage, become substance. The seal is substance and changes the nature and operation of the contract. It seems to me, therefore, that the question which I have been considering is settled upon principle against the plaintiffs. But however this may be, it has been held as settled upon authority for more than thirty years past."

¹ Irwin v. Brown, 2 Cranch C. C. 314.

² Clegg v. Lemesurier, 15 Grat. 108; Mann v. Sutton, 4 Rand, 253; Hopkins v. Railroad Co. 3 Watts & S. 410; Clark v. Farmers' Manuf. Co. 15 Wend. 256; Parks v. Duke, 2 McCord, 380; Lewis v. Wilson, 5 Blackf. 369; Helper v. Alden, 3 Minn. 332; Warren v. Lynch, 5 Johns. 239.

³ Clark v. Farmers' Manuf. Co. 15 Wend. 256. See Central Nat. Bank v. Charlottesville, &c. R. R. Co. 5 S. C. 156, where respecting a note with the seal of the corporation, which made it impressed upon it, and which was held negotiable, it was said: "The seal of a corporation is not in itself conclusive of an intent to make a specialty. It is equally appropriate as the means of evidencing the assent of a corporation to be bound by a simple contract as by a specialty." Indorsement by corporation through its seal, held not to affect its negotiability in Rand v. Dovey, 83 Penn. St. 280. See *post*, § 664.

⁴ See *ante*, § 5, note.

⁵ Buller v. Crips, 6 Mod. 29 (1704). Holt, C. J., declared that he had desired to speak with two of the most famous merchants in London, and that they

be observed, however, that merely by attaching a seal to the signature does not make it a sealed instrument, unless there be a recognition of the seal in the body of the instrument by some such phrase as "witness my signature and seal," or "signed and sealed," for otherwise the door would be thrown open to frauds and forgeries, by the facility with which seals could be superadded.¹ Such is the view taken in Virginia; but it is conceded that the rule was otherwise at common law,² and there are decisions adhering to the common-law rule.³

§ 33. In some of the States of the United States, sealed instruments for the payment of money are placed by statute upon the same footing as bills and notes in respect to their negotiability; and the addition of a seal to a bill or note payable to order or bearer in no way impairs its negotiability.⁴

In others, bonds are made transferable, and may be sued upon in the name of the assignee, but the latter takes them subject to all defenses that were available to the original obligee.⁵

§ 34. A scroll affixed as a seal is generally of the same force as a seal,⁶ and parol evidence, where such is the case, is

had told him that not only notes, but bonds for money, were transferred frequently, and indorsed as bills of exchange.

¹ *Peasley v. Boatwright*, 2 Leigh, 196. In *Anderson v. Bullock*, 4 Munf. 442, the following was held to be a promissory note, and the scroll annexed as a seal to be mere surplusage:

\$2,361 81.

RICHMOND, October 10, 1801.

On or before the first day of February next, we bind ourselves, our heirs, executors, or administrators, to pay Thomas and Amos Ladd, or order, two thousand three hundred and sixty-one dollars and eighty-one cents.

AUSTIN & ANDERSON. [L. s.]

Cromwell v. Tate's Exs. 7 Leigh, 305; *Baird v. Blagrove*, 1 Wash. 170; *Argenbright v. Campbell*, 3 H. & M. 174; *Austin v. Whitlock*, 1 Munf. 487; *Jenkins v. Hart*, 2 Rand. 446; *Clegg v. Lemesurier*, 15 Gratt. 108.

² *Cromwell v. Tate's Exs.* 7 Leigh, 305.

³ *Trasher v. Everhart*, 3 Gill & J. 246.

⁴ Colorado, Dakota, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Massachusetts, Nebraska, North Carolina, Ohio, Tennessee.

⁵ As in Virginia.

⁶ *Giles v. Maulden*, 7 Richardson, 11; *Peasley v. Boatwright*, *supra*; *contra*, *Blackwell v. Hamilton*, 47 Ala. 470.

admissible to show that a scroll affixed was intended as a seal.¹ An instrument binding the signers to pay a certain sum of money, and signed by some with, and by others without, seals, is the bond of the former, and the promissory note of the latter, and one action of debt may be brought against all the parties.²

SECTION II.

CERTAINTY AS TO ENGAGEMENT TO PAY.

§ 35. *In the second place, the engagement to pay must be certain.*—Therefore the bill must contain a certain direction, and the note a certain promise to pay. A bill is in its nature the demand of a right, not the mere asking of a favor, and therefore a supplication made, or authority given to pay an amount, is not a bill. The language, “Mr. Little, please to let the bearer have £7, and place it to my account, and you will much oblige your humble servant,” was held not a bill;³ but on the other hand, where the language was: “Mr. Nelson will much oblige Mr. Webb by paying I. Ruff, or order, on his account, twenty guineas,” was held to import an order, and therefore a good bill.⁴ The usual expression used in bills is, “please pay,” and it has been well said by Justice Story that the language should not be too nicely scanned, nor be regarded because of its politeness as asking a favor rather than demanding a right.⁵ “Please let the bearer have \$50; I will arrange it with you this forenoon,” and signed, “your’s, most obedient,” was held sufficient in Kentucky.⁶ An instrument directing a certain person to deliver a particular sum to A. B., or to be accountable or responsible to him for a particular sum would be a good bill,⁷ and so would a

¹ Pollock v. Glassell, 2 Grat. 439.

² Rankin v. Roler, 8 Grat. 53.

³ Little v. Stackford, 1 Mood. & Malk. 371.

⁴ Ruff v. Webb, 1 Esp. R. 129.

⁵ Story on Bills, § 33; Chitty, p. 150; Thomson, 6.

⁶ Bresenthal v. Williams, 1 Duval, 329.

⁷ Morris v. Lee, 2 Lord Raymond, 1396.

- direction to credit him in cash for a particular sum,¹ or any expression from which such direction could be inferred.

§ 36. A promissory note must contain a certain promise to pay. It is said by Story, that, "it seems that to constitute a good promissory note, there must be an express promise upon the face of the instrument to pay the money; for a mere promise implied by law, founded upon an acknowledged indebtedness, will not be sufficient."² But we think the better language is used by Byles, who says: "No precise words of contract are necessary, provided they amount, in legal effect, to a promise to pay."³ In other words, if over and above the mere acknowledgment of debt, there may be collected from the words used a promise to pay it, the instrument may be regarded as a promissory note.

In England, it seems to be well settled that an ordinary due-bill, which is there frequently given in the following form :

" LONDON, 1st January, 1875.

" Mr. A. B. :

" I. O. U. £100.

" C. D."

does not amount to a promissory note, but is mere evidence of an account stated, requiring no stamp under the English stamp acts. This was the view taken by Lord Chief Justice Eyre in 1795, where the paper ran "I. O. U. eight guineas,"⁴ and though in 1800 Lord Eldon held a similar paper to be a promissory note, and ruled it out when offered in evidence, because it had no stamp,⁵ subsequent decisions have recurred to the doctrine of Chief Justice Eyre, and it is the established law of England.⁶

¹ *Ellison v. Collingridge*, 9 C. & B. 570; *Allen v. Sea Fire, &c. Ins. Co.* 9 C. B. 574. But see *Woolley v. Sergeant*, 3 Halsted, 262.

² Story on Promissory Notes, § 14.

³ Byles on Bills, 8.

⁴ *Fisher v. Leslie*, 1 Esp. 425.

⁵ *Guy v. Harris*, Chitty on Bills, 526.

⁶ *Israel v. Israel*, 1 Camp. 499, Lord Ellenborough. The paper ran, "I owe my father 470*l*." *Childers v. Boulnois*, Dow. & Ry. 8; *Payne v. Jenkins*, 4 Car. & P. 335; *Fesenmayer v. Adcock*, 16 M. & W. 449; *Tompkins v. Ashby*, 6 B. & C. 541; 9 Dow. & Ry. 543.

In the United States the decisions are conflicting. In some of them a naked due-bill is held to be a promissory note;¹ as in Illinois, for instance, where the paper ran "Due G. S. W., five hundred and twenty-five dollars,"² and in Missouri, where the words were, "Due B., one hundred and fifty dollars."³ In others such a paper is held to be a mere acknowledgment of indebtedness.⁴

§ 37. The question seems to us simply one of intention. If a debtor give a mere due-bill to his creditor containing nothing but an acknowledgment of the debt, it is fair to presume that he merely designed to furnish him with evidence of its existence. The law implies a promise to pay from the existence of the debt; but that promise not being written on the note, it cannot be regarded as a promissory note. To be a "promissory note," the promise must not only be implied from the fact of indebtedness evinced by the note, but should be expressed in the note in so many words, or by necessary implication.

§ 38. There may be words superadded to the acknowledgment, however, from which an intention to accompany it with an engagement to pay may be gathered. Thus in New York the words "Due S., or bearer, \$340, for value received, with interest," were held to constitute a note;⁵ so in the same State, the words, "Due A. B., or bearer, two hundred and 26-100, for value received;"⁶ in Maine, the words, "Good to bearer,"⁷ and in Tennessee, "Due J. C. R., or order,"⁸ were held sufficiently obligatory to constitute a promissory note. So in New Hampshire the language, "Good R. C., or order

¹ *Fleming v. Burge*, 6 Ala. 373; *Brewer v. Brewer*, 6 Ga. 588; *Marrigan v. Page*, 4 Humph. 247; *Cummings v. Freeman*, 2 Humph. 145 (overruling *Read v. Wheeler*, 2 Yerger, 50).

² *Jacquin v. Warren*, 40 Ill. 459; 39 Id. 461.

³ *Brady v. Chandler*, 31 Mo. 28.

⁴ *Currier v. Lockwood*, 40 Conn. 348; *Read v. Wheeler*, 2 Yerger, 50.

⁵ *Sackett v. Spencer*, 29 Barb. 180; *Lowe v. Murphy*, 9 Ga. 338.

⁶ *Russell v. Whipple*, 2 Cow. 536.

⁷ *Hussey v. Winslow*, 59 Me. 170.

⁸ *Marrigan v. Page*, 4 Humph. 247.

for thirty dollars, borrowed money,"¹ and in Maine, "Due A. B., or order, \$20, on demand,"² has been given the like effect; and so in Arkansas, "Due I. H., or order, value received."³ In these, as in other cases, the insertion of negotiable words have been justly construed as manifesting an intention to make the instrument promissory and negotiable, and they have been effectuated accordingly.

§ 39. The insertion of "on demand," has been thought, in itself, sufficient to show that the debtor intended to do more than merely state the balance due on account. It recognizes an obligation, and necessarily implies a promise to pay when demanded. This view was taken in Connecticut, where the words used were, "Due John Allen, \$94 91, on demand," Smith, J., saying: "Where a writing contains nothing more than a bare acknowledgment of a debt, it does not, in legal construction, import an express promise to pay; but where a writing imports not only the acknowledgment of a debt, but an agreement to pay it, this amounts to an express contract."⁴ And the like view has obtained in other cases. The mere addition of the words "value received," would not alone, it seems, import a promise in addition to the acknowledgment,⁵ though it has been held otherwise.⁶ But, "Due A. B., \$325, payable on demand,"⁷ or "I acknowledge myself indebted to

¹ Franklin v. March, 6 N. H. 364; Huyck v. Meador, 24 Ark. 195; Cummings v. Freeman, 2 Humph. 144.

² Carver v. Hayes, 47 Me. 257.

³ Huyck v. Meador, 24 Ark. 192.

⁴ Smith v. Allen, 2 Day, 337.

⁵ Read v. Wheeler, 2 Yerger, 50; Currier v. Lockwood, 40 Conn. 348; Am. Law Reg. Jan'y, 1875. Judge Redfield, in a note to this case, dissents from its conclusions, as did also two of the judges (Foster and Phelps), who were members of the court which decided it. Judge Redfield says: "A promissory note is not required to be in any particular form, much less to embrace the word 'promise.' All that is required is that the written terms used, in their proper legal construction, shall import an admission by the maker that he holds himself bound to pay the payee a definite sum of money at a definite time; or, no time being named, then presently on demand."

⁶ Finney v. Shirley, 7 Mo. 42; see Huyck v. Meador, 24 Ark. 192.

⁷ Kimball v. Huntington, 10 Wend. 675; Mitchell v. Rome R. R. Co 17 Ga. 574; Pepoon v. Staggs, 1 Nott & McCord, 102.

A. in 100%, to be paid on demand, for value received,"¹ or "I. O. U. 85%, to be paid May 5th,"² would constitute promissory notes, significance being given to the words of payment as indicating a promise.

§ 40. There are other memoranda of indebtedness which have been held, like bare due-bills, not to amount to notes. Thus, a memorandum, "Mr. T. has left in my hands \$200," is not a note.³ And the following papers:

"I have received the sum of —, which I borrowed from you, and I have to be accountable for the said sum with interest,"⁴ and "I. O. U. —, which I borrowed of Mrs. Melanotte, and to pay her five per cent. till paid,"⁵ have been held not notes, because not importing promises to pay.

So, in a written bargain for buying goods, a promise to pay the seller the price in a limited time is not a note, but a mere memorandum of the terms of the bargain.⁶

SECTION III.

CERTAINTY AS TO THE FACT OF PAYMENT.

§ 41. *In the third place the fact of payment must be certain.* The instrument must be payable unconditionally, and at all events, in order to be negotiable. If the order or promise be payable provided terms mentioned are complied with; as, for instance, that a railroad be built to a certain point by a certain time, it is not a bill or note;⁷ and likewise if payable provided a certain act be not done;⁸ or another person shall not previously pay;⁹ or provided a certain ship shall arrive;¹⁰ or provided the maker shall be able.¹¹ Some-

¹ Casborne v. Dutton, 1 Selwyn's N. P. 320.

² Waithman v. Elzee, 1 C. & K. 35.

³ Tompkins v. Ashby, 6 B. & C. 541; s. c. 1 M. & M. 32.

⁴ Horne v. Redfearne, 4 Bing. N. C. 433.

⁵ Melanotte v. Teasdale, 13 M. & W. 216.

⁶ Ellis v. Ellis, Gow, 216.

⁷ Eldred v. Malloy, 2 Col. T. 320; Chitty on Bills, 134.

⁸ 8 Mod. 363.

⁹ Roberts v. Peake, 1 Burr. 323.

¹⁰ Coolidge v. Ruggles, 15 Mass. R. 387; Palmer v. Pratt, 2 Bing. 185.

¹¹ *Ex parte* Tootle, 4 Vesey, 372; Salinas v. Wright, 11 Tex. 572.

times a condition of time is expressed by the word "when," as "when A. shall marry;"¹ "when a certain suit is determined;"² "when a certain sale is made;"³ or "certain dividends declared;"⁴ "when a certain amount is collected;"⁵ or "when the estate of M. is settled up;"⁶ "after arrival and discharge of coal by brig A."⁷ So, if it be expressed to be payable subject to this policy."⁸ In all these cases the contingency implied deprives the instrument of its character as a bill or note, as the events named may never happen. If payable in installments, no time for the payment of the installments being mentioned, it is not a promissory note.⁹ In Illinois, where the promise was to pay a railroad company or order, a certain sum, in such instalments, and at such times as the directors of the payee company might assess or require, it was held negotiable, and in effect payable on demand, or in installments on demand.¹⁰

§ 42. In England, it has been held that an order for a certain sum "payable ninety days after sight or when realized," was not a bill, as the latter alternative made it payable upon a contingency,¹¹ but this is not the view which prevails in such cases in the United States.

§ 43. *Authorities in the United States.* In the United States, if the time must certainly come, although the particular day is not mentioned in the note, it is regarded as negotiable, as the fact of payment is then certain. Thus, where the note ran, "I promise to pay A. B., or bearer, \$75 one year from date, with interest annually, and if there is not

¹ Pearson v. Garrett, 4 Mod. 242; Beardsley v. Baldwin, Stra. 1157.

² Shelton v. Bruce, 9 Yerger, 24.

³ De Forest v. Frary, 6 Cow. 151; Hill v. Halford, 2 B. & P. 413.

⁴ Brooks v. Hargreaves, 91 Mich. 255,

⁵ Corbett v. State of Georgia, 24 Ga. 287.

⁶ Husband v. Epling, 81 Ill. 172 (1876).

⁷ Grant v. Wood, 12 Gray, 220.

⁸ American Exchange Bank v. Blanchard, 7 Allen, 332. But a mere note of the number of the policy for which the note was given, would not vitiate its negotiability. Union Ins. Co. v. Greenleaf, 64 Me. 123; see § 797.

⁹ Moffatt v. Edwards, Car. & M. 16.

¹⁰ White v. Smith, 77 Ill. 351.

¹¹ Alexander v. Thomas, 16 Q. B. 333.

enough realized by good management in one year, to have more time to pay, in the manufacture of the plaster bed on Stearns' land," it was held negotiable, Pierpont, C. J., saying that the only uncertainty was as to the length of time to be given, and "this uncertainty the law makes certain by giving him a reasonable time thereafter (the time prescribed) to make the payment."¹ So, where the note ran "to be paid as soon as collected from my accounts at P.," it was held that the phrase was not intended to make the debt conditional, but only to prescribe that a reasonable time be allowed for collection of the accounts.² So, where the note was to pay "by 20th of May, or when he completes the building according to contract," it was held that the 20th of May fixed the ultimate day when it should fall due.³ So, where the promise was to pay "against the 19th of December, or when the house John Mayfield has undertaken to build for me is completed," the like decision was made.⁴ So a note payable on or before a certain day;⁵ for, as said in such a case by Cooley, J.: "The legal rights of the holder are clear and certain; the note is due at a time fixed, and it is not due before. True, the maker may pay sooner if he shall choose, but this option if exercised would be a payment in advance of the legal liability to pay, and nothing more. Notes like this are common in commercial transactions, and we are not aware that their negotiability is ever questioned in business dealings. It ought not to be questioned for the sake of any distinction that does not rest upon sound reason."⁶

§ 44. Other cases have arisen illustrative of these views. A note payable on demand after date, "when convenient," has been held payable absolutely in a reasonable time.⁷ So a note payable in six months "or as soon as I can with due

¹ Capron v. Capron, 44 Vt. 412 (1872).

² Ubsdell v. Cunningham, 22 Mo. 124 (1855).

³ Stevens v. Blount, 7 Mass. 240 (1810). ⁴ Goodloe v. Taylor, 3 Hawks, 458.

⁵ Mattison v. Marks, 31 Mich. 421; Jordan v. Tate, 19 Ohio, N. S. 586.

⁶ Mattison v. Marks, 31 Mich. 421 (1875); Helmer v. Krolick, 36 Mich. 373 (1877).

⁷ Works v. Hershey, 35 Iowa, 340.

diligence make the money out of said patent right;"¹ a note payable in nine months, "or as A.'s horse earns the money in the cavalry service;"² a note payable twelve months after date, "or sooner if made out of a certain sale,"³ have been each held valid, negotiable notes, payable absolutely at the termination of the time expressed, and earlier, provided the alternative event transpired. A note payable "from the avails of logs bought of M. M., when there is a sale made;"⁴ or "when I sell my place where I now live," have been held in Maine payable absolutely after a reasonable time.⁵

§ 45. So, where the note was to pay "as soon as realized," to which was added "to be paid in the course of the season now coming," Shaw, C. J., said the undertaking to pay was absolute, and that "whatever time may be understood by the 'coming season,' whether harvest time or the coming year, it must come by mere lapse of time, and that must be the ultimate limit of the time of payment."⁶ So, where the certificate is payable "on the return of this certificate," it is negotiable, because that merely requires, as in the case of any note, the return of the evidence of the debt; but if there be added "and the return of my guaranty of a certain note," it would engraft a collateral condition which would defeat the negotiability of the instrument.⁷

The American decisions quoted seem to us salutary and correct. It has been held by the United States Supreme Court that a note payable "as soon as the crop can be sold, or the money raised from any other source," is not a promissory note."⁸

§ 46. If payable when, or so many days after, "A. shall come of age,"⁹ the instrument would not be a bill or note,

¹ Palmer v. Hummer, 10 Kansas, 464; *contra*, Hubbard v. Mosely, 11 Gray, 170.

² Gardner v. Barger, 4 Heiskell, 669.

³ Ernst v. Steckman, 74 Penn. St. 13. To same effect, Walker v. Woolen, 54 Ind. 164.

⁴ Sears v. Wright, 24 Me. 278.

⁵ Crooker v. Holmes, 65 Me. 195.

⁶ Cota v. Buck, 7 Metc. 588 (1844).

⁷ Smilie v. Stevens, 39 Vt. 316; Blood v. Northrup, 1 Kansas, 29.

⁸ Nunez v. Dautel, 19 Wall. 592.

⁹ Kelley v. Hemmingway, 13 Ill. 604.

as A. might die a minor, and the fact that he actually attains majority does not alter it; but if the time when A. will come of age is specified, it will be good, as it will be taken to be payable absolutely when the time arrives.¹ If payable at or within a certain time after a man's death, it is sufficient, because the event must occur;² and a promise to pay "on demand, after my decease, \$850," signed by the promiser, is a good note, negotiable as any other, and binding on the promiser's estate at his death.³ So a note payable "one day after date or at my death,"⁴ and if the day of payment must come at the same time, it has been said that the distance is immaterial.⁵ The English courts have gone so far as to hold that if payable at a certain time after a government ship is paid off, it would be good, because government is sure to pay;⁶ but this decision has been justly criticised and distrusted.⁷

An agreement to pay ninety days after the happening of two events, one of which may never happen, is not negotiable.⁸ A note payable "on or by" a certain day is payable on that day;⁹ and a note payable "by" a certain day may be declared on as payable on that day.¹⁰

§ 47. A promise to pay a certain sum for stock "in whole or from time to time in part, as the same shall be required within thirty days after demanded, or upon notification of thirty days in any newspaper," would answer the conditions necessary to a negotiable promissory note.¹¹

And so would a promise to pay a certain sum "in such manner and proportions, and at such time and place as A.

¹ Goss v. Nelson, 1 Burr. 226.

² Goode v. Colehan, 2 Stra. 1217; Mahier v. Successors of Henne, 246.

³ Bristol v. Warner, 19 Conn. 7.

⁴ Conn v. Thornton, 46 Ala. 588.

⁵ Worth v. Case, 42 N. Y. 362.

⁶ Andrews v. Franklin, 1 Stra. 24; Evans v. Underwood, 1 Wils. 262.

⁷ 1 Parsons, 40; Edwards, 142.

⁸ Sackett v. Palmer, 25 Barb. 178.

⁹ Massie v. Belford, 68 Ill. 290.

¹⁰ Preston v. Dunham, 42 Ala. 217.

¹¹ Protection Insurance Co. v. Hill, 31 Conn. 534. See Stillwell v. Craig, 58 Mo. 17, where note payable in installments not to exceed 10 per cent. on each share, at thirty days' notice of call from board of directors, was held negotiable.

shall require," being payable on demand;¹ but a like promise to pay at such times and in such articles as C. may need for support, would not, the medium of payment not being money.² A written instrument acknowledging receipt of a certain sum, and promising to pay it to a certain party "on return of this receipt," has been held a perfect negotiable note in New York, and its return was regarded as not of the essence of the contract.³

If the note be in part for a sum certain, and part upon a contingency, it will not be negotiable.⁴

§ 48. If a promissory note be made payable by installments, with a condition that if default be made in the payment of the first installment by the maker, the whole shall be immediately payable, it is negotiable within the statute of Anne. It is not payable upon a contingency, or at a time uncertain, but is likened to a bill payable at a certain time after sight; and the period or periods when it shall be done is dependent on the act of the maker himself.⁵ In Michigan, where the promise was to pay "\$1,500, to be paid 20 per cent. a month from the 1st July, 1871," towards building a certain road, the note was held negotiable.⁶ And in Illinois, where a note is not payable to a corporation or order "in such installments, and at such times as the directors of said company may from time to time require," the like decision was rendered, Sheldon, J., saying: "It was in effect payable on demand, or in installments on demand."⁷

¹ Goshen v. Turpin, 9 Johns. 217; Washington Co. Mutual Ins. Co. v. Miller, 26 Vt. 77.

² Corbett v. Steiametz, 15 Wisc. 170.

³ Frank v. Wessels, 64 N. Y. 158, Church, Ch. J., saying of the paper: "It contains an express promise to pay Feist or order a specified sum of money upon demand, with interest. These are the statutory elements of such a (negotiable promissory) note." 1 R. S. 721, § 7. "The words, 'on the return of this receipt,' do not make it payable upon a contingency, or constitute a condition precedent to any payment. * * * This restriction would be implied, if not expressed; it is implied in every promissory note; and there is also an implied exception on account of mistake or accident. * * * This clause is not of the essence of the contract." See *ante*, § 45.

⁴ Palmer v. Ward, 6 Gray, 340.

⁵ Carlin v. Kenealy, 12 M. & W. 139.

⁶ Wright v. Irwin, 33 Mich. 32.

⁷ White v. Smith, 77 Ill. 351 (1875).

§ 49. *Cases arising out of Confederate war.*—During the war between the United States and the Confederate States, obligations were frequently given, payable when, or a certain time after, peace should be declared. Where a note was expressed to be payable “six months after peace is declared between the United States and the Confederate States of America,” it was held actionable six months after peace ensued.¹ And the like ruling prevailed as to a note payable “thirty days after peace between the C. S. and the U. S.,”² and as to a note payable “one day after the treaty of peace.”³ But in West Virginia, where a bond was payable “six months after the ratification of peace between the U. S. and C. S.,” it seems to have been regarded as a wager upon the success of the Confederacy; but the case went off on a formal point.⁴ In North Carolina, this view has been adopted and applied,⁵ and certainly is not without force. Only the United States Senate can ratify a peace, and a peace ratified between two countries implies the independence of each. And further, it may be said that until the condition precedent is fulfilled, no liability accrues. But upon the principle “*res magis valeat, quam pereat*,” we think the better view is that “six months after peace” would fulfill the meaning of the terms as they were used in the country, though they are the very words of Confederate treasury notes; and it has been so decided in Texas.⁶

§ 50. *Instruments payable out of a particular fund not negotiable.*—In accordance with these principles, the character of the instrument as a bill or note is destroyed if it be made payable expressly or by implication out of a particular fund; for its payment becomes then conditioned on the sufficiency

¹ Brewster v. Williams, 2 So. Car. 455 (1871).

² Mortee v. Edwards, 20 La. An. 236 (1868).

³ Gaines v. Dorsett, 18 La. An. 563 (1866).

⁴ Harris v. Lewis, 5 W. Va. (Hagans), 576 (1872).

⁵ McNinch v. Ramsey, 66 N. C. 229 (1872).

⁶ Knight v. McReynolds, 37 Tex. 204. A case arose in the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, involving this question (Phelps v. Moomaw), but it was compromised, and never came to trial. The inferior court ruled as in Texas.

of that fund, which may prove inadequate.¹ Thus the insertion, in an order of A. upon B. to pay a certain sum, of the words "on account of brick work done on a certain building,"² or "out of any money in his hands belonging to me,"³ have been held to imply contingencies, and non-negotiable. So, also, where the paper was expressed as payable "for value received in stock, ale, brewing vessels, &c., this being intended to stand against the undersigned as a set-off for the sum left me in my father's will, above my sister's share,"⁴ and where the words were added "out of rents,"⁵ "out of my growing substance,"⁶ "out of the net proceeds of certain ore,"⁷ or "out of a certain claim,"⁸ "out of a certain payment when made,"⁹ or "the demand I have against the estate of A.,"¹⁰ or "out of my part of the estate of A.,"¹¹ or "being the amount that came to you from B. to me,"¹² or "out of the proceeds of A.'s bond,"¹³ or "and deduct the same from my share of the profits of the partnership."¹⁴

¹ Wadlington v. Covert, 51 Miss. 631.

² Pitman v. Crawford, 3 Grat. 127; Edwards on Bills, 143.

³ Averett's Adm. v. Booker, 15 Grat. 165, Lee, J.: "Here, the sum to be paid is not payable absolutely and at all events. It is payable out of a particular fund, to wit, the moneys, if any, in the hands of the drawee, belonging to the drawer. The draft, therefore, cannot be treated as a bill of exchange, nor can a recovery be had upon it as such." Jenney v. Hearle, 2 Ld. Raym. 1361.

⁴ Clarke v. Perceval, 2 B. & Ad. 660.

⁵ 1 Parsons N. & B. 43.

⁶ Josselyn v. Lacier, 10 Mod. 294.

⁷ Worden v. Dodge, 4 Denio, 159.

⁸ Richardson v. Carpenter, 47 N. Y. 661; Corbett v. State, 24 Ga. 287.

⁹ Haydock v. Lynch, 2 Ld. Raym. 1563.

¹⁰ West v. Forman, 24 Ala. 400.

¹¹ Mills v. Kuykendale, 2 Blackf. 47.

¹² Harriman v. Sanborn, 43 N. H. 128.

¹³ Kenny v. Hinds, 44 How. Pr. R. 7.

¹⁴ Munger v. Shannon, 61 N. Y. 258, Dwight, C.: "The present order, it should be observed, is payable out of an uncertain fund, from profits, and, of course, none may be realized. This fact deprives it of an element essential in a bill of exchange, which is that it be payable absolutely, and not upon a contingency. * * * I think that the true construction of the present order is, that it was an equitable assignment of a certain amount of the profits of the business of L. A. Gulick. Cowperthwaite v. Sheffield, 3 N. Y. 243, is not opposed to this view, since, in that case, there was nothing on the face of the bills to indicate that they were drawn on a specific fund, but they were in the ordinary forms of bills of exchange. The same remark is to be applied to Harris v. Clark, 3 N. Y. 93."

§ 51. *Indications as to mode of reimbursement.*—The statement as to a particular fund in a bill, however, will not vitiate it, if inserted merely as an indication to the drawee how to reimburse himself, or to show to what account it should be charged. Thus, where the bill said, “and charge the same against whatever amount may be due me for my share of fish,” it was held a mere indication of the means of reimbursement, and the payment not limited to the proceeds of the fish.¹ So, where A. B. directed the defendant in writing to pay the plaintiff or order £9 10s, “as my quarterly half pay, to be due from 24th of June to 27th of September next, by advance,” the court held it a good bill, saying. “The mention of the half-pay is only by way of direction how he shall reimburse himself, but the money is still to be advanced on the credit of the person.”² So it was held where the expression used was, “pay A. L. or order,” it will be in full of certain judgment;³ or that it is “secured according to the condition of a certain mortgage;”⁴ or that it was “given in consideration of a certain patent right;”⁵ or “as part pay for a piano forte,” or for any other consideration.⁶ The statement that collateral security has been deposited for the performance of the promise contained in the bill or note is a recital only which does not affect its negotiability;⁷ and though the recital contain the terms of the deposit, that does not alter the case, for it renders neither the amount, the time of payment, the payee, nor the engagement to pay uncertain.⁸

¹ Redman v. Adams, 51 Me. 433; Edwards on Bills, 144; see §§ 41, 797.

² Macleod v. Snee, 2 Stra. 762; 2 Ld. Raym. 1481.

³ Ellett v. Britton, 6 Tex. 229.

⁴ Littlefield v. Hodge, 6 Mich. 326; Howry v. Eppinger, 34 Mich. 29. In this case the note contained the memorandum “secured by mortgage.” Held, not to affect it. See Roberts v. Jacks, 31 Ark. 597; Duncan v. Louisville, 13 Bush (Ky.) 385.

⁵ Hereth v. Meyer, 33 Ind. 511.

⁶ Preston v. Whitney, 23 Mich. 260; Wright v. Irwin, 33 Mich. 32; Collins v. Bradbury, 64 Me. 37; see §§ 41, 797.

⁷ Wise v. Charlton, 4 A. & E. 786; Fancourt v. Thorne, 9 Q. B. 312.

⁸ Towne v. Rice, 122 Mass. 74; Arnold v. Rock River, &c. R. R. 5 Duer, 207.

§ 52. The rule seems to be that if the memorandum or collateral agreement impairs the essential characteristics of certainty necessary to negotiable paper, it destroys its negotiability, but otherwise not. A promise to pay S. or order \$1,000, or upon surrender of "this note," to issue stock for the same, does not violate this rule, and is a good note, the option to receive the stock being entirely with the payee.¹ So it was held in Wisconsin that a note, otherwise negotiable, was not therein affected by the fact that it contained a memorandum that, if the maker failed to pay it at maturity, the whole amount of the premium on a policy of insurance, for which it was given, should be considered earned, and the policy void.²

The negotiability of a promissory note payable to order is not restrained by the circumstance of its being given for the purchase of real property in Louisiana, and the notary before whom the contract of sale was executed writing upon it the words "*ne varietur*," according to the laws and usages of that State, and others governed by the civil law.³

SECTION IV.

CERTAINTY AS TO THE AMOUNT TO BE PAID.

§ 53. *In the fourth place, the amount to be paid must be certain.*⁴ Therefore, the instrument is not negotiable if it engages to pay a certain sum "and all other sums which may be due," as the aggregate amount is not capable of definite ascertainment.⁵ So, if it be for a certain sum "and whatever

¹ Hodges v. Shuler, 22 N. Y. 114.

² Kirk v. Dodge County Mutual Ins. Co. 39 Wisc. 138.

³ Fleckner v. Bank of U. S. 8 Wheat. 338.

⁴ Gaar v. Louisville B. Co. 11 Bush (Ky.) 180.

⁵ Smith v. Nightingale, 2 Stark. 375.

sum you may collect of me for C.;"¹ or if it be for "the proceeds of a shipment of goods, value about £2,000, consigned by me to you;"² or "the demands of the sick club in part of interest;"³ or "a certain sum, the same to go as a set off;"⁴ or if it be expressed "deducting all advances and expenses;"⁵ or if it be for "\$800 and such additional premium as may be due on policy No. 218,171."⁶ But, *id certum est quod certum reddi potest*, and if the amount can be ascertained from the face of the paper, the form of expression is immaterial. Therefore, a promise to pay bearer a certain sum per acre for so many acres as a certain tract contained, was held to be a note as soon as the number of acres was indorsed upon it.⁷

§ 54. If there be added to the amount "with current exchange on another place," the commercial character of the paper is not impaired, as that ~~is~~ is capable of definite ascertainment.⁸ Exchange is an incident to bills for the transmission of money from place to place. Its nature and effect are well understood in the commercial world, and merchants having occasion to use their funds at their place of business, sometimes make the currency at that point the standard of payments made to them by their customers at a different point. Exchange preserves the equivalence of amounts in value, and does not introduce such an element of uncertainty as destroys the negotiability of the bill or note which embodies it in its terms.⁹ But there are cases which hold that an agreement to pay exchange destroys the negotiable character

¹ Legro v. Staples, 16 Me. 252; Lime Rock F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Hewitt, 60 Me. 407.

² Jones v. Simpson, 2 B. & C. 318.

³ Bolton v. Dugdale, 4 B. & Ad. 619.

⁴ Clark v. Percival, 2 B. & Ad. 660.

⁵ Cashman v. Haynes, 20 Pick. 132.

⁶ Marrett v. Equitable Ins. Co. 54 Me. 537.

⁷ Smith v. Clopton, 4 Tex. 109.

⁸ Smith v. Kendall, 9 Mich. 241; Leggett v. Jones, 10 Wisc. 34; see, also, Grutacup v. Woulloise, 2 McLean, 581; Price v. Teal, 4 McLean, 201; Johnson v. Frisbie, 15 Mich. 286; Bradley v. Lill, 4 Bissell, 473. See Pollard v. Hernes, 3 B. & P. 335, where a paper "payable in Paris, or, at the choice of the bearer, at the Union Bank in Dover, or at H.'s usual residence in London, according to the course of exchange upon Paris," was declared on and treated as a promissory note.

⁹ Smith v. Kendall, 9 Mich. 242.

of the paper, and renders it a special promise requiring proof of consideration.¹ Where there is such an addition to a bill or note, payable where it is drawn, it is clear that it might be rejected as surplusage, there being in such case no exchange.²

SECTION V.

CERTAINTY AS TO THE MEDIUM OF PAYMENT, WHICH MUST BE MONEY.

§ 55. *In the fifth place, the medium of payment must be money.* It is indispensably requisite, in order to constitute a bill of exchange or negotiable promissory note, that the direction or promise be to pay in money.³ And if the instrument be expressed to be payable "in cash or specific articles," in the alternative,⁴ or in merchandise, as for instance, "in good merchantable whisky at trade price,"⁵ or "in ginned cotton at eight cents per pound,"⁶ or "in work,"⁷ it becomes a special contract, and by the law merchant loses its character as commercial paper. Nor can it be for payment in "good East India bonds,"⁸ or in "foreign bills,"⁹ or by bill or note.³ A bond payable "in notes of the United States Bank, or either of the Virginia banks," has been held not payable in money;¹⁰ but where the bond was for a certain sum, and it was added, "which sum may be discharged in notes or bonds due on good solvent men in R.," it was held payable

¹ *Lowe v. Bliss*, 24 Ill. 168; *Read v. McNulty*, 12 Rich. (Law), 445. In *Russell v. Russell* (1 McArthur, 263 [1874]), it was held that a note made and payable in Michigan, "with current exchange on New York," was not negotiable, the court regarding the sum as uncertain, so that an indorsee could not sue in his own name.

² *Clauser v. Stone*, 29 Ill. 116; *Hill v. Todd*, 29 Ill. 103; *Byles on Bills* (Sharswood's ed.) 73.

³ *Chitty on Bills* [*132], 153.

⁴ *Matthews v. Houghton*, 2 Fairfax, 377.

⁵ *Rhodes v. Lindley*, Ohio Cond. 465; *Chitty on Bill* [*132].

⁶ *Lawrence v. Dougherty*, 5 Yerg. 435.

⁷ *Quimby v. Merritt*, 11 Humph. 439.

⁸ *Smith v. Boehm*, *Chitty, Jr.* 234.

⁹ *Jones v. Fales*, 4 Mass. 245; *Young v. Adams*, 6 Mass. 182.

¹⁰ *Chitty on Bills* [*132 3], 153.

¹¹ *Peirne v. Dunlap*, 8 Leigh, 514.

in money.¹ But the courts would not go so far, we think, as to hold an instrument couched in such terms negotiable,² for, in order to possess that quality, it should afford on its face every element necessary to fix its value, and such a paper would be a special contract rather than a negotiable bill or note.

§ 56. *Instruments payable in bank bills, or in currency.* Strictly pursuing this principle, it has been held in England that a note payable in cash, or bank of England notes, was not negotiable under the statute of Anne, though the bills of that bank were at any time redeemable in money.³ In Pennsylvania, this ruling was followed upon an instrument payable in "current bank bills or notes," the court remarking that "it was payable in more than forty kinds of paper of different value."⁴ The Supreme Court of the United States has applied it where the note was payable in the "office notes of a bank."⁵ When the medium of payment is expressed to be "good current money," or "current money," it is not objectionable, as legal tender money is intended;⁶ but if it be "in currency" simply, the paper is not negotiable, as the term includes all varieties of the circulating medium.⁷

¹ Butcher v. Carlisle, 12 Gratt. 520.

² Williams v. Sims, 22 Ala. 512.

³ *Ex parte Iveson*, 2 Rose, 225.

⁴ McCormick v. Trotter, 10 Serg. & R. 94.

⁵ Irvine v. Lowry, 14 Peters, 293.

⁶ Wharton v. Morris, 1 Dallas, 124; Graham v. Adams, 5 Ark. 361; Wilburn v. Greer, 6 Ark. (1 Eng.) 255; Black v. Ward, 27 Mich. 193. But *contra*, McCherd v. Ford, 3 T. B. Monroe, 163.

⁷ Lampton v. Haggard, 3 Monroe, 149; Farwell v. Kennett, 7 Mo. 595. And like decisions were rendered where the bill or note was payable "*in common currency of Arkansas*," Dillard v. Evans, 4 Ark. 185; "*in Canada bills*," Gray v. Worden, 29 Q. B. (Upper Canada R.) 535; "*in bank bills*," Simpson v. Meneden, 3 Cold. 429; "*in New York funds or their equivalent*," Hasbrook v. Palmer, 2 McLean, 10; "*in current bank bills*," Fry v. Rousseau, 3 McLean, 106; "*in foreign bills*," Jones v. Fales, 4 Mass. 245; "*in paper medium*," Lange v. Kohne, 1 McCord, 115; "*in current bank notes*," Little v. Phoenix Bank, 2 Hill, 425; Pardee v. Fish, 60 N. Y. 265; "*in Pennsylvania or New York paper currency*," Lieber v. Goodrich, 5 Cow. 186; "*in current notes of the State of North Carolina*," Warren v. Brown, 64 N. C. 381; "*in current funds at Pittsburg*," Wright v. Hart, 44 Penn. St. 454; "*in current funds*," Cornwell v. Pumphrey, 9 Ind. 135; Haddock v. Woods, 46 Iowa, 433.

But the decisions, as will be seen from the subjoined notes, are contradictory.¹ In some cases it is held that the meaning of such phrases as "current funds" may be explained by parol evidence as to the understanding of the parties, and that they may be shown to have meant *money*.²

In business paper it is best to adhere to strict rules; and as certainty is of the first moment in commercial dealings, and paper payable in fluctuating values is uncertain and delusive, we think sound judgment approves the doctrine of the text. Money alone is legal tender, and only the note which represents money should be held negotiable. It should be expressed simply as payable in dollars, which have a definite signification fixed by law.³

§ 57. It has been suggested that since Congress has declared and the Supreme Court held, that the treasury notes of the United States shall be "legal tender" in discharge of debts, the terms "in currency" should be construed to mean legal tender currency, and instruments so payable should be deemed negotiable. But "the very reverse of this proposition is true," as said in Iowa, in respect to a certificate of

¹ In the following cases, instruments expressed to be payable as indicated were held negotiable: "*in current funds*," *Shoemaker's Bank v. Street*, 16 Ohio, N. S. 5; "*in current Ohio bank notes*," *Swetland v. Creigh*, 15 Ohio, 118; "*in current funds of the State of Ohio*," *White v. Richmond*, 16 Ohio, 5; "*in funds current in the city of New York*," *Lacy v. Holbrook*, 4 Ala. 88; "*in good current money of this State (or in Arkansas money)*," *Graham v. Adams*, 5 Ark. 261; *Wilburn v. Greer*, 1 Eng. 255; but otherwise, if "*in Arkansas money of the Fayetteville branch*," *Hawkins v. Watkins*, 5 Ark. 481; in New York, "*in New York State bills or specie*," *Keith v. Jones*, 9 Johns. 120; "*in bank notes current in the city of New York*," *Judah v. Harris*, 19 Johns. 144; "*in North Carolina bank notes*," *Deberry v. Darnell*, 5 Yerg. 451; "*in lawful current money of Pennsylvania*," *Wharton v. Morris*, 1 Dallas, 124; "*in foreign money*," *Sanger v. Stimpson*, 8 Mass. 260; "*in currency*," *Butler v. Paine*, 8 Minn. 324; *Hunt v. Divine*, 37 Ill. 137; *Swift v. Whitney*, 20 Ill. 144; *Laughlin v. Marshall*, 19 Ill. 390; *Peru v. Farnsworth*, 18 Ill. 563; *Drake v. Markle*, 21 Ind. 433; *Fry v. Dudley*, 20 La. An. 368; "*in currency of the State of Mississippi*," *Mitchell v. Hewitt*, 5 Smedes & M. 361; "*in currency of Missouri*," *Cockrell v. Kirkpatrick*, 9 Mo. 688; "*in New York State currency*," *Ehle v. Chittanooga Bank*, 24 N. Y. 548.

² *Haddock v. Woods*, 46 Iowa, 435; *Huse v. Hamblin*, 29 Iowa, 501; *Pilmer v. Branch Bank*, 16 Iowa, 321.

³ *Omohundro v. Crump*, 18 Grat. 703.

deposit payable in currency. And, continued Beck, J.: "It is evident that it was not intended that payment should be made in coin, or 'legal tender' government notes. The holder of the paper could have demanded payment thereon in 'legal tender' money, without any words in the instrument indicating the currency in which payment should be made. * * Some other medium of circulation is described by the word currency."¹ In Arkansas, it has been held that a note payable "in greenback currency" was negotiable, because legal tender currency, and not national or other bank notes was intended;² and in New York it has been said by Church, Ch. J.: "The objection that the instrument is not a promissory note because payable in paper currency, is answered by the suggestion that this must be taken to refer to the legal tender paper currency which under the United States laws and decisions is money."³

§ 58. It is not necessary, however, that the money should be that current in the place of payment, or where the bill is drawn; it may be in the money of any country whatever.⁴ But it has been held that it is necessary that the instrument should express the specific denomination of money when it is payable in the money of a foreign country, in order that the courts may be able to ascertain its equivalent value; otherwise it is not negotiable. Thus in New York, where a note was given for a certain sum "payable in Canada money," it was held not negotiable; and the court said:

"This view of the case is not incompatible with a bill or note payable in money of a foreign denomination, or any other denomination, being negotiable, for it can be paid in our own coin of equivalent value, to which it is always reduced by a recovery. A note payable in pounds, shillings and pence, made in any country, is but another mode of ex-

¹ Huse v. Hamblin, 29 Iowa, 244; but see Fry v. Dudley, 20 La. An. 368.

² Burton v. Brooks, 25 Ark. 215.

³ Frank v. Wessels, 64 N. Y. 158 (1876).

⁴ Chitty on Bills [*133], 154; Story on Bills, § 43; Black v. Ward, 27 Mich. 193; Thompson v. Sloan, 23 Wend. 71.

pressing the amount in dollars and cents, and is so understood judicially. The course, therefore, in an action on such an instrument, is to aver and prove the value of the sum expressed, in our own tenderable coin.”¹

Intention, to be gathered from the face of the paper, according to fixed rules, is the test of negotiability, and we do not see how the idea of its possessing a negotiable quality is excluded by the mere fact that the denomination of foreign money is not set out. A case, remarkable for its learning and ability, decided by the Supreme Court of Michigan, adopts this view; and there it has been held that a note payable “in Canada currency” is negotiable, the terms being equivalent to Canada money.²

SECTION VI.

THE CONTRACT MUST BE ONLY FOR THE PAYMENT OF MONEY.

§ 59. In the sixth place it is essential to the negotiability of the bill or note, that it purport to be only for the payment of money.³ Such at least may be stated to be the general rule, for if any other agreement of a different character

¹ Thompson v. Sloan, 23 Wend. 71.

² Black v. Ward, 27 Mich. 193 (1873), Campbell, J., saying:

“A note payable in Canada currency means no more and no less than that it is payable in Canada money at the Canada standard, and that it is governed as to the amount it calls for by the same rules as if it had been made in Canada, and payable in so many dollars, without containing any further direction.”

“It is evident the language was used to exclude the idea that it should be paid in dollars according to our paper standard, and to put it on the footing of a gold contract.”

“It is urged that this is superfluous, and that as every one is presumed to know the law, it would not have been put in except for some purpose which would change its legal import. The objection appears to us to be far fetched and unreasonable. This case cited above sufficiently answers it. A very large proportion of the bonds and deeds drawn up in this country describe the money secured or paid as ‘lawful money of the United States,’ when there can be no other lawful money in the republic, and when it is clearly superfluous.”

³ Fletcher v. Thompson, 55 N. H. 308.

be engrafted upon it, it becomes a special contract clogged and involved with other matters, and has been deemed to lose thereby its character as a commercial instrument. But at the present time we think that this general rule is subject to the qualification, that if the superadded agreement do not impair the certainty of the promise to pay the certain amount named, but only facilitates the means of its collection, it does not in any degree destroy the negotiability of the instrument, but is embodied in the contract of all the parties, and passes as an incident of the paper itself to every holder.

§ 60. In accordance with the general rule above stated, it has been held that if a note for a certain amount be given for the hire of a negro, to which is added, "said negro to be furnished with the usual quantity of clothing," was not a negotiable promissory note, but a special contract for the hiring and clothing of the negro.¹ And this seems to us clearly the correct doctrine, though the view has been taken that such a paper is negotiable, the obligation to pay the money only passing to an indorsee.² So it has been held that if the instrument be to pay money, and also "to deliver up horses and a wharf;"³ or to pay money "and take up a certain outstanding note,"⁴ it is not a negotiable note. So if it be to pay money "and all fines according to rule," it is not a negotiable note, and the additional words cannot be construed as insensible surplusage. "It is quite possible," said Parke, B., "that they have a meaning, and may import that certain pecuniary fines or forfeitures are to be paid by the defendants; and, if so, this is certainly no promissory note within the statute, but is a specific agreement to do certain things."⁵

So, likewise, where the following words were added, the

¹ Barnes v. Gorman, 6 Rich. 297.

² Baxter v. Stewart, 4 Sneed, 213; Gaines v. Shelton, 47 Ala. 413.

³ Martin v. Chantry. 2 Strange, 1271. ⁴ Cook v. Satterlee, 6 Cow. 118.

⁵ Ayrey v. Fearnside, 4 Mees. & W. 168.

instruments were held special agreements and not negotiable: "If any dispute should arise about the sale of goods for which the note is given, it is to be void,¹ or it is "only a security for all balances up to its amount."² So if it provide that the payee is to receive less than the principal sum if it be paid before maturity.³ So, where the promise was to pay H. a certain amount, adding, "and said H. is to build a barn and fence, and said P. (the promissor), is to have all the land back of the house."⁴

§ 61. *Additions of power to confess judgments, of waivers of exceptions, and of stipulations to pay collection fees.*—Sometimes it is stated in the note that (1) the promissor appoints the payee, or order, or holder to confess judgment for him when the note is payable; or (2) waives benefit of appraisement laws, or homestead exemptions, where such laws or exemptions exist; or (3) stipulates for payment of collection, and attorney's fees. The authorities differ as to the negotiability of such instruments; but the later cases maintain that they are, and the principle is becoming established that, if the note is in itself certain and perfect without conditions, and there is merely superadded the provision or declaration that the payee or holder may confess judgment for the maker; or that certain remedies are granted, or rights waived in respect to its collection, then the negotiability of the paper is not destroyed.⁵ The leading case of *Overton v. Tyler*, 3 Barr, 346, in which a power to confess judgment engrafted on the note was held to render it non-negotiable,⁶

¹ *Hartley v. Wilkinson*, 4 Camp. 127. ² *Leeds v. Lancashire*, 2 Camp. 205.

³ *Fralick v. Norton*, 2 Mich. 130.

⁴ *Fletcher v. Thompson*, 55 N. H. 308.

⁵ 2 *Parsons*, N. & B. 147.

⁶ *Zimmerman v. Anderson*, 67 Penn. St. 421. In this case the following note was sued on by the indorsees against the maker: "Township of Buffalo, March 25, 1868. \$125.00. Six months after date I promise to pay to E. W. Lowe, or order, one hundred and twenty-five dollars, for value received, with interest, waiving the right of appeal, and of all valuation, appraisement, stay, and exemption laws." Signed, Moses Anderson, and indorsed by E. W. Lowe. The defense was failure of consideration, grounded on the alleged non-negotiability of the note. But it was held negotiable. Read, J., saying: "The paper in this

does not now seem to be followed by the State courts as a general rule; and the declaration of Chief Justice Gibson in that case, that "a negotiable bill or note is a courier without

case comes within all the definitions of the best text writers of a promissory note, for it is a written promise by the defendant to pay to E. W. Lowe, or order, \$125, six months after date, for value received, with interest, absolutely and at all events. But it is urged that the words 'waiving the right of appeal, and of all valuation, appraisement, stay and exemption laws,' destroys its negotiability. In what way? They do not contain any condition or contingency, but after the note falls due and is unpaid, and the maker is sued, facilitate the collection by waiving certain rights which he might exercise to delay or impede it. Instead of clogging its negotiability it adds to it, and gives additional value to the note. * * * These principles and cases clearly prove this to be a regular negotiable promissory note; but we are met by the case of *Overton v. Tyler*, in 3 Barr, 346, decided by this court a quarter of a century ago, which, however, is plainly distinguished from the one before us. In *Overton v. Tyler*, the payment was fixed for a day named specifically in the instrument, with a regular power of attorney to confess judgment, upon which a judgment was entered on the 10th March, and execution issued thereon on the 2d of June, one day after the money was payable, and the waivers which followed all related to the judgment thus entered two months and twenty-one days before the paper fell due. It is unnecessary to say how far this ruling is sustained by the authorities, for, if perfectly good and sound law, it does not touch the present case."

While the court distinguishes this case from *Overton v. Tyler*, 3 Barr, 346, it draws a very fine distinction—one without a material difference, and it evidently does not regard that case with much favor. In *Overton v. Tyler* the note ran: "For value received I promise to pay Francis Tyler and Levi Westbrook, or bearer, one thousand dollars with interest, by the first day of June next. And I do hereby authorize any attorney of any court of record in Pennsylvania to appear for me and confess judgment for the above sum to the holder of this single bill, with costs of suit, hereby releasing all errors and waiving stay of execution, and the right of inquisition on real estate; also waiving the right to have any of my property appraised which may be levied upon by virtue of any execution issued for the above sum." Gibson, C. J., said: "A negotiable bill or note is a courier without luggage. It is requisite that it be framed in the fewest possible words, and those importing the most certain and precise contract; and though this requisite be a minor one, it is entitled to weight in determining a question of intention. To be within the statute, it must be free from contingencies or conditions that would embarrass it in its course; for a memorandum to control it, though indorsed on it, would be incorporated with it and destroy it. But a memorandum, which is merely directory or collateral, will not affect it. The warrant and stipulations incorporated with this note evince that the object of the parties was not a general, but a special one. Payment was to be made, not as is usual at so many days after date, but at a distant day certain; yet the negotiability of the note, if it had any, as well as its separate existence, was instantly liable to be merged in a judgment, and its circulation arrested by

luggage," is answered by the assertion that such provisions facilitate rather than incumber the circulation of such instruments. They are not luggage, but ballast.

§ 62. Upon the same principle that power to confess judgment is not, by the later cases, considered to impair the negotiable quality of the instrument, it has been held that an agreement added, "if not paid when due and suit brought thereon, I hereby agree to pay collection and attorney's fees thereon," does not impair it.¹ Nor do the addition of such fees render a bill or note, otherwise unimpeachable, usurious.² Such fees need not be sued for by the attorney, but

the debt being attached, as an encumbrance to the maker's land; and it was actually merged when it had nearly three months to run. Now it is hard to conceive how the commercial properties of a bill or note can be extinguished before it has come to maturity. That is not all. A warrant to confess judgment, not being a mercantile instrument, or a legitimate part of one, but a thing collateral, would not pass by indorsement or delivery to a subsequent holder; and a curious question would be, whether it would survive as an accessory separated from its principal, in the hands of the payee, for the benefit of his transferee, I am unable to see how it could authorize him to enter up judgment, for the use of another, on a note with which he had parted. But it may be said that his transfer would be a waiver of the warrant as a security for himself or any one else; and that subsequent holders would take the note without it. The principle is certainly applicable to a memorandum indorsed after signing, or one written on a separate paper. But the appearance of paper with such unusual stipulations incorporated with it would be apt to startle commercial men as to their effect on the contract of indorsement, and make them reluctant to touch it. All this shows that these parties could not have intended to impress a commercial character on the note, dragging after it, as it would, a train of special provisions which would materially impede its circulation." See *Sweeney v. Thickstun*, 77 Penn. St. R. 131.

In *Osborn v. Hawley*, 19 Ohio, 130, it was held that a power of attorney added to, and as part of a note, did not affect its negotiability.

¹ *Sperry v. Horr*, 32 Iowa, 184. See also, to the same effect, *Smith v. Muncie National Bank*, 29 Ind. 158; *Wyant v. Pattorf*, 37 Ind. 512; *Hubbard v. Harrison*, 38 Ind. 323; *Stoneman v. Pyle*, 35 Ind. 104; *Johnson v. Crossland*, 34 Ind. 334; *Dietrich v. Baylie*, 23 La. An. 767; *Gaar v. Louisville B. Co.* 11 Bush. (Ky.) 180; *Nickersen v. Sheldon*, 33 Ill. 373. In *Seaton v. Scoville* (18 Kansas. 433; 16 Alb. L. J. 148 (1877), 21 American R. 212), the Supreme Court of Kansas held a paper promising to pay a certain sum, "also costs of collecting, including reasonable attorney's fees, if suit be instituted on this note," to be a good negotiable note.

² *Stoneman v. Pyle*, 35 Ind. 104; *First National Bank v. Silvers*, 34 Ind. 149; *Smith v. Silvers*, 32 Ind. 321.

are recoverable by the holder.¹ And the liability for them, as for every engagement, imported by the bill or note, enters into the acceptor's² and indorser's contract.³ But the decisions illustrating these doctrines are not uniform, and in Pennsylvania, where the note contained a warrant of attorney to enter judgment for the amount, and five per cent. collection fees, it was held not negotiable.⁴ So, in that State where to the note was added, "and five per cent. collection fees if not paid when due," it was held not negotiable, Sharswood, J., saying: "It is a necessary quality of negotiable paper, that it should be simple, certain, unconditional, and not subject to any contingency. * * Interest and costs of protest after non-payment at maturity are necessary legal incidents of the contract, and the insertion of them in the body of the note would not alter its negotiability. Neither does a clause waiving exemption, for that in no way touches the implicity and certainty of the paper. But a collateral agreement as here, depending too, as it does, upon its reasonableness, to be determined by the verdict of a jury, is entirely different."⁵

The holder must prove the amount of the attorney's fees in order to recover them.⁶

¹ Johnson v. Crossland, 34 Ind. 334. But it has been held in Ohio that a stipulation for a certain per centage, besides interest, for collection fees is usurious. State v. Taylor, 10 Ohio, 378; Shelton v. Gill, 11 Ohio, 417.

² Smith v. Muncie National Bank, 29 Ind. 158.

³ Hubbard v. Harrison, 38 Ind. 323.

⁴ Sweeney v. Thickstun, 77 Penn. St. 131.

⁵ Woods v. North, 84 Penn. St. 410 (1877). In First Nat. Bank v. Gay, 63 Mo. 33 (1876), there was added to the promise: "And if not paid at maturity, and the same is placed in the hands of an attorney for collection, we agree and promise to pay an additional sum of ten per cent. as attorney's fee. Held not a promissory note, nor negotiable.

⁶ Wyant v. Pattorf, 37 Ind. 512. In Stoneman v. Pyle, 35 Ind. 103 (1871), the note contained a stipulation for the payment of attorney's fees. Worden, J., said: "As the note was payable at a bank in this State, it is governed by the law merchant, and the holder thereof is entitled to all the rights of a holder of commercial paper, unless the clause in the note stipulating for the payment of attorney's fees, in case suit should be commenced thereon, takes it out of that class of paper. It is earnestly urged by counsel for the appellee, that the provision above indicated

SECTION VII.

DELIVERY.

§ 63. *In the seventh place the instrument must be delivered.*—Delivery is the final step necessary to perfect the existence of any written contract; and therefore as long as a bill or note remains in the hands of the drawer or maker it is a nullity.¹ And even though it be placed by the drawer or maker in the hands of his agent for delivery, it is still undelivered as long as it remains in his hands, and may

makes the amount of the note uncertain, and therefore that it does not come within the legal requirements of commercial paper. It may be conceded that a note, in order to be placed upon the footing of bills of exchange, must be for a sum certain; for in no other way can the maker know precisely what he is bound to pay, or the holder what he is entitled to demand. But the note in question, if paid at maturity, or after maturity, but before suit brought thereon, is for a sum certain. On the maturity of the note the maker knew precisely what he was bound to pay, and the holder what he was entitled to demand. In the commercial world, commercial paper is expected to be paid promptly at maturity. The stipulation for the payment of attorney's fees could have no force except upon a violation of his contract by the defendant. Had the defendant kept his contract, and paid the note at maturity, or afterwards, but before suit, he would have been required to pay no attorney's fees, nor would there have been any difficulty as to the extent of his obligation.

"We see no reason, on principle or authority, or on grounds of public policy, for holding that such a stipulation destroys the commercial character of paper otherwise having that character. See *Smith v. Silvers*, 32 Ind. 321. The case is quite analogous to a class of cases on the subject of usury. Says Mr. Parsons: 'So, if the borrower agrees to pay the sum borrowed at a time certain, or on demand, with lawful interest, and if he fail to do so, so much more by way of penalty; even if it be called extra interest, this is not such usury as would affect the contract, because the borrower has the right to pay the principal and avoid the penalty.' 2 Parsons Notes and Bills, 413, 414. So here the defendant had the right to pay the face of the note when due, and avoid the attorney's fees. As long as the note retained the peculiar characteristics of commercial paper, viz., up to the time of its maturity and dishonor, the amount to be paid on the one hand, and recovered on the other, was fixed and definite."

¹ *Bailey v. Taber*, 5 Mass. 286; *Marvin v. McCullum*, 20 Johns. 288; *Freeman v. Ellison*, 37 Mich. 459; *Lansing v. Caine*, 2 Johns. 300; *Woodford v. Dorwin*, 3 Vt. 82; *Ward v. Churn*, 18 Grat. 801; *Hopper v. Eiland*, 21 Ala. 714; *Richards v. Darst*, 51 Ill. 141; *Roberts v. Bethell*, 12 C. B. 778; *Cox v. Troy*, 5 B. & Ald. 474; *Howe v. Ould*, 28 Grat. 7; *Bartlett v. Same*, Id.

be recalled; and, while there, the payee has no right to it, unless it be wrongfully withheld by the agent.¹ It is not necessary, however, to aver the delivery of a bill or note, for the averment that a bill was drawn or a note made includes the idea of a delivery, without which the drawing or making is not complete.² So essential is delivery, that it has been held that where a promissory note, the writing of which was unknown to the grantee, lay in the grantor's possession, and was found amongst his papers after death, the payee could not claim or sue upon it;³ and though such a note should be found, accompanied with written directions to deliver it to the payee, the payee will still have no right of action, unless the directions be valid as a testament.⁴

It is to be observed, however, that delivery may be constructive as well as actual, by manual passing of the instrument. A direction to a third person who is in actual custody thereof, to hold it subject to the payee's or transferee's order; or an order to the depositary to deliver it, is sufficient in legal contemplation.⁵

¹ Thomson on Bills, 90-91; *The King v. Lambton*, 5 Price, 428; Byles [*146], 265; Edwards on Bills, 186; 1 Parsons N. & B. 48-50.

² *Churchill v. Gardner*, 7 T. R. 596; *Smith v. McClure*, 5 East, 477; *Binney v. Plumley*, 5 Vt. 500; *Peets v. Bratt*, 6 Barb. 662; *Chester, &c., R. R. Co. v. Lickiss*, 72 Ill. 521.

³ *Disher v. Disher*, 1 P. Wms. 204; *Chitty, Jr.* 230.

⁴ *Gough v. Findon*, 7 Exch. 48.

⁵ *Howe v. Ould*, 28 Grat. 7; *Bartlett v. Same, Id.*; *Fisher v. Bradford*, 7 Greenl. 28; *Richardson v. Lincoln*, 5 Metc. 201; *Mitchell v. Byrne*, 6 Rich. 171.

In *Howe, Knox & Co. v. Ould & Carrington*, 28 Grat., it appeared that Samuel Strong, the owner of a note executed to him by Samuel Myers, indorsed it, and deposited it with the First National Bank of Richmond, Va., as collateral for a loan obtained from the bank by Betz, Youngaling & Byer. Strong sold the note to Ould, and gave him an order on the bank for it, who at once presented the order at the bank, but was informed that the president was out of town. A few days afterwards the president informed him, that the debt for which the note was pledged was nearly paid, and that he would deliver him the note but for the fact that an attachment had been issued against it,—of the attachment which antedated the sale of the note, Ould & Carrington had no notice. It was held that they were entitled to it,—were not affected by the attachment of which they had no notice at time of purchase; and that the constructive delivery of the note was sufficient.

§ 64. If the party who has signed or indorsed the instrument die before delivery, it is a nullity, and cannot be delivered by his personal representative;¹ but if advances had been made on the faith of a delivery, then the promisee or indorsee would be entitled to a delivery.²

It is said by Mr. Chitty, in respect to a bill, that delivery (by the acceptor) is not essential to vest the legal interest in the payee.³ But the doctrine sustained by the authorities goes only to the extent that if the drawee actually accepts the bill, and improperly detains it in his hands, an averment that the bill was accepted is sufficient, without averment of a delivery by the acceptor.⁴

§ 65. Whenever a bill or note is found in the hands of the payee, it will be presumed that it was delivered to him,⁵ and that the delivery took place on the day of its date, if it be dated,⁶ and, at any rate, before the day of its maturity.⁷ But the presumption both as to the fact and the time of delivery may be rebutted.⁸

As a bill or note takes effect only by delivery, so it takes effect only on delivery; and if this be subsequent to its date, it will be binding only from that day.⁹ But still, when delivered, if it bear an anterior date, and be payable at some future day from date, the time will be computed according to its terms, and therefore by relation from its date; for it is competent for the parties to frame their contracts to suit

¹ *Clark v. Boyd*, 2 Ohio, 56; *Clark v. Sigourney*, 17 Conn. 511; *Bromage v. Lloyd*, 1 Exch. 32; *Byles* [*56], 142.

² *Perry v. Crammond*, 1 Wash. C. C. 100; 1 Pars. N. & B. 49.

³ *Chitty on Bills* [*172], 198.

⁴ *Smith v. McClure*, 5 East, 476; *Story on Bills*, § 203, note 2; *Thomson on Bills*, 90.

⁵ *Griswold v. Davis*, 31 Vt. 390; *Woodford v. Dorwin*, 3 Vt. 82.

⁶ *Cranston v. Goss*, 107 Mass. 439; *Sinclair v. Baggaley*, 4 M. & W. 312; *Anderson v. Weston*, 6 Bing. N. C. 296.

⁷ *Churchill v. Gardiner*, 7 T. R. 596; *Smith v. McClure*, 5 East. 477; *Binney v. Plumley*, 5 Vt. 500; see Chapter XXI on Transfer by Indorsement, sec. vi.

⁸ *Woodford v. Dorwin*, 3 Vt. 82.

⁹ *Lovejoy v. Whipple*, 18 Vt. 379.

themselves,¹ and it will be proper to describe it as drawn on the day it bears date.²

§ 66. If the bill or note bear no date, the time must be computed from its delivery; and if the day of actual delivery cannot be proved, it will be computed from the earliest day on which it appears to have been in the hands of the payee or any holder.³ It is not necessary to aver a date to the bill or note, but it is sufficient to aver that it was drawn or made on a certain day.⁴

§ 67. Delivery to a father of an order for an amount due his minor son is sufficient delivery in law;⁵ and so delivery to a trustee is sufficient as delivery to the *cestui que trust*.⁶

It is essential to delivery that the minds of both parties should assent, in order to bind them; and if, through inattention, infirmity, or otherwise, one does not assent, the act of the other is nugatory. Therefore, leaving a check on the desk of a clerk⁷ or the counter of a bank,⁸ without the knowledge of such clerk or the bank officer, is not delivery.

Where notes were executed and left with the payee's agent, who objected only to their form, but retained them, agreeing to accept them, if the form could not be changed, and it was not, it was held to be sufficient delivery.⁹ Placing bills or notes signed or indorsed, in the custody of the postman, addressed to the payee or indorsee—that being the course of business between the parties—has been held, in

¹ Powell v. Waters, 8 Cow. 669; Bumpass v. Timms, 3 Sneed, 459; Snaith v. Mingay, 1 Maule & S. 87; Barker v. Sterne, 9 Exch. 684.

² Snaith v. Mingay, 1 Maule & S. 89.

³ Clark v. Sigourney, 17 Conn. 511; Richardson v. Lincoln, 5 Met. 201; Woodford v. Dorwin, 3 Vt. 82.

⁴ De La Coutier v. Bellamy, 2 Show. 422 (1683); Hague v. French, 3 Bos. & P. 173; Giles v. Bourne, 6 Maule & S. 73.

⁵ Mason v. Hyde, 41 Vt. 432.

⁶ Tucker v. Bradley, 33 Vt. 325.

⁷ Kinney v. Ford, 52 Barb. 194.

⁸ Chicopee Bank v. Philadelphia Bank, 8 Wall. 641.

⁹ Bodley v. Higgins, 73 Ill. 375.

England, a sufficient delivery;¹ and so depositing them in the post office, with the assent of the payee or indorsee, is considered sufficient in the United States.² And if a bill or note so deposited be lost on the way, and the creditor obtain a duplicate, and cause it to be demanded and protested, he may recover.³ The vendor of negotiable paper has the right of stoppage *in transitu* to the same extent as the vendor of other species of personal property; and the right to the remedy applies not only as against the vendee, but as well against a creditor of the vendee who has made a loan upon the promise of the vendee to transfer the paper to him on its arrival.⁴

§ 68. *Escrows.* A bill or note, as well as a deed, may be delivered as an escrow—that is, delivered to a third party to hold until a certain event happens, or certain conditions are complied with—and then the liability of the party commences as soon as the event happens or the conditions are fulfilled, without actual delivery by the depositary to the promisee.⁵

But there is this distinction between negotiable and sealed instruments. If the custodian of the former betrays his trust, and passes off the negotiable instrument to a *bona fide* holder, before maturity and without notice, all parties are bound; but if the instrument be sealed, the rule is otherwise. A bill or note cannot be shown to have been delivered to the promisee as an escrow, for the evidence would be repugnant to the act.⁶ These questions are elsewhere more fully considered.⁷ It has been said, however, by the Court of Appeals of New York, that “instruments not under

¹ *Rex v. Lambton*, 5 Price, 428.

² *Kirkman v. Bank of America*, 2 Cold. 397.

³ *Kirkman v. Bank of America*, *supra*.

⁴ *Muller v. Pondir*, 55 N. Y. 325.

⁵ *Couch v. Mecker*, 2 Conn. 302; 1 Parsons N. & B. 51; see Chapter on Bona Fide Holder, § 856; *Taylor v. Thomas*, 13 Kansas, 217.

⁶ 1 Parsons N. & B. 51; *Scott v. State Bank*, 9 Ark. 36; *Massman v. Holscher*, 49 Mo. 87; *Badcock v. Steadman*, 1 Root (Conn.), 87; see *post*, §§ 79, 81.

⁷ See Chapter XXVI on Rights of Bona Fide Holder or Purchaser, § 856; *Henshaw v. Dutton*, 59 Mo. 139.

seal may be delivered to the one to whom on their face they are made payable, or who by their terms is entitled to some interest or benefit under them, upon conditions, the observance of which is essential to their validity. And the annexing of such conditions to the delivery is not an oral contradiction of the written obligation, though negotiable, as between the parties to it, or others having notice. It needs a delivery to make the obligation operative at all, and the effect of the delivery and the extent of the operation of the instrument may be limited by the conditions with which the delivery is made.”¹

§ 69. *Bills and notes made on Sunday.* By the common law, there is no interdiction of secular business being conducted on Sunday, and, unless restrained by statute, a party may draw, make, indorse, or accept bills and notes on Sunday, and their acts will be as valid as if done on any other day.² By statute, however, in many of the States of the United States, no contract can be entered into on Sunday, or secular business legally conducted.

Bills and notes executed and delivered on Sunday fall within the interdiction of such laws; and the rule applicable to such instruments is, that the plaintiff cannot recover when, in order to sustain his supposed claim, he must set up an illegal agreement, to which he himself is a party.³ But it is delivery that completes a contract, and if the bill or note be delivered on another day, it will be valid, though dated and signed on Sunday; and parol evidence is competent to show that it was so delivered on a different day, notwithstanding its date as of Sunday.⁴ And when so de-

¹ *Benton v. Martin*, 52 N. Y. 574, *Folger*, J.

² *Begbie v. Levy*, 1 *Crompt. & J.* 180; 1 *Tyrw.* 130; *Chitty, Junior*, 1516; *Chitty on Bills* [*148], 171; *Thomson on Bills*, 171.

³ *Pope v. Linn*, 50 *Me.* 86; *Pinney v. Calendar*, 8 *Minn.* 42; *Bramhall v. Van Campen*, 8 *Minn.* 13; *State Capitol Bank v. Thompson*, 42 *N. H.* 370; *Smith v. Bean*, 15 *N. H.* 577; *Bank of Cumberland v. Mayberry*, 4 *Hub.* 198; *Smith v. Case*, 2 *Oregon*, 190; *Furz v. Nicholls*, 2 *M. G. & S.* 500.

⁴ *Flanagan v. Meyer*, 41 *Ala.* 133; *Aldridge v. Branch Bank*, 17 *Ala.* 45;

livered on a different day, it is no objection to it that interest commences to run on Sunday.¹ Though the note made and delivered on Sunday be void, the payee may recover upon the original consideration.² And the weight of authority seems to be, that, although a contract be entirely closed up on Sunday, yet, if ratified by the parties upon a subsequent day, it is valid.³

§ 70. *Indorsements on Sunday.*—The indorsement of a bill or note on Sunday stands on the same footing as drawing a bill or making a note, and the indorsee cannot sue upon such an indorsement, either in his own name, or in another's for his benefit.⁴ The indorsee of a bill or note made or drawn on Sunday can stand upon no better footing than his transferrer, provided he have notice of the fact. And if the bill or note bear a certain date, or it appears that it was executed upon a certain day of the month, the court will take judicial notice of the fact, if such day were Sunday. The almanac has long been regarded and held as a part of the law of the land.⁵ And an indorsee would, doubtless, be chargeable with notice from the face of the paper, if the day of the date it bears was Sunday.

Clearly, however, an indorsee who takes a bill or note dated as of a secular day, and without notice from its face or otherwise, that it was executed on Sunday could recover upon it.⁶ And if the instrument were without date, there

Vinton v. Peck, 15 Mich. 287; Drake v. Rogers, 32 Me. 524; Fritsch v. Heesless, 40 Mo. 556; Lovejoy v. Whipple, 18 Vt. 379; State Capitol Bank v. Thompson, 42 N. H. 376; Dohmey v. Dohmey, 7 Bush (Ky.) 217; King v. Fleming, 72 Ill. 21; Love v. Wells, 25 Ind. 503 (a deed).

¹ Marshall v. Russell, 44 N. H. 509.

² Sayre v. Wheeler, 31 Ia. 112.

³ King v. Fleming, 72 Ill. 21; Commonwealth v. Kendig, 2 Penn. St. 448; Clough v. Davis, 9 N. H. 500; Lovejoy v. Whipple, 18 Vt. 379; Hilton v. Houghton, 35 Me. 143; Winchell v. Carey, 115 Mass. 560.

⁴ Benson v. Drake, 55 Me. 555; but see State Capitol Bank v. Thompson, 42 N. H. 370.

⁵ Finney v. Callendar, 8 Minn. 41.

⁶ Brieber v. Commercial Bank, 31 Ark. 128; Cranson v. Goss, 107 Mass. 439; Greathhead v. Walton, 40 Conn. 81; Pope v. Linn, 50 Me. 84; State Capitol Bank v. Thompson, 42 N. H. 370.

would be nothing about it to intimate notice, or charge the indorsee with its illegality because made on Sunday.¹

§ 71. The execution of a note does not import a debt existing previous to the period of its execution; but its effect is to give the debt and the note a cotemporaneous origin.² Proof of the giving of a promissory note by one person to another, nothing else appearing, is *prima facie* evidence of an accounting and settlement of all demands between the parties, and that the maker at the date of the note was indebted to the payee upon such settlement to the amount of such note.³ But this is a mere presumption, which may be repelled by proofs of the consideration of such note, and of the occasion for, and circumstances attending the giving of the same.⁴

¹ State Capitol Bank v. Thompson, 42 N. H. 370.

² Johnston v. Lane's Trustees, 11 Grat. 553.

³ Lake v. Tysen, 6 N. Y. 461; De Freest v. Bloomingdale, 5 Denio, 304; Dutcher v. Porter, 63 Barb. 20; Sherman v. McIntyre, 14 N. Y. S. C. (7 Hun), 592.

⁴ Sherman v. McIntyre, 14 N. Y. S. C. (7 Hun), 592.

CHAPTER III.

FORMAL REQUISITES OF BILLS AND NOTES.

SECTION I.

FORMALITY IN RESPECT TO STYLE AND MATERIAL.

§ 72. Having sufficiently treated of the elements essential to the contract in order to impart to it the character of negotiability, we now come to speak of the formal preparation and delivery of the instrument.

§ 73. *As to the peculiar forms of bills and notes.*—It does not appear necessary that they should be framed in any particular form, provided they possess the essential qualities which have been mentioned. We give the forms which are usually in vogue amongst merchants, and it would be unwise to depart from them.¹ But the law respects substance more than form; and where the intention appears to have assumed the obligations which devolve upon drawers and makers of negotiable instruments, it will be enforced, although not evidenced in the usual commercial form. Thus, an order written under a note, "Please pay the above note, and hold it against me in our settlement," signed by the drawer and accepted by the drawee, has been held a good bill;² and so, also, has been held a like order written under an account.³ And where an indorsement was made on a bond, ordering the contents to

¹ Chitty on Bills [*128], 148; see Appendix A.

² Leonard v. Mason, 1 Wend. 252.

³ Hoyt v. Lynch, 2 Sandf. 328.

be paid to order for value received, it was held a good bill.¹ And an instrument of the following tenor: "Nobleboro, October 4th, 1869. Nathaniel O. Winslow, Cr. By labor, 16 $\frac{3}{4}$ days, *a* \$4 per day, \$67. Good to bearer. (Signed,) Wm. Vannah," has been decided to be a negotiable promissory note, payable to Winslow on demand.² But the words under an itemized account: "A. B., please pay the above bill," if naming no payee, would not be a bill.³

§ 74. It does not matter upon what portion of the instrument the maker or drawer affixes his name, so that he signed as drawer or maker.⁴ In a late case, where the maker of a note, which was in printed form, by mistake signed his name above the printed line which stated the bank at which it was payable, it was held that the printed line below the signature was nevertheless part of the note, especially where it had interest coupons attached, and was indorsed in that form; these circumstances precluding all doubt of the fact that the designation of the place of payment was on the note at the time it was executed.⁵ "I, A. B., promise to pay," is as good a note, if written by A. B. or his authorized agent, as "I promise to pay," subscribed "A. B."⁶ And so "I, A. B., request you to pay" would be a good bill, though not undersigned.⁷ Nor is it at all material whether the writing is in pencil or ink,⁸ though, as a matter of permanence and security, ink is, of course, preferable. And the name may be printed as well as written, though, in such cases, it cannot prove itself, and must be shown to have been adopted and used by

¹ Bay v. Freazer, 1 Bay, 66. But see Norris v. Solomon, 2 M. & Rob. 117.

² Hussey v. Winslow, 59 Me.

³ Platzer v. Norris, 38 Tex. 387.

⁴ Hunt v. Adams, 5 Mass. 359; Clason v. Bailey, 14 Johns. 484; Schmidt v. Schmaelter, 45 Mo. 502.

⁵ Turnbull v. Thomas, 1 Hughes, 172.

⁶ Taylor v. Dobbins, 1 Strange, 399.

⁷ Saunderson v. Jackson, 2 Bos. & P. 238; Chitty, Jr. on Bills, 10.

⁸ Brown v. Butchers' Bank, 6 Hill, 443; Reed v. Roark, 14 Tex. 329; Closson v. Stearns, 4 Vt. 11; Geary v. Physic, 5 Barn. & C. 234; Chitty on Bills [*126], 147. A deed in pencil has been deemed sufficient. McDowell v. Chambers, 1 Strob. Eq. 347.

the party as his signature.¹ The full name may be written; and at least the surname should appear, and generally does. But this is not indispensable—the initials are sufficient.² and any mark which the party uses to indicate his intention to bind himself will be as effectual as his signature, whether there be a certificate of witnesses on the instrument or not.³ But, of course, a mark does not prove itself like a signature, although it is an adminicle of proof.⁴ Any peculiarity in it may be shown as evidence of its genuineness;⁵ but, unless there be an attesting witness, or one who saw it written, or is familiar with its characteristics, the plaintiff cannot recover.⁶

§ 75. The name is not necessary if it be sufficiently indicated who the party is. A note signed "Steamboat Ben Lee and owners,"⁷ has been held sufficient; and likewise a bill drawn on "Steamer C. W. D. and owners," and accepted "Steamer C. W. D., by A. B., agent."⁸

§ 76. *Manifest informalities.*—A manifest informality of expression or grammatical error, whether in respect to date, amount, time, place, or other matter, will in nowise affect the validity of a bill or note. Thus, it has been held that a note in form negotiable, but running "sixty days after date, I promised to pay," instead of "I promise," was as good as if

¹ *Schneider v. Norris*, 2 Maule & S. 286; *Brown v. Butchers' Bank*, 6 Hill, 443; *Pennington v. Baehr* (Sup. Ct. Cal.), Cent. L. J. vol. 2, No. 6, Feb. 5, 1875; *Story on Bills*, § 58.

² *Merchants' Bank v. Spicer*, 6 Wend. 443; *Palmer v. Stephens*, 1 Denio, 471; 1 *Parsons N. & B.* 36.

³ *Willoughby v. Moulton*, 47 N. H. 205 (unwitnessed); *Shank v. Butsch*, 28 Ind. 19 (unwitnessed); *Flint v. Flint*, 6 Allen, 34; *Hilborn v. Alford*, 22 Cal. 482; *George v. Surrey*, 1 Moody & M. 516, where the indorsement was "Ann Moore X her mark." *Brown v. Butchers' Bank*, 6 Hill, 443, where the figures "1, 2, 8" were held sufficient.

⁴ *Hilborn v. Alford*, 22 Cal. 482; *Flowers v. Billing*, 45 Ala. 488; see cases *supra*, and *Story on Bills*, § 53, note 6.

⁵ *George v. Surrey*, 1 Moody & M. 516; *Thomson on Bills*, 35; 2 *Parsons N. & B.* 480.

⁶ See *Thomson on Bills*, 30, 31, 33. ⁷ *Sanders v. Anderson*, 21 Mo. 402.

⁸ *Alabama C. v. Brainard*, 35 Ala. 478.

the promise in the past tense had been expressed in the present.¹ So the singular "pound" clearly means, "pounds."²

A note payable "twenty-four after date,"³ and one payable "six after date,"⁴ have been held not void for uncertainty, but parol evidence has been admitted to ascertain the intention of the parties; and a note payable "four months after," has been held payable "four months after date."⁵

"With ten *per cent.* after due,"⁶ or "at ten *per cent.*, value received,"⁷ clearly means with ten *per cent.* "interest," although the word "interest" be omitted.

Where a note is dated in December, and made payable on "the 25th of December next," it is admissible to show that December instant was intended.⁸ And where a bill was drawn "payable on the 6-9 Jan.," the evidence of bankers and brokers was held admissible to show that the figures were designed to designate the days of grace.⁹ The words "are to be paid," if obviously necessary to make sense, may be understood as implied, and considered as inserted.¹⁰

§ 77. As to the material upon which negotiable instruments should be written, it does not appear to be necessary that the substance should be paper. It is conceived that they might be written on parchment, cloth, leather, or any other convenient substitute for paper.¹¹ Whether a valid bill or note may be written upon metal, stone, or wood, does not seem to have been decided; but, if it were distinctly proven that the instrument was intended as a bill or note, the sub-

¹ Perkins' Case, 7 Grat. 651; Commonwealth v. Parmenter, 5 Pick. 279.

² Rex v. Post, Russ. & Ry. 101. ³ Conner v. Routh, 7 How. (Miss.) 176.

⁴ Nichols v. Frothingham, 45 Me. 220.

⁵ Pearson v. Stoddard, 9 Gray, 199. ⁶ Higley v. Newell, 28 Iowa, 516.

⁷ Williams v. Baker, 67 Ill. 238; Thompson v. Hoagland, 65 Ill. 310; Cramer v. Joder, 65 Ill. 314.

⁸ McCrary v. Caskey, 27 Ga. 54.

⁹ Kelsey v. Hibbs, 13 Ohio, N. S. 340.

¹⁰ Peyton v. Harman, 22 Grat. 643.

¹¹ Byles on Bills (Sharswood's ed.) 165. A deed must be written upon parchment or paper. Coke, Littleton, 229.

stance could be no objection to its validity. But it is, of course, entirely out of the usual course of business; and it must rarely, if ever, occur that such a question is presented. Certainly the courts would look with suspicion upon so peculiar an instrument; and its unusual form would in itself be a warning to all purchasers that they took it at their peril.¹ A metallic token, like an I. O. U., would seem at common law to be only evidence of a debt.²

§ 78. Individuals, bankers and others have frequently, in the United States, issued their promissory notes in printed forms closely resembling, in size, color, and texture of the paper, and in mode of execution, bank notes. They are intended to circulate as money, and very often constitute a currency in themselves, when no national or State law prohibits them. They are valid obligations when not so prohibited, and are enforced by the courts as the promissory notes of the parties executing them.³

§ 79. The whole of the bill or note must be expressed in writing. But the whole of it need not be in the body of the instrument; and a cotemporaneous memorandum or indorsement on any part of it may qualify its terms by making it payable upon a contingency,⁴ or at a particular place,⁵ or providing that it may be renewed.⁶ And there may be a written stipulation on a detached paper affecting the instrument, which would be admissible as between the original parties and their representatives;⁷ but such stipulation would not affect a *bona fide* holder for value, who acquired it without notice.⁸ But any party having notice would stand on no

¹ 1 Parsons N. & B. 23.

² Byles on Bills (Sharswood's ed.) 281.

³ James v. Rogers, 23 Ind. 453 (1865).

⁴ Beele v. Bidgood, 1 Man. & Ry. 143; 7 B. & C. 453; Hartley v. Wilkinson, 4 M. & S. 25; Heywood v. Perrin, 10 Pick. 228; Shaw v. M. E. Society, 8 Metc. 226; Chitty on Bills [*126], 146; Wheelock v. Freeman, 13 Pick. 168; Byles (Sharswood's ed.) [*94] 193; Leeds v. Lancashire, 2 Camp. 205.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Hartley v. Wilkinson, 4 M. & S. 25.

⁷ Bowerbank v. Monteiro, 4 Taunt. 844.

⁸ Hoare v. Graham, 3 Camp. 57.

better footing than the original parties.¹ Whether the instrument be a bill of exchange or promissory note, or otherwise, and whether or not it be negotiable, must be determined by its face, without reference to any other source.²

§ 80. *Parol evidence*.—It is a general principle of law that parol evidence is inadmissible to vary or contradict a written contract. Therefore, if a bill or note be absolute upon its face, no evidence of a verbal agreement made at the same time qualifying its terms, can be admitted. Thus where a note is payable on demand, it cannot be shown by verbal testimony that it was agreed that it should not be paid till after the decease of the testator;³ nor until after sale of the maker's estates;⁴ nor until a certain account should be adjusted and credited on its face;⁵ nor until certain premises were delivered up;⁶ nor until a dividend of a bankrupt's assets should have been made;⁷ nor until the amount was collected from certain sources;⁸ nor until a certain draft was received.⁹ Nor can it be shown verbally that demand of a post-dated check was not to be made at maturity;¹⁰ nor that a note in which no time for payment is expressed, and is therefore constructively payable on demand, was to be paid at a specified time.¹¹ Nor can it be shown that there was any agreement to prolong or vary the time of payment specified in the instrument, by taking part payment and waiting for the residue, by receiving payment in instalments, or otherwise than the instrument itself declares;¹² nor that it was not to be negotiated but re-

¹ Gibbon v. Scott, 2 Stark. 286.

² Strachan v. Muxton, 24 Wis. 21.

³ Woodbridge v. Spooner, 3 B. & Ald. 233; Graves v. Clark, 6 Blackf. 183.

⁴ Free v. Hawkins, 8 Taunt. 92; 1 J. B. Moore, 535.

⁵ Mahan v. Sherman, 7 Blackf. 378. ⁶ Moseley v. Hanford, 10 B. & C. 729.

⁷ Rawson v. Walker, 1 Stark. 361.

⁸ Campbell v. Upshaw, 7 Humph. 185; McClanaghan v. Hines, 2 Strob. 122; Litchfield v. Falconer, 2 Ala. 280.

⁹ Kincaid v. Higgins, 1 Bibb, 396.

¹⁰ Hill v. Gaw, 4 Barr, 493.

¹¹ Thompson v. Ketchum, 8 Johns. 189.

¹² Eaton v. Emerson, 14 Me. 335; Barton v. Wilkins, 1 Mo. 74; Dawson v. Bank of Illinois, 4 Scam. 56; Walker v. Clay, 21 Ala. 797; Blakemore v. Wood,

newed.¹ Nor that it was not to be paid in case a certain verdict was obtained;² nor that it was merely given as an indemnity against certain claims;³ nor merely as a receipt.⁴ On this subject the United States Supreme Court has recently said: "Negotiable notes are written instruments, and as such they cannot be contradicted, nor can their terms be varied by parol evidence; and that proposition is universally true where the promissory note is in the hands of an innocent holder. Where a bill of exchange was drawn in the usual form, and was protested for non-payment, the court held twenty years ago that parol evidence of an understanding between the drawer and the party in whose favor the bill was drawn was inadmissible to vary the terms of the instrument."⁵

§ 81. The principle applies to every element of the instrument. It cannot be shown by parol that the sum agreed to be paid was different;⁶ nor that an additional sum was to be paid in a certain contingency;⁷ nor that a certain account was to be deducted from the note,⁸ or the value of certain articles credited upon it;⁹ nor that a note payable in "lawful money" was to be paid in silver;¹⁰ nor when expressed to be payable in dollars, that it was payable in bank notes, corporation, or individual notes, or in any paper currency,¹¹ or in goods or other articles."¹²

3 Sneed, 470; Rice v. Ragland, 10 Humph. 545; Sturdivant v. Hull, 59 Me. 172; Roache v. Roanoke Classical Seminary, 56 Ind. 202.

¹ Heist v. Hart, 73 Penn. St. 286. ² Foster v. Jolly, 1 Cramp. M. & R. 703.

³ Ridout v. Bristow, 1 Cromp. & J. 231. ⁴ Billings v. Billings, 10 Cush. 178.

⁵ Brown v. Spofford, 95 U. S. (5 Otto) 480 (1877); see Brown v. Wiley, 20 How. 442; Specht v. Howard, 16 Wall. 564; Forsyth v. Kimball, 91 U. S. (1 Otto) 291.

⁶ Beard v. White, 1 Ala. 436; 5 Porter, Ala. 94; Carter v. Hamilton, 11 Barb. 147; Downs v. Webster, Brat. 79.

⁷ Gazoway v. Moore, Harper, 401. ⁸ Eaves v. Henderson, 17 Wend. 190.

⁹ Featherston v. Wilson, 4 Ark. 154; St. Louis, &c. Ins. Co. v. Homer, 9 Metc. 39.

¹⁰ Alsop v. Goodwin, 1 Root, 196.

¹¹ Noe v. Hodges, 3 Humph. 162; Cole v. Handley, 8 Smedes & M. 473; Pack v. Thomas, 13 Smedes & M. 11; Baugh v. Ramsey, 4 T. B. Monroe, 155; M'Minn v. Owen, 2 Dallas, 173; Hair v. La Bronse, 10 Ala. 548; Langenberger v. Kraeger, 48 Cal. 147; Clark v. Hart, 49 Ala. 86.

¹² Bradley v. Anderson, 5 Vt. 152; Coe v. Wallace, 5 Blackf. 199.

In Missouri, it has been held that if payable in the "currency of the State," it cannot be shown that anything was intended but gold and silver, or notes of the bank of Missouri.¹

Nor can any condition be engrafted in the instrument by verbal testimony—as that it should be void unless others interested agreed to the settlement in which it was given;² or was to be void if certain bills should be paid at maturity;³ or was to be void or surrendered up in the event the case in which it was given for a fee were compromised,⁴ or in any other contingency.⁵ Nor can it be shown that it was only to be paid out of a particular fund or estate.⁶ But a delivery to the payee to take effect only upon a condition precedent, it has been held, might be shown as between the original parties.⁷

Evidence of want of consideration is admissible between original parties. "Every bill or note imports two things, value received, and an agreement to pay the amount on certain specified terms. Evidence is admissible to deny the receipt of value, but not to vary the engagement."⁸ The cases amply sustain the foregoing views, which seem to us altogether correct. It has been held that it is competent to show by parol that at the time a note was made, it was agreed that it should be held for nothing on the happening of a certain event.⁹ But unless such event operated a failure

¹ Cockrill v. Kirkpatrick, 9 Mo. 688.

² Ely v. Kilborn, 5 Denio, 514.

³ Penny v. Graves, 12 Ill. 187.

⁴ Dale v. Pope, 4 Littell, 166.

⁵ Brown v. Hull, 1 Denio, 400; Holt v. Moore, 5 Ala. 521; Adams v. Wilson, 12 Metc. 138; Spring v. Lovett, 11 Pick. 417; Haverin v. Donnell, 7 Smedes & M. 244; Underwood v. Simonds, 12 Metc. 275; Rose v. Learned, 14 Mass. 154; Brown v. Langley, 5 Scott N. R. 249; Sears v. Wright, 24 Me. 278; Dale v. Pope, 4 Littell 166; Tower v. Richardson, 6 Allen, 351; Anderson v. Magruder, 10 Cal. 419; Calhoun v. Davis, 2 Ind. 532; Goddard v. Cutts, 11 Me. 440; Miller v. White, 7 Blackf. 491; Burge v. Dishman, 5 Ind. 272; Potter v. Earnest, 45 Ind. 418, Osborn, J.: "A verbal condition cannot be annexed to a promissory note."

⁶ Adams v. Wilson, 12 Metc. 138; Currier v. Hale, 8 Allen, 47; Campbell v. Hodgson, Gow, 74; Rawson v. Walker, 1 Stark. 361; Brown v. Spofford, 95 U. S. (5 Otto) 482 (1877).

⁷ Benton v. Martin, 52 N. Y. 574; see *ante*, § 68.

⁸ Abbott v. Hendricks, 1 M. & G. 795 (39 E. C. L. R.) See Small v. Clewley, 63 Me. 155.

⁹ Bissinger v. Guiteman, 6 Heisk. 277.

of consideration, we cannot perceive upon what principle such a view could be taken.

Cotemporaneous *written* agreements may be proven to control the effect of negotiable or other instruments as between immediate parties, and those having notice;¹ and a purchaser, after maturity, of a negotiable instrument, would be bound by such agreement when proven.²

SECTION II.

THE FORMAL ELEMENTS AND PHRASES OF BILLS AND NOTES.

§ 82. We have now to consider: 1st, The date; 2d, the amount; 3d, the time of payment; 4th, the place of payment; 5th, name of the drawer or maker; 6th, name of the drawee (if it be a bill); 7th, name of the payee; 8th, the terms of negotiability; 9th, the words of consideration; 10th, the words of advice; and 11th, the attestation.

§ 83. In the first place, as to the date, this is usually written in the right hand corner of the instrument; but no date is essential to the validity of a bill or note;³ and it is of no consequence on what portion of the paper it is written.⁴ If there be no date, it will be considered as dated at the time it was made,⁵ and parol evidence is admissible to show from what time an undated instrument was intended to operate,⁶ or to show that there was a mistake in the date.⁷ When a note without date is made for another's accommodation, the

¹ Goodwin v. Nickerson, 51 Cal. 166. ² Munro v. King, 3 Colorado, 238.

³ Michigan Ins. Co. v. Leavenworth, 30 Vt. 11; Mechanics' &c. Bank v. Schuyler, 7 Cowen, 337; Byles [*74], 166; Edwards, 150; Bayley, 21; Story on Bills, § 37.

⁴ Shepherd v. Graves, 14 Howard, 505.

⁵ Giles v. Bourne, 6 Maule & S. 73; De la Courtier v. Bellamy, 2 Show. 422; Seldenridge v. Connable, 32 Ind. 375.

⁶ Davis v. Jones, 25 L. J. C. P. 91; 17 C. B. 625 (84 E. C. L. R.); Richardson v. Ellet, 10 Texas, 190; Lean v. Lozardi, 27 Mich. 424; Thomson on Bills, 37.

⁷ Drake v. Rogers, 32 Me. 524.

maker authorizes him to fill up the date as he sees fit.¹ An indorsee has been allowed to prove against the maker a mistake in the date of a note, though by such proof the maker was cut off from a defense valid as to the payee.² But a maker would not be admitted to prove a different date as against an indorsee for value, who relied on its apparent date.³ A mistaken date may be rectified in equity.⁴

§ 84. When the paper is payable at a specified time after date, it is almost indispensable that the date should appear on its face, for otherwise, if it be a bill, the drawee cannot tell when it falls due, nor can an indorsee tell whether it be a bill or note. Nor can the holder know when to present it for payment, nor when it will be considered overdue. When the bill or note is payable at sight, or on demand, or on a certain day, the date is not so material; but to avoid difficulty, it should never be omitted.⁵ And it has been questioned whether or not the drawee might not reasonably refuse to accept or pay an undated bill, on account of embarrassments, in respect to remedy and evidence, to which he might be subjected.⁶

§ 85. Bills, checks and notes are sometimes post-dated or ante-dated for purposes of convenience;⁷ and the fact that they are negotiated prior to the day of date, is not a suspicious circumstance against which parties must guard.⁸ The indorsee of a bill which was post-dated, and indorsed by the payee who died the day before the day of date, was held in an English case to have derived title through the indorser, and entitled to recover against the drawer,⁹ and this case has been followed in the United States.¹⁰ So if a note bear date

¹ *Androscoggin Bank v. Kimball*, 10 Cush. 373.

² *Drake v. Rogers*, 32 Me. 524; *Germania Bank of Distler*, 11 N. Y. S. C. (4 Hun). 633.

³ *Huston v. Young*, 33 Me. 85.

⁴ *Paysant v. Ware*, 1 Ala. 160.

⁵ *Story on Notes*, § 48.

⁶ *Story on Bills*, § 37.

⁷ *Gray v. Wood*, 2 Har. & J. 328; *Richter v. Selin*, 8 Serg. & R. 425.

⁸ *Brewster v. McCardel*, 8 Wend. 478; *Edwards on Bills*, 151.

⁹ *Pasmore v. North*, 13 East. 517;

¹⁰ *Brewster v. McCardel*, 8 Wend. 478.

as of a time before the maker became of age, or as of a time when the maker was disqualified by being a *feme covert*, it may be shown in answer to the plea of infancy or coverture, that the period of its actual date or delivery was when no such incapacity or disqualification existed.¹ And if the bill or note be ante-dated or post-dated, as of a time when it would be valid, it may be shown that it was dated or delivered at a time when the party had no capacity to enter into the contract, or that it came within the interdiction of a statute.² And whenever there is a false date to evade the law, the instrument is void as to all parties having notice.³ If the date does not correspond with the declaration, the discrepancy must be explained.⁴ But where it is alleged that a note was made on a certain day (and not that it bore date on that day) it is not a fatal variance that it bears date on another day.⁵

§ 86. *Secondly, as to the amount or sum payable.*—This is usually specified in figures in the upper, or lower, left hand corner of the instrument, as well as in writing in the body of it. Where a difference appears between the words and figures, evidence cannot be received to explain it; but the words in the body of the paper must control;⁶ and if there is a difference between printed and written words, the writ-

¹ Pasmore v. North, 13 East, 517; Story on Notes, § 48.

² Bailey v. Taber, Mass. 286.

³ Serle v. Norton, 9 M. & W. 309; Byles on Bills [*75], 168; Edwards, 151.

⁴ Fitch v. Jones, 5 Ellis & B. 238; Fanshawe v. Pect, 2 H. & N. 1.

⁵ Coxon v. Lyon, 2 Camp. 307; Smith v. Lord, 2 Dow. & L. 759.

⁶ Payne v. Clark, 19 Mo. 152; Riley v. Dickens, 19 Ill. 30; Mears v. Graham, 8 Blackf. 144; Saunderson v. Piper, 5 Bing. N. C. 425. In Smith v. Smith, 1 R. I. 398, it appeared a bill bore the marginal figures "\$175 94," and on its face called for the payment of "three hundred and seventy-five $\frac{3}{10}$ %" expressed as indicated. The clerk of the bank, where it was left for discount, observing the difference between the marginal figures and the words in the body, changed the marginal figure 1 to a 3, thereby conforming them. The Court said: "We do not think the marginal notation constitutes any part of the bill. It is simply a memorandum or abridgment of the contents of the bill for the convenience of reference. The contract is perfect without it. If this is so, any alteration in the figures cannot avoid the contract, because it is no alteration, either material or immaterial, in the contract." Chitty on Bills [*150], 173; Thomson, 40.

ten must control.¹ If the words are so obscurely written or printed as to be indistinct, the figures in the margin may be referred to to explain them.² If by inadvertence the amount is expressed in figures only, it will suffice.³ It has been held in the United States, that where the figures were in the margin of the paper, and the amount was left blank in the body of it, it was fatally defective.⁴ But in England, where the body contained the word "Fifty——," and was blank as to the denomination of money intended, and in the margin "£ fifty" was written, it was held, and that too in a criminal case, that "Fifty——" clearly meant "fifty pounds."⁵

If it had really been the intention of the parties to the paper that the words should be written so as to conform to the figures, it seems clear that there was implied authority to the holder to fill the blank accordingly.⁶ Where the word "dollars" is left out, or the dollar mark is omitted, they will, nevertheless, be supplied in this country,⁷ where, under the like circumstances, "pounds" would be supplied in England.⁸ Where "three hundred dollars" was expressed

¹ 1 Parsons N. & B. 28.

² Riley v. Dickens, 19 Ill. 29; Corgan v. Frew, 39 Ill. 31; Chitty on Bills [*149], 172.

³ Sweetzer v. French, 13 Metc. 262; Petty v. Fleispel, 21 Tex. 169. Corgan v. Frew, 39 Ill. 31, where there was in the margin "\$500," and in the body "five hundred," and it was held to mean "dollars."

In Louisiana it is provided by the Revised Statutes of 1870. as follows:

Sec. 319. No bill of exchange, promissory note, or other obligation for the payment of money, made within this State, shall be received as evidence of a debt, when the whole sum shall be expressed in figure, unless the same shall be accompanied by proof that it was given for the sum therein expressed. The cents or fractional parts of a dollar may be in figures."

⁴ Norwich Bank v. Hyde, 13 Conn. 279; but see Corgan v. Frew, *supra*.

⁵ Rex v. Elliott, 2 East P. C. 951; 1 Leach C. L. 175.

⁶ Bank of Commonwealth v. Curry, 2 Dana, 142; Bank of Limestone v. Penick, 5 Monroe, 25; Norwich Bank v. Hyde, 13 Conn. 279.

⁷ Corgan v. Frew, 39 Ill. 31; Williamson v. Smith, 1 Cold. 1; McCoy v. Gilmore, 7 Ohio, 268; Murrill v. Handy, 17 Mo. 406; Coolbroth v. Purinton, 29 Me. 469; Sweetzer v. French, 13 Metc. 262; Northrop v. Sanborn, 22 Vt. 433; Booth v. Wallace, 2 Root, 247; Harman v. Howe, 27 Grat. 677.

⁸ Rex v. Elliott, 1 Leach C. L. 175; 2 East P. C. 951; Phipps v. Tanner, 5 C. & P. 488.

in a note, it was left to a jury to say whether or not "three, &c.," was intended,¹ and a note for "the sum of fifty-two, 25-100," was held to denote, beyond question, that the fraction meant was "dollars."² So where the note was for "one hundred and ninety-one, fifty cents," the word dollars was supplied.³ The marginal figures are really not a part of the instrument, but a mere memorandum of the amount.⁴

§ 87. *The term dollars.*—When the term "dollars" is used in any security for money given in any of the United States, it is understood to mean dollars "of the lawful money of the United States;" and extraneous evidence will not be permitted as a general rule to give it a different signification.⁵ But under peculiar circumstances, such as arose during the existence of the Confederate States, when the term "dollars" was applied to Confederate currency in all circles, parol or other evidence will be permitted to explain the true meaning and intent with which it was employed.⁶ Thus, in a case before the United States Supreme Court, involving the legal effect of a note for \$10,000, dated Montgomery, Ala. (which was in the Confederate States during the war), November 28th, 1864, Chief Justice Chase, delivering the opinion of the court, said: "It is quite clear that a contract to pay dollars, made between citizens of any State of the Union, while maintaining its constitutional relations with the national government, is a contract to pay lawful money of the United States, and cannot be modified or explained by parol

¹ Burnham v. Allen, 1 Gray, 496.

² Murrill v. Handy, 17 Mo. 406.

³ Beardsley v. Hill, 61 Ill. 354.

⁴ Commonwealth v. Emigrant Ins. Co. 98 Mass. 12; Smith v. Smith, 1 R. I. 398. See *ante*, § 86, and notes.

⁵ Bank v. Supervisors, 7 Wall. 26; Thorington v. Smith, 8 Wall. 12; Omohundro v. Crump, 18 Grat. 705; Lohman v. Crouch, 19 Grat. 321; Smith v. Walker, 1 Call, 24; Commonwealth v. Beaumarchais, 3 Call, 107; Wilcoxon v. Reynolds, 46 Ala. 529; Hightower v. Maull, 50 Ala. 495; Stewart v. Salamon, 94 U. S. (4 Otto), 434.

⁶ Lohman v. Crouch, 19 Grat. 331; Thorington v. Smith, 8 Wall. 12; Donley v. Tindall, 32 Tex. 43; Stewart v. Salamon, 94 U. S. (4 Otto), 434; Confederate Note Case 19 Wall. 548; Wilmington, &c. R. R. v. King, 91 U. S. (1 Otto), 3.

evidence. But it is equally clear, if in any other country coins or notes denominated dollars should be authorized, of different value from the coins or notes which are current here under that name, that, in a suit upon a contract to pay dollars made in that country, evidence would be admitted to prove what kind of dollars were intended, and if it should turn out that foreign dollars were meant, to prove their equivalent value in lawful money of the United States. Such evidence does not modify or alter the contract. It simply explains an ambiguity which, under the general rules of evidence, may be removed by parol evidence."¹ But the same tribunal has held that in the absense of parol testimony it would be presumed that a note payable in one of the Confederate States, during the war, in "dollars," was presumptively payable in lawful money of the United States.² In such cases the Supreme Court of the U. S. holds that the sum payable in actual money must be ascertained by the value in coin, or legal currency of the United States, at the time when and place where the note was made, of the Confederate note, equal in nominal amount to the number of dollars specified.³

§ 88. *Thirdly, as to the time of payment.*—Bills and notes are usually drawn payable at a specified time after date, or after sight, or at sight.⁴ Sometimes they are made payable on demand, or no time is specified, in which case on demand is understood.⁵ A note promising to pay when the maker can make it convenient, has been held payable within a reasonable time;⁶ and it seems that notes payable within a reasonable time are generally regarded as negotiable in the

¹ Thorington v. Smith, 8 Wall. 12.

² The Confederate Note Case, 19 Wall. 548.

³ Stewart v. Salamon, 94 U. S. (4 Otto), 434, (1876).

⁴ Story on Bills, § 50.

⁵ Thompson v. Ketchum, 8 Johns. 189; Green v. Drebillis, 1 Iowa, 552; Stover v. Hamilton, 21 Grat. 273; Bowman v. McChesney, 22 Grat. 609; Whitlock v. Underwood, 2 B. & C. 157; Story on Bills, § 50; Chitty [*151], 174; and interest runs from date, Collier v. Gray, 1 Tenn. 110; see *ante*, §§ 40, 44.

⁶ Lewis v. Tipton, 10 Ohio, N. S. 88.

United States, the law fixing a definite limit to the period to be allowed.¹

When the word month is used in specifying the time of payment, a calendar month is understood; and the word year signifies a calendar year.²

In England, foreign bills are frequently drawn payable at usance or usances; and by usance is meant the common period fixed by customary dealing between the country of the drawer and the country of the place of payment for the payment of bills.³

§ 89. A note payable "when demanded,"⁴ or "on call," or "when called for,"⁵ is not distinguishable from one payable on demand. If payable with interest "twelve months after notice," the amount is due whenever demanded after notice has been given and twelve months have expired;⁶ and where the expression used is "on demand with interest after four months," it is due when four months have expired.⁷ But, in such a case, it has been held that demand might be made immediately, but that interest would not begin until after the time specified.⁸

§ 90. *Fourthly.*—*The place of payment* need not be specified in the bill or note, but very often is. If the drawer designate in the bill a place of payment, he will be discharged, unless it be there presented at maturity, as will also an indorser;⁹ but as to the maker of a note or acceptor of a bill payable at a particular place, unless the restrictive words "only and not elsewhere" be added, no presentment there at maturity or afterwards is necessary to charge him.¹⁰ Where no place of payment is expressed in a note, the place

¹ Bowman v. McChesney, *supra*.

² See Ch. XX on Presentment for Payment.

³ Story on Bills, § 50.

⁴ Bowman v. McChesney, 22 Grat. 609; Kingsbury v. Butler, 4 Vt. 458.

⁵ Bowman v. McChesney, 22 Grat. 609.

⁶ Clayton v. Gosling, 5 B. & C. 360.

⁷ Hobarts v. Dodge, 1 Fairf. 156.

⁸ Loring v. Gurney, 5 Pick. 15.

⁹ See Chapter XX on Presentment for Payment.

¹⁰ See Chapter XX on Presentment for Payment.

of payment is understood to be where the maker resides;¹ and if none be expressed in a bill, where the drawee resides is understood.²

Circumstances, however, may control this inference. Thus, if a bill were drawn upon a merchant abroad addressed to him "at Paris or at London," the place of payment would be deemed the place where he accepted it, whether Paris or London.³ If the drawer direct on the face of the bill that it be paid at his own house, it creates a presumption that it is an accommodation bill; and that he was to pay it; and unless he rebut it by showing that he really had effects in the drawee's hands, notice of dishonor will be dispensed with.⁴

The execution of a note, on its face payable at a bank, the place for the name of which is left blank, at a town named, authorizes the payee, before the maturity of the note, to insert the name of a particular bank at such town in the blank space, so that, whatever limitation of authority may have been imposed by the maker on the payee, and although, by the law of the State, no note is negotiable unless payable at a specified bank, the note will be negotiable, and governed by the law merchant in the hands of a *bona fide* indorsee.⁵ In some of the States of the United States the place of payment is made by statute the criterion of negotiability.⁶

¹ Story on Notes, § 49.

² Chitt^y on Bills (13 Am. ed.), [*151], 174; Story on Bills, § 48.

³ Freese v. Brownell, 35 N. J. (Law), 285; Story on Bills, § 46.

⁴ Sharp v. Bailey, 9 B. & C. 44.

⁵ Gillaspie v. Kelly, 41 Ind. 158; Spittler v. James, 32 Ind. 203. See *post*, § 144.

⁶ Thus in Alabama it is provided by statute, Code of 1867, § 1833, that "Bills of exchange and promissory notes payable in money at a bank or private banking house are governed by the commercial law, except so far as the same is changed by this Code."

In Indiana, by the Revised Statutes of 1852, c. 77, § 6, that "Notes payable to order, or bearer, in a bank in this State, shall be negotiable as inland bills of exchange, and the payees and indorsees thereof may recover as in case of such bills."

It has been held in Georgia, that a note payable at "H. & J.," does not upon its face show that it was made for the purpose of negotiation at a chartered bank; and that the fact that suit thereon is brought against the indorsers by H. & J., and who are described in the pleadings as lately bankers doing business

Where it is necessary to negotiability that the note be payable at a bank in the State, and a note is made in the State payable at a bank, it will be presumed that the bank is in the State.¹

§ 91. *Fifthly, as to the name of the drawer or maker.*—It is of the first importance, indeed indispensable, that the bill or note should point out with certainty the party who enters into the contract imported by its terms, and if the promise be in the alternative, it is not a good negotiable instrument. Thus, where the note ran, “I, A. B., promise to pay,” and was signed “A. B. or else C. D.,” the court said: “This is not a promissory note against this defendant, within

under the name, style and firm of H. & J., is not sufficient to prove that H. & J. is a chartered bank. *Salmons v. Hoyt*, 53 Ga. 493.

In Virginia, the Code (see Code of 1873, c. 141, § 7) provides that “Every promissory note, or check for money, payable in this State (1) at a particular bank, or (2) at a particular office thereof for discount and deposit, or (3) at the place of business of a savings institution or savings bank, or (4) *at the place of business of a licensed broker*; and every inland bill of exchange payable in this State shall be deemed negotiable, and may, upon being dishonored for non-acceptance or non-payment, be protested, and the protest be in such case evidence of dishonor in like manner as in the case of a foreign bill of exchange.”

The words italicised, “*at the place of business of a licensed broker*,” were interpolated by an amendment of the Code in 1866, at the instance of the Richmond brokers. *Acts of Assembly*, 1866, p. 490.

The declaration that every inland bill of exchange payable in this State shall be deemed negotiable, is only confirmatory of the common law. If payable in another State, its negotiability is to be determined there.

In the *Freeman's Bank v. Ruckman*, 16 Grat. 126, the note sued on was executed in Boston, Mass., and was payable “at either of the banking houses in Wheeling, Va.” Judge Moncure said: “The note was not payable at a particular bank, or at a particular office thereof, &c. (following the statute), but ‘at either of the banking houses in Wheeling, Va.’ and therefore is not a negotiable note.” It is not necessary in Virginia that the note in order to be negotiable be expressly payable in that State: “It is certainly true that such note, &c., must on its face be payable in this State, because the section so requires. But it does not require that the State shall be expressly named in the note.” *McVeigh v. Bank of The Old Dominion*, 26 Grat. 830. Moncure, P. See *Woodward v. Gunn*, Virginia L. J. April, 1878, p. 243. In this case it was held, that a note on which the place of payment, after the word at, in a printed note was left blank, but was intended to be filled with the name of a bank in Virginia, thus making the note negotiable, might under the peculiar circumstances which appeared to be treated as negotiable, although in fact the blank for the place of payment was never filled.

¹ *McGuirk v. Cummings*, 54 Ind. 246. See *McVeigh v. Bank of Old Dominion*, 26 Grat. 830, and *supra*.

the statute of Anne. It operates differently as to the two parties. It is the absolute undertaking on the part of Corner (A.) to pay, and it is conditional only on the part of the defendant (B.), who undertakes to pay only in the event of Corner's not paying."¹ But it has been said that such an instrument would be a good note as against A.²

§ 92. The name of the drawer is absolutely needful upon the face of the bill; for without it the drawee cannot tell whether he should accept it or not, or any holder know to whom notice should be given. Indeed, it is paradoxical to speak of a bill without a drawer; for the very term imports a negotiable order drawn by some one.³ And even when such an instrument bears the name of one upon it who signs as acceptor, it is still nothing more than an inchoate paper, which cannot be sued upon unless a drawer's name is authoritatively inserted in it.⁴ And it has been well said that it is "an abuse of terms to say that one was the acceptor of a bill which had never been drawn; or, in other words, that he had accepted an 'order,' or 'request,' that had never been made upon him."⁵

¹ *Ferris v. Bond*, 4 Barn. & Ald. 679; *Story on Notes*, § 34; 1 *Parsons N. & B.* 36-7; *Chitty* [*140], 162.

² *Bytes* (Sharswood's ed.) [*92], 190; see *Edwards on Bills*, 134. This seems to be there implied by the author's language.

³ *Story on Bills*, § 53.

⁴ *McCall v. Taylor*, 19 C. B. N. S. 30; *Tevis v. Young*, 1 Metc. (Ky.) 199; *May v. Miller*, 27 Ala. 515; *Bytes* (Sharswood's ed.) [*83], 178.

⁵ *Tevis v. Young*, 1 Metc. (Ky.) 199. In this case the instrument sued on was in the form of a bill, but no name was signed as drawer. It was dated Shelbyville, and addressed "To W. G. Rogers, Shelbyville;" accepted by Rogers, and indorsed "John Tevis." Suit was brought by Young against Tevis as indorser, and Rogers as acceptor; but it was held that the instrument was incomplete, and the action could not be maintained. It was said by the court, per Duval, J. (Simpson, J., dissenting): "The fallacy of all the reasoning of counsel upon this point, consists in their failure to recognize the distinction between a bill of exchange and the mere form of such an instrument. The words written upon the face of the paper in question are utterly inoperative, and without force or legal effect for any purpose as a commercial instrument, without the name of a drawer, either subscribed to the paper, or inserted in the body of it. Whether the name of the drawer, or of any subsequent party to the bill, be

§ 93. By executing a promissory note, the maker engages to pay the amount therein named to the bearer, if it be payable to bearer; to the payee or order, if it be payable to a particular person or order. By the very act of engaging to pay to a particular payee he acknowledges his capacity to receive the money; and also his capacity to order it to be paid to another. And therefore if the maker is sued by an indorsee of the payee, he cannot defend himself on the ground that the payee had no capacity to indorse it by reason of being an infant,¹ a married woman,² a bankrupt,³ a fictitious person,⁴ a corporation without legal existence,⁵ or that such payee was insane at the time the note was executed;⁶ though, if the payee became insane after the execution of the note, his indorsement would then be a mere nullity, and if the acceptor knew of such insanity he would not be justified in making payment to any one whose title was affected by it.⁷

Forged or fictitious, makes no difference as it respects the liability of the indorser. The indorsement implies an undertaking that the antecedent parties are competent to draw and accept the bill, and that their signatures are genuine. But the indorsement does not imply an undertaking that the paper indorsed contains the names of all the antecedent parties necessary to constitute a valid bill of exchange, when the face of the paper itself shows that it is blank as to all or any of such names. The indorsement of the paper would, doubtless, confer upon the party intrusted with it, authority to fill up the blanks with the names of any parties, at the discretion of the latter; and so, the indorsement of a piece of blank paper would give the holder authority to make a bill of exchange, upon which the indorser would be liable, in the hands of an innocent holder for value, for whatever amount, or in the names of whatever parties the bill might be subsequently drawn and accepted. But certainly it cannot be supposed that in either of the cases stated, the indorser could be held liable, as such, until the paper should have been drawn and executed and completed as a bill of exchange. It is not the mere authority to make a bill, which of itself creates the liability, but it is the execution of that authority."

¹ Taylor v. Croker, 4 Esp. 187; Jones v. Darch, 4 Price, 300; Grey v. Cooper, 3 Doug. 65.

² Smith v. Marsack, 6 C. B. 486, Wilde, C. J.

³ Drayton v. Dale, 2 Barn. & Cress. 293. ⁴ Lane v. Krekle, 26 Wis.

⁵ Ray v. Indianapolis Ins. Co. 39 Ind. 290; John v. Farmer's Bank, 2 Blackf. 367; Vater v. Lewis, 36 Ind. 291; Snyder v. Studebaker, 19 Ind. 462; Greiner v. Ulery, 20 Iowa, 266.

⁶ See Smith v. Marsack, *supra*.

⁷ See Bigelow on Estoppel, 450, 541; Alcock v. Alcock, 3 Man. A. G. 268 (42 E. C. L. R.) The fact of lunacy came to defendant's knowledge pending the trial.

There are authorities which hold that the insanity of the payee at the time the paper was executed may be shown;¹ but they have been sharply criticised,² and do not accord with the general principle of estoppel applied to negotiable paper.

§ 94. *Joint and several notes.*—A note by two or more makers may be either joint, or joint and several. A note signed by more than one person, and beginning "we promise," is joint only.³ A joint and several note usually expresses that the makers jointly and severally promise. But a note signed by more than one person, and beginning "I promise," is several as well as joint;⁴ and so also is one signed by two makers, and running "we or either of us promise to pay."⁵

If a note be signed by a person in the name of a firm, whether that name represents in form more than one person, as "A. & Co.," or only one person, as "A.," it is in both cases the joint note of the firm, and all the partners will be bound, whether the language be "I," or "We" promise.⁶ If the note runs "We promise," and is signed "A. B., principal; C. D., surety," it is still the joint note of both; and if it were written "I promise," and signed in the same manner, it would be the joint and several note of both.⁷ A joint and several note, though on one piece of paper, comprises in reality and in legal effect, several notes.⁸ Thus if A., B. & C. make a joint and several note, there is the several note of each, and

¹ Peaslee v. Robbins, 3 Metc. (Mass.) 164. ² Bigelow on Estoppel, 450, 451.

³ Barrett v. Funay, 38 Ind. 86; Thomson on Bills, 156.

⁴ Monson v. Drakely, 40 Conn. 552; Maiden v. Webster, 30 Ind. 317; Holman v. Gilliam, 6 Rand. 39; Hemmenway v. Stone, 7 Mass. 58; Barrett v. Skinner, 2 Bailey, 88; Marsh v. Ward, Peake, 130; Partridge v. Colby, 19 Barb. 248; Ladd v. Baker, 6 Fost. 76; Lane v. Salter, 4 Rob. (N. Y.) 239; Galway v. Mathew, 1 Camp. 462.

⁵ Pogue v. Clark, 25 Ill. 335; Harvey v. Irvine, 11 Iowa, 82.

⁶ Rees v. Abbott, Cowper, 832.

⁷ Hunt v. Adams, Mass. 358; Palmer v. Grant, 4 Conn. 389.

⁸ Fletcher v. Dyte, 2 T. R. 6; Byles, 78.

the joint note of all—in all four notes.¹ The joint note may be valid, though the several notes are void.²

§ 95. *Two or more drawers.*—The drawer of a bill is generally a single person or a copartnership firm, or a corporation. But two or more persons may unite in drawing a bill.³ And they may make it payable to their joint order, or to the order of either of them, or to a third person or order. Sometimes another person unites with the drawer as a surety, and such person is called a “surety-drawer.” Where several persons unite in drawing a bill of exchange upon a person in whose hands they have no funds, and the bill is accepted and paid, all of them are bound to the acceptor, and neither one of them can show that he signed as surety for the others, and that the drawee knew the fact when he accepted the bill.⁴ The doctrine has been carried farther, and it has been held that if A. and B. draw on C. without having funds in his hands, and B. signs himself surety, both must be considered as drawers to all the parties to the bill, as well to the acceptor as the payee, for the acceptor may have been induced to accept the bill quite as much as the payee or other holder to take it, because B., as surety of A., was liable to him for payment in the character of joint drawers.⁵

In New York a different view is taken, on the ground that the liability of a joint drawer extends to the payee or subsequent holder alone, and even if he draws the bill, with the understanding that he is to be liable to the acceptor, such a contract would be a parol promise to pay the debt of another, and void under the statute of frauds.⁶ But this view does not seem to us tenable.⁷

¹ King v. Houre, 13 M. & W. 565.

² McClae v. Sutherland, 3 E. & B. 1 (77 E. C. L. R.); Byles (Sharswood's ed.) [*8], 79.

³ Suydam v. Westfall, 4 Hill, 211; 2 Denio, 205.

⁴ Suydam v. Westfall, 4 Hill, 211; 2 Denio, 205.

⁵ Swilley v. Lyon, 18 Ala. 558; Story on Bills, § 420.

⁶ Griffith v. Reed, 21 Wend. 502; Wing v. Terry, 5 Hill, 160.

⁷ Story on Bills, § 420; Edwards on Bills, § 376.

§ 96. *Sixthly; as to the drawee.*—A bill of exchange being an open letter of request from the drawer to a third person, supposed to be under obligation to accept the bill, should be regularly addressed to such person by his christian name and surname, and also by a designation of his place of residence; and if it is addressed to a firm, the name of the firm should be expressed in the address.¹

Such, at least, is requisite to perfect the bill in a proper and business-like manner; and without such accuracy in the address, it does not appear who should be called upon to accept or pay it, or who would be justified in so doing. In an early English case, it was held that it was not necessary that the bill should have a drawee;² but that case has been distinctly repudiated, and both in England and in the United States it is settled doctrine that a drawee must be pointed out.³ But the *bona fide* holder of a check without a drawee,

¹ Byles (Sharswood's ed.) [*84], 179; Chitty on Bills (13th Am. ed.) [*164], 188; Story on Bills, § 58.

² Regina v. Hawkes, 2 Moo. C. C. 60.

³ Peto v. Reynolds, 9 Exch. 410. Alderson, B., said: "With respect to the question whether this instrument is or is not a bill of exchange, the case of Regina v. Hawkes is undoubtedly in point. I must own, however, that I now think I was wrong on that occasion. The case seems to have been decided on the ground that Milner v. Gray, 8 Taunt. 739, governed it; and the fact was not adverted to, that Gray v. Milner may be thus explained: that a bill of exchange made payable at a particular place or house, is meant to be addressed to the person who resides at that place or house. Therefore, in that case, the bill was on the face of it directed to some one; and the court held, that, inasmuch as the defendant promised to pay it, that was conclusive evidence that he was the party to whom it was addressed. But in the case of Regina v. Hawkes, the instrument was addressed to no one." See, also, Reynolds v. Peto, 11 Exch. 418; Watrous v. Hallbrook, 39 Texas, 572.

In Ball v. Allen, 15 Mass. 435, Parker, C. J., says: "The mere possession of a paper drawn in the form of an order, there being no drawee in existence, we think, cannot entitle the possessor to an action in any form, for the paper may have been carelessly dealt with as being imperfect, and may have come to the possessor by finding.

"It is enough for the purpose of justice, that the holder of such a paper may entitle himself to recover, merely by showing that he paid for it, or that he came otherwise fairly by it; for it can rarely happen that he will be unable to produce the person for whom he received it. If the circumstances are such as induce him to decline producing evidence of the manner in which the paper

which has been issued as a memorandum of indebtedness, may recover on account for money had and received.¹

§ 97. Where a bill was drawn payable to the drawer's order, and there was added "Payable at No. 1 Wilmot street, opposite the Lamb, Bethnal Green, London," and was accepted by one Milner, it was held sufficient, upon the ground that it must be considered as directed to the person residing at that house, and acceptance by the defendant was acknowledgment that he was intended as the drawee.² Such a bill—any accepted bill without a drawee—is considered by many authorities as defective in its inception, but perfected by acceptance, the acceptor being estopped to deny that he was the drawee.³ And this seems the correct doctrine. But it was regarded in the case above cited as informal, but valid.⁴ That decision, however, has been questioned.⁵

§ 98. If the bill be addressed to A., or in his absence to B., it is sufficient and valid, and will bind whichever accepts as acceptor.⁶ And it has been thought that a direction to A. or B. in the alternative, would be sufficient if both were at the same place at the same time.⁷ If the bill is drawn upon A., B. and C., it may be accepted by A. and B. only, and they will be bound as acceptors, and it will be no variance to allege in the declaration that it was drawn upon A. and

came to him, no probable harm will be the result of his loss of the money." Story on Bills, § 58; 1 Parsons N. & B. 61; 2 Robinson's Practice (new ed.) 144.

¹ Ellis v. Wheeler, 3 Pick. 19; see Ball v. Allen, *supra*.

² Gray v. Milner, 8 Taunt. 739; 3 Moore, 90. Dallas, C. J., said the instrument was clearly a bill of exchange; and that, "it being directed to a particular place, could only mean to the person who resided there; and that the defendant, by accepting it, acknowledged that he was the person to whom it was directed."

³ Wheeler v. Webster, 1 E. D. Smith, 3; Thomson on Bills, 46; Grierson v. Sutherland, Scotch Case therein cited; Chitty on Bills [*164], 188; 1 Parsons N. & B. 288-9.

⁴ Gray v. Milner, *supra*; Edwards on Bills, 174.

⁵ Davis v. Clarke, 6 Q. B. 16; see, also, Peto v. Reynolds, *supra*; Story on Bills (Bennett's ed.), 58; 1 Parsons N. & B. 62.

⁶ Anonymous, 12 Mod. 447; Chitty, Junior, 216.

⁷ Marius on Bills, 16; Story on Bills (Bennett's ed.) § 58.

B., without referring to C.¹ But if a bill is intended to be accepted by two persons, it should be addressed to both, otherwise, though accepted by both, it will bind only the drawee as acceptor, as there cannot be a series of acceptors.² The drawer and drawee may be the same person, but such an instrument would be actionable without acceptance.³

By the French and English usage, the address is uniformly at the left hand lower corner, upon the face of the bill; but the Italians and Dutch, as it seems, write it on the back of the bill.⁴ But it is not supposed that the place of the address is essential, if it distinctly appear what was intended.

§ 99. *Seventhly; as to the payee.*—The bill or note must point out with certainty the party who is to receive the money—that is, it must designate a payee.⁵ But the payee need not be named in person, it being sufficient if some one be indicated. Thus if the instrument be payable to A. or bearer, or to bearer, or to the holder, or to order, it is intended to mean whoever comes in lawful possession, and the holder may sue upon it.⁶ If the note be written “due the bearer \$100, which I promise to pay A. or order,” it is payable not to the bearer, but to A. or order.⁷ And whenever a bill or note is payable to a certain person or order, it is payable to whomsoever the payee named may by indorsement order it to be paid.⁸

So the instrument, though not naming a payee on its face, yet if it furnishes a sufficient description by which he may be ascertained, it is sufficient; the maxim applying *id*

¹ Mountstephen v. Brooke, 1 Barn. & Ald. 224; Story on Bills, § 58.

² Davis v. Clarke, 6 Ad. & El. N. S. 16; Jackson v. Hudson, 2 Camp. 447; see Chapter XVIII on Acceptance.

³ See Chapter V on Irregular, &c. Instruments.

⁴ Story on Bills (Bennett's ed.) § 58, note 1.

⁵ Rich v. Starbuck, 51 Ind. 87.

⁶ Mechanics' Bank v. Straiton, 3 Abbott N. Y. App. 269; Hathwick v. Owen, 44 Miss. 803.

⁷ Cock v. Fellows, 1 Johns. 143; see *post*, § 102.

⁸ See Chapter XXI on Transfer by Indorsement.

certum est quod certum reddi potest. Thus it suffices if it be payable to "the administrators of the estate of A.;"¹ or to the "trustees acting under the will of A.;"² or to the "heirs of A.," though A. were then alive;³ or to "A. or his heirs;"⁴ or to the order of the person who should thereafter indorse it;⁵ for in all such cases the payee is ascertainable.

§ 100. Where the writing ran, "I owe the estate of A. B. \$190," it was held that no payee was sufficiently designated, and it was inferred under the circumstances to be a mere memorandum of a balance due.⁶ But it has been held that a note regular in form, payable "to the estate of T. A. Thornton," might be sued on by Thornton's personal representative.⁷ The contrary view, however, has been taken.⁸ If a note is payable to A., and there are two persons of the same name, father and son, it seems that it would be *prima facie* payable to the father;⁹ but the son being in possession, and bringing the action, would be entitled to recover.¹⁰ Wherever there is any misdescription or misspelling of the payee's name, it may be shown who was really intended.¹¹

§ 101. If the note were made payable "to the secretary for the time being of a certain society," it would not be

¹ Adams v. King, 16 Ill. 169; Moody v. Threlkeld, 13 Ga. 55.

² Megginson v. Harper, 2 Cramp. & M. 322.

³ Bacon v. Fitch, 1 Root, 181.

⁴ Knight v. Jones, 21 Mich. 161.

⁵ United States v. White, 2 Hill, 59.

⁶ Bowles v. Lambert, 35 Ill. 239.

⁷ Hendrick's Ex's. v. Thornton, 45 Ala. 300.

⁸ Tittle v. Thomas, 30 Miss. 132; Lyon v. Marshall, 11 Barb. 248, Edwards, J.: "The instrument sued upon (by Lyon's representatives) was made payable to the 'estate of Moses Lyon, deceased,' and not to any person or persons by name. Such an instrument is clearly not a promissory note under the statute. But whatever it may be considered, it certainly is not a promise to pay the testator, for he is described as deceased. It could only be recovered upon as a promise to pay some other person or persons. If it be regarded as a promise to pay the plaintiffs, as it was treated in this case, there was no necessity for their suing in a representative capacity; and having done so unnecessarily, they are liable to pay costs, without a special motion or order for that purpose."

⁹ Sweeting v. Fowler, 1 Starkie, 106; Wilson v. Stubbs, Hobart, 330.

¹⁰ Stebbing v. Spicer, 19 L. J. C. P. 24; 8 C. B. 827 (65 E. C. L. R.).

¹¹ Jacobs v. Benson, 29 Me. 132; Willis v. Barrett, 2 Starkie, 29; Hall v. Tafts, 18 Pick. 455.

sufficient, as it would be a floating promise, the performance of which would be made to the person being secretary at its maturity;¹ but if it be payable "to the now secretary" of a certain society, it would be different, as such person could be immediately and definitely ascertained.² And if payable to the "trustees of W. Chapel, or their treasurer for the time being," it would suffice, as the trustees are the real payees, the treasurer being merely designated as their agent to receive payment.³ So it would suffice if payable to "the treasurer or his successors in office" of a corporation named; for the corporation would then be the real payee, and the treasurer its agent to receive payment.⁴ And such would also be the effect of a note payable "to the treasurer of a corporation," the corporation, but not the treasurer, being named.⁵

§ 102. If no one be named or definitely referred to as payee, the instrument is fatally incomplete; and therefore "\$500 on demand, value received,"⁶ is mere waste paper, and so also papers running "Good for one hundred and twenty-six dollars on demand,"⁷ and "pay on within \$750."⁸ But "received of A. one hundred dollars, which I promise to pay on demand,"⁹ is regarded as sufficient, it being inferred that A. is the payee.

Pothier puts a case quite similar: "If," says he, "the drawer should omit the name of the payee, but should draw

¹ *Storm v. Sterling*, 3 Ellis & B. 382.

² *Ibid.*; *Robertson v. Steward*, 1 Man. & G. 511; *Davis v. Garr*, 2 Seld. 124; *Rex v. Box*, 6 Taunt. 325.

³ *Holmes v. Jacques*, 1 Q. B. 376.

⁴ *Fisher v. Ellis*, 3 Pick. 322; *Rogers v. Gibson*, 15 Ind. 218.

⁵ *McBrown v. Corporation of Lebanon*, 31 Ind. 268; *Vater v. Lewis*, 36 Ind. 293.

⁶ *Gibson v. Minet*, 1 H. Bl. 569.

⁷ *Brown v. Gilman*, 13 Mass. 158; see also *Mayo v. Chenoweth*, Breese, 155; *Mathews v. Redwine*, 23 Miss. 233; *Enthoven v. Hoyle*, 13 C. B. 373.

⁸ *Douglass v. Wilkeson*, 6 Wend. 637.

⁹ *Green v. Davies*, 4 B. & C. 235; *Ashby v. Ashby*, 3 Moore & P. 186; *Chadwick v. Allen*, 2 Stra. 706.

the bill in this form: "Pay a thousand livres at sight, value received of A. B.," it appears to me reasonable to presume that the drawer intended that the bill should be payable to the person from whom the value had been received, as no other person is named, to whom it ought to be paid."¹ He adds, however, that he has learned from an experienced merchant, that bankers would make a difficulty as to paying such a bill.²

§ 103. *Alternative payees.*—A note payable to A. or to B. is not negotiable, for, as said by Abbott, C. J., in an English case: "For if a note is made payable to one or other of two persons, it is payable to either of them only on the contingency of its not having been paid to the other, and is not a good promissory note within the statute."³ The same views have obtained in some of the United States, but the cases are not uniform on the subject. In Illinois, where the note was payable to "Olive Fletcher or R. H. Oakes, administrators of Winslow Fletcher, deceased," Caton, C. J., said: "The instrument sued on was payable in the alternative to one of two persons, and for that reason is not a promissory note, and could not be sued on as such. * * Here the promise was to pay Fletcher or Oakes, but which is uncertain; which of them had the right to receive the pay is not specified, and the legal right to the money is not vested in either."⁴ In New York, it has also been held that a note payable in the alternative is not negotiable; but, value received being expressed, it might be sued on as a non-negotiable note.⁵ And likewise in New Hampshire, but it was thought that action might be brought in the name of all the payees.⁶

¹ Pothier de Change, n. 31; Story on Bills, § 55.

² Story on Bills, § 55.

³ Blanckenhagen v. Blundell, 2 Barn. & Ald. 418 (1819); Osgood v. Pearson, 4 Gray, 455; Carpenter v. Farnsworth, 106 Mass. 561; Story on Bills, § 54.

⁴ Musselman v. Oakes, 19 Ill. 81 (1857).

⁵ Walrad v. Petrie, 4 Wend. 576 (1830).

⁶ Willoughby v. Willoughby, 5 N. H. 245 (1830), approved in Quinby v. Merritt, 11 Humph. 440 (1850).

Opposing decisions have been rendered in South Carolina,¹ and by one of the Circuit Courts of the United States,² where it has been held that a note payable in the alternative is payable to, and may be sued upon by, either one of the payees; but in neither case was the English precedent above quoted before the court. And it may be considered as settled that a bill or note payable in the alternative is not negotiable.

§ 104. *In the eighth place; as to the terms of negotiability.*—It was formerly held that a bill payable to A. or bearer was not negotiable;³ but the contrary doctrine is now well established.⁴ It was also at one time a matter of doubt whether it was not essential to the character of a bill of exchange that it should be negotiable—that is to say, that it should be payable “to A. or order,” or “to A. or bearer,” or “to bearer;” for otherwise it was thought to be a mere common law contract.⁵ But it is now well settled that it is not necessary to constitute a bill of exchange that it should be negotiable, and that it is entitled to grace, and is in all respects a bill, though containing no negotiable words.⁶ Nor are such words necessary to the character of a promissory note, nor to entitle it to grace, though wherever the statute of Anne has been adopted, or its principles obtain,

¹ Ellis v. McLemore, 1 Bailey (So. Car.) Law R. 13 (1830).

² Spaulding v. Evans, 2 McLean, 139 (1840).

³ Hodges v. Steward, 1 Salk. 125.

⁴ Grant v. Vaughan, 3 Burr. 1516. In some States peculiar phrases are essential to negotiability of promissory notes. In Alabama, Indiana and Virginia, they must be expressed to be payable in bank. (See *ante*, chapter on Formal Requisites, § 90—Place of payment.) In Arkansas the words “without devaluation” must be used (see act of April 10, 1869); and in Missouri, “for value received” must be used in a note, but not in a bill; Lowenstein v. Knopf, 2 Mo. App. 159 (see Code of Missouri, chap. 86, § 15). In very many States similar statutes to that of Anne have been enacted. In Illinois a note payable to “A. or bearer,” is not under the statute deemed negotiable; Garvin v. Wiswell, 83 Ill. 218. See first §§ 663, 1496.

⁵ Story on Bills, § 60.

⁶ Averett's Adm'r v. Booker, 15 Grat. 167; Michigan Bank v. Eldred, 9 Wall. 544; Wel's v. Brigham, 6 Cush. 6; Story on Bills, § 60; Chitty [*159], 182.

they or some similar words are requisite to its negotiability; ¹ and they are also requisite to the negotiability of a bill, as without some such words, making the instrument payable to A. or order, or to bearer, or to A. or assigns, the power to transfer it so as to give a right of action to the indorsee against prior parties is not imparted.² But the indorsement would give a right of action against the payee himself, as it is, in legal effect, the drawing of a bill on the party who is, or is to be, primarily liable for payment, that is the drawee, acceptor, or maker.³

§ 105. If the bill or note be payable to a certain person only, it is not negotiable so as to bind the maker or drawer in the hands of any other person than the payee,⁴ though the payee, if he indorse it, will be bound thereon to his immediate indorsee.⁵ If it be payable "to the bearer A.," it is the same as if simply payable to A., and is not negotiable.⁶ But if payable to A. or bearer, it is the same as if payable to bearer.⁷ And if payable to order only, it has been held the same as payable to bearer.⁸ But if payable "to the order of A.," it is the same as if payable to A. or order.⁹

§ 106. No precise form of words is necessary to impart negotiability. As has been said in Pennsylvania, "'order' or 'bearer' are convenient and expressive, but clearly not the only words which will communicate the quality of negotiability. Some equivalent words should be used. Words

¹ *Ibid.*; *Smith v. Kendall*, 6 T. R. 123; 1 Esp. 231; *Rex v. Box*, 6 Taunt. 328; *Burchell v. Slocock*, 2 Lor 1 Raym. 1545; 1 Parsons N. & B. 227; *Maule v. Crawford*, 21 N. Y. S. C. (14 Hun), 193; *Hisford v. Stone*, 7 Nebraska, 380; and words "without defalcation or discount" will not suffice.

² *Douglass v. Wilkeson*, 6 Wend. 637; *United States v. White*, 2 Hill (N. Y.) 59; *Story on Bills*, § 60.

³ *Hill v. Lewis*, 1 Salk. 132; *Ballingalls v. Gloster*, 3 East, 482; *Smallwood v. Vernon*, 1 Strange, 478; *Thomson on Bills*, 53; *Story on Bills*, § 60.

⁴ *Hackney v. Jones*, 3 Humph. 612; *Warren v. Scott*, 32 Iowa, 22; *Hill v. Lewis*, 1 Salk. 132. See *post*, § 633.

⁵ *Warren v. Scott*, 32 Iowa, 22.

⁶ See *Story on Bills*, §§ 119, 199, 202.

⁷ *Eddy v. Bond*, 19 Me. 461.

⁸ *Davega v. Moore*, 3 McCord, 482.

⁹ *Frederick v. Cotton*, 2 Shower, 8; *Smith v. McClure*, 5 East, 476; *Story on Bills*, § 56; *Howard v. Palmer*, 64 Me. 86; *Durgin v. Bartol*, Id. 473.

in a bill, from which it can be inferred that the person making it, or any other party to it, intended it to be negotiable, will give it a transferable quality against that person. The concession, therefore, may be made, that if the makers of this note, having omitted the usual words to express negotiability, had said, 'this note is and shall be negotiable' it would have been negotiable."¹

§ 107. A note may be made negotiable at one bank, and payable at another, the word negotiable not importing, as we have already seen, that the note is also payable where it is negotiable. But making the note negotiable at a particular bank has in itself a meaning. And in a case where the note was negotiable at the Union Bank of Georgetown, in Maryland, but payable at the Bank of Potomac, in Alexandria, Virginia, Chief Justice Marshall said:² "By making a note negotiable in bank, the maker authorizes the bank to advance on his credit to the owner the sum expressed on its face. It would be a fraud in the bank to set up offsets against this note in consequence of any transactions between the parties. These offsets are waived, and cannot, after the note has been discounted, be again set up." At the time of the decision, by the laws in force in Alexandria, Virginia, an offset might have been pleaded against the assignee, as the note was not under the Virginia laws negotiable, while, if governed by the laws of Maryland in force in Georgetown, it was a negotiable note; but the chief justice thought it entirely immaterial whether the question was governed by the laws of the one State or the other, on the grounds above stated.³

§ 108. *In the ninth place; as to the words of consideration.*—The words "value received" are almost invariably expressed in bills of exchange and promissory notes, and they were at one time thought essential, by the custom of mer-

¹ Raymond v. Middleton, 29 Penn. St. 530, Porter, J.; see U. S. v. White, 2 Hill (N. Y.) 59.

² Mandeville v. Union Bank, 9 Cranch, 9 (1815).

³ See *post*, § 325-6.

chants, to impart negotiability to the instrument.¹ But it is now well settled that they only express what the law itself implies from the execution of the paper;² and it has been said that they “are only inserted *ex majori cautela*, in order that the payee may be able to recover upon it in an action for money lent, or money had and received, in case the instrument should be defective in other respects, as a bill of exchange.”³

When the words “value received” are inserted in a note, it is obvious that they import value received by the maker from the payee;⁴ but where a bill is drawn payable to the order of a third person, they are ambiguous.

They may mean either value received by the acceptor from the drawer, or by the drawer of the payee. But the latter is the more natural and probable construction; for, as said by Lord Ellenborough, it is more natural “that the party who draws the bill should inform the drawee of a fact which he does not know, than one of which he must be well aware.”⁵ When, however, the bill is drawn payable to the drawer’s own order, the words “value received” must mean received by the acceptor of the drawer; and in such a bill, if the declaration state that it was for value received by the drawer, it will be a variance.⁶ A declaration on an

¹ Byles on Bills (Sharswood’s ed.) [*82], 176; Edwards on Bills, 56; see 2 Bl. Com. 468. In Missouri they are essential to the negotiability of promissory notes under the statute, but not to bills. Code, chap. 86, § 15; Bailey v. Smock, 61 Mo. 213; Lowenstein v. Knopf, 2 Mo. App. 159.

² Poplewell v. Wilson, 1 Strange, 274 (1719); Macleod v. Snee, 2 Ld. Raym. 1481 (1727); Grant v. Da Costa, 3 Maule & S. 351 (1815); Hatch v. Frayes, 11 Ad. & El. 702; Underhill v. Phillips, 17 N. Y. S. C. (10 Hun), 591; Kendall v. Galvin, 15 Me. 131; Townsend v. Derby, 3 Mete. 363; Hubble v. Fogartie, 3 Rich. 413; Leonard v. Walker, Brayton, 203; Arnold v. Sprague, 34 Vt. 402; Hughes v. Wheeler, 8 Cow. 77; People v. McDermott, 8 Cal. 288; 1 Parsons N. & B. 193; Bayley on Bills, 33; Thomson, 53; Byles (Sharswood’s ed.) [*82], 177; Chitty [*161], 185; Story on Bills, § 63; Story on Notes, § 51; Edwards on Bills, 56, 169.

³ White v. Ledwick, 4 Doug. 247 (1785), Ashurst, J.

⁴ Clayton v. Gosling, 5 B. & C. 361 (11 E. C. L. R.); 8 D. & R. 110.

⁵ Grant v. Da Costa, 3 Maule & S. 351.

⁶ Highmore v. Primrose, 5 Maule & S. 65.

action on a bill of exchange need not state that any value has been received, although it is stated on the face of the bill,¹ and the like rule applies to actions on note.²

§ 109. *In the tenth place, as to the words of advice.*—Sometimes the words “without further advice,” or, “as per advice,” are inserted in bills of exchange; and when the latter appear, they warn the drawee not to accept or pay the bill until he receives advice respecting it. And if he disregards the intimation, he acts at his peril.³ Such words are altogether unnecessary; but by admonishing the drawee to await advice, they sometimes serve as safeguards against alterations; and Mr. Chitty says that every prudent drawer ought to send a distinct letter of advice, and that no prudent drawee should accept without having previously received one, stating the sum for which the bill is drawn.⁴

§ 110. *In the eleventh place, as to the statement of account.*—Words are frequently inserted in bills of exchange, indicating the account to which they are to be charged; but they are not essential.⁵ If the drawee be debtor to the drawer, “put it to your account,” is usually inserted; but if the drawer is himself to be the debtor, he inserts “and put it to my account.” And where the amount is to be credited to a third person, “put to the account of A. B.”⁶

In Indiana, where A. sued B. upon the following instrument:

“Mr. B.:

“Sir, Please pay to ‘A.’ or order the sum of one hundred and nineteen dollars on said bill of 1 $\frac{3}{4}$ in. lumber, and oblige the firm of

[SIGNED]

“C. & Co.”

“I accept.”

[SIGNED]

“B.”

¹ Grant v. Da Costa, 3 Maule & S. 351.

² Underhill v Phillips, 17 N. Y. S. C. (10 Hun), 591.

³ Byles on Bills [*86], 182; Edwards on Bills, 172; Story on Bills, § 65.

⁴ Chitty on Bills [*162], 187.

⁵ Laing v. Barclay, 1 B. & C. 392; 2 D. & R. 530; Chitty on Bills [*162], 186.

⁶ Ibid.

it was held that the instrument possessed all the characteristics of a bill of exchange.¹

§ 111. *Provision in case of need.*—Sometimes provision is made, in the bill, that the holder in case of need shall apply to another drawee; by which is meant, that if the first drawee refuse to honor the bill, the second shall be resorted to. The holder is bound to apply to the party so indicated, and he may accept or pay the bill without protest. The usual form is: “*In case of need, apply to Messrs. C. & D., at E.*,”² or in French, “*au besoin chez Messrs. C. & D., à E.*” In the event that the party so pointed out pays the bill, the drawer will be liable to him for the full amount.³

§ 112. *In the twelfth place; as to the attestation.*—It is not necessary that there should be an attesting witness to a bill or note, though in many cases one is resorted to as matter of convenience.⁴ Where the instrument is signed by a marksman, or by initials only, it may be important to have the act attested by a witness, in order to establish the genuineness of the mark or initials, and the occasion of its execution.⁵ When there is an attesting witness, the signature or mark to the instrument must be proved by him and not otherwise, unless by reason of his death, absence from the country, or other cause, he cannot be produced at the trial;⁶ but when such is the case, the next best evidence, that is, proof of the party's signature or mark, is not required, but proof of the attesting witness' signature is required instead.⁷

¹ Spurgin v. McPheeters, 42 Ind. 527.

² Chitty on Bills [*165], 189; Story on Bills, § 65.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Chitty on Bills (13 Am. ed.) [*166], 190; Story on Notes, § 54; Edwards on Bills, 175.

⁵ Story on Notes, § 54.

⁶ Greenleaf on Evidence, §§ 569, 572; Chitty on Bills [*166], 190; Edwards on Bills, 175; 2 Parsons N. & B. 474; Stone v. Metcalf, 1 Starkie, 53; Lemon v. Deane, 2 Camp. 636; M'Craw v. Gentry 3 Camp. 232; Burt v. Walker, 4 Barn. & Ald. 697; Richards v. Frankum, 9 Car. & P. 211; January v. Goodman, 1 Dallas, 208.

⁷ Greenleaf on Evidence, § 575; Story on Notes, § 54; Chitty on Bills (13 Am. ed.) [*166], 190; 2 Parsons N. & B. 480; Page v. Newman, Mood. & M. 79;

Such is also the rule where the attesting witness is blind¹ or insane.² Such are the rules of evidence of the common law on this subject. In regard to promissory notes the rule has been so far relaxed, in some cases, that the admission of the party that he executed the instrument may be shown without calling the subscribing witness.³ And the doctrine has been repudiated that those who attest such an instrument are agreed upon as the only witnesses to prove it; but only applied where the note is fully identified, and there is no chance of mistake in respect to what the party intended to admit.⁴ In England, by statute of 1854, such instruments may be proved by other than subscribing witnesses.⁵

If the attesting witness is not able to prove the signature, by reason of not having seen the party write, secondary evidence is admissible.⁶ So if he does not recollect his own signature, it may be proved by other testimony;⁷ and so if his own testimony is not clear.⁸

SECTION III.

THE SEVERAL PARTS OF A FOREIGN BILL CALLED A SET.

§ 113. In order to avoid delay and inconvenience which may result from the loss or miscarriage of a foreign bill, and to facilitate and expedite its transmission for acceptance or payment, the custom has prevailed from an early period for the drawer to draw and deliver to the payee several parts of the same bill of exchange, which may be forwarded by

Kay v. Brookman, Id. 286; Shiver v. Johnson, 2 Brev. 397; Dunbar v. Marden, 13 N. H. 311.

¹ Wood v. Doury, 1 Ld. Raym. 734. But see Cronk v. Frith, 9 Car. & P. 179.

² Nelson v. Whittall, 1 B. & Ald. 22, note; Carrie v. Child, 3 Camp. 293.

³ Shaver v. Ehle, 16 Johns. 201; Hall v. Phelps, 2 Id. 451; Henry v. Bishop, 2 Wend. 575; Williams v. Floyd, 11 Penn. St. 499; Hodges v. Eastman, 12 Vt. 358; Edwards on Bills, 176.

⁴ Shaver v. Ehle, 15 Johns. 201; Edwards on Bills, 176.

⁵ Edwards on Bills, 176.

⁶ Lemon v. Dean, 2 Camp. 636.

⁷ Shiver v. Johnson, 2 Brev. 397; Quimby v. Buzzell, 16 Me. 470.

⁸ Walker v. Warfield, 6 Metc. 466.

different conveyances, and any one of them being paid the others are to be void. These several parts are called a set, and constitute in law one and the same bill.¹ Sometimes there are four, but usually three parts.² And if any person undertakes to draw or deliver a foreign bill to another person, it seems that he is bound to deliver the usual number of parts,³ and it has been thought that the promisee may in such a case demand as many parts as he pleases.⁴ But this is questionable.⁵

In Europe, it is not unusual for the original bill to be forwarded for acceptance, and, in the meantime, a copy of it negotiated.⁶ But this practice is not followed in England or in the United States.⁷

§ 114. It is usual for the drawer, and to his protection it is essential, to incorporate in each part of the set, a condition that it shall only be payable provided the other remain unpaid; in other respects the parts are identical in terms. Thus the first part should be expressed: "Pay this my first of exchange—second and third remaining unpaid," where there are three parts, or where there are four parts there should be added, "second, third, and fourth remaining unpaid."⁸ This condition operates as notice to the world that all the parts constitute one bill, and that if the drawee pay any part the whole is extinguished.⁹ The condition should mention every part of the set, for if a person intending to make a set of three parts should omit the condition in the

¹ Story on Bills, § 66; Edwards on Bills, 161; Byles [*376], 555; Chitty [*155], 178; 1 Parsons N. & B. 58, 60; Thomson on Bills, 45; Bayley on Bills, 24.

² Ibid.

³ Kearney v. West Granada Mining Co. 1 H. & N. 412; Byles [*376], 555; Thomson, 46, 92.

⁴ Chitty on Bills [*154], 178; Edwards, 151; Byles [*376], 556.

⁵ Story on Bills, § 66.

⁶ Byles on Bills (Sharswood's ed.) [*377], 557.

⁷ 1 Parsons N. & B. 60.

⁸ Thomson on Bills, 45; Bayley, 24; Chitty [*155], 178.

⁹ Holdsworth v. Hunter, 10 B. & C. 449; Wells v. Whitehead, 15 Wend. 527; Durkin v. Cranston, 7 Johns. 442; Ingraham v. Gibbs, 2 Dallas, 134; Byles [*376], 555; Edwards, 161.

first, and make the second with a condition, mentioning the first only, and in the third take notice only of the other two, he might be obliged to pay each, for it would be no defense to an action by a *bona fide* holder on the second that he had paid the third, nor to an action on the first that he had paid either of the others.¹ But an omission is not material, perhaps, which upon the face of the condition must necessarily have arisen from a mistake, as if mention of an intermediate part were omitted, for instance, "pay this my first of exchange, second and fourth unpaid."²

§ 115. The indorser or transferer is bound to pass to his transferee all the parts of the bill in his possession, and he may be even liable to hand them over to a subsequent transferee if he have them still in his possession.³ If the indorser improperly circulate two parts to distinct holders he may be liable on each.⁴

§ 116. The drawee should accept but one part of the set. And having accepted one part, he should not pay another part, for he would still be liable on the accepted part.⁵ When however he pays the part he accepts, the whole bill is extinguished.⁶ The party entitled to the bill should claim and hold all the parts, for payment of any one part to another person might defeat him.⁷ But he to whom any one part of the set is first transferred acquires a property in all the other parts and may maintain trover even against a *bona fide* holder, who subsequently by transfer or otherwise, gets possession of another part of the set.⁸ For it is the duty of

¹ Davison v. Robertson, 3 Dow. 218; Thomson on Bills, 45; Byles (Sharswood's ed.) [*376], 556; Chitty [*155], 178.

² Chitty [*155], 178.

³ Pinard v. Klockman, 32 L. J. Q. B. 82; 3 Best & Smith, 388 (113 E. C. L. R.)

⁴ Holdsworth v. Hunter, 10 B. & C. 449.

⁵ Holdsworth v. Hunter, 10 B. & C. 449; Chitty on Bills [*155], 178; Byles [*377], 556.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Holdsworth v. Hunter, 10 B. & C. 449.

⁸ Perreira v. Jopp, 10 B. & C. 450, note a; Chitty, Jr., 1477; Holdsworth v. Hunter, 10 B. & C. 449; Byles on Bills [*376], 556.

the person taking one part to inquire after the others; and he is advertised by their absence, that they, or one of them, may be outstanding in the hands of a prior *bona fide* holder.¹

§ 117. In a suit against the drawer or indorser, the very part of the set which has been protested, must be produced,² and there is authority for the view, that in a suit against the indorser, all of the set must be produced, or their non-production satisfactorily accounted for.³ But the United States Supreme Court has held that, when the part which has been protested is produced, it is sufficient. The indorser may defend by showing that another person than the plaintiff has a superior adverse claim by reason of prior acquisition of another part, but unless he can prove that fact, the law protects him in making payment to the holder of the part protested, and requires no explanation from him as to the whereabouts of the other parts.⁴

¹ Lang v. Smyth, 7 Bing. 284, 294 (20 E. C. L. R.); 5 M. & P. 78.

² Wells v. Whitehead, 15 Wend. 527; 3 Kent's Com. 109.

³ Byles on Bills (Sharswood's ed.) [* 377], 557; 2 Starkie on Ev. 142.

⁴ Downes v. Church, 13 Peters, 205, Story, J. But see Wells v. Whitehead, 15 Wend. 527, and Edwards on Bills, 163.

CHAPTER IV.

STAMPS UPON NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.

§ 118. It seems that stamp duties were first levied on the continent of Europe, in Holland, in the year 1624, being employed to raise revenues for the prosecution of war against Spain.¹ In England, they were first imposed in 1694, war then being waged against France.² In the United States, individual States have at different periods imposed stamp duties; but such duties were never imposed by the Federal Government until July 1st, 1862, during the progress of the war against the Confederate States. At that time, a sweeping act, requiring deeds, bills, notes, checks, and other agreements and evidences of debt to be stamped, was passed, being framed for the most part upon the model of the British statutes. That act has been much curtailed by various amendments; and, at the present writing (April 1, 1875), the following provision of the act of Congress, approved February 8th, 1875, contains the only requisition on the subject of stamps applicable to negotiable instruments, to wit:

Be it enacted (sec. 15), that the words "bank check, draft, or order for the payment of any sum of money whatsoever, drawn upon any bank, banker, or trust company, at sight or on demand, two cents," in Schedule B of the Act of June 30th, eighteen hundred and sixty-four, be, and the same is hereby, stricken out, and the following paragraph inserted in lieu thereof:

"Bank check, draft, order, or voucher for the payment of any sum of money whatsoever, drawn upon any bank, banker, or trust company, two cents."

¹ Edwards on Stamp Act, 2.

² Edwards on Stamp Act, 3.

§ 119. The original provisions of the stamp act can therefore be now of but limited interest to the legal profession, and the public generally. But we append the portion of the schedule in force in 1870. Instruments executed before that time have generally been barred by statutes of limitation.¹

¹ We transcribe also a few of the notes of Mr. Orlando F. Bump to his annotated edition of the stamp act.

I. BANK CHECK, draft, or order for the payment of any sum of money whatsoever, drawn upon any bank, banker, or trust company, or for any sum exceeding ten dollars drawn upon any other person or persons, companies, or corporations, at sight or on demand, two cents.

Checks drawn on a bank by one of its proprietors for his daily expenses, or by its employees for their wages, must be stamped. Bout. 344.

The check of a correspondent on money to his credit, to transfer an amount of money collected for him, must be stamped. Checks drawn by a State for moneys belonging to the State are exempt. Bout. 345.

When a note is made payable at a certain bank, and a check is drawn upon the same bank for the amount thereof, the check must be stamped. When the note is simply charged at the bank to the account of the promisor without the use of a check, no stamp is required. Bout. 347.

If a check upon a book-keeper is used merely as a memorandum to show the liability of the drawer to the firm of which he is a member, it is exempt; but if used for any other purpose, and especially if paid out or transferred, or negotiable to a third party, it should be stamped. Bout. 349.

II. BILL OF EXCHANGE (inland), draft, or order for the payment of any sum of money not exceeding one hundred dollars, otherwise than at sight or on demand, or any promissory note (except bank notes issued for circulation, and checks made and intended to be forthwith presented, and which shall be presented to a bank or banker for payment), or any memorandum, check, receipt, or other written or printed evidence of an amount of money to be paid on demand, or at a time designated, for a sum not exceeding one hundred dollars, five cents, and for every additional hundred dollars, or fractional part thereof in excess of one hundred dollars, five cents. Promissory notes for a less sum than one hundred dollars are exempt.

A check payable at sight, but post-dated, which has been put into circulation prior to the day of its date, should be stamped the same as a promissory note, and not as a check payable on demand. Pope v. Burnset *et al.* 4 I. R. R. 133.

An agreement jointly and severally to pay the sums set opposite to the respective names of the makers is a promissory note. Ballard v. Burnside, 49 Barb. 102.

A due bill is a promissory note under the Illinois statutes, and in that State should be so stamped. Jacquin v. Warren, 40 Ill 459.

III. BILL OF EXCHANGE (foreign), or letter of credit, drawn in but payable out of the United States, if drawn singly, or otherwise than in a set of three or more, according to the custom of merchants and bankers, shall pay the same

§ 120. Schedule B of the Act of Congress of July 1st, 1862, entitled "An act to provide internal revenue to sup-

rates of duty as inland bills of exchange or promissory notes. If drawn in sets of three or more: for every bill of each set where the sums made payable shall not exceed one hundred dollars, or the equivalent thereof, in any foreign currency in which such bills may be expressed, according to the standard of value fixed by the United States, two cents. And for every additional hundred dollars, or fractional part thereof in excess of one hundred dollars, two cents.

A foreign bill of exchange or letter of credit, drawn in, but payable out of the United States, if drawn according to the custom of merchants and bankers, is liable to the same stamp tax as an inland bill of exchange, *i. e.*, if drawn at sight or on demand it is liable to a tax of two cents; if drawn otherwise than at sight or on demand it should be stamped at the rate of five cents for each \$100 or fractional part thereof. Duplicates require the same amount of stamps as the original. 9 I. R. R. 165.

The phrase "letter of credit" is construed to refer to such letters as are equivalent to a bill of exchange, the payment of which is not contingent upon any other transaction. Bout. 353.

IV. BILL OF LADING or receipt (other than charter-party), for any goods, merchandise, or effects, to be exported from a port or place in the United States to any foreign port or place, ten cents.

An inland or domestic bill of lading is exempt. 9 I. R. R. 161.

A bill of lading to any port in British North America is exempt. 9 I. R. R. 161.

V. BOND of any description, other than such as may be required in legal proceedings, or used in connection with mortgage deeds, and not otherwise charged in this schedule, twenty-five cents.

State and city securities are exempt from stamp duty. 1 I. R. R. 75; 3 I. R. R. 14; see Bump's ed. Stamp Act, 41.

VI. CERTIFICATE of stock in any incorporated company, twenty-five cents.

VII. CERTIFICATE of profits, or any certificate or memorandum showing an interest in the property or accumulations of any incorporated company, if for a sum not less than ten dollars and not exceeding fifty dollars, ten cents. Exceeding fifty dollars and not exceeding one thousand dollars, twenty-five cents. Exceeding one thousand dollars, for every additional one thousand dollars, or fractional part thereof, twenty-five cents.

VIII. CERTIFICATE. Any certificate of damage, or otherwise, and all other certificates or documents issued by any port warden, marine surveyor, or other person acting as such, twenty-five cents.

IX. CERTIFICATE of deposit of any sum of money in any bank or trust company, or with any banker or person acting as such:

If for a sum not exceeding one hundred dollars, two cents.

For a sum exceeding one hundred dollars, five cents.

When money is received as a *bona fide* deposit, against which the depositor may draw, the certificate need only be stamped with a two cent or a five cent stamp, according to whether the amount exceeds one hundred dollars or not, even though the deposit draws interest for part or for all the time it remains in bank. 11 I. R. R. 4, 5.

X. CERTIFICATE of any other description than those specified, five cents.

port the government, and to pay interest on the public debt," contained the provisions respecting the stamps required upon negotiable instruments, including bills of exchange, promissory notes, checks, bills of lading, negotiable bonds, and certificates of deposit; and this schedule, either in its original form, or as subsequently amended, continued in force until the first day of October, 1872, when it was repealed "excepting only the tax of two cents on bank checks, drafts or orders," by the subjoined section of the act of that date.¹

¹ 17 U. S. Stat. at Large, c. 315, sec. 36, p. 256:

SEC. 36. That on and after the first day of October, eighteen hundred and seventy-two, all the taxes imposed by stamps under and by virtue of Schedule B of section one hundred and seventy of the act approved June thirtieth, eighteen hundred and sixty-four, and the several acts amendatory thereof, be, and the same are hereby repealed, excepting only the tax of two cents on bank checks, drafts, or orders: Provided, that where any mortgage has been executed and recorded, or may be executed and recorded, before the first day of October, Anno Domini eighteen hundred and seventy-two, to secure the payment of bonds, or obligations that may be made and issued from time to time, and such mortgage not being stamped, all such bonds or obligations so made and issued on or after the first said day of October, Anno Domini eighteen hundred and seventy-two, shall not be subject to any stamp duty, but only such of their bonds or obligations as may have been made and issued before the day last aforesaid: And provided further, That, in the meantime, the holder of any instrument of writing of whatever kind and description, which has been made or issued without being duly stamped, or with a defunct [deficient] stamp, may make application to any collector of internal revenue, and that upon such application such collector shall thereupon affix the stamp provided by such holder upon such instrument of writing as [is] required by law to be put upon the same, and subject to the provisions of section one hundred and fifty-eight of the internal revenue laws.

It is also provided by c. 462, p. 250, Stat. 1873-4, as follows:

An Act to provide for the stamping of unstamped instruments, documents or papers:

Be it enacted, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America, in Congress assembled, That all instruments, documents and papers, heretofore made, signed or is ued, and subject to a stamp duty or tax under any law heretofore existing, and remaining unstamped, may be stamped by any person having an interest therein, or, where the original is lost, a copy thereof, at any time prior to the first of January, eighteen hundred and seventy-six. And said instruments, documents and papers, and any record thereof, shall be as valid, to all intents and purposes, as if stamped when made, signed or issued, but no right acquired in good faith shall in any manner be affected by such stamping as aforesaid. Provided, That to render such stamping valid, the person desiring to stamp the same, shall appear with the instrument, document,

§ 121. It is not within the purview of this work to treat otherwise than incidentally and briefly on the subject of stamps. In Edwards on the Stamp Act, Bump's Annotated edition of the Stamp Act, and in the appendix to the second volume of Parsons on Notes and Bills, will be found very ample information respecting the act of Congress, with the decisions of the American courts, and also of the British courts *in pari materia*. Herein we shall only touch upon some of the most prominent and important points, the act no longer having application, except in a very limited degree, to the subject of this treatise.

§ 122. *As to the construction of the stamp act.*—It will be observed that section 163 of the act relating to stamps does not in terms apply to instruments recorded, admitted or offered as evidence in the State courts. It is therefore the conclusion of reason, and of the majority of the adjudicated cases, that Congress did not intend the act to apply to the State courts. It can have full operation and effect, if construed to apply to those courts only which have been established under the Constitution of the United States, and by acts of Congress, and over which the Federal legislature can legitimately exercise control, and to which they can properly prescribe rules regulating the course of justice, and the mode of administering the law.¹ A broader interpretation

or paper, or copy thereof, before some judge or clerk of a court of record, and before him affix the proper stamp; and the said judge or clerk shall indorse on such writing or copy a certificate, under his hand, when made by said judge, and under his hand and seal, when made by said clerk, setting forth the date at which, and the place where, the stamp was so affixed, the name of the person presenting said writing or copy, the fact that it was thus affixed, and that the stamp was duly canceled in his presence.

SEC. 2. That all laws or parts of laws in conflict with the above, are hereby repealed. Approved, June 23d, 1874.

¹ Green v. Holway, 101 Mass. 243; Moore v. Quirk, 105 Mass. 49; Carpenter v. Snelling, 97 Mass. 452; Beebe v. Hutton, 47 Barb. 187; Daily v. Coker, 33 Tex. 815; Davis v. Richardson, 45 Miss. 499; Moore v. Moore, 47 N. H. 467; People v. Gates, 43 N. Y. 40; Griffin v. Ranney, 35 Conn. 239; Sammons v. Halloway, 21 Mich. 162; Fifield v. Cluse, 15 Mich. 505; Clement v. Conradt, 19 Mich. 170; Bowen v. Byrne, 55 Ill. 467; Bumpass v. Taggart, 26 Ark. 398;

should not be given it. But the contrary view has been taken.¹

§ 123. Where the stamp laws of the United States are recognized as binding in the State courts, the defense that the note was not stamped until after it was issued, is not permitted to be made against a *bona fide* holder for value, who received it after it was stamped.² Bearing all the appearances of an instrument conforming to every legal requirement, it would only facilitate fraud to permit this latent defect to be pleaded against an innocent party; and therefore the instrument is enforced.

If a bill or note be void for want of a stamp, the creditor may nevertheless recover on the original consideration.³

§ 124. There must be express proof that the stamp was omitted with the intent to evade the act, in order to invalidate the instrument. The section of the stamp act declaring invalid the instrument, and subjecting to a penalty of fifty dollars every person who makes, signs, accepts or issues a bill, note, or draft for money without a stamp, "with intent to evade the provisions of this act," has been the subject of numerous adjudications: and it is distinctly settled by weight of authority, that the words "with intent to evade the provisions of this act," are connected with and qualify both the clause declaring the instrument invalid, and that imposing the penalty of fifty dollars.⁴ "It is a fraudulent and not an accidental omission at which the penalty of the statute"

Burson v. Huntington, 21 Mich. 415; Atkins v. Plympton, 44 Vt. 21; Fifield v. Cluse, 22 Ind. 276; Rockwell v. Hunt, 40 Conn. 328; Duffy v. Hobson, 40 Cal. 240 (overruling Hallock v. Jaudin, 34 Cal. 171).

¹ City of Muscatine v. Sterneman, 30 Iowa, 526.

² Sperry v. Horr, 32 Iowa, 184; Robinson v. Law, 31 Iowa, 9; Blackwell v. Denie, 20 Iowa, 63; Pearson v. Cummings, 28 Iowa, 344.

³ Wilson v. Carey, 40 Vt. 179.

⁴ Harper v. Clark, 17 Ohio St. 190; Rhemstron v. Cone, 26 Wis. 163; Hitchcock v. Sawyer, 39 Vt. 412; Desmond v. Norris, 10 Allen, 250; Hallock v. Jaudin, 34 Cal. 167; Sawyer v. Parker, 57 Me. 39. Redlich v. Doll, 54 N. Y. 241; Green v. Halway, 101 Mass. 213.

is levied, says the United States Supreme Court, concurring in effect with the State authorities herein cited.¹

§ 125. A number of cases concede that there must be a fraudulent "intent to evade the provisions of the act," in order for the instrument to be invalid, or the party to be subject to the penalty imposed; but maintain that the mere omission to put the proper stamp on the paper is presumptive evidence that such intent to evade the act existed, on the ground that every person must be presumed to know the law, and is chargeable with the duty to comply with it.² But penal laws and laws concerning revenues must be strictly construed. Stamps are frequently omitted by inadvertence, or mistake; and to throw the burden of proving the negative proposition that he had no intent to evade the act upon the party would be a harshness of construction unfamiliar to the liberal principles of the common law. And the cases which hold that the intent to evade the act must be affirmatively shown, in addition to the mere fact of omission, commend themselves to favor as embodying the better opinion of this question.³ It will, therefore, never avail to demur to an unstamped instrument.⁴

§ 126. *Power of Congress.*—The gravest question which the Federal stamp act can give rise to, is whether or not Con-

¹ Campbell v. Wilcox, 10 Wall. 421.

² Harper v. Clark, 17 Ohio, 190; Miller v. Morrow, 3 Cold. 587; Beebe v. Hutton, 47 Barb. 187; Howe v. Carpenter, 53 Barb. 382; Miller v. Larmon, 38 How. Pr. R. 417; Maynard v. Johnson, 2 Nev. 16; Wayman v. Torreyson, 4 Nev. 124.

³ Campbell v. Wilcox, 10 Wall. 421; Daily v. Coker, 33 Tex. 815; Moore v. Moore, 47 N. Y. 467; Green v. Holway, 101 Mass. 243; Moore v. Quirk, 105 Mass. 49; Powell v. Feely, 49 Ill. 143; U. S. Express Co. v. Haines, 48 Ill. 248; Craig v. Dimock, 47 Ill. 308; Morris v. McMorris, 44 Miss. 441; Davis v. Richardson, 45 Miss. 499; Hallock v. Jaudin, 34 Cal. 167; Mitchell v. Mitchell, 32 Iowa, 421, overruling former cases in order to conform with decisions of Supreme Court of U. S. (see former case of Muscatine v. Sterneman, 30 Iowa, 526); Trull v. Meneton, 12 Allen, 396; Lynch v. Morse, 97 Mass. 458; Sawyer v. Parker, 57 Me. 39; Whiteman v. Sheckle, 43 Mo. 537; McGovern v. Hoesback, 53 Penn. St. 177.

⁴ Campbell v. Wilcox, *supra*.

gress has the power so to frame its laws for taxation as to prescribe the formalities of contracts, and records of process to constitute suits, and of evidence to sustain them. The power of Congress to raise revenue by taxation is admitted; but still it must be remembered that the Federal and State governments can neither trench upon the independent existence of the other, and must, therefore, exercise the powers existing in each, in a manner consistent with the legitimate freedom of both within their proper spheres. The United States Supreme Court has, accordingly, held that a State cannot tax the branches of the national banks, or their stocks and securities, or the salaries of government officers.¹ And reciprocally, the doctrine has been established by preponderance in numbers of cases, and by the weight of reason and authority, that the Federal government has no power, in the form of taxation or otherwise, to prescribe the formalities of contracts, records, process, or evidence; and that in so far as the stamp act of Congress, or any other act, undertakes so to do, it is unconstitutional and void.² They might, therefore, be admitted as evidence in State courts, although unstamped. But Congress has power to establish the rules of evidence in the Federal courts, and also to provide appropriate remedies by fine or imprisonment for the enforcement of its revenue laws.³

§ 127. It has been held that the United States internal revenue laws were not in operation in the Confederate States during the war between them and the United States, and that it was, therefore, unnecessary to stamp promissory notes made during the war, in order to give them validity.⁴

¹ *McCullough v. State of Maryland*, 4 Wheat. 316; *Weston v. City of Charleston*, 2 Peters, 442; *Dobbins v. Comr's of Eric*, 16 Peters, 435.

² *Craig v. Dimock*, 47 Ill. 308; *Latham v. Smith*, 45 Ill. 29; *Bumpass v. Taggart*, 26 Ark. 398; *Davis v. Richardson*, 45 Miss. 499; *Hunter v. Cobb*, 1 Bush (Ky.) 239.

³ *Craig v. Dimock*, 47 Ill. 308; *Clemens v. Conrad*, 19 Mich. 170.

⁴ *McElvain v. Meedd*, 44 Ala. 48; *Susong v. Williams*, 1 Heiskell, 625.

CHAPTER V.

IRREGULAR, AMBIGUOUS AND FICTITIOUS INSTRUMENTS, AND INSTRUMENTS IN BLANK.

SECTION I.

IRREGULAR AND AMBIGUOUS INSTRUMENTS.

§ 128. Ordinarily, as we have already seen, a bill of exchange comprises three separate and distinct parties, a drawer, a drawee, and a payee. But sometimes the drawer, and payee are the same person, as where the drawer expresses the bill to be payable to himself only; or to himself or order. And in such case when indorsed, it becomes payable to order, or bearer as the case may be.¹ There is no doubt that there may be a bill to which only one individual is a party, as where the drawer draws a bill upon himself, payable to his own order.² He may also draw a bill upon himself, payable to the order of a third party.³ But in all cases where the drawer and drawee are the same person, the instrument, although it be declared upon as a bill, may be regarded as in legal effect a promissory note; in which case

¹ Rice v. Hogan, 8 Dana, 134; Woods v. Ridley, 11 Humph. 194; Hall v. Shorter, 46 Ala. 453.

² Harvey v. Kay, 9 Barn. & Cres. 354; Planters' Bank v. Evans, 36 Texas, 592; Walton v. Williams, 44 Ala. 347; Randolph v. Parish, 9 Porter, 76; Chitty on Bills (13 Am. ed.) [*25], 33; Byles (Sharswood's ed.) [*89], 185.

³ Roach v. Ostler, 1 Man. & Ry. 120; Dehers v. Harriott, 1 Shower, 163 (1691); Robinson v. Bland, 2 Burr. 1077 (1760); Mayor v. Hammond, Chitty, Jr., 1423; Harvey v. Kay, 9 B. & C. 364; French v. Gordon, 10 Kans. 370; Planters' Bank v. Evans, 36 Texas, 592. In this case suit was brought by an indorsee against the maker of the following paper: "Ten months after date pay to the order of myself, thirty-nine hundred dollars, for value received, and charge to account of yours, H. E. To M. C. & Co., New Orleans, La.;" which instrument

the drawer will be bound without notice of dishonor;¹ or what is the same as a promissory note, it may be regarded as an accepted bill, the drawer's engagement that he himself, who is the drawee also, will pay it, being equivalent to acceptance.² A third party writing his name across the face of such a paper, could not be the acceptor, because not the drawee, and would be regarded as an indorser.³

In practice, it is usual to declare upon such instruments as bills of exchange, not admitting the identity of the drawer, and drawee.⁴ And their identity, as it seems, must be proved by the party alleging it.⁵ Where an agent draws a bill upon his principal by his authority, and for money obtained and used in his business, the drawer and drawee, it has been held, may be treated as in fact the same party, and held without demand or notice.⁶

§ 129. Where a copartnership carries on business at two places, and at one place draws a bill upon the firm at another, the drawer and drawee being the same, the bill may be treated as a promissory note, or as a bill at the holder's option. Thus where the manager of a branch of a joint stock bank,

was accepted by M. C. & Co., and bore the indorsement in blank of the maker and payee. Held (1) that it was optional with the indorsee, either to treat this instrument as a bill of exchange, and sue the drawer and the acceptor together; or to treat it as a promissory note, and sue the maker alone. Held further, (2) that such an instrument, when delivered to the drawee, imports that it is not drawn against funds of the drawer, in the hands of the drawee. And as the indorsee acquired the instrument before maturity. It is further held (3) that no defense was presented by an answer which alleged that the defendant had settled it with M. C. & Co., the drawees, without notice of its transfer to the plaintiff. (Evans, P. J., dissenting.) *Planters' Bank v. Evans*, 36 Texas, 592.

¹ *Roach v. Ostler*, 1 Man. & Ry. 120; *Randolph v. Parish*, 9 Porter (Ala.) 78; *Wardens of St. James Church v. Moore*, 1 Ind. (Carter), 289; *Chicago R. R. Co. v. West*, 37 Ind. 211; *Planters' Bank v. Evans*, 36 Texas, 592. See *Armfield v. Allport*, 27 L. J. Exch. 42.

² *Cunningham v. Wardwell*, 3 Fairfax, 456; *Planters' Bank v. Evans*, 36 Texas, 592.

³ *Walton v. Williams*, 44 Ala. 347.

⁴ *Roach v. Ostler*, 1 Man. & Ry. 120; *Harvey v. Kay*, 9 Barn. & C. 364; *Starke v. Cheeseman*, Carthew, 509.

⁵ *Cooper v. Poston*, 1 Duval, 417.

⁶ *Raymond v. Mann*, 45 Texas, 301 (1876).

drew a bill upon the bank at another place, Maule, J., said : "This is a bill drawn by the whole company, acting by their directors, upon the whole company. It is a promise, acting on behalf of the company, under the order of the directors, that the company shall pay. It is a promise made by the company at Dorking to pay in London. It is therefore in effect a promissory note."¹ In a recent case it was held that where a firm in one country drew upon the same firm in another country, and the bill was accepted, the paper was perhaps strictly a promissory note, but the holder might treat it either as a bill or a note; and where it appears to have been the intention that it should be negotiable in the market as a bill of exchange, it should be so treated.² The same principle applies where the duly authorized officer of an incorporated company draws on its behalf upon another officer, having custody of its funds; and the instrument may be treated as the note of the corporation.³

§ 130. A note must have two parties, a maker and a payee, and a note made by a person payable to himself, or to himself or order, is a nullity; but if he then indorse it, it becomes in legal effect payable to the bearer, or to the indorsee or order, according to the terms of indorsement; and it may be so treated and declared on,⁴ but there are decisions to

¹ *Miller v. Thompson*, 3 Man. & Gr. 576.

² *Willars v. Ayres*, 3 App. Cas. 133.

³ See Chapter XIV on drafts or warrants of one corporate officer upon another. In 1 *Parsons N. & B.* 63, it is said : "Where a duly authorized agent or officer of an incorporated company, draws in behalf of the company upon the treasurer, cashier, or other officer of the company who has the custody of, and is charged with the duty of disbursing the company's funds, this is in substance, it should seem, a draft by the company upon itself; and may be treated either as a bill of exchange or a promissory note."

⁴ *Wood v. Mytton*, 10 Q. B. 805 (1847); *Hooper v. Williams*, 2 Exch. 13 (1848). In this case Parke, B., said : "The principal question was, what the effect of this instrument was as it stood originally before it was indorsed, and whether it was, within the statute of 3 & 4 Anne, c. 9, a good and valid note payable to the order of the maker. The opinions of this court and of the Queen's Bench as to this point are at variance with one another. In *Flight v. Maclean*, this court held, on special demurrer to the first count of a declaration—stating a

the effect that such instruments are nullities.¹ Notes of this

note payable to the order of the maker, and indorsed to the plaintiffs—that the count was bad, such a note not being within the statute of Anne. The case of *Wood v. Mytton* afterward came on in the Queen's Bench. It was an action on a similar note indorsed to the plaintiff. After verdict for the plaintiff, a motion was made in arrest of judgment, and the court discharged the rule, holding, after a minute examination of all the provisions of the statute of Anne, that such a note was within that statute, and assignable by indorsement. Though these decisions are not at variance, as will be afterwards explained, the construction of the statute by the two courts differs. After a careful perusal of the statute, we must say that we do not think that it ever contemplated the case of notes payable to the maker's order, which are incomplete instruments, and have no binding effect on any one till indorsed. The Court of Queen's Bench thought that, though the first part of the 1st section of the statute of Anne applied only to notes payable to another person, or his order, or to bearer, which notes it makes obligatory between the parties, yet that the second part applies to every note payable to any person, and therefore includes a note payable to the maker or his order. It appears to us that this is not the meaning of this part of the section, which is, as we think, intended to make those instruments to which it had previously given an obligatory effect between the original parties transferable to third persons, so as to enable them to sue upon them as upon the transfer of bills of exchange. The previous part of the section had given to the payee when the note was made payable to another person, or to another person or order, and to the bearer, whoever at any time he might be, a right to sue, thus providing entirely for notes payable to bearer, whether in the hands of the original or a subsequent bearer; and then the section proceeds to make the class of notes payable to a person or order transferable. We think that the legislature, by the second part of the section, could only mean to make that instrument which gave a right to sue assignable, and no right to sue could exist in any one in the case of a note payable to the maker's order until the order was made in the shape of an indorsement. Until that indorsement was made, it was an imperfect instrument, and, in truth, not a promissory note at all, and consequently not transferable under the statute. What, then, is the effect of the indorsement to another person? We think it was to perfect the incomplete instrument, so that the original writing and indorsement taken together became a binding contract, though an informal one, between the maker and the indorsee; and then, and not till then, it became an assignable note. * * * It appears to us, then, that the instrument in this case was, when it first became a binding promissory note, a note payable to bearer, and consequently was properly described in the declaration. This view of the case reconciles the decision of this court in *Flight v. Maclean* with that of the Queen's Bench in *Wood v. Mytton*, but not the reasons given for those decisions. In the case in this court, the declaration was bad on special demurrer, as it did not set out the legal effect of the instrument. In that in the

¹ *Muhling v. Sattler*, 3 Metc. (Ky.) 286. The utmost effect given such papers being to admit them as evidence of indebtedness from maker and indorser to indorsee, when executed for such indebtedness, and not then unless so averred.

kind are of common use in England and in this country, and though characterized as "informal, if not absurd in form," they are designed to enable the holder to pass them without indorsement, and are simply roundabout notes payable to bearer.

The fact that the name of the payee is the same as that of the maker does not show that they are the same person; on the contrary, when such a note is sued on, it will be presumed that they are different persons until their identity is proved.¹ It might be urged with force that the maker is estopped from showing his identity with the payee.

§ 131. If the instrument be so ambiguous that it is doubtful whether it be a bill or note, the holder may treat it as either at his election. Thus, where the form of the instrument was :

"£44 11s. 5d.

"LONDON, 5th August, 1833.

Three months after date I promise to pay Mr. John Bury, or order, forty-four pounds eleven shillings and five pence. Value received.

"JOHN BURY.

"J. B. Grutherot,

"35 Montague Place, Bedford Place."

Queen's Bench, the motion being for arrest of judgment, the declaration was in substance good, for it set out an inartificial contract, which had the legal effect of a valid note payable, as stated on the record, to the plaintiff. The difference between the two courts in the construction of the statute is of no practical consequence, as in our view of the case securities in this informal, not to say absurd form, are still not invalid; and it might be of much inconvenience if they were, for there is no doubt that this form of note, probably introduced long after the statute of Anne—and for what good reason no one can tell—has become of late years exceedingly common; and it is obvious that, until they are indorsed, they must always remain in the hands of the maker himself, and so he can never be liable upon them." See *Brown v. De Winton*, 17 L. J. C. P. 280 (60 E. C. L. R.); *Gay v. Lander*, 17 L. J. C. P. 287 (60 E. C. L. R.); *Plets v. Johnson*, 3 Hill, 114; *Hall v. Shorter*, 46 Ala. 453; *Muldrow v. Caldwell*, 7 Mo. 763; *Scull v. Edwards*, 8 Eng. 24; *Miller v. Weeks*, 22 Penn. St. 89; *Smalley v. White*, 44 Me. 442; *Woods v. Ridley*, 11 Humph. 194; *Wilder v. De Wolf*, 24 Ill. 190; 1 *Parsons N. & B.* 17, 18; *Byles on Bills* (Sharswood's ed.) [*6] 75, [*87] 183; *Thomson on Bills*, 52.

But in *Flight v. McLean*, 16 M. & W. 51, a demurrer to a declaration charging that the defendant made his note, and thereby promised to pay to defendant £500, and that the defendant indorsed the same to plaintiff was sustained.

¹ *Cooper v. Poston*, 1 Duval, 417.

And Gutherot's name was written across the paper as an acceptance, and Bury's name on the back as an indorsement; it was held that Bury might be treated either as a drawer of a bill on Grutherot or as the maker of a note, and therefore was bound without notice of dishonor. Holroyd, J., said: "Until Grutherot put his name to this instrument it was clearly in terms a promissory note, and having been once such the fact of his having afterward put his name to it as acceptor cannot alter the nature of it."¹

§ 132. In a later case, where the instrument ran "Two months after date I promise to pay A. B. or order £99 (signed) H. Oliver," and was addressed to J. E. Oliver, and accepted by him, it was held that it might clearly be declared on against H. Oliver as a bill of exchange. Erle, J., said: "It is not unjust to presume that it was drawn in this form for the purpose of suing upon it either as a promissory note or as a bill of exchange." And Crompton, J., said it was most important that the decision should not be impeached; "that equivocal instruments of this kind, possessing the character both of promissory notes and bills of exchange, may be treated as either."²

§ 133. Sometimes the instrument is in the common form of a bill of exchange, except that the word "at" is substituted for "to" before the name of the drawee—as in the following manner:

"Two months after date, pay to the order of John Jenkins
78*l.* 11*s.*, value received.

"THOS. STEVENS."

"At Messrs. JOHN MERSEN & Co."

Such an instrument may be undoubtedly declared on as a bill, and Lord Ellenborough thought that, perhaps, it might be treated as a note, at the option of the holder.³ But in a

¹ *Edis v. Bury*, 6 Barn. & Cres. 433 (13 E. C. L. R.)

² *Lloyd v. Oliver*, 18 Q. B. 471 (83 E. C. L. R.) To same effect see *Brazelton v. McMurray*, 44 Ala. 323.

³ *Shuttleworth v. Stevens*, 1 Camp. 407 (1808); see also *Allan v. Mawson*, 4 Camp. 115 (1814).

later case, where an indictment for forgery described a similar instrument as a promissory note, it was held a variance, as it was in law a bill of exchange.¹ Mr. Chitty says that if such word "at" before the drawee's name "is written so small, or in a manner so indistinct, as to be capable of deceiving, it might be declared on either as a bill or as a promissory note after it is due."² But the authority cited only establishes that it undoubtedly is a bill,³ and this seems to us the correct conclusion.

§ 134. *As to certified notes.*—There is no such thing as acceptance of a regular promissory note; but when notes are expressed to be payable at a particular bank, there may be a custom for the bank, with the consent of the holder, instead of paying it at maturity, when authorized to do so, to certify it as "good," in like manner as checks are often certified. By such certificate the bank becomes the debtor, and the parties to the note are discharged; and the bank cannot afterwards say that there were no funds of the maker on deposit, or that it was not authorized so to appropriate them. In New York it has been said on this subject: "The presentation of the note at the counter of the bank, on its maturity for payment, was in the ordinary course of business; and so was the certificate then and there indorsed by the teller, certifying that the same was good. The legal effect and force of such certificate was, that the maker had deposited funds in the bank to meet said note; and that the bank then held the same in deposit for that purpose, and would pay the amount upon request. * * * The indorsement was, in effect, an absolute engagement on the part of the bank to pay the note, and dispense with protest, or steps to charge the indorser, as much so as if the defendant had actually received the cash on the presentation of the note, in-

¹ Rex v. Hunter, Russ. & Ry. C. C. 511.

² Chitty on Bills (13th Am. ed.) [*25], 33, citing Allan v. Mawson, 4 Camp. 115; see also Chitty, Jr. 11.

³ Allan v. Mawson, 4 Camp. 115, Gibbs, C. J.

stead of taking the certificate of the teller that the note was good.¹"

§ 135. In another New York case it appeared that on the day a note payable at the Irving Bank matured, it was there presented, certified as good, and charged in account against the maker. The maker had no funds to meet it, which was discovered before 3 o'clock on the same day; and the Irving Bank requested that its certificate be canceled. This was refused; whereupon the Irving Bank took up the note, presented it at its own counter, refused payment, and notified the indorsers. It was held that the Irving Bank, under these circumstances, had a right to retract its certificate; that it took the note as a purchaser, and not as a payor, and that although it was marked as paid by the Seventh Ward Bank, which held it for collection; and, therefore, that the maker and indorsers were bound to the Irving Bank.²

SECTION II.

BILLS AND NOTES TO WHICH THERE ARE FICTITIOUS OR NON-EXISTING PARTIES.

§ 136. The law abhors fraud and discountenances the instruments by which it may be committed. For this reason bills and notes payable to fictitious payees are not tolerated, and will never be enforced, save when in the hands of a *bona fide* holder, who received them without knowledge of their true character. The appearance of a name upon the paper as a payee and indorser is naturally calculated, and has been often used as a means to give it fictitious credit, whereby innocent parties are beguiled into purchasing it. The use of fictitious names in this manner has been highly censured, and the person fraudulently indorsing such a name

¹ Mead v. Merchants' Bank, 25 N. Y. 148.

² Irving Bank v. Wetherald, 36 N. Y. 337.

upon a bill or note, to give it currency, would be guilty of forgery.¹

There is no doubt that if the holder knew, at the time that he took the bill, that the payee was a fictitious person, he cannot recover upon it against the acceptor, though the acceptor also had knowledge of the fiction, it being the policy of the law to interdict the circulation of such deceptive instruments.² Nor is there any doubt that such a bill or note is, in effect, payable to bearer, and may be declared on as such by a *bona fide* holder, who acquired it in ignorance of the fact, against the drawer,³ and also against the acceptor, *supra protest*, who is subrogated for the drawer.⁴ He may also recover against an acceptor in the ordinary course of business, if he knew of the fiction when he accepted, and thus participated in the fraud.⁵

§ 137. In a case before Lord Ellenborough, where the acceptor of a bill having a fictitious payee was sued, it was held that such a bill was neither, in effect, payable to the order of the drawer, or to bearer, but was utterly void. On a motion for a new trial, however, Lord Ellenborough said that he conceived himself bound by *Minet v. Gibson*, and other cases which had been carried up to the House of Lords, and though by no means disposed to give them any extension, yet if it had appeared that the acceptor knew the payee to be a fictitious person when he accepted, he should have

¹ Thomson on Bills, 52; see Chapter on Forgery.

² *Hunter v. Jeffery*, Peake's Ad. Cas. ; Chitty, Jr. 587 (1797); *Minet v. Gibson*, 3 T. R. 481 (1789), affirmed in the House of Lords, 1 H. Bl. 569; 2 Brown Par. Cas. 48 (1791).

³ *Collis v. Emett*, 1 H. Bl. 313 (1790); see also *Vere v. Lewis*, 3 Term R. 298 (1789), Lord Kenyon, C. J., Ashurst and Buller, J.J.; *Phillips v. Inthun*, 18 J. Scott, N. S. 694 (114 E. C. L. R.); Byles on Bills (Sharswood's ed.) [*79], 173; *Lane v. Krekle*, 22 Ia. 404; *Forbes v. Espy*, 21 Ohio, N. S. 483; *Rogers v. Ware*, 2 Neb. 29.

⁴ *Phillips v. Inthun*, 18 J. Scott, 694 (114 E. C. L. R.)

⁵ Edwards on Bills, 125, 6, 8; *Hunter v. Blodgett*, 2 Yeates, 489; *Tatlock v. Harris*, 3 T. R. 174 (Chitty, Jr. 453); *Vere v. Lewis*, Id. 182 (Chitty, Jr. 455); *Minet v. Gibson*, 1 H. Bl. 569; *Gibson v. Hunter*, 2 H. Bl. 187, 288.

directed the jury to find for the plaintiff.¹ And this seems to be the rule of the English law, that the acceptor must have participated in the fraud in order to be bound.²

§ 138. We cannot perceive the wisdom or philosophy of applying the test of the acceptor's knowledge of the fiction. If the holder has acquired the bill *bona fide*, he may certainly sue the drawer, although he makes title against him through the name of a fictitious person,—why may he not also sue the acceptor who, by acceptance, admits that he has funds of the drawer in his hands? If, indeed, the name of

¹ Bennett v. Farnell, 1 Camp. 130 (1807); see also Were v. Taylor, therein cited, and Gibson v. Hunter, 2 H. Bl. 187. The reporter appends the following note to the case of Bennett v. Farnell: "Almost all the modern cases upon this question arose out of the bankruptcy of Livesay & Co. and Gibson & Co., who negotiated bills, with fictitious names upon them, to the amount of nearly a million sterling a year. The first case was Tatlock v. Harris, 3 T. R. 174, in which the Court of King's Bench held that the *bona fide* holder for a valuable consideration of a bill drawn payable to a fictitious person, and indorsed in that name by the drawer, might recover the amount of it in an action against the acceptor, for money paid or money had and received, upon the idea that there was an appropriation of so much money to be paid to the person who should become the holder of the bill. In Vere v. Lewis, 3 T. R. 182, decided the same day, the court held there was no occasion to prove that the defendant had received any value for the bill, as the mere circumstance of his acceptance was sufficient evidence of this; and three of the judges thought the plaintiff might recover on a count which stated that the bill was drawn payable to bearer. Minet v. Gibson, 3 T. R. 481, put this point directly in issue, and the unanimous opinion of the court was, that where the circumstance of the payee being a fictitious person is known to the acceptor, the bill is in effect payable to bearer. Soon after the Court of Common Pleas laid down the same doctrine, in Collis v. Emmet, 1 H. Bl. 313. This decision was acquiesced in, but Minet v. Gibson was carried up to the House of Lords, 1 H. Bl. 569. The opinion of the judges being then taken, Eyre, C. B. (p. 618) and Heath, J. (p. 619) were for reversing the judgment of the court below, and Lord Thurlow, C., coincided with them (p. 625); but the other judges thinking otherwise, judgment was affirmed (Parl. Cas. 8vo, ii, 48). The last case upon the subject reported is Gibson v. Hunter, 2 H. Bl. 187, 288, which came before the House of Peers upon a demurrer to evidence, and in which it was held that, in an action on a bill of this sort against the acceptor, to show that he was aware of the payee being fictitious, evidence is admissible of the circumstances under which he had accepted other bills payable to fictitious persons."

² Chitty on Bills [*157], 181 (13 Am. ed.); Edwards on Bills. 128; 1 Parsons N. & B. 32; Byles (Sharswood's ed.) [*79], 173; Thomson on Bills, 52; Story on Bills, § 200, § 56.

an existing payee were forged, the holder could not sue the acceptor, because the amount in his hands would be due such real payee. But where the payee's name is fictitious, the acceptor is not concerned; for the reason that the drawer has directed him to pay the money to the order of that name, and if it be thereon indorsed by the drawer or by the holder, he would fulfill that direction and discharge the debt.¹ The language of Lord Loughborough, in a previous case, is broad enough to sustain our view;² and the better opinion is, as it seems to us, that a bill with a fictitious payee may be treated by the innocent holder precisely as if payable to bearer.³

§ 139. In the case of a note payable to a fictitious person, it appears to be well settled that any *bona fide* holder may recover on it against the maker as upon a note payable to bearer.⁴ It will be no defense against such *bona fide* holder for the maker to set up that he did not know the payee to be fictitious. By making it payable to such person he avers his existence, and he is estopped as against a holder ignorant of the contrary to assert the fiction.⁵ It has been held that if a party takes a note payable to a fictitious person for a debt due himself, he may recover on the common counts,⁶ though not, as it seems, upon the note itself, as he has participated in the wrong by taking a fictitious paper.⁷

Where a note has as its payee a fictitious firm, and the holder indorses it assuming the firm's name, a *bona fide* indorsee may recover against the maker.⁸

¹ See Ch. XXIII on Acceptance.

² See *Collis v. Emett*, 1 H. Bl. 313.

³ See *Rogers v. Ware*, 2 Neb. 29.

⁴ *Farnsworth v. Drake*, 11 Ind. 103; *Plets v. Johnson*, 3 Hill (N. Y.) 115; *Bronson, J.*, held to be the common law; *Stevens v. Strong*, 2 Sandf. 139 (by N. Y. statute); *Rogers v. Ware*, 2 Neb. 29; see also *Blodgett v. Jackson*, 40 N. H. 26. Recovery on common counts allowed. *Forbes v. Espy*, 21 Ohio, N. S. 483.

⁵ *Lane v. Krekle*, 22 Ia. 404. But in New York, by statute, the maker is not bound to an indorsee even, unless he, the maker, knew of the fiction at the time of signing. *Mancort v. Roberts*, 4 E. D. Smith, 84.

⁶ *Foster v. Shattuck*, 2 N. H. 447.

⁷ See *ante*, § 136.

⁸ *Blodgett v. Jackson*, 40 N. H. 26.

§ 140. If the bill or note be payable to some person who had no interest in it, and was not intended to become a party to it, whether such person is or is not known to exist, the payee may be deemed fictitious. But if it be payable to some person known at the time to exist, and present to the mind of the drawer when he made it, as the party to whose order it was to be paid, the genuine indorsement of such payee is necessary, in order to a recovery thereon by an indorsee, even though he have no interest in it, and the drawer knew that fact.¹

§ 141. *Adopted names.*—Parties sometimes adopt and use fictitious names as their own, and when there is a real party in existence who uses a fictitious name as descriptive of, and with intent to bind himself, it is the same in law as if it were his real name; and he may be sued by the holder, and declared against as having contracted by such adopted name.² But if it were not a name which he adopted and used as his own, the only civil remedy of the holder would be a suit in tort for the false representation.³

SECTION III.

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS EXECUTED IN BLANK.

§ 142. In subsequent portions of this work will be found the citation and discussion of cases illustrating the rights of holders of Negotiable Instruments intrusted to another with blanks,⁴ and of holders of such instruments altered after issue;⁵ but we deem it proper here to state the general principles applicable to them. Parties often lend their mercantile credit to others by signing their names to blank papers to be afterwards filled as bills of exchange or promissory notes written over their signatures as drawers or makers; or by

¹ Rogers v. Ware, 2 Neb. 29.

² Ladd v. Rogers, 11 Allen, 209.

³ Bartlett v. Tucker, 104 Mass. 345.

⁴ See Chapter XXVI, Sec. III, Vol. I, § 843 *et seq.*

⁵ See Chapter XLIII, Sec. VI, Vol. II, § 1405 *et seq.*

signing their names in the appropriate manner to indicate that they design to bind themselves as acceptors or indorsers of the instrument which it is contemplated to complete upon such blank papers. And it is a settled principle of commercial law, that when such instruments are afterward completed by the holder of such blanks, to whom they are loaned, such parties become as absolutely bound as if they had signed them after their terms were written out; and further, that the presence of their names upon blanks purports an authority granted to the holder to fill them for any sum, and with any terms as to time, place and conditions of payment. And that although the party may prescribe limits to the holder, a *bona fide* transferee from him, ignorant of such limitation of authority, when he takes an instrument which has exceeded it, may recover upon it. In an early case, where the party had indorsed his name on the back of five copper-plate checks, blank as to sums, dates and times of payment, and Galley, the holder, filled them up as his own notes, with different dates, sums and times of payment, the indorser was held bound to the plaintiff who had discounted them, and Lord Mansfield said: "The indorsement on a blank note is a letter of credit for an indefinite sum. The defendant said: 'Trust Galley to any amount, and I will be his security.' It does not lie in his mouth to say the indorsements were not regular."¹ And this admirable statement of the law is almost universally quoted with approval, and followed as a precedent, applying equally to maker, acceptor and drawer, as to the indorser.² The United States Supreme Court has

¹ Russel v. Langstaffe, 2 Doug. 514 (1781).

² Usher v. Dauncey, 4 Camp. 97 (1814) (Bill); Bulkley v. Butler, 2 B. & C. 425; (Bill held good, though sum not filled up till after bankruptcy of acceptor); Powell v. Duff, 3 Camp. 182; Schultz v. Astley, 29 E. C. L. R. 414; Mahone v. Central Bank, 17 Ga. 111; Fullerton v. Sturgiss, 4 Ohio, N. S. 529; Bank of Commonwealth v. Curry, 2 Dana, 142; Bank of Limestone v. Perrick, 5 T. B. Mon. 25; Jones v. Shelbyville Ins. Co. 1 Metc. (Ky.) 58; Michigan Ins. Co. v. Leavenworth, 30 Vt. 11; Androscoggin Bank v. Kimball, 10 Cush. 373; Nichol v. Bate, 10 Yerg. 429; Ives v. Farmers' Bank, 2 Allen, 236; Rich v. Starbuck, 51 Ind. 87; Hardy v. Norton, 66 Barbour, 527; Joseph v. National Bank, 17 Kansas, 259; Waldron v. Young, 9 Heiskell, 777; Thomson on Bills, 37.

said, on the same subject: "Where a party to a negotiable instrument intrusts it to the custody of another, with blanks not filled up, whether it be for the purpose to accommodate the person to whom it was intrusted, or to be used for his own benefit, such negotiable instrument carries on its face an implied authority to fill up the blanks and perfect the instrument; and as between such party and innocent third parties, the person to whom it was so intrusted must be deemed the agent of the party who committed such instrument to his custody—or, in other words, it is the act of the principal, and he is bound by it."¹ And again: "But the authority implied from the existence of the blanks would not authorize the person intrusted with the instrument to vary or alter the material terms of the instrument by erasing *what is written or printed* as part of the same, nor pervert the meaning and scope of the same by filling the blanks with stipulations repugnant to what was plainly and clearly expressed in the instrument before it was so delivered."² * *

"And it does not confer authority to make any additions to the terms of the note; and if any such of a material character are made by such a party, without the consent of the party from whom the paper was received, it will avoid the note even in the hands of an innocent holder."³

§ 143. The authority implied by a signature to a blank, and the credit granted, are so extensive, that the party so signing will be bound, though the holder was only authorized to use it for one purpose, and has perverted it to another;⁴ and though the authority was limited to a time which has expired,⁵ or was only to be exercised upon a condition which

¹ Bank of Pittsburgh v. Neal, 22 How. 107; Davidson v. Lanier, 4 Wall. 457; Angle v. N. W. &c. Ins. Co. 92 U. S. (2 Otto), 330.

² Angle v. N. W. Mut. Life. Ins. Co. 92 U. S. (2 Otto), 331. See also Goodman v. Simonds, 20 Howard, 361; Bank of Pittsburgh v. Neal, 22 Id. 108.

³ Coburn v. Webb, 56 Ind. 100; Ivory v. Michael, 33 Mo. 400; see McGrath v. Clark, 56 N. Y. 36, and vol. II, § 1406.

⁴ Putnam v. Sullivan, 4 Mass. 45. See Chapter XXVI, on Rights of Bona Fide Holder, and Chapter XI, for Agents.

⁵ Montague v. Perkins, 22 Eng. L. & Eq. 516.

has not happened.¹ If the date be left blank, any holder has a right to insert the true date; and should he insert an improper date, and the parties will still be bound to a *bona fide* holder for value and without notice of the impropriety,² but a party having notice, could not recover, unless he acquired it from one who took it *bona fide* without notice.³ The marginal figures being no part of the instrument, it has been held that where the holder of a note, in blank, filled it up and negotiated it for a larger amount than was indicated by the marginal figures, this did not vitiate the note although he also altered the figures.⁴ If the place of payment be left blank, the principles above stated apply.⁵

§ 144. The authority implied by one signing a blank paper is so extensive that such paper will be valid in the hands of a *bona fide* holder, whether it be framed as a negotiable instrument or otherwise. Virginia, where a paper was signed and indorsed in blank, and intrusted to the maker for whose accommodation it was made, it was held that a *bona fide* holder who had advanced money upon it, and who knew that it was made in blank, could recover against such party whether it were filled up as a common promissory note, or as a negotiable note.⁶ So in Indiana, where a note was

¹ See Chapter XXVI, on Rights of Bona Fide Holder.

² Page v. Morrel, 3 Abb. N. Y. App. Dec. 433; Redlich v. Doll, 54 N. Y. 238.

³ Emmons v. Meeker, 55 Ind. 321.

⁴ Schryver v. Hawkes, 22 Ohio St. 308. ⁵ Redlich v. Doll, 54 N. Y. 238.

⁶ Orrick v. Colston, 7 Grat. 189 (1850); Daniel J., saying: "It is well settled that a blank indorsement on a negotiable instrument, blank as to date or amount at the time of the indorsement, if made for the purpose of giving a credit to the drawer, is as effectual to bind the indorser for any amount with which the instrument may be filled up by the drawer, or an innocent holder for value, as if the instrument had been completed at the time of the indorsement. In the case of Russell v. Langstaffe, 2 Doug. R. 514, the Court of King's Bench held, in the language of Lord Mansfield, that such an indorsement 'is a letter of credit for an indefinite sum,'—that the indorser in effect said, 'trust the drawer to any amount, and I will be his security.' So in Schultz v. Astley, 29 Eng. C. L. R. 414, which was the case of an acceptance written on a paper, before entirely blank, it was held that the blank acceptance was an acceptance of the bill afterward put upon it; and that there is no distinction in principle,

filled up as non-negotiable, under express stipulation with the indorsers, for accommodation of the makers, that it should not be made payable at bank; but the indorsee had inserted a provision making it payable "at the Bank of Indiana, at the Laporte branch," in a blank space left on the face of the note, and then transferred it, it was held that the holder could recover; and Ray, J., said: "The surety who has not scrupled to trust his principal with the semblance of a general authority to make the delivery, must stand the hazard he has incurred."¹ So where the paper was drawn in the form of a blank bill of exchange, and it was filled up by the party for whose accommodation it was drawn as a negotiable note, the party who signed the blank was held liable.²

§ 145. *Payee in blank*.—Bills and notes are also often executed in full with the exception of the name of the payee, which is left blank in order that it may be afterward filled up with the name of the actual holder who demands payment, the design of this form of paper being to enable the owner to pass it off to another without incurring the responsibility of an indorser, and without risking a depreciation of its current

when the bill has passed into the hands of third persons, between holding the acceptor liable to a given amount, when the bill is afterward drawn in the name of the party who has obtained the acceptance, and when it is drawn by a stranger who becomes the drawer at the instance of the party to whom the acceptance is given. And in the case of *Douglass v. Scott and Fry*, decided by this court, 8 Leigh, 43, where the paper was signed in blank and indorsed in blank, and delivered to another to be filled up and used as a negotiable instrument to raise money on, the decision was founded on the proposition, that the negotiable note afterward drawn over the signature of the maker, did, together with its indorsements bind all the parties to the same extent as if the maker had signed and the indorsers indorsed the paper in its perfect form." See *Morehead v. Parkenburg Nat. Bank*, 5 W. Va. 74.

Mr. Conway Robinson, in his *Practice* (vol. 2, new ed. p. 136), dissents from the view expressed in this opinion. It may be observed that he was opposing counsel in the case when it was decided.

¹ *Spitler v. James*, 32 Ind. 203 (1869); *Gillespie v. Kelley*, 41 Ind. 158 (1872). See *contra* *Morehead v. Parkenburg Nat. Bank*, 5 W. Va. 74. In this case the Court does not seem to have paid sufficient attention to the fact that the space left afforded opportunity for the alteration by adding the place of payment which made the note negotiable. See *post*, § 1405, 1409.

² *Luellen v. Hare*, 32 Ind. 211 (1869).

value, which might possibly result from indorsing it "without recourse."¹ The same result might be attained by making the instrument payable to the drawer's or maker's order, or to bearer; but a bill or note with the payee blank is to almost every legal intent and purpose payable to bearer. It passes from hand to hand by delivery.² Any *bona fide* holder for value may fill it up with his own name and sue upon it.³ And although thus brought in apparent privity with the maker or drawer, he may, by proving that he was not the party to whom it was first delivered, exclude defenses valid as against such first party, and enjoy all the rights of a *bona fide* holder for value and without notice.⁴

But the holder must actually fill up the blank with his name before he can recover upon the instrument, as until

¹ *Brummel v. Enders*, 18 Grat. 895; *Harding v. State*, 54 Ind. 359.

² *Wookey v. Pole*, 4 Barn. & Ald. 6 (6 E. C. L. R. 323).

³ In *Brummel v. Enders*, 18 Grat. 895, the case of a note blank originally as to the name of the payee, it was said by Joynes, J.: "The question as to the effect of such an instrument came before the Court of King's Bench in the year 1813, in the case of *Crutchley v. Clarence*, 2 Maule & Sel. R. 90, which is the leading case. That was an action against the drawer of a bill of exchange payable to the order of — (the name of the payee being left blank). It was indorsed to the payee by one Vashon, and the plaintiff inserted his own name as payee, and the case was distinguished from *Russel v. Langstaffe*, Doug. R. 514, because the bill in that case was filled up by one of the original parties. But the court overruled the objection, and held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover. Lord Ellenborough, C. J.: 'As the defendant has chosen to send the bill into the world in this form, the world ought not to be deceived by his acts. The defendant, by leaving the blank, undertook to be answerable for it when filled up in the shape of a bill.' * * * Though the bill in this case was indorsed to the plaintiff, the title to it did not pass by the indorsement because the name of the indorser was not in the bill. It passed by the delivery. In the following year the same question came before the Court of Common Bench in an action against the acceptor of the same bill. *Crutchley v. Mann*, 5 Taunt. R. 529 (1 Eng. C. L. R. 179). It was objected that the authority given to the person to whom the bill was first delivered, to insert his name as payee, was not transferable from hand to hand. But the court held that the plaintiff had a right to insert his name as payee, and was entitled to recover. Upon the authority of these cases, it is laid down in all the treatises that any *bona fide* holder of a bill or note which is blank as to the name of the payee may insert his own name, and thus acquire all the rights of payee." *Rich v. Starbuck*, 51 Ind. 87.

⁴ *Brummel v. Enders*, 18 Grat. 905; *Nelson v. Cowing*, 6 Hill, 336; *Pindar v. Barlow*, 31 Vt. 539; *Rich v. Starbuck*, 51 Ind. 87. See also Chapter VII on Consideration, sec. 3, and cases cited.

then it does not import a contract with him.¹ And unless so filled up, a description of it as a bill or note in an indictment would not be sustained.²

§ 146. Not only may the holder of a note in which there is left a blank as to the name of the payee, fill it up with his own name, but where it is delivered with such blank to a party, and by him indorsed in blank, the holder may fill up the blank in the body of it with the name of the indorser, and then complete the indorsement by filling it up to himself. He thus perfects the instrument upon its skeleton form, and makes it what it was evidently designed to be.³

In Massachusetts the following skeleton note :

“ \$1,585 90.		BROOKLYN, September 20, 1858.	
	after date	promise to pay to the order of	
Dec. 23,		dollars at	value received.
			GEO. R. IVES.”

was delivered to Yale as a mere memorandum, and not to be used as a note. Yale filled it up as a note for \$1,585 90, payable to his own order at the Atlantic Bank, New York, and indorsed it to the plaintiff, who discounted it for him. The court held all evidence as to any agreement between the original parties inadmissible, and the holder entitled to recover.⁴

It is clear, however, that a holder who knew when he took the paper that the authority to fill it up had been departed from, cannot recover.⁵

¹ *Greenhow v. Boyle*, 7 Blackf. 56; *Seay v. Bank of Tennessee*, 3 Sneed, 558.

² In *Rex v. Randall, Russ. & Ry. C. C.* 195, it was held that a bill blank as to the name of the payee did not answer the description of a bill of exchange in an indictment. But however that may be, “the cases cited abundantly establish that a party to such a bill is liable upon it as if it was filled up. It has been held, too, that while a bill or note is blank as to the payee, the holder cannot sue upon it as bearer, but that he must insert his name as payee. *Greenhow v. Boyle*, 7 Blackf. 56; *Seay v. Bank of Tennessee*, 3 Sneed, 558. But these cases fully recognize the doctrine of the case of *Crutchley v. Clarence* (see *ante*, §§ 144, 145, and notes). They only hold that the insertion of the name of the plaintiff, so that the paper may on its face import a contract with him, is necessary to enable him to sue upon it.” See *Rees v. Conococheague Bank*, 5 Rand. 326.

³ *Elliott v. Chesnut*, 30 Md. 562.

⁴ *Ives v. Farmers' Bank*, 2 Allen, 236; *Brummel v. Enders*, 18 Grat. 897.

⁵ *Wagner v. Diedrich*, 50 Mo. 484; *Clower v. Wynn*, 59 Ga. 246.

§ 147. If the holder exceed the terms of his authority in filling up the blank, he can have no benefit from it, even to the extent of his authority, for his wrongful act is an utter nullity as to himself;¹ and if the party who takes such paper from the holder have notice that he has exceeded his authority, he participates in the wrongful act by negotiating for it, and cannot recover against the party who signed the blank.² But what charges the transferee with notice is a matter on which the authorities differ. By some authorities it is held that if he knew that the paper had been signed as a blank, and filled up by force of authority by the holder, he should inquire as to the extent of such authority, and if he fails to do so, he takes the paper at his peril.³ And Vice Chancellor Stuart said in an English case: "If the holder has notice of the imperfection [that the signature was made in blank] he can be in no better situation than the person who gave it in blank."⁴ But this qualification of Lord Mansfield's doctrine, that the blank signature is "a letter of credit for an indefinite sum," does not impress us as an improvement upon it. The paper being limitless in its terms, is *prima facie* limitless as to the authority it confers. The holder is invested with a general authority as to that paper,⁵ and the graphic phrase of Lord Mansfield describes it to perfection. High

¹ Van Duzer v. Howe, 21 N. Y. 531; Putnam v. Sullivan, 4 Mass. 45.

² Davidson v. Lanier, 4 Wall. 456. The Court said: "The delivery of a bill of exchange signed and indorsed in blank, only authorizes the receiver to fill it up in conformity with the authority given him. If there has been no agreement, the authority is general; if there has, it must be pursued. The burden of proof that there was an agreement, and that its terms have been violated, is, in such a case, upon the defendant; but if he can make the proof it will avail him. No person unless authorized, either directly or by just inference from the nature of the transaction, can fill up a blank bill for his own benefit, nor can such a bill be enforced against the drawer and indorser against any one who takes it in bad faith—that is, with knowledge that it has been filled up without authority or in fraud." Hatch v. Searles, 2 Sm. & Gif. 147; Johnson v. Blasdale, 1 Smedes & M. 17; Hemphill v. Bank of Alabama, 6 Smedes & M. 44.

³ Van Duzer v. Howe, 21 N. Y. 531; Byles (Sharswood's ed.) [*182], 308.

⁴ Hatch v. Searles, 2 Sm. & Gif. 147.

⁵ Chitty on Bills [*29], 38.

authorities, including Story and Parsons, concur in these views, which seem to us clearly the most philosophical.¹

§ 148. *Bonds with blanks*.—A bond—that is “a deed whereby the obligor promises to pay a sum of money to another on a day appointed”²—stands upon a footing entirely different from bills and notes, and other negotiable instruments. It cannot be left blank either as to the sum, name of the obligee, or other material part, and filled up afterward by an agent, so as to bind the obligor. In other words, it must be perfected in every respect before it amounts to anything. The reason of the distinction is, that authority to make a deed can only be imparted to an agent by an instrument of equal dignity—that is, by deed. In an early English case, a different doctrine was announced by Lord Mansfield,³ and it has been followed in some American cases.⁴ But that decision has been overruled in England;⁵ and in the United States the doctrine of the text has been approved.⁶ It may be stated, however, as a limitation of this doctrine, that it does not extend so far as to apply to that peculiar class of instruments which pass under the general title of “coupon bonds.” They are now universally regarded as negotiable, when so framed as to indicate an intention to make them so. And being negotiable, are governed, for the most part, by the rules applicable to commercial securities, and not by common law principles.⁷ Individual bonds, when made negotiable by statute, would doubtless stand on the same footing.

¹ *Orrick v. Colston*, 7 Grat. 189; *Huntington v. Branch Bank*, 3 Ala. 186; *Story on Bills*, § 222; 1 *Parsons N. & B.* 109; see also *Edwards*, 252–3.

² 2 *Blackstone's Com.* 346; *Preston v. Hull*, 23 Grat. 602, *Staples, J.*

³ *Texira v. Evans*, 1 Anstr. 60; see 2 *Robinson's Practice* (new ed.) 13.

⁴ *Woolley v. Constant*, 4 Johns. 60; *ex parte Decker*, 6 Cow. 60; *ex parte Kerwin*, 8 Cow. 118; *Duncan v. Hodges*, 4 McCord, 239; *Gonslin v. Commander*, &c. 6 Rich. 497.

⁵ *Hibblewhite v. McMowrie*, 6 Mees. & W. 200; *Enthoren v. Hoyle*, 9 Eng. L. & Eq. 434; *Sheppard's Touchstone*, 68.

⁶ *Preston v. Hull*, 23 Grat. 602; *Davenport v. Sleight*, 2 Dev. & Bat. (Law) 381; *Burden v. Sutherland*, 70 N. C. 523; *Bland v. O'Hagan*, 64 N. C. 471.

⁷ *White v. Vermont, &c. R. R. Co.* 21 How. 575; *Preston v. Hull*, 23 Grat. 613.

CHAPTER VI.

MEMORANDA UPON BILLS AND NOTES, AND COLLATERAL AGREEMENTS.

SECTION I.

MEMORANDA UPON BILLS AND NOTES.

§ 149. As to memoranda upon bills and notes, questions have frequently arisen as to whether or not they were to be regarded as incorporated into the instruments themselves. In an English case, where the words "with lawful interest," were written in the corner of a note after its execution, and without the maker's consent, Lord Campbell, C. J., said: "This forms part of the contract. It would clearly have been so if it had been written in the body of the note, and we think a memorandum of this kind written in the corner of the note is equally part of the contract, because the contract must be collected from the four corners of the document, and no part of what appears there is to be excluded."¹ And this rule has been applied in numerous English and American cases. Such memoranda, if made by agreement of the parties before signing, will bind all the parties to the instrument, and all who have or are legally presumed to have notice thereof, and may be pleaded by either plaintiff or defendant.² How far, and under what circumstances a *bona fide* transferee of the paper is affected by the addition, erasure, or obliteration of such memoranda, is elsewhere considered.³

¹ Warrington v. Early, 2 Ellis & Bl. 763 (75 E. C. L. R.); see also Benedict v. Cowden, 49 N. Y. 402; Dewey v. Reed, 40 Barb. 21; Wait v. Pomeroy, 20 Mich. 427.

² 2 Parsons N. & B. 539; Byles on Bills (Sharswood's ed.) [*94], 193.

³ See Chapter XLIII, on Alterations.

§ 150. The principle above stated has been applied, in the United States, and construed as part of the instrument, where the memorandum was written at the bottom of the note, "one-half payable in twelve months, the balance in twenty-four months;"¹ where on the margin was written, "payable in fulled cloth one year from the month of October next;"² where on the back of the note was written a condition making it payable in five years, in a certain contingency;³ where the word "facilities," signifying certain bank notes, was written on a note under the name of the subscribing witnesses;⁴ where the words "[foreign bills]" were written in brackets under the note, its negotiability being thereby destroyed;⁵ where, under the maker's signature was written, "If the machine should not be delivered, this note not to be paid;"⁶ where there was indorsed on a note payable on its face on demand, a condition that it was not to be payable until the happening of a certain event;⁷ where there was written under the maker's signature a memorandum that it was not to be collected until a certain event transpired.⁸

§ 151. *Memoranda on back.*—It seems that the purport of the instrument is not only to be collected from "the four corners," but from "the eight corners," a memorandum on the back, affecting its operation, being regarded the same as if written on its face. This view has been applied where a note payable absolutely on its face, bore an indorsement that payment was not to be compelled, but to be received when convenient to the maker to make payment;⁹ where a note absolute on its face, bore on the back: "This note is given on condition that if any dispute shall arise between Lady Wray and D. Hartley respecting the sale of the within men-

¹ Heywood v. Perrin, 10 Pick. 228.

² Fletcher v. Blodgett, 16 Vt. 26.

³ Henry v. Colman, 5 Vt. 403.

⁴ Springfield Bank v. Merrick, 14 Mass. 322.

⁵ Jones v. Fales, 4 Mass. 254.

⁶ Wait v. Pomeroy, 20 Mich. 425. See also The State v. Stratton, 27 Iowa, 424.

⁷ Effinger v. Richards, 35 Miss. 540.

⁸ Johnson v. Heagan, 28 Me. 329.

⁹ Barnard v. Cushing, 4 Metc. 231.

tioned fir, then the note to be void;"¹ where there was indorsed on the back of the note that it was "to be taken for security of all such balances as J. M. may happen to owe to T. L. & Co., not extending farther than the within named sum of £200, but this note to be in force for six months, and no money to be called for sooner in any case;"² where, on the back of a note was indorsed, "the within note is given for securing certain floating advances;"³ so where it was indorsed on the back of a note that payment was not to be expected until a mill was sold,⁴ so where condition was written on the back of the note providing for deductions on certain contingencies.⁵

§ 152. The New York cases do not seem to be uniform and consistent on this subject. In one case it was held that a memorandum on the back of the note that it was to be delivered 'as consideration for a judgment to S. & O., "was no part of the note, and the effect of it was only to show the consideration and operate as a notice to any person who might purchase the note."⁶ And in another, that an indorsement on the back of a note of a condition

¹ Hartley v. Wilkinson, 4 Camp. 127 (1814).

² Leeds v. Lancashire, 2 Camp. 205 (1809), Lord Ellenborough said: "In the hands of a *bona fide* holder who received it as a promissory note, it might possibly be considered as such, but the present plaintiffs (the payees) can only treat it as a guaranty for Marriott to the amount of £200. As to them the indorsement must be incorporated with the body of the note." But when the case came before the King's Bench, as reported in 5 Maule & Selwyn, 25 (1815), the above *obiter dictum* as to a *bona fide* holder was not repeated, and Lord Ellenborough, C. J., said: "How can it be said that this note is a negotiable instrument for the payment of money absolutely, when it is apparent that the party taking it must inquire into an extrinsic fact, in order to ascertain if it be payable? By the indorsement the party takes nothing but a contingent benefit, dependent upon the happening or not of a particular dispute about the property." Bayley, J., said: "This note cannot be said to be payable at all events." And Dampier, J., said: "The argument is, that a promissory note to pay, 'unless a dispute shall arise between A. & B.,' imports an unconditional promise to pay."

³ Cholmeley v. Darley, 14 Mees. & W. 344.

⁴ Blake v. Coleman, 22 Wis. 416.

⁵ Henry v. Colman, 5 Vt. 402.

⁶ Sanders v. Bacon, 8 Johns. 485 (1811); see Edwards on Bills, 147, 281.

that it was to be delivered to the payees as security for a certain acceptance, and was to be void in a certain event, did not affect its negotiability, and was not a part of it.¹ But it has been there held that a memorandum on the margin of a note specifying no place of payment, running "payable at the Bank of America," entered into its terms, and, being made without the maker's consent, materially altered and avoided it.² The like view prevailed as to a memorandum added on the face of a note, "interest to be paid semi-annually,"³ and as to a memorandum under the maker's signature, "the above note to be paid from the profits of machines when sold."⁴ And in the last quoted case it was doubted whether the earlier cases could be regarded "as the deliberate adjudications of the Supreme Court of this State."⁵

§ 153. If the memorandum be intended merely to identify and earmark the instrument it will not affect its operation;⁶ and it has been regarded of this character where it was indorsed upon a note by the payee that he desired his executors not to call in the money until three years after his death.⁷

§ 154. *Parol evidence as to Memoranda.*—It is competent for either party to show by parol testimony the time when, the person by whom, and the circumstances under which a memorandum upon a bill or note was made. If made—and it will be presumed that it was made—contemporaneously with the execution of the instrument, and as a constituent

¹ Tappan v. Ely, 15 Wend. 363 (1836).

² Woodworth v. Bank of America, 19 Johns. 391 (1821), overruling same case in 18 Johns. 316 (1820).

³ Dewey v. Reed, 40 Barb. 17 (1863).

⁴ Benedict v. Cowden, 49 N. Y. 396 (1872).

⁵ Benedict v. Cowden, 49 N. Y. 405, Allen, J.

⁶ Benedict v. Cowden, 49 N. Y. 402; Brill v. Crick, 1 Mees. & W. 232; Fitch v. Jones, 5 Ellis & B. 238 (85 E. C. L. R.); Byles on Bills (Sharswood's ed.) [*94], 193.

⁷ Stone v. Metcalf, 4 Camp. 217.

part thereof,¹ it will be given full effect as above stated; if made after its execution, and with the consent of all parties, it will modify and control its operation; and if made by a stranger without the consent of any party, it will be a spoliation, and be disregarded; while if made by the holder without consent of the parties, it will vitiate and avoid it, being a material alteration.² And when any of these questions of fact are raised, they are to be put in issue and tried by a jury.³ But when the memorandum is a part of the instrument, parol testimony is inadmissible to alter or vary its terms, as it is part of a written contract.⁴

§ 155. Although an agreement be written upon the same paper that the note is written on, and yet if it be evident that it was not intended to incorporate the terms of the agreement in the instrument itself, the transferability and negotiability of the instrument will not be affected by it.

¹ Fletcher v. Blodgett, 16 Vt. 26. In this case, memorandum on margin of note was payable in merchantable fulled cloth one month from the month of October next. The note was for \$41 50, payable one day after date, with interest annually. *Held*, the memorandum was part of the note, and was to be presumed to have been made at time of signing. Henry v. Colman, 5 Vt. 402. Condition written on back of note created as part of it. Jones v. Fales, 4 Mass. 253. In this case the words [foreign bills] were written on the margin of the note. Parsons, C. J., said: "It is a reasonable conclusion that these words must all be taken to be the words of the maker of the note, written before it was delivered to the promisee." Tuckerman v. Hartwell, 3 Greenl. 147. In Harvey v. Effinger, 35 Miss. 552, a written agreement was appended to or indorsed on the note that it was not to be payable until the happening of a certain event. Smith, C. J., said: "According to the well-settled rule on the subject, the note, and the agreement, constituted one instrument." See also Leeds v. Laneashire, 5 Maule & Sel. 25 *ante*, § 151, note. Prof. Parsons does not seem to concur with the text. He says in 2 vol. N. & B., p. 544: "It has been held that words written on the back of a note are no part of the body thereof, *prima facie*, but are presumed to be done after the note is completed." This view is taken in Buy v. Sprader, 50 Miss. 330, where Simrall, J., says: "If such memoranda are at the foot or on the back of the note or other instrument when executed, they constitute a part of the contract. But being disconnected from the body of the instrument to which the maker's name is signed, it forms no original part of it, until shown to have been upon it when executed."

² *Ib.*; Dewey v. Reed, 40 Barb. 16; Brill v. Crick, 1 Mees & W. 231.

³ Makepeace v. Harvard College, 10 Pick. 303.

⁴ Heywood v. Perrin, 10 Pick. 228.

Thus, where the payee of a note, at the time of taking it, wrote underneath it an agreement to take the above note in certain labor if done in six months, there being no evidence that the promisor had ever performed or offered to perform the labor, and the six months having expired, it was held that the two instruments were not to be construed together as parts of the same contract, and that an indorsee might recover on it in his own name.¹

SECTION II.

COLLATERAL AGREEMENTS.

§ 156. When there is a contemporaneous written contract affecting the terms of the bill or note, it is to be construed together with the bill or note, in so far as each may be given effect, and there is no repugnancy between them. Thus, where a note is payable in five years, with interest at ten per cent., and at the time of its execution a mortgage is given to secure its payment, in which it is stipulated that interest shall be payable annually, the mortgage as between the parties will control the payment of interest.² So, if there be a contemporaneous written contract recognizing the note, and promising to pay an additional sum on a contingency, for the same consideration, it is a good bargain, and merges all prior stipulations.³

§ 157. After a bill or note has been executed and delivered, it is a subject of contract like any other property or chose in action; and evidence, therefore, will be admitted to show a subsequent bargain upon a good consideration to extend the time of payment,⁴ or an agreement that payment

¹ *Odiorne v. Sargent*, 6 N. H. 401. See *ante*, § 61, 62.

² *Muzzy v. Knight*, 8 Kan. 456. See also *Meyer v. Graeber*, 19 Kan. 165; *Dobbins v. Parker*, 46 Iowa, 358, *post*, § 835.

³ *Cuthbert v. Bowie*, 10 Ala. 163.

⁴ *Solomons v. Jones*, 3 Brev. 54.

might be made to a third person,¹ or that the contract for which the paper was given has been rescinded, and thus the consideration failed.²

§ 158. Where there is an agreement subsequent to the execution of the instrument, upon a valid consideration, to do or receive something else for and instead of the note, and such agreement has been actually carried out, it operates as a discharge of the instrument, and there can be no recovery upon it.³ But if the agreement be still executory, it has been held that it must be enforced in another suit. Thus, a defense to a note payable in one year, that an oral collateral agreement provided that payment should not be demanded until the expiration of five years, is no bar to a suit brought before the lapse of five years.⁴ So, where the payee of a note, who had sold a certain article, warranted it, and promised, if bad, to furnish a duplicate before the note should be paid, it was held no defense to the note.⁵ Peculiar statutes may, in some States, change these common law principles.

§ 159. An agreement to renew a bill or note would be binding,⁶ but unless it otherwise expressed the number of times of renewal, it would be construed as an agreement to renew once only.⁷ If contemporaneous with the execution of the instrument, such agreement would not be binding unless in writing, for the reason that it would contradict the terms of a written contract, and parol evidence for that purpose is inadmissible. But if, after the note is made, such agreement, though oral, would be binding if for a consideration.⁸ In an action on a note payable in ninety days from date, but con-

¹ Low v. Treadwell, 12 Me. 441.

² Allen v. Furbish, 4 Gray, 504; Newton v. Jackson, 23 Ala. 335.

³ Crossman v. Fuller, 17 Pick. 171.

⁴ Dow v. Tuttle, 4 Mass. 414; 2 Parsons N. & B. 530, 531; *contra*, Grafton Bank v. Woodward, 5 N. H. 99; Erwin v. Saunders, 1 Cow. 249.

⁵ Kelso v. Frye, 4 Bibb, 493.

⁶ Innes v. Munro, 1 Exch. 473.

⁷ Id.

⁸ Grafton Bank v. Woodward, 5 N. H. 99; Fleming v. Gilbert, 3 Johns. 528; Hoare v. Graham, 3 Camp. 57; Gibbon v. Scott, 2 Stark 286.

taining on its face a provision that if the maker pay one-half the note, and the interest on the other half, in advance, for ninety days the payment of that half should be extended for that further length of time—it should be described according to its terms in a declaration, and a description of it as payable in ninety days from date would be a variance.¹ But if the agreement for extension or renewal were on a separate paper, it should not be noticed in the declaration.² In England it has been held that when there has been a valid subsequent agreement for renewal, the defendant must show that he applied for a renewal, or the plaintiff will prevail.³ Any agreement between the payee and the maker of a note not written on its face could not effect a *bona fide* indorsee for value, and without notice; and the payee, after indorsing it, would be estopped to assert a restriction upon its negotiability.⁴

¹ Woodstock Bank v. Downer, 27 Vt. 482; Barnard v. Cushing, 4 Metc. 230.

² Smalley v. Bristol, 1 Mich. 153.

³ Gibbon v. Scott, 2 Stark. 286.

⁴ Hodges v. Shuler, 24 Barb. 68.

CHAPTER VII.

CONSIDERATION OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.

§ 160. By consideration, is meant a benefit or gain of some kind to the party making the promise, or a loss or injury of some kind to the party to whom it is made. By the common law a promise made without consideration was invalid, and in order to enforce any contract it was necessary to aver and prove a consideration.

The most ancient exception to this rule was made in reference to promises under seal, the solemn act of the party in attaching a seal to the evidence of his contract being regarded as importing a consideration and estopping him from denying it. The necessities of trade soon produced another relaxation of the rule; and by the usage and custom of merchants, bills of exchange and promissory notes came to be regarded as *prima facie* evidences of consideration; and peculiar qualities were accorded to them which were possessed by no other securities for debt. These qualities, so far as they relate to the consideration of such instruments, we propose now to discuss.

SECTION I.

WHAT INSTRUMENTS IMPORT A CONSIDERATION.

§ 161. There is no doubt that if the instruments sued on be a bill of exchange—although it lacks the words “payable to order,” or “bearer,” which are essential to its negotiability—it is unnecessary to aver or prove a consideration, for it imports a consideration in itself by the very fact that it is a

bill of exchange.¹ But if it is shorn of its character as a bill of exchange by being made payable out of a particular fund, or upon a condition, or in a different medium than money, it does not, *per se*, import a consideration. And consideration must be averred and proved;² unless it be stated on its face that it was given for "value received," or some equivalent, or there are expressions in it inconsistent with any other theory than that it was upon a consideration, in which cases it would be *prima facie* evidence of consideration.³ If its terms are just as consistent with that of its existence—as of consideration as they are with the theory or a total want for instance, a draft addressed to "the trustee of N. and A.," directing the payment of a sum "out of any money in his hands belonging to me,"—it would not afford such a legal presumption of consideration as to dispense with proof of it.⁴ If an order be so drawn as to imply that the drawee has funds in his hands to meet it, acceptance of it is an admission of the funds in hand and their sufficiency.⁵

§ 162. At common law an action of debt cannot be sustained upon a promissory note, as of itself importing a debt; but the plaintiff must declare upon the contract as in *assumpsit*, and must both aver and prove a valuable consideration.

¹ Averett's Adm. v. Booker, 15 Grat. 169 (1839); Josceline v. Lassere, 10 Mod. 294, 317 (1714); Haydock, v. Lynch, 2 Ld. Raym. 1563.

² Averett's Adm. v. Booker, *supra*; Atkinson v. Manks, 1 Cow. 151; De Forest v. Frary, 6 Cow. 151; Belderback v. Burlingame, 27 Ill. 311, order payable "in lumber;" Josceline v. Lassere, 10 Mod. 294, 317 (1714); Haydock v. Lynch, 2 Ld. Raym. (1563); 1 Robinson's Pr (new ed.) 143.

³ Averett's Adm. v. Booker, *supra*; 1 Parsons N. & B. 226, 228, note; see Joliffe v. Higgins, 6 Munf. 3.

⁴ Averett's Adm. v. Booker, 15 Grat. 170; Lee, J. saying: "Taking all the terms of the paper together they are at least consistent with the theory of the absence of all considerations, as they are with that of any value received. The terms of the order would admit equally well of several different constructions. The drawer might have known that he had just such a sum in the hands of the drawee, and intended merely to give authority to the latter to deliver the same to the payee for him; or without knowing whether the trustee had received funds for him or not, might have merely given the order, if he had, to authorize the payee to receive them for him as agent."

⁵ Varner v. Nobleborough, 2 Greenl. 123; Maber v. Massias, 2 Bl. Rep. 1072.

And the note, though it could not be declared on, might be given in evidence in support of the contract stated, as, for instance, on account for money lent.¹ One effect of the English statute of Anne, which has been quoted² was, that an action of debt might be maintained on a promissory note without alleging a consideration, and, of consequence, without proving any.³ And such is the effect of all statutes which make promissory notes negotiable, or which authorize actions of debt upon them though non-negotiable. But such notes as are not negotiable by statute, or upon which no action of debt is authorized by statute remain as at common law; and not importing a consideration, it must be alleged and proved.⁴

§ 163. These general principles are affected more or less by statutes in the United States, and it has been said by a learned author that the only conclusion to which he is led by the authorities respecting non-negotiable notes, is that in some of the States the "presumption of consideration would be denied, and in others, perhaps, admitted."⁵ It is quite certain, however, that the transferee of a non-negotiable instrument can stand on no better footing respecting the original parties than his transferer, and that the consideration may be inquired into, though "value received" is expressed.⁶ Whenever a note is expressed to be "for value received," or states a consideration, it is *prima facie* evidence of considera-

¹ Peasley v. Boatwright, 2 Leigh, 198 (1830); Jackson v. Jackson, 10 Leigh, 452 (1839); Bourne v. Ward, 51 Me 191; Bristol v. Warner, 19 Conn. 7; Birckleback v. Wilkins, 22 Penn. St. 26; Clarke v. Martin, 2 Ld. Raym. 757; Story v. Atkins, Id. 1430; Trier v. Bridgman, 2 East, 359.

² *Ante*, § 5, note 5.

³ Peasley v. Boatwright, *supra*.

⁴ Peasley v. Boatwright, *supra*; Averett's Adm. v. Booker, 15 Grat. 165; Courtney v. Doyle, 10 Allen, 123. In this case the note ran "I promise to pay A. B. three hundred dollars with interest from date (signed) C. D." *Held*, that consideration must be averred and proved.

⁵ 1 Parsons N. & B. 227. In Kimball v. Huntington, 10 Wend. 675, a note running "Due A. B. \$325 payable on demand," was held to import consideration.

⁶ Chamberlain v. Gorham, 20 Johns. 144; 1 Parsons N. & B. 228; Edwards on Bills, 217.

tion, though it may not be negotiable, and whether it be payable in money or specific articles.¹ The transferee of a non-negotiable note must aver and prove consideration for the transfer.²

§ 164. While a bill or negotiable note imports in itself a consideration, yet when evidence has been introduced to rebut the presumption which it raises, the burden is upon the plaintiff to satisfy the jury upon all the evidence, and by the preponderance of evidence that there was a consideration; and the mere production of the instrument does not shift upon the defendant the burden of proving that there was no consideration.³ The production of the note as has been said, is a *prima facie* evidence of a consideration, sufficient, if not rebutted, to maintain the plaintiff's case. But to hold that such an admission in the note of a consideration therefor (as the words "value received") changes the burden of proof, and compels the defendant to assume it, would be to hold that such an admission when made orally, and when not contained in the instrument would have the same effect."⁴ And again: "As the burden is on the plaintiff to prove a good consideration (for the note), if the whole evidence offered on both sides, leaves it in doubt whether there was a good consideration or not, the plaintiff fails of making out his case, and the defendant will be entitled to a verdict."⁵

§ 165. *Proof of consideration when bill or note is in hands of third parties.*—When the bill or note has passed into the hands of a third party, we have already seen that the defendant, if he be not the immediate indorser of the in

¹ Walrad v. Petrie, 4 Wend. 575; Bourne v. Ward, 51 Me. 191; Edwards on Bills, 210; 1 Parsons N. & B. 226.

² Barrick v. Austin, 21 Barb. 241.

³ Black River Savings Bank v. Edwards, 10 Gray, 387; Delano v. Bartlet, 6 Cush. 364; Small v. Clewley, 62 Me. 155; Burnham v. Allen, 1 Gray, 501; Crowninshield v. Crowninshield, 2 Gray, 529; Slate v. Flye, 26 Me. 312.

⁴ Commonwealth v. McKie, 1 Bennett & Heard's Leading Criminal Cases, Note 16, Am. Rep. 412; Small v. Clewley, 62 Me. 155.

⁵ Burnham v. Allen, 1 Gray, 501; Small and Clewley, 62 Me. 155.

dorsee, has a double burden imposed upon him. He must show in such cases not only the want or failure of the original consideration, but he must go farther and show want or failure of the consideration between the plaintiff and his immediate indorser. It is important to observe, however, that the rules of evidence conform themselves, in some respects, to suit the circumstances under which the parties are presumed to be placed; and there are two leading principles which are well settled.

The *first* is that proof of a total want of consideration, as that the bill or note was executed for accommodation, or was intended as a gift, or was given for a balance erroneously supposed to be due, will not shift it upon the plaintiff to show that he acquired it upon a sufficient consideration,¹ and subsequent failure of consideration stands on the same footing.² Respecting accommodation bills, it was said by the Court of Exchequer, Lord Abinger delivering the opinion: ³ "If a man comes into court without any suspicion of fraud, but only as the holder of an accommodation bill, it may fairly be presumed that he is a holder for value. The proof of its being an accommodation bill is no evidence of the want of consideration in the holder. If the defendant says, I lent my name to the drawer for the purpose of his raising money upon the bill, the probability is that money was obtained upon the bill. Unless, therefore, the bill be connected with some fraud, and a suspicion of a fraud be raised from its being shown that something has been done with it of an illegal nature—as that is has been clandestinely taken away or has been lost or stolen, in which case the holder must show that

¹ See Chapter XXIV on Bona Fide Holder, §§ 777, 810; Secs. II and VII. This rule was first laid down by Parke, J., in *Heath v. Sansom*, 2 B. & Ad. 291, dissenting from the opinion of the court; but it is now well settled in England as well as in the United States. *Whitaker v. Edmunds*, 1 Moody & R. 366; *Mills v. Barker*, 1 Mees. & W. 425; *Percival v. Frampton*, 2 Crompt. M. & R. 180; *Ellicott v. Martin*, 6 Md. 509; *Ross v. Bedell*, 5 Duer, 465; *Harger v. Worrall*, 69 N. Y. 370.

² *Wilson v. Lazier*, 11 Grat. 477; *Knight v. Pugh*, 4 Watts & S. 445.

³ *Mills v. Barber*, 1 Mees. & W. 425.

he gave value for it—the *onus probandi* is cast upon the defendant.”

§ 166. But if the defendant show that there was fraud or illegality in the origin of the bill or note, a new coloring is imparted to the transaction. The plaintiff, if he has become innocently the holder of the paper, is not permitted to suffer; but as the knowledge of the manner in which it came into his hands must rest in his bosom, and the means of showing it must be much easier to him than to the defendant, he is required to give proof that he became possessed of it for a sufficient consideration.¹

If he is innocent, the burden must generally be a light one; and if guilty, it is but a proper shield to one who would be, but for its protection, his victim.

§ 167. It was formerly considered necessary, in order to enable the defendant to put the plaintiff on proof of consideration, that defendant should have given the plaintiff notice to prove consideration;² but it is well settled now that no such notice is necessary, and it is seldom given.³ It was, also, formerly held that where the consideration given by the plaintiff was disputed, and a notice to that effect had been given, the plaintiff must go into his whole case in the first instance, and could not reserve proof of consideration as an answer to the defendant.⁴ But now the plaintiff is only required to give affirmative proof of consideration after the defendant has given evidence tending to rebut the *prima facie* case which the production of the instrument makes out.⁵

¹ *Vathir v. Zane*, 3 Grat. 246. In *Harvey v. Towers*, 6 Exch. 656, Pollock, C. B., said: “It is now well settled that if a bill be founded in illegality or fraud, or has been the subject of felony or fraud, upon that being proved, the holder is compelled to show that he gave value for it.” *Smith v. Braine*, 16 Q. B. 244, overruling *Brown v. Phillpot*, 2 M. & R. 285; *Bailey v. Bidwell*, 13 Mees. & W. 73. *Sperry v. Spaulding*, 45 Cal. 544.

² *Paterson v. Hardacre*, 4 Taunt. 111; *Byles on Bills* (Sharswood’s ed.) [*115, 116], 221, note d.

³ *Mann v. Lent*, 1 M. & M. 240; 10 B. & C. 877 (21 E. C. L. R.); *Bailey v. Bidwell*, 13 Mees. & W. 75.

⁴ *Delaney v. Mitchell*, 1 Stark. 439 (2 E. C. L. R.).

⁵ *Byles* (Sharswood’s ed.) [*116], 221, note d.

SECTION II.

BY WHAT LAWS THE LEGALITY OF CONSIDERATION IS DETERMINED.—
CONFEDERATE OBLIGATIONS.

§ 168. The laws in force at the time a note is given determine its legality; and where a law prohibiting the sale of spirituous liquors has been repealed, it does not thereby validate a note given in violation of the statute when it was in force; and a renewal of the note will be tainted with the original illegality.¹

§ 169. The legality of the consideration of a contract is to be determined by the laws of the State or country where the contract is made, and not by those of the State or country where the suit is brought. The rules of every nation from comity admit that the laws of every other nation in force within its own limits ought to have the same force everywhere, so far as they do not prejudice the rights of other governments or their citizens.² The rule is founded not merely on the convenience, but on the necessity of nations; for otherwise it would be impracticable for them to carry on an extensive intercourse or commerce with each other.³

¹ *Holden v. Cosgrove*, 12 Gray, 216.

² See Chapter XXVII, on Conflict of Laws; *Thorington v. Smith*, 8 Wall. 11. Chief Justice Chase, after speaking of the supremacy of the Confederate Government in the seceded States, says: "It must follow as a necessary consequence from this actual supremacy of the insurgent government, as a belligerent within the territory where it circulated, and from the unity of civil obedience on the part of all who remained in it, that this currency must be considered in courts of law in the same light as if it had been issued by a foreign government temporarily occupying a part of the territory of the United States. Contracts stipulating for payments in this currency cannot be void for that reason only, as made in aid of the foreign invasion in the one case, or of domestic insurrection in the other. They have no necessary relations to the government, whether invading or insurgent. They are transactions in the ordinary course of civil society, and, though they may indirectly and remotely serve the ends of the unlawful government, are without blame, except when they have been entered into with actual intent to further invasion or insurrection. We cannot doubt that such contracts should be enforced in the courts of the United States, after the restoration of peace, to the extent of their just obligation."

³ *Boyce v. Tabb*, 18 Wall. 548.

§ 170. These principles have been applied by the courts of the United States, since the close of the war against the Confederate States, to instruments executed during the war for the loan of Confederate States treasury notes, or which were payable in that medium—it having been the only currency in general circulation within the Confederate lines; and also to those executed in payment of hires or purchase money of slaves after slavery had been abolished.

The United States Supreme Court has held unanimously that a promissory note payable in Confederate States treasury notes, made between parties within the lines of the Confederate States during the war, was not executed upon an illegal consideration, unless it was executed with the intent to aid the Confederate cause;¹ and the courts of some of the reconstructed Southern States and of other States have adopted similar views.² Confederate currency having been the only medium of exchange in the Confederate lines for the better part of the war, any other view would seem peculiarly rigorous and cruel, and utterly opposed to that spirit of comity and humanity which should ameliorate as far as possible the disadvantages and hardships of conflicts between nations. But partisan judges have not been lacking in the conquered States, and their extreme and violent notions have found expression in decisions which will remain as an enduring stain upon the records of the American judiciary.³

§ 171. Bonds issued by the convention of a secession State to raise revenues to carry on war against the United

¹ *Osborn v. Nicholson*, 13 Wall. 656.

² *Rodes v. Patillo*, 5 Bush (Ky.) 271; *Rivers v. Moss*, 6 Bush (Ky.) 600; *Dearing v. Rucker*, 18 Grat. 426; *Boulware v. Newton*, Id. 708; *Lohman v. Crouch*, 19 Grat. 331; *Magill v. Manson*, 20 Grat. 527; *Green v. Sizer*, 40 Miss. 530; *Murrell v. Jones*, Id. 565.

³ Note for loan of Confederate States treasury notes void: *Lawson v. Miller*, 44 Ala. 616; *Calfee v. Burgess*, 3 W. Va. 274; *Prigeon v. Smith*, 31 Texas, 171; *Reavis v. Blackshear*, 30 Texas, 753. Contracts solvable in Confederate money held void. *Biossat v. Sullivan*, 21 La. Ann. 565; *Latham v. Clark*, 25 Ark. 574. And this has been held to apply, although the paper, on its face, was payable simply in dollars. *Donley v. Tindall*, 32 Tex. 43.

States have been held by the United States Supreme Court to be upon an illegal consideration.¹

§ 172. In respect to promissory notes given for slaves, before President Lincoln's emancipation proclamation was issued, the Supreme Court of the United States has set the question of their validity at rest. It has been decided by that tribunal that a note dated March 26th, 1861, and given for a slave, could be recovered upon, notwithstanding that slavery was abolished on the first of January, 1862, and the contract of sale contained the warranty, "the said negro to be a slave for life,"² and also notwithstanding the thirteenth amendment to the Constitution, made in 1865, by which it is ordained that "neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall exist in the United States nor in any place subject to their jurisdiction."

In the State tribunals of the Southern States, where this question has been of much consequence, conflicting views have been taken, but many of the cases concur in judgment with the Supreme Court of the United States,³ and in other States of the Union, both before and since the war, the principles of these decisions have been asserted.⁴

§ 173. A recovery upon instruments executed for slaves, or for Confederate money, has been sought to be prevented by articles in the new Constitutions of some of the States, denying jurisdiction to the courts to enforce them; or in

¹ *Hanauer v. Woodruff*, 15 Wall. 439.

² *Osborn v. Nicholson*, 13 Wall. 655; *Boyce v. Tabb*, 18 Wall. 548. In *Fitzpatrick v. Hearne*, 44 Ala. 171, it was held that a warranty on the sale of slaves "that the title of said slaves was warranted for the life of said negro slaves," was not broken by the subsequent emancipation of the slaves. To same effect, *Hand v. Armstrong*, 34 Ga. 232; *Wilkinson v. Cook*, 44 Miss. 367; *McNealy v. Gregory*, 13 Fla. 417.

³ *McElvain v. Mudd*, 44 Ala. 48; *Thompson v. Warren*, 5 Cold. 644; *Dowdy v. McClellan*, 52 Ga. 408; *Calhoun v. Calhoun*, 2 S. C. 283; *contra*, *Laprice v. Bowman*, 20 La. Ann. 234; *Lytle v. Wheeler*, 21 Ib. 193.

⁴ *Roundtree v. Baker*, 53 Ill. 241, in which case it was held that an obligation for the purchase of a slave in Kentucky, when slavery was legal, might be sued upon in Illinois, and the subsequent abolition of slavery did not affect the note

some such language declaring that they shall be deemed void. But such declarations, whether of a State Constitution or of a legislative enactment, evidently violate the provision of the national Constitution prohibiting the passage of any law impairing the obligation of a contract. The United States Supreme Court has so held,¹ and the decision is obviously just; but some of the Southern tribunals have held otherwise.²

In some of the States it has been held that notes for slaves sold after Lincoln's emancipation proclamation were as valid as those for slaves sold before,³ and according to the principles of the text, which the authorities amply sustain, there can be substantially no difference in the cases, the Confederate Government being in power and protecting slavery within its lines as a legal institution. But the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case above quoted, especially withheld any opinion as to cases arising after emancipation.

SECTION III.

BETWEEN WHAT PARTIES THE CONSIDERATION IS OPEN TO INQUIRY.

§ 174. The same rule which admits inquiry into the consideration of negotiable paper between the original payor and payee extends to admit such inquiry in any suit between parties between whom there is a privity. That is to say, between the immediate parties to any contract evidenced by the drawing, accepting, making or indorsing a bill or note, it may be shown that there was no consideration (as, that it was for accommodation);⁴ or that the consideration has failed, or a set-off may be pleaded; but as between other

¹ *White v. Hart*, 13 Wall. 646; *Boyce v. Tabb*, 18 Wall. 548; *McElvain v. Mudd*, 44 Ala. 48; *McNealy v. Gregory*, 13 Fla. 417.

² *Graham v. Maguire*, 39 Ga. 531; *Green v. Clark*, 21 La. Ann. 567; *Lawson v. Miller*, 44 Ala. 616; *Barrow v. Pike*, 21 La. Ann. 14.

³ *McElvain v. Mudd*, 44 Ala. 48; *Hall v. Keese*, 31 Tex. 504.

⁴ *Murphy v. Keyes*, 39 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 18.

parties remote to each other, none of these defenses are admissible. It becomes important then to determine who are to be regarded as the immediate parties, or parties between whom there is a privity, to a negotiable instrument, and who are remote. Among the former may be classed: (1) The drawer and acceptor of a bill,¹ or (2) The drawer and payee² of a bill as a general rule; (3) The maker and payee of a note;³ and (4) The indorser and immediate indorsee of a bill or note.⁴

But the want of consideration, or the failure thereof, cannot be pleaded in a suit brought: (1) By an indorsee against the maker of a note; (2) By an indorsee against a prior but not his immediate indorser;⁵ nor (3) by the payee against the acceptor of a bill, as a general rule.⁶ They are regarded as remote parties to each other, and between such parties two distinct considerations must be inquired into in order to perfect a defense against the holder: (1) The consideration which the defendant received for his liability; and (2) That which the plaintiff gave for his title.⁷ And if any inter-

¹ *Thomas v. Thomas*, 8 Wisc. 476. Where it was held that acceptors could show as against drawers that they accepted for too much. *Spurgin v. McPheeters*, 42 Ind. 527.

² *McCulloch v. Hoffman*, 17 N. Y. S. C. (10 Hun), 133; *Spurgin v. McPheeters*, 42 Ind. 527.

³ *Puget de Bras v. Forbes*, 1 Esp. 117; *Jeffries v. Austin*, 2 Stra. 674.

⁴ *Easton v. Pratchett*, 1 Crompt. M. & R. 798; 2 Crompt. M. & R. 542; *Holiday v. Atkinson*, 5 B. & C. 501; *Abbott v. Hendricks*, 1 Man. & G. 791; *Klein v. Keyes*, 17 Mo. 326; *Barnet v. Offerman*, 7 Watts, 130; *Clement v. Reppard*, 15 Penn. St. 111; *Spurgin v. McPheeters*, 42 Ind. 527.

⁵ 1 *Parsons N. & B.* 176.

⁶ *Hoffman & Co. v. Bank of Milwaukee*, 12 Wall. 181. In this case a consignor who had been in the habit of drawing bills of exchange on his consignee, with bills of lading attached to the drafts drawn, drew bills on him with forged bills of lading attached to the drafts, and had the drafts, with the forged bills of lading so attached, discounted in the ordinary course of business by a bank ignorant of the fraud, and the consignee, not knowing of the forgery, paid the drafts. It was held that there was no recourse by the consignee against the bank. See the opinion of the court, p. 190. In *Marsh v. Low*, 55 Ind. 271, breach of warranty on sale of personal property by the drawee to drawer was held no defense to acceptor.

⁷ *Hoffman & Co. v. Bank of Milwaukee*, 12 Wall. 181; *Craig v. Sibbett*, 15

mediate holder gave value for the instrument, that intervening consideration will sustain the plaintiff's title.¹

§ 175. Who are the immediate parties to a bill or note however does not always appear on its face. The name of the payee is often left blank, or there is an indorsement in blank upon the instrument, and in such cases when the blank is filled up with the holder's name he would appear to be the original payee or indorsee.² In such cases the holder may show that his ostensible is not his real relation to the paper; and the want or failure of consideration cannot be pleaded against him if he show that it has passed through intermediate hands, and that he is not the immediate promisee of the party attempting the defense.³ If the note were made to the payee for his accommodation, and indorsed by him to a holder who parts with nothing on the faith of its transfer, and had notice of its accommodation character, upon these facts appearing, the holder could not recover.⁴

§ 176. So, also, it may be that the drawer is the primary debtor, and bound to the acceptor, although as to third parties the acceptor would be the principal. As, for instance where the acceptance has been upon letters of credit⁵ or for the drawer's accommodation.⁶ So, if A. for a good consideration, moving from B. to him, should procure

Penn. 240; U. S. v. Bank of Metropolis, 15 Peters, 393; Swift v. Tyson, 16 Peters, 1; Robinson v. Reynolds, 2 Q. B. 196 (42 E. C. L. R.); Thiedemann v. Goldsmith, 1 De Gex F. & J. 4; Hunter v. Wilson, 19 L. J. Exch. 8; 4 Exch. 489; Spurgin v. McPheeters, 42 Ind. 527.

¹ Byles on Bills (Sharswood's ed.) 236; 1 Parsons N. & B. 192; Hunter v. Wilson, 4 Exch. 489; Boyd v. McCann, 10 Md. 118; Howell v. Crane, 12 La. Ann. 126; Watson v. Flanagan, 14 Tex. 354; Roscoe on Bills, 111; Kyd on Bills, 277; Story on Bills, § 188; Johnson on Bills, 80; see Chapter XXIV, on rights of *bona fide* holder or purchaser.

² Brummel v. Enders, 18 Grat. 873; Hoffman v. Bank of Milwaukee, 12 Wall. 193.

³ Ibid.; Munroe v. Bordier, 8 C. B. 862; Arbouin v. Anderson, 1 Q. B. 498; Glasscock v. Rand. 14 Mo. 550; Horn v. Fuller, 6 N. H. 511.

⁴ Powers v. French, 8 N. Y. S. C. (1 Hun), 582.

⁵ Turner v. Browden, 5 Bush (Ky.) 216.

⁶ Id.

C. to make his note in favor of B., it would seem that it would be no sufficient answer in an action by B. against C. that the latter received no consideration from A.,¹ or that it had failed.² But if it were shown that there was no consideration between A. and C. the maker, or that such consideration had failed, it would then be necessary for the payee B. to show a consideration moving from him to A.³

And if the consideration between the party requesting the execution of the note and the maker were illegal, the note would not be valid, notwithstanding the consideration between such party and the payee were good, if the payee knew the consideration moving the maker were illegal. To hold otherwise would furnish an easy subterfuge to escape the consequences of illegal dealings. Thus, where A. was

¹ Id.; *Railroad v. Chamberlin*, 44 N. H. 497.

² *South Boston Iron Co. v. Brown*, 63 Me. 139. Barrows, J.: "Where, at the request of the party with whom he deals, one makes his promissory note, which is to be a partial payment, for a piece of work to be done for him, payable to a third party, who is a creditor of the party with whom he contracts for the work, and it is credited by the payer to such party in good faith, the maker cannot set up the defense of failure of consideration as between himself and the party with whom he deals in defense of a suit upon such note in the name of the payee."

³ *Aldrich v. Stockwell*, 9 Allen, 45. The defendant offered to show that the note was for a water-wheel sold by Thompson to him with warranty, which had failed, the wheel being worthless, and had been made payable to plaintiff at Thompson's request. The court below ruled that these facts constituted no defense, but the Supreme Court held otherwise, and Gray, J., said: "If such were the facts, the defendant was entitled to treat the sale as a nullity; and the proof of entire failure of consideration would have rebutted the presumption of consideration arising from the admission of the making of the note, and would have established a complete defense as between the original parties to the note. One consideration of the note having been proved, there could be no presumption, in the absence of evidence, that there was any other, and the defendant was not, therefore, obliged to prove that there was no other consideration for the note. If there was any other consideration, it was for the plaintiff to show it. As the case stood, the plaintiff might have held the note in trust, or as agent for Thompson. The presiding judge, by ruling that the facts offered to be proved by the defendant would constitute no defense, left nothing upon which he could go to the jury. The verdict to which he submitted under this ruling must, therefore, be set aside. Upon a new trial, it will be open to the plaintiff to show, if he can, that the consideration which failed was not the only consideration for the note, but there was another valuable consideration for it moving from the plaintiff to Thompson."

indebted to B. for intoxicating liquors sold in violation of law, and B. was indebted to C. for a legal consideration, and A., at B.'s request, executed a note with mortgage to C., who knew the illegality of the debt to B., it was held that such note and mortgage was invalid.¹

So, if A., for a good consideration moving from B. to him, authorizes him to draw a bill on C. to a certain amount on his (A.'s) account, and B. draws accordingly, and C. accepts, C. will be absolutely bound to B., the drawer, as to any subsequent *bona fide* holder for value.² But the consideration of the acceptance failing, we should think the consideration for the authority from A. to B. would have to be proven.³

If the original consideration were tainted with fraud or illegality, or has failed in whole or in part, and the bill or note has passed into the hands of a *bona fide* holder for value without notice, yet if it be returned for a valuable consideration to the payee who is a privy to the original consideration, he could stand upon no better footing than if the instrument had remained in his hands.⁴

§ 177. That the bill or note has been lost or stolen,⁵ or was executed under duress,⁶ or under fraudulent misrepresentations,⁷ or for fraudulent consideration,⁸ or for illegal consideration,⁹ or has been fraudulently obtained from an intermediate holder,¹⁰ or been in any way the subject of fraud or felony,¹¹ or has been misappropriated and diverted,¹² is a good defense as between the parties privy to it. And the

¹ Baker v. Collins, 9 Allen, 253.

² Pillans v. Van Mierop, 3 Burr. 1663; 1 Parsons N. & B. 183.

³ Aldrich v. Stockwell, 9 Allen, 45.

⁴ Sawyer v. Wisewell, 9 Allen, 42;

Kost v. Bender, 25 Mich. 516 (see *post*, § 805).

⁵ Mills v. Barber, 1 M. & W. 425.

⁶ Clark v. Peace, 41 N. Hamp.

⁷ Vathir v. Zane, 6 Grat. 246; Hutchinson v. Bogg, 28 Penn. St. 294.

⁸ Morton v. Rogers, 12 Wend. 484. See rights of *bona fide* holder.

⁹ Edmonds v. Groves, 2 M. & W. 642; Bingham v. Stanley, 2 Q. B. 117; Shirley v. Howard, 53 Ill. 455; Holden v. Cosgrove, 12 Gray, 216.

¹⁰ 1 Parsons N. & B. 188.

¹¹ Holden v. Cosgrove, 12 Gray, 216; Western Bank v. Mills, 7 Cush. 546.

¹² Merchants' Nat. Bank v. Comstock, 55 N. Y. 24.

same defense which the defendant might make to an action by an indorsee of the note given by him, and the same requirement of proof may be made by him in an action on a renewal of a former note, both notes being regarded as given upon the same consideration.¹

§ 178. *Consideration of bills purchased for remission of money.*—The writers upon foreign bills contemplate four parties to the transaction. 1. The giver of value or purchaser of the bill which is drawn for remittance—such purchaser desiring the draft for money on a foreign place being called the remitter. 2. The drawer of the bill. 3. The drawee abroad. 4. The payee. The ordinary course of dealing with reference to such foreign bills begins by the sale of the bill by the drawer to some person other than the payee; and it does not contemplate, therefore, that the consideration for the bill should necessarily move from the payee to the drawer, or that no person but the drawer should have a right to confer a title to the bill upon the payee.² In such

¹ See *post*, §§ 179, 205.

² *Munroe v. Bordier*, 8 C. B. 862 (65 E. C. L. R.) In this case it was held, that where the purchaser or remitter in London of a foreign bill gets from the drawer, according to the usage in London, credit until the next foreign post-day for the amount, and delivers the bill to the payee, who receives it *bona fide* and for value, the drawer is liable for the amount to the payee, although, in consequence of the purchaser's or remitter's failure before the next foreign post-day, the drawer never receives value for it. The declaration stated that A. (the defendant) made a bill of exchange, and directed it to B., a merchant in France, requiring him to pay the amount to the order of C. (the plaintiff); that A. delivered the bill to D., who delivered it to C.; and that B. refused payment, &c. A. pleaded that he made and delivered the bill to D. for the use of C., on the faith and terms of being paid the price and value thereof according to the usage of merchants in that behalf, that is to say, on the next foreign post-day; that neither C. nor any other person, then or at any time before or since, paid him the said price or value of the bill, or any part thereof; that he never had any value or consideration for the making or delivery of the bill; and that C. always held and still held the same without any value or consideration whatever to him (A.) for the same. Replication, that, after the making of the bill and before it became due, D., who appeared to be, and whom C. believed to be, the lawful holder, delivered the bill to him for a good and valuable consideration, and without notice of the premises in the plea mentioned. *Held*, that the plea was no answer to the action; and that, even if it were sufficient to call upon C. to

case, there would be no privity between the drawer and payee, and the former could not plead against the latter for the want or failure of consideration.

If the bill be delivered by the drawer to the remitter upon a promise to pay the price next day, and the remitter, without paying, transmit the bill to the payee, the drawer might plead no consideration to the suit of the latter, provided the remitter were his agent.¹ But if the remitter purchase the bill on credit for himself, and sell it in good faith to the payee, the drawer could not resist the payee's suit for want of consideration if the remitter failed to pay the purchase money.² Thus, if Duncan, Sherman & Co., of New York, being indebted to Gilliatt & Sons, of London, procure Fisk & Hatch, New York, to draw a bill on London in favor of Gilliatt & Sons, and remit it to the latter in payment of the debt, the liability of Fisk & Hatch to Gilliatt & Sons will be absolute, whether any consideration for the drawing of the bill has been paid by Duncan, Sherman & Co. or not. But if Duncan, Sherman & Co. were agents of

show *bona fides*, he did so by his replication. In *Kyd on Bills*, it is said the parties to bills of exchange are generally four, two at the place where the bill is drawn, and two at the place of payment; as where A., a merchant at Amsterdam, owes money to B., a merchant in London, instead of sending the money in specie to B., he applies to C., another merchant in Amsterdam, to whom D., a fourth person residing in London, is indebted to an equal amount. A. pays to C. the money in question, and receives from him a bill directed to D. to pay the amount to B., or to any one appointed by him, who sends it to his correspondent B., with an order that the money be paid to him by D. *Kyd on Bills*, 3.

¹ *Puget de Bras v. Forbes*, 1 Esp. 117. The plaintiff resided in Holland, and, having money in England, employed Agassiz, Rengement & Co., as his agents, to sell it out, and to remit it to him in bills on Holland. The agents bought of the defendants bills on Holland in favor of the plaintiff; and it was proved to be the custom of London, for persons in the habit of remitting foreign bills, to give the bills on one day, but not to receive the money for them until the next post-day. The bills were bought on February 17, and the next post-day was Tuesday, February 21. On Monday, the 20th, Agassiz, Rengement & Co. stopped payment, so that the defendants, in fact, never received any value for the bills which they had so drawn on Holland in favor of the plaintiff; and they having ordered their correspondent abroad not to pay the bills, an action was brought against them by the plaintiffs, as drawers. It was held that they were not bound.

² *Munroe v. Bordier*, 8 C. B. 872 (65 E. C. L. R.); 2 Rob. Prac. (new ed.) 145.

Gilliatt & Sons in purchasing the bill, there would then be a privity between Gilliatt & Sons and Fisk & Hatch, and want of consideration could be pleaded.

SECTION IV.

WHAT ARE SUFFICIENT AND LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS.

§ 179. When it has been determined that the relations of the parties are such as to admit an inquiry into the consideration, it becomes then important to ascertain what is such a consideration as will support an action upon a negotiable instrument. A valuable consideration is necessary to support any contract, and the rule makes no exception as to the character of the consideration respecting negotiable instruments when the consideration is open to inquiry. Therefore, a consideration founded on mere love and affection, or gratitude, is not sufficient to sustain a suit on a bill or note; as, for instance, when a bill or note is accepted or made by a parent in favor of a child, or *vice versa*, it could not be enforced between the original parties, the engagement being gratuitous upon what is called a good, in contradistinction to a valuable consideration.¹

And if a note is executed and delivered with the intention of presenting it as a gift, and is afterward taken up and a new note given in its stead, the renewed note is without valuable consideration.² And, of course, a note given by a parent to his child during his lifetime could not be enforced after his death against his estate.³

¹ Parker v. Carter, 4 Munf. 273; Hill v. Buckminster, 5 Pick. 391; overruling Bowers v. Hurd, 10 Mass. 427; Fink v. Cox, 18 Johns. 145; Pearson v. Pearson, 7 Johns. 26; Pennington v. Gittings, 2 Gill & J. 208; Smith v. Kittridge, 21 Vt. 238; Holliday v. Atkinson, 5 B. & C. 501; Easton v. Prachett, 1 Crompt. M. & R. 798; 2 Crompt. M. & R. 542; Story on Bills (Bennett's ed.), 181; 1 Parsons N. & B. 178; Chitty on Bills (13th Am. ed.), 89.

² Copp v. Sawyer, 6 N. H. 386; Hill v. Buckminster, 5 Pick. 391. See § 205.

³ Phelps v. Phelps, 28 Barb. 121.

§ 180. It seems now to be settled, that a bill, note or check, delivered by the maker or drawer to the payee as a gift, and without any adequate consideration, but intended by him to be paid, cannot be enforced as against the donor or his personal representative.¹ But a note given "for value received and his kindness to me," would be good, the first part of the sentence denoting an adequate consideration.² But the indorsee could not enforce against his indorser a note indorsed to him as a gift.³

Where a note without consideration was delivered to the payee in a sealed envelope, on the condition that the seal should not be broken in the maker's lifetime, and the maker dying, the envelope was opened, it was held that the payee could recover, although he did not know the contents of the envelope until it was opened.⁴

A request written by the maker below a promissory note that the payee will accept the note from his true friend the writer, is not conclusive as matter of law that the note was without consideration, although the note was delivered in a sealed envelope, whereon was indorsed a request not to open it till after the writer's death.⁵

Evidence of a party's pecuniary circumstances is not competent to show want of consideration.⁶ In general the mere inadequacy of consideration, except as a circumstance bearing upon the question of fraud or undue influence, is not a defense to a promissory note. If no part of the consideration was wanting at the time, and no part of it subsequently failed, although inadequate in amount, the note is a valid obligation, while a want or failure of consideration, in whole or in part, is a good defense to the whole note, or to the extent of such failure.⁷

§ 181. A gift of a negotiable instrument of a third party

¹ Holliday v. Atkinson, 5 B. & C. 501; 8 Dow & R. 163. See *ante*, Chap. I, § 25.

² Woodbridge v. Spooner, 3 B. & Ald. 235.

³ Easton v. Pratchett, 1 C. M. & R. 798.

⁴ Worth v. Case, 42 N. Y. 362.

⁵ Dean v. Carruth, 108 Mass. 242.

⁶ Hartman v. Shaffer, 71 Penn. St. 312.

⁷ Earl v. Peck, 64 N. Y. 598; Worth v. Case, 42 N. Y. 362.

is not such a negotiation of it in the usual course of business as to give the donee the full protection which is extended a *bona fide* holder for value. And if the donee afterward transfer it for less than its value, or for a wholly inadequate consideration, his indorsee can recover from a prior party having a defense against the donor only what he himself paid for it.¹ But as to all prior parties having no defense against the donor, the donee can himself recover the whole amount,² and *a fortiori*, an indorsee who has paid only a partial consideration may recover the whole amount against all prior parties who have no defense against his immediate indorser.³

§ 182. *A mere moral obligation not sufficient.*—A mere moral obligation, although coupled with an express promise, will not constitute a valuable consideration, and it is only where there is a precedent duty which would create a sufficient legal or equitable right if there had been an express promise at the time, or where there is a precedent consideration, that an express promise will create or revive a cause of action.

Thus, a promissory note made after full age for necessities furnished to the promissor during infancy;⁴ or a note executed for the payment of a debt discharged in bankruptcy, or barred by the statute of limitations,⁵ or voluntarily released,⁶ or for the reimbursement of a person who has volun-

¹ Byles on Bills (Sharswood's ed.), 227; Nash v. Brown, Chitty on Bills (13 Am. ed.), 89; Brown v. Mott, 7 Johns. 361; Holeman v. Hobson, 8 Humph. 127; Bethune v. McCrary, 8 Georgia, 114; Chicopee Bank v. Chapin, 8 Met. 40; Youngs v. Lee, 18 Barb. 187. See *ante*, Chap. I, § 24.

² Milnes v. Dawson, 5 Exch. 948.

³ Moore v. Candell, 11 Mo. 614; Turner v. Brown, 3 Smedes & M. 425; Farbell v. Sturtevant, 28 Vt. 513; Reid v. Furnival, 5 C. & P. 499.

⁴ Hawkes v. Saunders, Cowp. R. 289; Eastwood v. Kenyon, 11 Ad. & El. 438 (39 E. C. L. R.); Chitty on Bills (13 Am. ed.) 87.

⁵ Eastwood v. Kenyon, 11 Ad. & El. 438 (39 E. C. L. R.); Trueman v. Fenton, Cowp. 544.

⁶ Stafford v. Bacon, 25 Wend. 384; Valentine v. Foster, 1 Metc. 520; Snevely v. Read, 9 Watts, 396.

tarily paid a debt of the promissor,¹ would be valid, as upon any other valuable consideration. And in any case where the contract was merely voidable, but otherwise founded on a valuable consideration, a bill or note given to discharge it will be valid—but otherwise if the contract were void.²

But it has been held in England by the Court of Exchequer, that a bill given since the repeal of the usury laws to pay a debt with usurious interest, contracted during the existence of the usury laws, was binding.³ And a note given by the purchaser of an estate to the vendor for the purchase money, is made on sufficient consideration though the contract be void by the statute of frauds.⁴ The indorsement of a note of a bankrupt by the payee gives it no effect as to the bankrupt; and it has been held that a new promise by the bankrupt after his discharge in bankruptcy, and after the indorsement, does not revive his liability;⁵ but it has been held in Massachusetts that a promise by the maker of a note after his discharge in bankruptcy to pay it is a contract to pay it according to its tenor,⁶ and we cannot see that there is any just reason to the contrary. If the bankrupt could bind himself by a renewal, why insist on that form of obligation when the same result is attainable by his recognition of his old one? It is, in effect, a renewal of its vitality without the circumvention of requiring a new execution of it.

§ 183. Not only will money paid, or advances made, or credit given, or work and labor done, constitute a sufficient consideration for a bill or note—but receiving a bill or note as security for a debt or forbearance to sue upon a present claim or debt, or becoming a surety, or doing any other act

¹ *Hayes v. Warren*, 2 Str. 933; *Stokes v. Lewis*, 1 Term R. 20.

² *Eastwood v. Kenyon*, 11 Ad. & El. 438 (39 E. C. L. R.); *Littlefield v. Shee*, 2 Barn. & Adol. 811.

³ *Flight v. Reed*, 22 L. J. Exch. 265; 1 H. & C. 708 (S. S.).

⁴ *Jones v. Jones*, 6 M. & W. 84.

⁵ *Wallbridge v. Harron*, 18 Vt. 448; *White v. Wardwell*, 31 Me. 558.

⁶ *Way v. Sperry*, 6 Cush. 238.

at the request of the drawer, indorser, or acceptor, will be equally sufficient to enforce his engagement.¹ A note on condition that the payee abstain for a certain time from intoxicating drink would be valid.²

§ 183*a*. Bankers receiving the bills or notes of their customers for collection are considered holders for sufficient consideration, not only to the extent of advances already made by them either specifically or upon account, but also for future responsibilities incurred upon the faith of them.³ The balances upon an account are a shifting consideration for bills and notes deposited as security with the banker.⁴ Thus, where one bank, which we may call A., sent an accommodation bill accepted by C., to another bank, which we may call B., to secure an indebtedness upon account; and when the bill became due, the latter bank had become indebted to the former, but the bill was not withdrawn, and subsequently the indebtedness shifted back, and the original debtor, bank A., became bankrupt, owing to the correspondent B. a sum upon account, it was held that the latter could recover against C. upon the accommodation bill accepted by him.⁵ Where a bank discounts a bill before maturity, paying part of the proceeds in money, and applies the residue in payment of a past due note of the payee which is surrendered, it is a holder for valuable consideration.⁶ Where a note was delivered by the maker to the payee to be discounted for the maker's benefit, and the payee left it at the bank with the

¹ Bayley on Bills, ch. 12; Chitty on Bills (13 Am. ed.) 86; Roscoe on Bills, 386; Foster v. Wise, 27 La. Ann. 538. A promise by A. to indemnify B. for becoming guarantor for C. is not within the statute of frauds, and need not be in writing. Chapin v. Merritt, 4 Wend. 657.

² Lindell v. Rokes, 60 Mo. 249.

³ Byles on Bills (Sharswood's ed.) 230; Bosanquet v. Dudman, 1 Stark, 1; Percival v. Frampton, 2 Crompt. M. & R. 180.

⁴ Bank of Metropolis v. New England Bank, 1 How. 239; s. c. 17 Peters, 174; Swift v. Tyson, 16 Peters, 21.

⁵ Attwood v. Crowdie, 1 Stark. 483 (2 E. C. L. R.)

⁶ Mechanics', &c. Bank v. Crow, 60 N. Y. 85; Brown v. Leavitt, 31 N. Y. 113; Pratt v. Coman, 37 Id. 440.

understanding that he, the payee, might draw against it, it was held in a suit against the maker, of whose interest in the note the bank had no notice, that the maker was liable for the sums drawn against the note by the payee, the payment of which sums was in effect a discount of the note to the amount so paid; also that the result would be the same if it should be considered that the note was simply pledged for the sums paid upon the draft.¹

§ 184. *As to pre-existing debts.*—There is no doubt that a pre-existing debt of the drawer, maker, or acceptor is a valid consideration for his drawing or accepting a bill or executing a note, and indeed is as frequently the consideration of negotiable paper as a debt contracted at the time,² and it is equally as valid and sufficient consideration for the indorsement and transfer to the creditor of the bill or note of a third party which is in his hands. And the best considered, as well as the most numerous authorities, regard the creditor who receives the bill or note of a third party from his debtor either in payment of,³ or as collateral security for, his debt, as entitled to the full protection of a *bona fide* holder for value, free from all equities which might have been pleaded between the original parties.⁴

¹ Platt v. Beebe, 57 N. Y. 339.

² Swift v. Tyson, 16 Peters, 1; Townsley v. Sumrall, 2 Peters, 170.

³ See Chapter XXIV, on *bona fide* holder; Byles [*121], 229; Swift v. Tyson, 16 Peters, 1; Bank of St. Albans v. Gilliland, 23 Wend. 31; Bank of Sandusky v. Scoville, 24 Wend. 115; Youngs v. Lee, 18 Barb. 187; Bertrand v. Barkman, 8 English, 150; Henry v. Ritenour, 31 Ind. 136; Robinson v. Lair, 31 Iowa, 9; Smith v. Isaacs, 23 La. Ann. 454; Schepp v. Carpenter, 51 N. Y. 602 (1873). In this case, Carpenter made his note to and for accommodation of Church, without restriction, and Church, being indebted to plaintiff in a larger sum, transferred the note to him on account thereof, and was credited with the amount, Johnson, C., said: "The existence of the debt from Church to the plaintiff was a sufficient consideration between them to sustain a promise to pay it, or a transfer of property to secure its payment, and according to the doctrine which has prevailed in this State for many years, to sustain the transfer of a note made for the debtor's accommodation and general benefit."

⁴ See Chapter XXV, Section 1, § 832.

§ 185. *As to debts of third persons.*—There is no doubt that a debt due from a third person, as from A. to B., is a good consideration for a note as from D. to B., provided there were an express agreement for delay,¹ or an implied agreement which would arise if the debt were then due, and the note were made payable at a future day.² So the surrender up of an obligation of a third person is a sufficient consideration.³ If the original debt from the third person were payable simultaneously with the note, there might be a want of consideration unless credit for the original debt had been given upon a promise of the note, which would be sufficient.⁴ A note given for the payee's assumption of the debt of the maker evidenced by another note is upon sufficient consideration.⁵ So a note given by a father for the benefit of his son to be applied by the latter in part payment of a defalcation.⁶ So any other thing done at his request by the promisee for a third person will, in general, be a sufficient consideration—such as forbearing to sue on a debt due by such person, or guaranteeing his debt, or becoming liable for his acts or defaults.⁷

§ 186. While as a general rule, the discharge of a debt of a third person will be a valid consideration for a bill or note,⁸ in Massachusetts it has been held that a promissory note given by a widow to a creditor of her deceased husband is void for want of consideration if the husband has left no estate or assets; and although the creditor gives the widow at the same time a receipted bill acknowledging payment from her husband's estate by the note, the circumstances

¹ Mansfield v. Corbin, 2 Cush. 151; Guy v. Bibend, 41 Cal. 324.

² Parsons N. & B. 195; Balfour v. Sea, Fire, & Life Ins. Co. 3 C. B. N. S. 300 (91 E. C. L. R.); Thompson v. Gray, 63 Maine, 228; York v. Pearson, 63 Maine, 587.

³ Henry v. Ritenour, 31 Ind. 136.

⁴ Crofts v. Beale, 11 C. B. 172 (73 E. C. L. R.); 1 Parsons N. & B. 195.

⁵ Turner v. Rogers, 121 Mass. 12. But see Stulenmire v. Ware, 48 Ala. 589.

⁶ Papple v. Day, 123 Mass. 521.

⁷ Story on Bills, § 183.

⁸ Brainard v. Capella, 31 Mo. 428; Arnold v. Sprague, 34 Vt. 402; Thatcher v. Dinsmore, 5 Mass. 299; Byles on Bills (Sharswood's ed.) [*123], 233; Poplewell v. Wilson, 1 Stra. 264; Railroad v. Chamberlain, 44 N. H. 497; *ante*, § 184.

being such that no good could be derived by the widow, or injury done the creditor by the transaction.¹ In Alabama, where the husband had assets, the widow, who gave a note for his debt, was held not bound, the payee having represented to her that she was liable to pay the debt, the court resting its decision partly on the view that there was no consideration, and partly on the view that the representation was fraudulent.² And in Maryland it was held a note given by a vestryman of a church to pay a debt of the church was without consideration, and void; and the fact that it was payable at a future day to raise no presumption of forbearance to sue, it appearing that it was made for the purpose of closing an account.³ A promissory note given by the heir, in renewal of one made by his ancestor, which was barred by limitation, at the time of the latter's death, has been held void for want of consideration.⁴

§ 187. *Cross notes and acceptances and other instances.*— If one gives his acceptance to another, that will be a good consideration for another bill or acceptance, although such first acceptance be unpaid.⁵ “By the exchange of the obligation of one for that of another, a good consideration is raised for the undertaking of each.”⁶ A note given by a borrower

¹ Williams v. Nichols, 10 Gray, 83, Dewey, J., saying: “The widow would derive no benefit from the discharge of a debt due by her deceased husband. Nor do we perceive how any possible damage to such creditor could arise from having given a receipt to the widow purporting to discharge such demand.” *Contra*, York v. Pearson, 63 Maine, 587. It is said in England that it is a sufficient consideration for a note that it be given by a widow out of respect to the memory of her husband. Chitty on Bills (13 Am. ed.) 82. No such decision would, we think, be now rendered.

² Maull v. Vaughn, 45 Ala. 141. See also Watson v. Reynolds, 54 Ala. 192, where it is held that a widow's note for debt of deceased husband, not taken in payment, and where there was no suspension of the remedy, or receipted account, is without consideration. In California, where widow was executor and the estate community property, so that she had an interest in it, her note to a creditor of her husband was enforced, though the debt was outlawed and she thought otherwise. Mull v. Van Trees, 50 Cal. 547.

³ Rogers v. Waters, 2 Gill & J. 84.

⁴ Didlake v. Robb, 1 Woods, 680.

⁵ Rose v. Sims, 1 B. & Ad. 521 (20 E. C. L. R.)

⁶ Newman v. Frost, 52 N. Y. 424, Folger, J.

for the amount of cash loaned, and including also a note given for the balance of the loan, is upon good consideration to the whole amount.¹ And cross acceptances, or cross notes, bills or checks for the mutual accommodation of the parties, are respectively considerations for each other.² And a contract between two accommodation indorsers that they will share any loss equally between them, is upon sufficient consideration.³

✱ Where one has given his own note in purchase of the note of another from the payee, notice to him by the maker not to pay his note given in purchase, and that the bought note originated in fraud, does not deprive him of the character of a *bona fide* holder for value, and he need pay no attention to such notice.⁴ Where a note is given for a draft assigned by the payee to the maker, and an agreement is made at the same time that in the event the maker of the note could not collect or realize on the draft, he was to be released from payment of the note, no recovery can be had on the note, if the maker has been unable to realize on the draft.⁵

Delay in fulfilling a promise to marry and services rendered during the engagement, constitute a good consideration for a note;⁶ and in Scotland it has been held that a bill granted to a woman as a security for a promised marriage is valid, and may be enforced against the man if he break his promise.⁷ The meritorious consideration arising out of the

¹ Backus v. Spaulding, 116 Mass. 418.

² Newman v. Frost, 50 N. Y. 427; Wooster v. Jenkins, 3 Denio, 187; Mickles v. Colvin, 4 Barb. 304; Adams v. Soule, 33 Vt. 539; Stickney v. Mohler, 19 Md. 490; Whittier v. Eager, 1 Allen, 449; Shannon v. Langhorne, 9 La. Ann. 526; Eaton v. Carey, 10 Pick. 211; Bacon v. Holloway, 2 E. D. Smith, 159; Dowe v. Schutt, 2 Denio, 621; Rankin v. Knight, 1 Cincinnati, 515; Crescent Bank v. Hernandez, 25 La. Ann. 43.

³ Phillips v. Preston, 2 How. 278.

⁴ Adams v. Soule, 33 Vt. 538.

⁵ Hall v. Henderson, 84 Ill. 611.

⁶ Prescott v. Ward, 10 Allen, 203.

⁷ Thomson on Bills (Wilson's ed.), 72; citing Calder v. Provan (Scotch case). In Lew v. Peers, 4 Burr, 2225, judgment was arrested on a bond which defendant had agreed to pay plaintiff if he married any one else but her. This case is clearly distinguishable from the principle of the text of Thomson, though he seems to think it in conflict.

duty of a husband to support his wife, is not sufficient in equity to sustain a note, given by the husband to the wife, as against the husband's collateral heirs.¹

§ 188. Professional services, whether of a physician, attorney, or other person, in the learned or skilled professions, constitute, in general, a sufficient consideration for a bill or note; and consideration that the plaintiff, an attorney, should prevent the approval of the commanding general to the sentence of a military court condemning a guerilla to death, is valid.² Services rendered in procuring a pardon for an offense have also been respected;³ though it has been said by some of the authorities that this would contravene public policy unless done by leave of the court.⁴ This is, we think, too severe. Services exerted in procuring the passage of an act through a legislative body are not recognized as the legitimate exercise of the legal profession; and compensation for them cannot be recovered.⁵ If contingent upon the passage of a bill, it would be obvious that they were illegitimate.⁶

A note to a railroad corporation, to be paid when the road is constructed, is upon sufficient consideration.⁷

§ 189. *Accommodation bills and notes.*—The mercantile credit of parties is frequently loaned to others by the signature of their names as drawer, acceptor, maker or indorser of a bill or note, used to raise money upon, or otherwise for their benefit. Such instruments are termed accommodation paper. An accommodation bill or note, then, is one to which the accommodating party has put his name,

¹ Whitaker v. Whitaker, 52 N. Y. 368.

² Thompson v. Wharton, 7 Bush (Ky.) 563.

³ Meadow v. Bird, 22 Ga. 246.

⁴ Chitty on Bills (13th Am. ed.) 100; Thomson on Bills (Wilson's ed.) 70; citing Stewart v. Earl of Galloway (Scotch case); Norman v. Cole, 3 Esp. 253.

⁵ Marshall v. Balt. & O. R. R. Co. 16 How. 334; Clippinger v. Hepbaugh, 5 Watts & Serg. 315. See Sharswood's Legal Ethics (2d ed.) 99.

⁶ Mills v. Mills, 40 N. Y. 543.

⁷ Rose v. San Antonio R. R. Co. 31 Tex. 49.

without consideration, for the purpose of accommodating some other party who is to use it and is expected to pay it.¹ Between the accommodating and accommodated parties the consideration may be shown to be wanting, but when the instrument has passed into the hands of a third party for value, and in the usual course of business, it cannot be;² for as between remote parties, as we have already seen, the consideration which the plaintiff gave for his title, as well as that for which the defendant contracted the liability, must be impeached in order to defeat a recovery.³ And the circumstance that the accommodation maker was assured that the payee would protest it being known to the holder, does not weaken in any degree his title to recover.⁴

§ 190. An accommodation indorser, who has paid the amount of the note to a subsequent indorser, may recover of the maker without offset, although he knew when he indorsed it that the maker was a creditor of the payee for an amount greater than the amount of the note.⁵ And the payee may recover against the acceptor, although he knew when he took the bill that the acceptance was for accommodation of another party.⁶ And it has been held that the accommodation payee and indorser may recover the full amount of the note, although he took it up by paying only a part.⁷ But this is, we think, erroneous.

If one member of a firm obtains an accommodation note payable to himself, and afterwards indorses it to a third person, who re-indorses it to the same firm, before maturity, and for good consideration, such firm cannot recover against

¹ Byles on Bills (Sharswood's ed.) [*125], 237; *Fant v. Miller*, 17 Grat. 47; *Robertson v. Williams*, 5 Munf. 531.

² *Violett v. Patton*, 5 Cranch (S. C.), 142; *Yeaton v. Bank of Alexandria*, Id. 49; *French v. Bank of Columbia*, 4 Cranch (S. C.), 59; *Fant v. Miller*, 17 Grat. 47; *Robertson v. Williams*, 5 Munf. 331.

³ *Ante*, Chapter VII, sec. 3.

⁴ *Thatcher v. West River National Bank*, 19 Mich. 196.

⁵ *Barker v. Barker*, 10 Gray, 339. ⁶ *Spurgeon v. McPheeters*, 42 Ind. 527.

⁷ See Chapter XLI on Principal and Surety, § 1353, note.

the maker, both parties being affected with the notice of a want of consideration.¹

§ 191. An accommodation bill or note is not considered a real security, but a mere blank, until it has been negotiated, and it then becomes binding upon all the parties, in like manner and to the like effect as if they were successive indorsers;² but until it has been negotiated any party may withdraw his indorsement, acceptance or other liability upon it, and rescind his engagement; and that right is not impaired by the circumstance that he may be indemnified by an assignment or other security.³

§ 192. A person who indorses a note as an accommodation indorser for the payee, such note having been made by an accommodation maker, is subject to all the obligations and acquires all the rights of a party to negotiable paper.

If obliged to take up such note, the accommodation maker cannot set up fraud on the part of the payee in the inception of the note, as a defense to his suit.⁴

§ 193. *Fraudulent considerations*.—"Fraud cuts down everything," is the sharp phrase of the Lord Chief Baron Pollock in an English case.⁵ And between immediate parties it at once destroys the validity of a bill or note into the consideration of which it enters. We have seen that if a horse or other personal chattel is warranted, and a bill, note or check given for the price, the breach of the warranty is no defense to the action on the bill, note or check (unless authorized by statute); but if it appear that the seller knew that there was unsoundness in the horse or other chattel, the element of fraud enters into the transaction. There was in fact, no contract, and proof of the fraud at once defeats the

¹ Quinn v. Tuller, 7 Cush. 244.

² Whitworth v. Adams, 5 Rand. 342; Taylor v. Bruce, Gilmer, 42; May v. Boisseau, 8 Leigh, 164; Downes v. Richardson, 5 Barn. & Ald. 674.

³ May v. Boisseau, 8 Leigh, 164.

⁴ Laubach v. Pursell, 35 N. J. L. R. 434.

⁵ Rogers v. Hadley, 32 L. J. Exch. N. S. 248 (1863).

action on the bill, note or check.¹ While inadequacy of consideration in the origin, or transfer of a negotiable instrument, is not in itself, a defense to a suit upon it, yet it is oftentimes a circumstance strongly tending to show a fraud in the contract in which it was given or transferred. Evidence, therefore, in a suit on a note for certain pictures, is not admissible for the purpose of reducing the damages by proving that they were of inferior value; but it would be good to show that they were fraudulently palmed off on the defendant.² A note is not vitiated by representations of what others say as to the value of property sold, unless the payee making them knew they were false.³

If the defendant repudiate the contract on the ground of fraud, he must return the consideration—otherwise the plaintiff may recover on the bill or note.⁴

§ 194. *Fraud on third persons vitiates consideration.*—Fraud upon third persons vitiates a bill or note given in furtherance of it as between the parties; and the most frequent instance in which fraud of this kind appears is in undue advantage claimed by one or more creditors when the debtor enters into a composition in which all appear to stand on the same footing. If the creditor refuses to enter into the agreement of composition until he receives a note for the residue of his debt,⁵ or receives a note as inducement to his consent,⁶ such note will be fraudulent and void; and the transaction is none the less fraudulent, and the note none the less void, because it is given after the composition was entered into,

¹ Lewis v. Cosgrove, 2 Taunt. 2.

² Solomon v. Turner, 1 Stark. 51 (3 E. C. L. R.); see, also, Rudderow v. Huntington, 3 Sandf. 252, where goods were sold by an auctioneer with warranty or misrepresentation, and turned out to be spurious. *Held*, no defense, it not appearing that the auctioneer knew the fact.

³ Davidson v. Jordan, 47 Cal. 351.

⁴ Archer v. Bamford, 2 Stark. 175; Macaltimer v. Croasdale, 3 Houst. 365; Sternbury v. Bowman, 103 Mass. 326; Heaton v. Knowlton, 53 Ind. 357.

⁵ Cockshott v. Bennett, 2 T. R. 763; Knight v. Hunt, 5 Bing. 432 (15 E. C. L. R.); Rice v. Maxwell, 13 S. & M. 289.

⁶ Winn v. Thomas, 55 N. H. 294.

having been agreed on before,¹ and the fraud extends to the composition notes given to such creditor, and vitiates them also.² If the note for the residue be given by a third person who is indemnified by the debtor, it will be void.³ In these cases the creditor and insolvent are "*particeps criminis*," but not "*in pari delicto*." It can never be *par delictum* when one holds the rod and the other bows to it.⁴ So if a third person pay money for the debtor, in fraud of the composition, the debtor's note to such person for the amount is void.⁵

Where a statute provides that fraudulent conveyances, bonds, notes, &c., shall be void "as against the parties whose right or debt is attempted to be avoided," it has been held a note given with such fraudulent intent will be valid as between maker and payee.⁶ But it has been held that the maker of such notes, the contract being unexecuted, may make the defense that they were given in fraud of others, though the rule would not extend so as to admit of his pleading against executed contracts.⁷

SECTION V.

WHAT ARE ILLEGAL CONSIDERATIONS.

§ 195. (1) *As to illegal considerations by the common law.*—A bill or note which is founded upon an illegal consideration is void; for the law will not aid one who seeks or has consented to its violation. Sometimes the consideration is illegal, because opposed to the general principles of the common law; and sometimes because it is specially interdicted by statute. The considerations which are illegal at common law

¹ Howe v. Litchfield, 3 Allen, 444; Took v. Tuck, 4 Bing. 224; Fay v. Fay, 121 Mass. 561.

² Dougherty v. Savage, 28 Conn. 248.

³ Bryant v. Christie, 1 Stark. 329.

⁴ Smith v. Cuff, 6 M. & S. 160.

⁵ Bryant v. Christie, 1 Stark. 329.

⁶ Carpenter v. McClure, 39 Vt. 13.

⁷ Hamilton v. Scull's Admr. 25 Mo. 166; Brown v. Finley, 18 Mo. 375. See McCausland v. Rulston, 12 Nev. 195.

are: 1. Such as violate the rules of religion, moral or public decency; and, 2. Such as contravene public policy.

A bond given in consideration of future illicit cohabitation would be void; but not so if given for past cohabitation;¹ but a bill or note as between immediate parties would not be enforced if given for past cohabitation, because not founded upon a consideration.²

As a general rule, wagers are not illegal by the common law.³ But wagers upon the sex of a person;⁴ that an unmarried female would bear a child;⁵ upon the result of a prize fight;⁶ or the result of a criminal trial;⁷ or upon the question of war or peace⁸—would be illegal, as opposing public policy and sound morals. And, as a general rule, in the United States all manner of wagers are declared illegal by statutory enactments. In Massachusetts one who pays a gambling debt for another cannot recover the amount.⁹

§ 196. *As to considerations which oppose public policy.*—Considerations which oppose public policy are never respected by the law; and contracts founded upon them are universally condemned. Contracts in general restraint of trade;¹⁰ or restraining or preventing marriage even for a time;¹¹ or to assist another in furthering a marriage where the promisor has no right to interfere;¹² to procure or sell a public office¹³ or votes; to suppress evidence or interfere with the course of justice by dropping a criminal prosecution;¹⁴ and contracts to indemnify a person in doing an act

¹ *Beaumont v. Reeve*, 8 Q. B. 483; *Friend v. Harrison*, 2 C. & P. 584.

² 1 *Parsons N. & B.* 214; *Byles* (Sharswood's ed.) [*132], 246.

³ *Good v. Elliott*, 3 T. R. 693.

⁴ *Da Costa v. Jones*, Cowp. 729.

⁵ *Ditchburn v. Goldsmith*, 4 Camp. 152.

⁶ *Hunt v. Bell*, 1 Bing. 1; 7 *Moore*, 212.

⁷ *Allen v. Hearn*, 1 T. R. 57; *Rust v. Gott*, 9 Cow. 169.

⁸ *Id.*

⁹ *Scolluns v. Flynn*, 120 Mass. 271.

¹⁰ *Chitty on Bills* (13 Am. ed.) [*83], 99.

¹¹ *Hartley v. Rice*, 10 East 22; *Lowe v. Peers*, 4 Burr. 2225.

¹² *Roberts v. Roberts*, 3 P. Wms. 66; 1 *Parsons on Contracts*, 555, 556.

¹³ *Richardson v. Mellish*, 2 Bing. 229 (9 E. C. L. R.); *Martin v. Wade*, 37 Cal. 168.

¹⁴ *Edgcombe v. Rodd*, 5 East, 294; *Fallows v. Taylor*, 7 T. R. 475; *Porter*

of known illegality, as inducement thereto;¹ or to do anything reprehensible for its injurious effects upon the feelings of third persons; or in fraud of the rights and interests of third persons²—are instances of the kind of contracts which the law will not recognize.

Of the like kind are contracts founded on consideration to resign a public office;³ to induce the withdrawal of a bid for a government contract;⁴ to withdraw the papers in defense in a divorce suit;⁵ to get possession of goods wrongfully held;⁶ for the sale of libelous or immoral works;⁷ or for the supply of drinks to influence votes for a public office;⁸ or to influence a public officer in the discharge of his duty;⁹ or to procure the appointment of a party as administrator of an estate.¹⁰

Abandonment of the prosecution of an offense against the public, of which the law requires prosecution, is, as we have seen, not a good consideration. It is a high requirement of public policy that felonies should be investigated and punished, and compounding a felony, as such a compromise is called, is frowned upon by the courts, and is never permitted to be enforced.¹¹ It is not necessary to stamp the transaction with illegality that a felony should have been committed. It is sufficient if it be charged, for the investi-

v. Havers, 37 Barb. 353; Gardner v. Maxey, 9 B. Mon. 90; Commonwealth v. Johnson, 3 Cush. 454; Soule v. Bonney, 37 Me. 128; Clark v. Ricker, 14 N. H. 44; Hinesburgh v. Sumner, 9 Vt. 23.

¹ Chitty on Bills (13 Am. ed.) [*85], 102; Edwards on Bills, 340; Goodale v. Holdridge, 2 Johns. 193.

² Id.

³ Meachum v. Dow, 32 Vt. 721.

⁴ Kennedy v. Murdick, 5 Har. 458.

⁵ Stontenburg v. Lybrand, 13 Ohio, N. S. 228.

⁶ White v. Heylman, 10 Casey, 142.

⁷ Fores v. Johnes, 4 Esp. 97; Turk v. Richmond, 13 Barb. 533.

⁸ Jackson v. Walker, 5 Hill, 27, s. c. 7 Hill, 387.

⁹ Cook v. Shipman, 51 Ill. 316.

¹⁰ Porter v. Jones, 52 Mo. 399.

¹¹ Henderson v. Palmer, 71 Ill. 579; Commonwealth v. Pease, 16 Mass. 91; Wallace v. Hardacre, 1 Camp. 45; Collins v. Blantern, 2 Wils. 347. See Sumner v. Summers, 54 Mo. 340, where it is held that a note given under an agreement to secure dismissal of a prosecution for felony is void.

gation of the charge is the policy of law, which is sought to be protected.¹

But compounding a private misdemeanor, such as a suit for slander,² or bastardy proceedings,³ or other civil action, is a good consideration for a note; and a good bill substituted for a forged one without any agreement to stifle the prosecution, is valid.⁴ So is a note given to the prosecutor after the trial and conviction for expenses of the prosecution.⁵ It has been held in Alabama that a note given for embezzled funds would not be invalidated by an accompanying agreement not to prosecute for a felony.⁶ The true question, however, in such a case seems to be, was the note given for the money, or to settle the prosecution; and in the first event it would be valid, in the latter illegal and void.⁷

Forbearance to prosecute a claim, or the compromise of a doubtful one, is a good consideration for a note or bill;⁸ but the compromise of one clearly illegal is not.⁹ So, resignation of an office in a corporation is a good consideration;¹⁰ and all contracts in partial restraint of trade on fair and beneficial terms, are supported.¹¹ Consideration that the payee would not drink intoxicating liquors for a certain time, has been held sufficient.¹²

§ 197. (2) *As to considerations illegal by statute.*—The *bona fide* holder for value who has received the paper in the

¹ Chandler v. Johnson, 39 Ga. 85.

² Wallridge v. Arnold, 21 Conn. 424; Clark v. Reker, 14 N. H. 44; Drage v. Ibberson, 2 Esp. 643; Gardner v. Maxey, 9 B. Mon. 90.

³ Merrill v. Fleming, 42 Ala. 234.

⁴ Wallace v. Hardacre, 1 Camp. 45.

⁵ Kirk v. Strickwood, 4 B. & Ad. 421 (24 E. C. L. R.)

⁶ Bibbs v. Hitchcock, 49 Ala. 468.

⁷ Godwin v. Crowell, 56 Ga. 566.

⁸ Keefe v. Vogle, 36 Iowa, 87; Muirhead v. Kirkpatrick, 21 Penn. St. 237; Stewart v. Ahrenfeldt, 4 Denio, 189; Phelps v. Younger, 4 Ind. 450; Austell v. Rice, Ga. 472; Stephens v. Spiers, 25 Mo. 386; Wyatt v. Evins, 52 Ala. 285; Bozeman v. Rushing, 51 Ala. 529.

⁹ Sullivan v. Collins, 18 Iowa, 228. See Tucker v. Ronk, 43 Iowa, 80.

¹⁰ Peck v. Regua, 13 Gray, 407.

¹¹ Bunn v. Gray, 4 East, 190; Jenkins v. Temples, 39 Ga. 655, when the contract was not to trade in the same place. Nobles v. Bates, 7 Cow. 307; Perkins v. Lyman, 9 Mass. 522.

¹² Lindell v. Rokes, 60 Mo. 249.

usual course of business is unaffected by the fact that it originated in an illegal consideration, without any distinction between cases of illegality founded in moral crime or turpitude, which are termed *mala in se*, and those founded in positive statutory prohibition which are termed *mala prohibita*. The law extends this peculiar protection to negotiable instruments, because it would seriously embarrass mercantile transactions to expose the trader to the consequences of having the bill or note passed to him impeached for some covert defect.¹ There is, however, one exception to this rule; that when a statute, expressly or by necessary implication, declares the instrument absolutely void, it gathers no vitality by its circulation in respect to the parties executing it;² though even upon such instruments an indorser may, as we shall hereafter see, be held liable.³

There are very few cases in which the statute renders such instruments absolutely void; and the most important, if not the only instances now to be met with, are the statutes against usury and gaming.⁴

In England, the policy of declaring the instrument a nullity in the hands of a *bona fide* holder no longer prevails, the statute of 8 & 9 Victoria, ch. 109, having relaxed the ancient rule on the subject;⁵ and in some of the States similar statutes have been enacted.⁶ But the change has not become general, and in the States where contracts founded on gam-

¹ Thomson on Bills (Wilson's ed.) 68; Grimes v. Hillenbrand, 11 N. Y. S. C. (4 Hun), 354; Town of Eagle v. Kohn, 84 Ill. 292.

² See also Chapter XXIV, on Bona Fide Holder, § 807, *et seq.* Bayley v. Taber, 5 Mass. 286; Vallett v. Parker, 6 Wend. 615, Savage, C. J., said: "Wherever the statutes declare notes void, they are and must be so in the hands of every holder; but where they are adjudged by the court to be so, for failure of or the illegality of the consideration, they are void only in the hands of the original parties, or those who are chargeable with, or have had notice of the consideration." Glenn v. Farmer's Bank, 70 N. C. 191; Town of Eagle v. Kohn, 84 Ill. 292; Hatch v. Burroughs, 1 Woods, 439.

³ See Chapter XXI, sec. 1.

⁴ 3 Kent Com. 44; Story on Bills (Bennet's ed.) § 189.

⁵ See Parsons v. Alexander, 5 El. & Bl. 263, s. c. 30 Eng. L. & Eq. 299.

⁶ Vallett v. Parker, 6 Wend. 615; Kendall v. Robertson, 12 Cush. 156.

ing or usurious considerations are declared void, bills and notes given to secure them are held void in the hands of every holder.

§ 198. When the statute merely declares expressly or by implication that the considerations shall be deemed illegal, the bill or note founded upon such consideration will be valid in the hands of a *bona fide* holder without notice;¹ but the burden of proof will be upon the plaintiff, when the illegal consideration appears, to show that he is a *bona fide* holder without notice.² And if the statute in terms only forbids suit to be brought upon bills and notes founded on certain considerations, "except by a *bona fide* holder who has received the same upon a valuable and fair consideration, without notice or knowledge, &c.," they will be good in the hands of such a holder, but the burden of proof will be devolved upon him in like manner, if it appear that the instrument originated in such a consideration.³ But want or failure of consideration do not require such proof of the holder.⁴

Where a statute provided that wherever, in an action brought on a contract for the payment of money, it shall appear that unlawful interest has been taken, the plaintiff shall forfeit threefold the amount of the unlawful interest so taken, &c., it was held to apply to the innocent indorsee of a note who received it in due course of trade.⁵

¹ Paton v. Coit, 5 Mich. 505; Sisternans v. Field, 9 Gray, 331; Wyatt v. Bulmer, 2 Esp. 538. See Chapter XXIV, on Rights of a *bona fide* Holder or Purchaser.

² Id.

³ Paton v. Coit, 5 Mich. 505; Johnson v. Meeker, 1 Wis. 416; Doe v. Burnham, 11 Fost. 426; Story on Bills, § 193; Bottomley v. Goldsmith, 36 Mich. 29.

⁴ Ross v. Bedell, 5 Duer, 462; Wilson v. Lazier, 11 Grat. 478.

⁵ Kendall v. Robertson, 12 Cush. 156. Shaw, C. J., said: "The former law extended the entire forfeiture to any holder of the note, though an innocent indorsee; the natural conclusion is, in the absence of express words changing the operation of the law, that it was the intention of the legislature to extend such partial forfeiture in like manner, and attach it as before to the note, although held by an innocent indorsee without notice. In both cases the intention of the legislature appears to have been the same, to suppress a mode of lending regarded as dangerous and injurious to society, by attainting the contract, and attaching the penal consequences to the contract itself, whenever set up as a proof of a debt."

§ 199. Where a statute declared that all payments made for spirituous liquors sold contrary to law "should be held and considered to have been received in violation of law, without consideration, and against law, equity and good conscience," it was held that a bill given for liquors so sold was valid in the hands of a *bona fide* holder without notice.¹ A bill accepted to secure payment of money taken in at an unlicensed theater is void in the hands of all knowing the consideration for which it was given.²

If the paper be susceptible of a legal and an illegal construction, the courts will enforce it according to the most favorable construction, *ut res magis valeat quam pereat*. Thus, where a due bill was made payable in Confederate bonds, or Tennessee money, the first named medium was deemed illegal, but payment in Tennessee money was enforced.³

The statement of consideration in a bill or note may be explained or contradicted in any case in which the consideration may be disputed between the parties; and it may be shown either that the consideration was different from that stated or that there was none at all.⁴ In some of the States notes given in purchase of patent rights are required to have the fact written or printed on the face, under heavy penalties, the frauds arising out of such transactions being very frequent, and the legislatures seeking to suppress them, and such notes are open to the same defenses in the hands of a *bona fide* holder as when held by the payee.⁵ But under such a statute, if the patent right consideration were not impressed in the note, a *bona fide* holder would be protected according to the general principles of the law merchant.⁶

¹ Cazet v. Field, 9 Gray, 329.

² De Bignis v. Armistead, 10 Bing. 107 (25 E. C. L. R.)

³ Hanauer v. Gray, 25 Ark. 350.

⁴ Abbott v. Hendricks, 1 Man. & G. 791; Foster v. Jolly, 1 Crompt. M. & R. 703; Smith v. Brooks, 18 Ga. 440; Litchfield v. Falconer, 2 Ala. 280; Matlock v. Livingstone, 9 Smedes & M. 489; Barker v. Prentiss, 6 Mass. 430.

⁵ Pennsylvania.

⁶ Palmer v. Minar, 15 N. Y. S. C. 342 (1876).

§ 200. *Effect of knowledge of illegal use of article sold.*

—It is stated as a general principle, by some of the text writers, that if goods be sold by a trader with mere knowledge that the purchaser intends an illegal use of them, but without lending any aid to his unlawful purpose, he may sustain an action on the contract;¹ and a number of cases would seem to support such a declaration.

But the proposition is certainly of limited application, and the courts are careful not to extend it. If the articles be sold with distinct knowledge that they are to be used for any illegal purpose, it is doubtful if the courts should allow a recovery of the purchase money; for public morality and good government must condemn the furnishing of means to violate the law; and when the use contemplated involves a heinous crime, as when one sells arsenic with knowledge that the purchaser intends to poison his wife with it,² or sells noxious drugs, knowing that the brewer who buys them intends to use them in his manufacture,³ it is clear that the recovery should not be allowed. And it has been held, both in England and in this country, that money lent to a man to enable him to settle his losses on an illegal stock-jobbing transaction cannot be recovered back.⁴ “No man ought to furnish another with the means of transgressing the law, knowing that he intended that use of them.”⁵

Following the principle of the text (but applying it to a case which the author by no means intends to approve), the United States Supreme Court has held that a due bill for goods, sold to be used by the Confederate States in prose-

¹ Byles on Bills (Sharswood's ed.) [*132], 247; 1 Parsons N. & B. 215; Gardner v. Maxey, 9 B. Mon. 90; Clark v. Recker, 14 N. H. 44; McGavock v. Puryear, 6 Cold. 34; Puryear v. McGavock, 9 Heiskell, 461; Coppock v. Bower, 4 M. & W. 361.

² Lightfoot v. Tenant, 1 Bos. & Pul. 551.

³ Langton v. Hughes, 1 Maule & Sel. 593.

⁴ Canaan v. Bryce, 3 Barn. & Ald. 179, Abbott, C. J., saying: “If it be unlawful in one man to pay, how can it be lawful for another man to furnish him the means of payment.”

⁵ De Groot v. Van Duzer, 20 Wend. 390.

cuting the war against the United States, was void as upon an illegal consideration, and that an action could not be maintained by the seller or by any holder of the bill who was cognizant of the purpose for which the goods were purchased.¹ And in Massachusetts it has been held that there can be no recovery upon a note by the plaintiff against a defendant who executed it to him for liquors, the defendant well knowing that they were to be resold in violation of law and co-operating to that end.² And in Arkansas, where the payee sold guns to be used in the war against the United States, he was not permitted to recover.³ Like decisions have been rendered where the party selling a horse knew he was to be used in the Confederate States cavalry service;⁴ and where the lender of money knew that iron was to be bought with it for military uses against the United States.⁵

Money lent for the purpose of being used in gaming cannot be recovered back by the lender; and a bill or note given for such purpose is, as between the parties, void.⁶ It is fully settled that the repayment of money lent for the express purpose of accomplishing an illegal object cannot be enforced.⁷ But knowledge that the money was to be so used

¹ *Hanauer v. Doane*, 12 Wall. 342, Bradley, J.: "With whatever impunity a man may lend money or sell goods to another who he knows intends to devote them to a use that is only *malum prohibitum*, or of inferior criminality, he cannot do it without turpitude when he knows, or has every reason to believe that such money or goods are to be used for the perpetration of a heinous crime, and that they were procured for that purpose. * * * There are cases to the contrary; but they are either cases where the unlawful act contemplated to be done was merely *malum prohibitum*, or of inferior criminality; or cases in which the unlawful act was already committed, and the loan was an independent contract, made not to enable the borrower to commit the act, but to pay obligations which he had already incurred in committing it."

² *Hubbell v. Flint*, 13 Gray, 277.

³ *Tatum v. Kelly*, 25 Ark. 209. See also *Oxford Iron Co. v. Spradley*, 51 Ala. 171.

⁴ *Booker v. Robbins*, 26 Ark. 660. *Contra*, *Thetford v. McClintock*, 47 Ala. 650; though otherwise if he intended such use.

⁵ *Oxford Iron Co. v. Spradley*, 46 Ala. 98; *Logan v. Plummer*, 70 N. C. 388.

⁶ *M'Kinnel v. Robinson*, 3 M. & W. 434; *Cutler v. Welsh*, 43 N. H. 497; *Mordecai v. Dawkins*, 9 Rich. 262.

⁷ *M'Kinnell v. Robinson*, 3 M. & W. 434.

must be distinctly proved; and the mere fact that the borrower was a gambler, and that any one might expect him to game with the money, would not suffice, of course, to show it.¹

SECTION VI.

PARTIAL WANT, FAILURE AND ILLEGALITY OF CONSIDERATION.

§ 201. (1) *As to partial want of consideration.*—Whenever the defendant is entitled to go into the question of consideration, he may set up the partial as well as the total want of consideration.² Thus, where the drawer of a bill for £19 5s., payable to his own order, sued the acceptor, and it appeared that the bill was accepted for value as to £10, and as an accommodation to the plaintiff as to the residue, it was held, that although with respect to third persons the amount of the bill might be £19 5s., yet as between these parties it was an acceptance to the amount of £10 only.³ So where a note was given by A. to B., for the sum of £32 6s. 10d., upon B.'s representation and assurance that that amount was due, whereas A. owed B. £10 14s. 11d., and no more, the note was held good only for the amount that was actually due.⁴ So, where a father gives his son a note partly for services, and partly as a gratuity, the partial want of consideration might be pleaded as to such portion of the amount as was gratuitous; and it would be no objection that no distinct amount was fixed upon as compensation for the services, but it would be for the jury to settle what amount was founded on the one consideration, and what on the other.⁵

¹ 1 Parsons N. & B. 214.

² Thomson on Bills (Wilson's ed.) 64; Byles on Bills (Sharswood's ed.) 239.

³ Darnell v. Williams, 2 Stark. 166 (3 E. C. L. R.); Barber v. Backhouse, Peake, 61; Clarke v. Lazarus, 2 M. & G. 167.

⁴ Forman v. Wright, 11 C. B. 481. The words of the plea, "fraudulently and deceitfully," were rejected as surplusage.

⁵ Parish v. Stone, 14 Pick. 198; see Guild v. Belcher, 119 Mass. 257.

It was said in a recent edition of Story on Bills,¹ as it is said in a number of English cases,² that a partial failure of consideration is no defense; but it is conceived that the distinction already taken is the correct one, and the cases in which the contrary dictum occurs are those in which the sum was unascertainable by mere computation, and was matter of unliquidated damages.³

§ 202. Where an article sold is received upon delivery, but does not answer the description given of its quality or value, the party who has given his bill or note in payment, cannot make the breach of warranty a defense in England and in many of the States—it being necessary that he should resort to his cross-action for damages for breach of contract,⁴ unless indeed the article be of no value, in which case the consideration will be regarded as having entirely failed.⁵ There should be an offer in such a case to return the property and rescind the contract, according to some cases,⁶ but according to others this is unnecessary.⁷

If the article be of any value at all, although entirely speculative, the contract will be enforced.⁸

§ 203. (2) *As to total and partial failure of consideration.*—The total failure of consideration is as good a defense to a suit upon a bill or note as the original want of it, and is confined to the like parties. If the contract is rescinded, the consideration of the bill or note totally fails, and

¹ Story on Bills (Bennet's ed.) § 184.

² Morgan v. Richardson, 1 Camp. 40; Obbard v. Betham, Moody & M. 483; Tye v. Gwynne, 2 Camp. 346.

³ Chitty on Bills (13th Am. ed.) [*76], 91; Roscoe on Bills, 105; Bayley on Bills, 344; 1 Parsons N. & B. 207; Day v. Nix, 9 J. B. Moore, 159; Edwards on Bills, 335; Story on Notes, § 187. In an early case Lord Kenyon left it to the jury to consider what damages had been suffered by the defendant in a suit on a note, in the transaction in which it was given; but the case has not been followed as a precedent. Ledger v. Ewer, Peake, 216.

⁴ Washburn v. Picot, 3 Dev. 390; Warwick v. Nairn, 10 Exch. 762; Elming v. Drew, 4 McLean, 388. But see Peden v. Moore, 1 Stew. & P. 71; Spalding v. Vandercook, 2 Wend. 431; Harrington v. Stratton, 22 Pick. 510.

⁵ Shepherd v. Temple, 3 N. H. 455.

⁶ Thornton v. Wynn, 12 Wheat. 183.

⁷ Shepherd v. Temple, 3 N. H. 455.

⁸ Johnson v. Titus, 2 Hill, 606.

payment of it cannot be enforced.¹ Thus, if the vendee give his bill or note for goods of a certain manufacture, growth, or description, and the payee fails to deliver goods of the character contracted for, the former may rescind the contract, and refuse to pay his bill or note, there being a total failure of consideration.² So, where a purchaser of a patent gave his note for it, and the patent proved void, it was held that the consideration had totally failed.³ But proof that another patent had been issued for the same invention to another person would not show that the first was void.⁴

And a partial failure of the consideration is a good defense *pro tanto*.⁵ But such part as is alleged to have failed must be distinct and definite, for only a total failure, or the failure of a specific and ascertained part, can be availed of by way of defense; and if it be an unliquidated claim the defendant must resort to his cross action.⁶ Thus, where bills have been accepted in consideration of the payee giving the acceptor the lease of a house, and he let him into possession but gave no lease, it was held no defense to an action on the bill, but that there was merely a counter-claim for damages.⁷ So where the bill was given for work to be done, and the work when done was bungled in part, and not worth the amount of the bill.⁸

§ 204. (3) *As to partial illegality of consideration.*—When the defense is founded on illegality of consideration it is to be distinguished from a defense on the ground of a want or failure in the consideration by this peculiarity—that a par-

¹ Thomson on Bills (Wilson's ed.) 66.

² Wells v. Hopkins, 6 M. & W. 7.

³ Dickinson v. Hall, 14 Pick. 217.

⁴ Crow v. Eichinger, 34 Ind. 65 (1870).

⁵ Story on Bills, § 184; Story on Notes, § 187; Drew v. Towle, 7 Fost. 412; 1 Parsons N. & B. 207; Thomson on Bills (Wilson's ed.) 64.

⁶ Pulsifer v. Hotchkiss, 12 Conn. 234; Elminger v. Drew, 4 McLean, 388; Drew v. Towle, 7 Fost. 412; Stone v. Peake, 16 Vt. 213; Ferguson v. Oliver, 8 Smedes & M. 332; Kernodle v. Hunt, 4 Black, 57.

⁷ Moggridge v. Jones, 14 East, 485; 3 Camp. 38.

⁸ Trickey v. Larne, 6 M. & W. 278.

tial illegality vitiates the bill or note "*in toto*," while the partial want or failure of consideration only vitiates it "*pro tanto*."¹ And a mortgage to secure a bill or note of which the consideration is in part illegal, is also wholly void.² The reason of the distinction is based mainly upon the ground of public policy, the court not undertaking to unravel a web of fraud for the benefit of the party who has woven it.³ If, however, the legal portion of the consideration were distinctly severable, the party could still recover by the proper action to its proportionate extent,⁴ though not upon the bill or note.⁵ There is authority, however, to the effect that

¹ Scott v. Gillmore, 3 Taunt. 226; Robinson v. Bland, 2 Burr. 1077; Hay v. Ayling, 3 Eng. Law & Eq. 416; Hanauer v. Doane, 12 Wall. 342; Carlton v. Bailey, 7 Post. 230; Brigham v. Potter, 14 Gray, 522; Deering v. Chapman, 23 Me. 488; Woodruff v. Heniman, 11 Vt. 592; Clark v. Ricker, 14 N. H. 197; Hyslop v. Clarke, 14 Johns. 465; Chandler v. Johnson, 39 Ga. 85; Wynne v. Whesenant, 37 Ala. 46; Kidder v. Blake, 45 N. H. 530; Widoe v. Webb, 20 Ohio, N. S. 637; Snyder v. Willey, 33 Mich. 483.

² Brigham v. Potter, 14 Gray, 522; Denny v. Dana, 2 Cush. 160.

³ Byles on Bills (Sharswood's ed.) [*140], 256.

⁴ Carlton v. Woods, 8 Foster, 290, where it is held that if entire stock of goods be sold at one and the same time, but each article for a separate and agreed value, the contract of sale is divisible; and if the sale of some article be prohibited by law, the sale of the others will nevertheless be enforced as legal, in an action for goods sold and delivered. Robinson v. Bland, 2 Burr. 1077; Widoe v. Webb, 20 Ohio St. 431, 637; Hoyt v. Macon, 2 Col. 508.

⁵ Robinson v. Bland, 2 Burr. 1077; Hanauer v. Doane, 12 Wall. 342. In Widoe v. Webb, 20 Ohio St. 431, there was action on a note given in settlement of an account of which some of the items were for intoxicating liquors sold in violation of law. Scott, C. J., said: "With respect to the items of the plaintiff's account which were unconnected with the illegal sales, he might well have maintained an action on the original contracts of sale, even after the giving of this note. For being utterly void it discharged none of the just indebtedness of the defendant. But he chose to sue upon the note, which was *prima facie* evidence of indebtedness to the extent of the whole sum promised to be paid, and thus attempted to throw upon the defendant the burden of showing how much of it was given upon an illegal consideration, and upon the court the task of separating the sound from the unsound. If this effort should result in his losing what was justly due him, we can but repeat what was said in a similar case: 'It is but a reasonable punishment for his including with his just due that which he had no right to take.'" Brigham v. Potter, 14 Gray, 522; Perkins v. Cummings, 2 Gray, 258; Clark v. Ricker, 14 N. H. 44; Carlton v. Bailey, 7 Foster, 234; Carlton v. Woods, 8 Foster, 290.

there may be recovery on the bill or note to the extent of the distinctly severable and valid consideration.¹ Where the legal part of the consideration exceeds the amount of the note, though another part of the consideration be illegal, the note will be valid.² And it has been held that where a bill is given in renewal of other bills, one of which was upon an illegal consideration, it would be valid as to the amount which the legal bills evidenced, and void as to the rest for want of consideration.³

SECTION VII.

RENEWAL BILLS AND NOTES. HOW ILLEGALITY MAY BE PURGED.

§ 205. *As to bills and notes given in renewal.*—If the consideration of the original bill or note be illegal, a renewal of it will be open to the same objection and defense;⁴ and if the original instrument was obtained by fraud, a renewal of it by the original parties without knowledge of the fraud, would stand upon the same footing.⁵ But if at the time the renewal was executed the parties signing knew of the fraud in the original, they will be regarded as purging the contract of the fraud, and cannot then plead it.⁶ So if the maker of a note held by an indorsee who knew that the consideration between the maker and the payee had failed when he took it, executes to him a new note, it has been held to be a waiver of the defense, and the payee of the new note can recover.⁷

Where a note secured by mortgage or deed of trust is renewed, the mortgage is valid as a security for the renewal

¹ Clopton v. Elkin, 49 Miss. 95. See Guild v. Belcher, 119 Mass. 257, as to recovery against partners, where one partner is not privy to the entire consideration.

² Warren v. Chapman, 105 Mass. 87.

³ Doty v. Knox Co. Bank, 16 Ohio, N. S. 133.

⁴ Sawyer v. Wiswell, 9 Allen, 39; Holden v. Cosgrove, 12 Gray, 216; Scudder v. Thomas, 34 Ga. 239.

⁵ Sawyer v. Wiswell, 9 Allen, 39.

⁶ Sawyer v. Wiswell, 9 Allen, 39.

⁷ Gill v. Morris, 11 Heiskell, 614.

note,¹ and if the renewal note be a forgery it does not discharge the original, although the original was surrendered up, nor is the indorser of the original discharged, his liability having been fixed by notice.² "When a dealer at bank pays off a note by renewal, the debt is the same; the debt remains unpaid, the credit is extended."³ And as a general rule the surrender of the pre-existing note does not discharge it.⁴

§ 206. If a note or bill be given for a consideration which is in part illegal, a new note for the same, or in renewal of the first, is equally void.⁵ But a new note for that part of the consideration which is legal is good and valid. And if several new notes are given for the old one, some of the new ones may be taken to be for the legal part, and so be valid, especially if they are only adequate to this part, or if the deduction be otherwise favored by circumstances.⁶

§ 207. *In what way illegal consideration may be purged.*—When there is such illegality in the consideration of a bill or note which vitiates it in all hands there are several ways in which it may be purged and a new security become valid. Thus, Firstly, if there was usury in the consideration, and it is either paid up or is remitted, there is no doubt that if a new bill or note were given, and the usury in the original instrument excluded, such new bill or note would be valid.⁷ Secondly. If the usurious or otherwise invalid security had been acquired by a *bona fide* holder for value, and without notice, a new bill or note executed by the drawer, maker,

¹ Aillet v. Woods, 24 La. Ann. 193; McNamara v. Coudon, 1 MacArthur, 364.

² Ritter v. Singmaster, 73 Penn. St. 400.

³ Farmers' Bank v. Mutual Ass. Soc'y, 4 Leigh, 88; Moses v. Trice, 21 Grat. 556; Tardy v. Boyd, 26 Grat. 638.

⁴ See Vol. II, § 1266.

⁵ 1 Parsons N. & B. 217; Chapman v. Black, 2 B. & Ald. 588; Wynne v. Calender, 1 Russ. 293; Preston v. Jackson, 2 Stark. 237.

⁶ Hubner v. Richardson, Bayley on Bills, 362; Crookshank v. Rose, 5 C. & P. 19.

⁷ De Wolf v. Johnson, 10 Wheat, 367; Hammond v. Hopping, 13 Wend. 505; Barnes v. Hedley, 2 Taunt. 184; 1 Camp. 157; 2 Parsons N. & B. 420; Bayley on Bills, 361.

acceptor, or other party bound upon the first to such *bona fide* holder, would be valid.¹ Thirdly. If the usurious or otherwise invalid security is lifted, and a third party, a stranger in whole or part to the original security, intervenes, and for motives peculiar to himself and unaffected by the illegal consideration, supplants it by a new security made by himself to the original payee, it would be valid,² and it matters not that the principal in the original becomes a surety upon the new security.³ If the new party be released, and the old contract is revived, the novation is rescinded, and usury may be pleaded.⁴ Fourthly. If A. makes a usurious or otherwise illegal agreement with B., and gives a bill or note to him for the amount, and then makes a new bill or note to C., to whom B. is indebted, the new note is valid.⁵

Fifthly. It has also been held that if A. make a usurious or otherwise illegal note to B., and afterward supplant it by the joint note of himself and C. to B., the joint note is valid;⁶ and Comyn says, "Where third persons are mixed up with the new transaction, the courts regard it with a favorable eye."⁷

¹ Torbett v. Worthy, 1 Heiskell, 107; Calvert v. Williams, 64 N. C. 168; Drake v. Chandler, 18 Grat. 912; Cuthbert v. Haley, 8 T. R. 390.

² Stone v. Smith, 6 Mumford, 541; Law's Ex'r v. Sutherland, 5 Grat. 357; Drake v. Chandler, 18 Grat. 912; Wales v. Webb, 5 Conn. 154; Windham v. Doles, 59 Ga. 266.

³ Drake v. Chandler, 18 Grat. 909.

⁴ Archer v. McCray, 59 Ga. 547.

⁵ Regina v. Sewel, 7 Mod. 118; Drake v. Chandler, 18 Grat. 912; Sherwood v. Archer, 17 N. Y. S. C. (10 Hun), 73.

⁶ Hulme v. Turner, 4 Esp. N. P. C. 111. In this case the payee of a note given for a usurious consideration arrested the maker, and to procure his liberation a third person joined the maker of the note in another note for the amount of the debt; and the chief justice said he was clearly of opinion the consideration of the first note could not be questioned in an action on the second, unless it could be shown that it was a colorable shift to evade the statute, devised when the money was originally lent and the first note granted. See Drake v. Chandler, 18 Grat. 912. We have seen it decided in a *nisi prius* Virginia case, that the liberation of the party was the consideration of the new joint note, and that only upon that ground could the decision of Hulme v. Turner be sustained. In Drake v. Chandler there is no allusion to this view.

⁷ Comyn on Usury, 186.

Sixthly. It has also been held that if a joint note be illegal, the note of one joint promissor, with a new party as surety thereon, would be valid.¹

Seventhly. If the party principal in the original and invalid security executes a new one, leaving off a surety upon the first—or adding a surety where there was none upon the first—or substituting a new surety for one that was upon the first—in all these cases there would still be a straight and unbroken line of obligation from the principal to the payee, And we should say that the new security was a mere renewal of the first, and would be invalid.²

Eighthly. It has been held that where an indorser upon a note void for usury gives his own note for the amount apparently due, it is tainted with the original usury and invalid.³ But if the original note were not usurious, usury in the renewal note would not prevent recovery of the amount due on the first, and an indorser of the first by indorsing the second, waives the necessity of protest and notice thereon in order to charge him.⁴

¹ *Gresham v. Morrow*, 40 Ga. 487. In this case it was held that where one who held the note of two joint promissors, given for slaves, and in full satisfaction thereof, took the note of one joint promissor, with a stranger as his security, it was a novation of the debt; and the consideration of the new note was not slaves, but the satisfaction of the first note.

² *Campbell v. Sloan*, 62 Penn. St. 481.

³ *First National Bank v. Plankinton*, 27 Wis. 177.

⁴ *Leary v. Miller*, 61 N. Y. 490.

BOOK II.

WHO MAY BE PARTIES.

CHAPTER VIII.

PERSONS PARTIALLY OR WHOLLY DISQUALIFIED.

§ 208. It was once thought that none but merchants could be parties to bills and notes, as they are purely mercantile instruments, but this notion long since became obsolete.¹ And it is well settled that any person laboring under no personal or political disability may be a party to any negotiable contract. We shall first speak of those who are partially or wholly disqualified by such disability, and who are (I) lunatics, (II) alien enemies, (III) infants, (IV) married women, (V) persons under guardianship, (VI) bankrupts. We shall then speak of those who may be parties, other than private individuals, and who are (I) personal representatives, (II) guardians, (III) trustees who may be included under the head of fiduciaries—and (IV) agents, (V) copartnership firms, (VI) private corporations, (VII) public corporations, and (VIII) government.

SECTION I.

LUNATICS, IMBECILES AND DRUNKARDS.

§ 209. Every person is presumed to be of sane mind until the contrary be shown by him who asserts it;² and insanity or imbecility cannot in England be shown under a general

¹ Chitty on Bills [*15], 20.

² Jackson v. King, 4 Cow. 207; Jackson v. Van Dusen, 5 Johns. 144; Edwards on Bills, 64; 1 Parsons N. & B. 150.

plea that the defendant did not execute the bill, note, or other instrument declared on, but must be specially pleaded.¹

The earlier authorities of the English law held that a man should not be allowed to stultify himself by alleging his own lunacy or imbecility;² but such a doctrine sounds more like the gibberish of a lunatic than like the decree of a humane and enlightened lawgiver. The maxim of the civil law, "*furiosus nullum negotium gerere potest, quia non intelligit quid agit*," expresses the sense of modern jurisprudence on the subject. And it may now be regarded as a general rule of universal law, that the contracts of a lunatic, idiot, or other person *non compos mentis*, from age or personal infirmity, are utterly void.³

§ 210. Prof. Parsons qualifies the doctrine stated in the text, by observing, that "possibly this defense (of insanity, imbecility, or aberration), to be effectual must go far enough to show that this defect of mind was known to the other contracting party."⁴ And this view has obtained in a number of cases in England and the United States. Thus it has been held no defense to an action for labor done and goods sold, that the defendant was of unsound mind, unless the plaintiff knew the fact, or took advantage of it.⁵ But we can see no philosophy in these rulings. If the defendant had no faculties of discretion, and were in fact deranged, the mere circumstance that, for the time being, he so deputed himself as to conceal his lunacy or imbecility, cannot alter his right to be protected against his own misfortune. And though honest persons may be ignorant of his condition, that is their misfortune, and they should not be allowed to

¹ Harrison v. Richardson, 1 Mood. & Rob. 504; Byles (Sharswood's ed.) [*60], 150.

² Beverley's Case, 4 Rep. 126; Stroud v. Marshall, Cro. Eliz. 398; 1 Parsons on Contracts, 383.

³ Edwards on Bills, 63; Story on Bills, § 106; Story's Eq. Juris. § 222; Byles on Bills (Sharswood's ed.) [*60], 150; see 1 Parsons N. & B. 149.

⁴ 1 Parsons N. & B. 149, 150.

⁵ Molton v. Camroux, 4 Exch. 17; Brown v. Todrell, 3 Car. & P. 30; Moody & M. 105; Beals v. Shce, 10 Penn. St. 56; Byles (Sharswood's ed.) [61], 151.

throw it upon one already helpless.¹ "It is a hard case either way, but it is very important that courts of justice should afford protection to those individuals who are unfortunately unable to be their own guardians," is the language of Lord Tenterden, C. J., in a case where a note, drawn, in an unusual form, by an imbecile, was held void in the hands of an innocent indorsee.² And no matter how perfect the note may be in form, it would be void in the hands of every person, however innocent, as against the imbecile or lunatic;³ but in this view, so obviously reasonable and just, the authorities are not entirely concurrent.

§ 211. Mere weakness of mind, not amounting to imbecility or insanity—mere immaturity of reason, or want of experience and skill in business, is no ground of defense either in law or equity, provided no fraud has been practiced on the party.⁴ But if the weakness of mind be so great as to incapacitate the party to guard against imposition and undue influence, it will suffice to vacate his contracts.⁵

§ 212. *In respect to necessities* an exception arises. In this regard an imbecile stands upon the footing of an infant. And his executed contracts for necessities, made while he was temporarily or apparently sane, with a party acting in entire good faith, would be enforced.⁶ And if a bill or note were executed by him for necessities under such circumstances, it would doubtless be valid, at least to the extent of their actual and proven value.⁷ A lunatic has been held

¹ Van Patton v. Beals, 46 Iowa, 63.

² Sentance v. Poole, 3 Car. & P. (1827); Chitty on Bills (13 Am. ed.) [*18], 24; Thomson on Bills (Wilson's ed.) 455.

³ Seaver v. Phelps, 11 Pick. 304, where it was held that an imbecile could not pledge a note, although the pledgee were entirely ignorant of his condition, and innocent of fraud. Van Patton v. Beals, 46 Iowa, 63.

⁴ Stewart v. Lisenard, 26 Wend. 299; Farnum v. Brooks, 9 Pick. 212; Osmond v. Fitzroy, 3 P. Wms. 129; Lewis v. Pead, 1 Ves. Jr. 19.

⁵ Johnson v. Chadwell, 8 Humph. 145.

⁶ McCullis v. Bartlett, 8 N. H. 569; La Rue v. Gilkyson, 4 Penn. St 375; Richardson v. Strong, 13 Ired. 106.

⁷ 1 Parsons N. & B. 149; Van Patton v. Marks, 46 Iowa, 63.

bound for medical services rendered his wife;¹ and in England, where a nobleman ordered carriages suitable to his rank, and the coachmaker supplied them *bona fide*, and they were actually used, it was held that an action was maintainable on the contract, notwithstanding there had been an inquisition of lunacy finding him to be of unsound mind at the time the carriages were ordered.²

§ 213. In the United States inquisitions of lunacy, under statutes providing for the appointment of guardians over persons of unsound mind, have been frequently regarded as conclusive evidence of lunacy as against all persons.³ But other authorities hold the inquisition conclusive evidence only as against the parties to it; and permit others to rebut it by clear evidence.⁴ And this seems to us the best view.⁵ In England, the inquisition is only presumptive evidence of lunacy.⁶ Before office found, the acts of a lunatic have been

¹ *Pearl v. McDowell*, 3 J. J. Marsh, 658; *Fitzgerald v. Reed*, 9 Smeed & M. 94.

² *Baxter v. Earl of Portsmouth*, 7 Dow. & Ry. 614; 2 Car. & P. 178. In *Dane v. Kirkall*, 8 C. & P. 679, it was held that a lunatic was bound by agreement for use and occupation of a house, although not necessary for her, it not appearing that the plaintiff knew she was a lunatic.

³ *Leonard v. Leonard*, 14 Pick. 280; *Wadsworth v. Sherman*, 14 Barb. 169; *Fitzhugh v. Wilcox*, 12 Barb. 235.

⁴ *Den v. Clarke*, 5 Hals. 117; *Rogers v. Walker*, 6 Penn. St. 371; *Edwards on Bills*, 64.

⁵ *Hicks v. Marshall*, 15 N. Y. S. C. 328 (1876). In this case suit was brought against the maker of a note by a *bona fide* holder for value without notice of any defect. Proceedings upon an inquisition of lunacy, had after making of the note and bringing of the suit, were given on evidence, and the defendant declared to be of unsound mind when he made the note. It was held that the inquisition established *prima facie* the insanity of the defendant at the time he made the note, and that in order to recover, the plaintiffs must show either that he was sane at the time, or that he had received such a consideration for the note, that justice and equity required it to be paid out of his estate.

In *Osterhout v. Shoemaker*, 3 Hill, 516, Bronson, J., says: "I see no principle upon which the inquisition taken upon a commission of lunacy can be given in evidence to defeat the rights of third persons who were strangers to the proceedings. * * * But it seems to be settled that such evidence is admissible, though not conclusive." See also *Hart v. Deamer*, 6 Wend. 497; *Goodall v. Harrington*, 3 N. Y. S. C. 345; *Hoyt v. Adees*, 3 Lansing, 173.

⁶ *Sergeson v. Sealey*, 2 Atk. 412; *Faulder v. Silk*, 3 Camp. 126.

said to be voidable only;¹ afterward void.² But this distinction would not extend so far as to prevent the contract of a lunatic from being ratified and confirmed after his restoration to sanity.³ And if after restoration, he continues to receive benefits under, instead of disaffirming the contract, it will be deemed a ratification.⁴

§ 214. *Drunkenness* is a species of mental aberration, produced by intoxicating stimulants. And if a person become so drunk as to be deprived of understanding and reason, there is no doubt that, while in such condition, he has no capacity to enter into a contract. And if he should sign a negotiable instrument, either as maker, drawer, indorser, or acceptor, it would certainly be void as to all parties having notice of the condition in which he signed it.⁵ If the drunkenness were so complete as to suspend all rational thought, the better opinion is that any instrument signed by the party would be utterly void even in the hands of a *bona fide* holder without notice, for, although it may have been the party's own fault that such an aberration of mind was produced, when produced, it suspended for the time being his capacity to consent, which is the first essential of a contract.⁶ "It is just the same," says Alderson, B., "as if the defendant had written his name on the bill in his sleep in a state of somnambulism."⁷ But it has been thought and held, that even when the drunkenness was complete, a bill or note then signed would be valid in the hands of a *bona fide* holder without notice.⁸ If the party were fully aware of what he

¹ Jackson v. Gumaer, 2 Cow. 552.

² Pearl v. McDowell, 3 J. J. Marsh. 658; Edwards on Bills, 64.

³ 1 Parsons N. & B. 151.

⁴ Arnold v. Richmond Iron Works, 1 Gray, 434; but see Berkeley v. Cannon, 3 Rich. (Law) 133.

⁵ Gore v. Gibson, 13 M. & W. 623; Pitt v. Smith, 3 Camp. 33; Molton v. Camrory, 2 Exch. 487; 4 Exch. 17; Wigglesworth v. Steers, 1 Hening & Mun. 70; Jenners v. Howard, 6 Blackf. 240; Clark v. Caldwell, 6 Watts, 139; 1 Parsons on Contracts, 383-84.

⁶ 1 Parsons N. & B. 151.

⁷ Gore v. Gibson, *supra*.

⁸ State Bank v. McCoy, 69 Penn. St. 204; Johnson v. Medlicott, 3 P. Wms. 130; Thomson on Bills (Wilson's ed.) 63; Chitty on Bills (13 Am. ed.) [*18], 24.

was doing when he signed the paper it would clearly be binding, as we think, in the hands of a *bona fide* holder.¹ Clearly, "the merriment of a cheerful cup, which rather revives the spirits than stupefies the reason, is no hindrance to the contracting of just obligations."²

§ 215. If the party made himself drunk for the purpose of entering into agreements and then avoiding them, the fraudulent intent antedating his drunkenness would render it incompetent for him to avail of the defense.³

Drunkenness, when relied upon as a defense, must be specially pleaded.⁴ If the party buy goods when drunk, and keep them when sober, he estops himself, and cannot then plead his drunkenness.⁵ Where a note based on insufficient consideration was obtained from a person under the influence of liquor at the time of its execution, and enfeebled in body and mind by long-continued disease and drunkenness, it was held in Alabama that a presumption of fraud arises, which must be countervailed by proof of fair consideration, and fair dealing on the part of the holder seeking to enforce payment.⁶

SECTION II.

ALIENS AND ALIEN ENEMIES.

§ 216. The mere fact that a person is an alien and a resident of a foreign country in nowise impairs the right of

¹ In *Miller v. Finley*, 26 Mich. 249, it was claimed that a father who signed a note already signed by his son, while in such a state of drunkenness, procured by the payee, that he was not responsible by his acts. The evidence for the plaintiff tended to show that he was fully aware of the transaction between his son and the payee, and took some part in it. The evidence of the son did not indicate his extreme intoxication; and the father himself seemed to recollect signing the note. Campbell, J., said: "The defense rests upon the ground of fraud, and not of illegality, and while if the old man's story is true, the note would be voidable as against the payee, it would not be a nullity as to all persons."

² Puffendorf, Book 3, ch. 6, § 4; Story on Contracts, § 27; *Cook v. Clayworth*, 18 Vesey, 12, Sumner's note.

³ 1 Parsons N. & B. 151; 1 Parsons on Contracts, 384, 385.

⁴ *Gore v. Gibson*, 13 M. & W. 623; Byles on Bills (Sharswood's ed.) [*61], 152.

⁵ *Gore v. Gibson*, 13 M. & W. 623. ⁶ *Holland v. Barnes*, 53 Ala. 83.

the citizens of another country to contract with him, or his right to contract with them. On the contrary, commercial intercourse between different nations, under relations of amity with each other, are to be favored and encouraged. But if war should break out between two countries, it at once interposes a barrier to, and an interdiction of, all commercial correspondence, intercourse and dealing between the citizens of the two countries. The hostile countries become sealed as against each other; and both for the purpose of identifying the citizen thoroughly and emphatically with the policy and interests of his country, and of preventing communications to the enemy which might be damaging in their character, the law of nations absolutely prohibits all intercourse between the citizens of belligerent countries, and pronounces all contracts between them utterly void.¹ Such contracts are not merely voidable, but *ab origine* void, and incapable of being enforced or confirmed.² And the rule applies not only to citizens and native subjects, but as well to all persons domiciled in the respective countries.³

This disability of alien enemies to contract does not rest upon any peculiarity of English or American law, but upon the universal public law of nations, as stated and approved by the most eminent writers, such as Grotius, Puffendorf, Vattel, Bynkershoek; and in the present age, Wheaton, Story, Kent, Parsons, and others.⁴

§ 217. It results from these principles, that if the United States and the United Kingdom of Great Britain, Scotland and Ireland were at war, a citizen of the United Kingdom

¹ *Griswold v. Waddington*, 19 Johns. 438, Chancellor Kent saying of this interdiction: "It reaches to all interchange or removal of property, to all negotiation and contracts, to all communication, to all locomotive intercourse, to a state of utter seclusion, to any intercourse but one of open hostility, to any meeting but in actual combat." *The Julia*, 8 Cranch, 131.

² *Griswold v. Waddington*, 16 Johns. 438; *Thomson on Bills*, 73; *Story on Notes*, § 94.

³ *McConnell v. Heetor*, 1 Bos. & P. 113; *Roberts v. Hardy*, 3 Maule & Sel. 533.

⁴ *Wheaton's International Law*, 556; *Story on Bills*, § 99; 1 *Parsons N. & B.* 152; 1 *Kent Com.* 67.

could not legally draw a bill of exchange upon a citizen of the United States;¹ nor could a citizen of the United States draw a bill upon a citizen of the United Kingdom.² This latter proposition of law has been denied in one of the circuit courts of the United States, and in Kentucky;³ but the weight of authority, as well as the clearly defined principles of international law, which have been already stated, overwhelmingly sustain the text. And it has been observed, in respect to the circuit court decision above referred to, that "even that case contains special circumstances not existing in the present case. The bill in that case was drawn

¹ *Willison v. Patteson*, 7 Taunt. 439; 1 Moore, 133 (1817). In this case, a British subject, resident in England, had in his hands funds of an alien enemy, who drew on him a bill payable to the drawer's order, and indorsed it to the plaintiff, an English-born subject resident in hostile territory. *Held*, that the indorsee could not recover.

In *Moon v. Foster*, decided by Chase, C. J., in U. S. Circuit Court at Richmond, Va., in 1868 (Chase's decisions reported by Johnson, p. 222), it appeared that during the late Confederate war the drawer at Winslow, N. C., drew on a drawee at Portsmouth, Va., the latter place being within the United States military lines. The chief justice instructed the jury that "if they should find that Winslow was not, at the time of making and issuing the draft, in the occupation or control of the national forces, then the draft in controversy, being an act of prohibited commercial intercourse, was not valid, negotiable paper." Cited in 19 Grat. 433. *Billgerry v. Branch*, 19 Grat. 393, 433; *Woods v. Wilder*, 43 N. Y. 164; *Wheaton on Inter. Law*, § 317; 1 Kent Com. 67; *Story on Bills*, § 100; *Thomson on Bills*, 73; 1 *Parsons N. & B.* 152; *Tarleton v. Southern Bank*, 49 Ala. 229.

² *Ibid.*

³ *United States v. Barker*, 1 Paine's C. C. 156 (1820). On the 2d of July, 1814, a bill of exchange was drawn by a citizen of the United States on a British subject in Liverpool, in favor of the United States, which was then at war with Great Britain. It was held a lawful transaction, and *Livingston, J.*, said: "The opinion of the court, then, is, that the plaintiff, by drawing the bill in question, violated neither the laws of nations nor any municipal regulation of his own country; that he did an act perfectly innocent, if not meritorious, and which has too long received the sanction of public opinion and general usage to render it necessary or proper to be checked by the interposition of a court of justice, which could not be done without sacrificing the interest of our innocent and unsuspecting merchants, to gratify the cupidity of those who may since have been advised that the transaction was unlawful, and may be desirous of taking advantage of it." Followed and approved in *Haggard v. Conkwright*, 7 Bush (Ky.), 16 (1869).

here by a citizen of the United States against funds which he had in England, and was indorsed to the United States Government, and prosecuted in its name and behalf.”¹ It was not upon these special circumstances that the decision turned, but they suggest an exception to the general rule in favor of the Government, which, upon considerations of public policy, may govern itself differently from its subjects.

§ 218. In like manner, the citizen of a country cannot accept a bill drawn by an alien enemy—that is, a citizen of a country at war with his own.² Nor indorse a bill or note to such alien enemy, nor be indorsee of one from him.³ Nor can he execute a note to such alien enemy, nor be payee of a note made by him;⁴ though it would seem that if the note were given by an agent acting under authority given before the war, and in renewal of a note made before the war, it would be valid.⁵

In the late war between the Confederate States and the United States, many transactions between parties on opposite sides of the hostile line occurred, and the principle that forbids communication between alien enemies has been regarded by the courts of the United States, and of the several States, as applicable to them. For while the Confederate States were short lived, for the time being they waged war like an independent nation, and were accorded belligerent rights.⁶

§ 219. The subject of a country at war with another, cannot acquire the rights of an indorsee of a bill drawn by an alien enemy upon a citizen of his own country, provided he knew at the time of the state of war between them; for by receiving a bill which is enemy's property, he makes him-

¹ Woods v. Wilder, 43 N. Y. 164, Rapallo, J.

² Ibid.

³ Billgerry v. Branch, 19 Grat. 393.

⁴ Ibid. McVeigh v. Bank of Old Dominion, 26 Grat. 785.

⁵ McVeigh v. Bank of the Old Dominion, 26 Grat. 785.

⁶ Billgerry v. Branch, 19 Grat. 393; Moon v. Foster, Chief Justice Chase's decision, cited in 19 Grat. 433; Chase's Decisions, 222; Wood v. Wilder, 43 N. Y. 164; Ward v. Smith, 7 Wall. 447; The Prize Cases, 2 Black (S. C.) 635; The Venice, 2 Wall. 258; The Hampton, 5 Wall. 372; The William Bagaley, 5 Wall. 377; Hanger v. Abbott, 6 Wall. 532; Tarleton v. Southern Bank, 49 Ala. 229; McVeigh v. Bank of Old Dominion, 26 Grat. 785.

self an instrument to enable such enemy to sue in the courts of his own country, and either encourages, or participates in that intercourse and correspondence which the laws of nations interdict.¹ If it does not appear that the indorsee knew that the instrument was invalid as between the original parties on account of the existence of war between their respective countries, they would be liable to him upon it; but, as a general rule, the place where the bill or note is dated, and the names, or address of the parties thereon noted, will indicate its true nature; and a declaration of war is always matter of such immediate and general notoriety that no one can long remain ignorant of it.² It has been held, however, that an assignment of a certificate of deposit issued by a bank within the lines of a hostile government, is valid.³

§ 220. Although a bill or note drawn, indorsed or accepted in favor of an alien enemy, may not be valid as between the original parties, yet if it be drawn upon the citizen of a hostile country by an alien enemy, in favor of a neutral, and no illegal use of it were intended or participated in, it would be valid in the hands of the neutral as against the drawer, and also as against the drawee if he accepted. And the same rule would apply to indorsements to neutrals of bills or notes executed between citizens of countries at war; and to the drawing of bills, making of notes, and indorsing of bills or notes by neutrals in favor of fellow-subjects or other neutrals; for a state of war does not suspend commerce between neutrals.⁴

§ 221. *Exceptions to general rule.*—There are some exceptions to the general interdiction of intercourse between alien enemies. Thus, if a prisoner of war should draw a bill on a fellow-citizen in his own country, or should make or indorse a note, that bill or note, whether payable or indorsed to an alien enemy, would be valid if it were drawn, made, or in-

¹ Thomson on Bills, 74.

² Thomson on Bills, 74.

³ Morrison v. Lovell, 4 Hagan (West. Va.) 346.

⁴ Story on Bills, §§ 103, 104; Story on Notes, §§ 98, 99; Edwards on Bills, 74.

dorsed for the purpose of obtaining necessary articles of subsistence or comfort.¹ So, if it were drawn, made, or indorsed for the ransom of a captured ship,² or for the repairs of a ship in an enemy's country, protected by cartel between the belligerents.³ And such instruments might be sued upon on the return of peace. But it would have to appear affirmatively that the consideration of the bill or note exempted it from the general rule. After the expiration of a temporary act prohibiting the payment of bills drawn during a state of war, under a penalty, a mere verbal promise to pay such bills would be valid.⁴

§ 222. The effect of war between two countries is to suspend at once all contracts between the citizens of those countries which require communication between them.⁵ But if an alien enemy has an agent in the hostile country, war does not revoke the agency; and the agent may still act for, receive, and pay out money for his principal; give or receive notice of dishonor of his commercial paper, and represent his principal in all transactions not contrary to the policy or interests of the government wherein the agent resides,⁶ that is to say, provided they can be conducted without intercourse or communication between the citizens or subjects of the contending powers—such as agencies to collect and preserve, but not to transmit money or property.⁷ But it seems they

¹ *Daubuz v. Morehead*, 6 Taunt. 332; *Edwards on Bills*, 74.

² *Ricord v. Bettenham*, 3 Burr, 1734; *Cornu v. Blackburne*, 2 Doug. 641; *Yates v. Hall*, 1 T. R. 73.

³ *Patts v. Bell*, 8 T. R. 548; *Sackley v. Furse*, 15 Johns. 338; *Edwards on Bills*, 74, 75; *Story on Notes*, § 97; *Story on Bills*, § 102.

⁴ *Duhammel v. Pickering*, 2 Stark. 90.

⁵ *Griswold v. Waddington*, 16 Johns. 438.

⁶ *Ward v. Smith*, 7 Wall. 447; *Dennistoun v. Imbrie*, Wash. C. C. 396; 3 *Manhattan Ins. Co. v. Warwick*, 20 Grat. 614; *Hale v. Wall*, 22 Grat. 424; *Monseaux v. Urquhart*, 19 La. 485; *Clarke v. Morey*, 10 Johns. 70; *Fisher v. Krutz*, 9 Kans. 510; *Hubbard v. Matthews*, 54 N. Y. 48; *Maloney v. Stephens*, 11 Heiskell, 738.

⁷ *Small's Adm'r v. Lumpkin*, 28 Grat. 835. See cases in preceding note.

must be created before the war begins.¹ Of the character described is an agency to receive notice of protest of commercial paper.²

SECTION III.

INFANTS.

§ 223. In the next place as to infants. Persons under twenty-one years of age are minors, or infants as they are more generally termed, and contracts made by them have been divided into three classes: First, void contracts, which are those clearly to the infant's disadvantage—as, for instance, a bond made with a penalty; second, voidable contracts, which are those which may or may not be for his benefit, according to circumstances—as, for example, a lease of his lands rendering rent; and third, valid contracts, which are such as are entered into for necessities.³ And by necessities are meant those things which are needed by the infant, and are suited to his means and rank in life.

But this distinction, as to void and voidable contracts, is now regarded as practically obsolete; all the contracts of an infant, not in themselves illegal, being capable of ratification by him after he has attained his majority, and, therefore, being voidable only.. For if absolutely void, they would be incapable of ratification.⁴

¹ *U. S. v. Lapine*, 17 Wall. 602; *U. S. v. Grossmayer*, 9 Wall. 72; *Small's Adm'r v. Lumpkins*, 28 Grat. 835; *Hubbard v. Matthews*, 54 N. Y. 44.

² *Hubbard v. Matthews*, 54 N. Y. 44.

³ Story on Notes, § 77.

⁴ 1 *Parsons on Contracts*, 295; *Byles on Bills* (Sharswood's ed.) [*39] 145; *Edwards on Bills*, 65; 2 *Kent Com.* [*234], Lect. 31; *Bingham on Infancy*, 45.

Chancellor Kent, in his Commentaries, says (see 2 *Kent's Com.* Lect. 31): "It is held that a negotiable note given by an infant, even for necessities, is void; and his acceptance of a bill of exchange is void; and a bond with a penalty, though given for necessities, is void. It must be admitted, however, that the tendency of the modern decisions is in favor of the reasonableness and policy of a very liberal extension of the rule, that the acts and contracts of infants should

§ 224. For necessities an infant may undoubtedly bind himself, and the better opinion is that he may execute a note not negotiable for the amount, the consideration of which might be inquired into, and his protection from imposition insured—he being bound not absolutely for the amount of the note, but only for the real value of the necessities for which it was given.¹ But it is denied by some of the authorities that an infant can execute any note whatever, of any binding force, even for necessities.² In England it has been held that an infant may execute a single bill (a bond without a penalty) for the exact sum due for necessities; but not a bond with a penalty, or carrying interest.³ An infant cannot bind himself for necessities when he has a parent or guardian who supplies his wants;⁴ but when he has authority from his guardian or parent, he may purchase them and bind himself for them.⁵

§ 225. *Negotiable paper signed by infants.*—In respect to negotiable paper to which infants have signed their names as parties, it may be stated as a general principle, universally recognized wherever the common law prevails, that an infant cannot bind himself absolutely as drawer, indorser, acceptor, or maker of a bill of exchange or negotiable note.⁶ In a case where the acceptor of a bill pleaded infancy, and it was

be deemed voidable only, and subject to their election, when they become of age, either to affirm or disallow them. If their contracts were absolutely void, it would follow as a consequence that the contract could have no effect, and the party contracting with the infant would be equally discharged." See *Harner v. Dipple*, 31 Ohio St. 72; *Reed v. Batchelder*, 1 Metc. 559.

¹ 1 Parsons N. & B. 68.

² *Bouchell v. Clary*, 3 Brev. 194; *Chitty on Bills* [*19], 26.

³ *Russell v. Lee*, 1 Lev. 86; *Byles* (Sharswood's ed.) [*57], 144; *Chitty on Bills* [*19], 26.

⁴ *Angel v. McClellan*, 16 Mass. 23; *Guthrie v. Murphy*, 4 Watts, 80.

⁵ *Rundel v. Keeler*, 7 Watts, 237; *Watson v. Heasel*, 7 Id. 344.

⁶ *Williamson v. Harrison*, Holt, 359; *Carth.* 160; 3 Salk. 197 (1690). The Court said: "Here the infant was a trader, and the bill of exchange was drawn in the course of trade, and not for necessities." *Story on Notes*, § 78; *Edwards on Bills*, 65.

replied that it was given for necessities, Lord Mansfield, C. J., said: "Did any one ever hear of an infant being liable as an acceptor of a bill of exchange? The replication is nonsense, and ought to have been demurred to."¹ And although the tenor of the modern authorities is to liberalize the law on the subject of infancy, the doctrine is generally followed that an infant cannot be a party to a negotiable instrument—the reason assigned being, that otherwise, should it be transferred to a *bona fide* holder for value, and without notice of the infancy, the infant, if bound at all, would be bound for the entire sum, and if inquiry were admitted into the consideration, the instrument would lose its character as negotiable paper.²

§ 226. The views of this subject which strike us as the most reasonable may be stated as follows: If the payee of a note made by an infant were to sue him upon it as maker, and he pleaded infancy, the payee might reply that it was executed for necessities, and that such necessities were reasonably worth the amount specified in the note. The burden of proof would rest upon the plaintiff to show that the consideration was necessities, and also to show their value; and no more than the value proved could be recovered. And this view would apply whether the note were in form negotiable or not.³

If the indorsee of the payee of such a note were to sue the indorser, the latter would, of course, be bound to him whether the maker were an infant or not; for by indorsement he warrants the capacity of prior parties and the entire

¹ Williamson v. Watts, 1 Camp. 552.

² Swasey v. Vanderheyden, 10 Johns. 33; Wamsley v. Lindenberger, 2 Rand. 478; McCrillis v. How, 2 N. H. 348; Conn v. Coburn, 7 N. H. 368; McMinn v. Richmonds, 6 Yerg. 9; Henderson v. Fox, 5 Ind. 489; Fenton v. White, 1 South. 100; Bouchell v. Clary, 3 Brev. 194; 1 Parsons N. & B. 69; Story on Notes, § 68; Story on Bills, § 84.

³ See Earle v. Reed, 10 Metc. 387; DuBose v. Wheddon, 4 McCord, 221 (1827); Haines' Adm'r v. Tannant, 2 Hill (S. C.) 400 (1834); see Edwards on Bills, 65; and Kyd on Bills, 29.

validity of the paper.¹ And were the indorsee to sue the maker, and he were to plead infancy, there seems to be no good reason why it might not be replied that the note was given for necessities, and that they were worth the amount specified; and that the indorsee, like the payee, should be entitled to recover upon proving the consideration to have been necessities, and upon showing their value.² The distinction taken in some cases,³ that the payee may sue the infant as maker, but that an indorsee cannot do so, seems extremely technical and unreasonable. If not absolutely void as to the payee, we cannot perceive why it should be so held as to an indorsee, who, while he could not stand upon a better footing than the indorser as against the infant, certainly should not be placed upon a worse; for the payee must generally have a better opportunity to know the fact of infancy than he. Nor can we see that holding the original consideration to be open to proof, upon infancy being shown, would damage the character of a negotiable note more than declaring it utterly void.

Justice seems to require that the mere negotiable form of the paper should not destroy all validity; and although it could not be said to be negotiable in the full sense of the term—protection to the infant—which is the sole object of the law—requires no more than that his infancy should shield him from all liability beyond the actual value of the necessities furnished; and justice to the holder demands that at

¹ See Chapter XXI, on Transfer by Indorsement.

² This doctrine is intimated in *DuBois v. Wheddon*, 4 McCord, 221, by Chancellor Nott, who said: "I see no reason why he (an infant) may not be bound by a bond or a bill of exchange. It is not true that no inquiry can be made into the consideration. The statutes against usury and gaming are every day set off as defenses to actions on bills of exchange and negotiable notes, even in the hands of innocent indorsees." In *Bradley v. Pratt*, 23 Vt. 378, Redfield, J., favors this view; but says it could not probably be recognized "without too great an infringement of the rules of law in regard to negotiable paper while current."

³ *Earle v. Reed*, 10 Metc. 387.

least that should be given him.¹ The Scotch law is entirely in harmony with these views.²

§ 227. *Infant as payee and indorser.*—An infant may undoubtedly be the payee of a bill or note, and may sue upon and enforce it, since it cannot be but for his benefit if the consideration thereof does not move from himself but from some third person, or if it be for a debt justly due to him.³ But whether or not an infant can personally receive payment is a different question. As a general rule payment should be made to his guardian, and if it be made to the infant personally, and be thereby dissipated and lost, the payer would not be discharged.⁴ An infant may also indorse a bill or note made payable to him or order, so far at least as to enable the indorsee to recover against the drawer, acceptor or maker, who by undertaking to pay to him or to his order, are estopped to deny his capacity to order payment to be made to the indorsee.⁵ And to this extent the infant's in-

¹ In a note to Byles on Bills [*59] 148, note 1, the learned American editor, Judge Sharswood, says: "A note may be valid as such, though not negotiable; in other words, though it may be so circumstanced as to let in all inquiries as to its consideration in the hands even of a *bona fide* holder. So here, on proof that the maker is an infant, the negotiability of the note is at an end; but it does not cease to be a note. It may be sued on by the holder in his own name. He stands in the shoes of the original payee, and can recover whatever he would have been entitled to recover. If the note is voidable, then without ratification it cannot be sued on at all. The holder, at most, must be subrogated to the rights of the original payee, in an action against the infant in the name of the payee, on a declaration founded on the original consideration. It is evident that the Kentucky case (*Beeler v. Young*, 1 Bibb, 519) can only be supported on this footing; and, contrary to its own syllabus, it really affirms that the note is valid as a note, though it is not a negotiable note."

² Thomson on Bills (Wilson's ed.)

³ *Warwick v. Bruce*, 2 Maul. & S. 205; *Holladay v. Atkinson*, 5 Barn. & C. 501; *Teed v. Elworth*, 14 East, 210; Story on Notes, § 79; Story on Bills, § 85; Byles on Bills (Sharswood's ed.) [*60], 150; Chitty on Bills [*20], 28.

⁴ *Phillips v. Paget*, 2 Ark. 80.

⁵ *Nightingale v. Withington*, 15 Mass. 272; *Frasier v. Massey*, 14 Ind. 352; *Hardy v. Waters*, 38 Me. 450; *Grey v. Coopers*, 3 Doug. 65 (1782); *Taylor v. Croker*, 4 Esp. 187 (1803); *Jones v. Darch*, 4 Price, 300 (1817); *Drayton v. Dale*, 2 B. & C. 293; 2 Dow. & Ry. 534 (1823); Chitty on Bills [*20], 26-29; Story on Notes, § 80; Story on Bills, § 85; Thomson on Bills, 131, 135; Byles (Sharswood's ed.) [*60], 149; Edwards, 246.

dorsement would be valid, even if made by his authorized agent or attorney.¹ "It would be absurd," it has been said by Parker, C. J., "to allow one who has made a promise to pay to one who is an infant, or his order, to refuse to pay the money to one to whom the infant had ordered it to be paid, in direct violation of his promise."² And in respect to the drawer of a bill payable to an infant or order, Lord Mansfield said: "The drawer says, 'let anybody trust the payee on my credit.'"³

§ 228. The infant cannot, of course, be bound by his indorsement to pay the bill or note, and Story says: "The infant may indeed avoid it, and intercept the payment to the indorsee, or by giving notice to the antecedent parties of his avoidance, furnish to them a valid defense against the claim of the indorsee. But until he does so avoid it, the indorsement is to be deemed, in respect to such antecedent parties, as a good and valid transfer."⁴ But whatever might be the infant's right to rescind his contract as against those deriving title through him, it is clear that when they have parted with value for the instrument, prior parties who, by making it payable to the infant, have warranted his capacity to indorse it, cannot escape responsibility for such warranty. And they may consequently be compelled to pay the bill or note twice.⁵ The case would be different in respect to an indorsement by an infant himself an indorsee and not the payee.⁶

§ 229. An infant's indorsement is voidable, not absolutely void.⁷ And it has been thought that where he receives a full consideration for the transfer of property, such as a negotiable bill or note, and makes a manual delivery of it, his right

¹ Hardy v. Waters, 38 Me. 450.

² Nightingale v. Withington, *supra*.

³ Grey v. Cooper, 3 Doug. 65.

⁴ Story on Notes, § 80.

⁵ Smith v. Marsack, 6 C. B. 488; 18 L. J. C. P. 65 (1848); see *post*, § 242, note 5, and *ante*, § 90; Taylor v. Croker, 4 Esp. 187.

⁶ See Story on Bills, § 85, p. 98 (Bennett's ed.), note 2.

⁷ Goodsell v. Myers, 3 Wend. 479; Edwards on Bills, 245; *contra*, see 10 Johns. 33.

to rescind or avoid the contract is suspended until he becomes of age.¹ And then he is not allowed to disaffirm the contract unless he returns the consideration paid to him.² We should say that he might disaffirm the contract and return the consideration at any time, provided it was not unreasonably delayed after he became of age.³

§ 230. *Ratification by adult of bills and notes executed when an infant.*—The bill of exchange or promissory note of an infant is not absolutely void, but voidable only at his election.⁴ And if, after reaching full age, the then adult ratify and confirm his bill or note executed while he was an infant, whether it were framed so as to be negotiable or not, he will be bound to pay the instrument according to its terms. For by ratification the adult validates the instrument in all respects, and it becomes the same as if it had been executed by an adult.⁵ The effect of the ratification, as stated by Shaw, C. J., is, “to ratify and confirm the contract, and give it the same legal effect as if the promisor had been of legal capacity to make the note when it was made.”⁶ And consequently the bill or note may be sued upon, without any

¹ *Roof v. Stafford*, 7 Cow. 179; 9 Cow. 626. On the last hearing of this case it was held that the infant might avoid a sale of chattels while an infant, but not a sale of land.

² *Medbury v. Watrous*, 7 Hill, 110.

³ See *Bool v. Mix*, 17 Wend. 119; 2 Kent Com. [*237], notes; Schouler's *Domestic Relations*, 546, as to personal property.

⁴ *Cole v. Pennell*, 2 Rand. 174; *Wamsly v. Lindenberger*, 2 Rand. 479; *Williams v. Moore*, 11 M. & W. 256, Parke, B., saying: “The promise of an infant is not *void* in any case, unless the infant chuses to plead his infancy.” Byles (*Sharswood's ed.*) [*58], 145; *Edwards on Bills*, 65, 66.

⁵ *Id.*; *Hunt v. Massey*, 5 Barn. & Ad. 902. In this case, the drawer sued the acceptor of a bill. It appeared that the acceptor was an infant when he accepted, but had ratified the bill after he reached full age. Taunton, J., said: “Where a voidable contract is made by a party under age, and ratified after he has attained full age, is it not usual to declare on the original promise? The first promise here was voidable only. As soon as it was ratified, it became binding *ab initio*.” *West v. Penny*, 16 Ala. 186; *Edgerly v. Shaw*, 5 Foster, 514; *Lawson v. Lovejoy*, 8 Greenl. 405; *Reed v. Batchelder*, 1 Metc. 559; *Cheshire v. Barrett*, 4 McCord, 241; *Little v. Duncan*, 9 Rich. 55; *Goodsell v. Myers*, 3 Wend. 479.

⁶ *Reed v. Batchelder*, 1 Metc. 559.

allegation of ratification—that being necessary to appear only in rebuttal of the plea of infancy, when pleaded.¹ It was held in England at one time, and also in the United States, that if an action be brought on a contract made by an infant, a ratification, proved to have been made after action brought would not suffice;² but this view has been sharply criticised, and is not tenable.³ The ratification inures to the benefit of every subsequent holder.⁴

§ 231. *What amounts to ratification.*—Unless a written ratification be required by statute, a verbal ratification will be effectual.⁵ As to what words will amount to a ratification, a mere recognition that the debt existed, or contract was made, is not sufficient.⁶ No peculiar form of words is requisite, but there must be a direct and explicit recognition of the contract, and words expressing or necessarily implying a promise to fulfill it. Thus, if the adult says, “I have not the money now, but when I return from my voyage I will settle with you,” or, “I owe you, and will pay you when I return,” it is sufficient.⁷ So if he promises to “remit in a short time,”⁸ or says, “all that is justly your due shall be paid,”⁹ or declares his intention to pay the note, and authorizes an agent to pay it, though nothing is done.¹⁰ And the words, “I will pay the note as soon as I can make it, but not this year. I understand the holder is about to sue it, but she had better not,” have been¹¹ held enough.

¹ *Supra*, notes 1 and 2.

² *Thornton v. Illingworth*, 2 Barn. & C. 824; Byles (Sharswood's ed.)

³ 1 *Parsons N. & B.* 72; Byles (Sharswood's ed.) [*58], 145, note 1.

⁴ *Reed v. Batchelder*, 1 Metc. 559.

⁵ *Martin v. Mayo*, 10 Mass. 137; *West v. Penny*, 16 Ala. 186; *Reed v. Boshears*, 4 Sneed, 118.

⁶ *Thrupp v. Fielder*, 2 Esp. 628; *Robins v. Eaton*, 10 N. H. 561; *Benham v. Bishop*, 9 Conn. 330; *Whitney v. Dutch*, 14 Mass. 460; *Hale v. Gerrish*, 8 N. H. 374; *Chitty on Bills* [*20], 27.

⁷ *Whitney v. Dutch*, 14 Mass. 460.

⁸ *Hartley v. Wharton*, 11 Ad. & El. 934.

⁹ *Wright v. Steele*, 2 N. H. 51.

¹⁰ *Orvis v. Kimball*, 3 N. H. 314.

¹¹ *Bobs v. Hansel*, 2 Bailey, 114, but query; 1 *Parsons N. & B.* 74.

§ 232. An admission by the adult, and the declaration that the party would get his pay, but accompanied by a refusal to give a note, would not amount to a ratification.¹ Nor would an admission, accompanied by a promise to endeavor "to get my brother bound with me."² Nor would the language, "I consider your claim worthy my attention, but not my first attention,"³ "I will have to pay I suppose, but I shall do so at my convenience."⁴ Nor would a direction in the adult's will, that his just debts be paid, apply to debts contracted in infancy.⁵

§ 233. The promise of the adult must be made to the party with whom he contracted, or his authorized agent, in order to amount to ratification; and if made to a third party, it will be insufficient.⁶ "It results from the fact of the original contract not being binding on the infant, that the new promise must possess all the ingredients of a complete agreement, to enable the plaintiff to recover against the infant. Hence, as no agreement is complete until the minds of the contracting parties meet, the new promise, to be binding on the infant, must be made to the creditor in person, or to his agent. The new promise creates a new contract; and the old debt supplies the consideration."⁷ And if it be coupled with a condition, as to pay "when able," the plaintiff must show the happening of the contingency, but need not show that payment may be made without inconvenience.⁸

If the promise be shown to have depended on any other condition, its fulfillment must be proven.⁹

§ 234. Mere part payment does not amount to ratification

¹ Hale v. Gerrish, 3 N. H. 374.

² Ford v. Phillips, 1 Pick. 202.

³ Wilcox v. Roath, 12 Conn. 550.

⁴ Dunlap v. Hale, 2 Jones, N. C. 381.

⁵ Smith v. Mayo, 9 Mass. 62.

⁶ Goodsell v. Myers, 3 Wend. 479; Bigelow v. Grannis, 2 Hill, 150; Hoit v. Underhill, 9 N. H. 439; Reed v. Boshears, 4 Sneed, 118.

⁷ Hodges v. Hunt, 22 Barb. 150, Paige, J.

⁸ Thompson v. Lay, 4 Pick. 48; Cole v. Saxby, 3 Esp. 159; Everson v. Carpenter, 17 Wend. 419.

⁹ *Ib.*; Proctor v. Sears, 4 Allen, 95; Chandler v. Glover, 32 Penn. St. 509.

by the adult.¹ Nor does a submission to arbitration, unless it proceed to a decision that the adult must pay.² But expressions of intention to abide by a former award, or accepting its benefits, would suffice.³ And the infant's conduct may be such as to amount to ratification. Mere silence and failure to disaffirm will not be sufficient alone; but connected with circumstances may become so. Thus, if the adult keep property purchased in infancy, after being requested to return it if he did not intend to keep it, it was held to be a ratification.⁴ And where an infant bought a yoke of oxen, for which he gave his note, and after his majority sold them and used the money, the like decision was rendered.⁵ And there are other decisions to like effect, where the adult has retained land purchased in infancy,⁶ or personal property,⁷ or taken a deed to property.⁸ If the adult refuse to return the consideration when notified to do so, and still has it in his power, it seems clear that he should be bound; but mere retention of the consideration, without such notice to return, would not alone suffice,⁹ and if it had been disposed of before the infant reached his majority, the failure to return it would be no ratification.¹⁰

§ 235. Ignorance of the law excuses no one, and therefore it is not necessary to a valid ratification of a contract made by an infant, that the adult ratifying should know the fact that his infancy rendered his contract invalid.¹¹ A different view has been taken in some cases,¹² but the doc-

¹ *Smith v. Mayo*, 9 Mass. 62; *Robbins v. Eaton*, 10 N. H. 561; *Hinely v. Margaritz*, 3 Barr, 428.

² *Benham v. Bishop*, 9 Conn. 330; 1 Parsons N. & B. 75, 76.

³ *Barnaby v. Barnaby*, 1 Pick. 221; *Jones v. Phoenix Bank*, 4 Seld. 228.

⁴ *Aldrich v. Grimes*, 10 N. H. 194.

⁵ *Lawson v. Lovejoy*, 8 Greenlf. 405.

⁶ *Armfield v. Tate*, 7 Ired. 258.

⁷ *Cheshire v. Barrett*, 4 McCord, 241; *Thomasson v. Boyd*, 13 Ala. 419.

⁸ *Montgomery v. Witbeck*, 23 Minn. 173.

⁹ *Benham v. Bishop*, 9 Conn. 330.

¹⁰ *Robbins v. Eaton*, 10 N. H.

¹¹ *Morse v. Wheeler*, 4 Allen, 570.

¹² *Harmer v. Killing*, 5 Esp. 193; *Reed v. Boshears*, 4 Sneed, 118; *Hinely v. Margaritz*, 3 Barr, 428; *Curtin v. Patten*, 11 S. & R. 305.

trine of the text is sustained both by decisions of courts and opinions of distinguished juridical writers.¹ It will, at least, be presumed that an adult, ratifying a contract entered into in infancy, knew the fact that he was not legally bound.²

§ 236. In England and some of the United States, ratification must be in writing. In 1828, Parliament enacted the statute of 9 George IV, c. 14, commonly called Lord Tenterden's act, whereby it is provided that "no action shall be maintained whereby to charge any person, upon any promise made after full age, to pay any debt contracted during infancy, or upon any ratification, after full age, of any promise or simple contract made during infancy, unless such promise or ratification shall be made by some writing signed by the party to be charged therewith." And similar statutes have been enacted in most of the United States.³ In England, the Court of Exchequer held that the statute made a distinction between new promises and ratification, and that "ratification," as therein used, would go so far as to comprehend such a ratification as would make a person liable as principal for an act done by another in his name.⁴ But this view has been criticised.⁵ And the view of Martin, B., in a later case, in the same court (in which, however, the judges were divided in opinion), defining ratification to be a "consent by a person, after he becomes of full age, to be liable for a debt contracted during infancy, expressed to the effect that he is willing to affirm it and treat it as valid,"⁶ seems to be a clear and correct conception of the subject.

§ 237. If an infant, after he becomes of age, retire from a firm, of which he has been a member, he must give notice of the fact; otherwise he will be bound by its contracts

¹ Schouler on Domestic Relations, 583.

² Taft v. Sergeant, 18 Barb. 322.

³ Code of Virginia (ed. 1873), p. 985, ch. 140. See Brown on Statute of Frauds, and Throop on Verbal Agreements.

⁴ Parsons N. & B. 77; Schouler on Domestic Relations, 576.

⁵ Harris v. Wall, 1 Exch. 122.

⁶ Mawson v. Blane, 10 Exch. 206.

made after his majority.¹ But the mere fact that he continues in a firm, after his majority, is no ratification of contracts made by the firm while he was an infant.²

§ 238. If an infant, together with an adult, make a joint promissory note, it has been held, in England, that the payee may bring his action upon it against the adult, without making the infant a party.³ But in the United States, a different view is taken, the infant's undertaking being voidable, not absolutely void;⁴ and this view is specially applicable when the note is not negotiable.⁵

SECTION IV.

MARRIED WOMEN.

§ 239. By the common law of England, and of many of the States of the United States, in which it has been adopted and preserved, the wife merges her personality by marriage in the person of her husband. They two become in law one person, in so far as affects the business concerns of life. That person is the husband, and the wife can make no contract binding upon herself, or upon her husband without his consent.⁶ This rule of the common law, which grew out of the feudal system, has been modified or abolished by statute in some of the States, and the tendency of legislation is to enlarge and enfranchise the capacity of married women, especially in those States which are the seats of great commercial

¹ *Goode v. Harrison*, 5 B. & Ald. 147. ² *Crabtree v. May*, 1 B. Mon. 289.

³ *Burgess v. Merrill*, 4 Taunt. 468; *Chandler v. Parkes*, 3 Esp. 76; *Jaffray v. Frebain*, 5 Esp. 47; *Edwards on Bills*, 67, note; *Byles* [*59], 149.

⁴ *Slocum v. Hooker*, 12 Barb. 563; 13 Barb. 536.

⁵ *Cole v. Pennell*, 2 Rand. 174; *Wamsley v. Lindenberger*, 2 Rand. 478; *Green, J.*, saying: "In England, a note of hand given by an infant, even for necessaries, is perhaps void; because, having the effect of a bill of exchange by statute, he might be precluded from contesting the consideration against a third person. But no such an objection exists as to the note of hand given in this case."

⁶ 1 Blackstone's Commentaries, 442; 2 Kent Com. 129.

centers. Experiments upon social institutions are the order of the day, but innovations of the kind are, to say the least, of very doubtful policy.

§ 240. Wherever the common law prevails a married woman cannot bind herself as the drawer, acceptor, maker or indorser of a negotiable instrument, and such instruments signed by her (unless as agent for another) are absolutely void.¹ And even a promise made by her after her husband's death to pay a bill or note which she executed during his lifetime will not bind her unless upon a new and good consideration.²

§ 241. The wife's identity is so completely merged in the husband's that she can no more contract with him than with a stranger. Therefore the drawing or indorsement of a bill or note by a husband to his wife is void, and she cannot sue upon it either in his lifetime,³ or against his executor after his decease.⁴ But the husband may indorse it to her in order that she may be the mere conduit, and indorse it over to another party, the whole transaction being regarded as the husband's.⁵ So the bill or note of a married woman payable to her husband is void, but if he indorse it he is liable upon his indorsement.⁶ And if a note be given by a husband to his wife for money advanced by her out of her separate estate, it constitutes a declaration of trust in favor of the wife.⁷

¹ *Mason v. Morgan*, 2 Ad. & El. 30; *Howe v. Wildes*, 34 Me. 566; *Chouteau v. Merry*, 3 Mo. 254; *Van Steenburgh v. Hoffman*, 15 Barb. 28; *Chitty on Bills* (13 Am. ed.) [*20], 28.

² *Loyd v. Lee*, 1 Strange, 94; *Chitty, Jr.* 242 (1717); *Meyer v. Haworth*, 8 Ad. & El. 467; *Littlefield v. Spee*, 2 B. & Ad. 811; *Eastwood v. Kenyon*, 11 Ad. & El. 438; *Vance v. Wells*, 6 Ala. 737; 8 Ala. 399; *Watkins v. Halstead*, 2 Sandf. 311; *Schouler on Domestic Relations*, 74; *Byles on Bills* (Sharswood's ed.) [*63], 153.

³ *Gay v. Kingsley*, 11 Allen, 345.

⁴ *Jackson v. Parks*, 10 Cusb. 550; *Swcat v. Hall*, 8 Vt. 187.

⁵ *Slawson v. Loring*, 5 Allen, 340.

⁶ *Haly v. Lane*, 2 Atk. 181.

⁷ *Murray v. Glasse*, 23 L. J. Ch. 126.

§ 242. *Married woman as payee and indorser.*—If a bill or note be made payable to a single woman, and she afterward marries, it becomes the property of her husband; and if made to her after marriage, it is the property of her husband. For two reasons, therefore, a married woman, who is the payee of a negotiable instrument, cannot transfer a perfect legal title to it, or bind herself by indorsing it; first, because she has no capacity to contract; and second, because the instrument is her husband's.¹ But still, although the husband might recover the instrument which has been transferred by his wife, in an action of trover against the holder, the drawer and acceptor of a bill and the maker of a note, who have bound themselves to pay to the payee or order, are estopped, when that order is made, to deny its sufficiency. It does not lie in their mouths to declare the effect of their own engagement to be different from its terms; and the holder, under the indorsement of a payee, who is a married woman, may recover against them.² And

¹ *Cotes v. Davis*, 1 Camp. 485 (1808); *Barlow v. Bishop*, 3 Esp. 266; 1 East, 432 (1801); *Connor v. Martin*, 1 Strange, 516; *Rawlinson v. Stone*, 3 Wilson, 5; *Evans v. Secrest*, 3 Ind. 545; *Savage v. King*, 17 Me. 301; *Shuttleworth v. Noyes*, 8 Mass. 229.

² *Smith v. Marsack*, 6 Com. B. 486; *Wilde, C. J.*, said: "In support of a contrary doctrine, the cases of *Connor v. Martin*, 1 Strange, 516; *Barlow v. Bishop*, 1 East, 432, and *Prince v. Brunatte*, 1 Bing. N. C. 435, s. c. 1 Scott, 342, were cited, on the argument, by the counsel for the defendant. In *Connor v. Martin*, as reported in Strange, the plaintiff declared on a note made to a *feme covert*, and indorsed by her to him; and, on argument, judgment was given for the defendant—the right being in point of law in the husband, and the wife having no power to dispose of it. But this case was cited by *Dennison, J.*, in *Rawlinson v. Stone*, 3 Wils. 1, 5, from a note taken by himself in court; and it appears from that learned judge's statement, that the promissory note in question had been given to the wife before marriage. *Barlow v. Bishop* is certainly a direct authority for the position, that, if a note is drawn payable to a woman or order, and her indorsee sues the maker, he may set up as a defense that she was a married woman, though he knew her to be such at the time he made the note. But it was observed by *Lord Abinger*, in *Pitt v. Chappelow*, 8 Mees. & W. 616, that, in *Barlow v. Bishop*, the plaintiff must be taken to have known the fact of the husband's property in the bill, and, therefore, could not take an assignment of it from the wife. Indeed, it appears, from the report of the case at *nisi prius*, in *Epinasse*, 3 Esp. 266, that the wife had given a previous note for the money in her own name, and that the note in question was given in conse-

if there be an indorser, after the married woman, he cannot dispute her capacity, as his indorsement warrants it.¹ But other parties to the instrument, not being estopped by their relation to it, may show that one—not the payee—who has indorsed it, is a married woman. These views clearly apply where the paper has been executed to the woman after her marriage; but if made to her before, disability subsequently created might be pleaded by any party.²

§ 243. The mere fact that the wife is living separate and apart from her husband,³ or that she has eloped from her husband and is living in adultery with another person,⁴ or that she has a separate maintenance secured to her,⁵ or that she has been divorced from her husband's bed and board (*a*

quence of such former note not being negotiable, which appears to favor Lord Abinger's supposition, that the plaintiff must have known of her coverture before the note was indorsed to him. In *Prince v. Brunatte*, it was certainly assumed by the court, as well as by the counsel on both sides, that such a plea as the present would be a good answer to the action; and the same observation arises with respect to the case of *Cotes v. Davies*, 1 Camp. 485, and that of *Prestwick v. Marshall*, 7 Bing. 565, s. c. 5 Moore & P. 513. But in none of these cases does it appear that the point now under consideration was ever made, viz., that the case falls within the general principle—which is stated by Bayley, J., in his judgment, in *Drayton v. Dale*, 2 Barn. & Cress. 293, as applicable to all negotiable securities—that a person shall not dispute the power of another to indorse an instrument when he asserts, by the instrument, that the other has such power. And we can discover no reason why this principle should not be applicable; and if it is, it appears to us to govern the present case, and to prove that the plea in question is bad. It need scarcely be added that, in so deciding, we do not mean at all to impugn the proposition that, if a bill or note is made payable to the order of a married woman, the property in it will pass by the indorsement of the husband, or he may sue on it, either joining his wife as a party to the action, or in his own name, at his option. And, consequently, it cannot be denied that the defendant may possibly be compelled to pay the bill in question twice. But this is a consequence which follows from his own act of accrediting the capacity of a woman to indorse, by accepting a bill payable to her order, who in truth was incapable.”

¹ *Prescott Bank v. Caverly*, 7 Gray, 217.

² See *Smith v. Marsack*, 6 Com. B. 486.

³ *Marshall v. Rutton*, 8 T. R. 545; *Hatchett v. Baddeley*, 2 W. Black. 1079; *Lean v. Schutz*, 2 W. Black. 1195; *Hyde v. Price*, 3 Ves. Jr. 443; *Story on Bills*, § 90; *Chitty on Bills* (13 Am. ed.) [*21], 28.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*

mensa et thoro),¹ will not at common law restore to the married woman her right to contract. In Massachusetts, a different rule prevails when there has been a divorce from bed and board, and the married woman may then contract.² Everywhere a divorce from the bonds of matrimony (*a vinculo matrimonii*) restores the woman to full competency.³ The fact that a married woman represents herself to be unmarried does alter her disability.⁴

§ 244. There are certain exceptional circumstances under which the contracts of a married woman may be binding upon her, or upon her husband, and we shall consider them under these heads: (1) When husband is an alien or civilly dead. (2) When wife has separate estate. (3) When wife is sole trader by special custom or statute. (4) When wife purchases necessities. (5) When husband adopts her name as binding him. (6) When wife is agent of husband.

§ 245. *And in the first place, when the husband is an alien enemy*, the wife may contract, for it may be necessary to her support and maintenance that she may sue and be sued, and her husband is legally barred from coming to or communicating with her.⁵ So if a married woman be resident in any country, and her husband is an alien who has never been in that country, it has been held that she may then contract like a *feme sole*.⁶ This would clearly be the case if by the laws of the country of which the husband was a citizen he could not leave without the sovereign's permis-

¹ Fairthorne v. Blaquiere, 6 Maule & S. 73; Lewis v. Lee, 3 Barn. & C. 291; Chitty on Bills (13 Am. ed.) [*21], 28; Byles (Sharwood's ed.) [*62], 152. In Scotland it is otherwise. Thomson on Bills, 138; and in England as it seems now by statute, 24 & 25 Vic. c. 86, § 6.

² Dean v. Richmond, 5 Pick. 461; see also 2 Kent Com. 136.

³ Chamberlaine v. Hewson, 5 Mod. 71; Chitty on Bills [*21], 28; Story on Bills, § 90; 1 Parsons N. & B. 78.

⁴ Cannam v. Farmer, 3 Exch. 698; Lowell v. Daniels, 2 Gray, 161.

⁵ Derry v. Duchess of Mazarine, 1 Lord Raymond, 147; M'Arthur v. Bloom, 2 Duer, 151.

⁶ Kay v. Duchesse de Peinne, 3 Camp. 123; Gregory v. Paul, 15 Mass. 31; Story on Bills, § 91; Chitty (13 Am. ed.) [*22], 29; 1 Parsons N. & B. 84.

sion, for then there would be a legal barrier between them.¹ But in the case of an alien who has once resided in a country, the *animus revertendi* is to be presumed, and it has been held in England that a woman by birth an alien, and the wife of an alien, cannot be sued as a *feme sole* if her husband has lived in that country, although he has left it and entered the service of a foreign State.²

§ 246. In Massachusetts it has been held that the residence of the husband in another of the United States is the same as if he were in a State entirely foreign, he being then beyond the jurisdiction of the State courts;³ and that whenever the husband has never been in the commonwealth, or has gone beyond its limits, deserted his wife and renounced his marital rights, her ability to contract and sue is restored.⁴ But this view, though perhaps salutary, is denied elsewhere,⁵ and seems an innovation on the strict rules of the common law.

If the husband has abjured the realm, or if he is "civilly dead," as he is termed, when by judicial sentence he has been banished or transported; or if he has by a religious profession, renounced civil life, the disability of the wife is suspended during that period, and her ability to contract

¹ M'Arthur v. Bloom, 2 Duer, 151.

² Kay v. Duchesse de Peinne, 3 Camp. 123.

³ Abbott v. Bailey, 6 Pick. 89.

⁴ Gregory v. Paul, 15 Mass. 31.

⁵ Chouteau v. Merry, 3 Mo. 254. In this case the husband abandoned his wife in Missouri, and removed to Arkansas Territory in 1821, and it was held that she was not bound on a note given by her in 1831 in Missouri. The court said: "Coverture operates a legal disability to contract, and all contracts of a *feme covert* are absolutely void. The facts in this case do not bring it within any of the exceptions. The cases cited from the English books are where the husbands abjured the realm, or were foreigners residing abroad. The principles settled in these cases do not apply. If by a removal from one State to another, or a separate residence in different States, the indissoluble connection by which the wife is placed under the power and protection of her husband could be canceled, and the parties thereby relieved of their respective liabilities and disabilities, there would be little need of troubling the legislature or the courts on the subject of divorces."

restored.¹ So, if he is imprisoned by judicial sentence.² And if the husband has been abroad and unheard of for seven years, he is presumed to be dead, and the wife's ability to contract revives.³

§ 247. *Second.* When the wife has a separate estate, it is held in England liable in equity for all of her debts contracted on the faith of it.⁴ There, where a married woman borrowed money, promising to repay it out of her separate property, the rents and profits thereof were appropriated to its payment.⁵ So, where a married woman gave a note jointly with her husband, and as a security for his debt;⁶ where a married woman accepted a bill drawn and indorsed by her daughter;⁷ and where a married woman living separately from her husband accepted a bill,⁸ her separate property was held liable.

§ 248. In the United States the authorities on this subject differ. In New York it has been held upon full consideration that it is essential in order to charge the wife's separate property, either (1) That the intention to do so should be declared in the very contract which is the foundation of the charge, or (2) That the consideration should be obtained for the direct benefit of the estate itself,⁹ though it is not necessary that the bill, note or other contract should specify the

¹ Hatchett v. Baddeley, 2 W. Black. 1079; Story on Bills, § 91.

² *Ex parte* Franks, 7 Bing. 762; Byles on Bills (Sharswood's ed.) [*63], 154; 2 Kent Com. 136.

³ Loring v. Sleineman, 1 Metc. 204; Byles (Sharswood's ed.) [*63], 154; Chitty [*22], 29.

⁴ Byles on Bills (Sharswood's ed.) [*62], 153; Edwards on Bills, 68, 69; Chitty on Bills [*21], 28, 29.

⁵ Bulfin v. Clarke, 17 Ves. 366.

⁶ Hulme v. Tenant, 1 Bro. C. C. 16.

⁷ Bingham v. Noyes, Chitty on Bills [*21], 28.

⁸ Stewart v. Lord Kirkwall, 3 Mad. 387.

⁹ Yale v. Dederer, 22 N. Y. 450; 18 N. Y. 265 (overruling same case in 21 Barb. 286); followed in White v. McNett, 33 N. Y. 371; Ledlie v. Vrooman, 41 Barb. 109; White v. Story, 43 Barb. 124; Barnett v. Lichtenstein, 39 Barb. 194; Corn Exchange Ins. Co. v. Babcock, 42 N. Y. 613. In New York it is held that if the married woman borrows money for the express purpose of benefiting her separate estate, her note for the amount is good, though the money be used for another purpose. McVey v. Cantrell, 70 N. Y. 295; *contra*, Heugh v. Jones, 32 Penn. St. 432.

particular property to be charged.¹ The general rule in this country, however, still seems to be, that the wife's separate property is liable in equity for all debts which she, by implication, or expressly by writing or parol, charges thereon, because it is right that her debts should be paid.² And as the doctrine arises entirely out of equity, it seems to us correct, as it is the existence of the intention to charge the separate estate, and not the peculiar mode of expressing it which creates the equity.³ At the present day in New York, contracts of a married woman in relation to her separate estate can be enforced at law or in equity, as the case may be,⁴ and the executory contracts of married women are *prima facie* valid.⁵ The intent to charge the separate estate may be inferred from circumstances, and a specific agreement is not necessary.⁶ But as to note of married woman payable to and indorsed by her husband, it has been held *prima facie* a nullity, and that evidence *aliunde* was necessary to charge her by showing that it was on her separate business or for the benefit of her separate estate.⁷

§ 249. In Massachusetts, where the statute confers upon married women the capacity to sell and convey their separate

¹ Corn Exchange Ins. Co. v. Babcock, 42 N. Y. 613.

² Todd v. Lee, 15 Wis. 365; Grapengether v. Fejervary, 9 Iowa, 163; Major v. Symmes, 19 Ind. 117; Rogers v. Ward, 8 Allen, 387; Pentz v. Simeon, 2 Beasley, 232; 2 Story's Eq. Juris. §§ 1398, 1401; 2 Kent Com. 164; Edwards on Bills, 70.

³ Owens v. Dickenson, 1 Craig & Ph. 48, Lord Chancellor Cottenham saying: "The separate property of a married woman being a creature of equity, it follows that if she has a power to deal with it, she has the other powers incident to property in general, namely: the power of contracting debts to be paid out of it; and inasmuch as her creditors have not the means at law of compelling payment of those debts, a court of equity takes upon itself to give effect to them, not as personal liabilities, but by laying hold of the separate property, as the only means by which they can be satisfied."

⁴ Hier v. Staples, 51 N. Y. 136; Corn Exchange Ins. Co. v. Babcock, 42 N. Y. 613.

⁵ Willsey v. Hutchins, 17 N. Y. S. C. (10 Hun), 503.

⁶ Conlin v. Cantrell, 64 N. Y. 219.

⁷ Second Nat. Bank v. Miller, 62 N. Y. 639.

property, enter into contracts, and carry on trade,¹ it has been held that the note of a married woman given in payment for land conveyed to her sole and separate use,² or for money borrowed to enable her to pay for farming land of which she holds a title bond to her sole and separate use, is valid.³

When a married woman charges her separate estate with a debt, all her estate held at the time of trial and judgment is liable, as well as that held when the contract was entered into.⁴

A promise made by a widow to pay a debt contracted during coverture would be void,⁵ unless she had a separate estate, in which case it would be valid.⁶

§ 250. *Third. When the wife is a sole trader*, by the custom of London she is liable on her contracts in the city courts, and though the husband must be joined in the action for conformity, execution will be against the wife alone.⁷ Statutes empowering married women to be sole traders have been passed in some of the States of the United States, and when so empowered they may make bills or notes;⁸ but unless so empowered, a married woman cannot, without her husband's consent, bind herself in trade, except under the circumstances which are herein enumerated. But, with the husband's consent, she may carry on trade separately as a regular merchant, and bind herself as a party to a negotiable instrument.⁹

¹ The general statutes, c. 108, § 3, provide that "a married woman may bargain, sell and convey her separate real and personal property, enter into any contracts in reference to the same, carry on any trade or business, and perform any labor or service on her sole and separate account, and sue and be sued in all matters having relation to her separate property, business, trade, services, labor and earnings, in the same manner as if she were sole."

² *Stewart v. Jenkins*, 6 Allen, 300.

³ *Chapman v. Foster*, 6 Allen, 136.

⁴ *Todd v. Ames*, 60 Barb. 462.

⁵ *Lloyd v. Lee*, 1 Strange, 94; *Littlefield v. Shee*, 2 B. & Ad. 84.

⁶ *Lee v. Muggridge*, 5 Taunt. 36.

⁷ *Beard v. Webb*, 2 B. & P. 93; *Bytes on Bills* (Sharswood's ed.) [*62], 152-3.

⁸ *Camden v. Mulen*, 29 Cal. 566.

⁹ *Todd v. Lee*, 16 Wis. 480; *Partridge v. Stocker*, 36 Vt. 108; *Richardson v. Merrill*, 32 Vt. 27; *Wieman v. Anderson*, 42 Penn. St. 311; *James v. Taylor*, 43 Barb. 530; *Schouler's Dom. Rel.* 245, 246.

§ 251. *Fourth. As to necessities.*—Every husband is bound to provide for his wife, and the common law enforces this obligation, lest the wife may become a burden to the community.¹ And if the husband fail to furnish her with the necessities of life, such as food, raiment, lodging and medical attendance, the law presumes an authority in her to procure them on his credit, and he will not be permitted to deny that authority was given.²

§ 252. *Fifth. When husband adopts wife's name.*—A person may adopt whatever name he pleases in his business dealings, and then when he uses such adopted name he will be bound by it.³ Therefore, if a husband sign his wife's name to a bill or note, he will be considered as having adopted it *pro hac vice*, and will be bound accordingly.⁴ So, if the wife executes a note for her husband, in his presence, and signs her own name merely, with his knowledge and consent, it will bind him.⁵ And in any case where the husband clearly authorizes his wife to draw or indorse bills or notes on his account and sign her name, and she does so, he will be regarded as intending thereby to bind himself, and will be so held.⁶ And if, after the wife has signed her name, the husband promises to pay the bill or note, or otherwise ratifies the wife's act, it will be presumed that she had authority from him, and he will be estopped to deny it.⁷ Thus, where a bill was addressed to "William Bradwell," and was accepted by "Mary Bradwell," his wife, who wrote her name across it, and William Bradwell, after its dishonor, promised to pay it very shortly, it was held that it was William Bradwell's acceptance, and Maule, J., said: "He, in

¹ Schouler's Domestic Relations, 76-79, 85; Mudge v. Bullock, 83 Ill. 22.

² Id.

³ See Chapter XI, on Agents as Parties.

⁴ Id.

⁵ Prestwick v. Marshall, 7 Bing. 565; Menkins v. Heringhi, 17 Mo. 297.

⁶ Cotes v. Davis, 1 Camp. 485; Hancock Bank v. Joy, 41 Me. 568; see Miller v. Delamater, 12 Wend. 433.

⁷ Cotes v. Davis, 1 Camp. 485; Lindus v. Bradwell, 5 C. B. 583; Shaw v. Emery, 38 Me. 484; Mudge v. Bullock, 83 Ill. 23.

effect, says that his wife was authorized by him to accept this particular bill in the way she did.”¹

And where the husband carries on business generally in his wife's name, that is conclusive that he adopts it and is bound by it.²

§ 253. *Sixth. When the wife is agent of her husband.*—Marriage does not incapacitate a married woman from being the agent of her husband. The power to act as his attorney implies no separation from, but is rather a representation of, her lord.³ Therefore, the husband will be bound whenever she uses his name by his express or implied authority. Unless the husband has adopted her name as binding on him, by authorizing its use, the wife must sign the husband's name.⁴ The form may be: “A. (husband) by B. (wife);” or “B. (wife) for C. (husband).” But the mere signature of the husband's name, if by his authority, would doubtless suffice.⁵

The wife's authority must be clearly proved.⁶ If she be the husband's amanuensis in his business, because he cannot write, a note signed by her must be proved to have been given on account of his business concerns.⁷ If the husband allow the wife to purchase goods, and to give a note, he may make any defense that would have been available had he made the note himself; but against a *bona fide* holder for value he would be defenseless.⁸ The wife cannot delegate authority granted her, but another person, in her presence, may write her husband's name for her.⁹

§ 254. *Husband's rights to wife's choses in action.*—Bills and notes possessed by a single woman before her marriage are her choses in action, and by marriage the husband

¹ *Lindus v. Bradwell*, 5 C. B. 583.

² *Abbott v. McKinley*, 2 Miles, 220.

³ 1 Black. Com. 442.

⁴ *Minard v. Mead*, 7 Wend. 68; *Abbott v. McKinley*, 2 Miles, 220.

⁵ 1 Parsons N. & B. 80. But see *Wood v. Goodridge*, 6 Cush. 117.

⁶ *Coldstone v. Tovey*, 6 Bing. N. C. 98.

⁷ *Smith v. Pedley*, Chitty, Jr. on Bills, 1241.

⁸ *Reakert v. Sanford*, 5 Watts & S. 164.

⁹ *Lord v. Hall*, 8 C. B. 627.

becomes entitled to reduce them into his possession, and to make them his own.¹ And so if a bill or note is made payable to a married woman, or becomes her property after marriage, the right thereto vests in her husband, and he alone is competent to indorse it,² or to receive payment.³

And the husband may, at his election, indorse or negotiate the instrument, or sue upon it alone in his own name;⁴ or he may sue upon it in the joint names of himself and his wife;⁵ or he may allow her to indorse it or negotiate it in her own name.⁶ In this last case it may be declared on, either as indorsed by the husband, or in the wife's name by his consent; and a good title may be thus acquired against the husband, as well as other parties.⁷ It was once held that a negotiable instrument was a personal chattel in possession;⁸ but it is well settled that it is a chose in action.⁹

§ 255. If a husband loaning money, takes therefor a note payable to himself and wife, it imports a gift to his wife in the event she survives him.¹⁰ And if, after marriage, a bill or note be executed to the husband and wife as joint payees, the legal interest survives to the survivor.¹¹

¹ *Richards v. Richards*, 2 B. & Ad. 447; *Garforth v. Bradley*, 2 Ves. 675; *Howard v. Okes*, 3 Wels. H. & G. 136; *Dean v. Richmond*, 5 Peck, 461; *Legg v. Legg*, 9 Mass. 99; *Chitty* [*22], 30; *Story on Bills*, § 93.

² *Id.*; *Phillis Kirk v. Pluckwell*, 2 Maule & S. 399; *Chitty* [*22, 23], 30.

³ *Byles* [*65], 157; 1 *Parsons N. & B.* 89.

⁴ *Mason v. Morgan*, 2 Ad. & El. 30; *Burrough v. Moss*, 10 B. & C. 558; *McNeilage v. Holloway*, 1 Barn. & Ald. 218; *Gaters v. Madeley*, 6 Mees. & W. 423; *Arnold v. Revonnet*, 4 J. B. Moore, 70; *Sutton v. Warren*, 10 Metc. 451.

⁵ *Richards v. Richards*, 2 B. & Ad. 447.

⁶ *Stevens v. Beals*, 10 Cush. 291; *Menkies v. Heringhi*, 17 Mo. 297; *Roland v. Logan*, 18 Ala. 307.

⁷ *Story on Bills*, § 92.

⁸ *McNeilage v. Holloway*, 1 Barn. & Ald. 218.

⁹ *Scarpellini v. Atcheson*, 7 Ad. & El. N. S. 864; *Richards v. Richards*, 2 Barn. & Ad. 447; *Gaters v. Madeley*, 6 Mees. & W. 423; *Hart v. Stephens*, 6 Q. B. 937; *Needles v. Needles*, 7 Ohio St. 432; *Tritt v. Colwell*, 31 Penn. St. 228; *Edwards on Bills*, 72.

¹⁰ *Sandford v. Sandford*, 45 N. Y. 723.

¹¹ *Richardson v. Daggett*, 4 Vt. 336; *Draper v. Jackson*, 16 Mass. 480; *Byles on Bills* (Sharswood's ed.) [*64], 156; see *Re Gadbury*, 32 L. J. 380.

§ 256. It is necessary, to the perfection of the husband's right of property in the bills, notes, and other choses in action of his wife, that he should reduce them into his own possession during the marital relation. And if he dies without having done so, and the wife survives him, the right to their sole possession revives to her, and does not pass to his personal representative, and she may then sue upon or indorse them.¹ If the wife dies, the husband surviving, her personal representative will be entitled to sue for them, but the husband will be entitled to the proceeds, when recovered, in right of his survivorship.² And the husband is entitled to be her personal representative.³ It has been held that if the husband gets actual possession of her unreduced choses in action after her death, although not her personal representative, they become his property.⁴ If he dies, without having taken out letters of administration on his wife's unsettled estate, the right to do so passes to his next of kin, and not to hers.⁵

§ 257. Any act of the husband during marriage manifesting a distinct purpose to make his wife's choses in action his own, operates as a reduction into possession, and bars her right of survivorship;⁶ but mere intention, unaccompanied by act, will not suffice.⁷ If the husband elects to bring suit upon the instrument in his own name, in cases in which he may join his wife or not, as he pleases,⁸ or collects the proceeds and

¹ *Vance v. McLaughlin*, 8 Grat. 289; *May v. Boisseau*, 12 Leigh, 521; *Draper v. Jackson*, 16 Mass. 480; *Hayward v. Hayward*, 20 Pick. 517; *Gaters v. Madeley*, 6 Mees. & W. 423; *Richards v. Richards*, 2 B. & Ad. 447; *Philliskirk v. Pluckwell*, 2 Maule & S. 393; *Byles* [*64], 155.

² *Betts v. Kimpton*, 2 Barn. & Ad. 273; *Story on Bills*, § 93; 1 *Parsons N. & B.* 85.

³ *Id.*

⁴ *Whitaker v. Whitaker*, 6 Johns. 112; *Lee v. Wheeler*, 4 Ga. 541; *Revel v. Revel*, 2 Dev. & Bat. 272.

⁵ *Schouler's Domestic Relations*, 162.

⁶ 1 *Parsons N. & B.* 86.

⁷ *Blount v. Bestland*, 5 Ves. Jr. 515.

⁸ *Oglander v. Baston*, 1 Vern. 396; 2 Ves. Sr. 677; see *Schouler's Dom. Rel.* 127.

applies them to his own use,¹ it is a reduction into possession. So, if the husband assumes ownership of the instrument, places it among his own effects, and indicates no intention to hold it in trust for his wife, it would seem that it is sufficient.² But the mere fact that he takes it in custody would not be alone sufficient, *per se*, as it might be in trust for his wife.³ Indorsing or transferring the instrument is a reduction into possession;⁴ but collecting interest or part payment is only a reduction *pro tanto*.⁵ And even collecting the whole amount, if it were promptly re-invested for the wife in other choses in action, would not defeat the wife's rights.⁶

Nor would mere authority to an agent to collect, not being a power coupled with an interest.⁷ The bankruptcy of the husband does not operate a reduction into possession.⁸ But, in the United States, it has been held that an assignment under an insolvent law defeats the wife's right of survivorship.⁹

§ 258. If a single woman, who is a party to a bill, note or other contract, marries, her husband becomes responsible, for by marriage he adopts her fortunes "for better for worse."¹⁰ And it matters not that he did not know, and that his wife had concealed from him the existence of such obligations.¹¹ Husband and wife must be sued jointly on such obligations.¹² But this liability ceases with the marital relation. If the husband dies, the wife alone is liable, and not his personal

¹ 1 Parsons N. & B. 86; see Schouler, 119.

² See Schouler's Domestic Relations, 119 ³ Holmes v. Holmes, 28 Vt. 765.

⁴ Scarpellini v. Atcheson, 7 Q. B. 864 (53 E. C. L. R.); Tuttle v. Fowler, 22 Conn. 58; Byles (Sharswood's ed.) [*65], 156; 1 Parsons N. & B. 86.

⁵ Nash v. Nash, 2 Mad. 133; Hart v. Stephens, 6 Q. B. 937.

⁶ Stanwood v. Stanwood, 17 Mass. 57.

⁷ 1 Parsons N. & B. 87.

⁸ Sherrington v. Yates, 13 M. & W. 855, overruling s. c. 11 M. & W. 42; Byles (Sharswood's ed.) [*65], 156.

⁹ Glasgow v. Sands, 3 Gill. & J. 96; Richwine v. Keirn, 1 Penn. 373.

¹⁰ 1 Black Com. 443; 2 Kent Com. 143-146.

¹¹ Schouler's Domestic Relations, 69.

¹² Mitchinson v. Hewson, 7 T. R. 349.

representative.¹ If the wife dies, only her personal representative is liable.² But the wife's choses in action unreduced to possession by the husband at the time of her death may be followed in the hands of the husband, when he is her administrator, by her creditors, and subjected to payment of her debts contracted when a *feme sole*.³

SECTION V.

PERSONS UNDER GUARDIANSHIP AND IN BANKRUPTCY.

§ 259. Persons under guardianship, whether for infancy, imbecility, improvidence, or otherwise, cannot contract, and therefore cannot be parties to negotiable instruments.⁴

§ 260. All rights of property belonging to a bankrupt pass by his bankruptcy to his assignee. He has, therefore, no power of disposition over it, and cannot sue upon his choses in action, or transfer or indorse them to another.⁵ But if, after bankruptcy, a note be made payable to the bankrupt or order, and by him transferred, the maker is estopped to deny his right to transfer by having made it payable to him or order.⁶ If the property in the instrument had passed from the bankrupt before his bankruptcy, and the indorsement, which was intended, omitted, he or his assignee may be compelled to indorse it afterward.⁷ A note given by a bankrupt after his discharge for a debt existing prior to the ad-

¹ Woodman v. Chapman, 1 Camp. 189; Curtton v. Moore, 2 Jones Eq. 204; Byles (Sharswood's ed.) [*65], 157.

² 2 Kent Com. 144; Byles [*65], 157.

³ Heard v. Stamford, 3 P. Wms. 409; Morrow v. Whitesides, 10 B. Monroe, 411; 1 Parsons N. & B. 86.

⁴ Manson v. Felton, 13 Pick. 206; Chew v. Bank of Baltimore, 14 Md. 299; 1 Parsons N. & B. 89.

⁵ 1 Parsons N. & B. 153; Story on Notes, § 102.

⁶ Drayton v. Dale, 2 B. & C. 293; see *ante*, § 93.

⁷ Smith v. Pickering, Peake, 50; *ex parte* Mowbray, 1 Jac. & W. 428; Watkins v. Maule, 2 Jac. & W. 237; Hughes v. Nelson, 29 N. J. (Eq.) 549.

judication, upon condition that the payee would dismiss a proceeding to set aside the discharge, is void ; and a subsequent promise to pay such a note would be also void.¹ If a bankrupt who is the payee of a bill or note, sells the same without indorsement before, and indorses it after bankruptcy, such indorsement will enable the holder to bring action in his own name, for the property in the note passed by the sale, and the indorsement is a mere form.²

¹ Fell v. Cook, 44 Iowa, 485.

² Hersey v. Elliott, 67 Me. 527.

CHAPTER IX.

FIDUCIARIES AS PARTIES TO BILLS AND NOTES.

§ 261. (1) *As to personal representatives.*—When a person dies, the administration of affairs of his personal estate, and its distribution among those to whom it descends, or its appropriation to the payment of debts, devolves upon his personal representative. When such representative is appointed by the will of the deceased, he is termed his executor. When none is named in his will, or the one named declines to act, the appointment devolves upon the courts, and the appointee is termed administrator. The executor's powers accrue at the date of the testator's death, for it is then that his will takes effect. But the administrator's powers accrue only from the time of his appointment;¹ but they relate back to the date of the decedent's death.² If the will be admitted to probate, a payment to the executor nominated will be valid, although it afterward transpire that the will was forged.³

§ 262. An administrator or executor cannot bind the decedent's estate by any negotiable instrument; he can only bind himself. If he make, accept or indorse a negotiable instrument he will bind himself personally, even if he adds to his own name the designation of his office as personal representative. Thus, if he signs himself "A. B., executor (or administrator) of C. D.," or "A. B., as executor of C. D.," the representative terms will be rejected as surplusage.⁴ And

¹ Wooley v. Clark, 5 B. & Ald. 744; Rand v. Hubbard, 4 Metc. 256; Allen v. Dundas, 3 T. R. 125; 1 Parsons N. & B. 161.

² Jewett v. Smith, 12 Mass. 309; Lawrence v. Wright, 23 Pick. 128; Miller v. Reigne, 2 Hill (S. C.) 592; McVaughers v. Elder, 2 Brev. 407.

³ Allen v. Dundas, 3 T. R. 125; Byles on Bills (Sharswood's ed.) [*54], 139; Thomson on Bills, 242; 1 Parsons N. & B. 161.

⁴ King v. Thom, 1 Term. R. 487. Buller, J.: "It is immaterial whether they

an accommodation indorser, or acceptor, who pays the amount of the instrument has no claim against the decedent's estate.¹ But if the bill or note of the personal representative be taken for a debt of the decedent, the estate is discharged from liability, and the representative alone is bound.²

§ 263. A personal representative may, however, execute a bill or note for the debt of his testator, and he will be personally bound to pay it even in the hands of the original holder; for assets in the hands of the personal representative constitute a sufficient consideration for a promise by him to pay the testator's debt, and the promise being in writing, no proof of consideration is necessary, even if the instrument be non-negotiable.³ But as between the original parties the personal representative may rebut the *prima facie* evidence of assets, and show total or partial deficiency; and he will then be exonerated from liability, unless there was some

(the executors) indorse it (the bill of exchange) as executors or not. If they indorse it at all they are liable personally, and not as executors, for their indorsement would not give an action against the effects of the testator." The bill had been indorsed to the executors after the decedent's death.

Where two executors gave a creditor of the testator a note whereby they "as executors severally and jointly promised to pay on demand, with interest," they were held personally responsible. Burrough, J., said: "They could only charge his estate with the original debt, and although the giving the note in question might not have amounted to the admission of assets in their hands at the time, still, by the promise of the payment of interest thereon, they made the debt their own, as it clearly showed it was to be paid on a future day, and amounted in effect to a request to the plaintiff to forbear to sue them on the original demand." Childs v. Monins, 5 Moore, 282; 2 Brod. & Bing. 460; 6 E. C. L. R. 201; Aspinall v. Wake, 10 Bing. 55; Snead v. Coleman, 7 Grat. 305; Christian v. Morris, 50 Ala. 586; McEldery v. Chapman, 2 Porter (Ala.) 33; Harrison v. McClelland, 57 Ga. 531; Cornthwaite v. First N. B. 57 Ind. 269; Erwin v. Carroll, 1 Yerg. 145; Tryon v. Oxley, 3 Iowa, 289; Sims v. Stillwell, 3 How. (Miss.) 176; Carter v. Sanders, 2 How. (Miss.) 851; Robertson v. Banks, 1 Smedes & M. 666; Davis v. French, 20 Me. 21; Walker v. Patterson, 36 Me. 273; Kirkman v. Benham, 28 Ala. 501; Wisdom v. Becker, 52 Ill. 346; Gregory v. Leigh, 33 Tex. 813; Edwards on Bills, 79, 248; Story on Notes, § 63; Story on Bills, § 74; Thomson on Bills, 145, 146.

¹ Kirkman v. Benham, 28 Ala. 501.

² Erwin v. Carroll, 1 Yerg. 145; Wisdom v. Becker, 52 Ill. 346; Cornthwaite v. First Nat. Bank, 57 Ind. 269; Carter v. Thomas, 3 Ind. 213.

³ Snead v. Coleman, 7 Grat. 300.

other consideration moving to him personally.¹ And he may, if he desires, exclude all personal liability by restricting his promise to pay "out of the assets of C. D.," or "out of the assets of C. D., and not otherwise," by such expression or its equivalent.² But the instrument in that case, being payable out of a particular fund, would not be negotiable.³ The surrender of promissory notes made by the decedent is a sufficient consideration for a note made individually by his personal representative.⁴

§ 264. *As to his powers over negotiable instruments of the deceased.*—The executor or administrator (and not the heir) has a right to the possession of the bills and notes of the deceased; and it is his duty to present and demand payment of them, to give notice in case of their dishonor, and make protest—in short, to do respecting them what would have been the duty of the decedent to do were he alive.⁵ And if a bill or note be indorsed or assigned to a dead man, whose death is not known, it becomes the property of his personal representative, in like manner as if he had died after the transfer;⁶ so, likewise, if the transfer were made in good

¹ Bank of Troy v. Topping, 13 Wend. 273; Rucker v. Wadlington, 5 J. J. Marsh, 238; Steele v. McDowell, 9 Smedes & M. 193; Byrd v. Holloway, 6 Smedes & N. 199; Edwards on Bills, 78. In Missouri in an action on a note signed "P. A. Executor," it was held, 1. That the style executor, &c., should be treated as mere *descriptio personæ*, especially as the note was on time, and carried interest; 2. That it *prima facie* imported consideration, but it was competent for the maker to show that as an individual contract it was without consideration; 3. That in such case where consideration of the note accrued after testator's death, the administrator would in first place be liable *de bonis propriis*, but would be entitled to re-imbusement out of the assets of the estate. Rittenhouse v. Ammerman, 64 Mo. 197.

² Childs v. Monins, 6 E. C. L. R. 201; Sneed v. Coleman, 7 Grat. 303; Carter v. Saunders, 2 How. (Miss.) 851; Kirkman v. Benham, 28 Ala. 501; Bank of Troy v. Topping, 9 Wend. 273; Story on Notes, § 63; Story on Bills, § 74; 1 Parsons N. & B. 161; Edwards on Bills, 79.

³ Ibid.; Edwards on Bills, 78.

⁴ Harrison v. McClelland, 57 Ga. 531.

⁵ King v. Thom, 1 T. R. 487; Thomson on Bills, 145; Byles (Sharswood's ed.) [*53], 139.

⁶ Murray v. East India Co. 5 B. & Ald. 204 (7 E. C. L. R.); Morse v. Clayton, 13 Smedes & M. 373.

faith with knowledge of his death, as it could be made with no other intention than to place the instrument among his assets.¹ A personal representative cannot purchase in his own right a note indorsed by his decedent. He can only pay it, as the law forbids his speculating on the subject of his trust.²

§ 265. If a bill or note held by the decedent be negotiable, the personal representative may transfer it by indorsement; and if non-negotiable, by assignment.³ But the representative would be liable in the event of dishonor, unless he distinctly exempted himself by the terms of the indorsement.⁴ If, however, such transfer be for the private debt of the personal representative, it is a fraud on the estate, and is void as to all parties with notice or knowledge of it, even if they paid full value.⁵

§ 266. It seems to be now settled that if there be several executors or administrators the bills or notes executed to the deceased in his lifetime may be indorsed by either one of them;⁶ and an assignment of a note of the testator by one of several executors as collateral security for a judgment against the estate has been held valid.⁷ It has been held otherwise where the note was made payable to several executors for a debt due the estate;⁸ but the better opinion seems to recognize no such distinction, and regarding the note in either case as assets, the indorsement by one representative is considered as effectual as that of all.⁹

¹ 1 Parsons N. & B. 154.

² *Burton v. Slaughter*, 26 Grat. 919.

³ *Rowlinson v. Stone*, 3 Wils. 1; *Cryst v. Cryst*, 1 Smith (Ind.), 370; *Cahoun v. Moore*, 11 Vt. 604; *Morse v. Clayton*, 13 Smedes & M. 373; *Graw v. Hannah*, 6 Jones, Law, 94; *Story on Notes*, § 123.

⁴ *Foster v. Fuller*, 6 Mass. 58; *Edwards on Bills*, 248.

⁵ *Miller v. Williamson*, 5 Md. 219; *Scott v. Searles*, 7 Smedes & M. 498; *Miller v. Helm*, 2 Smedes & M. 687; *Makepeace v. Moore*, 5 Gilm. 474.

⁶ *Moseley v. Graydon*, 4 Strob. 7; *Dwight v. Newell*, 15 Ill. 333; *Sanders v. Blaine*, 6 J. J. Marsh, 446; *Hertel v. Bogert*, 9 Paige, 52; 4 Hill, 492; *Edwards on Bills*, 79, 80, 248.

⁷ *Wheeler v. Wheeler*, 9 Cow. 34.

⁸ *Smith v. Whiting*, 9 Mass. 334.

⁹ *Bogert v. Hertell*, 4 Hill, 492; 1 Parsons N. & B. 155, 159.

§ 267. If the paper be transferable by indorsement (which includes delivery), the mere writing by the deceased in his lifetime of his name upon it will be nugatory; and the personal representative cannot complete the transfer by delivery. He must himself in his full legal sense indorse the paper, that is, write the transfer on it and deliver it.¹ In such a case it has been said respecting the holder, to whom the executor delivered the note with his testator's indorsement upon it, but without his own: "He failed to show any legal title to the note because of the manner in which it was transferred. He also failed to show any equitable title to it because of the manner in which it was transferred."² But if the paper were transferable by indorsement, and the deceased delivered it in his lifetime, for value, without indorsement, he passed the equitable title to it; and it would be the duty of the personal representative (which equity, if appealed to, would compel him to perform) to complete the formal transfer by his indorsement;³ but he would be entitled to add words protecting himself from personal liability.⁴

§ 268. It is settled now that a bill or note payable to "A., as executor," is assets in his hands—at least, at his election;⁵ and if he declares upon it as payable to him as executor, and charges it to have been made to him in his representative capacity, he may join counts upon promises to his testator in his lifetime.⁶ In an English case involving this subject,

¹ *Clark v. Boyd*, 2 Ohio, 56; *Clark v. Sigourney*, 17 Conn. 511; *Bromage v. Lloyd*, 1 Exch. 32; *Michigan Ins. Co. v. Leavenworth*, 30 Vt. 11; *Thomson on Bills* (Wilson's ed.), 91.

² *Taylor v. Surget*, 21 N. Y. S. C. (14 Hun), 116 (1878), *Brady, J.*

³ *Malbon v. Southard*, 36 Me. 147; *Watkins v. Maule*, 2 Jac. & W. 237; *Thomson on Bills*, 146, and *Ogilvie v. Moss*, *Fair v. Cranstown*, *McDonald v. Rankin*, there cited.

⁴ *Thomson on Bills*, 146; *Story on Notes*, § 120.

⁵ *Baker v. Baker*, 4 Bibb, 346; *Hemphill v. Hamilton*, 6 Eng. 425; *Henshall v. Roberts*, 5 East, 150; 1 *Parsons N. & B.* 155.

⁶ *Bogert v. Hertell*, 4 Hill, 503; *Sheets v. Pabody*, 6 Blackf. 120; *Fry v. Evans*, 8 Wend. 530; *King v. Thom*, 1 T. R. 487; *Byles* (Sharswood's ed.) 142; but see *Turnbull v. Freret*, 17 Mart. (La.) 703; 1 *Parsons N. & B.* 155, 156, note n.

Graham, B., said: "Whenever the money, when recovered, will be assets, counts in each character may be joined; and that is a fair and sound criterion, and one which is sufficient to prevent all ambiguity and doubt; it ought, therefore, to be adopted as a never failing rule."¹ If a note be payable to a party as executor, and be endorsed by him in his representative capacity, it has been held to be notice that it was assets in his hands.²

§ 269. It was a general rule of the common law that if a creditor appointed his debtor executor, it discharged his liability; and it was applied where the holder appointed the maker of a note or the acceptor of a bill his executor.³ But this rule was subject to exception where the assets, without such bill or note, were insufficient.⁴ It would be going beyond the purview of this work to discuss this rule here, as it has been generally reversed in the United States by statute. It did not extend to administrators.

§ 270. In Edwards on Bills it is said: ⁵ "In this State (New York) the giving of a note is not payment, and consequently, as between the original parties, the consideration may be inquired into, and where that fails, no recovery can be had on a note executed by a trustee or administrator; the effect of his giving a promissory note in his representative character which is not negotiable or not transferred is to cast upon him the burden of showing that he had no funds out of which to pay.⁶ If such a note shows on its face that it is made for value received by the heirs of the intestate, it does not raise even a presumption against the administrator.⁷ But where the note is negotiable, and contains an unqualified promise to pay, though signed with the addition of the words,

¹ Partridge v. Court, 5 Price, 412.

² Payne v. Flournoy, 29 Ark. 500.

³ Byles on Bills (Sharswood's ed.), 140; Story on Notes, 444. See Chapter XXVIII, Vol. II, on Payment.

⁴ 1 Parsons N. & B. 162.

⁵ Page 79.

⁶ Bank of Troy v. Topping, 9 Wend. 273.

⁷ Ten Eyck v. Vanderpoel, 8 Johns. 121.

“as administrator,” the note will be valid in the hands of a *bona fide* holder. Such words are merely descriptive of the person, and do not limit the maker’s liability on the note.¹

§ 271. (2 and 3) *As to guardians and trustees.*—Guardians cannot bind their ward’s estate, nor trustees the estate of their *cestuis que trust* by bills or notes; and hence, though they sign themselves as guardians or trustees, they are personally bound, because otherwise the instrument would be invalid.² It is true that they may contract to pay out of an estate; but then the payment would be conditional on the sufficiency of the estate, and the instrument, therefore, not negotiable.³ If a guardian take a note payable to his order as guardian for the property of his ward, and indorse it to a *bona fide* party for value, it is a good transfer, the words, “as guardian,” &c., being mere *descriptio personæ*.⁴

¹ King v. Thom, 1 Term R. 478.

² Thatcher v. Dinsmore, 5 Mass. 299; Hills v. Banister, 8 Cow. 31; Forster v. Fuller, 6 Mass. 58; Robertson v. Banks, 1 Smedes & M. 666; Conner v. Clark, 12 Cal. 168; Story on Notes, § 63; Story on Bills, §§ 74, 75; 1 Parsons N. & B. 89, 90.

³ 1 Parsons N. & B. 90; Story on Bills, §§ 74, 75.

⁴ Thornton v. Rankin, 19 Mo. 193; see Fountain v. Anderson, 33 Ga. 372.

CHAPTER X.

AGENTS AS PARTIES TO NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.

SECTION I.

COMPETENCY AND AUTHORITY OF THE AGENT. EXPRESS AUTHORITY AND GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LIABILITY.

§ 272. Every person who becomes a party to a negotiable instrument does not always do so by his own manual act. Such are the needs and conveniences of business, that bills, notes, checks, and all other instruments of indebtedment, are frequently signed by some one authorized, or professing to be authorized, to sign for another; and the principles by which the authority of the agent, the liability of principal and agent, and the interpretation of such instruments, are governed, are of prime importance to the commercial world. We have seen already what persons are competent to become parties to negotiable instruments. All such persons may empower agents to act for them, and bind them to all intents and purposes as effectually as they could bind themselves. But it is to be observed that it is not necessary that the agent should be himself competent to make a contract. He is the mere instrument of the contracting capacity and will, and Mr. Chitty says: "As this agency is a mere ministerial office, infants, *feme covert*, persons attainted, outlawed, excommunicated, aliens and others, though incapable of contracting on their own account, so as to bind themselves, may be agents for these purposes."¹

During the existence of slavery in the United States it

¹ Chitty on Bills (13th Am. ed) [*28], 36; see Edwards, 95; Coke's Littleton, 52 a.

was held that a slave might be an agent.¹ But imbeciles, lunatics and children of tender years, who actually lack capacity to be intelligent instruments, and have not the power or discretion to consent, could hardly be regarded as competent to be even the agents of another.²

§ 273. *As to the authority of the agent to bind the principal.*—The first question which propounds itself to a party treating with another who represents himself to be an agent and offers to execute or indorse a negotiable instrument, in the name of an alleged principal is this: Has this person authority to bind his alleged principal in this manner? The inquiry is vital. For if there be no such authority, express or implied, the alleged principal is not bound; and the only remedy is against the person falsely assuming to be agent.³ It is to be observed too that one may be agent for another in certain matters, but not in other matters. It is important, therefore, to see if the transaction proposed comes within the scope of the agent's authority. But again, the agent may have authority to bind the principal in a certain way, and yet not to execute or indorse a negotiable instrument. It is important, therefore, to see if he has authority to act in the particular way which he proposes. And we shall pursue these inquiries by considering the evidences of agency under the several heads of, (1) Express Authority, (2) Implied Authority, and hereafter we shall consider Ratification.

§ 274. *In the first place, as to the express authority of an agent,* it is not necessary that it should be granted in any particular form, unless it be authority to execute an instrument under seal, in which case it also must be under seal. Otherwise the authority may be written, or oral; and the agent, to execute or indorse a negotiable instrument, needs nothing more than verbal authority so to do,⁴ though it was

¹ The Governor v. Daily, 14 Ala. 469.

² Thomson on Bills, 147.

³ The Floyd Acceptances, 7 Wall. 676; Mechanic's Bank v. N. Y. & N. H. R. R. Co. 3 Kern. 631; Andover Bank v. Grafton, 7 N. H. 289.

⁴ Chitty (13 Am. ed.) [*28], §6.

once thought that a formal power of attorney was necessary.¹ It is obvious, however, that it is safer for one, dealing with an alleged agent, to require production of written authority; or otherwise unmistakable oral proof that authority had been given. If the authority is in writing, it cannot be disputed by parol proof of contrary verbal instructions to the agent, or otherwise;² besides it proves itself whenever produced, and its genuineness is established.

§ 275. *As to joint agencies.*—If two or more persons are authorized to bind their principal by conjoint action, all must unite, as it is their aggregate, and not their separate, action which the principal engages shall make him liable.³ Thus, where A. addresses a letter to B., saying, “I hereby authorize you and C. to use my name as indorser,” and B., without being joined by C., alone signed A.’s name as indorser, it was held that A. was not bound.⁴ And where a number of persons unite in a power of attorney, authorizing the attorney, “for us, and in our names and our behalf, to sign our names as indorsers,” upon bills and notes offered by A. B. for discount, it imports authority to sign their names as joint indorsers only, and not as several and successive indorsers.⁵

If four directors of a company are essential to act for it,

¹ Mann v. King, 6 Munf. 428.

² Thomson on Bills, 147, 148; Marius, 104; Beawes, No. 86.

³ Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Wilcox, 57 Ill. 180.

⁴ Union Bank v. Beirne, 1 Grat. 226.

⁵ Bank U. S. v. Beirne, 1 Grat. 234, 539. In the last case, Bank U. S. v. Beirne, 1 Grat. 539, nine persons had united in a power authorizing their attorney to endorse their names jointly on all bills, notes, or drafts drawn by J. B. S. to be discounted at certain specified banks for the accommodation of J. B. S., and the latter drew a bill payable to the order of one of the principals in the power, upon which the attorney indorsed the names of all his principals; and then the note was discounted at one of the specified banks for the accommodation of J. B. S. The bill being protested for non-payment, and action being brought against the indorsers, it was held that the bill being made payable to one of the principals in the power, the indorsement by the attorney was not such a joint indorsement as the power authorized.

and three only authorize an agent to draw bills in its name, they will not be binding.¹

§ 276. So, authority to bind the principal as a party to a negotiable instrument is authority to bind him separately, and does not authorize the agent to bind him conjointly or as copartner with another.² And authority "for him and in his behalf to accept bills drawn on him by his agents and correspondents," has been held to apply only to the principal's individual, and not to his partnership, affairs; and also only to authorize acceptance of bills drawn by an agent in that capacity, and not to extend to a bill drawn by a copartner.³

§ 277. *Agent cannot delegate authority.*—As the authority of an agent is not coupled with any interest, but he is a mere selected instrument to do certain things for another, he cannot delegate his powers to another unless authorized to do so.⁴ But if he has power to delegate his authority, he may exercise it.⁵ And merely employing an amanuensis to write the name, he himself having determined upon the propriety of doing so, would be unobjectionable.⁶

+ § 278. *General and special agents.*—There are some positions of agency in which, in the usual course of business, the agent draws, indorses, or accepts negotiable instruments; and in all such cases the principal will be bound by the agent's acts, although positively against his instructions. For between general and special agents there is a vital distinction. Where the agency is specially given to do a particular thing, the agent is circumscribed within the limits of actual authority; but where the agency is general—as that of a bank cashier, for instance—all acts within the scope of that general

¹ Du Carry v. Gill, 4 Car. & P. 121; Chitty on Bills [*28], 37.

² Stainback v. Reed, 11 Grat. 281; Bryan v. Berry, 6 Cal. 394.

³ Attwood v. Munnings, 7 B. & C. 278; 1 Man. & R. 66.

⁴ Brewster v. Hobart, 15 Pick. 302; Emerson v. Providence Hat Manuf. Co. 12 Mass. 237; Shankland v. Corporation of Washington, 5 Pet. 395.

⁵ Coles v. Trecothick, 9 Ves. 274.

⁶ Lord v. Hall, 8 C. B. 627; Commercial Bank v. Norton, 1 Hill, 501; Edwards on Bills, 88.

authority are binding on the principal. And if he seeks to avoid liability, he must show not only a limitation of the general authority, but also that the party dealing with the agent had notice.¹

§ 279. If the holder of a bill place it in the hands of an agent to be sold in the market, and expressly directs him not to indorse it, and the agent disobeys orders, and indorses his principal's name, the principal will not be bound, even to a *bona fide* holder.² But general authority to the agent to get the bill discounted, without restriction as to the mode, would imply authority to indorse it in the principal's name.³ And a subsequent promise of the principal to pay the bill where he had not authorized the agent to indorse, would be *nudum factum*.⁴

§ 280. The general principle that a principal is bound by act of an agent acting within the general scope of his authority, notwithstanding it is not in conformity to it, is subject to this limitation: that whenever an authority purports to be derived from a written instrument, or the agent signs the paper with the words, "by procuration," in such a case the party dealing with him is bound to take notice that there is a written instrument of procuration, and he ought to call for and examine the instrument itself, to see whether it justifies the act of the agent. Under such circumstances, he is chargeable with inquiry as to the extent of the agent's authority; and if, without examining into it when he knows of its existence—and especially if he has it in his possession—he ventures to deal with the agent, he acts at his peril, and must bear the loss if the agent transcended his authority.⁵

¹ See *Fenn v. Harrison*, 3 T. R. 757; *Edwards on Bills*, 85, 87.

² *Fenn v. Harrison*, 3 T. R. 757.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Stainback v. Bank of Virginia*, 11 Grat. 259; *Stainback v. Read*, 11 Grat. 281; *North River Bank v. Aymar*, 3 Hill, 262; *Alexander v. Mackenzie*, 6 C. B. 766; *Attwood v. Munnings*, 7 B. & C. 278. Action on acceptance purporting to be by procuration. *Holroyd J.*, said: "The word 'procuration,' gave due notice to the plaintiffs, and they were bound to ascertain, before they took the bill, that the acceptance was agreeable to the authority given." *Edwards on Bills*, 85; *Story on Agency*, § 72.

But no such duty exists to make inquiry respecting private instructions to the agent from his principal, whether written or oral, for they may well be presumed to be of a secret and confidential nature.¹

§ 231. *Limitations of general authority.*—If authority be vested in the agent in very general terms, but the instrument enumerates certain special objects and acts, this specification will be regarded as a limitation upon the general words; and the authority will be confined to action within the scope of the enumerated objects, unless there be some phraseology in the instrument, or some peculiar circumstance which impresses a different intention upon the instrument. Thus it was held, in New York, that a power of attorney to collect debts, to execute deeds of lands, to accomplish a complete adjustment of all concerns of the principal in a particular place, and to do all other acts which the principal could do in person, conferred no authority on the agent to sign a note in his principal's name, the general words being limited by the matters specially mentioned.² And so in England, where the agent was authorized to manage certain real estate, with general words extending his powers to all property of the principal of every description, and authorizing him "to do all lawful acts concerning all the principal's business and affairs of what nature or kind soever," it was held that the agent could not indorse bills in his principal's name.³

§ 282. Perfect good faith is the essence of agency; and an agent has no right to execute negotiable paper in his principal's name, or use negotiable paper belonging to his principal, for his individual purposes; and if the party dealing with the agent have notice that he is thus acting in fraud of his principal's rights, he cannot hold the principal liable.⁴

¹ North River Bank v. Aymar, 3 Hill, 262; Story on Agency, § 73.

² Rossiter v. Rossiter, 8 Wend. 494.

³ Esdaile v. La Nauze, 1 Younge & Col. 347.

⁴ Stainback v. Bank of Virginia, 11 Grat. 269; Treuttell v. Barandon, 8 Taunt. 100; Haynes v. Foster, 2 C. & M. 237.

On the contrary, the principal may recover paper belonging to him so transferred by the agent from the transferee.¹ A power of attorney to draw, indorse or accept bills negotiable at a particular bank in the principal's name, would be construed as giving authority to act only in the separate individual business of the principal; and would carry no authority to draw and indorse a bill in his own name, or in the joint name of himself and his principal.² If an agent acting under such authority drew a bill in his own name, and indorsed it in his principal's, and caused it to be discounted, and the proceeds passed to his individual credit, that circumstance would show that he was acting for his own benefit, and the party so discounting the bill could not recover against the principal.³ Agents cannot make contracts with themselves so as to bind their principals. The law will not permit one who acts in a fiduciary capacity to deal with himself in his individual capacity.⁴ Therefore a note made by a corporation to its trustees is against public policy and void.⁵

§ 283. So, where the plaintiff indorsed bills to A. B. specially as follows: "Pay A. B. or order, on account of plaintiff," and A. B. pledged the bills with defendant for his private debt, it was held that the form of indorsement was sufficient notice that the agent had no such power,⁶ Nor will a power of attorney to draw, indorse, or accept bills authorize the agent to draw a bill in the principal's name upon any one not having funds of the principal;⁷ nor to draw, accept, or indorse a bill for the accommodation of a third party, its true construction limiting the agent's author-

¹ Treuttell v. Barandon, 8 Taunt. 100.

² Stainback v. Bank of Virginia, 11 Grat. 231; Mechanics' Bank v. Schaumburg, 38 Mo. 228; First National Bank v. Gay, 63 Mo. 33.

³ Stainback v. Bank of Virginia, 11 Grat. 269.

⁴ San Diego v. San Diego, &c. R. R. 44 Cal. 112. See also § 1611, Vol. 2.

⁵ Wilbur v. Lynde, 49 Cal. 290.

⁶ Treuttell v. Barandon, 8 Taunt. 100; Byles (Sharswood's ed.) [*34], 112.

⁷ Stainback v. Bank of Va. 11 Grat. 269.

ity to act for the principal, and in his name to draw, accept and indorse bills in the usual course of the principal's business.¹ But the fact that a party was general agent of a firm, and had been in the habit of drawing drafts, and making notes and indorsements for them, may go to the jury to show by inference that he had authority to bind his principal by an accommodation acceptance.² So may evidence that a clerk had previously given notes in similar transactions for his principal.³

§ 284. If, however, an agent authorized generally to "sell, indorse and assign notes" by his principal, through a power of attorney, borrow money, and offer his principal's notes as security, indorsed by himself, it has been held that the principal would be bound, although the money was borrowed in the agent's name, and used by him in his private business, unless the party dealing with the agent knew of the intended misappropriation of the funds. And Lord Brougham said: "It is said that the indorsement was only to be made for the benefit of the principal, and not for the purposes of the agent. We do not see how this very materially affects the case, for it only refers to the use to be made of the funds obtained from the indorsement, not to the power; it relates to the purposes of the execution, not to the power itself; and though the indorsee's title must depend upon the authority of the indorser, it cannot be made to depend upon the purposes for which the indorser performs his act under the power."⁴ So, the principal will be bound in all cases where there is a misappropriation of funds obtained under a power exercised by the agent in conformity with his authority, unless the holder had notice.⁵ And, however much an

¹ Wallace v. Branch Bank, 1 Ala. 565; North River Bank v. Aymar, 3 Hill, 262; Nichols v. State Bank, 3 Yerg. 107.

² Commercial Bank v. Norton, 1 Hill (N. Y.), 501.

³ Valentine v. Packer, 5 Penn. 333.

⁴ Bank of Bengal v. McLeod, 7 Moore P. C. 35; Bank of Bengal v. Fagan, 7 Moore P. C. 61.

⁵ North River Bank v. Aymar, 3 Hill, 262.

agent may betray his trust, a *bona fide* holder of the bill or note, without notice, may hold the principal liable.¹

An agent may be called as witness to prove his agency, but his declarations are not admissible evidence against the alleged principal until the fact of agency is established.²

The principle that the transferrer of a negotiable instrument warrants its genuineness extends to transfers by an agent, unless he discloses his agency, and also the name of the principal. Otherwise, if the bill or note which he transfers be forged, in which case he will be bound.³

§ 285. If a man hold a bill or note as agent of another, and the circumstances be such that the principal cannot recover, the infirmity of the principal's titles infects his also, and he cannot recover.⁴ Thus *M. & Co.* remitted to the plaintiff in London a Bank of England note for £500, stating that they would at a future day draw for the amount. The plaintiff presented it for payment, but the bank detained it, on the ground that it had been obtained by means of a forged draft from a previous holder. In a suit by the plaintiff against the bank, it was held that the plaintiff was identified with his principals, and there being no evidence that they had given full value, he could not recover.⁵

§ 286. *For what acts principal not bound.*—A principal is not bound for the criminal acts of his agent, unless he participates in them, or has been guilty of gross negligence. Thus, where a bank clerk, or cashier, embezzles a special deposit in the bank, the bank is not liable, as it is not its acts, unless it had complicity in the wrong, or was grossly negligent.⁶

It has been held, that a bank is not liable in trover for

¹ *Exchange Bank v. Monteith*, 17 Barb. 171.

² *Nat. Mechanics' Bank v. Nat. Bank*, 36 Md. 5; *Streeter v. Poor*, 4 Kan. 412; *Poore v. Magruder*, 24 Grat. 200; 1 Phillips on Ev. [*515], note, 144.

³ *Lyons v. Miller*, 6 Grat. 440; *Merriam v. Walcott*, 3 Allen, 258.

⁴ *Lee v. Zagury*, 8 Taunt. 1144; Byles [*391].

⁵ *Solomons v. Bank of England*, 13 East, 235; 1 Rose, 99.

⁶ *Sturges v. Keith*, 57 Ill. 454.

bonds placed there on special deposit and stolen;¹ and though there are decisions holding that banks are liable for special deposits,² it has been held, and the better opinion is, that the receiving of such deposits is *ultra vires* of the ordinary business of banking, and that the bank is not liable.³ A gratuitous bailee is only bound in cases of gross negligence.⁴

§ 287. Losses occasioned by fraud or failure of third parties, to whom an agent has given credit, pursuant to the regular and accustomed practice of trade, are not chargeable upon him.⁵ And, therefore, where the receiver of Lord Plymouth's estate took bills in the country of persons who at the time were reputed to be of credit and substance, in order to return the rents in London, and the bills were dishonored and the money lost, the receiver was excused.⁶ And where remittance is made by post, according to instructions,⁷ in the usual way of business, the party making it is not liable for any resulting loss.⁸

A signature by an agent with authority satisfies the allegation of signature by the party's own hand.⁹

§ 288. A general authority to an agent is presumed to continue until its revocation is generally known. Therefore (to use the language of Chitty), after the discharge of a clerk or agent usually employed to draw, accept, or indorse bills or notes, the employer will be bound by his signature, made

¹ Dearbourn v. Union Nat. Bank, 58 Me. 273.

² Foster v. Essex Bank, 17 Mass. 479; see also Lancaster Nat. Bank v. Smith, 61 Penn. St. 47; Scott v. Nat. Bank, 72; Id. 471.

³ Wiley v. First Nat. Bank, 47 Vt. 546; see also Scott v. Crews, 2 Rich. S. C.; Erie Bank v. Smith, Randolph & Co. Sup. Ct. Penn. Leg. Gazette, 20 Jan'y, 1871; First Nat. Bank v. Ocean Nat. Bank, 60 N. Y. 278; Scott v. Nat. Bank, 72 Penn. St. 471; Whitney v. First Nat. Bank, S. C. Vermont Albany Law Journal, Vol. 18, No. 24, Dec. 14, 1878.

⁴ Scott v. Nat. Bank, 72 Penn. St. 471; Foster v. Essex Bank, 17 Mass. 501.

⁵ Chitty on Bills [*36], 49.

⁶ Knight v. Lord Plymouth, 2 Atk. 480.

⁷ National Bank of Bellefonte v. McManigle, 69 Penn. St. 156.

⁸ Warwick v. Noakes, Peake N. P. 68.

⁹ Porter v. Cumings, 7 Wend. 172; Pease v. Morgan, 7 Johns. 468; Booth v. Grove, Moody & M. 182; 3 Car. & P. 335; Helmsley v. Loader, 2 Camp. 450; Jones v. Mars, 2 Camp. 306 (overruling Levy v. Wilson, 5 Esp. 180).

after the determination of his authority, until the discharge be generally known.¹ And if A. permit B. to draw bills in his name, he will be liable as drawer to ignorant indorsees, although he had no interest, nor knew of the particular bills drawn in fraud of him by B., though he will not be liable to a payee, who had knowledge of the impropriety of the transaction.² When, therefore, the authority of such an agent has been determined, or he has been discharged from his employer, and there is reason to apprehend that he will circulate bills in his employer's name, it is advisable for the latter to give notice of the determination of the agent's authority through the public press, and also to all his correspondents individually—notice in the public press not being in general sufficient to affect a former customer, unless he has had express notice thereof.³ A different rule applies as to special and limited agencies. When their authority terminates by its own limitation the agents can no longer bind their principals. Thus, where plaintiff being about to leave home, deposited a power of attorney with his bank, authorizing his clerk to draw checks on his account for fifteen days, and after that time the clerk continued to draw checks, and used the money for his own purposes, it was held that the loss should fall on the bank, and that the principal was not bound after the fifteen days, as to checks so drawn. The fact that the checks had been returned in the principal's bank book, did not bind him by acquiescence, or estoppee, because the check drawer was his cashier, and the fact that he had drawn the checks after expiration of his authority was not discovered by the principal.⁴

Death operates as revocation of all agencies not coupled with an interest vested in the agent;⁵ but war between the countries of the principal and the agent does not.⁶

¹ Chitty on Bills (13 Am. ed.) [*32] 42; Story on Agency, §§ 470, 473; Anon. v. Harrison, 12 Mod. 346.

² Smith v. Stranger, Peake Add. 116; Chitty [*32], 42. ³ Chitty [*32], 42.

⁴ Manufacturers' Nat. Bank v. Barnes, 65 Ill. 69; see Weiser v. Denison, 10 N. Y. 68.

⁵ 1 Parsons on Contracts. 71.

⁶ See *ante*, Chapter VIII, sec. 2.

SECTION II.

IMPLIED AUTHORITY OF AGENT.

§ 289. *In the second place as to the implied authority of an agent* to bind his principal, it may be inferred from the circumstances of the case. Thus if the principal stand by and tacitly concur in the act of the agent signing his name, he would be as strictly bound as if he had expressly authorized the agent so to do. So authority may be implied from the course of business, and employment, or from repeated recognitions by the principal of the agent's authority. The circumstances which give rise to the implication of authority are for the jury to consider; and the jury will be warranted in holding the principal liable if they produce a strong and reasonable belief that authority existed.

§ 290. The authority to bind the principal in a certain character on a negotiable instrument cannot be construed as an authority to make the principal a party in any other character. Thus authority to draw a bill is not of itself authority to indorse one;¹ nor to accept one;² nor does authority to indorse imply authority to accept a bill;³ nor to make a several or joint note.⁴

But under certain circumstances authority to bind the principal in one form might be evidence throwing light on the question of authority to bind him in another. "It may be admitted," said Tindal, C. J., in a case quoted elsewhere in the text, "that an authority to draw does not import in itself an authority to indorse bills; but still the evidence of such authority to draw is not to be withheld from the jury,

¹ Robinson v. Yarow, 7 Taunt. 455; Murray v. East India Co. 5 B. & Ald. 204. Power to school directors to issue bonds does not authorize issue of notes. School District v. Sippy, 55 Ill. 287.

² Attwood v. Munnings, 7 B. & C. 278; Sewanee Mining Co. v. McCall, 3 Head, 621.

³ Attwood v. Munning, 7 B. & C. 278.

⁴ Cuyler v. Merrifield, 12 N. Y. S. C. (5 Hun), 559.

where they are to determine upon the whole of the evidence whether an authority to indorse existed or not.”¹ And a party may be agent to transfer a bill or note, and yet not to bind his principal by an indorsement.²

§ 291. So authority to execute certain notes will not extend to authorize an agent to renew them;³ and if the authority be to sign and indorse paper payable at a particular bank, the agent cannot under it sign or indorse paper payable at any other bank;⁴ nor will authority to sign a note or bill for a particular purpose be valid in respect to any other purpose.⁵ And if the authority specify the time at which the paper is to be made payable—as, for instance, in six months—it will not be binding on the principal if made payable at a different time—as, for instance, in sixty days.⁶ But where a party gave verbal authority to agent to sign a twenty days’ note, but did not intend to limit his authority to that time, and the note was made payable at thirty days, it was held that the jury should consider all the circumstances, and if they regarded the difference in time as immaterial, the principal should be held liable.⁷ And authority to renew a note at sixty or ninety days has been held to au-

¹ Prescott v. Flinn, 9 Bing. 19; see also Commercial Bank v. Norton, 1 Hill (N. Y.) 502.

² Brown v. Donnell, 49 Me. 421.

³ Ward v. Bank of Kentucky, 7 Mon. 93.

⁴ Morrison v. Taylor, 6 Mon. 82.

⁵ Nixon v. Palmer, 4 Seld. 389; Hortons v. Townes, 6 Leigh, 59; Tucker, P., saying: “The authority was to execute a note for the purpose of raising money; the note executed was not of purpose to raise money for the agent, James Townes, but to pay a debt contracted at that time with the plaintiffs for groceries, with an agreement that if it could not be discounted, the plaintiffs were to hold the note as their own property, and as a note binding on the defendants, according to the usual effect of such notes. Thus, the defendants, who had only authorized themselves to be made debtors to one of the banks, are made debtors to an individual. Here, it must be confessed, is a clear and obvious difference in form, between the authority given and the contract made. Is there no difference in substance? Very great, I apprehend.”

⁶ Batly v. Carswell, 2 Johns. 48; Edwards on Bills, 84.

⁷ Adams v. Flannagan, 36 Vt. 410.

thorize its renewal at eighty days, there being no violation of the object and intention of the parties.¹

§ 292. When the authority to execute or indorse a negotiable instrument is sought to be deduced from an agency to do certain other acts, it must be made to appear affirmatively that the signing or indorsement of such an instrument was within the general objects and purposes of the authority which was actually conferred. And in interpreting the authority of the agent it is to be strictly construed.² Thus a general authority to transact business for the principal, will not authorize the agent to bind him as a party to negotiable paper, according to many authorities, and the general principles of the law of agency.³ It has been held that authority to transact all business for the principal, would empower the agent to transfer a negotiable instrument in his principal's name;⁴ but the weight of authority is to the contrary.⁵ Authority to conduct, in one's place and stead, his commercial business, and sign the principal's name whenever requisite or expedient in the attorney's good discretion, would, however, be broad enough to cover cases of drawing bills of exchange,⁶ and so likewise authority to act "as lawful cashier and financial agent."⁷

§ 293. Authority to collect debts and give discharges carries no implication of authority to indorse a negotiable note. According to these principles, full authority to an attorney to ask, demand and receive all money that may become due the principal, and to "transact all business," will

¹ Bank of South Car. v. M'Willie, 4 McCord, 438.

² Byles on Bills (Sharswood's ed.) [*32], 108; Sewanee Mining Co. v. McCall, 3 Head, 619.

³ Sewanee Mining Co. v. McCall, 3 Head, 619. *Held*, that authority to general agent to transact business, and to draw on president of company, did not authorize him to accept a bill, even to avoid suspension of work of great importance to principal. Byles [*32] 108; Chitty on Bills [*29, 30], 39.

⁴ Bailey v. Rawley, 1 Swan, 205. To same effect, see Frost v. Wood, 2 Conn. 23.

⁵ Kilgour v. Finlyson, 1 H. Bl. 155; Hogg v. Snaith, 1 Taunt. 347; Hay v. Goldsmidt, 2 J. P. Smith, 79; Esdaile v. La Nauze, 1 Younge & C. 394.

⁶ Dollfus v. Frosch, 1 Denio, 368.

⁷ Edwards v. Thomas, 66 Mo. 482. Indorsement under such authority held valid.

not authorize the attorney to indorse bills received in payment.¹ So authority to demand and receive all moneys due on any account, to use all means for their recovery, to appoint attorneys to bring actions, and "*to do all other business*," would not authorize the agent to indorse a bill, for the words italicised would be construed with reference to the former, as meaning all business pertaining thereto.²

§ 294. An agent who is authorized to advance a sum of money to a person would exceed his authority by giving a note for the amount in his principal's name.³ And an agent to make purchases of goods or supplies, and pay for them,⁴ or to buy and sell goods for a trading company,⁵ is not thereby authorized to give a note or accept a bill for the amount; nor could an agent, to make sales, indorse his principal's name on the purchaser's bill to be discounted to raise funds for payment;⁶ nor could authority to accept bills, which would be a pledge of the principal's credit, be inferred from payment by the agent of unaccepted drafts on former occasions.⁷ The position of an ordinary merchant's clerk is not one which implies authority to bind the employer by signing a bill or note in his name;⁸ nor does the position of agent to attend and manage a grocery and provision store,⁹ nor that of an agent employed in the manufacture of carriages;¹⁰ nor does that of an attorney at law, to whom a note is sent for collection, authorize him to transfer it to a third person;¹¹ nor does that of a collecting agent, who takes checks in payment, authorize him to indorse them to the bank on which they are drawn;¹² nor that of manager of a farm through

¹ Hogg v. Snaith, 1 Taunt. 347. ² Hay v. Goldsmidt, 2 J. P. Smith, 79.

³ Webber v. William's College, 23 Pick. 302.

⁴ Brown v. Parker, 7 Allen, 339; Taber v. Cannon, 8 Metc. 456; Webber v. William's College, 23 Pick. 302; Gould v. Norfolk Lead Co. 9 Cush. 338.

⁵ Emerson v. Providence Hat Man. Co. 12 Mass.

⁶ Bank of Hamburg v. Johnson, 3 Rich. 42.

⁷ Gould v. Norfolk Lead Co. 9 Cush. 338.

⁸ Terry v. Fargo, 10 Johns. 114.

⁹ Smith v. Gibson, 6 Blackf. 369.

¹⁰ Paige v. Stone, 10 Metc. 160.

¹¹ Russell v. Drummond, 6 Ind. 216.

¹² Graham v. U. S. Saving Inst. 46 Mo. 187.

whose hands all payments and receipts pass, authorize him to sign a negotiable instrument in his principal's name.¹

§ 295. Masters of ships² and steamboats,³ and supercargoes,⁴ cannot bind their principals by drawing a bill upon them and accepting it in their name, without special authority to do so.

§ 296. If a person has upon a former occasion, in the principal's absence, usually accepted bills for him, and the latter, on his return, approved thereof, he would be bound in a similar situation on a second absence from home,⁵ and where it was proved that the defendant had been accustomed to assume the liability as indorser on notes on which his name had been indorsed by his son, and that he did not deny the particular indorsement until his son had absconded, but impliedly admitted his liability, it was held that these acts, unexplained, established his liability as indorser.⁶ Although an authority to draw does not import in itself an authority to indorse, it has been held that a jury was warranted in inferring a general authority of a clerk to indorse his employers' names upon evidence that he had been accustomed to draw checks for them—in one instance had been authorized to indorse—and in two instances that they had received the money obtained upon his indorsements of their names.⁷ So where a drawee had previously paid several bills accepted in his name by a third person, with whom he had connections in trade, he would be liable to an indorsee, although the bill accepted in like manner had been so accepted without his authority.⁸ And it has been held that if a person usually subscribes a negotiable instrument with

¹ Davidson v. Stanley, 2 Man. & G. 721.

² Bowen v. Stoddard, 10 Metc. 375.

³ May v. Kelly, 27 Ala. 497.

⁴ Scott v. M'Lellan, 2 Greenl. 199.

⁵ Beawes' pl. 86; Chitty on Bills (13 Am. ed.) [*31], 41.

⁶ Abeel v. Seymour, 13 N. Y. S. C. (6 Hun), 656.

⁷ Prescott v. Flinn, 2 Moore & S. 18; 9 Bing. 19.

⁸ Barber v. Gingell, 3 Esp. 60. See Stroh v. Hinchman, 37 Mich. 490, where the cases are reviewed by Cooley, J.

the name of another, proof of his having done so in many instances is sufficient to charge the party whose name is subscribed, without producing any power of attorney, or other proof of agency.¹

§ 297. But when it is sought to bind the principal on the ground of prior similar transactions, or recognition of such acts by the principal, it must be shown that the bill or note was taken upon the faith of them;² and therefore the holder of a bill purporting to be, but not in fact accepted by the person to whom it is addressed, cannot recover against the apparent acceptor by proving a fact subsequently discovered, that on a former occasion the defendant had given a general authority to the person who accepted in his name to accept bills for him. Unless it can be shown that the previous authority had never been revoked, or that the bill was taken on the faith of such authority, the holder cannot hold the principal liable.³

SECTION III.

HOW AGENT SHOULD SIGN; AND HOW INSTRUMENT CONSTRUED AND PARTIES' LIABILITIES DETERMINED.

§ 298. *Proper method of signature by agent.*—The best mode for an agent to sign or indorse a bill or note for his principal, so that it may clearly appear that he is "the mere scribe" who applies the executive hand as the instrument of another, is as follows: "A. B., by his attorney or agent, C. D." This style is unequivocal, being clearly intended to bind the principal only. "A. B. by C. D." is equally so—and in one way or the other the instrument should be always executed.⁴ Very frequently the form is adopted: "C. D. for

¹ Neal v. Irving, 1 Esp. 61; Haughton v. Ewbank, 4 Camp. 188.

² St. John v. Redmond, 9 Porter, 428; Edwards on Bills, 89; Thomson on Bills, 148.

³ Cash v. Taylor, 8 Law J. 262; Chitty on Bills (13 Am. ed.) [*32], 41.

⁴ Bradlee v. Boston Glass Co. 46 Pick. 347; Edwards on Bills, 83. See on this subject Chapter on Private Corporations, and § 398.

A. B.," or "C. D., agent for A. B.," and this form is now generally regarded as sufficient to indicate that the agent acts ministerially only and without intent to bind himself.¹ And this is, we think, the correct view, whether the phrase be used in the body of the instrument, or so signed at its foot; though the cases are by no means harmonious, and "C. D. for A. B.," or the like words, are regarded by some as indicating that C. D. was the promisor at the request of, or for the benefit of, A. B.² And there are cases which hold that if used in the body of the instrument, the words will be construed as binding the agent; while if at the foot, the principal.³ This distinction is very refined.

¹ See American Leading Cases, vol. I, 625, 634; Story on Agency, §§ 274, 278; 1 Parsons N. & B. 91; Story on Notes, § 68; Edwards, 83; Bank of Genesee v. Patchin Bank, 19 N. Y. 315; Long v. Colburn, 11 Mass. 97; Tiller v. Spradley, 39 Ga. 35; Raney v. Winter, 37 Ala. 277; Dubois v. Delaware, &c. Canal Co. 4 Wend. 285. In Early v. Wilkinson & Hunt, 9 Grat. 68, the promissory note sued on was signed "Robert H. Early [per Sam'l H. Early]." "The note in this case," said Moncure, J., "is in the perfect form of a negotiable promissory note of Robert H. Early, except that under his signature are the words '[per Sam'l H. Early],' in brackets. Without the addition of these words, it is certain that R. H. Early would alone have been bound on the note, even though he has given it as the known agent of Samuel H. Early. On the other hand, it may be said, that if these words had been added without being inclosed in brackets, and R. H. Early had authority to sign the note for Samuel H. Early, the latter would alone have been bound by the note, though the mode of executing the note by procuration would not, in that case, have been strictly formal. The question, then, depends alone upon the import of the brackets; and though it may seem strange that we should give so much import to a circumstance apparently so slight, yet we are of opinion that it is sufficient to turn the scale, and indicate an intention on the part of Robert H. Early not to do a mere ministerial act in giving effect and authenticity to the promise of another, but to indicate the capacity or trust in which he acted, or the person for whose account the promise was made. * * * If Robert H. Early had intended to bind Samuel H. Early, and not himself, he would have given more prominence to the name of the latter, which then would have been the important name. He would not have inclosed it in brackets, so that it might be taken from the note without injuring the sense of the balance. He would rather have inclosed his own name in brackets, as the name of the mere agent by whom it was signed. They were worse than useless on the supposition that S. H. Early was intended to be bound."

² 1 Parsons N. & B. 91; Tannant v. Rocky Mountain Nat'l Bank, 1 Col. 278.

³ Barlow v. Congregational Soc'y, 8 Allen, 463; Bradlee v. Boston Glass Co. 16 Pick. 347; Tanner v. Christian, 4 El. & Bl. 591; Penkwil v. Connell, 5 Exch. 381.

§ 299. It is competent and proper also for the agent to sign simply the principal's name, and to show his authority to do so by extraneous evidence;¹ for, as said by the United States Supreme Court, per Johnson, J.: "It is by no means true that the acts of agents derive their validity from professing on the face of them to have been done in the exercise of their agency."² But this style is not favored, as it increases the difficulties of proof, and at one time was questioned.³

In England, it is not unusual for an agent to sign "C. D., by procuration of A. B.," A. B. being the principal; but this is ambiguous, as it might import that A. B. was the agent signing by procuration for C. D., and it is advisable not to adopt this style.⁴

The words "per procuration" are an express intimation of a special and limited authority. And a person who takes a bill or note so drawn, accepted or indorsed is bound to inquire into the extent of the authority.⁵

§ 300. *General principles of construction of the instrument, and of liability of the parties.*—It is a general principle of commercial law, that a negotiable instrument must wear no mask, but must reveal its character upon its face. And it extends to the liability of parties thereto, who must appear as distinctly as the terms of the instrument itself, in order to be bound by those terms. The following rules are deductions from this general principle: *First*, That when the names of both principal and agent appear upon the instrument, it is to be taken to be the bill or note of the signer, unless there are distinct indications that he signed in a mere

¹ First Nat. Bank v. Gay, 63 Mo. 33; Cravens v. Gillilan, 63 Mo. 28; Morse v. Green, 13 N. H. 32; Haven v. Hobbs, 1 Vt. 238; Brigham v. Peters, 1 Gray, 139; Woodbury v. Moulton, 47 N. H. 11; Davidson v. Stanley, 2 Man. & G. 721; Llewellyn v. Winckworth, 13 M. & W. 598; Neal v. Irving, 1 Esp. 61; Barber v. Gingell, 3 Esp. 60; Chitty on Bills (13th Am. ed.) [*33] 44.

² Mechanics' Bank v. Bank of Columbia, 5 Wheat. 326.

³ 1 Parsons N. & B. 91, 92.

⁴ 1 Parsons N. & B. 91, 92.

⁵ Alexander v. McKenzie, 6 C. B. 766 (60 E. C. L. R.); Attwood v. Munnings, 7 B. & C. 273 (14 E. C. L. R.); Byles (Sharswood's ed.) [*33], 110; Thomson on Bills, 152.

ministerial character, intending to bind another. The actual signer will be bound, "unless," as said by Lord Ellenborough, "he states upon the face of the bill that he subscribes it for another; unless he says plainly 'I am the mere scribe.'" ¹ It is true that it is a question as to the intention of the party signing the instrument; but that intention must, as a general rule, be collected from the instrument itself. Chief Justice Shaw, in a well known case, has said: ² "As the forms of words in which contracts may be made and executed are almost infinitely various, the test question is, whether the person signing professes and intends to bind himself, and adds the name of another to indicate the capacity in which he acts, or the person for whose account the promise is made; or whether the words referring to a principal are intended to indicate that he does a mere ministerial act in giving effect and authenticity to the act and contract of another. Does the person signing apply the executive hand as the instrument of another, or the promising and engaging mind of a contracting party?"

§ 301. *As to indorsements by agents.*—If a bill be payable to A. B., describing him as "agent," it is generally considered mere *descriptio personæ*,³ and if he should indorse it in like manner, we should say he was personally liable. And we can see no difference between such a case and those in which it is held that where the maker of a negotiable note adds the word "agent," he, and he alone is bound, the term being regarded as descriptive merely.⁴ If the indorsement restricted the negotiability of the instrument, it might be different, for it might then be considered as standing on the footing of a non-negotiable instrument in respect to him.⁵ In Georgia where a bill payable to "S. C., agent" was similarly indorsed,

¹ Leadbetter v. Farrow, 5 M. & S. 345; Sowerby v. Butcher, 2 C. & M. 368. This is the general principle.

² Bradlee v. Boston Glass Co. 16 Pick. 347; see also Early v. Wilkinson, 9 Grat. 68.

³ Toledo Agricultural Works v. Heisser, 51 Mo. 128.

⁴ See *post*, § 305.

⁵ See *post*, § 303.

and then discounted at the indorser's instance for the benefit of his principal, parol evidence was admitted to charge him;¹ but this is a departure from the general principle of the law merchant.

§ 302. A peculiar case was decided in New York. The note was payable to "Israel Horsefield or order" simply. It was indorsed "Israel Horsefield, agent," and by him delivered for a debt due by a company of which he was agent. It was held that the form of the indorsement, under the circumstances (which might be shown), indicated to the plaintiff that it was merely intended by the payee to transfer title to the paper, without recourse, though as to a third party it might be different.² Chief Justice Savage dissented.³ The case has been quoted as holding that such an indorsement is equivalent to an indorsement without recourse, and it has been so construed by the courts;⁴ but we think that it only determines that under the peculiar circumstances it had that effect. In the absence of evidence as to the circumstances of the transaction, it has been held in New York that a draft drawn on "D. Agt. C. B. Co.," and accepted in like manner, would not bind the company.⁵

§ 303. *Second. That no party can be charged as principal upon a negotiable instrument unless his name is thereon disclosed.*—The reason of this rule is that each party who takes a negotiable instrument makes his contracts with the parties

¹ Merchants' Bank v. Central Bank, 1 Kelly, 429. Nisbet, J.: "A party cannot be discharged who is apparently liable on the contract, but a new party may be introduced by parol."

² Mott v. Hicks, 1 Cow. 533, Woodworth, J.

³ Mott v. Hicks, 1 Cow. 540. "Horsefield, it is true," he said, "signed the indorsement 'Israel Horsefield, agent.' But why agent? Agent for whom? He is the payee of the note individually, and it does not appear, except from his own testimony, that he was agent for the company. They cannot be sued upon this indorsement; and no judgment could be rendered against Horsefield which would bind their property. He is therefore liable personally, or there is no liability attached to this indorsement."

⁴ Hicks v. Hinde, 9 Barb. 531; Babcock v. Beman, 1 Kern. 200; 1 Parsons N. & B. 96.

⁵ Haight v. Naylor, 5 Daly 219.

who appear on its face to be bound for its payment; it is "a courier without luggage," whose countenance is its passport; and in suits upon negotiable instruments, no evidence is admissible to charge any person as a principal party thereto, unless his name in some way is disclosed upon the instrument itself;¹ although upon other written contracts, not negotiable, it is often competent to show that, although signed in the name of the agent only, they were executed in the business of the principal, and with the intent that he should be bound. And in such cases he is bound upon them accordingly.² The rule excluding parol evidence to charge an unnamed principal as a party to negotiable paper is derived from the nature of such paper, which being made for the purpose of being transferred from hand to hand, and of

¹ *Brown v. Baker*, 7 Allen, 339; *Slawson v. Loring*, 5 Allen, 340; *Pentz v. Stanton*, 10 Wend. 271; *Hyde v. Page*, 9 Barb. 150; *Arnold v. Stackpole*, 11 Mass. 27; *Bass v. O'Brien*, 12 Gray, 477; *Arnold v. Sprague*, 34 Vt. 409; *Thurston v. Munn*, 1 Greene (Iowa), 231; *Kenyon v. Williams*, 19 Ind. 45; *Williams v. Robbins*, 16 Gray 77; *Pease v. Pease*, 35 Conn. 131; *Byles* (Sharswood's ed.) [*37], 116; *Story on Bills*, § 76. This view does not obtain now in New York. In *Green v. Skeel*, 9 N. Y. S. C. (2 Hun), 486, the indorsee sued indorser of a note made by William Skeel. The word "agent" had been added to his name. The Court said, per Mullin P., J.: "It is difficult to reconcile the cases so as to ascertain with certainty when a principal is bound by a writing executed by a person who signs the same as agent. But it seems to be pretty well settled, that when the person signing his name with the word 'agent' added, is in fact, the agent of the principal, and the writing is executed in the course of the business of such agency, the principal is bound by a contract signed with the agent's name with the word 'agent' added. This case is at war with the ruling in *De Witt v. Walton*, 5 Selden 571; but that case has not been followed, if it is to be understood as deciding that the principal is not bound in any case by a writing signed by the agent in his own name with the word 'agent' added." See post § 305, notes. In *May v. Hewitt*, 33 Ala. 161, where a bill signed C. D., clerk, was drawn by the owners of steamboat Messenger, and was accepted by "B. Bell, captain," parol evidence was admitted to show who was bound by the acceptance.

² *Lerned v. Johns*, 9 Allen, 419. In this case the contract was signed B. by C., and parol evidence was admitted to show that B. was only agent of A., although there was no intimation of it on the contract, Hoar, J., saying: "The doctrine is well settled in England, that when a written contract, not under seal, is made by or with an agent, the principal, although undisclosed, may sue or be sued upon it, except in the case of commercial paper." *Kenworth v. Schofield*, 2 B. & C. 945; *Higgins v. Senior*, 8 M. & W. 834; see also *Williams v. Bacon*, 2 Gray, 387; *Dykers v. Townsend*, 25 N. Y. 57.

giving to every successive holder as strong a claim upon the original party as the payee himself has, must indicate on its face who is bound for its payment; for any additional liability not expressed in the paper would not be negotiable.¹

§ 304. *Third. It is not absolutely necessary that the principal's peculiar name should be used; but he may, by adoption, use that of his agent, or his agent, by his authority, may use his own name for his principal's.*—Individuals, as well as corporations, may sometimes be held liable upon negotiable and other contracts, executed and entered into under a name or style different from that which usually belongs to and is used by them, and in which their own proper names or signatures do not appear at all. But such liability exists only where it is affirmatively and satisfactorily proved that the name or signature thus used is one which has been assumed and sanctioned as indicative of their contracts, and has been, with their knowledge and consent, adopted as a substitute for their own names and signatures in signing bills and notes, or executing other written contracts. In such cases the adopted name is in law equivalent to the actual name of the party.²

§ 305. *Fourth. If the agent sign a note with his own name and discloses no principal, he is personally bound.*—The party so signing must have intended to bind somebody upon the instrument, and no promisor but himself thereon appearing, it must be construed as his note or as a nullity.³ And though he term himself “agent,” such suffix to his name will be regarded as a mere *descriptio personæ*, or as an earmark of the transaction, and may be rejected as surplusage.⁴

¹ See article in Albany Law Journal, Vol. 13, No. 19, May 6, 1876, p. 323.

² Brown v. Parker, 7 Allen, 337; see also Bank of Rochester v. Minton, 1 Den. 405; Bartlett v. Tucker, 104 Mass. 338; and see especially Minor v. Mechanics' Bank of Alexandria, 1 Peters, 46, and Chapter XIII, on Corporations, section, III.

³ Arnold v. Stackpole, 11 Mass. 27; Sharpe v. Bellis, 61 Penn. St. 71; Bedford Com. Ins. Co. v. Covell, 8 Metc. 442; 1 Parsons N. & B. 93; Story on Notes § 68; see Lyons v. Miller, 6 Grat. 440; Poole v. Rice, 9 W. Va. 73.

⁴ Toledo Iron Works v. Heisser, 51 Mo. 128; Collins v. Buckeye State Ins.

And this principle applies although it could be proved that the payee knew of the agency when the note was made, and it was understood that the principal, and not the agent, should be bound, for such evidence would vary the terms of the written note.¹ But under such circumstances, if the note were not paid the principal might be sued upon the original consideration.² However, if the payee, with full knowledge of the agency and of the principal's liability, and relying solely on the agent's credit, took his individual note, the principal cannot be resorted to at all.³ In a late case in New York the note was signed simply, "J. S. M. Agent." It was alleged to have been given for goods sold by the defendant, a lady, probably the agent's wife, and recovery against the alleged principal was sustained.⁴ This decision is in conflict with the general current of authority.⁵

§ 306. *Fifth. If the agent exceed his authority in signing his principal's name, or his own professedly as binding his principal, who is named, he is not bound as a party to the paper itself, but only in an action of tort for falsely assuming authority to bind another.*—Upon this proposition the authorities are not uniform, but the weight of reason, if not of authority, is, we think, clearly in its favor, both in England and in the United States. Where simply the principal's name is signed, without any profession of agency, it is patent

Co. 17 Ohio St. 215; Arnold v. Sprague, 34 Vt. 409; Graham v. Campbell, 56 Ga. 258; Hall v. Bradbury, 40 Conn. 32; Williams v. Robbins, 16 Gray, 77; see *post* § 398, 419; Anderson v. Shoup, 1 Ohio, N. S. 125; Kenyon v. Williams, 19 Ind. 45.

¹ 1 Parsons N. & B. 93; Story on Notes, § 68.

² Pentz v. Stanton, 10 Wend. 271, the Court saying: "It was a question for the jury to decide whether the goods were sold exclusively upon the credit of West (the agent) and of the bill, or not." Query, see Paige v. Stone, 10 Metc. 169.

³ Hyde v. Page, 9 Barb. 151 (1850); Paige v. Stone, 10 Metc. 169.

⁴ Moore v. McClure, 15 N. Y. S. C. (8 Hun), 555. Talcott, J.: "The fact that the name of the principal does not appear on the face of the note is not, under the modern decisions in this State, at all conclusive. If it was intended to be given in the business of the principal, was in fact so given, and with due authority, it is binding on the principal, and all this is matter of evidence, all covered by the averment that it is the note of the principal." See *ante*, § 303, note.

⁵ See *ante*, § 303.

that there is nothing in the instrument which could possibly import a liability upon the agent,¹ but where both the agent's and the principal's names appear, there is more room for division of opinion. By some authorities it is contended that as both names are on the paper, and the principal's is not rightfully there, the agent should be bound.²

§ 307. But, on the other hand, it is answered, that while the agent's name is on the paper, it is there in a form which expressly negatives any obligation upon him, and professes to assert the obligation of another. And it is only for such wrongful profession that an action may be maintained. This is the philosophical and correct view, as we think. The agent cannot be estopped to deny personal obligation as a party to the instrument, since he never held himself out as such.³ So, if a party sign a fictitious name, and it is not

¹ *Wilson v. Barthrop*, 2 M. & W. 863.

² *Edwards on Bills*, 80, 90; *Chitty* [*35], 47; *Pitman v. Kintner*, 5 Blackf. 251; *McClure v. Bennett*, 1 Blackf. 189; *Byars v. Doore*, 20 Mo. 284; see also note to *Thomas v. Hewes*, 2 C. & M. 530. In *Ormsby v. Kendall*, 2 Ark. 338, the note began, "Steamer Tecumseh and owners promise," and was signed "F. C. Kendall." *Held*, he was bound unless he had authority to bind owners. In *Dusenbury v. Ellis*, 3 Johns. Cas. 70, the note began, "I promise," and was signed "For P. S.—G. D. attorney." *Held*, G. D. was bound, the Court saying: "If a person, under pretense of authority from another, executes a note in his name, he is bound; and the name of the person for whom he assumed to act will be rejected as surplusage." In *Rossiter v. Rossiter*, 8 Wend. 494, where the agent, exceeding his authority, signed a note "H. R. P., by his attorney, W. S. Rossiter," he was held bound. To same effect is *Palmer v. Stephens*, 1 Den. 480. "These cases," it is said in *American Leading Cases*, vol. i. [*637], "may fairly be considered as overruling *Ballou v. Talbot*, 16 Mass. 461." But that case seems to stand quite firm as a precedent, notwithstanding.

³ *Bartlett v. Tucker*, 104 Mass. 338 (1870); *Draper v. Mass. Steam, &c. Co.* 5 Allen, 338; *Abbey v. Chase*, 6 Cush. 54; *Jefts v. York*, 10 Cush. 392; *Ballou v. Talbot*, 16 Mass. 461; *Sheffield v. Larue*, 16 Minn. 388; *Hall v. Crandall*, 29 Cal. 572; *Duncan v. Nells*, 32 Ill. 542; *McHenry v. Duffield*, 17 Blackf. 41; *Johnson v. Smith*, 21 Conn. 627; *Taylor v. Shelton*, 30 Conn. 122 (agent can only be bound on instrument where there are apt words to express his liability); *Hopkins v. Nehafy*, 11 Sergt. & R. 129; *Polhill v. Walter*, 3 B. & Adol. 114, special action sustained; *Jenkins v. Hutchinson*, 18 L. J. Q. B. 276 (1849), Lord Denman, C. J., said: "In the absence of any direct authority, we think that a party who executes an instrument in the name of another, whose name he puts to the instrument, and adds his own name only as agent for that other, cannot be treated

one which he adopts as his, he is only liable, in a special action on the case.¹ It results from these principles that if the agent had no authority to bind the principal, and there are no apt words to charge him personally, the instrument is void.²

§ 308. Still there are some cases in which the authority of the agent to bind the principal may enter into the inquiry as to the agent's liability; for if there be an ambiguity in the phraseology of the note, so that it cannot be definitely determined from its face whether it be that of principal or agent, in that case, as the principal could not be bound, an intention of the agent to bind himself might be inferred. If the principal ratify the agent's act, an action against the agent in tort cannot be maintained, his previous want of authority being thereby entirely cured.³

as a party to that instrument, and be sued upon it, unless it be shown that he was the real principal." 1 Parsons N. & B. 121, 122; Chitty on Bills (13th Am. ed.) [*35], 47; Thomson on Bills, 155. The contrary doctrine that once prevailed in New York (see note, *ante*) is now doubted; see *White v. Madison*, 26 N. Y. 116; *Walker v. Bank*, 5 Seld. 582.

¹ *Bartlett v. Tucker*, 104 Mass. 339, Gray, J.: "In *Long v. Colburn*, 11 Mass. 97, it was held that upon a promissory note beginning, 'For value received, I promise to pay,' and signed '*Pro* William Gill, J. S. Colburn,' no action would lie against Colburn; and the Court said: 'The plaintiff's remedy is against Gill, if Colburn had authority to make the promise for him; and if he had not, a special action on the case might make Colburn answerable.' In *Ballou v. Talbot*, 16 Mass. 461, the same point was adjudged; and it was held that upon a note signed 'Joseph Talbot, 2d, agent for David Perry,' no action would lie against Talbot, although the jury found that he was not authorized to sign the note as agent for Perry. So where a note, purporting on its face to be the note of the pastor and deacons of the First Freewill Baptist Church in Lowell, was signed 'S. D. York, agent for the First Freewill Baptist Church in Lowell,' it was held that no action could be maintained on the note against York. *Jefts v. York*, 4 Cush. 371."

² See *McClure v. Bennett*, 1 Blackf. 190; *Taft v. Brewster*, 9 Johns. 334.

³ *Sheffield v. Larue*, 16 Minn. 388; but see *contra*, *Rossiter v. Rossiter*, 8 Wend. 494.

SECTION IV.

LIABILITY OF AGENT WHO DRAWS ON ACCOUNT OF HIS PRINCIPAL, OR
INDORSES TO HIM.

§ 309. In respect to bills of exchange drawn or indorsed by a party as agent, there are three cases in which an interesting question as to the drawer's or indorser's liability arises. *First*. When the drawer, who is known to be agent of the drawee, draws in favor of the drawee's creditor—whether or not he is liable to such creditor. *Second*. When an agent, selling goods for the owner, draws on the buyer for the amount—whether or not he is liable to the owner. And *Third*. Whether or not an agent, to whom a bill or note is made payable, is liable on an indorsement thereof to his principal.

§ 310. As to the first question, it is said by Story, in his treatise on Agency, “if an agent should, in his own name, draw a bill of exchange on his principal for the debt of the latter, he would be personally responsible as drawer in case of the dishonor of the bill, although upon the face of it the bill was drawn on account of his principal.”¹

And it is stated in the American Leading Cases to be the general rule, that “whenever an agent puts his name to a negotiable instrument as a party to it, he is legally liable to the promisee and to indorsees upon it.”²

§ 311. The English cases clearly bear out these views.³ But the weight of authority in the United States is other-

¹ Story on Agency, § 269.

² Vol. I. [*635].

³ *Leadbetter v. Farrow*, 5 M. & S. 315 (1816). Agent of a country bank to whom plaintiff sent a sum of money in order to procure a bill on London, drew in his own name upon the London firm. *Held*, defendant was liable as drawer, though plaintiff knew he was agent.

Perhaps this case is distinguishable from the American cases in this, that the plaintiff wanted a bill drawn on London. That was the very object of his negotiation. But no such distinction seems to have been taken.

wise,¹ though the cases are not uniform.² If the drawer signs himself "A. B., agent," and the payee takes the bill so drawn on his principal debtor, to whom he has given credit, and to whom he looks for payment, it has been said there is really no valuable consideration for his ability.³ But the debt of another is a valuable consideration, and if the agent intended to be bound upon the draft, no other consideration would be necessary. Bills are constantly drawn for accommodation, and the transaction might be construed as intended to be of this character. We think, however, that a bill

¹ *Krumbaar v. Ludeling*, 3 Martin (old series), [*640], p. 700. The agent drew on his principal for a debt due the payee, without describing himself as agent. The Court said, per Mathews, J.: "The attempt of Ludeling to show that he acted merely as agent for the Amelungs, in drawing the bill on which this suit is commenced, can be considered properly in no other light than an offer of evidence to show a want of consideration in the written agreement, and that, for this reason, he is not bound to fulfill any obligation which might otherwise have resulted from it. There is no doubt of the personal liability of the drawer of a bill of exchange, who signs it without expressing his agency, when it passes into the hands of third persons having no knowledge of the circumstances under which it was drawn, and between whom and the drawer the law will not allow the consideration to be inquired into. The appellee having signed, without expressing for whom he signed, is clearly liable on the face of it; but he is at liberty to show a want of consideration, and any circumstances of fraud or violation of good faith on the part of the appellant, which may be sufficient to exonerate him from this apparent liability, the suit against him being brought by a person "with whom he was immediately concerned in the negotiation of the instrument."

Wolfe v. Jewett, 10 La. O. S. 614 (1835); *Lincoln v. Smith*, 11 La. O. S. 11 (1837). In these cases there was no intimation of agency on the face of the bill.

Hicks v. Hinde, 9 Barb. 528 (1850). In this case the drawer signed the bill "John Hinde, agent." *Held*, not bound, Paige, J., saying: "This case may be distinguished from the case of *Pentz v. Stanton*. In that case the name of the principal was not disclosed to the vendor by the agent at the time of the purchase of the goods and giving of the draft for the price of the goods. The non-disclosure of the principal made the agent liable for the goods. And being so liable, it was proper he should be held personally liable on the draft."

² *Mayhew v. Prince*, 11 Mass. 55 (1814), Parker, J.: "The agency under which he acted is a matter between him and his employer, but cannot protect him from the claim of the payees of the bill, who have a right to consider him as an independent drawer, notwithstanding they may have known, either from the terms of the bills themselves, or from extraneous evidence, that the defendant was acting as servant to one of the house on which the bill was drawn." To same effect see *Newhall v. Dunlop*, 14 Me. 180 (1837).

³ See 1 Parsons N. & B. 94.

drawn by "A. B., agent," might well be distinguished from a note so signed; for the language is not inconsistent with the idea that the drawer signs as agent of the drawee whose name is disclosed upon the face of the instrument;¹ while in a note none but the maker's name is disclosed, therefore, parol evidence might well be admitted to show the real circumstances of the case, from which might be inferred the understanding of the parties. When there is no intimation of agency accompanying the drawer's name, the case presented is more difficult. This view, however, may be presented when the buyer has parted with his goods upon faith of the principal's credit, but dealing with his agent, he then has funds in the principal's hands; and it is his draft that the principal would honor, provided he knew the fact that he was indebted to the drawer.

The agent's draft serves as a voucher of that fact. And although if there be no evidence to contradict the presumption that the agent intended to go security for his principal in the form pursued, he might well be held liable as drawer, there may be circumstances which would render it unjust so to hold him. Thus, suppose he was requested by the creditor to draw on his principal for the amount which, according to agreement, only the principal owed; in that case, it seems to us, he would be a drawer for the accommodation of the creditor; and if this be what is meant by the authority which calls him a drawer "without consideration," it would seem clearly correct, though not so in any other light. We conclude, therefore, that presumptively the agent drawing on his principal is bound to the creditor; but if there were an express understanding that he was not to be bound, or circumstances from which it might be inferred that such was the understanding, he would be regarded as having drawn for the creditor's accommodation—not, indeed, to enable him to raise money, necessarily, but to enable him, in the most succinct form, to vouch to his debtor the amount and authenticity of the debt, and call for payment at the same time.

¹ Hicks v. Hinde, 9 Barb. 529.

§ 312. As to the second question, whether or not the drawer of a bill on a purchaser of goods from him as agent, in favor of his principal, is liable to him (the principal) upon the bill, the authorities are divided. In England, his liability is affirmed,¹ but not without meeting with dissent and criticism from high authority.² In the United States, the contrary doctrine has found favor with the courts,³ though in turn receiving criticism from discriminating authors.⁴

§ 313. The whole question seems to us to turn on the inquiry whether or not the agent, by customary course of dealing, or express authority, was authorized by the principal to draw bills on the purchaser in his favor. If so, he should be considered as really using his own name as the principal's, and the latter could not hold him liable, as there would be no consideration, but, instead, a trust reposed. If, on the other hand, there was no such express or implied authority, the agent should be regarded as assuming in the form of drawer to assure the debt.

¹ *Le Fevre v. Lloyd*, 5 Taunt. 749 (1813). A broker being employed to sell goods, sold them for a bill at two months, in accordance with instructions, and himself drew a bill on the buyer for the amount, and was held liable. The Court said: "The broker, by giving this bill, put an end to all doubt."

² 1 Parsons N. & B. 104; Chitty on Bills, 9th ed. p. 34, citing *ex parte Robinson*, 1 Buck, 113; *Kedson v. Dilworth*, 5 Price, 564. Chitty says: "These decisions, subjecting an agent to personal liability as regards third persons ignorant of the circumstances under which the agent became a party, are consistent with the other principles of law applicable to these instruments. But it seems questionable whether even at law it is correct to allow an employer to recover from his agent under such circumstances, because, in general, between original parties it may be shown, as a good defense at law, that the bill was drawn, accepted, or indorsed for the plaintiff's accommodation, or for a purpose or consideration which has failed or been satisfied; and to allow such a principal to recover at law against his agent, is only to compel the latter to resort to a court of equity for relief, which might just as well be afforded at law, and a court of equity will certainly afford relief."

³ *Jones v. Lathrop*, 44 Ga. 398 (1871), the court saying the bills were not drawn "in favor of the plaintiff for any valuable consideration received by the drawers from him therefor." *Roberts v. Austin*, 5 Whart. 313 (1839); *Mechanics' Bank v. Earp*, 4 Rawle, 390 (1834).

⁴ 1 American Leading Cases [*635], where it is said: "The case of *Roberts v. Austin*, 5 Whart. 313, is believed to have been an oversight on the part of the learned court in which it was decided."

§ 314. As to the third question, whether or not an agent taking a bill payable to his own order, and indorsing it to his principal, is liable thereon, is the subject of opposing opinions. In England, it has been held that an agent, purchasing bills for his principal and indorsing them to his principal, is liable on his indorsement, unless it be qualified by appropriate words, however small the commission he gets upon the purchase, the Court of Common Pleas saying he might have specially indorsed the bills *sans recours*, but did not do it.¹ Clearly, if the agent indorse for the principal's accommodation,² or merely indorse according to the principal's instructions, in order to remit him money which he has collected, he is not bound.³ In the case of a factor who sells goods on account of his principal under a *del credere* commission—by which is meant an agreement to guarantee in consideration of a premium—it has been held in Pennsylvania that the agent, under such a commission, guarantees only the solvency of the debtor, and is not bound as a party to the bill which he indorses to his principal by way of remitting the money.⁴ But this view of the liability of a factor under a *del credere* commission is against the view which has obtained in England and in the United States, which is to the effect that such a factor is liable to his principal for the amount of the debt immediately on its falling due,⁵ and is, therefore, bound on his indorsement of a bill which he remits in discharge thereof.⁶

¹ Goupy v. Harden, 7 Taunt. 159 (1816).

² See Chitty [*34], 46; *ex parte* Robinson, Buck's Cases, 113 (1817).

³ Warwick v. Noakes, Peake's N. P. 68 (1781); Lewis v. Brehme, 33 Md. 431 (1870); Kimball v. Bittner, 62 Penn. St. 205.

⁴ Sharp v. Emmett, 5 Whart. 290 (1839); followed in Byers v. Harris, 9 Heiskell, 652.

⁵ McKenzie v. Scott, 6 Bro. P. C. 280 (1796); Morris v. Cleasley, 4 Maule & S. 566 (1816), takes a different view as to the factor's liability; and so also do the cases of Thompson v. Perkins, 3 Mason C. C. R. 232 (1823), before Story, J., Peele v. Northcote, 7 Taunt. 48. But the weight of authority is in accordance with McKenzie v. Scott; and sustaining the text are the cases of Wolf v. Koppel, 5 Hill, 558; 2 Denio, 368; Sherwood v. Stone, 14 N. Y. 267 (1856); Swan v. Nesmith, 7 Pick. 220; Lewis v. Brehme, 33 Md. 412 (1870); Wickham v. Wickham, 2 Kay & Johns. 475; Centourier v. Hastie, 8 Exch. 39.

⁶ Lewis v. Brehme, 33 Md. 412 (1870); McKenzie v. Scott, 6 Bro. P. C. 280. (1796); Chitty on Bills (13th Am. ed.), [*34], 46.

§ 315. When there is no *del credere* commission under which the agent sells goods, the question whether he, *ipso facto*, binds himself by indorsing a bill or note taken payable to himself in payment is more difficult. High authority has considered him bound.¹ If he takes the bill without authority to do so he acts at his peril. But if he is authorized to give credit, and takes a bill or note payable at its termination to his own order, and acts without negligence in the matter, it seems unreasonable to hold him; for his own name as the payee might well be regarded as being used simply in the place of, and as his principal's. To exonerate himself from liability, however, the circumstances from which an intention not to be bound might be inferred, should be shown. There is really no consideration for his liability when he has made the indorsement without commission or compensation, and without departing from express or implied instructions; and in such cases no intention to bind himself could be inferred.²

SECTION V.

RATIFICATION BY PRINCIPAL OF UNAUTHORIZED ACTS.

§ 316. When the party ostensibly the principal, and who is competent to make the contract, with a full knowledge of all the circumstances, deliberately ratifies the lawful acts, doings, or omissions of another assuming to act as his agent, he will be bound thereby to all intents and purposes, to the full extent of such acts, doings, or omissions, as if they had been originally done by his authority.³ But this very state-

¹ Story on Agency, § 157.

² *Lewis v. Brehme*, 33 Md. 432, Alvey, J.: "For, in such a case, although he is a known agent, the making, or accepting, or indorsing of the instrument, is treated as an admission that it is his personal act, not only in respect to third persons, but also in respect to his principal."

³ *Trustees of Schools v. McCormick*, 41 Ill. 323. The act must have been done in the principal's name, or as his act. *Ellison v. Jackson Water Co.* 12 Cal. 550.

ment of the rule implies its limitations: (1) The party must have capacity to make the contract. (2) He must ratify it with a full knowledge of the facts attending it. (3) The contract must have been originally lawful. The true rule is that he who may authorize in the beginning may ratify in the end.¹

§ 317. A corporation, as well as an individual, may ratify its agent's acts;² and the ratification may be by express consent, or by acts and conduct of the principal inconsistent with any other hypothesis than that he approved and intended to adopt what had been done in his name.³

§ 318. Firstly. The party must have capacity to have made the contract in the particular mode adopted. If a contract can only be made in a prescribed mode, it cannot be ratified in disregard of that mode by any subsequent action of the impelled principal. Ratification is equivalent to a previous authority; it operates upon the contract in the same manner as though the authority to make the contract had originally existed.⁴ The power to ratify, therefore, necessarily supposes the power to make the contract in the first instance; and the power to ratify in a given mode supposes the power to contract in the same way.⁵ Therefore, where the charter of a city authorizes a sale of city property only at public auction, a sale not thus made is from its very nature incapable of ratification, because it could not have been otherwise made originally. So, where the charter authorizes a contract for work to be given only to the lowest

¹ First National Bank v. Gay, 63 Mo. 33.

² Hoyt v. Thompson, 19 N. Y. 218; Supervisors v. Schenck, 5 Wall. 782; Peterson v. Mayor of N. Y. 17 N. Y. 453; Johnson v. Stark Co. 24 Ill. 90; Keithsbury v. Frick, 34 Ill. 421; Knox County v. Aspinwall, 21 How. 544; Trundy v. Farrar, 32 Me. 225.

³ Supervisors v. Schenck, 5 Wall. 782; Knox County v. Aspinwall, 21 How. 544; Bissel v. Jeffersonville, 24 How. 299; Moran v. Miami Co., 2 Blackf. 725.

⁴ Paul v. Berry, 78 Ill. 158; Eadie v. Ashbaugh, 44 Iowa, 521; Darst v. Gale, 83 Ill. 137.

⁵ Ainsworth v. Creke, L. R. 4 C. P. 483; Bird v. Brown, 4 Exch. 786.

bidder, after notice of the contemplated work in the public journals, a contract made in any other way—that is, given to any other person than such lowest bidder—cannot be subsequently affirmed. Were this not so, the corporate authorities would be able to do retroactively what they are prohibited from doing originally.¹

§ 319. Secondly. The principal will not be bound unless he knew the facts attending the transaction.² Thus, ordinarily, payment or part payment of a bill or note is a ratification of its terms; but where a note had been altered without knowledge of the surety, and he being ignorant of the alteration, made a payment upon it, it was held not a ratification.³ If the principal ratifies in ignorance of material facts, and on learning them desires to disavow the contract, he can only do so by relinquishing the proceeds, and restoring the party who dealt with his supposed agent to as good a situation as he was before.⁴

§ 320. Thirdly. The contract must have been originally lawful. This principle is plain, for ratification being equivalent to an original authority, and possessing no greater or other virtue, can only apply retrospectively to validate those things which original authority would have validated.

§ 321. But a party cannot ratify a contract so far as it is to his interest, and repudiate it as to the rest. Ratification is an integral act. And therefore where an attorney compromised a debt for his principal, who, with full knowledge, retained the amount paid on such compromise, the principal

¹ *Zollman v. San Francisco*, 20 Cal. 102; *Field, J., McCracken v. San Francisco*, 16 Cal. 591; *Brady v. The Mayor*, 16 How. Pr. R. 432.

² *School District v. Thompson*, 5 Minn. 280; *First Nat. Bank v. Parsons*, 19 Minn. 183; *Nixon v. Palmer*, 4 Seld. 398; *Fletcher v. Dysart*, 9 B. Mon. 413; *Miller v. Board of Education*, 44 Cal. 166; *Supervisors v. Schenck*, 5 Wall, 782.

³ *Benedict v. Miner*, 58 Ill. 19.

⁴ *Culver v. Ashley*, 19 Peck, 30; *Eadie v. Ashbaugh*, 44 Iowa, 521.

was held bound by all the terms of the compromise.¹ Where one assumes without authority to act for another, if that other wishes to avail himself of the acts of the agent he must adopt the whole or none.²

§ 322. Retaining proceeds of a note is ratification of the means by which they were obtained ; and when a wife signed her husband's name without authority, but he took the money raised, he was held bound.³ So, if a principal receives from his agent the notes of third parties for property sold, he waives the right to hold the creditor of the agent liable for the value of the property.⁴ Mere silence when informed that another has used one's name, and an attempt to get indemnity against loss, has been held, under the circumstances, not to amount to ratification.⁵ Long silence, however, coupled with circumstances, may frequently operate as ratification.⁶ Where an agent fraudulently sells property, and embezzles the proceeds, the principal by accepting compensation from the agent ratifies the sale, and estops himself from recourse against the purchaser.⁷

¹ *Henderson v. Cummings*, 44 Cal. 325 ; see 1 *Parsons on Contracts*, 53.

² *Eadie v. Ashbaugh*, 44 Iowa, 521 ; *Davenport Sav. Fund Assn. v. N. A. Fire Ins. Co.* 16 Iowa, 74 ; *Benedict v. Smith*, 10 Paige, 127.

³ *National Bank v. Fassett*, 42 Vt. 432.

⁴ *Trustees of Schools v. McCormack*, 41 Ill. 323.

⁵ *Hortons v. Townes*, 6 Leigh, 47. *Brockenburgh, J.*, saying: "There was no evidence of any assent given, or any actual ratification of the attorney by the principals, but the ratification is inferred from their silence. That is too equivocal a circumstance from which to form such a conclusion ; and the subsequent conduct of the defendants in standing a suit shows that they did not understand their failure to object as an actual ratification."

⁶ *Wardrop v. Dunlop*, 8 N. Y. S. C. (1 Hun), 325.

⁷ *Ogden v. Marchand*, 29 La. 61.

CHAPTER XI.

BANKS AND OTHER AGENTS FOR NEGOTIATION OR COLLECTION.

§ 323. WITH regard to the duties of agents in respect to bills and notes, it is said by Chitty, upon the authority of Beawes, that an agent employed in negotiating bills of exchange is bound : first, To endeavor to procure acceptance; secondly, On refusal, to protest for non-acceptance; thirdly; To advise the remitter of the receipt, acceptance, or protesting; and, fourthly, To advise any third person that is concerned, and all this without delay.¹ This seems to be a concise and accurate statement of the general principle, and we shall endeavor to follow into its various ramifications.

SECTION I.

BANKS AS COLLECTING AGENTS.—WHAT CONSTITUTES AGENCY AND OF WHOM THEY ARE AGENTS.

§ 324. The business of collecting commercial paper is a part of the regular business of banking; and it is not necessary that the charter of the bank should specifically confer the power to engage in it upon the bank, as it is plainly within the powers implied by the creation of such an institution.² Nor is it necessary for the bank to enter into any special contract with a person who deposits paper in it for collection, in order to invest it with all the rights, duties and liabilities of a collecting agent. Frequently the banks charge a commission for collections to be made in distant places. But the advantages arising from business associa-

¹ Chitty on Bills [*36], 48; Beawes *lex Mercatoria*, 41; *West Branch Bank v. Fulmer*, 3 Barr, 399.

² *Tyson v. State Bank*, 6 Blackf. 225.

tion, and the possible or probable temporary use of the money, are a sufficient consideration for the undertaking to collect it.¹ And although the party bound to make payment resides in a distant place, or the paper is payable at a bank in a distant place, no special directions or contract for its transmission are necessary, it being assumed that there is a tacit understanding, arising from the obvious circumstances, that such transmission is expected by the depositor, and undertaken by the bank.²

§ 325. *Effect of making paper payable at a bank.*—A bank at which negotiable paper is made payable, and at which it is deposited for collection, is the agent of the holder or depositor to receive the money at its maturity, and in no respect the agent of the parties liable for its payment; and though payment be not made at maturity, the bank has implied authority to receive the money at any time thereafter, and while the paper remains at the bank.³ Payment may, therefore, be safely made to the bank by the debtor, unless he receives actual notice not to do so.⁴ The designation of the bank as place of payment, imports a stipulation that the holder will have the paper at the bank at maturity to surrender up, and that the maker or acceptor will then pay it; and if it be not then lodged there, and the payor himself or his agent is there, with necessary funds to meet it, he so far satisfies the contract that he cannot be made responsible for any future damages, either as costs of suit or interest, for delay.⁵

§ 326. But the mere fact that a bill or note is made payable at a bank does not of itself confer any agency upon the bank, either of the payee or of the payor. In order to

¹ Halls v. Bank of the State, 3 Rich. 366; Bank of Utica v. M'Kinster, 11 Wend. 475; Bank of Utica v. Smedes, 3 Cow. 662.

² Fabens v. Mercantile Bank, 23 Pick. 330; Bank of Washington v. Triplett, 1 Peters, 25.

³ Alley v. Rogers, 19 Grat. 383; Marine Bank v. Fulton Bank, 2 Wall. 253; Ward v. Smith, 7 Wall. 447; Morse on Banking, 323.

⁴ Id.

⁵ Ward v. Smith, 7 Wall. 447.

make the bank the payee's agent to receive the money, the paper must be indorsed to, or lodged with it, for collection, or it must have received authority from the payee to collect the amount due;¹ and without such circumstances or such authority any amount which the bank receives to apply in payment, it will be deemed to have taken as the agent of the payor.² And, in like manner, it has been held that the bank is not, by the paper being made there payable, constituted the agent of the payor to make payment; nor does the receipt of such a note by the payee amount to an agreement that the maker may make a deposit at the bank of the amount of the note, and thus discharge his obligation, and that the money so deposited is at the risk of the holder of the note. The bank has no right to pay out the money of its depositor, nor can his money be taken to pay his note there payable, except by means of his verbal order or assent, or his check or draft. And where no such order, assent, check or draft has been given, the money remains at his risk, and he is liable to the holder.³ A different view is taken

¹ *Caldwell v. Evans*, 5 Bush (Ky.) 380; *Balme v. Wambaugh*, 16 Minn. 120.

² *Ward v. Smith*, 7 Wall. 447; *Pease v. Warren*, 29 Mich. 9 (1874); *Cooley, J.*: "It cannot be pretended that making a note payable at a bank can make the bank the agent of the payee to receive payment, unless the officers are disposed to accept the agency; and in this case the refusal was distinct and emphatic."

³ *National Bank v. Smith*, 12 N. Y. S. C. (5 Hun), 183; 66 N. Y. 272; *Wood v. Merchants' Saving, &c. Co.* 41 Ill. 267. In this case the note was payable "at the banking house of J. G. Conrad, Chicago." It was there presented at maturity, and marked "Good. C. W. Dunlop, Teller." At the time the maker had funds on deposit, but had given no authority to or order on the banker to pay the note. The next day Conrad failed, and made an assignment for the benefit of creditors. The court held that the maker was still bound; and Breese, J., concluding his opinion, said: "To sum up all on this point in a few words, the fact that the note was made payable at Conrad's bank, did not authorize that bank to pay the note without being so ordered by the maker, verbally, or by check or draft or other writing. The holder of the note could not, therefore, draw the funds except on the order of the maker, and the money in the bank belonging to him remained at his risk."

"It would be going too far to hold that the mere certification of a note by the bank at which it was payable, that it was 'good,' should operate to release the maker, and be held equivalent to an actual payment of the money. We

by some text writers and cases.¹ The question may be affected by a course of dealing from which an implied understanding might be inferred. If the bank make a special agreement to apply the deposit to checks,² or if instructed to do so,³ it cannot then make other application of it, even to a debt due itself.⁴ Where an agent deposits in bank the proceeds of property sold by him for his principal, under instructions thus to keep it, a trust is impressed upon the deposit in favor of the principal, and his right thereto is not affected by the fact that the agent at the same time deposited other moneys of his own; nor is it affected by the fact that the agent, instead of depositing the identical moneys received by him on account of his principal, substitutes other moneys therefor.⁵ If the bank be the owner of a bill or note thus payable, and have funds of the payer on deposit, it may claim the bill or note as offset in a suit for the deposit;⁶ and such plea may be available in equity under some circumstances, the insolvency of the payer for instance, before the maturity of the bill or note.⁷

think the better rule is to consider nothing as an actual payment which is not really such, unless there be an express agreement that something short of a payment shall be taken in lieu of it." See on this subject the Albany Law Journal, June 29, 1878, p. 500.

¹ In Byles on Bills [*19], 91, it is said: "If the funds in the banker's hands have been applied to the payment of the customer's acceptance, made payable at the banker's, though without any further authority, that is a defense (to the banker) to an action (brought by the customer) for dishonoring the (customer's) check." See also, to same effect, Byles [*188], 319; Edwards on Bills, 166, where it is said that if a note is made negotiable at a bank, "the maker authorizes the bank to pay it out of his funds on deposit, or by advancing the amount to his credit." *Mandeville v. Union Bank*, 9 Cranch, 11. In this latter case the note was negotiable at the bank. See ante, § 167; *Keymer v. Laurie*, 18 L. J. Q. B. 218 (1849), *Patteson, J.*: "The plaintiff, by making the acceptance payable at the defendants' (banking house), clearly authorized them to pay it." See also, *Thatcher v. Bank*, 5 Sandf. 121.

² *Wilson v. Dawson*, 53 Ind. 513.

³ *Egerton v. Fulton Nat. Bank*, 43 How. Pr. 216.

⁴ *Id.*

⁵ *Van Alen v. American Nat. Bank*, 52 N. Y. 4. See *Overseers of the Poor v. Bank of Va.* 2 Grat. 547.

⁶ *Ford v. Thornton*, 3 Leigh. 695.

⁷ *Ford v. Thornton*, 3 Leigh. 695.

SECTION II.

RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF BANKS OR OTHER COLLECTING AGENTS.

§ 327. It is the duty of the bank as soon as the bill, note or check is placed in its hands for collection, to take the appropriate steps necessary to its prompt payment or prompt acceptance, by making presentment for acceptance without delay, and presentment for payment at maturity. And if the instrument be not duly accepted or paid, the bank must take all necessary steps to fix the liability of the drawer, if it be a foreign bill, by placing it in the hands of a notary for protest, and by giving due notice of its dishonor to the party who indorsed the instrument to it for collection, whether it be a bill or note, inland or foreign. If the bank fail in any of these duties, it becomes immediately liable in damages to the holder.¹ And it will be no defense that it was unaccustomed to undertake collections, and that its error arose from want of familiarity with the ordinary course of proceedings.² Nor that it acted in accordance with its own best views of the requirements of law, as where it presented a bill without allowing grace, conceiving it to be a check.³

§ 328. The theory of this rule is, that the receipt by the bank of negotiable paper, deposited for collection, forms an implied undertaking to make the demands and protests, and give the notices required by law or mercantile usage, for the perfect protection of the holder's rights against all previous parties, for which undertaking the use of the funds thus temporarily obtained, or of the average balances thereof, for the purposes of discount or exchange, forms a valuable consideration.⁴ And so valuable frequently is this consideration,

¹ *West Branch Bank v. Fulmer*, 3 Barr, 399, Gibson C. J.; *Merchants' Nat. Bank v. Stafford Nat. Bank*, 44 Conn. 567; *Beawes Lex Mercatoria*, 41. See *Bird v. La. State Bank*, 93 U. S. 97.

² *Ivory v. Bank of State*, 36 Mo. 475.

³ *Georgia Nat. Bank v. Henderson*, 46 Ga. 493 (1870).

⁴ *Allen v. Merchants' Bank*, 22 Wend. 215, Verplanck, Senator.

that collections constitute a most lucrative branch of the business of banking, and are often so desirable as a means of acquiring exchange which is above par, that the allowance of a small premium by the collecting bank for the privilege of making such collections is not unusual.¹

§ 329. *The measure of damages* which the holder is entitled to recover of the bank, or other collecting agent, who has been guilty of negligence or default in respect to it, is the actual loss which has been suffered.² That loss is *prima facie* the amount of the bill or note placed in its or his hands; but evidence is admissible to reduce it to a nominal sum.³

§ 330. *Duty of collecting bank to present for acceptance.*—Elsewhere in this volume, it will be seen that bills payable upon a certain day—say, for instance, thirty days after date—need not be presented for acceptance, but only for payment at maturity. If such a bill, however, be placed in the hands of a bank or other agent for collection, the principle which exonerates the holder as between him and the drawer and indorsers from making presentment for acceptance, does not apply as between the collecting agent and himself. While the holder is not himself bound to make such presentment, it is his interest that it shall be done; and as has been well said respecting a bill placed in an agent's hands: "it is the duty of a faithful agent to do for his principal whatever the principal himself would probably have done if he was a discreet and prudent man. Even where the principal is habitually negligent in attending to his own interests, it forms no excuse for similar negligence on the part of his agent."⁴ Therefore it has been considered that an

¹ Reeves v. State Bank of Ohio, 8 Ohio St. 480.

² Bank of Washington v. Triplett, 1 Pet. 25; Tyson v. State Bank, 6 Blackf. 225; Merchants' Bank v. Stafford Bank, 44 Conn. 567.

³ Van Wart v. Woolley, 5 Dow. & R. 374; Allen v. Suydam, 20 Wend. 321; Borup v. Nininger, 5 Minn. 523.

⁴ Allen v. Suydam, 20 Wend. 321. See Chapter XVII, on Presentment for Acceptance, and authorities quoted.

Allen v. Suydam, 20 Wend. 321 (1838), confirming s. c. 17 Wend. 368, Ver-

agent would be liable to the owner for any damages resulting from the non-presentment of such a bill.

planck, Senator, said : " The principle is familiar that an agent for pay is bound to use such means, care, skill and precaution as are adequate to the due execution of his trust. He must use the ordinary diligence of a skillful and prudent man in such affairs. Now an early presentment for acceptance is an obvious precaution, which a prudent man of business would take to insure collection of a questionable draft. By this neglect or delay, the payees were prevented from making those demands and taking such immediate measures as to the drawer, on receipt of notice of non-acceptance, as might possibly have secured the payees in some way or other. At the late period at which they did receive such notice, they preferred looking to the responsibility of their agents. These must be held responsible for the consequences of their negligence to the amount of the damage so caused. Nor is it a sufficient defense of the agents, that the bill would not have been accepted if immediately presented, because the drawer had directed that it should not be, nor that it was uncertain whether the funds in the hands of the drawees were sufficient or not to meet the draft at the day fixed for payment. At and after the time when the draft should have been presented, the drawer was in business at New York, struggling for and obtaining credit, and having the command of funds which he applied to pay other drafts presented subsequently to the date, when with due diligence notice of the non-acceptance of this bill would have been received. Whatever might have been his first intention, it was not for a court and jury to assume the broad presumption that an immediate demand, upon return of the draft, with such other legal measures as the state of business between the parties or other circumstances might render advisable, would not have led to the ultimate payment. As a mere conjectural inference from the character and course of business of Eastabrook, as incidentally presented in the evidence, I should think the probability rather the other way, and that immediate and urgent measures might, perhaps, have prevented loss. His death and the consequent insolvency of his estate, have left all this mere matter of conjecture; but it is quite immaterial as to the question of the agent's duty and the right of action against him, though were it distinctly in evidence either way, it might affect the measure of damages.

" Thus far, then, I think the law quite clear as to the rights of holders of bills and the duties of collecting agents, but I have had more hesitation as to the rule of damages. Is the plaintiff in similar cases to be obliged to make out in evidence the precise actual amount of the damage he sustained, and thus give to the party in fault all the numerous and great advantages of doubt, uncertainty and difficulty in the proof? Or are we to apply to these cases the doctrine of *laches* in commercial paper, as between the holder and other parties, and consider the agent as having made the paper his own by his neglect? Contradictory as these rules are, they have yet each their share of authority, and are just and wise when applied to other questions; but I am not satisfied with the equity in the commercial policy of either, when applied to a collecting agency, and I have sought in the decisions for some safer and more equitable doctrine on that head.

" Considering the subject in regard to commercial policy, there is, on one side, the vast amount of paper daily collected through our banks, the great pub-

§ 331. *How collecting bank should give notice of dishonor.*—Sometimes a bank holding indorsed paper for collection sends notice in the event of its dishonor to the indorser from whom it was received. Sometimes it sends notices not only to him, but also to the drawer and to all the indorsers, addressed to their post-offices, or delivered at their places of business, respectively. Sometimes it encloses notices for all the parties entitled thereto under one envelope in company with notice to the last indorser, that he may thus be conveniently supplied with the means of transmitting notice to the successive indorsers, and to the drawer, antecedent to him, if such there be. But how far the duty of the bank extends in this regard, and what it must do to discharge itself of liability is a question upon which opinion has divided. The weight of authority, however, is strongly to the effect, and

lic necessity for giving every facility and inducement to such collections, the serious drawback on those facilities and inducements that would be occasioned, and the opportunity of fraud afforded, if worthless paper deposited for collection can, whenever parties are discharged by the blunder of a clerk, be saddled irrevocably on responsible agents, and “made their own” absolutely, and without allowing any defense or mitigation of damages. On the other hand, the policy of holding such agents to strict accountability is equally clear. Our whole system of negotiable paper and its responsibilities, formed, as it is, by long experience, and admirably adjusted to the varied uses of commerce, rests upon the single principle of strict punctuality in demands, presentments and notices, as well as in payments. Now, the policy and necessity of that punctuality apply with the same force to the agent of such paper that they do to the principal. I can, therefore, find no sounder rule of damages, nor one better protecting and reconciling all these claims of policy and justice, than that pointed out by the decisions in a large class of cases of agency, and by the analogy of the measure of damages in trover. In those cases the presumption is, in the first instance, to the full nominal amount of the loss, as it appears on the face of the transaction against the agent wanting in diligence, or the party guilty of the tortious conversion. Thus, where an agent or factor neglects to insure for his principal, according to order, he is held responsible for the default *prima facie*, to the total amount which he ought to have covered by insurance. But, at the same time, he is allowed to put himself in the place of the underwriter, and to prove fraud, deviation, or any other defense which would have been good, had the insurance been made, or which would go to show that nothing at all, or how much, was actually lost by the neglect. *Delancy v. Stoddart*, 1 T. R. 22; *Wallace v. Telfair*, 2 Id. 188; *Webster v. De Tastat*, 7 Id. 757. In the courts of this State, *Rundle v. Moore*, 3 Johns. Cas. 36. And in the courts of the United States, *Morris v. Summeril*, 2 Wash. R. 203. See also 1 Phil. on Ins. 521, and the cases there cited.”

the law may be assumed to be, that it is only necessary for the bank to notify its immediate predecessor, that is, the party from whom it received the paper, no matter what may be the nature of the title or interest of that party to or in it.¹ But special circumstances may vary this general principle. Thus an agreement between the bank and its principal may vary it.² So also may a usage of the collecting bank.³ And a local usage, as in the city of New York, for the collecting bank to notify all parties entitled to notice would undoubtedly be respected and enforced.⁴

§ 332. *In respect to a check put in bank for collection* from another bank located in the same place, the collecting bank may present it for payment at any time before the close of banking hours on the business day next following that on which it comes into possession of the check.⁵ The holder of the check, whether he be the payee, or an indorsee, is obliged to present it within a like time from the day of its date, in order to escape all contingency of loss; and if on the day after it is drawn he places it in another bank for collection, instead of presenting it at the counter of the drawee bank for payment, he takes the peril of loss upon himself without recourse against the drawer, should the drawee bank fail in the mean time; and without recourse against the collecting bank by reason of its not presenting the check until a day later.⁶

¹ Phipps v. Milbury Bank, 8 Mete. 79; Bank U. S. v. Goddard, 5 Mason, 366; State Bank v. Bank of the Capitol, 41 Barb. 343; Spencer v. Ballou, 18 N. Y. 327; Mead v. Engs, 5 Cow. 303; Howard v. Ives, 1 Hill, 263; Farmers' Bank v. Vail, 21 N. Y. 485; Bank of Mobile v. Huggins, 3 Ala. N. S. 206; Branch Bank v. Knox, Id.

² State Bank v. Bank of the Capitol, 41 Barb. 343, where notification to a part only of the indorsers was held evidence going to show an agreement to notify all.

³ Morse on Banking, 340.

⁴ Smedes v. Bank of Utica, 20 Johns, 372; 3 Cow. 662.

⁵ Boddington v. Schlencker, 4 B. & Ad. 752; 1 Nev. & M. 540; Alexander v. Burchfield, Car. & M. 75; 3 Scott N. R. 555; 7 Man. & G. 1061; Moule v. Brown, 4 Bing. N. C. 266; 5 Scott, 694; Hare v. Henty, 10 C. B. N. S. 65; Rickford v. Ridge, 2 Camp. 537. See Vol. II, Chapter XLIX, on Checks.

⁶ Morse on Banking, 324; Moule v. Brown, 4 Bing. N. C. 266 (33 E. C. L. R.)

§ 333. *When collecting bank bound to pay amount.*—The collecting bank is not bound to pay the amount of a bill, note or check placed in its hands for collection to the holder, until such amount is received, or would be received but for the default of itself or some agent for whose act it is responsible. It is frequently the case that for the accommodation of customers they are permitted to draw before, and in anticipation of the reception of such amounts. But this habit is mere favor, and, though long continued, gives the customer no right to demand that it be done in any particular case.¹ And although a bank, according to its custom, put to its customer's credit the amount of a bill deposited for collection, deducting the proper discount, and he was thereafter entitled to draw upon it, it has been held in England that upon a subsequent failure of the bank before collection, the customer could recover the bills specifically, no title to the bank having passed; or that he could recover the amount from the assignees if the collection had been made.²

§ 334. As soon as the bank collects the money, it becomes the debtor of the depositor of the instrument for collection—especially if it places the amount with its other funds, and uses it as its own, although it be credited on the account of such depositor,³ and although instructed to hold it subject to his order, which the very deposit itself would imply.⁴ And if it receive, by the depositor's instructions, the amount of the instrument in specific bank bills, which are at the time depreciated, any subsequent depreciation will be at the risk of the bank if it uses them as its own, instead of holding them as a bailment.⁵ But the depreciation of the currency of payment at the time of payment would be the depositor's loss.⁶

¹ Scott v. Ocean Bank, 23 N. Y. 289; Morse on Banking, 365.

² Giles v. Perkins, 9 East, 13.

³ Marine Bank v. Fulton Bank, 2 Wall. 253; Bank U. S. v. Bank of Ga. 10 Wheat 333; Wallace v. McConnell, 13 Pet. 136; Levy v. Bank U. S. 4 Dall. 234.

⁴ Marine Bank v. Fulton Bank, 2 Wall. 253.

⁵ Id.

⁶ Marine Bank v. Fulton Bank, *supra*; Morse on Banking, 369.

§ 335. *Currency to be Collected.*—Without special authority, a bank or other agent for collection can only receive payment of the debt due the principal in the legal currency of the country, or in bills which pass as money at their par value by the common consent of the community; and such bank or agent will not be authorized by the circumstance that they were the principal currency in which the ordinary transactions of business were conducted to receive depreciated bank bills or other depreciated bills issued as a circulating medium.¹ Clearly an agent for collection would have no implied authority to receive payment in goods; and the party bound for payment is chargeable with notice of the agent's authority.² The collecting agent has no right to accept certification of a check, instead of payment. By doing so he assumes the risk of payment, and becomes liable to the owner for the amount of the check with interest from the day of certification. The law presumes damages to the owner of the check in such a case, and it is unnecessary to prove them.³

¹ Ward v. Smith, 7 Wall. 447; Alley v. Rogers, 19 Grat. 366 (1839), in which case Moncure, J., said: "In regard to notes deposited in a bank for collection during the war, when Confederate money was the only currency, they might properly have been paid in such money, at least without notice that other money was demanded. To have made such a deposit without such a notice could have been for no other purpose and with no other expectation than to get Confederate money. In regard to notes payable at bank before the war, deposited for collection and protested for non-payment, but neglected to be withdrawn from bank by the owner residing in this State, it might be very questionable whether, after the lapse of two or three years, the bank would have authority to receive payment of such notes in a currency which came into existence after the protest of the note, and which, at the time of such payment, had depreciated in value as twelve to one compared with specie, in which payment might legally be demanded; or whether the debtor, having notice of the facts, could make a valid payment of the note in such a currency and under such circumstances." But in this case the notes were payable to a resident of the State of Kentucky, who had deposited them at the bank before the war, and it was held that to receive payment in Confederate currency under these circumstances was not authorized in the bank, and did not release the debtor.

² Mudgett v. Day, 12 Cal. 139.

³ Essex Co. Nat. Bank v. Bank of Montreal, 7 Bissell, 193.

SECTION III.

THE MANNER OF PLACING COMMERCIAL PAPER IN BANK FOR COLLECTION, AND THE RIGHTS OF THE COLLECTING BANK.

§ 336. As to the manner of placing a bill, note or check in bank for collection, it is always better to indorse it specially to the bank, with the restrictive words, "for collection," superadded. Those words evince a clear indication that the indorser does not intend to bind himself by his indorsement, or to part with his legal title to the proceeds of collection. They prevent the danger which would arise from the loss or misappropriation of the paper if it were indorsed in blank. And by showing that the indorser only constitutes the bank his agent for collection, it forestalls any difficulty in accounting between subsequent banks.¹

§ 337. *Rights between Banks.*—The importance of this precaution is often exhibited where one bank claims a lien upon the securities, really or ostensibly another's, for balances or advancements. As a general rule, a bank has a general lien on all securities in its hands belonging to a customer for the general balance due from the latter;² and if the bank A., which receives a note indorsed in blank by the holder H. for collection, transmits it to bank B., which has a general balance against bank A., the question arises whether or not it may apply the proceeds of the note to the discharge of such balance as against H., its actual holder and owner. Clearly, if the bank B. knew the fact that the bank A. was not the real owner of the note, it could not do so;³ and we think that the question simply resolves itself into the inquiry whether or not the bank B. can be regarded as a *bona fide*

¹ Sweeney v. Easter, 1 Wall. 173 (1863); Cecil Bank v. Farmers' Bank, 22 Md. 148.

² Davis v. Bowsher, 5 T. R. 488; Bank of Metropolis v. New England Bank, 1 How. 239; Van Amee v. Bank of Troy, 8 Barb. 315.

³ Van Amee v. Bank of Troy, 8 Barb. 315 (1850); Bank of Metropolis v. New England Bank, 6 How. 227 (1848).

holder of the note without notice of any defect of title—or at least is to be decided by exactly the same principles that apply to the rights of such a holder.

§ 338. The United States Supreme Court has stated the doctrine with admirable clearness, that if the B. bank, actually in possession of the proceeds of collection, had regarded and treated the A. bank as the owner of the paper transmitted, it would be entitled to retain such proceeds as against the real owners, provided that upon the credit of such remittances, made or anticipated in the usual course of dealing between them, balances had been suffered to remain in the hands of the A. bank to be met by the proceeds of such paper.¹ In other words, that the B. bank could retain the funds whenever they could be regarded applied by agreement to the payment of the pre-existing debt; and that the paper being received under a blank indorsement would be evidence of title in the A. bank, and its transmission to the B. bank as evidence of application to such debt, when the course of dealing between the two authorized such inference.

§ 339. In New York the opposite doctrine is followed, but mainly upon the ground peculiar to the decisions of that State, that receiving negotiable paper in payment of, or as security for, an antecedent debt, is not such a valuable consideration as to constitute the holder a holder for value; and that the case is not altered by a long course of dealings between the parties, by which the bank claiming to retain the proceeds has been in the habit of receiving payment of balances due in notes, or has omitted to collect a balance by reason of an expectation or promise of payment of it in notes, or in consequence of the omission to collect it after taking such a note in payment.² And it is there held that

¹ *Bank of Metropolis v. New England Bank*, 6 How. 227 (1848), Taney, C. J., explaining and confirming same case in 1 How. 234 (1843).

² *McBride v. Farmers' Bank*, 26 N. Y. 454 (1863), Balcom J.; *Van Amee v. Bank of Troy*, 8 Barb. 322 (1850), Hand, J.; *Commercial Bank of Clyde v. Marine Bank*, 1 Abb. 405 (1867), Court of Appeals decisions; *Lindauer v. Fourth Nat. Bank*, 55 Barb. 75 (1869); *Dod v. Fourth Nat. Bank*, 59 Barb. 265 (1871).

it is only where, by express contracts or well established course of dealing, the correspondent becomes responsible for the collection, and cannot seek reimbursement for advances, in case of non-payment of the paper, that he can retain it or the proceeds of collection, as against the real owner, the mere giving credit for the amount not being sufficient.¹ And in Connecticut, it has been denied altogether that the custom of transmitting bills for collection from one bank to another, and crediting in account the avails to over-balances due, can affect the claims of the actual owner, on the ground that a usage between the banks could not deprive a third person of his rights.²

§ 340. But the views of the United States Supreme Court seem to us to embody the true logic of the question. The bank transmitting the paper indorsed in blank is ostensibly its owner. It has agreed, by implied contract arising from usage, that the avails shall be applied to balances against it. With this understanding, its correspondent undertakes the collection and applies the avails. And then, when this contract has been executed, it would seem to be in contravention of the universally recognized principles which control the negotiation of commercial paper, to permit a third party, who had declared by his form of indorsement that he had parted with title, to come in and assert it. If he chooses not to adopt the well-known form of indorsement—"for collection"—he should not be permitted to deny, against the bank which has collected the paper, the legal effect of that form of indorsement which he chose to adopt.³

¹ Dickerson v. Wason, 47 N. Y. 439 (1872); reversing 54 Barb. 220 (1869); Dod v. Fourth Nat. Bank, 59 Barb. 275 (1871).

² Lawrence v. Stonington Bank, 6 Conn. 529, Hosmer, C. J. (1827).

³ In Bank of Washington v. Triplett, 1 Pct 30 (1828), Marshall, C. J., used language which militates against this view. But the cases referred to *supra* are subsequent, and may be regarded as overruling the above case *pro tanto*. He said: "The custom to indorse a bill put in bank for collection is universal; and the Bank of Washington had no more reason to suppose that Triplett & Neales (the payees and indorsers) had ceased to be the real holders from their indorsement, than for supposing that the cashier of the Bank of Washington had become

SECTION IV.

HOW FAR BANK LIABLE FOR DEFAULT OF NOTARY, SUBAGENT OR CORRESPONDENT BANK.

§ 341. What is the extent of the duty and responsibility of the collecting bank in taking the steps necessary to collection, or fixing the parties' liabilities, is a question of difficulty. How far it is liable for the neglect or default of the notary which it employs to perform notarial functions? or of the subagent or corresponding bank to which it may confide the paper? Thus, suppose A., residing in Richmond, Virginia, holds a note payable in New York, and deposits it in "The State Bank" at Richmond for collection, the bank in Richmond forwards it to the "First National Bank" in New York city, which is its correspondent, and the latter places it in the hands of a notary public, to make demand and protest, and to forward notice to the indorsers. The question arises, then, whether the "State Bank" of Richmond has fully discharged its duty, and absolved itself from all farther liability by the due transmission of the note in its course for collection.

There are several classes of cases in which the courts have pronounced different views of this question.

The first class maintains the absolute liability of the bank for any negligence or default of the notary, agent or correspondent, as well as of its own immediate servants, regarding it, by the act of undertaking the collection, as obligating itself to see that every proper measure is taken, and not inquiring whether it has itself been guilty of any negligence or not, or whether the parties reside at the place of its location or not. This doctrine has become firmly established in the jurisprudence of New York, the leading case of *Allen v. Merchants' Bank*, decided by the Court of Errors, having been followed by numerous others, and the question being considered there as *res adjudicata*.¹

the real holder by the indorsement to him." The view that the indorsement in blank puts the bank on inquiry is also taken in *Van Amee v. Bank of Troy*, 8 Barb. 322.

¹ *Allen v. Merchants' Bank*, 22 Wend. 215, overruling s. c. 15 Wend. 432;

The second class of cases requires the bank to prove that it exercised due care and diligence in selecting a competent and trustworthy notary, agent or correspondent. This much is perfectly agreed, but these cases hold it sufficient, and exonerate the bank from all liability beyond making such a selection.

There is implied authority, in the deposit for collection, to employ a subagent, as they hold, and such subagent is really the agent of the holder, and not of the bank, which is only bound to act judiciously in selecting him.¹

A third class of cases holds that where a bank receives a bill or note for collection against a drawer or maker, resident at the place of the bank, or where the bank undertakes for its collection by their own officers, there can be no doubt that it would be liable for any loss that might result from neglect. But they consider that where such an instrument is received for collection at a point distant from the location of the bank, the bank discharges its duty by sending it in due season to a competent, reliable agent, with proper instructions.²

Walker v. Bank of N. Y. 5 Seld. 582; Ayrault v. Pacific Bank, 47 N. Y. 573, Allen, J., saying: "A bank receiving a bill or promissory note for collection, whether payable at its counter or elsewhere, is liable for any neglect of duty occurring in its collection by which any of the parties are discharged, whether of the officers and immediate servants, or other agents of the bank, or its correspondents, or agents employed by such correspondents. If the bank employs a notary to present a promissory note for payment, and give the proper notices to charge the parties, the notary is the agent of the bank, and not of the depositor or owner of the paper. A notary is not necessarily employed, as the service can be performed by any clerk or other servant of the bank. This general liability may be varied by express contract or by implication arising from general usage." Montgomery County Bank v. Albany City Bank, 3 Seld. 459 (1852); Commercial Bank of Penn. v. Union Bank, 1 Kern. 211 (1854); Donner v. Madison County Bank, 6 Hill, 648; Reeves v. State Bank, 8 Ohio St. 465; Hyde v. First Nat. Bank, 7 Bissell, 156.

¹ Stacy v. Dane County Bank, 12 Wis. 629; Bellemire v. Bank U. S. 4 Whart. 105; Baldwin v. Bank of La. 1 La. Ann. R. 13; Hyde v. Planters' Bank, 17 La. 566; Frazier v. Gas Bank, 2 Rob. 296; Warren Bank v. Suffolk Bank, 10 Cush. 532; see also Jackson v. Union Bank, 6 Har. & J. 146, which is an interesting case; 1 Parsons N. & B. 480.

² Dorchester, &c. Bank v. New England Bank, 1 Cush. 186; Fabens v. Mercantile Bank, 23 Pick. 330. The Court saying: "It is well settled that when a

§ 342. The cases which hold the bank absolutely liable for any laches or negligence, whereby the holder of the paper suffers loss, commend themselves to our approbation. Any other rule opens the door to carelessness in the conduct of banking business, which should be conducted with every safeguard to the customer who intrusts his interests to the keeping of such agents. If they are averse to dealing with distant and unknown parties, they should decline undertaking the collection or handling of the paper; and if they assume it, they should do so for sufficient compensation, and be held responsible. If unwilling to take charge of the collection under this implied understanding, they should insist on a special contract, or refuse it. General usage might vary this liability, but the mere practice of banks for their own convenience would raise no implication of such usage.¹

§ 343. In a number of cases where a notary public was employed to make demand and protest, or give notice, stress has been laid upon the circumstance that such an officer is an agent provided by law, and holding a governmental commission to perform these functions, and that the bank has a right *prima facie* to repose a confidence in his official character, which it could not, save upon its own responsibility, repose in an unofficial employee.² Professor Parsons, taking this view, compares the notary to the "mail service."³

note is deposited with a bank for collection, which is payable at another place, the whole duty of the bank so receiving the note, in the first instance, is seasonably to transmit the same to a suitable bank or other agent at the place of payment. And as a part of the same doctrine, it is well settled that, if the acceptor of a bill or promisor of a note has his residence in another place, it shall be presumed to have been intended and understood between the depositor for collection and the bank that it was to be transmitted to the place of the residence of the promisor." *East Haddam Bank v. Savill*, 12 Conn. 303; *Etna Ins. Co. v. Alton City Bank*, 12 Conn. 303; *Daly v. Butchers' & Drovers' Bank*, 56 Mo. 94.

¹ *Ayrault v. Pacific Bank*, 47 N. Y. 570.

² *Baldwin v. Bank of La.* 1 La. Ann R. 13; *Bellmire v. Bank U. S.* 4 Whart. 105; *Bank of Mobile v. Huggins*, 3 Ala. 206; *Tiernan v. Commercial Bank*, 7 How. (Miss.) 618; *Agricultural Bank v. Commercial Bank*, 7 S. & M. 592; *Stacy v. Dane County Bank*, 12 Wis. 629.

³ 1 Parsons N. & B. 480.

Thus, in Mississippi, it has been held that a notary was to be regarded *prima facie* as a competent and suitable person to intrust with such duties; but if the plaintiff proved that he was not a competent and faithful person, by reason of his intemperate habits when the note was delivered to him, the bank which committed it to him was liable for any negligence or default on his part from which damage resulted.¹ But, in a subsequent case, it was held, in the same State, that it was not sufficient proof of a notary's unfitness to show that he was a man of habitually dissipated character, but that it must be shown "that he was drunk at the time he took the note."²

But if the notary is so employed by the bank as to become its own officer, like its cashier or teller, the bank is liable for all his defaults, because he is placed on the same footing as its regular bank officials, and acts in discharge of certain allotted functions. Thus, in Missouri, where any private individual is allowed to perform all notarial duties, and a bank appointed a person to be its notary for one year, and required a bond from him, it was held that he was an officer of the bank, for whose defaults in the line of his employment the bank was liable.³

SECTION V.

REMEDY OF THE HOLDER AGAINST COLLECTING AGENT.

§ 344. The authorities differ greatly as to the remedy of the holder and owner of a bill or note, when one of a series of banks through which it passes in the course of collection, or the notary employed to make presentment or protest, has committed a default whereby loss has ensued. One class of cases holds that only the first bank which received the paper for collection is liable to the holder, the contract for collec-

¹ Agricultural Bank v. Commercial Bank, 7 How. (Miss.) 648.

² Bowling v. Arthur, 34 Miss. 41.

³ Gerhardt v. Boatman's Savings Inst. 38 Mo. 60.

tion being between him and it, and it alone being his agent,¹ Another class of cases holds that the holder can sue only the bank or the notary which committed the default, such bank or notary being the agent of the owner, selected for him by the bank which received the paper for collection, under implied authority from the holder to do so.² And still another doctrine has been declared that the holder has an election as to the remedy, and may resort to either party—the first bank employed to collect the paper, or the one to whom it was transmitted, and which actually does the act of default complained of.³

§ 345. A distinction has been taken which, though fine, seems reasonable, between cases in which the paper is put in bank “for collection,” and those in which it is there placed to be “transmitted for collection.” And it has been held that, in the latter case, the first bank performs its whole duty, and discharges itself from further liability, by trans-

¹ *Montgomery County Bank v. Albany City Bank*, 3 Seld. 459 (1852), case in point; *Commercial Bank v. Union Bank*, 1 Kern. 212 (1854). [These cases over-rule *Bank of Orleans v. Smith*, 3 Hill, 560 (1842)]. See *McBride v. Farmer's Bank*, 26 N. Y. 450; *Hyde v. First National Bank*, 7 Bissell, 156. *Hopkins, J.*, saying: “It follows that the owner is to look to his immediate contractor, and has no remedy against the under-contractor or agent employed by the bank; that such agents or contractors have no privity of contract with the owner, and are not liable to him, but are only liable to the party immediately employing them; in short, that the subagent employed by the bank owes no duty to the party who deposited the paper for collection with his principal, and hence is not responsible to him for any damages. This, I understand to be the effect and meaning of the late decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of *Hoover, Assignee v. Wise*, 8 Chicago Legal News, 193 (1 Otto, 91 U. S. 308).” See also *Reeves v. State Bank*, 8 Ohio St. 465; *Mackay v. Ramsay*, 9 Clark & Fin. 818.

² *Farmers' Bank of Va. v. Owen*, 5 Cranch C. C. 504 (1838); see *Mechanics' Bank v. Earp*, 4 Rawle, 386; *Bank of Washington v. Triplett*, 1 Pet. 25.

In *Wilson v. Smith*, 3 How. 769, the U. S. Supreme Court, per Taney, C. J., held that the subagent for collection might be sued by the holder. Taney, C. J., said: “We think the rule very clearly established, that whenever, by express agreement between the parties, a subagent is to be employed by the agent to receive money for the principal, or where an authority to do so may be fairly implied from the usual course of trade, the principal may treat the subagent as his agent; and where he has received the money, may recover it in an action for money had and received.”

³ *Bank of Orleans v. Smith*, 3 Hill (N. Y.) 563, Nelson, C. J.

mitting the paper duly in course of collection ;¹ while, in the former, it undertakes to collect the paper, and is absolutely bound if it be not properly attended to, whatever agency it may employ.² Where nothing is said upon the subject, and the contract is to be implied from the mere act of placing the paper in the bank, we should say that, by accepting it, it undertook absolutely its collection.

§ 346. If the paper change ownership after being left at a bank for collection, it seems that an action will lie against the bank for negligence by any person who becomes beneficially interested.³

§ 347. Instructions to the collecting bank or other agent, given by the holder in respect to the method to be pursued in collecting or protesting the paper, or notifying any of the parties, must be duly transmitted ; and if the bank fail to do so, it is bound for any resulting damage.⁴ Thus, where bankers at St. Paul, Minnesota, received paper for collection payable at St. Anthony, were informed that there were two persons of the same name as the indorser, the one residing at St. Paul, and the other at Nininger, and that the latter was the indorser (which the note did not state), they should

¹ *Bank of Washington v. Triplett*, 1 Pet. 28, 30. The payees of a bill indorsed it in blank, and delivered it to the cashier of the Mechanics' Bank of Alexandria, "for the purpose of being transmitted through the said bank to a bank in Washington for collection." The cashier indorsed it to the order of the Bank of Washington, and transmitted it to it for collection ; and suit was brought by the holder against the Bank of Washington for damages, on the ground of negligence in failing to give proper notice of non-acceptance. Marshall, C. J., said : "The bill was not delivered to the Mechanics' Bank of Alexandria for collection, but for transmission to some bank in Washington to be collected. That bank would, of course, become the agent of the holder. By transmitting the bill as directed, the Mechanics' Bank performed its duty, and the whole responsibility of collection devolved on the bank which received the bill for that purpose ; the Mechanics' Bank was the mere channel through which Triplett and Neale (the payees) transmitted the bill to the Bank of Washington." See also, *Mechanics' Bank v. Earp*, 4 Rawle, 386 ; *Allen v. Merchants' Bank*, 22 Wend. 235.

² *Montgomery County Bank v. Albany City Bank*, 3 Seld. 462, Jewett, J. .

³ *Bank of Utica v. M'Kinster*, 11 Wend. 475.

⁴ *Borup v. Nininger*, 5 Minn. 523 ; *Merchants' Bank v. Stafford Bank*, 44 Conn. 567.

have transmitted such information to their agents at St. Anthony, and failing therein, were liable in damages to the holder of the paper.¹

§ 348. Collections are sometimes undertaken by express companies, and they come then within the rule laid down. Thus, where an express company received a draft for collection, with instructions to return it at once if not paid, and on demand of the drawee, he refused to pay until certain explanations were received from the drawer, whereupon the company consented to wait until the drawee could communicate with the drawer; and he receiving satisfactory explanations, was ready to pay, and so remained two days without renewed demand from the company, but on the fourth day (the third being Sunday) became insolvent, the company was held liable to the drawer for the loss.²

§ 349. When the owner of a bill or note sends it to a notary or correspondent for collection, he has a right to anticipate that the maker or acceptor will honor his paper, and it is not incumbent on him to inform the holder for collection where notices shall be sent, in the event of dishonor to the drawer or indorsers. The "due diligence" required by law it is incumbent on the holder for collection to exercise by making proper inquiries; and if he is not in default, the owner may recover.³ It might be otherwise where the collector is a mere servant of the owner, acting under his supervision.⁴

¹ Borup v. Nininger, *supra*.

² Whitney v. Merchants' Union Express Co. 104 Mass. 152.

³ Bartlett v. Isbell, 31 Conn. 297.

⁴ Bartlett v. Isbell, *supra*.

CHAPTER XII.

PARTNERS AS PARTIES TO NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.

SECTION I.

NATURE AND VARIETIES OF COPARTNERSHIP.

§ 350. A partnership exists whenever two or more persons unite skill, labor or property in an undertaking, and participate in its profits; unless such participation in the profits be by way of services as an employee without interest in, or control of, the subject-matter, in which case the participant is not a partner.¹ Partners are of several kinds. I. Actual and ostensible. II. Secret or dormant. III. Nominal or ostensible. IV. General. V. Special or limited. VI. Retired.

In the first case, where the partner is both actual and ostensible, there can be no difficulty in fixing his liability, which is palpable, although his name may not be expressed in the style of the firm. Secret or dormant partners are just as liable, when they are discovered, as those who are ostensible, because, participating as they do in the profits, they are held equally liable for losses. But in case of withdrawal from the firm, no notice is necessary, the secrecy of their connection with it rendering it superfluous.² And the dormant partner who retires will not therefore be bound on a note made in the firm name after dissolution.³

§ 351. In an English case, it was said by Bayley, B.: "We are of opinion that where a partnership name is pledged, the partnership, of whomsoever it may consist, whether the partners are named in the firm or not, and whether they are

¹ Ogden v. Astor, 4 Sandf. 311; Vandenburg v. Hall, 20 Wend. 70.

² Davis v. Allen, 3 N. Y. 168; Magill v. Merrie, 5 B. Mon. 168; Scott v. Colmisnil, 7 J. J. Marsh. 416; 1 Parsons on Contracts, 143.

³ Vacarro v. Toof, 9 Heiskell, 194.

known or secret partners, will be bound, unless the conduct or title of the person who seeks to charge them can be impeached."¹ Where a bill of exchange has been drawn, accepted or indorsed in the name of a firm, as for instance, "Brown, Robinson & Co.," without stating the names of each of the partners, the holder may sue only those known to him to be partners at the time he received the bill; and though he may, if he pleases, sue all whom he discovers afterward to be partners, he is not obliged to do so.²

§ 352. A mere nominal or ostensible partner is as much bound by the negotiable paper, or other engagements of the firm, as if actual; for if he suffer himself to be held out to the world as a member, he authorizes third persons to regard him as a contracting party. If such partner desires to avoid liability, he must give due notice that he is not an actual partner.³

A general partnership is such as exists by operation of law when two or more persons combine in an undertaking and share the profits, and in which all are jointly and severally bound for all the partnership debts. A special or limited partnership is one in which the special partner contributes to the common stock a specific sum in actual cash, and is liable only to that extent for the debts of the partnership. This privilege is granted by statute in most of the States, being unknown to the common law, and is accompanied by stringent conditions.⁴

§ 353. When a copartner, who has not been secret or dormant, retires from a firm, he should take immediate steps to acquaint all having business connections with the firm of his retirement, in order that they may be apprised that he no longer designs to be held responsible for its transactions.

Personal notice to those indebted to, or doing business

¹ Wintle v. Crowther, 1 Tyrw. 215; 1 Crompt. & J. 310; see *ex parte* Hamper, 17 Ves. 403.

² De Mantort v. Saunders, 1 Bar. & Adol. 398.

³ 1 Parsons N. & B. 142, 143; Davis v. Allen, 3 N. Y. 172.

⁴ Edwards on Bills, 106, 107.

with the firm, by circular letters addressed to them or otherwise, and advertisement in a public journal, is the proper and business-like way to proceed. And when these steps are taken, they are sufficient notice for the purpose of exonerating the retiring partner from further liability.¹ But unless notice is brought home to those who have regularly dealt with the firm, it is insufficient.²

§ 354. *If a person is a partner in two firms*, the one firm cannot sue the other at law, as the names of all the members, whether appearing in the firm's name or not, must be set forth in the declaration, and the same party cannot be both a plaintiff and a defendant.³ The remedy would be in equity. In some States, however, as in Pennsylvania, the common law has been changed by statute, so that an action will lie.

But this difficulty ceases when the instrument passes to a third party, who may sue both firms.⁴ And when there is a good defense against one of several partners, it applies equally to all, although the others may have been entirely innocent of complicity in the fraud of the one, or have been themselves its victims.⁵

One member of a firm may advance money to another

¹ In *Davis v. Allen*, 3 N. Y. 172, Jewitt, C. J., says: "The general principle is, that where a person has done business with another, as a member of a firm, or has so publicly appeared as a partner as to satisfy a jury that the plaintiff must have believed him to be such, and he suffers the plaintiff to continue in and act upon that belief, by omitting to give notice of his having ceased to be a partner, after he really had ceased, he will be responsible for the consequences of his original representation, uncontradicted by a subsequent notice. An omission to give such person notice, under such circumstances, of his retirement, is held to be equivalent to a continual representation that he still remains a member of the firm. But in order to render him liable on this ground, it is necessary that he should have been known as a member of the firm to the plaintiff, either by direct transactions or public notoriety." See *Edwards on Bills*, 115, 116.

² *Parkin v. Carruthers*, 3 Esp. 248; *Vernon v. Manhattan Co.* 17 Wend. 524.

³ *Pitcher v. Barrows*, 17 Pick. 361; *Babcock v. Stone*, 3 McLean, 172; *Mainwaring v. Newman*, 2 B. & P. 120; *Neale v. Turton*, 4 Bing. 149; *Moffat v. Van Milligan*, 2 B. & P. 124; *Thomson on Bills*, 163; *Chitty on Bills* [*60], 75.

⁴ *Pitcher v. Barrows*, 17 Pick. 361; *Davis v. Briggs*, 39 Me. 304.

⁵ *Richmond v. Heapy*, 1 Stark. 204; *Brandon v. Scott*, 7 E. & B. 231 (90 E. C. L. R.); *Aistley v. Johnson*, 5 H. & N. 137.

to relieve him from liability for debts of the firm, and take his note therefor; and the transaction will be regarded as a private one between the two members. The other members, in such case, are not liable to pay the note, and have nothing to do with it.¹ A note of a firm payable to one of its members is valid in the hands of an indorsee.²

SECTION II.

THE AUTHORITY OF A COPARTNER TO BIND THE FIRM.

§ 355. The general authority of a partner to bind the firm springs from the mutual agency of the copartners for each other; and from the course and usage of the business in which they are engaged. It follows, therefore, that a person contemplating partnership with another cannot, without a special authority, bind him by a contract for the proposed partnership benefit—for example, for the purpose of raising capital—his agency not commencing until the connection is consummated.³ The copartnership being formed, the copartner can bind his associates only in such transactions as pertain to their partnership business; and the copartnership business must be of such a character that the giving of negotiable paper would be the convenient and proper mode of conducting it, in order to create the presumption of agency in a copartner to give a bill or note in the firm's name.

§ 356. *Implied authority of partner to bind the firm.*—It results from the very nature of partnership—from the very fact that the copartners are mutual general agents for each other in their copartnership affairs—that the express assent of one to the act of another within the scope of their business is unnecessary. The authority to each partner is implied to bind the firm within the legitimate scope of its busi-

¹ Chamberlain v. Walker, 10 Allen, 429.

² Hapgood v. Watson, 65 Me. 510.

³ Greenslade v. Dower, 7 B. & C. 635; 6 L. J. (K. B. O. S.) 155.

ness by the very fact that it is a firm, and it has been said by Lord Ellenborough, C. J.: "It would be a strange and novel doctrine to hold it necessary for a person receiving a bill of exchange indorsed by one of several partners, to know whether the others assented to such indorsement, or that it should be void."¹

§ 357. The borrowing of money and negotiation of bills and notes being incidental to, and usual in, the business of copartnerships formed for the purpose of trade, it follows that when a copartner borrows money professedly for the firm, and executes therefor a negotiable instrument in the copartnership name, it will bind all the partners, whether the borrowing were really for the firm or not, and whether he diverts and misapplies the funds or not, provided the lender is not himself cognizant of the intended fraud. And the burden will not be thrown on him to show that he was not cognizant of the fraud, or to prove value given for the paper.²

¹ *Swan v. Steele*, 7 East, 210. In *Fox v. Clifton*, 6 Bing. 795, Tindal, C. J., said: "By the general rule of law relating to partnerships in trade, each member of it is liable to the debts and engagements of the whole company contracted in the course of the trade. This is a consequence not confined to the law of this country, but extending generally throughout Europe; and it is founded, partly on the desire to favor commerce, that merchants in partnership may obtain more credit in the world; and more especially on the principle that the members of trading partnerships are constituted agents, the one for the other, for entering into contracts connected with the business and concerns of the partnership, so that by the contracts of the agent all his principals are bound. But to subject a person to responsibility, as a partner, for the acts of another done without his express concurrence, he must stand in one or other of these two situations: first, he must at the time of making the contract, whether bill, note or other instrument, have been actually a partner in the joint concern; or, secondly, admitting that he was not, he must have represented or permitted himself to be represented as such, before or at the time of making the contract, either generally to all the world, or to several individuals, or to the plaintiff in particular, or to some person through whom he claims."

² *Hayward v. French*, 12 Gray, 453; see also *Onondaga County Bank v. De Puy*, 17 Wend. 47; *U. S. Bank v. Bouncey*, 5 Mason, 176; *Buckner v. Lee*, 8 Ga. 235; *Ihmsen v. Negley*, 1 Casey, 297; *Edwards on Bills*, 106; *Sedgwick v. Lewis*, 70 Penn. St. 221; *Sherwood v. Snow*, 46 Iowa, 485; *Whitaker v. Brown*, 16 Wend. 505.

§ 358. If there be mere joint ownership, as in the case of a ship, or only a particular agreement to share in a single transaction, or a copartnership in a matter of business not requiring the execution of negotiable paper as the proper, usual and convenient mode of conducting it, the copartners will not be impliedly bound by the act of one, but must give him express authority.¹ Thus, where a bill was addressed to two owners of a ship, as for necessities furnished the same, and one accepted in the name of both, it was decided that the other was not bound to a *bona fide* holder, the bill having been drawn for the separate use of the acceptor.² So, where there is no partnership in trade, but an agreement as to a particular transaction between farmers, the acceptance by one of bills, without the other's concurrence, will not bind him.³ The principle seems to be well stated by Mr. Chitty, who says: "The partnership must be in a trade or concern to which the issuing or transfer of bills is necessary or usual."⁴ The United States Supreme Court has held that a bill drawn by a partner in the name of a firm engaged in farming, working a steam saw-mill, and in trading, was binding, because trading and running the mill required capital and the use of credit; but if the firm had been engaged in farming alone, no one partner could have bound it by a bill or note.⁵ It has also been held that partners in mining⁶ and gaslight⁷ companies have no implied authority to bind the firm as parties to negotiable instruments.

Upon these principles one of a law firm cannot bind it by a promissory note without consent of all the members;⁸

¹ Chitty on Bills (13 Am. ed.) [*45], 58.

² Williams v. Thomas, 6 Esp. 18; Edwards on Bills, 111.

³ Greenslade v. Dower, 7 B. & C. 635; 1 Man. & Ry. 640.

⁴ Chitty on Bills (13 Am. ed.) [*45], 58; see Thomson on Bills, 158.

⁵ Kimbro v. Bullit, 22 How. 256; see Greenslade v. Dower, *supra*.

⁶ Dickinson v. Valpy, 10 B. & C. 128.

⁷ Brumah v. Roberts, 3 Bing. N. C. 96.

⁸ Levy v. Pyne, Car. & M. 453; Hedley v. Bainbridge, 3 Q. B. 316 (42 E. C. L. R.); Marsh v. Gold, 2 Pick. 285; Thomson on Bills, 158; Garland v. Jacomb, L. R. 8 Exch. 218, 6 Moak. E. R. 289; Smith v. Sloan, 37 Wis. 285.

nor can one of a firm practicing medicine bind it in a like manner except for medicine and other necessities of his profession;¹ nor can one of a firm keeping tavern bind his copartners except strictly within the business.² It is said, however, that if the concerns were of such vast magnitude as to require large capital and credit, the rule would be of doubtful application, and that it would depend very much upon the usage of the particular firm and others similarly engaged.³ The general authority of a partner to bind the firm exists only by implication, and may be rebutted by evidence that the party who took the security had previous notice that no such authority existed.⁴

§ 359. If the firm receive and hold the proceeds of negotiable paper, executed by one of their number in a transaction not in their business, the firm will be considered as ratifying the act, and will be bound;⁵ and this is the rule whether the paper be signed by the partner in his own name or the firm's;⁶ and likewise if they delay so long after having knowledge of the transaction as to raise a presumption that they ratify and adopt it. But if as soon as the other partners hear of the transaction they repudiate it, they will not be bound.⁷

SECTION III.

FORMAL SIGNATURE OF THE FIRM'S NAME.

§ 360. *As to the form of signature of the firm.*—The signature of the firm should be written by the copartner in the very terms of the style of the firm. Or the copartner should express that he signs his own name for himself and his co-

¹ Crosthwait v. Ross, 1 Humph. 23; Edwards on Bills, 102.

² Cooke v. Branch Bank, 3 Ala. 175.

³ 1 Parsons N. B. 139.

⁴ Gallway v. Matthew, 10 East, 264; King v. Faber, 22 Penn. 21.

⁵ Richardson v. French, 4 Metc. 577; Clay v. Cottrell, 18 Penn. 408; Whitaker v. Brown, 16 Wend. 505.

⁶ Hardeman v. Bank of Middletown, 28 Penn. 440.

⁷ Foster v. Andrews, 2 Penn. 160.

partners, or should write out the names of the firm. The best way is to write simply the firm's name, and, if he pleases, with the addition "by A. B.," that being the name of the signing member. Certainly, it should distinctly appear that the signature is intended to bind the firm, and (except in the case of an acceptance by one partner in his own name of a bill drawn on the firm, which case will presently be considered) such will not be the manifest intention unless the instrument be signed in the manner above indicated.¹

And in general, when the name of one partner only appears on the bill or note, his copartners would not be chargeable, although the instrument were used for partnership purposes. Therefore, where the plaintiff declared, on a note made by T. W., in his own name, as on a note made by T. W. and R., and offered to show that they were jointly indebted, and that they gave the note for that debt, he was nonsuited, on the ground that this was a separate security for a joint debt.² The same rule applies to acceptance.³ So the indorsement of one partner does not bind the firm on the bill, though the money were applied to the firm's purposes, and they might be sued for money lent.⁴

The principle is simply this: that when it can be collected from the face of the paper that the signing partner intended to bind the firm, it will be bound; otherwise not.

§ 361. In accordance with the principle of the text, it has been held that a note beginning "I promise," and signed by one of the firm for the rest, as "A. B. for A. B. C. D. & Co.," will bind the whole firm,⁵ and not the signing partner singly.⁶ So if it begins, "I promise," and is signed in the firm's name.⁷

¹ Chitty on Bills, [*57], 72; Thomson on Bills, 164.

² Siffkin v. Walker, 2 Camp. 307. ³ Cunningham v. Smithson, 12 Leigh, 43.

⁴ Emly v. Lye, 15 East, 7; Kilgour v. Finlayson, 1 H. Black. 156; *ex parte* Emly, 1 Rose, 61; Cunningham v. Smithson, 12 Leigh, 43. But see the case of Denton v. Rodie, 3 Camp. 493, and Chitty on Bills, [*59], 74, note *f*.

⁵ Gallway v. Mathew, 10 East, 264; 1 Camp. 403; Staats v. Howlett, 4 Den. 559; Thomson on Bills, 156.

⁶ *In re* Clarke, 14 M. & W. 469, overruling Hall v. Smith, 1 B. & C. 407.

⁷ Doty v. Bates, 11 Johns. 544.

And if a partner draws a bill or note in a fictitious name, and indorses it in the partnership name, the firm will be bound by the indorsement.¹

If the partner, intending to use the firm's name, make a slight and immaterial variation from it, the firm is still bound;² but if the variation is material, it will not be.³ If A. B. and C. are partners, a note given by one of them, signed "A. & Co.," will be presumed to be in the partnership name;⁴ and if the names of all the partners are written on the paper, instead of the firm's name, and it is given in the firm's business, the firm will be bound.⁵

One partner cannot, without special authority, execute a joint and separate note in the partnership name;⁶ but it has been held—and justly, as we think—that such a note would be void only as a several note, and good as a joint note.⁷

§ 362. *Acceptances.*—The doctrine is generally recognized that if a bill be drawn upon a firm, the acceptance by one partner, whether in his own name or the name of the firm, will bind the firm, it being only necessary for it to appear that he acted for it.⁸ In an English case a bill was drawn on "Rumsey & Co." It was presented to "T. Rumsey, Jr.," who wrote across it "accepted, T. Rumsey, Sen." It was contended that the firm was not bound. But Lord Ellenborough said: "This acceptance does not prove the partnership; but if the defendants were partners, they are both bound by it. For this purpose it would have been enough if the word 'accepted' had been written on the bill, and the effect cannot be altered by

¹ Thicknesse v. Bromilowe, 2 Crompt. & J. 425.

² Williamson v. Johnson, 1 B. & C. 146; Faith v. Richmond, 11 Ad. & El. 339; Forbes v. Marshall, 11 Exch. 166.

³ Kirk v. Blurton, 9 M. & W. 284; MacLae v. Sutherland, 3 Ellis & B. 31. Where the style of the firm was simply "John Blurton," it was held that a bill signed "John Blurton & Co." did not bind them. Kirk v. Blurton, 12 L. J. Ex. 117; Thomson on Bills, 164.

⁴ Drake v. Elwyn, 1 Caine, 184.

⁵ Norton v. Seymour, 3 C. B. 792; Maynard v. Fellows, 43 N. H. 258.

⁶ Perring v. Hone, 2 C. & P. 401; 4 Bing. 28 (77 E. C. L. R.)

⁷ MacLae v. Sutherland, 3 El. & B. 36 (77 E. C. L. R.)

⁸ 1 Parsons N. & B. 123; Collyer on Partnership, § 410; Byles on Bills, 144.

adding 'T. Rumsey, Sen.' If a bill of exchange is drawn upon a firm, and accepted by one of the partners, he must be understood to exercise his power to bind his copartners, and to accept the bill according to the terms in which it was drawn."¹ This seems the true *rationale* of the question, and should be sustained on the familiar maxim, "*Ut res magis valeat quam pereat.*" But it has been held that, in such a case as that quoted, the firm would not be bound, because its name is not signed as acceptor, and that the single partner, whose name is on the bill, could not be charged as acceptor, because not the drawee of the bill.² In Connecticut, the view

¹ *Mason v. Rumsey*, 1 Camp. 384 (1808); to same effect see *Wells v. Masterman*, 2 Esp. 731. In *Thomson on Bills*, 164, note *i*, it is said, "It may be doubted whether this doctrine would be adopted in Scotland." See *post*, § 488.

² *Heenan v. Nash*, 8 Minn. 409 (1863). In this case it was said, in sustaining this doctrine, by Flandrau, J.: "In the case of *Mason v. Rumsey*, 1 Camp. 384, it was held that an acceptance by one member of a firm in his own name would bind the firm when the bill was drawn on the firm. The same was again held in *Wells v. Masterman*, 2 Esp. 731. This doctrine seems to have been adopted in *Collyer on Partnership*, § 410, and in *Byles on Bills*, 144, on the authority of these cases and some others there collected. In the case of *Dougal v. Cowles*, 5 Day's Connecticut Reports, 511, the same is again laid down on the authority of the case of *Mason v. Rumsey*. There are other cases that hold an acceptance by a member of a firm in a name other than the firm name, to raise a question of fact, to be left to the jury, whether the name used substantially describes the firm, or whether it so far varies that the acceptor must be taken to have made it on his own account. See *Faith v. Richmond*, 11 Adolph. & Ellis, 338, 339; Eng. Com. Law. Rep. 113; *Drake v. Elwyn*, 1 Caine's Rep. 184.

"Acceptances could formerly be made by parol, which was the law in Connecticut at the time of the decision cited from 5 Day, and that point is expressly made by the court in deciding the case. The same may be said of the case of *Mason v. Rumsey*, which was decided before the statute of 1 & 2 George IV, chap. 78, sec. 2, which provided that acceptances to be valid must be in writing. Even after this statute the English courts have held that the word 'accepted,' written on the bill by one having authority, is sufficient to bind the drawees. The only principle upon which the courts have held that an acceptance by one partner in his own name will bind the firm, is the implied authority which each member has to act for the whole, and when the bill is drawn upon the firm and accepted by one, they hold that he intended to accept it as drawn.

"I find one English case, decided in the Court of Exchequer in 1841, which holds a doctrine much more in accordance with our views of the principles which should govern the question. In *Kirk v. Blurton*, 9 Meeson & Welsby's Rep. 283, the defendants were partners under the name of 'John Blurton.' One of the firm drew a bill in the name of 'John Blurton & Co.' The firm was sued upon

of the text seems to be taken; and it is there held that the drawing of a bill by one partner in his own name on the firm of which he is a member is, in contemplation of law, an acceptance of the bill by the drawer in behalf of the firm.¹

And in England, where a bill was drawn on "E. M. and others, trustees, &c.," and there was written across it, "accepted, E. M."—it appearing that E. M. had authority to

it, and the partner who did not draw the bill defended. *Faith v. Richmond*, *Mason v. Rumsey*, and other cases were cited. Alderson, B., in delivering the opinion, says: 'The court do not entertain any doubt as to the principles of law applicable to this case. One partner can bind his copartner only to the extent of the authority which is given to partners generally, to enable them to carry on the partnership business,' which authority, he says, in another part of the opinion, is 'to bind the firm in the name of the partnership, and in that only.'

"Since the passage of our statute on the subject of acceptances, no inferences can be indulged in. To make an acceptance valid, it must be in writing, signed by the acceptor or his lawful agent. Mr. Nash, as a partner of the firm of Nash & McGrorty, had a right to accept the bill for the firm by virtue of his general powers as a partner, but this power of a partner is to bind the firm by the use of the firm name, and in no other way. This he did not do, and we are clear that the acceptance cannot be held to bind the firm.

"We are next to consider whether the defendant can be held as acceptor individually. It is a well settled rule of commercial civil law that no one can accept a bill but the person upon whom it is drawn, except for honor. *Polbill v. Walter*, 3 Barn. & Ad. 114; *Davis v. Clark*, 1 Carr. & Kir. 117; *May v. Kelly & Frazier*, 27 Ala. 497. If a bill is drawn upon A, and B. accepts it, the act is merely voluntary, without any consideration, and creates no liability whatever in the law. It is allowed, for the convenience of commerce, that a person, other than the drawee, may, after presentation, refusal and protest, accept, for the honor of the drawer or any of the indorsers, or of all the parties, as he may see fit; but this is a well understood transaction, and is done *supra protest*, and under certain well settled forms and ceremonies. There is no pretense that Mr. Nash was such an acceptor of the bill in question.

"Where a bill is drawn upon several individuals, an acceptance by any one of them is binding upon him, although the bill may be treated, and should be, as dishonored, if not accepted by all the drawees, because the holder is entitled to the acceptance of them all; but in such case a liability accrues against the party accepting, because he is a drawee, as much as if the bill had been drawn upon him alone. Where, however, the bill is drawn upon a firm, any member of the partnership, in his individual capacity, is quite as much a stranger to the same as a third person. He is only connected with the bill through his membership of the firm, which is drawee, and in virtue of such membership he has power to use the firm name in accepting it. If he accepts it in his individual name, he does not bind the firm, and there is no consideration for his act. It is the case of a bill drawn on one party, and accepted by another."

¹ *Dougal v. Cowles*, 5 Day, 511.

accept for the trustees—they were held liable as acceptors, Pollock, C. B., saying: “His acceptance did not import that he accepted merely as an individual, but that he was the party whose hand performed that duty by direction of the rest: and the mere fact that he needlessly added his name to the acceptance made no difference.”¹

§ 363. *Where firm transacts business in one partner's name.*—Sometimes the firm transacts business in the name of a single partner, and questions often arise whether or not paper executed in the name of a single partner was intended as his only, or as that of the firm. *Prima facie*, it is to be presumed to be the paper of the individual partner whose name is signed to it, and the burden of proof is upon the holder to show affirmatively that the signature was intended for the signature of the firm.² Judge Story has said on this subject: “Where the business is carried on in the name of one of the partners, and his name alone is the name of the firm, it is necessary not only to prove the signature, but that it was used as a signature of the firm, by a party authorized to use it on that occasion, and for that purpose. In other words, it must be shown to be used for partnership objects and as a partnership act. The proof of the signature is not enough. The burden of proof is upon the plaintiffs to establish that it is a contract of the firm, and ought to bind

¹ Jenkins v. Morris, 16 M. & W. 877.

² Cunningham v. Smithson, 12 Leigh, 43; Macklin v. Crutcher, 6 Bush (Ky.) 401; Boyle v. Skinner, 19 Mo. 82; Mercantile Bank v. Cox, 38 Me. 500; Buckner v. Lee, 8 Ga. 285; Bank of Rochester v. Monteath, 1 Denio, 402; Manufacturers' & c. Bank v. Winship, 5 Pick. 11. Putnam, J.: “If it had been proved that the note had been given for the use of the firm at the manufactory, the partners in that concern would be liable. The burden of proof was on the plaintiffs.” Isaac and Peter Blackburn carried on business near Plymouth in the name of Isaac Blackburn only. Peter carried on business separately in London. In respect to bills drawn by Isaac in his own name, Lord Eldon said, in *ex parte* Bolitho, 1 Buck, 100: “Unless you can show that when Isaac drew the bills he drew them not as Isaac, but as Isaac and Peter, there can be no legal contract upon the bills against the two; there may be a right of action, if you can bring it to this. that the money was raised by them for partnership purposes.” Chitty on Bills [*42, 43], 56.

them.”¹ But when it is shown to have been executed in the business of the firm, and that the firm was intended to be bound, there is no doubt that it will be.²

§ 364. In New York it has been held, that where the bank account of a firm was kept in the name of one of its members, and all checks were drawn in his name, with the knowledge and assent of the others, the firm was liable upon such a check drawn in the firm business; and that the holder of such a check might show that the money was not advanced by him upon the individual security of the single partner.³

In accordance with the principles stated, if the partnership is carried on in the name of one individual only, and he issues a bill or note in his own name for his separate use, his copartners would not be liable in case of misapplication, because the firm is not pledged,⁴ though if really for the benefit of the firm it would be.⁵

SECTION IV.

ACCOMMODATION—PRIVATE—AND PROHIBITED TRANSACTIONS.

§ 365. (1) *As to accommodation transactions of copartner.*—No one member of a firm can bind it, without the consent of all of its members, by signing the copartnership name as drawer, maker, acceptor or indorser of a negotiable paper for the accommodation of a third party, for the obvious reason that such a transaction is not within the scope of copartnership business, unless expressly or impliedly made so, and would ordinarily be without authority, and in fraud of the firm. And every holder of such paper, chargeable with notice of its character, would be disqualified to recover upon it;⁶

¹ U. S. Bank v. Binney, 5 Mason, 176.

² South Carolina Bank v. Case, 8 Barn. & C. 427.

³ Crocker v. Colwell, 46 N. Y. 212.

⁴ *Ex parte* Bolitho, 1 Buck, 100. Explained in Wintle v. Crowther, 1 Tyrw. 214.

⁵ South Carolina Bank v. Case, 8 Bar. & C. 433; 2 M. & R. 459.

⁶ Chenowith v. Chamberlain, 6 B. Mon. 60; Bank of Rochester v. Bowen, 7 Wend. 158; Tompkins v. Woodward, 5 West Va. (Hagans) 229; 1 Parsons N. & B. 129; Bloom v. Helm, 53 Miss. 21.

and if the plaintiff be payee, he would be required to prove the assent of the copartners before he could do so.¹

If it appears on the face of the bill or note that it was signed by a partner, in the name of the firm, as surety, this will be notice to the world that it was not given in due course of the partnership business; and the burden would be thrown upon the holder not only to show that he gave value for the instrument, but also that all the parties assented to its execution in their name.² If the word "surety" be attached to the partnership name, that would impress upon the paper notice of its character.³ Where a bill or note is carried by the drawer or maker to a bank to get it discounted on his own account, or transfer it to another party, and it bears the name of a firm which is payee and indorsed thereon, the transaction shows on its face that it is accommodation paper, and the bank or other holder must prove the copartners' assent in order to bind them.⁴ But a bank discounting partnership paper for one partner, and placing the amount to his credit, would not be chargeable with notice that he was acting in fraud of the firm, or be required to prove assent of his copartners.⁵ If the partnership engagement as surety or indorser is really for the partnership benefit in their legitimate business, it has been held that the paper will be valid.⁶ Where A., B. & C., copartners, indorsed a note for accommodation, and A. dying before its maturity, B. & C. renewed the indorsement in the partnership name, it was held that A.'s estate was discharged, on the old note by want of notice, and on the new one by want of authority;⁷ but that if A., B. & C. had been makers of the note that was renewed, it would be different.⁸

¹ *Tompkins v. Woodward*, 5 West Va. 230. ² 1 *Parsons N. & B.* 140.

³ *Austin v. Vandemark*, 4 Hill, 259; *Foot v. Sabin*, 19 Johns. 154; *Boyd v. Plumb*, 7 Wend. 309; *Edwards on Bills*, 103, 104.

⁴ *Bank of Vergennes v. Cameron*, 7 Barb. 143; see *Bloom v. Helm*, 53 Miss. 21.

⁵ *Ex parte Bonbonus*, 8 Ves. 542.

⁶ *Langan v. Hewitt*, 13 Smedes & M. 122.

⁷ *Central Savings Bank v. Mead*, 52 Mo. 546.

⁸ *Boatman's Sav. Inst. v. Mead*, 52 Mo. 543.

§ 366. (2) *As to private debts of a member of the firm.*—No one member of a firm can, without the consent of all of his copartners, bind them by making, drawing, accepting or indorsing a bill or note, for his private debt, in the partnership name; and the creditor who receives such an instrument, or the indorsee who takes it with notice of the consideration, cannot recover upon it. In order to recover, the party who took the paper from the partner for his private debt, must prove the assent of all the copartners to his act.¹ Prof. Parsons seems to think that the English authorities are to the contrary;² and Mr. Chitty's opinion seems to be that the mere circumstance that an acceptance in the partnership name by one partner is given for his private debt, does not raise the presumption that it was wrongfully made. But such a transaction is out of the orderly and usual course of business. It does not import fairness on its face, and the American authorities seem to us to reach the correct conclusion. We quote Mr. Chitty's language as showing the state of the English law on the subject.³

¹ Foot v. Sabin, 19 Johns. 154; Dob v. Halsey, 16 Johns. 34; Williams v. Wallbridge, 3 Wend. 415; Rogers v. Batchelor, 12 Pet. 229; Smith v. Strader, 4 How. 404; Baird v. Cochran, 4 Serg. & R. 397; Noble v. McClintock, 2 Watts & S. 152; Mauldin v. Branch Bank, 2 Ala. 503; Sweetser v. French, 2 Cush. 309; Taylor v. Hillyer, 3 Blackf. 433; Windham Co. Bank v. Kendall, 7 R. I. 77; Tompkins v. Woodward, 5 West Va. 229, 230; Gale v. Miller, 54 N. Y. 538; 1 Parsons N. & B. 126, 127; Sherwood v. Snow, 46 Iowa, 486; Bank of Commerce v. Selden, 3 Minn. 155.

² 1 Parsons N. & B. 127. In Ridley v. Taylor, 13 East, 175, Lord Ellenborough, C. J., said: "This bill had an existence, according to its apparent date, eighteen days before the time of its delivery to the plaintiffs; it was drawn for a sum considerably exceeding the debt, and was not only drawn and indorse^d, but accepted also, before it was produced to them; and although it is stated in the case, that in fact the bill was drawn and indorsed by Ewbank in the partnership firm, it does not appear that the plaintiffs knew that it was drawn and indorsed by him. Under these circumstances it might reasonably be supposed, by the party to whom it was given, to be a partnership security, of which Ewbank, the partner in possession of it, had for some valuable consideration, or in virtue of some arrangement with Ord, the other partner, become the proprietor, so as to be authorized to deal with it as his own. At any rate, the contrary does not either actually or presumptively appear." See Green v. Deakin, 2 Stark. 317.

³ Chitty on Bills (13 Am. ed.) [*47], 60, where it is said: "It has been considered that the mere circumstance of a bill being given for an antecedent debt

§ 367. Distinct proof, it has been held, must be given of the copartner's assent, and that mere knowledge on their part is not sufficient.¹ But unless they were prompt to repudiate the act as not binding on them, we should say they were bound.² And their assent may be implied by circumstances.³ A course of dealing by the firm in recognizing such transactions would suffice.⁴ And when such a course of dealing is proved, evidence that the copartnership articles contained an express prohibition of such acts by any copartner would be inadmissible.⁵ The admissions of the partner executing

due from one only of the partners raises a presumption that the creditor knew the bill was given without the concurrence of the other partners." And in *Ex parte Goulding*, 2 G. & J. 118, the Vice-Chancellor said: "After an attentive consideration of the authorities, I am of opinion that when one partner gives the acceptance of the firm in payment of his separate debt, without authority from his copartner, such acceptance does not bind the firm." And it has also been considered that the taking the instrument from one of the partners in his own handwriting, without consulting the others, raises a presumption that there is not any concurrence of the firm. *Hope v. Cust*, 1 East, 53. And in an action on a bill against three acceptors where it appeared that the defendants were partners in a tea speculation, and the drawer, a wine merchant, drew, in payment for wine delivered to one of the three, the judge directed the jury that, if they found that the bill was so drawn without the knowledge and consent of the other two defendants, they were not liable; and the jury found for the defendant. *Wood v. Holbeck*, May 28, 1826. And from the cases of *Shirreff v. Wilks*, 1 East, 48, and *Green v. Deakin*, 2 Stark. 347, a conclusion has been reached, in an excellent work, that if one partner accept in the partnership name a bill drawn by his own separate creditor for his separate debt, or if for such separate debt he give a promissory note in the name of the firm, it lies upon the creditor to show that his debtor had authority so to give him the joint security of the firm, and that *prima facie* the transaction is fraudulent on the part of both debtor and creditor. *Bayley on Bills*, 59. But as a partner may, in his individual capacity, have a claim upon the firm, in the respect of which he might draw, accept or indorse a bill in the name of the firm, it has in other cases been considered that the mere circumstance of the party to whom he delivers it knowing that he was using it for his private benefit does not of itself necessarily afford sufficient presumptive evidence of collusion to invalidate the transaction, and that the partner objecting to liability must prove all the facts sufficient to induce a jury to find that the partner really acted fraudulently, and that the holder had notice of the fraud. *Ex parte Bonbonus*, 8 Ves. 542; *Ridley v. Taylor*, 13 East. 175.

¹ *Elliott v. Dudley*, 19 Barb. 326.

² *Foster v. Andrews*, 2 Penn. 160.

³ *Gansevoort v. Williams*, 14 Wend. 133.

⁴ *Butler v. Stocking*, 4 Seld. 108.

⁵ *Michigan Bank v. Eldred*, 9 Wall. 544.

partnership paper for his private debt, are no evidence to bind the firm.

§ 368. (3) *As to special limitations of partnership authority.*—Copartners may enter into any contract between themselves restraining the firm, or any member of it, from executing or indorsing a negotiable instrument; and it is a fraud upon the firm for any member to violate it, for which his injured copartners may maintain an action.¹

But in the hands of a *bona fide* holder, without notice, the fact that express partnership articles have been violated, or that the name of the firm has been used in a private or accommodation transaction, is no objection to the validity of the instrument, or their right to recover; for their association with the wrong-doer enabled him to commit the fraud.²

§ 369. (4) *As to the burden of proof.*—The order in which the burden of proof shifts from one side to the other may be stated as follows: (1) When the payee of a bill or note sues upon it, and it appears to have been signed in the firm's name, and he exhibits the paper and proves the signature of the signing partner (where this is necessary), he establishes his case *prima facie*, it being presumed that the partner acted within the scope of the partnership business.³

(2) If the firm resists payment, it will be sufficient to show that the copartner signed the firm's name for a private debt due the plaintiff, and its defense is then complete, unless the plaintiff reply by showing the assent of the copartners.⁴

¹ Byles on Bills (Sharswood's ed.) 128.

² *Michigan Bank v. Eldred*, 9 Wall. 544; *Kimbro v. Bullit*, 22 How. 256; *Winship v. Bank of U. S.* 5 Pet. 529; *Catskill Bank v. Stall*, 15 Wend. 364, and 18 Wend. 466; *Wells v. Evans*, 20 Wend. 251; *Waldo Bank v. Lambert*, 16 Me. 416; *Bascom v. Young*, 7 Mo. 1; *Cotton v. Evans*, 1 Dev. & B. Eq. 284; *Miller v. Hughes*, 1 A. K. Marsh. 181; *Parker v. Burgess*, 5 R. I. 277; *First Nat. Bank v. Morgan*, 13 N. Y. S. C. R. (6 Hun), 346; *Wright v. Brosseau*, 73 Ill. 381; see *Hibernian Bank, v. Everman*, 52 Miss. 500.

³ *Doty v. Bates*, 11 Johns. 544; *Manning v. Hays*, 6 Md. 5; *Vallett v. Parker* 6 Wend. 615; *Michigan Bank v. Eldred*, 9 Wall. 548; *Knapp v. McBride*, 7 Ala. 19; *First National Bank v. Carpenter*, 34 Iowa, 432; *Hamilton v. Summers*, 12 B. Mon. 11; *Foster v. Andrews*, 2 Penn. 160; *Edwards on Bills*, 105.

⁴ *Williams v. Walbridge*, 3 Wend. 415; *Rogers v. Batchelor*, 12 Pet. 299; *Taylor v. Hillyer*, 3 Blackf. 433.

(3) And the burden would also be devolved upon the plaintiff to prove value given, if it were shown that the paper was executed in violation of partnership articles of agreement.¹

(4) When suit is brought by a subsequent holder, it will also be sufficient for him to produce the instrument and prove the signing partner's signature in order to make out a *prima facie* case.²

(5) If when this had been done the firm shows, by way of defense, that the instrument was executed by the signing partner in fraud of the firm, by being given to the payee for the partner's private debt, or for the payee's accommodation, and thus perfects its defense as against the payee, it is held, by numerous cases, that the holder must then prove that he acquired it in the usual course of business for a valuable consideration, under circumstances not affecting him with notice of the fraud.³ And such seems to be the accepted doctrine on the subject,⁴ though upon the plea of *non accepit* it has been held in England insufficient to show that an acceptance was fraudulent on the part of the signing partner, without bringing home to the plaintiff knowledge of the fraud.⁵

¹ Grant v. Hawks, Chitty on Bills (13 Am. ed.) [*42], 55.

² Michigan Bank v. Eldred, 9 Wall. 548.

³ Bank of St. Albans v. Gilliland, 23 Wend. 311; Bank of Vergennes v. Cameron, 7 Barb. 143; Monroe v. Cooper, 5 Pick. 412; Hart v. Potter, 4 Duer, 458; Hogg v. Skene, 34 L. J. C. P. (N. S.) 153. In Carner v. Cameron, 31 Mich. 373 (1875), in an action by a transferee of a note signed in the name of a firm, it was held (1) That the presumption was that it was for the benefit of the firm; but (2) the defendants might show it was made in fraud of the firm to the knowledge of the payee; and (3) that, therefore, the presumption would be that the transferee was not a *bona fide* holder for value, and the burden of proof was on him.

⁴ Chitty on Bills (13 Am. ed.) [*42], 55; Edwards on Bills, 105, 106; Byles on Bills (Sharswood's ed.) [*47], 129. Judge Sharswood says in his note: "The doctrine of the text is sustained by the whole current of the American authorities." 1 Parsons N. & B. 128.

⁵ Musgrave v. Drake, 5 Q. B. 185 (48 E. C. L. R.) Lord Denman saying: "Where issue is joined on the plea of *non accepit*, and the proof offered of the acceptance is the signature of one partner competent to bind the firm, then, though the defendants show that this signature was a fraudulent act on the part

(6) In an English case, it was said by Lord Ellenborough: "An indorsee may recover on a bill against partners in a concern, though the drawing or accepting were contrary to agreement between them, and by one of the partners in fraud of the rest; but then the indorsee must show that he gave value."¹ This is, we think, the correct view, though not entirely concurred in.² The fact that a bill or note made by a member of a firm in his own name, is afterwards indorsed in the name of the firm in his handwriting, is not a circumstance of suspicion, nor does it carry with it notice to a purchaser that the firm's name is being used in the private business of the maker, or otherwise improperly.³

SECTION V.

THE EFFECT OF A DISSOLUTION OF THE FIRM.

§ 370. The power of a partner ceases upon dissolution of the firm, and the surviving partners or expartners can enter into no contract which will bind the estate of the deceased, except such as is necessary or appropriate in settling the affairs of the concern.⁴ "Dissolution operates as a revocation of all authority for making new contracts. It does not revoke the authority to arrange, liquidate, settle and pay those before created."⁵ The power of the surviving partner does not extend to giving a note, drawing a check,⁶ or accepting a bill in the firm's name.⁷ And the firm will not be bound on

of such partner, yet if the proof does not affect the plaintiff with knowledge of the fraud, that does not put the plaintiff to an answer nor make it necessary for him to give any explanation or account of the transaction." To same effect is Thomson on Bills (Wilson's ed.) 761; but see Hogg v. Skene, *supra*.

¹ Grant v. Hawks, Chitty on Bills (13 Am. ed.) [*42], 55.

² See Michigan Bank v. Eldred, 9 Wall. 548.

³ Moorehead v. Gilmer, 77 Penn. St. 118; Miller v. Consolidation Bank, 13 Wright, 514.

⁴ Darling v. March, 22 Maine, 184.

⁵ *Id.*

⁶ Gale v. Miller, 54 N. Y. 536.

⁷ Morrison v. Perry, 18 N. Y. S. C. (11 Hun), 33 (1877); Lockwood v. Comstock, 4 McLean, 383; Husk v. Smith, 8 Barb. 570; Mitchell v. Ostrom, 2 Hill, 520; Perrin v. Keene, 19 Me. 355; Haddock v. Crocheron, 32 Tex. 276; Hamil-

such note or acceptance, although the creditor had no notice of dissolution.¹ And, according to the weight of authority, no one partner can after the dissolution renew a bill or note of the firm.² Nor can one partner indorse bills and notes given to the firm before dissolution,³ unless the dissolution occur by the death of one or more of the partners,⁴ for, as said by Lord Kenyon, "the moment the partnership ceases, the partners become distinct persons; they are tenants in common of the partnership property undisposed of from that period; and if they send any securities which did belong to the partnership into the world after such dissolution, all must join in doing so."⁵ But where the dissolution is by the death of one of the partners the survivor may indorse a note, payable to the firm in his own name.⁶ The reason of the distinction between the authority of a partner after dissolution while his copartner is living, and the authority of the survivor when dissolution has been caused by death, is that in the former case the implied authority for one partner to act is all gone; whereas in the latter case the bill or note vests exclusively in the survivor, although he must account therefor, as part of the partnership assets.⁷

In the case of a renewal note, increasing the rate of interest upon the original, made after dissolution, it does not dis-

ton v. Seaman, 1 Ind. 185; Bank of Port Gilson v. Baugh, 9 Smedes & M. 290; Tombeckbee Bank v. Dumell, 5 Mason, 56; Lansing v. Gaine, 2 Johns. 300; Wrightson v. Pullan, 1 Stark. 375, *per* Lord Ellenborough; Edwards on Bills, 111, 113; Bayley on Bills (2 Am. ed.) 58; *contra*, Robinson v. Taylor, 4 Barr, 242.

¹ Morrison v. Perry, 18 N. Y. S. C. (11 Hun), 36.

² Parker v. Cousins, 2 Grat. 373; Long v. Story, 10 Mo. 636; Stone v. Chamberlain, 20 Ga. 259; Martin v. Kirk, 2 Humph. 529; National Bank v. Norton, 1 Hill, 572; Palmer v. Dodge, 4 Ohio St. 21; Wilson v. Forder, 20 Ohio St. 89; Edwards on Bills, 117, 118.

³ Parker v. Macomber, 18 Pick. 505; Fellows v. Wyman, 33 N. H. 351. The case of Lewis v. Reilly, 1 Q. B. 349, to the contrary, has been generally disapproved. See Story on Notes (Thorndike's ed.) § 125 and note. Humphreys v. Chastain, 5 Ga. 166; Sanford v. Mickles, 4 Johns, 224; Abel v. Sutton, 3 Esp. 108; Edwards, 120.

⁴ See *post*.

⁵ Abel v. Sutton, 3 Esp. 108.

⁶ Johnson v. Berlzheimer, 84 Ill 54; Jones v. Thorn, 2 Mart. (La.) N. S. 463.

⁷ Story on Notes (7th ed. by Thorndike), § 125; Crawshaw v. Collins, 15 Vesey, 218, 226.

charge the partnership liability upon the original, and the amount of the original, with the aggregate of interest thereon, may be received (there being nothing objectionable as to the shape of the pleadings).¹

§ 371. Where a note is issued by a partner after dissolution, it will not bind the other partners, even though given for a debt due by the firm;² and even though it is antedated so as to appear of a date anterior to the dissolution,³ and though it be in the hands of a *bona fide* holder without notice, unless, indeed, he were not chargeable with notice of the dissolution, in which case it would be different.⁴

As a note takes effect by delivery, it has been held that a note signed in the partnership name before the dissolution, and delivered to the payee after the dissolution, without the consent of other members of the firm, would not bind them.⁵ And in like manner if the paper was indorsed before dissolution of the firm, and not put into circulation until afterward, unless all the partners unite in doing so they would not, according to high authorities, be bound by it.⁶

✕ § 372. But the contrary doctrine prevails in England. In one case, one partner drew a bill in the partnership name, leaving the amount and date blank, and then indorsed it in blank in the partnership name, to be afterward negotiated by the clerk of the firm. The partner who drew the bill afterward died, and the survivors formed a new firm, but the clerk filled up the blanks in the bill drawn by the deceased partner and negotiated it. And the surviving partners were held bound, although no part of the value came to

¹ *Wilson v. Forder*, 20 Ohio St. 89.

² *Whitman v. Leonard*, 3 Pick. 177; *Bank of S. C. v. Humphreys*, 1 McC. 388; *Haddock v. Crocheron*, 32 Tex. 276.

³ *Wrightman v. Pullan*, 1 Stark. 375; *Bayley on Bills* (2 Am. ed.) 59; *Lansing v. Gaine*, 2 Johns. 300.

⁴ *Bristol v. Sprague*, 8 Wend. 423; see *post*, § 286.

⁵ *Woodford v. Dorwin*, 3 Vt. 82.

⁶ 3 Kent Com 63; *Collyer on Partnership*, § 544; *Abel v. Sutton*, 3 Esp. 108, *Lord Kenyon dubitante*; *Glasscock v. Smith*, 25 Ala. 474; but see 1 Parsons N. & B 146.

their hands.¹ In another case, A. and B. were sued by an indorsee on a bill drawn by them payable to their own order and indorsed by them. B. pleaded that A. had indorsed the bill to the plaintiff after dissolution of the firm, and that defendant knew of the dissolution at the time of the dissolution. The plea was held bad for not showing that plaintiff had colluded with A. or was privy to the fraud. Lord Denman said: "It is, perhaps, doing no violence to language, to say that the partnership could not be dissolved as to this bill, so as to prevent it from being indorsed by either defendant in the name of the firm."² And this doctrine seems to us more in consonance with the principles of the law merchant respecting negotiable instruments. In Massachusetts, it has been held, that where the individual note of a partner, made after dissolution was transferred by the holder to the firm by an indorsement in blank, in payment of a debt, such note being payable to bearer, might be legally transferred to a third person by another partner who was authorized to settle the partnership concerns.³ ↙

§ 373. *When expartner may bind firm.*—If authorized verbally, or in writing, one expartner may bind the firm after dissolution as party to a bill or note, but authority to settle or close up the business of the firm does not imply authority to one partner after dissolution to give a note in the name of the firm for the firm debt, or to renew one given before the dissolution.⁴ Nor will authority to give or renew a note be implied by authority "to settle business of the firm and sign its name for that purpose;"⁵ "to use the name of

¹ Usher v. Dauncey, 4 Camp. 97. Lord Ellenborough said that this case came within the principle of Russell v. Langstaff, Doug. 513.

² Lewis v. Reilly, 1 Q. B. 349. ³ Parker v. Macomber, 18 Pick. 505.

⁴ White v. Tudor, 14 Texas, 641; Haddock v. Crocheron, 32 Texas, 276; Myatt v. Bell, 41 Ala. 222; Palmer v. Dodge, 4 Ohio St. 21; Martin v. Walton, 1 McCord, 16; Parker v. Macomber, 18 Pick. 505; Long v. Story, 10 Mo. 636; Parker v. Cousins, 2 Grat. 572; Kilgour v. Finlayson, 1 H. Black, 155; Edwards on Bills, 118.

⁵ National Bank v. Norton, 1 Ill. 372; Hamilton v. Seaman, 1 Ind. 185.

the firm in liquidation only of past business ;”¹ “to settle all demands in favor of or against the firm ;”² or by the use of any similar expression.

In England, however, authority to use the partnership name was considered in one case sufficient to leave it for a jury to say whether, according to usage and custom, it would authorize a renewal in the firm’s name.³ In Pennsylvania, it is held that after dissolution of the firm one partner has free authority to borrow,⁴ and to execute or renew bills and notes in settlement of the past business of the firm.⁵ And in that State it was also held in a suit by the indorsee of a note, executed by one of two partners in the firm’s name, after dissolution, could recover against the firm, notice of the dissolution being proved as against the payee, but not as against the indorsee.⁶

§ 374. *Statute of Limitations.*—By some authorities it is maintained that where the statute of limitations has run against a partnership debt, one partner’s promise or acknowledgment, though made after dissolution, will revive it,⁷ while others take the contrary view.⁸ This seems to us correct, for, as said by the United States Supreme Court, “when the statute has once run against a debt the cause of action against the partnership is gone. The acknowledgment, if it is to operate at all, is to create a new cause of action.”⁹ Nor will a part payment by one partner made after dissolution revive the debt to which the statute has applied as against others for the same reasons.¹⁰ But the English doctrine is otherwise.¹¹

It has been held in Massachusetts that an acknowledg-

¹ *Martin v. Kirk*, 2 *Humph.* 529. ² *Lockwood v. Comstock*, 4 *McLean*, 383.

³ *Myers v. Huggins*, 1 *Strob.* 473.

⁴ *Davis v. Desauque*, 5 *Whart.* 530.

⁵ *Brown v. Clark*, 14 *Penn. St.* 469; *Robinson v. Taylor*, 4 *Penn. St.* 242.

⁶ *Albeitz v. Mellon*, 37 *Penn. St.* 369.

⁷ *McIntire v. Oliver*, 2 *Hawks*, 209.

⁸ *Van Keuren v. Parmelee*, 2 *Comst.* 523; *Levy v. Cadet*, 17 *Serg. & R.* 126; *Belote v. Wyne*, 7 *Yerg.* 534.

⁹ *Bell v. Morrison*, 1 *Pet.* 351.

¹⁰ *Exeter Bank v. Sullivan*, 6 *N. H.* 124.

¹¹ *Whitcomb v. Whiting*, *Doug.* 652.

ment signed in the partnership name, made by one partner after dissolution, of a balance due in a course of dealing proved by other evidence, is admissible against the other party in a suit against both, especially where the partner who made the acknowledgment was authorized to settle the business of the firm.¹

§ 375. Notwithstanding the dissolution of the firm, the use of the firm's name by one partner will bind all, unless due notice of the dissolution were given so as to affect the holder of the paper with its infirmities.²

¹ *Ide v. Ingraham*, 5 Gray, 106.

² *Lansing v. Gaine*, 2 Johns. 309; *Bristol v. Sprague*, 8 Wend. 423; *Cony v. Wheelock*, 33 Me. 366; *Whitman v. Leonard*, 3 Pick. 177; *Booth v. Quin*, 7 Price, 193.

CHAPTER XIII.

PRIVATE CORPORATIONS AS PARTIES TO NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.

§ 376. THE first inquiry to be made in respect to an instrument purporting to be that of a corporation, is, "Has the corporation in question a legal right to bind itself in such a form?" That question being determined affirmatively, the party negotiating for the instrument should then ascertain—*First*. Whether or not the officer or agent who has signed on behalf of the corporation is competent in law to bind it. *Second*. Whether the individuals signing as officers or agents of the corporation are in fact such. *Third*. Whether or not they were authorized, expressly or impliedly, by the corporation to sign the instrument in its behalf. *Fourth*. Whether the signatures are genuine; and *Fifth*. Whether or not the instrument is to be interpreted as a corporate or individual obligation. These inquiries we shall endeavor to answer under three general heads: I. Authority of the corporation to execute the instrument. II. Authority of the agent, in law and in fact, to bind the corporation. III. Interpretation of the instrument.

SECTION I.

AUTHORITY OF THE CORPORATION TO EXECUTE THE INSTRUMENT.

§ 377. It is obvious that the inquiry as to the power of the corporation to execute the instrument is of the first importance, for if it exceed its powers, its act is as much a nullity as the act of a married woman or a lunatic; and however ignorantly or innocently the party dealing with it may have been, he cannot enforce his contract made with it.

It is considered as an act "*ultra vires*," that is "beyond the powers" of the corporation, and therefore without legal sanction or vitality. And being a mere nullity, circulation from hand to hand, and ownership by a *bona fide* holder, can impart no vitality to it; and as against the corporation he can stand on no better footing than his predecessors.¹ Nor is this rule so harsh as it might seem. Ignorance of the law excuses no one, and a corporation being a legal creation, all persons dealing with it are chargeable with notice of its legal character.²

§ 378. Chief Justice Marshall has well defined a corporation as "an artificial being, invisible, intangible and existing only in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of the law, it possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly or as incidental to its very existence. These are such as are supposed to be best calculated to effect the object for which it is created."³ In endeavoring then to ascertain whether or not a corporation has authority to do a certain act, we should see, *first*, whether any express power is conferred, and *second*, if none such be found, whether such power is implied as an incident of its nature. And in the latter inquiry, the character of the corporation is obviously the controlling element to be considered.

¹ *School Directors v. Fogleman*, 76 Ill. 189; *Pearce v. Madison, &c.* R. R. 21 How. 441; *Macgregor v. Dover, &c.* R. R. 18 Q. B. 618; *Earl of Shrewsbury v. North Staffordshire R. R. L. R.* 1 Eq. 593.

² In *Broughton v. Manchester & S. Waterworks Co.* 3 B. & Ald. 1, where it appeared that an act of Parliament prohibited corporations, other than the Bank of England, from accepting bills payable at a less period than six months from date; and the acceptance in suit came within the prohibition. Holroyd, J., said: "Here the defendants are made a corporation by a public act of Parliament, and every person is bound to take notice of that act; and when, therefore, a holder of a bill, though a *bona fide* indorsee, takes the defendant's acceptance, he must know that they are a body corporate; and he therefore receives it, knowing it to be the acceptance of a corporation prohibited from owing money on such a bill; he is not, therefore, an innocent indorsee, because he takes a bill which he knows is prohibited by statute."

³ *Dartmouth College v. Woodward*, 4 Wheat. 636.

§ 379. Corporations are either private or public—public when “the whole interests and franchises are the exclusive property and domain of the government itself;”¹ otherwise private. Public corporations are established exclusively for public purposes, and comprise cities, towns, villages, counties, townships, parishes and all other corporations erected by the government as governmental agencies. Private corporations comprise banks, building associations, railroad companies, and all other associations formed for manufacturing, trading or other objects of private gain, emolument, gratification or benefit.²

§ 380. *Of the authority of private corporations to issue negotiable instruments* we shall first speak, and then of the authority of public corporations. It is quite easy to determine whether or not there is express power *in totidem verbis* to issue the particular instrument by consulting the terms of the corporate charter. If not expressed, then the inquiry arises, is the power implied in some power conferred, or from the general character of the institution?³ The English decisions on this subject seem to us more consistent with principle than those in the United States.

There it has been held that trading and banking corporations might draw or accept bills without express authority to do so, because such acts are necessary to the very objects of their existence. But that a corporation chartered to supply a city with water could not do so, for, as said by Bayley, J., “it cannot be necessary for this purpose that they should become the makers of promissory notes, or the acceptors of bills of exchange.”⁴ And certainly it does not seem “incidental to its very existence” (to quote Chief Justice Mar-

¹ Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 636.

² See Dillon on Municipal Corporations (2 ed.), Vol I, § 30, and cases cited.

³ Broughton v. Manchester & S. Waterworks, 3 B. & Ald. 1, Best, J., saying that when “a company like the Bank of England, or the East India Company, are incorporated for the purposes of trade, it seems to result from the very object of their being so incorporated that they should have power to accept bills or issue promissory notes.”

⁴ Broughton v. Manchester & S. Waterworks, 3 B. & Ald. 1.

shall's definition) that a water supply corporation should execute a negotiable instrument, as its corporators might be expected to operate with a cash capital, unless the power were conferred to operate upon credit.

Likewise, it has been held that a railroad company cannot, without express authority, bind itself by accepting a bill of exchange.¹

§ 381. *In the United States* the cases go to great lengths in upholding the validity of corporate negotiable instruments. "In this country it may be regarded as settled," says Prof. Parsons,² "that the power of corporations to become parties to bills of exchange, or promissory notes, is co-extensive with their power to contract debts. Whenever a corporation is authorized to contract a debt, it may draw a bill or give a note in payment of it. Every corporation, therefore, may become a party to bills and notes for some purposes. Thus a mere religious corporation may need fuel for its rooms, and as an economical measure may buy a cargo of coal, and give its note for it; and such a note would undoubtedly be valid in this country." And instancing how far a corporation may go, he adds: "if, for example, the Trustees of Columbia College, in New York, bought a cargo of cotton, and gave their negotiable note for twenty thousand dollars, the seller might suppose that they had need of some means of transmitting a large amount of money, and found that they could do it to most advantage by using this cotton; or that they wanted it for some other legitimate purpose. Such a note would clearly be valid in the hands of a *bona fide* holder without notice; nor do we think that the nature of the transaction merely would be notice to the original payee that it was given for an unauthorized purpose." But it might be said with propriety, that so singular a spectacle as the trustees of a literary institution buying cotton, would more naturally lead the party dealing with them to suspect

¹ Bateman v. Mid-Wales R. R. L. R. 1 C. P. 499.

² 1 Parsons N. & B. 164, 165; approved in Catron v. First Universalist Society, 46 Iowa 108.

that they were speculating with their trust funds, and that such party would, by the very nature of the act, be apprised of their defective authority.

§ 382. *Prevailing doctrines in United States.*—In this country three propositions respecting private corporations may be regarded as settled. *First.* That it has implied power to contract debts like an individual whenever necessary or convenient in furtherance of its legitimate objects.¹ *Second.* That whenever it may contract a debt, it may borrow money to pay it.² And, *Third,* That whenever it contracts a debt for materials, services, or otherwise, in the scope of its business, or borrows money, it may execute a negotiable bill, note,³ or bond,⁴ and secure it by mortgage, to the creditor in payment. The doctrine on this subject was well stated in a New York case, where Vice Chancellor Sandford, said: "A corporation, in order to attain its legitimate objects, may deal precisely as an individual may who seeks to accomplish the same ends. If chartered for the purpose of building a bridge, it may contract a debt for labor, the materials, or the land upon which the bridge is abutted. If more advantageous, it may borrow money to purchase such land or materials, or to pay

¹ *Fay v. Noble*, 12 Cush. 1; *McMasters v. Reed*, 1 Grant's Cas. 36; *Moss v. Averill*, 10 N. Y. 449; *Barry v. Merchants' Exchange Co.* 1 Sand. Ch. 280; *Commercial Bank v. Newport*, 1 B. Mon. 13. See also cases cited in succeeding notes.

² *Mead v. Keeler*, 24 Barb. 20; *Beers v. Phoenix Glass Co.* 14 Barb. 358 (1852); *Partridge v. Badger*, 25 Barb. 146 (1857); *Fay v. Noble*, 12 Cush. 1; *Stratton v. Allen*, 16 N. J. Eq. 229.

³ *Mott v. Hicks*, 1 Cow. 513; *Safford v. Wyckoff*, 4 Hill, 442; *Moss v. Oakley*, 2 Hill, 265; *Barry v. Merchants' Exchange Co.* 1 Sand. Ch. 280; *Meed v. Keeler*, 24 Barb. 20; *Barber v. Mechanics' Ins. Co.* 3 Wend. 96; *Barnes v. Ontario Bank*, 19 N. Y. 152; *Leavitt v. Blatchford*, 17 N. Y. 521; *Curtis v. Leavitt*, 15 N. Y. 66; *Partridge v. Badger*, 25 Barb. 146; *Moss v. Averill*, 10 N. Y. 449; *Att. Gen. v. Life and F. Ins. Co.* 9 Paige, 470; *Hamilton v. Newcastle R. R. Co.* 9 Ind. 359; *Hardy v. Merriman*, 14 Ind. 203; *McMasters v. Reed*, 1 Grant's Cas. 36; *Smith v. Eureka Flour Mills*, 6 Cal. 1; *Carne v. Brigham*, 39 Me. 35; *Clark v. School District*, 3 R. I. 199; *Lucas v. Pitney*, 3 Dutch 221; *Commercial Bank v. Newport Man. Co.* 1 B. Mon. 13; *Buckley v. Briggs*, 30 Mo. 452.

⁴ *Smith v. Law*, 21 N. Y. 296; *Curtis v. Leavitt*, 15 N. Y. 66; *Barry v. Merchants' Exchange Co.* 1 Sand. Ch. 280; *Commonwealth v. Pittsburgh*, 41 Penn. St. 278; *Railroad Co. v. Evansville*, 15 Ind. 395; *White Water Valley Canal Co.* 21 How. 414.

for such labor; and as the evidence of the indebtedness, it may execute to the creditors a note, a bond, or a mortgage, whether the debt be for the money borrowed, or the work, material, or lands.”¹ And in a more recent case it was said that “the right of corporations in general to give a note, bond, or other engagement to pay a debt is so nearly identical or so inseparably connected with the right to contract the debt, that no doubt upon the question ought to be admitted. When a corporation can lawfully purchase property, or procure money on loan in the course of its business, the seller or the lender may exact, and the purchaser or borrower must have, the power to give any known assurance which does not fall within the prohibition, express or implied, of some statute. The particular restriction must be sought for in the charter of the corporation, or in some other statute binding upon it; but if not found in that examination, we may safely affirm that it has no existence.”²

§ 383. Applying these principles in particular cases, the courts have upheld the right to contract debts, and to borrow money to pay them, where the company was chartered to build a railroad;³ to build a plank-road;⁴ to hold real estate, and to erect buildings for a public exchange;⁵ to build and hold property for religious purposes;⁶ to operate a flouring mill;⁷ and where a railroad was empowered to contract with a connecting road for its use, it was held that it might accept bills drawn by the connecting road, as a con-

¹ *Barry v. Merchants' Exchange Co.* 1 Sand. Ch. 280.

² *Comstock, J., in Curtis v. Leavitt*, 15 N. Y. 66. See also *Mott v. Hicks*, 1 Cow. 513; *Barber v. Mechanics' Ins. Co.* 3 Wend. 96; *Jackson v. Brown*, 5 Wend. 596; *Moss v. Oakley*, 2 Hill, 265; *Att. Gen. v. Life & Fire Ins. Co.* 9 Paige, 470; *Safford v. Wykoff*, 4 Hill, 442; *Barry v. Merchants' Exchange Co.* 1 Sand. Ch. 280; *Meed v. Keeler*, 24 Barb. 20; *Hamilton v. Newcastle, &c. R. R. Co.* 9 Ind. 359; *Hardy v. Merriman*, 14 Ind. 203; *Smith v. Eureka Flour Mills*, 6 Cal. 1; *Buckley v. Briggs*, 30 Mo. 452; *Commercial Bank v. Newport Man. Co.* 1 B. Mon. 13; *McMasters v. Reed*, 1 Grant's Cas. 36; *Carne v. Brigham*, 39 Me. 35.

³ *Lucas v. Pitney*, 3 Dutch. 221.

⁴ *Smith v. Law*, 21 N. Y. 296.

⁵ *Barry v. Merchants' Ex. Co.* 1 Sand. Ch. 280.

⁶ *Davis v. Proprietors' Meeting House*, 8 Metc. 321.

⁷ *Smith v. Eureka Flour Mills Co.* 6 Cal. 1.

sideration for a change of gauge.¹ So trustees of a society to build a monument, it has been held, may make a promissory note;² so may corporations empowered to buy and sell lands or goods;³ so may one authorized to advance money upon goods, accept bills in anticipation of consignments;⁴ so may one engaged in the manufacture of glass execute its bills or notes for wood to be used, or other materials;⁵ so may a building fund association borrow money and execute its notes in payment.⁶

§ 384. Ordinarily a corporation has implied power to take a bill or note for a debt due it. But there is no implied power to a corporation to loan out its funds,⁷ unless it be a bank, or authorized to conduct banking business, or make loans and discounts, as other corporations are sometimes empowered to do. Therefore an insurance company prohibited from discounting paper could not lend money on a note and take interest in advance.⁸ And prohibition of *banking* powers is a prohibition from making discounts.⁹

But it has been held that an insurance company empowered to make insurances cannot contract debts, or borrow money, and consequently could not draw or accept a bill, or make a note; for no such implied power can be deemed necessary to its business, which is to be conducted by subscriptions of stock.¹⁰

¹ Smead v. Indianapolis R. R. Co. 11 Ind. 104.

² Hayward v. Pilgrim Society, 21 Pick. 270.

³ Clark v. Farmers' Woolen Man. Co. 15 Wend. 256; Commercial Bank v. Newport Man. Co. 1 B. Mon. 13; Fay v. Noble, 12 Cush. 1; Ketchum v. City of Buffalo, 4 Kern. 356.

⁴ Munn v. Commission Co. 15 Johns. 44.

⁵ Mott v. Hicks, 1 Cow. 513.

⁶ Davis v. West Saratoga B. Union, 32 Md. 285.

⁷ Madison, &c. Plank R. Co. v. Watertown Plank Road Co. 7 Wis. 59. *Held*, that a plank road company is not authorized to lend money generally, but might lend an amount to one of its contractors to enable him to build a section. Grand Lodge of Freemasons v. Waddill, 36 Ala. 313. *Held*, that Lodge of Masons could not lend money. Waddill v. Alabama R. R. Co. 35 Ala. (N. S.) 323. *Held*, railroad company could not.

⁸ N. Y. Fireman's Ins. Co. v. Ely, 2 Cow. 664.

⁹ Philadelphia Loan Co. v. Towner, 13 Conn. 249.

¹⁰ Bacon v. Mississippi Ins. Co. 31 Miss. 116.

§ 385. Corporations having a right to receive bills or notes in payment of debts, have the implied right to indorse them, or to dispose of them by assignment without indorsement, as may suit their purposes.¹ And if authorized to borrow money, they may borrow a bill or note, and indorse it, or assign it.² Power to "sell and convey" its bills and notes impliedly authorizes the corporation to transfer them by indorsement or assignment.³

§ 386. When a corporation has a general power, express or implied, to be a party to bills and notes, such instruments will be presumed to have been executed in the legitimate course of its business, and whether so executed or not will be valid in the hands of a *bona fide* holder without notice.⁴ Unless the corporation be specially authorized to do so, the execution or indorsement of accommodation paper for the benefit of a third person is an act beyond the scope of its corporate authority; but, according to the principles stated, a *bona fide* holder taking without notice of its character could enforce it.⁵ Its indorsement on the paper is presumably valid, and it cannot be inferred in the absence of proof that it was for accommodation.⁶ Where a railroad company transferred and guaranteed bonds of another, itself receiving the proceeds, it was held estopped to deny its liability upon the guaranty.⁷

¹ *Marvine v. Hymers*, 12 N. Y. 223; *Planters' Bank v. Sharp*, 6 How. 301; *Hardy v. Merriweather*, 14 Ind. 203; *McIntyre v. Preston*, 5 Gil. 48; *Bank of Genesee v. Patchin Bank*, 3 Kern. 309.

² *Lucas v. Pitney*, 3 Dutch. 221; *Turniss v. Gilchrist*, 1 Sand. 53; *Holbrook v. Basset*, 5 Bosw. 147.

³ *Cooper v. Curtis*, 30 Me. 488; *Savage v. Walshe*, 26 Ala. (N. S.) 619.

⁴ *Mitchell v. Rome R. R. Co.* 17 Ga. 574; *Supervisors v. Schenck*, 5 Wall. 784; *Hart v. Missouri, &c. F. & M. Ins. Co.* 21 Mo. 91; *Barker v. Mechanics' Ins. Co.* 3 Wend. 94; *Lafayette Bank v. St. Louis Stoneware Co.* 2 Mo. App. 294.

⁵ *Bird v. Daggett*, 97 Mass. 494; *Monument Nat. Bank v. Globe Works*, 101 Mass. 57; *Bank of Genesee v. Patchin Bank*, 3 Kern. 309; 19 N. Y. 312; *Morford v. Farmers' Bank*, 26 Barb. 568; *Bridgeport City Bank v. Empire Stone Dressing Co.* 30 Barb. 421; *Hall v. Auburn Turnpike Co.* 27 Cal. 255; *Madison, &c. R. R. Co. v. Norwich Sav. Soc'y*, 24 Ind. 457.

⁶ *Lafayette Bank v. St. Louis Stoneware Co.* 2 Mo. App. 299.

⁷ *Arnot v. Erie R. R. Co.* 12 N. Y. S. C. (5 Hun), 608.

Although the agent or officer of the corporation making accommodation paper exceeded his authority, such holder could not sue him for his tortious act, as the paper is valid as to him, and having a remedy against the corporation, he suffers no damage thereby.¹ The same principle which prohibits corporations from becoming parties to accommodation paper would apply to their becoming guarantors, or sureties for others.²

A corporator sued on a note by a corporation cannot plead its illegality.³

SECTION II.

AUTHORITY OF THE AGENT IN LAW AND IN FACT TO BIND THE CORPORATION.

§ 387. (1) When it is settled that the corporation has legal authority to do the act, the next question is, are the parties pretending to act for it the legal agencies by which its authority may be exercised. Not infrequently the charter of incorporation provides that the corporate instruments of debt shall be signed by the president, or signed by its president and countersigned by the cashier, or prescribe some such formality of their execution. In such cases, these being the legal agencies provided by law to bind the corporation by their acts in a particular way, instruments signed by other officers or agents, purporting to bind the corporation, would bear upon their face evidence of departure from the legal mode, and be notice to all of the irregularity. And it would not be competent for the corporation to bind itself by instruments in any other form, or executed by other agents, than those prescribed by law.⁴ Thus, where a bank charter pro-

¹ Bird v. Daggett, 97 Mass. 494.

² Madison, &c. Plank Road Co. v. Watertown, &c. Plank Road Co. 7 Wis. 59; Madison, &c. R. R. Co. v. Norwich Sav Soc'y, 24 Ind. 457.

³ Ramsey v. Peoria, &c. Ins. Co. 55 Ill. 311.

⁴ McCullough v. Moss, 5 Den. 575, Lott, Senator.

vided that its bills, notes and other contracts should be binding if signed by the president and countersigned by the cashier, and that the funds of the corporation should not be bound for any contract unless it was so signed and countersigned, it was held that bank bills signed by the vice-president and countersigned by the assistant cashier were not binding although the board of directors had authorized the vice-president and assistant cashier to sign them.¹ And this is clearly correct, for when a corporation is limited and restricted to certain defined powers, and also to certain prescribed modes, the ends contemplated by the charter would be practically defeated, as well by a departure from the mode designated as by an exercise of the powers prohibited.² So where it was provided that the business of a lead mining company should be conducted by its directors, it was thought that the president and secretary could not bind it by a note unless authorized so to do by the directors, and such authority was not to be presumed.³ But any officer or agent, acting under authority of directors having power under the charter to bind the corporation, might bind the corporation, and his authority from them might be shown to exist by implication from the course of business, as well as by express resolution.⁴ Substantial compliance with the statutory requirements is all that is necessary. Therefore, where the statute required that a corporate bill should be accepted by two directors, and that they should express that it was accepted by them on behalf of the corporation, and the two accepting directors wrote "appointed to accept this bill" in their acceptance, it was held sufficient.⁵

¹ *Planters', &c. Bank v. Erwin*, 31 Geo. 377, Lumpkin, J.: "If it be said that these bills have got into the hands of innocent holders, our reply is, that they could have protected themselves by looking at the charter, which, in strong phraseology, has exempted the corporation from liability for bills thus signed. The want of power to bind even the corporate funds in this way was patent, and whosoever would might avoid imposition."

² *Lucas v. San Francisco*, 7 Cal. 469.

³ *McCullough v. Moss*, 5 Den. 575. To same effect see *Cattron v. First Universalist Society*, 46 Iowa, 106.

⁴ *Preston v. Missouri, &c. Lead Co.* 51 Mo. 45.

⁵ *Halford v. Cameron's Coalbrook, &c. Co.* 3 Eng. L. & Eq. 309.

Where the directors of an incorporated company authorized its agent to give "a company note" it was held that the term "note" was not employed in its strict sense, but that a due bill, memorandum, check or other similar security would fall fairly within the meaning of it.¹

§ 388. (2) *Whether or not the parties so describing themselves are really officers or agents of the corporation* is next to be determined. The ordinary and most unexceptionable form of proof is made by the production of the records or books of the corporation containing the entry or resolution of appointment, the records being shown to be those of the corporation.² But it is not necessary that this mode of proof should be adopted. Nor is it necessary that there should be such record evidence in existence, or that any particular mode of appointment should have been pursued, unless required by statute. It was the ancient doctrine of the common law that a corporation could not express its assent, and therefore could not constitute an officer or agent, save by instrument under seal.³ This doctrine is now completely obsolete in the United States, and here there is no doubt that such a body may, by mere vote or other appropriate corporate act not under seal, appoint an officer or agent whose acts and contracts within the scope of his authority would bind the corporation.⁴ And if a corporation employ a person to discharge official duties—such as a bank, which places a person behind its counter to exercise the duties of cashier—it will be bound by his acts although the formalities of qualification have not been complied with, unless the statute creating the corporation provides that his acts shall be void until such formalities be performed.⁵ Indeed, the doctrine is well

¹ Tripp v. Swanzy Man. Co. 13 Pick. 293.

² Clark v. Benton Man. Co. 15 Wend. 256; Narragansett Bank v. Atlantic Silk Co. 3 Metc. 282; Thayer v. Middlesex Mut. Ins. Co. 10 Pick. 226; Owings v. Speed, 5 Wheat. 424.

³ Angell & Ames on Corporations, chap. ix, § 3, p. 214.

⁴ Bank of Columbia v. Patterson's Adm'r, 7 Cranch, 305; Fleckner v. U. S. Bank, 8 Wheat. 387.

⁵ Bank of U. S. v. Dandredge, 12 Wheat. 83.

settled that if officers of a corporation openly exercise a power which presupposes a delegated authority for the purpose, and other corporate acts show that the corporation must have contemplated the legal existence of such authority, the acts of such officers will be deemed rightful, and the delegated authority will be presumed. If a person acts notoriously as cashier of a bank, and is recognized by the directors, or by the corporation, as an existing officer, a regular appointment will be presumed, and his acts as cashier will bind the corporation, although no written proof is or can be adduced of his appointment. In short, the acts of artificial persons afford the same presumptions as the acts of natural persons. Each affords presumptions, from acts done, of what must have preceded them, as matters of right or matters of duty.¹

§ 389. (3) *Whether or not the officer or agent is authorized in fact to do the particular act, is the next question.*—Proof of his official character is often sufficient to decide it, for if the acts be done within the scope of his official duties, and the party dealing with him had no notice that the general authority implied by official relation was restricted by private instructions, the corporation would be liable. And here the distinction between general and special agents should be observed. If a corporation were to employ a special agent to go to a city and buy a fireproof safe, he could not execute a bill or note, or borrow money in its name, such acts not being within the scope of his special agency, and all dealing with him would be chargeable with notice of his limited authority.² But if a corporation elects a board of directors, a president, cashier, teller, or treasurer, it thereby designates such persons as authorized to exercise all powers which its charter reposes, or the usual course of

¹ Bank of U. S. v. Dandredge, 12 Wheat. 64, Story, J. See also Wild v. Bank of Passamaquoddy, 3 Mason, C. C. R. 505; Union Bank v. Ridgeley, 1 Har. & G. 392; Barrington v. Bank, 14 Serg. & R. 421; Morse on Banking, 139; East River Nat. Bank v. Gove, 57 N. Y. 601. Distinguishing and questioning Thatcher v. Bank of the State, 5 Sand. S. C. 121.

² McCullough v. Moss, 5 Den. 567.

business in like institutions accords to such officers. They are its general agents within the sphere of official duty and discretion. It can only act by its agents. And they are, in fact, held out to the public as its representatives within these spheres, and are, in fact, so far as the public is concerned, *pro tanto*, the corporation. The corporation is, therefore, bound by their acts done within the range of their official character; and the general principle, as stated by the United States Supreme Court, is, that "where a party deals with a corporation in good faith, the transaction is not *ultra vires*, and he is unaware of any defect of authority or other irregularity on the part of those acting for the corporation, and there is nothing to excite suspicion of such defect or irregularity, the corporation is bound by the contract, although such defect or irregularity in fact exists. If the contract can be valid under any circumstances, an innocent party in such a case has a right to presume their existence, and the corporation is estopped to deny them." And it adds: "The principle has become axiomatic in the law of corporations."¹

§ 390. Applying this principle to particular cases, the courts have enforced the liability of the corporation, where the president of a railroad company, who was also a director and transfer agent, fraudulently overissued certificates of stock;² where the cashier of a bank issued a false certificate of deposit;³ where the cashier of a bank certified a check

¹ Merchants' Bank v. State Bank, 10 Wall. 644 (1870), Swayne, J.; see also Supervisors v. Schenck, 5 Wall. 784; Thompson v. Lee County, 3 Wall. 327; Mercer County v. Hackett, 1 Wall. 93; Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 203; Moran v. Commissioners, 2 Black, 722; Bissell v. Jeffersonville, 24 How. 288; Commissioners of Knox County v. Aspinwall, 21 How. 539; Com. v. Pittsburg, 34 Penn. 497; Commonwealth v. Alleghany County, 37 Penn. 287; Stoney v. American Life Ins. Co. 11 Paige, 635; Society for Savings v. New London, 29 Conn. 174; Claffin v. Farmers' Bank, 36 Barb. 540, overruling s. c. 25 N. Y. (11 Smith) 293; Safford v. Wyckoff, 4 Hill (N. Y.) 445; De Voss v. City of Richmond, 18 Grat. 338.

² New York, &c. R. R. v. Schuyler, 34 N. Y. 30.

³ Barnes v. Ontario Bank, 19 N. Y. 156.

without authority;¹ where the teller of a bank fraudulently certified a check to be good;² where the treasurer of a railroad company, whose duty it was to issue certificates of stock, fraudulently issued certificates regular in form, but representing no real stock, and pledged them as security for a loan to himself.³

§ 391. The principle is based upon the idea that where one of two innocent parties must suffer, the loss should fall upon the one who created the trust which enabled the trustee to mislead.⁴ And it applies as well where the controversy is between the original parties, as in favor of indorsers and holders without notice of the alleged defect.⁵ And it is settled law that a negotiable security of a corporation which appears upon its face to have been duly issued by such corporation, and in conformity with the provisions of its charter, is valid in the hands of a *bona fide* holder thereof without notice, although such security was in point of fact issued for a purpose, and at a place or in a manner not authorized by the charter of the corporation.⁶

§ 392. *What officers have implied powers to bind corporations as parties to negotiable instruments.*—The cashier of a bank has *prima facie* authority by virtue of his office to transfer and indorse negotiable paper held by the bank for its use, and on its behalf; and while it is perfectly competent for the bank to depart from the general course of

¹ Merchants' Bank v. State Bank, 10 Wall. 604.

² Farmers' Bank v. Butchers' Bank, 14 N. Y. 624, s. c. 16 N. Y. 133; Mead v. Merchants' Bank, 25 N. Y. 146.

³ Tome v. Parkersburg R. R. Co. 39 Md. 36.

⁴ Bank of U. S. v. Davis, 2 Hill, 465; F. & M. Bank v. B. & D. Bank, 16 N. Y. 133; Welland Canal Co. v. Hathaway, 8 Wend. 480; N. Y. & N. H. R. R. Co. v. Schuyler, 34 N. Y. 30; Hern v. Nichols, 1 Salk. 289; Barnes v. Ontario Bank, 19 N. Y. 156; Farmers' & M. Bank v. Butchers' & D. Bank, 14 N. Y. 624; 16 N. Y. 133; Mead v. Merchants' Bank, 25 N. Y. 146; Merchants' Bank v. State Bank, 10 Wall. 604.

⁵ Savings Co. v. New London, 29 Conn. 174; Tash v. Adams, 10 Cush. 252; Supervisors v. Schenck, 5 Wall. 784.

⁶ Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 203; Thompson v. Lee County, 3 Wall. 327; Goodman v. Simonds, 20 How. 365.

business, it is incumbent on it to show, in order to escape liability on such an indorsement, that it had restricted his power in this regard, and that such restriction was known to the holder.¹ Especially has the cashier authority to indorse negotiable paper for collection merely.² But he has no implied power to transfer non-negotiable paper, judgments, or personal property; and his authority must be proved directly or by usage.³ So, he has implied authority to draw bills or checks on funds of the bank elsewhere;⁴ to certify checks drawn upon the bank;⁵ to receipt for and issue certificates of deposit;⁶ to borrow money and execute promissory notes of the bank therefor;⁷ also, we should say, to accept bills in the bank's name,⁸ although the implication of this power *virtute officii* has been denied.⁹ And to buy and sell bills and notes for the bank, indorsing them also when sold, is within the ordinary scope of his office.¹⁰ So, too, in the absence of restrictions, if he has procured a *bona fide* rediscount

¹ West St. Louis, &c. Bank v. Shawnee, &c. Bank, 95 U. S. (5 Otto) 558; Fleckner v. U. S. Bank, 8 Wheat. 357; Wild v. Passamaquoddy Bank, 3 Mason, 505; Robb v. Ross County Bank, 41 Barb. 586; Cooper v. Curtis, 30 Me. 488; City Bank v. Perkins, 29 N. Y. 554; Kimball v. Cleveland, 4 Mich. 606; Everett v. U. S. G. Port. (Ala.) 166; Harper v. Calhoun, 7 How. (Miss.) 203; Farrar v. Gilman, 19 Me. 440; State Bank v. Wheeler, 21 Ind. 90; Lafayette Bank v. State Bank, 4 McLean, 208; Angell & Ames on Corporations, 245; Morse on Banking, 151, 152, 153.

In Bissell v. First Nat. Bank, 69 Penn. St. 415, it was held that the bank was bound by indorsement of its cashier, "A. B., cashier," although not made at the bank, but upon the street.

² Potter v. Merchants' Bank, 28 N. Y. 641; Elliott v. Abbott, 12 N. H. 549; Corser v. Paul, 41 N. H. 24; Hartford Bank v. Barry, 17 Mass. 94.

³ Barrick v. Austin, 21 Barb. 241; Holt v. Bacon, 25 Miss. 567.

⁴ Morse on Banking, 150.

⁵ Merchants' Bank v. Bank of Columbia, 5 Wheat. 326; United States v. City Bank, 21 How. 356; Merchants' Bank v. Central Bank, 1 Kel. 418; Morse on Banking, 150.

⁶ Merchants' Bank v. State Bank, 10 Wall. 604; Morse on Banking, 148.

⁷ State Bank v. Kain, 1 Breese, 45; Morse on Banking, 54, 55.

⁸ Barnes v. Ontario Bank, 19 N. Y. 152; Sturgis v. Bank of Circleville, 11 Ohio St. 153; Ridgway v. Farmers' Bank, 12 Sergt. & R. 256; Ballston Spa Bank v. Marine Bank, 16 Wis. 120; Morse on Banking, 148.

⁹ Farmers, &c. Bank v. Troy City Bank, 1 Dough. (Mich.) 457. Such is the implication of this case. Morse on Banking, 164.

¹⁰ Pendleton v. Bank of Ky. 1 T. B. Mon. 179.

of the paper of the bank, his acts will be binding, because of his implied power to transact such business.¹ But he has no power to bind the bank as a party to accommodation paper; and it would be void in the hands of any one taking it (except from a holder without notice) with notice of its character;² nor has he power to release a debt,³ though if he informs a surety that the debt of his principal is paid, and the surety relying on his statement change his position, the bank would be estopped from making claim against him.⁴ The assistant cashier has no implied power to accept or certify a check.⁵

§ 393. The president of a bank and of other incorporated institutions has implied authority to take charge of their litigation, and to employ counsel to prosecute or defend causes. And the corporation will be bound by his action unless it be known to the party employed that he was acting against the will of the corporation.⁶ A bank president has the implied power to receipt for deposits.⁷ But the president of a bank is not the executive officer who has charge of its moneyed operations. A recent author says that he has no implied power to draw checks on its behalf, or against its funds,⁸ though established usage may confer such power upon him, to be exercised in the cashier's absence, or otherwise.⁹

It has been thought that the president of a lead mining

¹ *West St. Louis, &c. Bank v. Shawnee, &c. Bank*, 95 U. S. (5 Otto), 559 (1877).

² *West St. Louis, &c. Bank v. Shawnee, &c. Bank*, 95 U. S. (5 Otto), 558; *Lafayette Bank v. State Bank*, 4 McLean, 208; *Morse on Banking*, 164; *Farmers' &c. Bank v. Troy City Bank*, 1 Dough. (Mich.) 457.

³ *Cocheco Nat. Bank v. Haskell*, 51 N. H. 116.

⁴ *Id.*

⁵ *Pope v. Bank of Albion*, 57 N. Y. 126 (1874).

⁶ *Alexandria Canal Co. v. Swann*, 5 How. 83; *American Ins. Co. v. Oakley*, 9 Paige, 496; *Savings Bank v. Benton*, 2 Metc. (Ky.) 240; *Mumford v. Hawkins*, 5 Den. 355; *Hodges' Ex'r v. First Nat. Bank*, 21 Grat. 59; *Morse on Banking*, 128, 129; but in *Ashuelot Man. Co. v. Marsh*, 1 Cush. 507, it was held that a president of a manufacturing corporation cannot bind it by bringing suit without authority.

⁷ *Sterling v. Marietta, &c. Trading Co.* 11 Sergt. & R. 179.

⁸ *Morse on Banking*, 132.

⁹ *Neiffer v. Bank of Knoxville*, 1 Head, 162.

company has no implied power to bind it by a note in the absence of authority from the directors;¹ and it was recently held in Michigan that no such power was impliedly vested in the general agent of a mining company, although his drafts were customarily drawn for current needs of the company, and were duly honored.²

§ 394. If he has a general authority from the directors, the president of a bank may indorse bills or notes payable to it.³ And it would seem that he has an implied power to indorse and transfer its negotiable paper.⁴ The president of an insurance company may indorse its bills and notes so as to bind it, when it is shown that according to the usual practice of the company its notes were so negotiated, or that by its course of business he had been held out as a proper person to indorse them,⁵ but not otherwise, without express authority.⁶

The treasurer of a corporation authorized to pay and discharge a debt is not thereby empowered to execute a note for it, being without funds in hand.⁷ And the treasurer of a corporation is not such an officer as is vested with implied power to make negotiable paper in its name, though particular circumstances might exist which would create such an implied power.⁸

An allegation that a corporation made a note or accepted a bill, by its treasurer or other officer, is a sufficient averment that such officer had authority to bind the corporation.⁹

§ 395. It is well settled that neither the president nor the cashier of a bank has authority, *virtute officii*, to give up

¹ McCullough v. Moss, 5 Den. 575.

² New York Iron Mine v. First Nat. Bank, Sup. Ct. of Michigan, Albany L. J. Dec. 21st, 1878, Vol. 18, No. 25, p. 489.

³ Spear v. Ladd, 11 Mass. 94; Northampton Bank v. Pepoon, 11 Mass. 288.

⁴ See Leavitt v. Connecticut Peat Co. 6 Blatchf. 139 (1868).

⁵ Elwell v. Dodge, 33 Barb. 336. This was the case of an indorsement by a president of an insurance company, but the doctrine stated is inferable from it.

⁶ Marine Bank v. Clements, 3 Bosw. 600.

⁷ Torrey v. Dustin Monument Ass'n, 5 Allen, 327.

⁸ Partridge v. Badger, 25 Barb. 172.

⁹ Id.

or release a debt or liability to the bank, or make any admission which would release any party to an obligation, negotiable or otherwise, due to the bank—for such purposes the board of directors only having the power to act.¹

§ 396. The decisions upholding the doctrine that certain officers have implied power to bind their corporations, rest upon the view that such acts fall, according to the customs and usages of business, within their spheres of duty. But it is only in such spheres of duty that the implication arises.² The secretary of an insurance company is not to be presumed to have authority to bind it by drawing a bill, and therefore express authority or usage of the company, giving him such power would have to be proved, in order to bind it.³ So the secretary of a mining company has no implied power to indorse or transfer bills and notes belonging to it.⁴

§ 397. It is not uncommon to authorize the president and cashier to borrow money or obtain discounts, and in such case they must act jointly; and the act of the cashier alone would not bind the bank, unless the party dealing with him believed him to be acting in pursuance of his general authority.⁵ But if both agree as to the act, it may be executed by paper signed by one of them.⁶

SECTION III.

INTERPRETATION OF THE INSTRUMENT.

§ 398. Unless the name of the corporation for which the officer or agent assumes to act is disclosed upon the face of

¹ *Hodges v. First Nat. Bank*, 22 Grat. 59; *Olney v. Chadsey*, 7 R. I. 225; *Merchants' Bank v. Marine Bank*, 3 Gill, 96; *Bank of U. S. v. Dunn*, 6 Pet. 51; *Bank of the Metropolis v. Jones*, 8 Pet. 12; *Brouwer v. Appleby*, 1 Sand. 158; *Hoyt v. Thompson*, 1 Seld. 320; *Spyker v. Spence*, 8 Ala. 333; *Mt. Sterling Turnpike Co. v. Looney*, 1 Metc. (Ky.) 550; *Cochecho Nat. Bank v. Haskell*, 51 N. H. 116.

² *Morse on Banking*, 66, 76, 86, 89.

³ *First National Bank v. Hogan*, 47 Mo. 472.

⁴ *Blood v. Maveuse*, 33 Cal. 590.

⁵ *Morse on Banking*, 150.

⁶ *Ridgway v. Farmers' Bank*, 12 Sergt. & R. 256.

the instrument, or the officer's or agent's name is adopted by the corporation and used as its own in business transactions, the corporation cannot be bound upon the instrument, and the officer or agent will himself be personally bound if its terms of obligation can be interpreted as referable to him. The questions of most difficulty on this subject arise when the names of both corporation and of officer or agent appear on the face of the paper; and it has often puzzled courts to determine whether or not it was in legal effect the instrument of the corporation, or the private contract of the officer or agent. Bills, notes, acceptances and indorsements are each to some extent peculiar; at least the different relations of the parties respectively to the paper are circumstances which in themselves throw some light on its interpretation. And we shall, therefore, consider separately the interpretation of the maker's, acceptor's, drawer's and indorser's contract. Certain general principles of the law of agency apply to all. And where it is manifest from the face of the instrument, that it was executed for a corporate purpose; where, to use the language of the United States Supreme Court, "the marks of an official character not only exist on the face, but predominate,"¹ it is, as a general rule, to be regarded as the paper of the corporation, and not as that of the individual officer or agent.²

§ 399. Corporations may be known by several names as well as natural persons, and therefore the misnomer of a corporation in any written contract does not prevent its being bound, provided its identity with that intended by the parties is averred in pleading and sustained by the proof.³ It is not infrequently the case that a firm is incorporated as a company, and uses sometimes its corporate and sometimes its copartnership title, or sometimes styles itself a company instead of a firm. And sometimes a corporation

¹ *Mechanics' Bank v. Bank of Columbia*, 5 Wheat. 336; *Jackson v. Claw*, 18 Johns. 348.

² See Chapter on Agents, Section III.

³ *Angell & Ames on Corporations*, 169. See § 485.

transacts its business in the name of an agent, in which case it will be bound as effectually as if its corporate title had been used. An action by "The Redway Cotton Manufactory" was sustained in Massachusetts on a note given to "Richardson, Metcalf & Co.;"¹ and against the "Boston Iron Company" on notes signed "Horace Gray & Co.;"² and in New York one on a bond by "The New York African Society, &c., given to the Standing Committee of the New York African Society;"³ and on an acceptance in the same State in the name of "H. G. & Co.," made by the president of the corporation, that being his copartnership style, and used by the corporation as a convenient mode for raising funds, the corporation was held liable.⁴

§ 400. *In respect to the maker*, it is best to sign the corporate name after words which import necessarily, and only, a corporate promise. But it is by no means essential that this form be observed. And if the officer or agent add to his name "for — Company," it is quite sufficient to indicate that it is the company's promise, and not his.⁵ A different view has been taken in some cases;⁶ but this rule is sustained by reason and by great weight of authority. If the obligatory tenor of the note indicate that the corporation is to be bound, then the official signature will be deemed to be affixed as for the corporation, and the individual will not be liable. It was so held where the note ran "The Ocean Mining Co. promise to pay," and was signed by "J. H., Trustee," and by "S. N. S.;"⁷ where the note commenced

¹ Medway Cotton Manuf'y v. Adams, 10 Mass. 360. See also Commercial Bank v. French, 21 Pick. 486; Minot v. Curtis, 7 Mass. 441.

² Melledge v. Boston Iron Co. 5 Cush. 158.

³ African Society v. Varick, 13 Johns. 38.

⁴ Conro v. Port Henry Iron Co. 12 Barb. 27.

⁵ Emerson v. Providence Hat Man. Co. 12 Mass. 237. See *ante*, § 298.

⁶ McBean v. Morrison, 1 A. K. Marsh. 545. When the note ran "I promise to pay, etc., A. B. for value received of C. D., on account of his wages at the Madison Hemp Flax Spinning Company," and was signed "For the Madison Hemp and Flax Company, W. Macbean, Pres't," it was held the individual note of Macbean, on the ground, as stated by Rowan, J., that "the law reduces the liability from the obligatory tenor of the note."

⁷ Shaver v. Ocean Mining Co. 21 Cal. 45.

"The Newport Manufacturing Co. promise to pay," and was signed "J. W. T., Treasurer;"¹ where the note ran "The Patent Cloth Man. Co. promise to pay," and was signed "W. S., Agent."²

§ 401. Where the note ran, "I promise," and was signed "For the Providence Hat Manufacturing Company, A. B. (the agent)," it was held the company's, and not the agent's, note, notwithstanding the words "I promise," it being sufficiently indicated that it was done as agent.³ But where the note commenced "We, the subscribers, jointly and severally promise," and was signed "for the Boston Glass Manufactory, A., B. & C.," the joint and several undertaking, and the omission of any designation of office or agency were considered together, as showing it to be an individual note.⁴ In a later case, where the note began, "We jointly and severally promise to pay," and was signed "Patton & Johnson, for Ira Gove," the words "jointly and severally," as indicating the personal contract of Patton & Johnson, were regarded as overbalanced by the form of the signature, "for Ira Gove," which, it was said, "so clearly manifests the purpose to be

¹ Commercial Bank v. Newport Man. Co. 3 B. Mon. 13.

² Shotwell v. M'Kown, 2 Southard, 828.

³ Emerson v. Providence Hat Man. Co. 12 Mass. 237.

⁴ Bradlee v. Boston Glass Co. 16 Pick. 347. The plaintiff had proved the agency. Shaw, C. J., said: "The words 'for the Boston Manufactory,' if they stood alone, would perhaps leave it doubtful and ambiguous whether they meant to bind themselves as promisors to pay the debt of the company, or whether they meant to sign a contract for the company, by which they should be bound to pay their own debt, though the place in which the words are introduced would seem to warrant the former construction. But other considerations arise from other views of the whole tenor of the note. The fact is of importance that it is signed by three instead of one, and with no designation or name of office indicating any agency or connection with the company. No indication appears on the note itself that either of them was president, treasurer or director, or that they were a committee to act for the company. But the words 'jointly and severally' are quite decisive. The persons are, 'we, the subscribers,' and it is signed Jonathan Hunnewell, Samuel Gore, and Charles F. Kupfer. This word 'severally' must have its effect; and its legal effect was to bind each of the signers. This fixes the undertaking as a personal one. It would be a forced and wholly untenable construction to hold that the company and signers were all bound; this would be equally inconsistent with the terms and the obvious meaning of the contract."

the execution of a contract binding solely upon the defendant, that if either is to be rejected as surplusage and of no effect, it should be the words 'jointly and severally.'"¹

§ 402. Where the promissory terms of the notes are, "The president and directors of the A. B. Company promise to pay, &c.," they are sufficient to import distinctly a corporate obligation, and the signature of the president subscribed will not bind him personally.²

But in England, where the directors of a joint stock newspaper company gave a note for a purchase for the company, running, "On demand, we jointly and severally promise to pay, &c., for and on behalf of the Wesleyan Newspaper Association," and signed their names as directors, it was held that the words "jointly and severally" were equivalent to "jointly and personally," and that they were personally bound.³ In another case, where the note ran, "We jointly promise to pay, &c.," and was signed by three of the directors of a joint stock company, and countersigned by the secretary, and purported to be on account of stock of the company, it was held the note of the company.⁴

§ 403. The addition of official character to the signature at the foot of the note will not of itself be sufficient to indicate an intention to bind the corporation, but will be regarded merely as an earmark or *descriptio personæ*. Thus, where a note was signed "A. B., Prest. Henderson Loan Co.," it was held the individual note of Henderson.⁵ The like decisions were rendered where a note commenced "I promise," and was signed "J. S., Trustee of Sullivan Railroad;"⁶ where a note began "We promise," and was signed

¹ Rice v. Gove, 22 Pick. 158.

² Hamilton v. Newcastle R. R. Co. 9 Md. 19; Pitman v. Kintner, 5 Blackf. 250.

³ Healey v. Story, 3 Exch. 3; 18 L. J. N. S. S.

⁴ Lindus v. Melrose, 3 Hurl. & N. 177; see Bottomley v. Fisher, 8 Law Times, N. S. (Exch.) 688; Price v. Taylor, 6 Jurist, 402.

⁵ Burbank v. Posey, 7 Bush. (Ky.) 373.

⁶ Fiske v. Eldridge, 12 Gray, 474, Dewey, J., saying: "The case of Mann v. Chandler, 9 Mass. 335, may be thought to be favorable to the defense, and con-

"W. S., Prest. Blannerhasset Oil Company, and W. H., Treasurer;"¹ and where the note was signed "B. & C., Trustees of Union Religious Society;"² where the note was dated "Commercial Bank of Rodney, Rodney, Miss., 8 March, 1839," began "We promise," and was signed "T. F., Prest.," and countersigned "J. L., Cashier;"³ where the note began, "For value received, on policy No. 11,176, I promise," was signed "A. B., Prest., Dorchester Avenue R. R. Co.," and was proved to have been given in consideration of a policy of insurance issued to that company by the payee;⁴ where there was added to the signatures "Trustees of School District No. 1;"⁵ where the note was signed "A. B. & C. B. Receivers;"⁶ where there was added "Secretary Masonic Female College;"⁷ where there was added "Trustees of Baptist Society;"⁸ where there was added "Treasurer of St. Paul's Parish;"⁹ where the note ran "We, the trustees of the Seventh Presbyterian Church," and was signed "A. B. C. & D. Trustees;"¹⁰ where there was added "As Trustees of the First Universalist Society," to a note of several signers beginning "I promise."¹¹

trary to what seems the doctrine of the other cases referred to. * * That case differs from the others in its facts as to the description annexed to the name. It may be that the signature of the treasurer of a corporation may be thought to be the ordinary mode of executing such contracts on the part of the corporation, and that those words in themselves import a promise of the party whose treasurer he is. We think the present case differs from it, and is more analogous to the other cases cited. In the case of *Seaver v. Coburn*, 10 Cush. 324, a party signing a contract as "Treasurer of the Eagle Lodge," was holden personally liable. Such a note as the one in suit we think must be taken to be the personal promise of the signer, and the word "trustee," placed after the signature, be held to be a mere *descriptio personæ*, intended to indicate the fund to be charged with the note, or the uses to which the money has been applied."

¹ *Scott v. Baker*, 3 Hag. (W. Va.) 285; *Rand v. Hale*, Id. 495.

² *Hovey v. Bannister*, 8 Cow. 31.

³ *Fitch v. Lawton*, 6 How. (Miss.) 371.

⁴ *Haverhill, &c. Ins. Co. v. Newhale*, 1 Allen, 130.

⁵ *Fowler v. Atkinson*, 6 Minn. 579.

⁶ *Towne v. Rice*, 122 Mass. 67.

⁷ *Drake v. Flewellen*, 33 Ala. 106.

⁸ *Brockway v. Allen*, 17 Wend. 41; see *Mears v. Graham*, 8 Blackf. 144.

⁹ *Sturdivant v. Hull*, 59 Me. 172; see *Gregory v. Leigh*, 33 Tex. 813.

¹⁰ *Powers v. Briggs*, 79 Ill. 493; see, to like effect, *Hays v. Crutcher*, 54 Ind. 260.

¹¹ *Burlingame v. Brewster*, 79 Ill. 515.

§ 404. The weight of authority, both English and American, undoubtedly bears out the doctrine of the text. But Prof. Parsons takes a different view of the law in his admirable work,¹ and there are undoubtedly a few cases which sustain him, though by no means so many as those cited by him, many of them containing other indications than mere official designation that they were executed in the business of the corporation.²

§ 405. *Official designation in body of the instrument.*—Where, in the body of the note, there is the expression, “I, A. B., Treasurer of —— Company,” or, “I, A. B., Cashier of —— Company, or Bank,” or, “I, A. B., President of ——,” and it is signed in like manner, there are cases which consider it sufficiently indicated that it is intended to be the note of the corporation, and especially when the signature is likewise accompanied with the official designation; and high authority favors them.³ Thus it has been held that a note beginning “I, Treasurer of Dorchester Turnpike Corporation,” and signed “G. L. C., Treasurer, &c.,” was the note of the corporation;⁴ but the decision has been criticised and

¹ 1 Parsons N. & B. 168, in which it is said: “If a corporation certainly authorize to make, sign, accept or indorse negotiable paper, has an officer authorized to use their name in this way, and this officer writes his own name as drawer of a bill of exchange, with the express addition of his office, it seems that he would be held to do this officially, and to bind the corporation and not himself.”

² Johnson v. Smith, 21 Conn. 627. The promisors signed themselves “Vestrymen of the Episcopal Society.” The Society received the money for which the notes were given. Church, C. J., quoted the language of Swift, C. J., in Hovey v. Magill, 2 Conn. 680, with approval: “I can see no good reason for the addition of agent, but to render the note obligatory on the company, and exclude all idea of individual liability.” See also Hovey v. Magill, 2 Conn. 680, note signed “A. W. Magill, agent for the Middletown Manufacturing Company,” and running “I promise.” *Held*, the company’s.

In Procter v. Webber, 1 D. Chipman, 371, the note ran, “I, Christopher Webber, as Agent of the Green Mountain Turnpike Corporation,” and was signed “Christopher Webber, Agent of the Green Mountain Turnpike Corporation.” *Held*, the company’s. McCall v. Clayton, Busbee L. R. (N. C.) 422; Dispatch Line of Packets v. Bellamy Man. Co. 12 N. H. 205.

³ 1 Parsons N. & B. 169.

⁴ Mann v. Chandler, 9 Mass. 335; Blanchard v. Kaull, 44 Cal. 448, announces same doctrine.

doubted,¹ and, we think, should not be followed. It is true that bank bills are universally signed in this way, as observed by Professor Parsons; and, as to them, the principle may be well applied, as they bear upon their face distinct evidences of their character as representatives of money issued by a bank, and which it would be illegal (in many of the States at least) for an individual to issue. And so other printed securities, such as bonds and coupons, might be couched in similar phrase without exciting a doubt that they were corporate obligations. In respect also to bills drawn and notes signed by the cashier of a bank, the mention of his character as cashier, according to the inclination of the decisions, stamps upon the instrument the obligation of the bank.² Farther, we think, neither reason nor authority will permit us to go. In New York, it has been held that a note running "I, John Franklin, Pres't of the Mechanic Fire Insurance, promise, &c.," was Franklin's and not the company's.³ So in Maine, where the note ran, "We, the Trustees of the Wayne Scythe Company, promise," and was signed by the individual names.⁴ So in Indiana, where the note began, "We, the Trustees of the Methodist Church in Rockport, promise," and was signed "A. B., C. D., &c., Trustees of the M. E. Church."⁵

§ 406. So in Massachusetts, where a note ran, "We, Trustees of the New Congregational Meeting House, promise,"⁶ and another ran, "We, the Prudential Committee for and in behalf of the Baptist Church in Lee, agree to pay, &c.,"⁷ and only the individual names of the parties were

¹ Barlow v. Congregational Society, 8 Allen, 460; Fiske v. Eldridge, 12 Gray, 476.

² See *post*, § 417.

³ Barker v. Mechanic Ins. Co. 3 Wend. 94.

⁴ Fogg v. Virgin, 19 Mc. 353. But see Klostermann v. Loos, 58 Mo. 290.

⁵ Mears v. Graham, 8 Blackf. 144; McClure v. Bennett, 1 Blackf. 189. This interpretation was given because there was no power to bind the corporation.

⁶ Packard v. Nye, 2 Metc. (Mass.) 47. But the contrary was held in Iowa, where the note ran, "We, the undersigned, Directors of School District No. —," and parol evidence to bind them personally was excluded. Baker v. Chambliss, 4 Iowa (G. Greene), 429.

⁷ Morell v. Codding, 4 Allen, 403. Dewey, J.: "The present case lacks one

signed, without official designation, the like view was taken—that the signers were individually bound. The latter case, we do not think, can be sustained, as the words “for and in behalf of the Baptist Church, &c.,” sufficiently indicate that the signers did not design to bind themselves personally.¹

But the decisions are very conflicting, and the tendency is to restrain, rather than to enlarge, the constructive liability of corporations. In a late English case a note running “We, the Directors of the Isle of Man Slate and Flag Company,” in the body was held the individual note of the company, although the corporate seal was attached.² If the expression were, “We, as Directors,” or “as Trustees,” the idea of individual liability would be excluded by the use of the restrictive word “as.”³ And in Kentucky, where the note ran, “The President and Directors of the H. & B. &c. Co.,” and was signed by those officials, the president adding “Pres’t” to his name, it was held clear that they promised on behalf of the company, and bound it alone.⁴ But in another case, where the note ran, “The President, by order of the Board” of said company promises to pay, and was signed by him and the directors with their simple names, it was held the note of the President.⁵

element which, when it exists, is usually decisive of the character of the promise; that is, the introduction of the name of a principal as a part of the signature, as in the case of *Long v. Colburn*, 11 Mass. 97, where the form of the signature was ‘pro William Gill—J. S. Colburn.’” In Vermont, a note running “We, in behalf of the First M. E. Society in Middlebury,” and signed by simple individual names, was held at least *prima facie* their individual note. *Pomeroy v. Slade*, 16 Vt. 220.

¹ *Haskell v. Cornish*, 13 Cal. 45. The note ran, “We, the undersigned Trustees of the First African Methodist Church, in behalf of the whole Board of Trustees,” and was signed simply with individual names of H. C. C. and J. C. L. *Held*, that it was the note of the church, though it might be otherwise if the defendants had no authority to execute the note for the church.

² *Dutton v. Marsh*, L. R. 6 Q. B. [*361], 359 (1871).

³ *Sanborn v. Neal*, 4 Minn. 137; *Blanchard v. Kaul*, 44 Cal. 448. Note began, “We, as Trustees” of A. N. & Co., and was signed A., B. & C., Trustees of A. & N. Co. *Held*, the company’s note; see also *Yowell v. Dodd*, 3 Bush (Ky.) 581.

⁴ *Yowell v. Dodd*, 3 Bush (Ky.) 581.

⁵ *Caphart v. Dodd*, 3 Bush (Ky.) 584.

§ 407. But there may be some additional expression to the mere official designation, which, taken in connection therewith, shows an intention to bind the corporation, and it will then have that effect. Thus "I, as Treasurer of the Congregational Society, or my successors in office, promise to pay," was held a note of the society;¹ and a note payable "to the Treasurer of the First Parish in Hopkinton, or his successor," was held likewise payable to the parish,² it being indicated clearly that the official and not the individual was referred to.

✕ So where the promise was to pay "eighty-five dollars for the use of N. E. P. Union Store, No. 607," signed "M., Treasurer," it was held to indicate an attempt to bind the corporation, not the officer;³ and likewise where the promise was "We, as trustees, but not as individuals, promise to pay," and signed "A., B. & C., Trustees."⁴

§ 408. Sometimes there are other indicia to which importance is attached, as evidencing a corporate or individual character. In Indiana, where the note commenced "We promise," and was signed "A. B., Secretary," but the corporate seal was attached with the impression "Neal Manufacturing Co., Madison, Ind.," it was held the corporate note.⁵

But in England, where the note ran "We, the directors of the Isle of Man Slate and Flag Company," and the corporate seal was attached, it was held differently, Cockburn, C. J., saying that he had had some doubt "whether the affixing of the seal might not be taken as equivalent to a declaration in terms on the face of the note that the note was signed by the persons who put their names to it on behalf of the company, and not in behalf of themselves;" but, on consideration, he

¹ Barlow v. Congregational Society, 8 Allen, 460.

² See Hood v. Hallenbeck, 14 N. Y. S. C. (7 Hun), 366, and *post*, § 419; Buck v. Merrick, 8 Allen, 123.

³ Dow v. Moore, 47 N. H. 419.

⁴ Shoe & Leather Nat. Bank v. Doe, 123 Mass. 151, Ames, J.: "We believe no case can be found in which a promise 'as trustees, &c.,' accompanied with an express disclaimer of personal liability, would fail to exempt him."

⁵ Means v. Swormstedt, 32 Ind. 87.

concurred that that effect could not be given to the placing of the seal of the company upon the note. It might be that that was simply for the purpose of earmarking the transaction."¹

The two cases are distinguishable in this, that the use of the plural expression "we promise" in the Indiana case, followed by a single signature with the corporate seal, indicated a design to bind the company, who were many, rather than the individual who, had he intended to bind himself, would doubtless have said "I promise," while in the English case the expression "we," used in reference to a number of directors, was consistent with their personal obligation.

Where the note runs "The President and Directors promise to pay," and is signed "A. B., President," it would be evident that no personal engagement was intended, and the corporation alone would be bound.²

§ 409. *The drawer*.—The same general principle applies to the drawer of a bill as to the maker of a note, and although he designate himself as president, or otherwise, as a corporate official, he will nevertheless be personally liable. And the mere fact that the officer or agent directs on the bill that it be placed to his account as such, will not alter it. Thus where F. & Co. drew a bill upon the insurance company of which they were agents, with the direction to "charge the same to account of F. & Co., agents P. F. & M. Ins. Co.," they were held as drawers, although the bill was delivered by the insurance company to the payee in payment of a loss on one of its policies.³

§ 410. But the direction to place to account may often indicate, especially when connected with other circumstances, that it is the corporation's draft. Thus, where the direction

¹ Dutton v. Marsh, L. R. 6 Q. B. 363 (1871).

² Mott v. Hicks, 1 Cow. 532 (1823); Pitman v. Kentner, 5 Blackf. 251.

³ Tucker v. Fairbanks, 98 Mass. 101. The contrary doctrine is maintained in New York. In Conro v. Port Henry Iron Co. 12 Barb. 54, Willard, P. J., said: "Adding the title 'agent' to the signature of the drawer of a bill, is notice that the party means not to be personally liable, and when the principal is indorser, he alone is responsible."

was "place to account of Derby Fishing Co." signed "A. B., Pres't," it was held that the company was the drawer.¹ So, where a bill which was stamped on the margin "Pompton Iron Works," with the direction "place to account of Pompton Iron Works. W. Burtt, agent,"² the like view was taken, the marginal stamp, and the fact that Burtt signed himself agent, connected with the direction being regarded as indicative that it was the corporate bill. So, "charge to account of this company. I. R. Jackson, agent," was held the company's draft, it being a printed corporate draft, with other marks of official character.³ But the words, "charge to account of proprietors Pembroke Iron Works," signed simply "Joseph Burrell," with no mark of corporate liability or agency of Burrell, was considered his personal bill.⁴ So, "place to the account of Durham Bank, as advised," signed simply "Christ'r Farrow," was held to bind Farrow personally, although he was known to be agent of the bank, the expression importing, as said by counsel, "nothing more than that the drawer had a credit with the Durham Bank to the amount, and that the drawees were to look to that credit."⁵ So, a bill signed "A. B., Pres't," with direction "to charge as ordered," would be plainly the drawer's individual draft.⁶

§ 411. Where the bill was headed with the name of a banking house, the direction was "charge same to account of this office," and was signed by the drawer as agent, these three circumstances were considered as definitely fixing it as the banker's and not the agent's draft.⁷ Where the bill contained a direction "to charge the same to account of disbursements of bark Dublin," and was signed by the master of the vessel without addition, it was held that the owners

¹ Witte v. Derby Fishing Co. 2 Conn. 435.

² Fuller v. Hooper, 3 Gray, 334.

³ Slawson v. Loring, 5 Allen, 343; (see *post*, §§ 412, 416, as to acceptor).

⁴ Bank of British N. A. v. Hooper, 5 Gray, 567.

⁵ Leadbitter v. Farrow, 5 Maule & S. 345.

⁶ Kean v. Davis, 1 N. J. 683.

⁷ Sayre v. Nichols, 7 Cal. 538.

were not bound, there being no disclosure of agency.¹ And this seems to us the correct view, for the reasons well stated by the court; but, in Louisiana, where the agent of the owners of a steamboat drew a bill in his own name, and directed the drawee to change the amount "to account of steamer Walter Scott," it was held that the agency of the drawer was apparent on the face of the bill, in consequence of this direction, which negatived the idea of personal liability.² If the bill were in the name of the corporation, and the direction to "charge this institution," signed "A. B., cashier," it is plainly the bill of the corporation.³ If the bill were signed thus: "For the Montgomery Iron Works, A. B., pres't. C. D., sect'y," it would be the bill of the corporation.⁴

§ 412. *In respect to the acceptor of a bill.*—There can be but one acceptor of a bill; and that person must be the drawee, unless he be an acceptor for honor. Therefore, when it is sought to determine whether the officer or agent of a corporation, or the corporation itself, is the acceptor of a bill, the question may generally be solved by ascertaining

¹ Bass v. O'Brien, 12 Gray, 477. Bigelow, J., saying: "The owners of the vessel were clearly not liable as drawers of the draft. It does not purport on its face to bind them. Peterson did not sign it as master or as agent of the owners, or otherwise indicate that he drew it in a representative capacity. The direction to charge the amount to the disbursements of the bark Dublin was only a designation of the account to which the payment was to be debited when the draft was taken up by the drawees, but did not in any way disclose the persons who were ultimately responsible for such disbursements. The rule is well settled that when an agent signs negotiable paper in his own name, without disclosing his principal, the agent only is liable, and evidence *dehors* the instrument cannot be resorted to for the purpose of showing that it was given for or on account of some other person. Whoever takes negotiable paper enters into a contract with the parties who appear on the face of the instrument, and cannot look to other persons for payment."

Newhall v. Dunlap, 14 Me. 182. The request to charge to "account of cargo of the Hope" was said "to indicate the fund to which it was to be charged, not the character in which the drawer signed." To same effect, see Snow v. Goodrich, 14 Me. 235.

² Maher v. Overton, 9 La. 115.

³ Safford v. Wyckoff, 1 Hill, 11; 4 Hill, 442.

⁴ Raney v. Winter, 37 Ala. 277.

who is the drawee. If the bill be drawn on the drawee as an individual, he cannot, by words of procuration or official description in his acceptance, make it the corporation's. Thus, when the bill was addressed "to Mr. W. C.," and was expressed "for value received in machinery supplied the adventurers in H. mines," and W. C. wrote upon it, "Accepted for the company, W. C., Purser," it was held W. C.'s individual acceptance.¹ So where the drawee accepted in form, "Treasurer, Neuvitas M. Co.," it was held likewise.² And on the other hand, if the bill be drawn on the corporation by name, and accepted by its appropriate officer or agent in his individual name, adding his official designation, the acceptance will bind the company only, and as taken in connection with the address, the agency for the drawee, who alone could accept, would be disclosed.³ And even if there were no expression indicating office or agency annexed to the acceptor's name, the very fact of acceptance would, we think, imply agency for the drawee.

§ 413. In England, it has been long settled that even if the drawee's full official character be added to his name in the address of the bill, his acceptance will bind him personally, although there be expressions of agency in it also. Thus,

¹ *Mare v. Charles*, 5 El. & B. 978. Lord Campbell and Wightman and Coleridge, JJ., concurred, and Coleridge, J., said: "The bill was addressed to the defendant, and no one else could accept it. He wrote upon it 'Accepted,' and signed his name. He now says, in effect, that it was not accepted at all, and what he wrote amounted to a refusal to accept; and this, he says, is the effect of the words 'for the company.' The question then is, are we to construe this *ut res magis pereat*, as not an acceptance? No; we must construe it *ut res magis valeat*; and, as my Lord (Campbell) has pointed out, it is easy so to construe it."

² *Bruce v. Lord*, 1 Hilt. 247 (N. Y. Com. Pl. 1836).

³ *Merchants' Bank v. State Bank*, 10 Wall. 604; *Alabama Coal Mining Co. v. Brainard*, 35 Ala. 479; *A. J. Walker, C. J.*, saying: "The bill of exchange in this case is alleged to have been drawn upon the defendant by the name and style of 'Steamer C. W. Dorrance and owners,' and to have been accepted by the defendant in and by the name and style of 'St'r Dorrance, per G. M. McConico.' The bill of exchange given in evidence corresponds in the name and style of the address and acceptance, with the description alleged; and if drawn upon the defendant, and by it accepted, as alleged, was admissible in evidence." See § 485.

where the address of the bill was to "H. Bishop, cashier of the York Buildings Company, at their house on Winchester street, London," and the direction was, "place the same to account of the York Buildings Company, as per advice," and was accepted thus, "Accepted 13th June, 1732, per H. Bishop," it was considered that the addition to the name was only descriptive, and as an indication where the drawee might be found, and the order to place to account as a direction how the drawee might reimburse himself; that the letter of advice was inadmissible against the plaintiff as indorsee, and that Bishop was personally bound.¹ So where the bill was addressed to "J. D., Purser, West Downs Mining Co.," and was accepted as follows, "J. D., Purser, per proc. West Downs Mining Co.," it was held J. D.'s individual acceptance.²

And in the United States the same doctrine has been applied,³ but not without dissent.⁴ In New York, where the bill was drawn on "J. R. L., President, Rosendale M'ng Co., New York," and accepted in like style, it was said, "the bill cannot be deemed the obligation of the company. It does not purport to have been drawn in their behalf, nor was it addressed to them, or accepted in their corporate name."⁵

§ 414. If the drawee be addressed as "A. B., agent," and accept in like form "A. B., agent," he will undoubtedly be

¹ Thomas v. Bishop, Chitty, Jun. 278; 2 Barnard, 335; 2 Stra. 955; 7 Mod. 180; Cases, tem. Hardwicke, 1 (1734); approved in Slawson v. Loring, 5 Allen, 345.

² Nicholls v. Diamond, 24 E. L. & Eq. 403; 9 Exch. 154.

³ Moss v. Livingston, 4 Coms. 208.

⁴ Shelton v. Darling, 2 Conn. 435. In this case the bill was drawn on "A. B., agent of the Commission Company," and was accepted by "A. B., agent, C. C." Held, no action could lie against A. B. individually.

Amison v. Ewing, 2 Cold. 367. Three bills were drawn on John O. Ewing, two designating him "Treasurer of the N. & N. W. R. R. Co.," and the other without any official designation whatever. All of them were accepted thus: "Accepted payable on return of March estimates, John O. Ewing, Treas." And all of them were held binding on the company, and not upon the drawee personally.

⁵ Moss v. Livingston, *supra*, Hurlbut, J.

personally bound, as there is no disclosure of any principal in the address to which his acceptance could be responsive.¹

If the drawee be addressed personally, as H., and he write across the bill "Accepted; Empire Mills, by H., Treasurer," it could not be his individual acceptance, as there are no words which could possibly import an obligation on his part; nor could it be the company's, as it is not the drawee.²

§ 415. *In respect to the payee and indorser.*—As the designation of the drawee generally indicates who is bound as acceptor, so the designation of the payee generally indicates in what character the first indorser signs. If a note be payable to an individual, with the mere suffix of his official character, such suffix will be regarded as mere *descriptio personæ*, and the individual is the payee. This view has been taken of a note payable to "J. G. M., Treasurer R. I. &c. R. R. Co.;"³ of a note payable to "A. B. for value received of the Providence Hat Man. Co., as agent thereof."⁴

¹ *Slawson v. Loring*, 5 Allen, 341 (1862). The bill was headed "Office Portage Lake Manufacturing Company," was addressed, in capital letters, to "E. T. LORING, AGENT," the address being printed as was the heading on a prepared form for company drafts. It was signed "charge the same to account of this company, I. R. Jackson, Agent." The court thought it clear that Jackson was not personally liable as drawer, but that Loring who had accepted by writing "E. T. Loring, Agent," across the face of the bill, was clearly liable as acceptor. After stating that the disclosure of the principal on the heading of the paper was only a disclosure of the drawer's principal, Bigelow, J., said: "What, then, is left on the face of the paper to show that the defendant is not liable as acceptor? Nothing, except the single circumstance that the address to him as drawee is printed in large capital letters at the top of the instrument, with the addition thereto of the word agent. This, certainly, does not necessarily or even *prima facie* indicate that he is the agent of the drawers. It is, to say the least, equally consistent with the idea that he is the agent of some third person not named on the face of the bill. Nor can we give any great effect to the fact that the defendant's name as drawee is printed as part of the blank used by the company. A draft or bill in like form might be used, if their course of business was to deal with him as the agent of some other person or company." The bill was sued on by an indorsee.

² *Walker v. Bank of State*, 9 N. Y. 582. But see *Amison v. Ewing*, 2 Cold. 361.

³ *Chadsey v. McCreery*, 27 Ill. 253. To same effect, see *Vater v. Lewis*, 36 Ind. 288.

⁴ *Buffum v. Chadwick*, 8 Mass. 103.

In New York a different doctrine prevails. There where a note was payable to, and indorsed by "R. Beman, Treasurer," and was delivered by Beman to the plaintiff on account of a debt due by the manufacturing company of which he was treasurer, it was held that he was not individually bound.¹

§ 416. Where a note is payable to a corporation by its corporate name, and is then indorsed by an authorized agent or official, with the suffix of his ministerial position, it will be regarded that he acts for his principal who is disclosed on the paper as the payee, and who, therefore, is the only person who can transfer the legal title. It was so held where a note payable to the Berkshire Bank was indorsed "Simon Larned, Attorney," Larned being president of the bank, and authorized as its attorney to indorse it.² So likewise where a note was payable to the "Globe Mutual Insurance or order," and was indorsed "L. Gregory, President."³

§ 417. An exception to the general rules of interpretation, which have been stated, has been made in respect to the cashiers of banks. They are the chief financial agents of their institutions, and when a bill or note is made payable to an individual with the suffix of "Cas.," "Cash.," or "Cashier," to his name, it has been generally decided to be really payable to the corporation of which such party is the cashier, and so to import upon its face, the officer's name being used as that of his principal, which may not be disclosed on the face of the paper. It has been so held where a bill was drawn payable to the order of "D. C. C., Cashier," no corporation being named.⁴ So where a bill was drawn payable to the order of "S. B. Stokes, Cas.," and was in like manner indorsed, the undisclosed bank was held bound by the indorsement.⁵ So where a note was indorsed "P. H. Folger, Cashier," Wilde, J., saying: "As to the objection, that the

¹ Babcock v. Beman, 1 Ker. 209.

² Northampton Bank v. Pepoon, 11 Mass. 288.

³ Elwell v. Dodge, 33 Barb. 336 (1861).

⁴ Bank of N. Y. v. Bank of Ohio, 29 N. Y. 619 (1864); First National Bank v. Hall, 44 N. Y. 395 (1871).

⁵ Bank of Genesee v. Patchin Bank, 19 N. Y. 313 (1859); 3 Kern. 309 (1855).

indorsement is not made in the name of the corporation, we think that the indorsement by the cashier in his official capacity sufficiently shows that the indorsement was made in behalf of the bank, and if that is not sufficiently certain the plaintiffs have the right now to prefix the name of the corporation."¹ And where a note was indorsed "pay to E. O., Cashier, or order," and was signed "E. C. K., Cashier," it was held a sufficient indorsement by one bank to another.² So where a bill was drawn on "John A. Welles, Cashier, Farmers', &c. Bank," and the acceptance was "John A. Welles, Cashier," the bank alone was held bound.³

§ 418. *When parol or other extraneous evidence is admissible.*—While it is true, as a general rule, that the liability of the principal or agent must be gathered from an inspection of the paper itself, there are nevertheless some cases in which doubtful expressions are used, or the instrument is so inaptly put together, that the precise meaning to be collected from its face, is left so ambiguous or obscure as to render its interpretation *per se*, too difficult and uncertain for just and sound construction. When the instrument is of this description, that is, when its language or terms are so unintelligible as to admit of no rational interpretation of the meaning, or are not sufficiently decisive of the intention of the parties, but, on the contrary, are equivocal and uncertain, extraneous proof, parol or written, may be admitted as between the original parties to show the true character of the instrument, and what party—the principal, or the agent, or both—is liable. Thus where a due bill was expressed to be "in full of labor performed on cottage lot of the R. R. Co.," saying nothing of what company, and was signed by the president with the simple signature "Ed. Robinson," parol evidence was held admissible to show that it was really the company's obligation;⁴ and so where a promissory note read, "We, the President and Directors of the

¹ Folger v. Chase, 18 Pick. 67.

² Watervliet Bank v. White, 1 Denio, 609.

³ Farmers', &c. Bank v. Troy City Bank, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 473.

⁴ Richmond, Pot. & Fred. R. R. Co. v. Snead, 19 Grat. 354.

Delancey's Valley and Sweet Air Turnpike Company, promise, &c.," and was signed by C. T. H., "President," I. N. H. and J. G. D., "Directors," and E. R. S., "Secretary," the same rule was applied to admit evidence to show that the note was signed and accepted as the note of the company.¹ So in Missouri where the note ran, "I promise to pay A. & B. \$645 for building a school-house in School District No. 3, township 51, range 21," signed "P. T. Reynolds, Local Director."² So in New York where the note ran, "we promise," and was signed by five persons who added: "Trustees of St. John's Ev. Lutheran Church, Hudson, N. Y.," and attached the corporate seal, the Court saying: "The case was within the authorities admitting of proof of the circumstances under which it was given with a view to determine the defendant's liability. In addition to what appeared on the face of the paper, it was proved that the corporation was indebted to the payee, that the latter made claim therefor to the corporation; that it was recognized and allowed by the trustees, its only officers; he requested a note, and the note in suit was given him. * * * The plaintiffs here stand in no better position on this question than would the payee, inasmuch as the note on its face disclosed the fact that this defense here interposed existed, or that the proof to establish it was admissible."³

§ 419. The Supreme Court of the United States has gone very far in admitting parol evidence to ascertain whether the principal or agent was intended to be bound, and the course of dealing between the parties, and the particular circumstances of the case were allowed to come before the court.⁴

¹ Haile v. Peirce, 32 Md. 327.

² McClellan v. Reynolds, 49 Mo. 314. See also Pratt v. Beaupre, 13 Minn. 190.

³ Hood v. Hallenbeck, 14 N. Y. S. C. (7 Hun), 367 (1876).

⁴ Mechanics' Bank v. Bank of Columbia, 5 Wheat. 326. The check in this case was as follows:

No, 18.

MECHANICS' BANK OF ALEXANDRIA,
June 25, 1817.

Cashier of the Bank of Columbia,

Pay to the order of P. H. Minor, Esq., ten thousand dollars.

\$10,000.

WM. PATON, JUN.

It was proved that the payee, Minor, was the teller of the Mechanics' Bank;

that the check was an official check cut out of the check book of the bank, and noted on the margin; that the money was drawn in behalf of and applied to the use of the Mechanics' Bank; and that other checks had been drawn by the cashier on behalf of the bank in the like form, in all respects save that he usually added "Cas." or "Ca." to his name.

Johnson, J., said: "It is by no means true, as was contended in argument, that the acts of agents derive their validity from professing, on the face of them, to have been done in the exercise of their agency. In the more solemn exercise of derivative powers, as applied to the execution of instruments known to the common law, rules of form have been prescribed. But in the diversified exercise of the duties of a general agent, the liability of the principal depends upon the facts, 1. that the act was done in the exercise, and 2. within the limits of the powers delegated. These facts are necessarily inquirable into by a court and jury; and this inquiry is not confined to written instruments (to which alone the principle contended for could apply), but to any act, with or without writing, within the scope of the power or confidence reposed in the agent; as, for instance, in the case of money credited in the books of a teller, or proved to have been deposited with him, though he omits to credit it."

CHAPTER XIV.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS AS PARTIES TO NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.

§ 420. *As to public or municipal corporations.*—In a subsequent portion of this work the subject of the power of public corporations to execute negotiable instruments will be considered in detail, in connection with the matter of coupon bonds, which constitute by far the most important branch of public obligations.

There is no doubt, however, that public corporations may have the power conferred on them to execute bills, notes, checks, and indeed all varieties of negotiable instruments. But the better opinion is, that such power does not exist, unless expressed or clearly implied.¹ The ordinary orders, warrants, certificates of indebtedness, and obligations to pay issued by municipal corporations, if negotiable in form, will in general enable the holder to sue in his own name. But they are not negotiable instruments so as to exclude inquiry into the legality of their issue, or preclude defenses which are available as against the original payees.² Powers conferred on municipal corporations which cannot be carried into execution without borrowing money, and giving obligations payable in future, have been considered sufficient to carry implied power to issue negotiable instruments; but such powers are not implied from the usual powers of administration conferred in specific matters, and the power to levy taxes to defray necessary corporate expenditures.³ It is

¹ Knapp v. Mayor of Hoboken, 39 N. J. (Law) 394; City of Williamsport v. Commonwealth, 84 Penn. St. 487; Dively v. Cedar Falls, 21 Iowa, 566; Clarke Des Moines, 19 Iowa, 200.

² Knapp v. Mayor of Hoboken, 39 N. J. L. R. 397; 1 Dillon on Municipal Corporations, § 406; see *post*, § 427, 435.

³ Police Jury v. Britton, 15 Wall. 572, *post*, § 422; Clemens on Corporate Securities, 26, 27. See also Mayor v. Ray, 19 Wall. 468.

thought in Pennsylvania, that whenever the municipality has authority to contract a debt by borrowing money or otherwise, so that the legislature must have contemplated its giving securities of some sort in payment, it has then by implication authority to evidence the same by bill, note, bond, or other negotiable instrument.¹ But we do not perceive that mere authority to contract a debt carries with it necessarily the idea that money must be borrowed, or the authority to execute negotiable instruments.² Municipal corporations in order to exercise municipal functions, such as opening streets, &c., must come under obligation to pay those who do the work. Taxation is the ordinary method of raising revenue for such purposes, and debts so contracted should be paid out of the municipal revenues raised by taxation. This subject is elsewhere discussed in this work, and it is not necessary here to elaborate it.³ The views of Judge Dillon, as expressed in a recent essay on the Law of Municipal Bonds, seem to us eminently sound, and worthy of approbation.⁴

§ 421. *Officers empowered to act for public corporations.*
—The common council of a city or town is the legislative branch of the municipal government; and when the city or town has the power to execute the instrument, that body would be the proper agency, by whom, or under whose directions, it should be exercised, and would have the

¹ City of Williamsport v. Commonwealth, 84 Penn. St. 501.

² See *post*, Vol. 2, § 1530.

³ See *post*, Vol. 2, § 1527 *et seq.*

⁴ See Dillon on Municipal Bonds, § 6, p. 12-13 *et seq.*, where it is said: "There is no resemblance between private and public or municipal corporations in this regard. The latter are not organized for trading, commercial or business purposes. They have in general but one mode of meeting their liabilities, and that is by taxation, and it is upon this resource that creditors must be taken to rely. For hundreds of years in England, such corporations have existed, without it ever being contended that they could, without express authority, issue commercial paper. * * * We regard as alike unsound and dangerous the doctrine that a public or municipal corporation possesses the implied power to borrow money for its ordinary purposes, and as incidental to that, the power to issue commercial securities. The cases on this subject are conflicting, but the tendency is toward the view above indicated."

implied authority to execute the power of the corporation. But the executive officers of cities and towns, and the supervisors, trustees, or representative officers of a county, parish, or other local jurisdiction, invested with the usual powers of administration in specific matters, and the power to levy taxes to defray the necessary expenditures of the jurisdiction, have no implied authority to issue negotiable securities of such a kind as to be unimpeachable in the hands of *bona fide* holders.

§ 422. Thus, it has been held that the mayor of a city could not execute the bond of the city, although he had received express authority from the council to borrow money from a bank, and to execute a note therefor.¹ So it has been held that county supervisors had no implied power to execute negotiable instruments, Field, J., saying: "Were it otherwise, it is easy to see that the county would be entirely at the mercy of the board."² Nor have the trustees or supervisors of towns, villages,³ and townships;⁴ nor the selectmen of towns and villages;⁵ nor the auditors of cities,

¹ Little Rock v. State Bank, 3 Eng. (Ark.) 227.

² People v. Supervisors El Dorado Co. 11 Cal. 175. To same effect, see Hubbard v. Town of Lyndon, 28 Wis. 675; Chemung Canal Bank v. Supervisors, 5 Den. 517.

³ Lake v. Trustees, 4 Den. 520; Hubbard v. Town of Lyndon, 28 Wis. 674.

⁴ Inhabitants v. Weir, 9 Ind. 224.

⁵ Rich v. Errol, 51 N. H. 350. In Smith v. Inhabitants of Cheshire, 13 Gray, 318, it was held that an order or draft of the selectmen of Cheshire on the treasurer of the town, payable to Westcott or bearer, was not negotiable; and that an action could not be brought in any name but that of the party to whom it was issued. Bigelow, J., after saying that such orders were common, but the right of the holder to sue depended on the question, whether the selectmen had power by virtue of their office, and without special authority from the town, to issue to persons having claims on the town negotiable notes, bills of exchange, or orders, on which a town can be held liable to indorsers or holders other than those to whom they were originally issued, continued: "The powers and duties of selectmen are not very fully defined by statute. Many of the acts usually performed by them on behalf of towns, and which are recognized as within their appropriate sphere, have their origin and foundation in long-continued usage. The management of the prudential affairs of towns necessarily requires the exercise of a large discretion, and it would be quite impossible by positive enactment to place definite limits to the powers and duties of selectmen to whom

who are mere executive agents.¹ And it has recently been held by the United States Supreme Court that there was no implied power to execute a negotiable bond in the police jury of a parish, Bradley, J., saying: "It would be an anomaly justly to be deprecated, for all our limited territorial boards charged with certain objects of necessary local administration, to become fountains of commercial issues, capable of floating about in the financial whirlpools of our large cities."² So there is no such implied power in the clerks of county courts, though such courts constitute the auditing boards of the counties;³ nor in the clerks of boards of supervisors to issue a negotiable warrant.⁴ Nor in county judges, who are special limited agents;⁵ nor in the mayor and recorder of a city;⁶ nor in the mayor alone.⁷

§ 423. *Difference between Public and Private Corporations.*—If private corporations, to increase their profits, em-

the direction and control of such affairs are intrusted. Speaking generally, it may be said that they are agents to take the general superintendence of the business of a town, to supervise the doings of subordinate agents, and the disbursement of money appropriated by vote of the town to take care of its property and perform other similar duties. But they are not general agents. They are not clothed with the general powers of the corporate body for which they act. They can only exercise such powers and perform such duties as are necessarily and properly incident to the special and limited authority conferred on them by their office. They are special agents empowered to do only such acts as are required to meet the exigencies of ordinary town business. * * The rule of law is well settled that a special agent has no authority to bind his principal by a promissory note, bill of exchange, or other negotiable paper. Such power can be conferred only by the direct authority of the party to be bound."

Taft v. Pittsford, 28 Vt. 289 (which seems to overrule Dalrymple v. Whitingham, 26 Vt. 245). But see Andover v. Grafton, 7 N. H. 302, and Great Falls Bank v. Farmington, 41 N. H. 33.

¹ Dana v. San Francisco, 19 Cal. 486; People v. Gray, 23 Cal. 125; Keller v. Weeks, 22 Cal. 460.

² Police Jury v. Britton, 15 Wall. 566 (1872). To same effect, see Bearman v. Board of Police, 42 Miss. 238.

³ Parcel v. Barnes, 25 Ark. 261.

⁴ Clark v. Polk County, 19 Iowa, 248.

⁵ Hyde v. County of Franklin, 27 Vt. 186; Daviess County Court v. Howard, 13 Bush. (Ky.) 102.

⁶ Clarke v. Des Moines, 19 Iowa, 200.

⁷ Short v. City of New Orleans, 4 La. Ann. 281; Goldschmidt v. New Orleans, 5 La. Ann. 436.

bark in enterprises not authorized by their charter, still, as to third persons, and when necessary for the advancement of justice, the stockholders will be presumed to have assented, since it is in their power to restrain their officers when they transgress the limits of their chartered authority.¹ But municipal corporations stand upon a different ground. They are not organized for gain, but for the purpose of government; and debts illegally contracted by their officers cannot be made binding upon the taxpayers from the presumed assent of the latter.²

The principle is applicable to both public and private corporations, as it is to individuals, that where they borrow money from a bank or other institution, it does not lie in their mouth to show that the transaction was of a character prohibited by the charter of such bank or other institution.³

¹ Lloyd v. West Branch Bank, 15 Penn. St. 174. It was held that, although a bank had no authority to receive certain notes on deposit, yet, if received, it was liable for them. Coulter, J., said: "The recognized and known functionaries, and especially the officers of a bank, are held out to the world as having authority to act according to the general usage, practice, and course of the business of such institutions."

"If it were otherwise, there would be no safety for the public in doing business with any one of such institutions; because their charters differ in some respects, and individuals cannot be presumed to carry these documents in their pockets as a *vade mecum*. Their acts, therefore, within the scope of such usage, practice, and course of business, will bind the corporation in favor of third persons transacting business with them, and who did not know at the time that the officer was acting beyond and above the scope of his authority. The property of stockholders is not bound by the irregular, unauthorized transactions or declarations of their officers, beyond the just sphere of their legal action. But if stockholders, without objection or interference, witness a course of business, usage, and practice on the part of their officers, this justifies third persons in believing that such usage of the officers is sanctioned by the principle and authorized by law."

² Bradley v. Ballard, 55 Ill. 420.

³ Township of Pine Grove v. Talcott, 19 Wall. 619, and cases therein cited.

CHAPTER XV.

DRAFTS OR WARRANTS OF ONE CORPORATE OFFICER UPON ANOTHER.

SECTION I.

DRAFTS OR WARRANTS OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS.

§ 424. *In the first place, as to drafts, orders, or warrants of private corporations.*—Sometimes, in dealing with corporations, one agent or officer draws upon another, and in respect to private corporations the doctrine may be regarded as settled by weight of authority, and by principle, that, provided the act be not *ultra vires*, an instrument so drawn is, in effect, the draft of the corporation upon itself, and may be treated either as an accepted bill, or as a promissory note. Such drafts come within a statutory provision respecting “bills and notes for the direct payment of money.”¹ They are frequently given for mere convenience in keeping accounts, and providing concurrent vouchers, and as it is not necessary, when bills and notes are drawn payable at a particular place to aver or prove presentment there as a condition precedent to binding the acceptor or maker, so it is considered that it is not necessary to aver or prove presentment to the drawee in person, or at his place of business or residence, or to give notice of non-payment, before suing the corporation, which is regarded as acceptor or maker.² This view has been applied in numerous cases: where the president and secretary of a water company drew upon its treasurer, and the corporation executed a mortgage signed in like manner to secure the draft;³ where the secretary of a railroad com-

¹ Gilstrah v. St. Louis, &c. R. R. Co. 50 Mo. 491.

² See 1 Parsons, N. & B. 63.

³ Dennis v. Table Mountain Water Co. 10 Cal. 369 (1858). A similar case is Hasey v. White Pigeon Beet Sugar Co. 1 Doug. Mich. 193 (1843).

pany drew upon its treasurer;¹ where the president of a railroad company drew upon its treasurer for a specified sum, stated as being amount due the payee for work done as contractor;² where the agent of a trading corporation drew upon its treasurer, who accepted the draft.³

§ 425. The contrary doctrine to that of the text at one time prevailed in Indiana,⁴ but was subsequently overruled by the cases already quoted. It has prevailed also in Alabama, where it is held that a company draft of the railroad corporation on the treasurer, signed by the president, must be presented, and notice given of dishonor (unless such precedent steps be excused) before action can be sustained.⁵

§ 426. In England, where the directors of an assurance company drew on its cashier, Wilde, C. J., said: "The company indicate that they mean to pay, by a direction to their officer to pay, and they point out to whom payment is to be made. It appears to me that the instrument contains all that is essential to constitute a promissory note."⁶

¹ *Indiana, &c. R. R. Co. v. Davis*, 20 Ind. 6 (1863); *Maux Ferry Gravel R. Co. v. Branegan*, 40 Ind. 361, overruling earlier cases.

² *Fairchild v. Ogdensburgh, &c. R. R. Co.* 15 N. Y. 337 (1857); approved in *Mobley v. Clark*, 28 Barb. 391 (1858).

³ *Shaw v. Stone*, 1 Cush. 256, *Shaw, C. J.*: "The right of the holders to proceed against the company as drawer was perfect, without demand on the acceptor or notice to the indorsers. *Walwyn v. St. Quintin*, 1 Bos. & Pul. 652. Nor, supposing them to be foreign bills, would a protest be necessary."

⁴ *Marion, &c. R. R. Co. v. Dillon*, 7 Ind. 404 (1856). The President of a railroad company drew upon its treasurer. There was no allegation of presentment. *Perkins, J.*, said: "If a man drew a bill or order directly upon himself payable immediately, it is his promissory note, and may be sued on accordingly. In such case he is the payer as well as drawer, and by the very act of drawing admits he is to pay, and that he has not then the money with which to make payment. But where the debt is due from a company, and it is the duty of one officer or set of officers to allow demands, and draw upon another officer who has the custody, and is charged with the duty of the disbursement of the company's funds for payment, such order must, as a general rule, be presented in a reasonable time for payment." See, also, the overruled cases, *Marion v. Logansport R. R. Co.* 7 Ind. 648 (1856); *English v. Trustees*, 6 Ind. 438 (1855); *Marion, &c. R. R. Co. v. Hodge*, 9 Ind. 163 (1857).

⁵ *Wetumpka, &c. R. R. Co. v. Bingham*, 5 Ala. 663 (1843).

⁶ *Allen v. Sea, Fire & Life As. Co.* 9 C. B. 574.

SECTION II.

DRAFTS OR WARRANTS OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.

§ 427. *In the second place, as to municipal drafts, orders, or warrants.*—Frequently a draft, order, or warrant is drawn by one officer of a municipal corporation upon another; or by the selectmen of a town, or supervisors of a county, upon an officer, for the payment of corporate indebtedness to the payee. The intention in such case is, as a general rule, to furnish vouchers to the proper disbursing officer, and not to put negotiable instruments in circulation. And it has been generally, and as we think justly, considered that such drafts, orders, or warrants are not negotiable instruments, and cannot be regarded either as bills of exchange or promissory notes, cutting out equities as against the corporation—on the ground that there is no implied authority in such officers to execute negotiable instruments. It has been so held, where the selectmen of a town drew an order on the treasurer payable to bearer;¹ where the auditor of a county drew upon the treasurer;² where the auditor of the city of San Francisco drew a warrant upon the treasurer, purporting on its face to be for a certain sum “as ordered by the board of supervisors;”³ where county judges drew a warrant upon the

¹ *Smith v. Cheshire*, 13 Gray, 318; *ante*, § 1.

² *People v. Gray*, 23 Cal. 125; to same effect see *Clark v. Polk County*, 19 Iowa, 248; *Keller v. Hicks*, 22 Cal. 460.

³ *Dana v. San Francisco*, 19 Cal. 490; Baldwin, J., saying: “We think that the plaintiff, counting alone upon the county scrip or warrants, as negotiable instruments, evidencing of themselves an indebtedness on the part of the county, cannot maintain his pretensions. This seems to be decided by the case of *The People v. Supervisors of El Dorado County*, 11 Cal. 170. The reason is, that the auditor had no authority to draw a bill of exchange, but he can only, in certain cases, issue warrants upon the order of the supervisors, or the allowance by the board, of an account which is chargeable as a debt upon the county. The warrant is not intended to constitute a new debt, or evidence of a new debt, against the county, but is the prescribed means the law has devised for drawing money from the county treasury. It may be very true, that the warrant, as an open account, may be assigned, and the assignee be protected as a holder of a claim against the county. But this would be, not because the indorsement of the war-

treasurer;¹ where the mayor and recorder of a city drew a warrant on the treasurer payable to "A. H. W. or bearer, out of any moneys in the general fund not otherwise appropriated;"² where the supervisors of a county drew upon the treasurer;³ where the clerk of the township board of education drew upon the township treasurer;⁴ where the directors of a school district drew upon the township treasurer.⁵ So it has been held that the mayor and recorder of a city have no implied power to execute negotiable warrants.⁶

§ 428. It has been held, however, in a number of cases that where corporate authorities are empowered by law to draw warrants, or orders in payment of debts, that they will be deemed negotiable if phrased in negotiable words, and may be sued upon by a transferee, like any other negotiable instrument. Thus where the charter of the city of Brooklyn required an order or warrant of the common council on the treasurer, for drawing money from the treasury, a draft on the treasurer running, "Pay Alexander Lynn, or order, fifteen hundred dollars for award No. 7, and charge to Bedford Road Assessment," and signed by the mayor and the clerk of the common council, was held to be a negotiable bill of exchange.⁷

rant carried with it the legal title of the scrip to the assignee, as an indorsee under the law merchant, but because the transaction would be, in equity, the assignment of the debt on which the scrip issued, and an authority to the assignee to receive the money. The question here is, not whether the county had the power to make a bill of exchange, but whether the auditor, when under the statute he issues a warrant, has the power to give it the form and qualities of such an instrument. We think he has not, and that the paper, as here presented, has no such effect, if indeed it was so designed."

"If the plaintiff has a valid claim upon the county, it ought to be paid; but he must proceed to enforce it in some other mode."

¹ Hyde v. County of Franklin, 27 Vt. 186.

² Clark v. Des Moines, 19 Iowa, 200.

³ Chemung Canal Bank v. Supervisors, 5 Denio, 517.

⁴ Steinbeck v. Treasurer, &c. 22 Ohio St. R. 144; see State v. Huff, 63 Mo. 238.

⁵ School Directors v. Fogleman, 76 Ill. 189.

⁶ Clark v. Des Moines, 19 Iowa, 201.

⁷ Kelly v. Mayor of Brooklyn, 4 Hill, 265, Cowen. J.: "The draft was signed, and countersigned according to the statute, by the mayor and clerk.

So, where the clerk, under the order of court, drew a warrant payable to A. B. or bearer, according to statutory form, it was held that it was negotiable by delivery, and the creditor could not recover against the county without producing it.¹

§ 429. *Indorsements*.—When a municipal corporation warrant is deemed a commercial instrument, negotiable like an ordinary bill of exchange, the party who transfers it with his indorsement is subject to the liabilities and entitled to the privileges of an ordinary indorser of a negotiable instrument.² But when such an instrument is regarded as a mere voucher, and not a bill or note, the transferrer by indorsement is not deemed an “indorser,” in the commercial sense of the term, and could not be held liable as such, though the form of the paper be negotiable.³ He would be liable, however, to refund the consideration if the instrument were not valid and legal according to its purport.⁴

§ 430. *Presentment*.—In the case of municipal corporations, it has been considered that an order by an officer or representative upon the disbursing authorities must be presented before the corporation can be sued, though, perhaps, no notice of dishonor would be necessary. This view was applied

There is nothing in the statute expressing or implying an inhibition to make the warrants negotiable.”

“Independently of any statute provision, a corporation may issue negotiable paper for a debt contracted in the course of its proper business. *Moss v. Oakley*, 2 Hill, 265. This is a power incident to all corporations, and no provision in its charter or elsewhere, merely directing a certain form in affirmative words, should be so construed as to take away the power. The draft in question was issued by the agents of the defendants, acting according to the usual course in such matters. A disavowal by the corporation, if allowed, might operate as a fraud upon plaintiff, and upon others. The money, when drawn for, or soon after, was in the possession of the corporation; and it stood a debtor to the plaintiffs *pro tanto*.” But see *contra*, *Clark v. Des Moines*, 19 Iowa, 290; *Short v. New Orleans*, 4 La. Ann. 281; *Goldschmidt v. New Orleans*, 5 La. Ann. 436.

¹ *Crawford County v. Wilson*, 7 Ark. (2 English) 219; see *Sweet v. Carver County*, 16 Minn. 107; *Comm'rs of Floyd County v. Day*, 19 Ind. 451.

² *Bull v. Sims*, 23 N. Y. 571.

³ *Keller v. Hicks*, 22 Cal. 460.

⁴ *Keller v. Hicks*, 22 Cal. 460.

in Maine and in Vermont, where the selectmen of a town drew upon its treasurer.¹

But other authorities, following the analogies of private corporations, regard such orders like bills of exchange drawn by a party upon himself, and which may be treated either as accepted bills or as promissory notes; and hold, therefore, that the corporation is bound absolutely for the debt without either presentment or notice.²

§ 431. When the warrant or order has been refused payment, the creditor may sue upon the original indebtedness of the corporation.³ Where there was no express or implied power in the officer who executed it to issue the warrant, the

¹ Varner v. Nobleborough, 2 Greenl. 126 (1822), Mellen, C. J.: "The selectmen were the agents of the town, drawing the order on their account on the town's banker. The case may be justly compared to that of a draft by a man on his banker, or a note payable at his banker's, or by his agent. In which cases it seems settled that the draft or note must be presented at the place appointed. But, in addition to the authority of decided cases, so nearly resembling this in principle, a strong argument against the present action arises out of the general—perhaps we may say universal—mode of conducting the affairs of a town in the settlement of accounts and payment of debts due from the corporation to individuals. Persons transacting business according to an established and well-known usage, are presumed to assent to such usage and contract in reference to it. Now, it is universally understood that selectmen, who draw an order on behalf of the town in favor of any of their creditors, have not the funds of the town in their hands, but that they are in the possession of the treasurer. When any creditor of the town receives an order on the treasurer for the amount due to him, he must be considered as understanding these facts and assenting to this mode of receiving payment, and as accepting the order under an implied engagement to conform to the established usage, and present the order to the treasurer for payment. Good faith requires him to do this, and the law considers him as promising so to do. If, on presenting the order, payment be refused, the town which drew the order on itself must be answerable instantler, for the reason before assigned. But no sound reason can be given why a town should be subjected to the perplexity and costs of an action, before the payee of an order will give himself the trouble to do his duty and request payment of the money due him according to the terms of it. We have no reason to believe but that the contents of the order would have been promptly paid on application at the treasury. Justice, as well as law, are against the plaintiffs according to the facts before us." Pease v. Cornish, 19 Me. 193; Dalrymple v. Whittingham, 26 Vt. 346; see Kelley v. Mayor of Brooklyn, 4 Hill, 265.

² Steel v. Davis County, 2 G. Greene (Iowa), 469.

³ Short v. City of New Orleans, 4 La. Ann. 281; Goldschmidt v. The Same, 5 La. Ann. 436.

plaintiff cannot make it even the *prima facie* ground of recovery, and must resort to the original consideration;¹ but when issued by an officer having a general power to issue warrants, it will be presumed to be upon a consideration, and if there be any defense, it must be pleaded and proved by the defendant.²

§ 432. It is not incumbent upon a creditor to take a town order in discharge of a debt due him, although it is the usage of the town to settle its indebtedness by giving an order of its selectmen on the treasurer, similar to that offered.³ But if he takes such order, he cannot recover the amount of the debt, as it seems, without producing it.⁴ And if once paid, it cannot be the subject of recovery even by a *bona fide* holder, at least where it is not deemed a negotiable instrument.⁵

When such warrants or orders are issued as vouchers, they do not bear interest after demand and refusal to pay;⁶ but some of the authorities which regard them as negotiable instruments, hold that interest is recoverable after dishonor.⁷

§ 433. *Payable out of particular fund.*—Where a warrant or order is made payable out of a particular fund, it creates no general charge against the corporation, but only against the fund which is designated.⁸ It has been so held where the order contained the memorandum, “and charge the same to account of Union avenue;”⁹ and where it was payable out of “the road and canal fund.”¹⁰

But if the memorandum merely indicate the consideration, or the source of reimbursement, it would be different.

¹ Allison v. Juniata County, 50 Penn. St. 353; see Dana v. San Francisco, 19 Cal. 491.

² Comm’rs of Floyd County v. Day, 19 Ind. 451.

³ Benson v. Carmel, 8 Greenl. 110; Willey v. Greenfield, 30 Me. 452; Dillon on Municipal Corporations, 1st ed. p. 398, § 410.

⁴ Sweet v. Carver County, 16 Minn. 107; Crawford County v. Wilson, 7 Ark. 219.

⁵ Chemung Canal Bank v. Supervisors, 5 Den. 517.

⁶ Allison v. Juniata County, 59 Penn. St. 353 (1865); Dyer v. Covington Township, 19 Penn. St. 200 (1852.)

⁷ Com’rs of Leavenworth v. Keller, 6 Kans. 518.

⁸ Lake v. Trustees, 4 Den. 520; Kingsberry v. Pettis County, 48 Mo. 207.

⁹ Lake v. Trustees, *supra*.

¹⁰ Kingsberry v. Pettis County, *supra*.

So held where there was written, "it being his proportionate part of the surplus revenue fund;"¹ so where it ran, "for award No. 7, and charge to Bedford Road assessment;"² so where it was payable "out of any funds belonging to the city not before specially appropriated."³

§ 434. *Suit by Transferee*.—Whether or not the indorsee or assignee of a corporation warrant or order drawn by one officer upon another, can sue the county or city in his own name, is another question which has frequently arisen. Where such papers are deemed negotiable, an indorsee or transferee may of course sue upon them as upon any other negotiable instrument.⁴ But where they are regarded as mere vouchers drawn by one officer upon another for convenience in disbursing funds, the contrary view has generally prevailed—that the transferee cannot sue upon them in his own name.⁵

§ 435. By some authorities it is considered that though town or country orders payable to bearer, or payable to order and indorsed, are not commercial paper in the hands of *bona fide* indorsees or transferees for value, so as to exclude evidence touching the legality of their inception, or so as to cut out defenses which would be good against the payee; yet they may be sued upon by the indorsee or transferee in his own name, in like manner as the assignee of a non-negotiable instrument.⁶

¹ Pease v. Cornish, 19 Me. 191.

² Kelly v. Mayor, 4 Hill, 263.

³ Bull v. Sims, 23 N. Y. 570.

⁴ Kelly v. Mayor, 4 Hill, 263; Dalrymple v. Town of Whittingham 26 Vt. 345 (but see Hyde v. County of Franklin, below); Crawford County v. Wilson, 7 Ark. (2 English) 219; Commissioners of Leavenworth v. Keller, 6 Kans. 510; see Great Falls Bank v. Farmington, 41 N. H. 33.

⁵ Hyde v. County of Franklin, 27 Vt. 185; Allison v. Juniata County, 50 Penn. St. 353. Thompson, J.: "It was distinctly said in that case (Dyer v. Covington Township, 7 Harr. [19 Penn. St.] 200, that an action does not lie on such paper, and in this I entirely concur. It is neither a bill, note, check, nor contract, nor is it a satisfaction of the original indebtedness, and the suit should ordinarily be on that." See Smith v. Cheshire, 13 Gray, 318.

⁶ Emery v. Mariaville, 56 Me. 316; Sturtevant v. Liberty, 46 Me. 459; Clark v. Polk County, 19 Iowa, 243; Andover v. Grafton, 7 N. H. 303, overruled by Great Falls Bank v. Farmington, 41 N. H. 33. This view is taken by Judge Dillon. Dillon on Municipal Corporations, 1st ed. p. 394, § 403. See *ante*, § 420.

CHAPTER XVI.

THE FEDERAL AND STATE GOVERNMENTS AS PARTIES TO NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.

SECTION I.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES AS TO GOVERNMENTAL LIABILITY, AND LIABILITY OF AGENTS.

§ 436. There is no doubt that when an officer of the government, Federal or State, who is authorized to bind the government as drawer, maker or acceptor of a negotiable instrument, draws or accepts a bill, or makes a note in behalf of the United States, or the State which he represents, its validity cannot be questioned when it has passed into the hands of a *bona fide* holder for value, without notice of any defect. The government would then be bound by its negotiable paper just as an individual. This doctrine was laid down by the United States Supreme Court in a case where the Bank of the Metropolis, being sued for a balance due the United States, pleaded as a set-off a draft drawn by Edwin Porter on Richard C. Mason, treasurer of the post-office department, at ninety days, and accepted by him as treasurer; and also four drafts, at ninety days, drawn by James Reeside on Amos Kendall, Postmaster General, and "accepted on condition that his contracts be complied with." The right of the officers to accept, on behalf of the government, was not questioned, and the court held them valid, declaring that: "When the United States, by its authorized officer, becomes a party to a negotiable paper, they have all the rights, and incur all the responsibilities, of individuals who are parties to such instruments;" and that all the bank had to look to "was

the genuineness of the acceptance and the authority of the officer to give it.”¹ At the present time there seems to be no officer of the Federal Government who has authority to bind it as a party to a bill or note.²

§ 437. In the case of *The Floyd Acceptances*, 7 Wall. 667, before the United States Supreme Court, the authority of government officers to draw or accept bills was discussed in a suit upon the following instrument:

Washington, November 28, 1859.

\$5,000.

Ten months after date, for value received, pay to our own order, at the Bank of the Republic, New York city, five thousand dollars, and charge to account of our contract for supplies for the army in Utah.

RUSSELL, MAJORS & WADDELL.

Hon. J. B. FLOYD, Secretary of War.

[Indorsement.]

RUSSELL, MAJORS & WADDELL.

[Acceptance.]

War Department, November 28, 1859.

Accepted:

JOHN B. FLOYD,
Secretary of War.

Suit was brought by a *bona fide* indorsee for value, but the court held that he could not recover, although it was proved that the army in Utah was in imminent danger from cold and starvation at the time when the secretary accepted the bill in order to secure supplies to save it, on the ground that there was no usage or practice by which the Secretary of War was authorized to accept such bills in behalf of the United States; and that although it was then and had been the practice of the heads of departments to accept drafts or bills for the transmission of funds to disbursing officers, or for the payment of those serving in distant stations, or for services rendered—such practice did not extend to cases of

¹ *United States v. Bank of Metropolis*, 15 Pet. 377. See this case explained in *The Floyd Acceptances*, 7 Wall. 666.

² *The Floyd Acceptances*, 7 Wall. 666.

this kind, and there was no express authority to any office of the government to draw or accept bills of exchange.¹

§ 438. A warrant issued by the auditor of a State upon the treasurer for an amount due a creditor is not a negotiable instrument.² And it has been held by the United States Supreme Court that an order drawn by the government of the United States upon the government of France, for an amount due by treaty stipulation, was not a bill of exchange in the sense of the law merchant.³

§ 439. Foreign governments may also be parties to negotiable instruments. In a case before the U. S. Supreme Court, the bills in suit were signed: "Le-Tombe, Le Consul Général," and directed: "Au citoyen Payeur Général des defenses du Departement de ———. A la Trésorerie Nationale à Paris." They bore a certificate showing that they had been registered at the consulate of France for the port of Philadelphia, and a declaration by Adet, the minister plenipotentiary of the French Republic, that the faith of the French nation was pledged for their payment, and requesting the proper officer of the treasury to pay them. The Court was unanimously of opinion that the bills were drawn upon account of the French government, and that Le Tombe was not personally bound.⁴

¹ The Floyd Acceptances, 7 Wall. 666, Nelson, Grier, and Clifford, JJ., dissented. Miller, J., who delivered the opinion of the court, said: "The United States v. Bank of Metropolis is the case mainly relied on as establishing the doctrine contended for by plaintiffs, and is confidently asserted to be conclusive of the cases under consideration, unless overruled. * * * The opinion of the court, after stating the facts, opens with the declaration that, 'when the United States, by its authorized officer, becomes a party to negotiable paper, they have all the rights, and incur all the responsibilities, of individuals who are parties to such instruments.' And further on it is said, that 'an unconditional acceptance was tendered to it (the bank) for discount; * * * all it had to look to was the genuineness of the acceptance, and the authority of the officer to give it.' If this language has any significance, it is that the authority of the officer, like the genuineness of the signature, is always to be inquired into at the peril of the party taking an acceptance purporting to bind the government."

² State v. Dubuclet, 23 La. Ann. 267.

³ United States v. Barker, 12 Wheat. 559.

⁴ Jones, Indorsee v. Le Tombe, 3 Dall. 384.

§ 440. *Governmental and private agents.*—In dealing with the officers and agents of government, whether Federal or State, it is important to remember that they stand in a different relation to their principals from private agents. Private agents, who are held out as such by their principals to the public, will bind them whenever they act within the apparent scope of their authority. And although they violate instructions, it will be no defense to the principal, who, having clothed them with the semblance of authority, cannot deny its reality. But with public agents it is entirely different. Their powers and duties are defined by statute, which is notice to the world of the limitations to their authority; and no pretension of authority, or customary action, can amplify that authority beyond the statutory limitation.¹ This rule is absolutely necessary to protect the public interest against losses and injuries arising from the fraud, mistake, or rashness, or indiscretion of public agents.² “It is better that an individual should occasionally suffer from the mistakes of public officers or agents, than to adopt a rule, which through improper combinations or collusion, might be turned to the detriment and injury of the public.”³ The difference in the statement of the rule as applicable to public and private agents is, however, rather a difference arising from the customary difference of facts in the circumstances under which they act, than in the principle applicable to them. For even as to private agents, the principal is not bound by their acts in excess of authority, when the party dealing with them has an opportunity to inspect that authority, and observe its limitations. This opportunity is rarely afforded in private agencies; whereas the statute of public record is a conspicuous notice to the world of the public agent's power.

§ 441. *Coupon bonds* issued by the Federal⁴ and State

¹ *Pierce v. United States*, 1 N. H. 270; *The Floyd Acceptances*, 7 Wall. 663.

² *State of Missouri v. Bank of Missouri*, 45 Mo. 528, *Wagner, J.*

³ *Whiteside v. U. S.* 93 U. S. (3 Otto), 257; *Mayer v. Eschback*, 17 Md. 282.

⁴ *Texas v. Hardenberg*, 10 Wall. 58; *Texas v. White*, 7 Wall. 700; *Seybel v. National Currency Bank*, 54 N. Y. 288; *Spooner v. Holmes*, 102 Mass. 503.

governments,¹ are established as in all respects negotiable instruments; and the rights of parties are ascertained, as a general rule, by the same principles which apply to like instruments issued by corporations. The treasury notes of the United States are deemed negotiable instruments, and their negotiability is not affected by the fact that they are issued under the treasury seal, nor by the fact that when issued the name of the payee is left blank.² A clause in such a note giving the holder the option, upon maturity, to convert it into bonds, does not destroy its negotiability so long as the option is not exercised, nor is negotiability destroyed by a clause reserving the option to the government to pay in coin or in paper money. But when the holder exercises the option given him, as by indorsing on the note, "Pay Secretary of the Treasury for redemption," the negotiability of the note is destroyed.³ In a recent case involving these questions, Dwight, Commissioner, said: "There is nothing to prevent the holder from taking bonds at any time, though the notes cannot be actually converted into bonds until maturity. Until an election is exercised they remain treasury notes; when that occurs their function is at an end, and the holder has only a claim against the United States for the proper amount of bonds. This is a chose in action, and not negotiable."⁴ If the government, instead of the holder, had the option to pay or convert notes into bonds, they would not be negotiable.⁵ In a recent case, the United States Supreme Court described the character of these notes; and held that after maturity the purchaser took them subject to the rights of antecedent holders, to the same extent as in other dishonored commercial paper.⁶

¹ State of Illinois v. Delafield, 8 Paige, Ch. 527; Arents v. Commonwealth, 18 Grat. 750.

² Dinsmore v. Duncan, 57 N. Y. 573; Vermilye v. Adams Express Company, 21 Wall. 138.

³ Id.

⁴ Dinsmore v. Duncan, 57 N. Y. 580.

⁵ Vermilye v. Adams Express Co. 21 Wall. 138.

⁶ Vermilye v. Adams Express Co. *supra*, Miller, J., saying: "The first thing which presents itself on this state of facts is to determine the character of those notes as it affects the law of their transferability at the time they were purchased

If a treasury note be drawn payable to order, and indorsed specially to a certain person, a thief or finder cannot acquire, or pass a title valid against the indorser, or the true owner—as every person taking it would have notice by the special indorsement, that only the indorsee could give title.¹

by appellants, for notwithstanding some testimony about the erasure of an indorsement on some of the notes, we are of opinion that it was so skillfully done as not to attract attention with the usual care in examining such notes given by bankers.

“They were the ordinary form of negotiable instruments, payable at a definite time, and that time had passed and they were unpaid. This was obvious on the face of the paper. The fact that the holder had an option to convert them into other bonds does not change their character.

“That this option was to be exercised by the holder, and not by the United States, is all that saves them from losing their character as negotiable paper; for if they had been absolutely payable in other bonds or in bonds or money at the option of the maker, they would not, according to all the authorities, be promissory notes, and they can lay claim to no other form of negotiable instrument. As it is, they were negotiable promissory notes nine months overdue when purchased by appellants. They were not legal tenders, made to circulate as money, which must, from the nature of the functions they are to perform, remain free from the liability attaching to ordinary promises to pay after maturity. Nor were they bonds of the class which, having long time to run, payable to holder, have become by the necessities of modern usage negotiable paper, with all the protection that belongs to that class of obligations. These were simply notes, negotiable it is true, having when issued three years to run, which three years had long expired, and the notes were due and unpaid.

“We cannot agree with counsel for appellants, that the simple fact that they were the obligation of the government takes them out of the rule which subjects the purchaser of overdue paper to an inquiry into the circumstances under which it was made, as regards the rights of antecedent holders. The government pays its obligations according to their terms with far more punctuality than the average class of business men. The very fact that when one of its notes is due the money can certainly be had for it, if payable in money, should be a warning to the purchaser of such an obligation after its maturity to look to the source from which it comes, and to be cautious in paying his money for it. In the case of *Texas v. White* (7 Wall. 700), the bonds of the government issued to the State of Texas were dated July 1, 1851, and were redeemable after the 31st day of December, 1864. This court held that after that date they were to be considered as overdue paper, in regard to their negotiability, observing that in strictness, it is true, they were not payable on the day when they became redeemable, but the known usage of the United States to pay all bonds as soon as the right of payment accrues, except when a distinction between redeemability and payability is made by law and shown on the face of the bonds, requires the application of the rule respecting overdue obligations to bonds of the United States which have become redeemable, and in respect to which no such distinction is made.”

¹ *Myers v. Friend*, 1 Rand. 13. See *post*, § 441.

§ 442. When a State borrows money on bonds issued for that purpose and pledges a certain fund for the interest to accrue thereon, such pledge has been deemed a part of the contract with the holders of the bonds, and that to divert it would impair the obligation of the contract,—which it is beyond the power of the State to do,¹—if the legislature of a State authorize its officers to borrow money and sell its bonds or stocks for that purpose at par value, a sale at a rate less than par value would be void; and a sale of bonds or stocks which draw interest from the day of sale, but which are to be paid for in future instalments only, and without interest, is a sale at less than par value.²

§ 443. Whenever a public officer makes a contract or engagement, which is fairly within the scope of his authority, the presumption of law is that he made it officially, and in his public character, unless the contrary appears by satisfactory evidence.³ Accordingly, where bills, notes or other evidences of debt are made payable to an officer of the United States, and it appears, either from their face or extraneous evidence, that they were for the benefit of the United States, the action should be brought in the name of the United States, and, under like circumstances, if payable to a State officer, suit should be brought in the name of the State. These doctrines were enforced where a bill, payable to “Thomas T. Tucker, Treasurer of the United States,” was sued on in the name of the United States;⁴ where a note was payable to “I. E. F., U. S. Indian Agent, his successors in office, or

¹ State v. Cardozo, 8 Richardson (S. C.) 71; see *post*, § 446, 448.

² State of Illinois v. Delafield, 8 Paige Ch. 527.

³ Park v. Ross, 11 How. 374; Balcombe v. Northrup, 9 Minn. 176.

⁴ Dugan v. U. S. 3 Wheat. 172. Marshall, C. J., said: “If it be generally true that when a bill is indorsed to the agent of another for the use of his principal, an action cannot be maintained in the name of such principal (on which point no opinion is given), the government should form an exception to such rule, and the United States be permitted to sue in their own name, whenever it appears not only on the face of the instrument, but from all the evidence, that they alone were interested in the subject-matter of the controversy.” See also, U. S. v. Boyce, 2 McLean, 352.

order, for the use of the Winnebago Tribe, etc.;"¹ where a note was payable to "James Irish, Land Agent of Maine."²

§ 444. No official or agent of the government, Federal or State, can ratify a contract, save one capable of making it for the government. Thus, the legislature of Illinois, having authorized the issue of bonds in a particular way, the recognition of the governor of the validity of bonds issued in a different way could impart no validity to them. "For," said the court, "no person can confirm an unauthorized agreement, made by another, unless he had himself the power to authorize the making of such an agreement. As the sovereign power of the State, by a legislative act, had prohibited any of its officers or agents from selling its stocks below their par value, it follows, of course, that nothing short of a law of the State, proceeding from the same authority, can legalize such a transaction."³ But if the legislature had the power to authorize their issue, its ratification subsequently would be equivalent.⁴ And such ratification might be absolute, or conditioned upon a future event, in which case, the condition being fulfilled, it would become absolute.⁵

§ 445. *As to the liability of public agents*, a different rule prevails from that applicable to private agents. In the ordinary course of things, an agent contracting on behalf of the government or of the public, is not personally bound by such a contract, even though he would be by the terms of the contract, if it were an agency of a private nature. The reason of the distinction is, that it is not to be presumed either that the public agent means to bind himself personally in acting as a functionary of the government, or that the party dealing with him in his public character means to rely on his individual responsibility.⁶ If, however, a functionary of the

¹ Balcombe v. Northrup, 9 Minn. 173.

² State v. Boies, 2 Fairf. 474; Irish v. Webster, 5 Greenl. 171.

³ State of Illinois v. Delafield, 8 Paige Ch. (N. Y.) 542.

⁴ Opinion of Court to the Governor, 49 Mo. 225.

⁵ Butler, Treasurer v. Dubois, Auditor, 29 Ill. 105.

⁶ Walker v. Christian, 21 Grat. 297; Hodgson v. Dexter, 1 Cranch, S. C. 345;

government, without disclosing his official character, or the public nature of the transaction in the instrument, issued a negotiable instrument in his own name, it would seem clear that a *bona fide* holder, without notice, might hold him individually responsible.

SECTION II.

STATE SECURITIES MADE RECEIVABLE FOR TAXES.

§ 446. By section 10, art. 1, of the Constitution of the United States, it is provided that no State shall pass any law "impairing the obligations of contracts." This provision was intended to prevent interferences by State legislatures with the relations of debtors and creditors; and it has been urged with great force, that it was not designed to apply to undertakings of States themselves, and that one legislature could not pass any act which a subsequent one could not repeal, although such repeal would abrogate or impair engagements entered into under pre-existing legislation. But it has been decided that a State may be a contracting party within the meaning of the Constitution, and that, if a legislative body make a contract on behalf of the State, no subsequent session, and no new legislative body, can repeal the law by which it was made, so as to impair the obligation contracted.¹

§ 447. These principles have an immediate bearing on State and corporation securities, and have been applied to them in a number of cases. In 1836, the legislature of Arkansas chartered "The Bank of the State of Arkansas," the whole capital of which belonged to the State. Its charter provided "that the bills and notes of said institution shall be received in all payments of debts due to the State of Arkansas," but this provision was repealed by the legislature in 1845. At the time of its repeal a large amount of

Macheath, v. Haldimand, 1 T. R. 172; Story on Agency, §§ 306-312; see Edwards on Bills, 90.

¹ New Jersey v. Wilson, Cranch, 164.

the issues of the bank were in circulation, and a judgment debtor of the State, after the repeal, tendered the amount due by him in bank notes to the collecting officer, who refused to receive them. The Supreme Court of the United States held that the legislation aforesaid constituted a contract which no subsequent legislation could impair; and that the collecting officer might be compelled by *mandamus* to receive the notes tendered.¹ In a subsequent case which went up from Tennessee, a similar decision was rendered by the same tribunal, which held the contract of the State to receive the bank notes for all public dues irrevocable. This guaranty was thought in no sense a personal one, but attached to the notes themselves as much as if written on the back thereof; that it went with them everywhere as long as they existed, and was a standing invitation to all persons to receive them, even though, after the notes were issued, the law declaring their receivability should be repealed. "The quality of negotiability is annexed to the notes in words that cannot be misunderstood, and which indicate the purpose of the legislature, that they should be used by every one indebted to the State."²

§ 448. In Virginia, the decisions of the United States Supreme Court have been followed. It appeared in the case presented that the State of Virginia, by her legislature, had undertaken to issue coupon bonds for two-thirds of her entire indebtedness, the remaining third being assumed to be the proportion which should be discharged by West Virginia, which had been forcibly, and without Virginia's consent, torn out of her boundaries. It was provided in the act of the Virginia Assembly that the coupons of the new issue of bonds should be receivable "at and after maturity for all taxes, debts and demands due the State." Some of her creditors accepted this adjustment of their bonded debt, and a holder of some of the coupons ten-

¹ Woodruff v. Trapnall, 10 How. 190.

² Furman v. Nichol, 8 Wall. 44.

dered them to the sheriff of Richmond in payment of taxes. In the meantime, the law authorizing the receipt of the coupons for taxes and other demands had been repealed, and the Assembly had passed an act prohibiting the collecting officers of the State from receiving the coupons in discharge "of taxes or other demands of the State now due, or that shall hereafter become due." The Supreme Court of Appeals held that the prior act constituted a contract between Virginia and her creditors who accepted its terms, and was upon sufficient considerations; and that no subsequent legislative act could repeal the provision that the coupons issued should be receivable for taxes; and, accordingly, sustained the peremptory mandamus which had been awarded compelling the sheriff to receive them.¹ But in subsequent cases the Court held that the legislature had full power to repeal the funding act as against all creditors who had not accepted its terms at the time of such repeal.²

¹ *Antoni v. Wright*, 22 Grat. 833. Bouldin, J., with whom concurred Moncure and Christian, JJ., delivered the opinion of the Court, which is a model of judicial style. Staples, J., dissented. The current of decisions is so strong in favor of the views stated in the text that they may be regarded as settling the law. Many learned lawyers believe, however, that they rest upon a mistaken notion—that States were never contemplated as contracting parties, in that clause of the Constitution which prohibits the passage of laws by States which impair the obligation of contracts; and we can but think that the decisions quoted have sacrificed the spirit to the letter of the law, and shorn States of their sovereignty, under color of a constitutional provision only designed to exact good faith from individuals in their dealings with one another. See also Clarke, *Ex parte*, S. C. of Va., reported in Va. Law Journal for April, 1878, where it is held that coupons attached to bonds issued under the Virginia Funding Act, are receivable for fines.

² *Wise v. Rogers*, 24 Grat. 169; *Maury v. Rogers*, Id.

BOOK III.

THE NEGOTIATION OF THE INSTRUMENT.

CHAPTER XVII.

PRESENTMENT FOR ACCEPTANCE.

SECTION I.

NATURE OF AND NECESSITY FOR PRESENTMENT FOR ACCEPTANCE.

§ 449. It is the right of the holder of a bill to present it for, and insist on its acceptance, even so late as the day before it falls due. If not presented for acceptance until the day it falls due, the right to demand acceptance becomes merged in the right to demand payment. If the bill be presented for acceptance before it falls due, it becomes dishonored if acceptance be refused; and notice must be forthwith given to the parties whom it is intended to charge.¹ And suit may at once be instituted against the drawer, and against the indorsers.² This rule of commercial law is so general and binding that a statute of a State which forbids a suit from being brought in such a case until after the maturity of the bill, can have no effect upon suits brought in the United States courts. The requisition of a State statute like this would be a violation of the general commercial law, which a State has no power to impose, and which the courts of the United States would be bound

¹ Chitty on Bills (13th Am. ed.), 309; *Goodall v. Dolley*, 1 T. R. 712; see Chapter XXIX, on Notice, vol. 2; *Bank of Washington v. Triplett*, 1 Pet. 25; *Townsley v. Sumrall*, 2 Pet. 170; *Smith v. Roach*, 7 B. Mon. 17; *Landrum v. Trowbridge*, 2 Metc. 281.

² *Id.*; *Woodward v. Row*, Keb. R. 132 (1666); see also *Lucas v. Ladew*, 28 Mo. 342; *Edwards on Bills*, 387; *Pilkinton v. Woods*, 10 Ind. 432; *Kinney v. Heald*, 17 Ark. 397.

to disregard.¹ So also, if the State statute seeks to make the right of recovery, in a suit brought in case of non-acceptance, dependent upon proof of subsequent presentment, protest and notice for non-payment.²

§ 450. Presentment to the drawee, it has been held, is necessary, even though the drawer has requested him not to accept;³ but the holder is not bound to present again after refusal to accept and notice given, even though the drawer requests him to do so, and promises that the bill shall be honored.⁴

The only cases in which the holder of a bill which, according to its tenor, should be presented for acceptance, can charge the drawer without presenting it for acceptance, arise when the relations between the drawer and drawee are such as to constitute the drawing of the bill a fraud upon the holder.⁵ When the bill is presented the acceptance must be according to its tenor to pay in money. If it be to pay by another bill, it is no acceptance, and the bill should be protested.⁶

§ 451. *Effect of acceptance*.—Before acceptance the drawee is under no liability to accept, unless he has specially contracted to do so, and the holder cannot sue him, even though he have funds of the drawer in his hands.⁷ But an acceptance operates as a full legal assignment of the amount to the holder, and the acceptor is bound to pay it. It has been much debated whether or not a bill before acceptance operates as an assignment when drawn upon funds of the amount it calls for; and it seems to be settled by the authorities that if drawn for the whole amount it operates as

¹ Watson v. Tarpley, 18 How. 517.

² Id.

³ Hill v. Heap, Dow & R. N. P. 57; see 1 Parsons N. & B. 338.

⁴ Hickligg v. Hardey, 7 Taunt. 312.

⁵ Smith's Mercantile Law (Holcombe & Gholson's ed.) 304; Bank of Washington v. Triplett, 1 Pet. 25.

⁶ Russell v. Phillips, 14 Q. B. 891.

⁷ Mandeville v. Welch, 5 Wheat. 277; Schimmelpennich v. Bayard, 1 Pet. 264; Tiernan v. Jackson, 5 Pet. 580. The case of Corser v. Craig, 1 Wash. C. C. R. 424, has been overruled. Luff v. Pope, 5 Hill, 413; 7 Id. 577; N. Y. and Va. S. Bank v. Gibson, 5 Duer, 574; Harris v. Clark, 3 Comst. 93.

an equitable assignment, which will take precedence of any subsequent lien or charge upon them;¹ and that after notice to the drawee it will bind him.² And it has been so held of a draft non-negotiable.³ But when the bill is for only a part of the drawer's funds, it is said that it does not operate as an assignment against the drawee, unless he accepts, for the reason that the creditor cannot be permitted without the debtor's assent to split up one cause of action into several.⁴ Where the draft is not negotiable, the weight of authority is to this effect.⁵

§ 452. *Effect of failure to present for acceptance.*—Whenever it is incumbent on the holder to present the bill for acceptance or payment, if he fails to do so at the proper time, he will lose not only his remedy on the bill, but also on the consideration or debt, in respect of which it was given or transferred.⁶ This doctrine is well settled, and was well expressed in an Arkansas case, where Scott, J., said: "In case a plaintiff has lost by his own laches his legal recourse against the defendant upon the bill or note, it is in vain that he brings it into court and offers to cancel it, with the expectation of being allowed, after cancellation, to proceed to recover on the original consideration. As well might he hope, by such means, to revive a cause of action that had been barred by the statute of limitations."⁷

¹ Mandeville v. Welch, 5 Wheat. 277; Anderson v. De Sær, 6 Grat. 364; Gibson v. Cooke, 20 Pick. 15. See *ante*, Chap. I, Section III.

² *Id.*

³ Cutts v. Perkins, 12 Mass. 209; Morton v. Naylor, 1 Hill, 583.

⁴ Story, J., in Mandeville v. Welch, 5 Wheat. 277; Gibson v. Cooke, 20 Pick. 15.

⁵ 1 Parsons N. & B. 334.

⁶ Adams v. Darby, 28 Mo. 182; Smith v. Miller, 43 N. Y. 171 (1870); 52 N. Y. 546 (1873); Camidge v. Allenby, 6 B. & C. 373; Darrach v. Savage, 1 Show. 155 (1691).

⁷ Gracie v. Sandford, 9 Ark. 238 (1848).

SECTION II.

FORMALITIES OF PRESENTMENT FOR ACCEPTANCE.

§ 453. In order that every step in the procedure may be properly taken, it is important to consider: (1) What bills must be presented for acceptance; (2) By and to whom such presentment should be made; (3) The place where such presentment should be made; and (4) The manner of making presentment for acceptance.

§ 454. *In the first place, as to what bills should be presented for acceptance.*—Bills payable on demand (which are immediately payable on presentment), or payable at a certain number of days after date, or after any other certain event, or payable on a day certain, need not be presented for acceptance at all, but only for payment. And the fact that such bills are payable at a bank, or other particular place, does not alter the rule on the subject.¹ But it is usual and best when the bill is payable at a future day, to present it for acceptance, in order to ascertain whether it will certainly be honored, and to procure the assurance of the acceptor's liability.² And in such cases, if acceptance be refused, the holder must make protest, and give notice in the same manner as if the bill were payable at so many days after sight.³

¹ Bank of Washington v. Triplett, 1 Pet. 25; Townsley v. Sumrall, 2 Pet. 170; Allen v. Suydam, 20 Wend. 321; Batchellor v. Priest, 12 Pick. 399; Bank of Bennington v. Raymond, 12 Vt. 401; Smith v. Roach, 7 B. Mon. 17; Carmichael v. Bank of Penna. 4 How. (Miss.) 537; Glasgow v. Copeland, 8 Mo. 268; Orr v. Maginnis, 7 East, 362; Dunn v. O'Keefe, 5 M. & S. 282; Walker v. Stetson, 19 Ohio St. 400; Story on Bills, § 228.

It not being necessary to present a bill payable on a day certain for acceptance, an agreement not to present it for acceptance will not discharge an indorser, although the drawee says it will not be accepted or paid. Fall River Bank v. Willard, 5 Metc. 216.

² U. S. v. Barker, 4 Wash. C. C. R. 464; Story on Bills, § 228.

³ Glasgow v. Copeland, 8 Mo. 268; Allen v. Suydam, 20 Wend. 321; U. S. v. Barker, 4 Wash. C. C. R. 464; Landrum v. Trowbridge, 2 Metc. 281.

Philpott v. Bryant, 3 Car. & P. 244, in which case Park J., said: "I should destroy half the trade of the city of London, if I were to hold that bills made payable so many days after date must be presented for acceptance."

Bills payable at sight, or at so many days after sight, or after demand, or after any other event not absolutely fixed, must be presented to the drawee for acceptance and payment, or for acceptance only, without unreasonable delay, or the drawer and indorsers will be discharged, for they have an interest in having the bills accepted immediately in order to shorten the time of payment, and thus put a limit to the period of their liability; and also enable them to protect themselves by other means before it is too late, if the bill is not accepted and paid within the time originally contemplated by them.¹ When the words "acceptance waived," are embodied in a bill, the ordinary proceedings in acceptance are dispensed with, and merged into those of payment or non-payment.²

§ 455. *In the second place, as to the person by and to whom presentment for acceptance should be made.*—The bill must be presented by the holder or his authorized agent, and to the drawee, or his authorized agent. The party in possession of the bill is presumed to be the holder, and to have the right to make presentment for acceptance or payment.³ The drawee may accept without risk, and if he refuse the protest will inure to the benefit of the rightful holder.⁴ If the drawee cannot be found, and any person has been indicated to be resorted to in case of need (*au besoin*), the bill should be presented to that person.⁵

¹ Allen v. Suydam, 20 Wend. 321; Aymar v. Beers, 7 Cow. 705; Robinson v. Ames, 20 Johns. 146; Wallace v. Agry, 4 Mason, 336; 5 Mason, 118; Mitchell v. Degrand, 1 Mason, 176; Story on Bills, § 238. Whether or not bills payable at sight are entitled to grace, is a question about which authorities differ, though preponderating in favor of the allowance of grace. See, on this subject, Chapter XX, on Presentment for Payment, Section IV.

² Webb v. Mears, 9 Wright, 222; Deneyre v. Milno, 10 La. Ann. 324; English v. Wall, 12 Rob. (La.) 132; Liggett v. Weed, 7 Kan. 276; Carson v. Russell, 26 Tex. 472.

³ Bank of Utica v. Smith, 18 Johns. 230; Freeman v. Boynton, 7 Mass. 483; Agnew v. Bank of Gettysburg, 2 Har. & Gill, 478. See Chapter XX, on Presentment for Payment, Section I.

⁴ Chitty on Bills (13th Am. ed.) 311.

⁵ Story on Bills, § 229; Edwards, 402.

If the bill be drawn upon two persons not partners, it seems that it must be presented to both, if not paid by the first;¹ but this has been doubted, for the reason that the holder would not be bound to take the single acceptance of the other—and if he did, it would be at his own risk, if the bill were not protested.² But if the bill be drawn upon a firm, presentment to any partner is sufficient,³ and the fact that the firm has been dissolved by bankruptcy does not render it necessary to present the bill to both.⁴

§ 456. The holder must be careful, when he does not find the drawee in person, to assure himself that the party to whom he presents the bill for acceptance is his authorized agent. And though in the case of a presentment for payment it may suffice to demand payment at the residence of the acceptor, yet in case of a presentment for acceptance, the holder must endeavor to see the drawee or his authorized agent, personally. And therefore, where in an action against the drawee on a refusal to accept, it appeared that the witness had carried the bill to a place which was described to him as the drawee's house, and that he offered it to a person in a tan yard, who refused to accept it; and the witness did not know the drawee's person, nor could he swear that the person to whom he offered the bill was he, or represented himself to be so, it was held that the evidence of presentment to the drawee for acceptance, was insufficient.⁵

§ 457. There is no doubt that a clerk found at the drawee's counting-room is a competent party for the bill to be presented to, and to refuse acceptance of it; and it seems that it is not necessary to show that such clerk was the clerk of the drawee authorized to accept or refuse acceptance of

¹ Willis v. Green, 5 Hill, 232; Story on Bills, § 229. See Union Bank v. Willis, 8 Metc. 504; Arnold v. Dresser, 8 Allen, 435; Gates v. Beecher, 60 N. Y. 523; American Law Register, July, 1875, p. 440.

² Story on Bills, § 229, note 9. See on this subject, Harris v. Clark, 10 Ohio, 5; and Greenough v. Smead, 3 Ohio St. 415.

³ Greatlake v. Brown, 2 Cranch C. C. 541; Story on Notes, § 239; 1 Parsons N. & B. 135; Holtz v. Boppe, 37 N. Y. 634.

⁴ Gates v. Beecher, 60 N. Y. 523.

⁵ Cheek v. Roper, 5 Esp. 175.

bills; but parol evidence is admissible to prove that the clerk was authorized to refuse acceptance.¹

§ 458. Chitty says, and Byles quotes his words with approval, that "if on presentment it appear that the drawee is dead, the holder should inquire after his personal representative, and, if he live within a reasonable distance, should present the bill to him."² Story states that the drawee's death will be "no excuse for the omission of presentment of the bill for acceptance,"³ and Roscoe considers that "the cases with regard to presentment of bills where the party is dead, &c., apply also to presentment for acceptance."⁴ But it has been well observed on this subject by Edwards that "upon principle, it is not easy to see upon what ground the holder is bound to present a bill drawn upon the deceased to his executor or administrator for acceptance. An acceptance by the representative, binding himself personally, is not according to the tenor of the bill; neither is an acceptance qualified so as to render him responsible to pay out of the assets that may come into his hands."⁵ The holder could not be bound to take the representative's acceptance in either form, and it would be reasonable to hold that where the drawee was dead the bill might be protested, and recourse had against the other parties.

§ 459. *In the third place, as to the place where presentment for acceptance may be made.*—It was at one time a

¹ Nelson v. Fotterall, 7 Leigh, 180; Stainback v. Bank of Virginia, 11 Grat. 260.

² Chitty on Bills (13 Am. ed.) [*280] 318, citing Molloy, ch. 2, c. 10, s. 34; Pothier Pl. 146; Byles (Sharswood's ed.), [*177] 303; Story on Bills, § 236.

³ Story on Bills, §§ 230, 236.

⁴ Roscoe on Bills, 146, 147.

⁵ Edwards on Bills, 401; see also Id. 454, note 2. In Thomson on Bills, 282, it is said: "It has been said that if the drawee is dead the holder should present it to his nearest heirs, and protest it on their refusal to accept, though they have not yet taken up his succession. This should certainly be done where the drawee's heirs have taken up his succession. But otherwise, there is no person representing him, as to the bill, and the presentment of it then appears as futile as if made to a stranger. In such a case, it seems necessary that a holder should, within a reasonable time, notify to the other parties the drawee's death, by which presentment has become impossible."

question much litigated in England, whether, if a bill payable generally—that is, without specification of a place of payment—was accepted payable at a particular place, such an acceptance was a qualified one. It was decided in the House of Lords (contrary, however, to the opinion of eight of the twelve judges to whom the question was referred), that such an acceptance was a qualified one, and that a demand at the particular place named was a condition precedent to a recovery against the acceptor, as well as against the drawer and indorser.¹ This decision led to the passage of the statute of 1 & 2 Geo. IV, c 78 (called Sergeant Onslow's act), in which it was recited that the practice and understanding of merchants had been different; and enacted that an acceptance payable at a particular place without further expression, should not be deemed a conditional acceptance; but if it were payable at a specified place "only, and not other, wise, or elsewhere," it should be deemed conditional.

§ 460. In many of the States of the United States the English statute has been substantially enacted; and the courts, with few exceptions, have, independently of statute followed the judgment of the eight judges against the House of Lords. Therefore, by the American law, it is settled that demand of payment at the place specified need not be averred by the plaintiff; but if the acceptor was at the place at the time specified, and ready to pay the money, it was a matter of defense to be pleaded on his part; which, defense, however, is no bar to the action, but goes only in reduction of damages, and in prevention of costs.² This subject will be more fully discussed when we come to consider presentment for payment.

But at any rate, the presentment of the bill or note for acceptance should be at the place of the domicile of the

¹ *Rowe v. Young*, 2 Brod. & B. 165; 2 Bligh, 391.

² See 1 Parsons N. & E. 305-311; Story on Bills, §§ 355-357; Byles on Bills (Sharswood's ed.), 318, 319, and 341-346; Edwards on Bills, 426, 428; Bayley, 115. In Indiana, the House of Lords has been followed: see Presentment for Payment, Chapter XX, Section V.

drawee, whether it be payable generally, or at a particular place—the place of payment being immaterial until after acceptance.¹ If the drawee has removed his residence from the place to which it is addressed—or really resided at a different place—the bill should be presented at his new or real place of domicile, if the holder can ascertain it by diligent inquiries.² If by such inquiries the drawee's place of domicile cannot be ascertained, or if he has absconded, the bill may be treated as dishonored.³

§ 461. *Presentment for acceptance may be either at the dwelling or the place of business of the drawee.*—If the drawee has his dwelling-house in one part of the town or city, and his place of business at another, it may be made at either place; and if the drawee resides in one town, and has his place of business at another, the holder may present the bill at either.⁴

§ 462. *How presentment for acceptance should be made.*—The holder of the bill should have it in his possession, make an actual exhibit of it to the drawee, and request its acceptance.⁵ “The term presentment imports not a mere notice of the existence of a draft which the party has in his possession, but the exhibiting of it to the person on whom it is drawn, that he may see the same, and examine his accounts or correspondence, and judge what he shall do; whether he shall accept the draft or not.”⁶ But while it is better in all cases to avoid all question by observance of the formality indicated, the drawer and indorsers may be charged by due protest and notice where the bill is not thus actually exhibited to the drawee, but he is enabled by seeing it or otherwise to give, and does give, an intelligent response to the request to accept it.⁷

¹ Chitty on Bills (13th Am. ed.), 316.

² Anderson v. Drake, 14 Johns. 114; Freeman v. Boyton, 7 Mass. 483; Bate-man v. Joseph, 12 East, 433.

³ Id.; Chitty, 316.

⁴ Story on Bills, § 236.

⁵ 1 Parsons N. & B. 348.

⁶ Fall River Union Bank v. Willard, 5 Metc. 216; Edwards on Bills, 505.

⁷ Fisher v. Beckwith, 19 Vt. 31; Carmichael v. Bank of Penn. 4 How. (Miss.) 567.

§ 463. If the holder does not produce the bill, the drawee may require him to do so, and decline accepting, save in the proper form by writing his name on its face; and then unless the holder produces it the drawer cannot be charged with the penalties of non-acceptance, but if the drawee makes no such requirement and does what is equivalent to acceptance he cannot afterward refuse to be held on the ground that he did not see the bill.¹

If the holder leave the bill with the acceptor, and by his negligence enable a third party to get possession of it, he cannot hold the acceptor liable in an action of trover.²

Either one of a set of bills may be presented and accepted; and the indorsement of one of a set carries all, and indorsee may maintain trover for the rest.³

SECTION III.

TIME OF PRESENTMENT FOR ACCEPTANCE.

§ 464. In connection with the time of presentment for acceptance, we shall consider (1) the time of day for such presentment, and (2) the period of time within which such payment must be made.

And in the first place: presentment for acceptance should in all cases be made during the usual hours of business, and such hours, except where presentment must be at a bank, generally range through the whole day to hours of rest in the evening.⁴ Eight o'clock in the evening would not be too late to present a bill for acceptance to a tradesman.⁵ And it matters not at what hour it is made, provided an answer be given by an authorized person.⁶ But it is a mere nullity if

¹ Fall River Union Bank v. Willard, 5 Metc. 216.

² Morrison v. Buchanan, 6 Car. & P. 18.

³ Downes & Co. v. Church, 13 Pet. 205; Walsh v. Blatchley, 6 Wis. 422; Perreira v. Jepp, 11 B. & C. 449; Edwards on Bills, 304 and 165.

⁴ Elford v. Teed, 1 M. & S. 28; 6 Id. 44; Parker v. Gordon, 7 East, 385; Cayuga County Bank v. Hunt, 2 Hill, 635; see Chapter XX, on Presentment for Payment, Section III; Edwards on Bills, 399.

⁵ Chitty on Bills [*313].

⁶ Chitty on Bills [*316].

made at an unreasonable hour—after bed-time or business hours—if no such answer be given.¹ If there is a known custom or usage in a town or city, which regulates business hours, that should govern in determining the proper hour for presentment at the drawee's place of business.²

§ 465. *Within what period of time presentment for acceptance must be made.*—It seems to be the general commercial law of the civilized world that, when a bill is payable at a day certain—as, for instance, on a day named, or a fixed day after date—it need not be presented until the day of payment, in order to charge the drawer or an indorser.³ The reason of this is that the drawer, by fixing a day certain for payment, assumes the responsibility of providing funds at that time, whatever may have been his previous credit with the drawee. And as to the indorser, by the very act of indorsement he draws a new bill on the same terms; and, besides, he waives his right of immediate acceptance by not enforcing it himself, but putting his bill into circulation without acceptance.⁴ There are, however, two exceptions to this general rule that it is not necessary to present a bill payable at a fixed time for acceptance, but only at maturity for payment: First, when there is an express direction to the payee or holder of a bill; and, second, when it is put into the hands of an agent for negotiation. If payable at sight, or at a certain time after sight, or on demand, the only rule which can be laid down is that it must be presented within a reasonable time,⁵ unless there be some well established usage of trade which fixes a definite time for such presentment, in which case such usage would control.⁶ If the bill be not presented within a reasonable time, the drawee is discharged,

¹ Story on Bills, § 237.

² Story on Bills, §§ 236, 349; Story on Notes, § 135.

³ Townsley v. Sumrall, 2 Pet. 178; Goupy v. Harden, 7 Taunt. 159; Bachellor v. Priest, 12 Pick. 399.

⁴ Verplanck, Senator, in Allen v. Suydam, 17 Wend. 368; 20 Wend. 321.

⁵ Wallace v. Agry, 4 Mason, 336; Mullick v. Radakissen, 9 Moore, P. C. 66; Bridgeport Bank v. Dyer, 19 Conn. 136.

⁶ Mellish v. Rawdon, 9 Bing. R. 416.

although all the parties continue solvent, and there is no damage caused by the delay.¹

§ 466. *General rule as to reasonable time—when question of law and when question of fact.*—"What reasonable time is," said Story, J., in a case before the U. S. Circuit Court,² depends upon the circumstances of each particular case, and no definite rule has been as yet laid down, or indeed can be laid down to govern all cases. The question is a question of fact for the jury, and not of law for the abstract decision of the court. Such, I take it, is the doctrine of the authorities."³ A more accurate statement of the rule, as we conceive, is that of Bigelow, J., in a Massachusetts case;⁴ "Ordinarily," says he, "the question whether a presentment was within a reasonable time, is a mixed question of law and fact, to be decided by the jury, under proper instructions from the court. And it may vary very much, according to the particular circumstances of each case. If the facts are doubtful or in dispute, it is the clear duty of the court to submit them to the jury. But when they are clear and uncontradicted, then it is competent for the court to determine whether the time required by law for the presentment has been exceeded or not."⁵

"In this State" (New York), says Edwards on Bills, 391, "the question is considered one of law to be decided by the court," quoting *Aymar v. Beers*, 7 Cow. 705. The cases

¹ *Mullick v. Radakissen*, 9 Moore P. C. 66; 28 E. L. & Eq. 86; *Carter v. Flower*, 16 M. & W. 743.

² *Wallace v. Agry*, 4 Mason, 336.

³ *Fry v. Hill*, 7 Taunt. 397; *Goupy v. Harden*, 7 Taunt. 159; *Muilman v. D'Eguino*, 2 H. Bl. 565; *Fernandez v. Lewis*, 1 McCord, 322; *Nichols v. Blackmore*, 27 Tex. 586.

⁴ *Prescott Bank v. Caverly*, 7 Gray, 217.

⁵ The rule as stated by Professor Parsons, Vol. 1 N. & B. 340, is substantially this: He says, "Where the facts are few and simple and the acts or admissions of parties clear and unequivocal, the question is one of law for the court. But where the rights and liabilities of parties depend on contracts, and a variety of transactions and dealings arising therefrom, or where the facts are contradictory and complicated, it is a question for the jury to determine." See also *Shute v. Robins*, 3 Car. & P. 80 (E. C. L. R.); *Straker v. Graham*, 4 M. & W. 721; *Mullick v. Radakissen*, 28 E. L. & Eq. 86; *Chambers v. Hill*, 26 Tex. 472.

cited in *Aymar v. Beers* in support of this doctrine related to notice. The principle of the text seems to us far more reasonable.

§ 467. *Due diligence must be exercised.*—It is not necessary for the holder to take the first opportunity to present for acceptance,¹ though to avoid question in case of loss it is advisable to do so—due diligence—that is, presentment within a reasonable time, is all that is necessary. “The distinction is,” as was said by Gibbs, C. J., “between bills payable at a certain number of days after date, and bills payable at a certain number of days after sight. In the former, the holder is bound to use all due diligence, and present the bill at maturity; but in the latter case, he has a right to put the bill into circulation before he presents it, and then, of course, it is uncertain when it will be presented to the drawee. It is to the prejudice of the holder if he delays to do it, and he loses his money and interest.”²

§ 468. There are certain circumstances which may affect the question of reasonable time, such, for instance, as: (1) The passing of the bill into circulation; (2) The fluctuations of the rate of exchange; and (3) The facilities of communication between the parties.

§ 469. *And, in the first place*, a larger latitude is allowed for presentment for acceptance when the holder transfers the bill and it passes into circulation. In such cases a long delay, say of a year or more, would not be negligence; but if the transferrer came again in possession of the bill, a more stringent rule would be applied to him than to transferees.³ But if the holder retains possession of the bill for an unreasonable time, and thus locks it up from circulation, he makes it his own, and will have no remedy against antecedent parties from or through whom he derived title.⁴

¹ *Muilman v. D'Eguino*, 2 H. Bl. 565; *Prescott Bank v. Caverly*, 7 Gray, 217.

² *Goupy v. Harden*, 7 Taunt. 159.

³ *Muilman v. D'Eguino*, 2 H. Bl. 565.

⁴ *Byles* (Sharswood's ed.) [*176], 302. *Bayley on Bills*, p. 227; *Chitty* [*275–6], 312; *Story on Bills*, § 231; *Robinson v. Ames*, 20 Johns. 146; *Gowan v. Jackson*, Id. 176; *Fry v. Hill*, 7 Taunt. 397.

§ 470. As illustrations: where A, of Calcutta, drew a bill, payable sixty days after sight, on B, of Hong Kong, and indorsed it to C, of Calcutta, and the latter, finding bills on China unsalable, without the prospect of improvement, kept the bill five months, and then indorsed it to C, who forwarded it for acceptance, which was refused, it was held that the drawer was discharged by the unreasonable delay, although the parties were solvent, and he had suffered no damage.¹ In South Carolina,² it appeared that a bill drawn in Charleston, South Carolina, on New York, at three days was not presented for two and a half months. The holder lived several days in the same house with the drawee; and it was held that the drawer was discharged by the delay. In another case, one month's delay was held too much, the distance between the residence of the drawer, and the drawee being only eighteen miles, with communication three times a week between them.³

In Louisiana,⁴ it appeared that a bill drawn in New Orleans on Liverpool, at thirty days, was sent by way of New-York, and a delay of two and a half months in presentment was held no laches; and it has been frequently held that, while a holder would hardly be warranted in sending the bill to a remote place wholly out of the course of trade, yet he may put it in circulation, or send it to any other place within reasonable mercantile regulations for remittance or sale. A bill drawn in Havana on London may be forwarded by way of the United States—one drawn in London by way of Paris and Genoa; and one drawn in New Orleans on Liverpool, by way of New York.⁵

¹ *Mullick v. Radakissen*, 28 Eng. L. & Eq. R. 86; 9 Moore P. C. 66.

² *Fernandez v. Lewis*, 1 McCord, 323.

³ *Dumont v. Pope*, 7 Blackf. 367.

⁴ *Bolton v. Harrod*, 9 Mart. (La.) 326.

⁵ In *Wallace v. Agry*, 4 Mason, 333, Story, J., said: "It has been said that the plaintiff was bound to send it (the bill) directly from Havana to England by some regular conveyance, and had no right to remit it to Boston for sale. I am of a different opinion. The party who receives a negotiable bill payable after sight has a right to sell it in the market where he resides, or to send it to any other place for sale. He is not bound personally to make a remittance of it, or to send it directly to the country on which it is drawn. He is at full liberty to

§ 471. Bills drawn in London on Calcutta at ninety days, were circulated seventy-eight days in England, and the delay was held no laches; ¹ and like decisions were rendered where a bill was drawn in London on Lisbon at thirty days, circulated through Paris and Genoa, and presented after a delay of three months and ten days; ² where a bill was drawn in Plymouth on London at twenty days' sight, and was not presented for nine days; ³ where one was drawn in Windsor on London, and was not presented for four days (Sunday intervening); ⁴ where a bill was drawn at sixty days at Augusta, Georgia, on New York, and was put in circulation and not presented for two months and a half; ⁵ and where a bill drawn in Antigua on London at ninety days, was circulated for six months—a packet leaving Antigua for London once a month. ⁶

§ 472. Where a sight draft on New York was indorsed to the plaintiff in Wisconsin, and was not mailed to New York for presentment for fourteen days, it was held *prima facie* evidence of laches, but might be rebutted. ⁷ But presentment in Boston on Wednesday, during banking hours, of a bill at sight, indorsed to the holder in Lowell after banking hours the previous Saturday, and forwarded by the

put it in circulation, or to send it to any other place for sale or remittance; and the only limitation upon this right is, that he shall have it presented within a reasonable time, be the conveyance direct or indirect. To be sure, the usage of trade is to be consulted on this, as on other occasions. The holder of such a bill is not at liberty to send it to very remote places, wholly out of the course of trade, if there be unreasonable delay thereby, in the presentment for acceptance; and thus to fix the drawer with an indefinite responsibility. But, on the other hand, the transmission in a direct trade is not necessary. No one can doubt that, by the course of trade, many bills of exchange drawn in Havana on England are sent to the United States for remittance or sale. The very testimony in this case establishes this fact. It would be a most inconvenient rule to hold that such a negotiation of bills was at the sole peril of the holder. I know of no rule of law reaching to such extent. In my judgment, the remittance of the bill to Boston for sale was not a discharge of the defendants."

¹ Muilman v. D'Eguino, 2 H. Bl. 565. ² Goupy v. Harden, 7 Taunt. 397.

³ Shute v. Robins, Moody & M. 133; 3 Car. & P. 80.

⁴ Fry v. Hill, 7 Taunt. 397.

⁵ Robinson v. Ames, 20 Johns. 146; Edwards on Bills, 389.

⁶ Gowan v. Jackson, 20 Johns. 176. ⁷ Walsh v. Dart, 23 Wis. 334.

holder to Boston on Tuesday, was held sufficient to charge an indorser.¹ Delay of twenty-one days to forward sight drafts received at Detroit, Michigan, on Chicago, Illinois, was held too long.²

Where a draft was drawn on New York by a bank in Erie, Pennsylvania, in favor of a traveling agent, who, in pursuance of his business, did not return to his home in New Jersey, where he had the first opportunity to negotiate it, until ten days after its date, it was held that the delay was not unreasonable under the circumstances.³ In an Illinois case where an inland bill drawn at sight on a Chicago bank, was mailed on the day of its date to the payee's address in Dakota Territory, and was received by him after some delay in the mail, and by him at the first opportunity put in circulation, and no delay was suffered other than that incident to the transaction of business in a sparsely populated territory; and the bill was presented for payment thirty-five days after date, and protested for non-payment—it was held that the drawer, who was duly notified was bound, the bank having failed in the meantime.⁴

§ 473. *In the second place: The falling or rising of the rate of exchange* in the place of residence of the drawee, should be taken into consideration in determining whether or not there was unreasonable delay; and if exchange were

¹ Prescott Bank v. Caverly, 7 Gray, 217.

² Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Allen, 11 Mich. 30; Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Gray, 13 Mich. 191; see Chambers v. Hill, 26 Tex. 586, where two and a half years was held a fatal delay.

³ National Newark Banking Co. v. Second National Bank, 63 Penn. St. 404.

⁴ Mortelius v. Charles, 76 Ill. 305. Scott, J., saying: "Bills both inland and foreign, having the quality of negotiability, are intended, in some degree, to be used as a part of the circulation of the country, and are indispensable in the conduct of extended commercial transactions. They afford a safe and convenient mode of making payments of indebtedness between distant points. Banking houses that for a consideration issue such bills, must be understood to do so in accordance with the known custom of the country—that they will be put in circulation for a limited period. If this were not so, their value would be greatly depreciated, and their utility in commercial transactions would be destroyed." See also Shute v. Robins, 3 C. & P. 80; Jordan v. Wheeler, 20 Tex. 698; Nichols v. Blackmore, 27 Tex. 586.

steady, without prospect of change, or were rising, a shorter and less extended period of time would be thought reasonable, while if the exchange fell immediately after the sale of the bill, the jury might then think a more extended period might fairly and reasonably be allowed the holder, in order to enable him *bona fide* to endeavor to make a fair profit, or at all events to endeavor to secure him from loss.¹ In an English case the bill was drawn in Calcutta on Hong Kong, at sixty days, and the indorsee kept the bill five months. *Held*, no laches. Parke, B., saying: The court "thought that the evidence proved that, for the whole of the time, a period of more than five months, bills on China were altogether unsalable in Calcutta; that such was the permanent and regular state of the market; and that although, if there was a reasonable prospect of the state of things being better in a short time, the holder would have had a right, with a view to his own interests, to keep the bill for some time, he had no such right when there was no hope of the amendment of that state of things; and we are of opinion that the evidence fully justified this conclusion from it, and that the court, deciding on facts as a jury, were perfectly right."²

§ 474. *In the third place: The facility of communication between the places* should be considered, in determining the question of laches, when the party who presents the bill has had it in his possession for some length of time;³ as also the distance between the places.⁴ In an English case,⁵ the bill was drawn in Carbonear, Newfoundland, on Poole, England, at ninety days, and was not presented until three months after date. Carbonear is twenty miles from, and was in daily communication with St. Johns, from which the mails were sent to England three times a week. The average length of the

¹ Mellish v. Rawdon, 9 Bing. 416; 2 Moore & S. 500; Wallace v. Agry, 4 Mason, 336; Mullick v. Radakissen, 28 Eng. L. & Eq. 8.

² Mullick v. Radakissen, 28 E. L. & Eq. 86.

³ Shute v. Robins, Moody & M. 133; 3 Car. & P. 80; Straker v. Graham, 4 M. & W. 721; Mullick v. Radakissen, 9 Moore P. C. 66; 28 E. L. & Eq. 86; Dumont v. Pope, 7 Blackf. 367.

⁴ Nichols v. Blackmore, 27 Tex. 586.

⁵ Straker v. Graham, 5 M. & W. 721.

voyage was eighteen days. No excuse being shown for delay, it was held that the bill was not presented in a reasonable time.

§ 475. *The question not affected by solvency of the drawer.*—But the continued solvency of the drawer, and the want of proof of actual loss by laches, are not circumstances to be considered in answer to the objection of delay in presentment; the simple question being, whether or not the delay was reasonable under the circumstances of the case. In an English case, where this subject was considered, it was said:¹ “It remains to consider only one point, which was insisted on in the court below and also argued at the bar before us, namely: that as the drawers remained perfectly solvent from the date of the bill to the present time, the rule as to presenting in a reasonable time did not apply, and that there was no laches which would constitute a defense by the drawers unless they had incurred a loss by that laches. The court below decided that the solvency of the drawers, and the want of actual loss by laches, constituted no answer to the objection of laches. We think they were right. * * * This point was fully considered in the case of *Carter v. Flower* (16 M. & W. 743), and we believe admits of no doubt; and we agree with the court below, that the continued solvency of the drawers does not prevent the application of the rule that the bill must be presented in a reasonable time, with reference to the interest of the drawer to put the bill into circulation, or the interest of the drawee to have the bill speedily presented.”

§ 476. *Agent's duty in presenting for acceptance.*—It has been already seen that there are two exceptions to the general rule that it is not necessary to present a bill payable at a time certain for acceptance before it becomes due—the first arising when there is an express direction to the payee or holder of the bill, and the second, when the bill is put in the hands of an agent for negotiation. In *Allen v. Suydam* (17 Wend. 368, confirmed in 20 Wend. 321), it was held that an

¹ *Mullick v. Radakissen*, 9 Moore P. C. 46; 28 E. L. & Eq. 86.

agent who received a bill, payable after date, for collection, and which had not been accepted, was bound to present it without unreasonable delay; and having delayed for seventeen days to do so, he was liable to his principal for all damages he might have sustained by his delay. This is a leading case, and was decided upon thorough argument and consideration. It is, however, criticised, and dissented from by Professor Parsons,¹ on the ground that as it would not be negligence in the principal to delay, it would be unjust to consider it such in the agent, and the latter should not be held responsible without some express or implied instruction to present immediately. But we are inclined to coincide with the case cited,² which is supported by the analogy of the Scotch law,³ and by English authority.⁴

§ 477. A case remarkable for its similarity to the New York case above quoted was decided by the Scotch Court of Session in like manner. A bill, payable at Glasgow three days after date, was sent to agents at that city for collection. Before the day of payment the drawer failed, and the Glasgow bank refused to accept. It was not clear whether the bank would have accepted the draft if it had been immediately presented, for the bank had no funds of the drawer, and the practice had been to make provision for such drafts at the day of payment. In an action against the agents, the court held "that, as agents, they were bound immediately to present the bill for acceptance."⁵

§ 478. *Effect of war, sickness, inevitable accident, and other reasonable causes of delay.*—Any reasonable cause, such as sickness,⁶ inevitable accident, or intervention of war, or

¹ 1 Parsons N. & B. 346-7.

² See Redfield & Bigelow's Leading Cases, pp. 34, 35; and *ante*, § 330.

³ Thomson on Bills (Wilson's ed.) 277.

⁴ Vanwart v. Wooley, 3 B. & C. 439; 5 Dow. & R. 374; Chitty on Bills (13 Am. ed.) 311; Byles (Sharswood's ed.) 299; Roscoe on Bills, 141, note 26.

⁵ Bank of Scotland v. Hamilton, 1 Bell's Commentaries, 409.

⁶ In *Aymar v. Beers*, 7 Cow. 705, the defendant sought to excuse delay in presenting for acceptance on account of the payee's sickness. The court below rejected the evidence; but the court above held that sickness was an excuse, and ordered a new trial. See Byles on Bills (Sharswood's ed.) [*176], 302.

other circumstances beyond the holder's control, will excuse delay in presentment for acceptance.¹ But these and other circumstances, excusing delay or failure to make due presentment for acceptance, will be hereafter considered in connection with the consideration of the excuses which may be made for like delay or failure in respect to presentment for payment, and giving notice of dishonor.

¹ U. S. v. Barker, 1 Paine, C. C. 156. In this case, a bill drawn in the United States on Liverpool was presented three months from date. War existing between the two countries, it was held no laches. The decision in this case as to the validity of the bill cannot be sustained. See *ante*, Chapter VIII, Section II.

CHAPTER XVIII.

ACCEPTANCE OF BILLS OF EXCHANGE.

SECTION I.

THE NATURE OF ACCEPTANCE.

§ 479. The drawer of a bill undertakes that when it is presented to the drawee he will accept it; and by acceptance is meant an undertaking on his part to pay it according to its tenor.¹ The acceptor, by his act, engages to pay the holder, whether payee or indorsee, the full amount of the bill at maturity; and if he does not, the holder may sue him.²

If the drawee have funds in his hands belonging to the drawer, it is his duty, according to mercantile usage, to honor the bill by accepting it; but he is not legally bound to do so by the mere fact that he holds such funds, any more than a debtor is legally bound to execute a promissory note to his creditor for the amount due upon his request to do so.³ But there may be relations between the drawer and drawee which make it incumbent on the latter to honor the bill. Thus if the drawee has been supplied with funds for the express purpose of meeting the bill; or if he have money on deposit under such circumstances as imply a contract on his part to accept the bill, as, for instance, if he be a banker, and the bill (or check) be drawn on a cash account, he will be

¹ Russell v. Phillips, 14 Q. B. 891 (68 E. C. L. R.); Byles (Sharswood's ed.) [*178], 304; Bayley (2 Am. ed.), 154; Story on Bills, § 272.

² Hoffman & Co. v. Milwaukee Bank, 12 Wall. 181; Bayley on Bills, 96.

³ Story on Bills, 113, 117, 238; Edwards on Bills, 405; Chitty (13 Am. ed.) [*281], 318, 319. See Chapter XLIX, on Checks, Sections X and XI, vol. II.

answerable in an action of tort for not honoring the draft. But until he has accepted the bill he is not liable as a party to it.¹

§ 480. Until he has accepted the bill, so entirely is the drawee a stranger to it, that he may himself discount it. And he may then transfer it as the *bona fide* holder to another, who may sue and charge the drawer.² He may discount it either for the drawer, the payee, or an indorsee. "If the acceptor discounts the bill for the drawer, and then indorses it away, the drawer will be liable upon it to the holder, and the transfer by the drawer to the acceptor will operate as an indorsement, although, at the time, the drawer does not intend to transfer by way of indorsement, being under the impression that the bill is discharged by coming into the hands of the acceptor. Nor will the payment of the amount, less the discount, be deemed a payment of the bill by the acceptor."³ If the drawee comes into possession of the bill before its dishonor, there is no presumption that he takes it with the obligation to accept.⁴

§ 481. Sometimes, though infrequently, the bill directs the drawee to pay the amount specified, at a certain time, "without acceptance," or contains upon its face the expression "acceptance waived." In such cases the bill is not impaired in its negotiability, but the effect is to merge the ordinary proceedings on acceptance, or non-acceptance, into those of payment or non-payment, and the drawer is bound just as upon an accepted bill.⁵

¹ Marzetti v. Williams, 1 Barn. & Ad. 415 (20 E. C. L. R.)

² Attenborough v. McKenzie, 36 Eng. L. & Eq. 562; Desha v. Stewart, 6 Ala. 852; Swope v. Ross, 40 Penn. St. 186; Story on Bills (Bennett's ed.), § 223.

³ Swope v. Ross, 40 Penn. St. 186, Strong, J. In Attenborough v. McKenzie, *supra*, the holder of the bill took it by indorsement after it was due from the transferee of the acceptor. The ruling goes to the length that even the accepting drawee of a bill may take it as an indorsee, and as such may issue it.

⁴ Desha v. Stewart, 6 Ala. 852.

⁵ Denegre v. Milne, 10 La. Ann. 324; English v. Wall, 12 Rob. (La.) 132; Webb v. Mears, 9 Wright, 222; Carson v. Russell, 26 Tex. 452; Miller v. Thomson, 3 Man. & G. 576 (42 E. C. L. R.); Rey v. Kinnear, 2 M. & Rob. 117.

SECTION II.

WHAT BILLS REQUIRE ACCEPTANCE, AND BY WHOM AND WHEN THEY SHOULD BE ACCEPTED.

§ 482. We come now to consider the former procedure in procuring acceptance.

And in the *first* place: There are some bills, such as are drawn payable immediately on demand, which are not presented for acceptance, but only for payment. They are considered in the preceding chapter on "Presentment for Acceptance." And there are some bills which do not need acceptance, in order to bind the drawee, or rather in which the act of drawing itself constitutes acceptance. Thus, a bill drawn without being addressed to any drawee,¹ or drawn by a party upon himself,² or by a partner upon the firm of which he is a member, for partnership purposes.³ A bill drawn by the president of a corporation in its behalf, on the treasurer thereof, would be a bill drawn by the corporation on itself, and hence, not need acceptance;⁴ but if not drawn on the treasurer in his official character, it would be otherwise.⁵

§ 483. *Either of a set of bills may be presented for acceptance*, and if not accepted, a right of action accrues immediately upon due notice against all the antecedent parties to the bill, without any others of the set being presented.⁶ But the drawee should accept but one of the set, for if two or more of the set should be accepted, and should come into the hands of different holders, and the acceptor should pay one, he might also be obliged to pay the others also.⁷

¹ Marion, &c. R. Co. v. Hodge, 9 Ind. 163; Dougal v. Cowles, 5 Day, 511.

² Hasey v. White Pigeon Company, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 193; Cunningham v. Wardwell, 3 Fairf. 466; Roach v. Ostler, 1 Man. & R. 120; cited, 1 Pars. N. & B. 288. See *ante*, § 128.

³ Dougal v. Cowles, 5 Day, 511; Miller v. Thompson, 3 Man. & G. 576.

⁴ Hasey v. White Pigeon Company, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 193. See *ante*, § 129.

⁵ Halsted v. The Mayor, 5 Barb. 218.

⁶ Downes v. Church, 13 Pet. 207; Bank of Pittsburg v. Neal, 22 How. 103.

⁷ Bank of Pittsburg v. Neal, 22 How. 109.

Where one of a set which was made and accepted in blank is filled up, varying from the others, not only in date and amount, but also as to time and place of payment, and is negotiated by the correspondent of the acceptor to a *bona fide* party, without notice that such act was done without authority, the acceptor is liable to such *bona fide* holder.¹

It seems that if the drawee accept two or more parts of a set of bills, and the several parts come into the hands of different *bona fide* holders without notice, he will be liable to pay on each part.²

§ 484. *In the second place, as to the person who may accept a bill.*—The drawing of a bill imports a contract on the part of the drawer that the drawee is a person competent to accept; and therefore, if the holder upon presentment of the bill ascertains that the drawee is incapable of contracting—for instance, is a minor, an idiot, or a married woman—he may cause it to be protested, and proceed against antecedent parties as usual in cases of dishonor.

§ 485. Except in cases of acceptance for honor, no one can accept a bill except the party on whom it is drawn, or his authorized agent.³ Thus, if it be addressed to A., an acceptance by B., unless for honor, will not bind him.⁴ Nor can there be a series of acceptors; and if⁵ a bill addressed to one be accepted by two persons, the acceptance of the first will be vitiated by having been altered in an essential part,⁶ unless made with the acceptor's consent. But if any other person, after an acceptance, subsequently accepts the bill for the purpose of guaranteeing its credit, at the accept-

¹ Bank of Pittsburg v. Neal, 22 How. 97.

² Bank of Pittsburg v. Neal, 22 How. 96.

³ Davis v. Clarke, 6 Q. B. 16; (51 E. C. L. R.); Jenkins v. Hutchinson, 13 Q. B. 744 (66 E. C. L. R.); Polhill v. Walter, 3 B. & Ad. 114 (23 E. C. L. R.); May v. Kelly, 27 Ala. 497; Keenan v. Nash, 8 Minn. 409.

⁴ Davis v. Clarke. 6 Q. B. 16 (51 E. C. L. R.); May v. Kelly, 27 Ala. 497.

⁵ Jackson v. Hudson, 2 Camp. 447; Bayley on Bills, 100; Story on Bills, § 254.

⁶ Thomson on Bills, 112, 212. There being no agreement as to any guaranty.

or's request, in the usual form of an acceptance, then, if there is a sufficient consideration, he may be bound thereby as a guarantor; but he is not liable as an acceptor.¹ And the addition will not be a material alteration.²

In an English case, where the bill was addressed by John Hart to "Mr. John Hart," payable to me or order—across its face was written, "Accepted, H. J. Clarke"—it was held that Clarke could not be sued as acceptor, and Coleridge, J., said: "Acceptance can only be made by the party addressed or for his honor. Here the last is not pretended, and the first cannot be presumed."³ A party may be bound as an acceptor by any name or designation he may see fit to adopt, provided it clearly appears by extraneous evidence who was intended; and if he intends to contract by a certain designation, he is estopped to deny that the name by which he assumed to enter into the contract was the appropriate appellation. "The West Tennessee Department of the Life

¹ Story on Bills, § 254; Chitty on Bills (13th Am. ed.), 321; Jackson v. Hudson, 2 Camp. 447. In this case the bill was drawn on and accepted by I. Irving. Under his acceptance a defendant wrote "Accepted, Jos. Hudson, payable at, &c." Hudson was sued as acceptor; and plaintiff offered to prove that he had had dealings with Irving, and had refused to trust him further, unless defendant would become his surety, and the defendant, in order to guarantee Irving's credit, wrote the acceptance in the bill. Lord Ellenborough said this was no acceptance, but a collateral undertaking, which should have been declared on as such. See Bayley on Bills, 100. In Thomson on Bills, p. 212, it is said: "It seems that a second person may accept a bill addressed to a first, if he accept on the footing expressed or understood at the time the bill was issued that he was to be a cautioner for the first; and if a person in this way become validly a party to a bill, he stands toward the holder in the same relation as if he were a co-principal, his rights as cautioner merely regulating his right of relief against the true principal."

² Smith v. Lockridge, 8 Bush (Ky.), 425, (1871). In this case the bill was addressed to W. T. and George Lane, and by them accepted. It was indorsed by S. H. Lane, H. Smith, and J. J. Anderson, and discounted by D. S. Lockridge. Smith and Anderson, two of the indorsers, claimed that it was accepted by the Lanes only when they indorsed it, and afterward that it was altered by being accepted by J. A. Blaydes, without their knowledge or consent. Blaydes' name was written across the face of the bill as an acceptor; but the Court held that he could not be an acceptor, and that it was not an alteration which discharged the indorsers, because in no wise changing their obligations or duties.

³ Davis v. Clarke, 6 Ad. & El. (N. S.) 16 (51 E. C. L. R.)

Association of America" would therefore be bound upon an acceptance made by its proper officer of a bill addressed to "The Western Department of the Life Association of America."¹

§ 486. Where a person other than the one addressed as drawee writes his name across the face of the bill, it would be competent for him to show as between immediate parties (and on account of its ambiguity, perhaps, as to others) in what character he intended to be bound.²

But if a party accept a bill in which no drawee is named, it will be regarded as acknowledging that he was the drawee, and will operate as a complete accepted instrument.³

§ 487. *An acceptance may be made by an agent*; but certainly, the holder may require the production by him of clear and explicit authority from his principal to accept in his name, and without its production may treat the bill as dishonored;⁴ and it has been doubted whether the holder is bound to acquiesce in an acceptance by an agent, as such an acceptance would multiply the proofs of the holder's title.⁵ But if the agency were clear, we think the holder would be bound to take the agent's acceptance—acceptance by procuration as it is termed.⁶ If the holder takes an acceptance from one unduly alleging his agency, and without giving notice to antecedent parties, they will be released, if the principal refuses to ratify the act.⁷

If the bill be drawn upon an agent in his individual name, it would seem clear on principle that none but he, as

¹ Hascall v. Life Association of America, 12 N. Y. S. C. (5 Hun), 152. See vol. I, § 399.

² Curry v. Reynolds, 44 Ala. 349.

³ Wheeler v. Webster, 1 E. D. Smith, 1; 1 Pars. N. & B. 289; Gray v. Milner, 8 Taunt. 739; 3 J. B. Moore, 90; Davis v. Clarke, 6 Q. B. 16; Thomson on Bills (Wilson's ed.) 212.

⁴ Atwood v. Munnings, 7 B. & C. 278; (14 E. C. L. R.); Byles on Bills (Sharswood's ed.), 113; Chitty (13th Am. ed.), 320; Thomson on Bills, 211; Roscoe on Bills, 71; Beawes, 87.

⁵ Coore v. Callaway, 1 Esp. 115; Byles, 113; Chitty, 321; Roscoe, 171.

⁶ Beawes, No. 87; Thomson on Bills, 211.

⁷ Thomson, 211; Chitty, 321.

an individual, could accept. But in Georgia, where the drawee was designated simply as "William S. Scruggs," an acceptance by him "for the Opinion Newspaper," was held to bind the firm doing business under that name.¹ This view could only be sustained upon the theory that the firm adopted and used his name.

§ 488. *Bills drawn on joint parties and partners.*—If a bill is drawn on two persons not partners, both should accept, and if either refuse, the bill may be protested for his non-acceptance;² but the party accepting will be bound by his acceptance.³ If the bill is addressed to two persons, "or either of them," acceptance by either is a sufficient compliance with its mandate.⁴

If a bill be drawn upon a firm, it may be accepted by any one of the partners in the partnership name;⁵ and it will be a good acceptance of the firm (as we think, although the authorities are in conflict), if only the name of the accepting partner be signed, as it will be understood to signify that the firm responds to the request of the bill, and that the signing partner attests it.⁶ But whether the acceptance be in the name of the firm, or of the signing partner, it will not bind the firm as against the drawer cognizant of the facts, unless the bill was drawn for partnership purposes,⁷ except in the hands of a *bona fide* holder for value, without notice, in which event it would be valid whether drawn for partnership purposes or otherwise.⁸

¹ Markham v. Hazen, 48 Ga. 570.

² Chitty on Bills (13th Am. ed.), 73, 321; Dupays v. Shepherd, Holt, 297.

³ Owen v. Van Uster, 10 C. B. 318 (70 E. C. L. R.); Bayley on Bills, 40, 101; Byles [*180], 306.

⁴ Thomson on Bills, 212.

⁵ Pinkney v. Hall, 1 Salk. 126 (1696); Mason v. Rumsey, 1 Camp. 384.

⁶ Byles on Bills (Sharswood's ed.), 126; Mason v. Rumsey, 1 Camp. 384; Chitty (13th Am. ed.), 53-54; Wells v. Masterman, 2 Esp. 731. The contrary doctrine has been held. See Heenan v. Nash, 8 Minn. 409; and *ante*, Chapter IX, on Partners as Parties, § 362.

⁷ Pinkney v. Hall, 1 Salk. 126.

⁸ Catskill Bank v. Stall, 15 Wend. 364; Bairs v. Cochran, 4 Sergt. & R. 397; Livingston v. Roosevelt, 4 Johns, 351.

§ 489. If a bill drawn on an individual member of a firm be accepted by him in the name of the firm, it will bind him individually, but not the firm;¹ and if a bill be drawn on a firm, and accepted by a person describing himself as manager or agent, there may be an action against him as acceptor, although he may have falsely affirmed his authority to accept, and the firm be not bound.² An acceptance of a bill drawn on him by a member of a firm will bind him only, although expressed to be on account of the firm.³

If a new partner be introduced into a firm, an acceptance by the old partners for an old debt in the name of the new firm will not, in the hands of the party taking it and cognizant of the facts, bind the new partner.⁴

§ 490. *In the third place, as to the time when acceptance may be made.*—The acceptor may write his acceptance before the bill is drawn, and deliver it in blank to be filled up; and in that event it will date, and the statute of limitations begin to run, from the time it is thus completed. It is not necessary that the bill should be drawn by the same person to whom the acceptor handed the blank acceptance.⁵ And where the blank acceptance was filled up after the lapse of twelve years, and, as the jury found, after the lapse of a reasonable time, the acceptor was held liable to a *bona fide* indorsee.⁶ Furthermore, the acceptor in blank will be liable for any amount for which the bill is filled up when it has passed into the hands of any *bona fide* holder, without notice that his authority has been exceeded.⁷

Acceptance dates from delivery, until which time it is revocable;⁸ but if not in the hands of the acceptor, and accepted verbally, this principle would have no application.⁹

¹ Nichols v. Diamond, 24 Eng. Law & Eq. 403.

² Owen v. Van Uster, 10 C. B. 318 (70 E. C. L. R.)

³ Thomson on Bills, 212.

⁴ Shireff v. Wilks, 1 East, 48.

⁵ Schultz v. Ashley, 7 C. & P. 99 (32 E. C. L. R.) See *ante*, § 142 *et seq.*

⁶ Montague v. Perkins, 22 Eng. L. & Eq. 516.

⁷ Bank of Commonwealth v. Curry, 2 Dana, 142; Moody v. Threlkeld, 13 Ga. 55; Byles on Bills (Sharswood's ed.) 308.

⁸ Cox v. Troy, 5 B. & Ald. 474; (but see Thornton v. Dick, 4 Esp. 270;) Johnson on Bills, 33.

⁹ 1 Parsons N. & B. 291.

An acceptance may be also after the bill has been discounted, and is just as binding then as if made before.¹

If there is a settled usage on the part of the bank to which a bill is sent for collection, not to note it as dishonored, after calling on the drawee for acceptance, it will be a good defense against the charge of negligence.²

§ 491. There may be acceptance of a bill after it has become payable, and after protest, in which case the bill is regarded as payable on demand.³ And after acceptance has been once refused, the drawee may afterward accept, and bind himself as acceptor—but he cannot bind the other parties unless the bill was duly protested.⁴

Death of the drawer is no revocation of a bill in the hands of a *bona fide* holder; and therefore, after his death, it may be accepted by the drawee, although he has knowledge of that fact.⁵ The presumption is that a bill was accepted before maturity, and within a reasonable time after date.⁶

§ 492. *Drawee may deliberate twenty-four hours whether or not to accept.*—When the bill is presented to the drawee for acceptance, he is entitled, if he desires it, to a reasonable time to examine into the state of his accounts with the drawer, and deliberate whether or not he will honor the bill. To afford him this opportunity, which it may be very necessary for him to avail of, he is allowed twenty-four hours, and it is usual to leave the bill with him for that period;⁷ though it

¹ *Mechanics' Bank v. Livingston*, 33 Barb. 458.

² *Bank of Washington v. Triplett*, 1 Pet. 25.

³ *Billing v. Devaux*, 3 Man. & G. 565; *Christie v. Pearl*, 7 M. & W. 491; *Jackson v. Pigot*, 1 Ld. Raym. 364; *Mitford v. Walcot*, Id. 374; *Bayley*, 181; *Story*, § 250; *Williams v. Winans*, 2 Green, 339; *Stockwell v. Bramble*, 3 Ind. 428; *Bank of Louisville v. Ellery*, 34 Barb. 630; *Kyd on Bills*, 73; *Roscoe*, 172.

⁴ *Wynne v. Raikes*, 5 East, 514; *Thomson on Bills* (Wilson's ed.) 214; *Chitty* [*286], 324.

⁵ *Cutts v. Perkins*, 12 Mass. 206; *Thomson on Bills*, 215; *Chitty* [*287], 325; *Hammond v. Barclay*, 2 East, 227. See *post*, § 498, and Chapter on Checks, § 1618, A.

⁶ *Roberts v. Bethell*, 12 C. B. 778 (74 E. C. L. R.)

⁷ *Connelly v. McKean*, 64 Penn. St. R. 113; *Case v. Burt*, 15 Mich. 82; *Overman v. Hoboken City Bank*, 31 N. J. L. R. (3 Vroom) 563; *Montgomery County*

has been said that if the post goes out in the meantime, the bill should be protested immediately if not accepted, and notice of dishonor sent.¹ But this rule is too rigid,² especially in countries like the United States, in which the mail facilities are so great; nor does it consist with the rule allowing a whole day for preparation of notice.

But if the drawee refuses to accept within the twenty-four hours, the bill must be protested immediately;³ and if at the end of twenty-four hours the drawee does not signify his acceptance, protest must be immediately made, and notice given.⁴

§ 493. *When acceptance irrevocable.*—When the bill is once accepted and issued, the acceptance is irrevocable. But a drawee, although he has written his acceptance on the bill, may change his mind and cancel it before redelivery of the bill to the holder.⁵ And where a bill was returned by the drawee with an obliterated acceptance, without evidence to account for the obliteration, it was held that there could be no recovery upon it.⁶

But after the acceptance has once been communicated to the holder—as by redelivery of the bill, accepted—it has been said that even with the holder's consent the drawee cannot then revoke, because the drawer and indorsers have acquired an interest in the acceptance.⁷ But if it were discov-

Bank v. Albany City Bank, 8 Barb. 399; 1 Parsons on Contracts, 266; *Bellasis v. Hester*, 1 Ld. Raym. 280; *Ingram v. Forster*, 2 J. P. Smith, 242; *Byles on Bills* (Sharswood's ed.) 303; 1 Parsons N. & B. 348; *Bayley on Bills* (Am. ed.) 139; *Story on Bills*, § 237; *Kyd*, 126; *Roscoe*, 46; *Edwards*, 400; *Chitty on Bills* (13 Am. ed.) 317, 321; *Johnson on Bills*, 30.

¹ *Bellasis v. Hester*, 1 Ld. Raym. 280; *Thomson on Bills* (Wilson's ed.) 213; *Beawes*, No. 17; *Byles on Bills* (Sharswood's ed.) 303.

² *Morrison v. Buchanan*, 6 C. & P. 18; *Chitty on Bills* (13 Am. ed.) 317-321.

³ 1 Parsons N. & B. 348; *Chitty on Bills* (13 Am. ed.) [*279], 317; *Edwards*, 400.

⁴ *Ingram v. Forster*, 2 J. P. Smith, 242.

⁵ *Cox v. Troy*, 5 B. & Ald. 474; 1 Dow. & Ry. 38; *Chitty on Bills* [*308], 347; *Edwards*, 418.

⁶ *Cox v. Troy*, 5 B. & Ald. 474; 1 Dow. & Ry. 38. This was previously doubted. *Chitty on Bills*, [*308], 347. *Thomson on Bills*, 220; *Byles* (Sharswood's ed.) [*189], 320.

⁷ *Chitty* [*308], 347.

ered by the acceptor immediately after the accepted bill had been redelivered to the drawee that he was not in funds as he had supposed, so that his acceptance was, in fact, made under a mistake, he may recall and revoke it, provided there be yet time for the holder to notify the drawer and indorsers, and save himself from loss.¹ If the drawee retain the bill after intimating his acceptance, he cannot return and revoke it.²

§ 494. *As to the date of acceptance.*—If the acceptance bears a date, it will be taken as *prima facie* evidence of the time when it was made, even when the date is in a different handwriting from the rest of the acceptance.³ When the acceptance bears no date, there is no presumption that it was made at the date of drawing; but, on the contrary, it will be presumed that it was made afterward.⁴ The presumption is, that it was made within a reasonable time after drawing, and prior to the term of payment.⁵ It is said, in Pardessus, that it may be inferred to have been accepted on the date of the bill.⁶

§ 495. Where a bill (says Mr. Chitty) payable at days, usances, or otherwise, after sight, is accepted, it is usual and proper to require the drawee to certify or write the day of the presentment and of the acceptance, by which means, in case of dispute, the same evidence which will establish the handwriting to the acceptance itself will also prove the time it was made.⁷ But it has been decided that if, on production of such a bill, an acceptance appears to have been written by the defendant under a date which is not in his handwriting, the date is evidence of the time of acceptance, because it is the usual course of business in such cases for a clerk to write the date, and for the party to write his acceptance

¹ Irving Bank v. Wetherald, 36 N. Y. 335; see Chapter XLIX, on Checks, Sect. II. Vol. 2.

² Smith v. M'Lure, 5 East, 476.

³ Glossup v. Jacob, 4 Camp. 227; 1 Stark, 70; Thomson on Bills, 217.

⁴ Begbi v. Levi, 1 C. & J. 180.

⁵ Roberts v. Bethel, 22 L. J. C. P. 69.

⁶ 1 Pardessus, 393.

⁷ Chitty on Bills (13 Am. ed.) [*292], 330.

under the date.¹ If there be no date, it may be inferred to have been accepted on the date of the bill.²

It has been suggested that when accepting a foreign bill for a large amount, and without advice, it is advisable, and a proper precaution, to specify the amount in words and figures (*e. g.*, \$2,000. Accepted for two thousand dollars), to avoid the risk of alteration.³

SECTION III.

FORM AND VARIETIES OF ACCEPTANCE.—EXPRESS AND IMPLIED ACCEPTANCE.

§ 496. According to the law merchant, an acceptance may be (1) expressed in words, or (2) implied from the conduct of the drawee. (3) It may be verbal or written. (4) It may be in writing on the bill itself or on a separate paper. (5) It may be before the bill is drawn or afterward. And there may be absolute, conditional, and qualified acceptances.

Acceptance by telegram has been held sufficient;⁴ and under the statutes of New York, which make an unconditional promise to accept a bill before it is drawn equivalent to actual acceptance in favor of a party, who upon the faith thereof receives it for valuable consideration, it has been adjudged that a telegram written and sent by the promisor operates as acceptance.⁵

By statute, in many of the States, these principles of the law merchant governing acceptances are modified, or repealed in one respect or another, as will be seen hereafter.

§ 497. (1) As to express acceptance it is usually made by writing the word "accepted," across the face of the bill,

¹ *Glossup v. Jacob*, 4 Camp. 227; 1 Stark. 69.

² *Chitty on Bills* [*292], 330.

³ *Chitty on Bills* [*300], 338.

⁴ *Central Savings Bank v. Richards*, 109 Mass. 414; *Coffman v. Campbell* (Sup. Ct. Ill.) Cent. L. J. July 12, 1878, p. 26.

⁵ *Molson's Bank v. Howard*, 40 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 15.

(which the drawee may do with pen or pencil), and adding the acceptor's signature. But by the law merchant neither the word nor the signature is necessary—"accepted"¹ without a signature, "seen,"² "honored,"³ "presented,"⁴ "I will pay the bill,"⁵ or writing the day and month when presented;⁶ or a written direction of the drawee on the bill to some other person to pay it,⁷ or the signature of the drawee alone,⁸ or the word, "excepted," it being obviously intended for "accepted."⁹ The words "I take notice of the above" were recently held in Massachusetts not necessarily to import acceptance; and even if they did, unexplained, to be open to explanation, as between immediate parties.¹⁰ Where the drawee wrote his name across the bill, it was held inadmissible for him to show that he refused to write "accepted," for the name alone imported it.¹¹ And it has been held that where the statute law requires that acceptance shall be in writing on the bill, and signed by the party to be charged thereby, or his agent, such requisition is complied with by the acceptor's writing his name across the face of the bill.¹² But merely paying and crediting a part of the amount on the bill would not amount to an acceptance in writing;¹³ and

¹ *Philips v. Frost*, 19 Me. 77; *Dufaur v. Oxenden*, 1 Moody & R. 90; *Leslie v. Hastings*, 1 Moody & M. 119.

² *Barnet v. Smith*, 10 Foster, 256; *Spear v. Pratt*, 2 Hill, 582.

³ *Anonymous*, Comb. 401.

⁴ *Story on Bills*, § 243; 1 Pars. N. & B. 282.

⁵ *Ward v. Allen*, 2 Metc. (Mass.) 53; *Leach v. Buchanan*, 4 Esp. 226.

⁶ 1 Pars. N. & B. 243; *Cunningham on Bills*, 26.

⁷ *Moore v. Wilby*, Buller N. P. 270; *Harper v. West*, 1 Cr. C. C. 192.

⁸ *Spear v. Pratt*, 2 Hill, 582; *Wheeler v. Webster*, 1 E. D. Smith, 1; *Kyd on Bills*, 80.

⁹ *Miller v. Butler*, 1 Cr. C. C. 170.

¹⁰ *Cook v. Baldwin*, 120 Mass. 317 (1876).

¹¹ *Kaufman v. Barrenger*, 20 La. Ann. 419.

¹² *Spear v. Pratt*, 2 Hill, 582.

¹³ *Bassett v. Haines*, 9 Cal. 261. In this case it appeared that A drew an order on B in favor of C, for \$206 50. C presented it to B, who paid \$22 50 thereon, and the amount was receipted on the back in the handwriting of B, and signed by C. The Court said: "The only question in the case is, whether this constitutes an acceptance 'in writing, signed by the acceptor,' as required by

even where a parol acceptance is sufficient a part payment by the drawee is not such a recognition as will, as matter of law, bind him to pay the remainder, for it may have been accompanied with positive refusal to pay more.¹

§ 498. Although usual it is not necessary for the signature when written to be across the face of the bill. It may be written at the bottom of the bill immediately below the drawer's name, or it may be written above and parallel to it. Thomson says: "The position of the drawee's subscription seems immaterial, provided it be there, for it may be written above as well as below that of the drawer; and as it has been held that an indorsement may be written on the face of the bill, an acceptance may, as is sometimes the case, be indorsed."²

A letter from the drawee to the drawer, the latter being dead, but the former not knowing it, has been held an acceptance, on the ground that it was so intended.³ The death of the drawer is no revocation of a bill if it has been delivered to the payee, and the drawee may accept and pay it.⁴ "The death of the drawer," says Parsons, "is no objection whatever to an ordinary acceptance by the drawee, whether with or without knowledge, for the death is no revocation of the

the sixth section of the act relating to bills of exchange and promissory notes." Wood's Digest, 72.

"We think it clear that this was no acceptance, either at common law or under the statute. Haines may have owed the drawer, Willse, the sum of twenty-two dollars and fifty cents, and no more. If so, the payment of that amount, and the indorsement of the same upon the paper, would not imply that he accepted and would pay the whole. The receipt is evidence that Haines owed only that sum and paid it. In all the instances cited by the counsel of plaintiff, the writing on the bill related to the entire amount. But the receipt only relates to the amount paid, and implies no acceptance of the order for the balance. Besides this, the receipt is not signed by the acceptor, within the meaning of the statute."

¹ Cook v. Baldwin, 120 Mass. 317 (1876).

² Thomson on Bills, §20.

³ Billing v. De Vaux, 3 Man. & G. 565.

⁴ Cutts v. Perkins, 12 Mass. 206; Thomson on Bills, 216; Story on Bills, § 250; 1 Parsons N. & B. 287; Chitty on Bills [*237], 325; Hammond v. Barclay, 2 East, 227, acceptance was before drawee had notice of the death of the drawer.

bill if it has passed into the hands of a holder for value.”¹ This view seems to us entirely correct, and has the sanction of authority.² Upon the delivery of the bill to the payee, the liability of the drawer becomes complete, if the holder is guilty of no laches, and it results that the drawer has a right to discharge that liability.³

§ 499. *Implied acceptance.*—(2) So acceptance may be implied from the conduct of the drawee. Any conduct of the drawee (no statute intervening) from which the holder is justified in drawing the conclusion that the drawee intended to accept the bill, and intended to be so understood, will be regarded as an acceptance.⁴ Thus, keeping a bill a considerable length of time without returning an answer, may, under some circumstances, be considered as an acceptance, especially if the drawee be informed that delay will be so considered, and there be an inference from the language of the drawee that he intended an acceptance.⁵

The cases have been decided upon special circumstances, and, as a general rule, the mere detention for an unreasonable time is not considered as amounting to an acceptance.⁶

Thus, where a bill has been sent to the drawee by mail for acceptance, with the view of waiting for funds or securities to be forwarded by the drawer, and is retained by the drawee, it is not an implied acceptance, for the retention is consistent with the rights of all parties.⁷ And where the holder leaves a bill for acceptance, it is his duty to call for it within a reasonable time, so as to ascertain whether it has

¹ 1 Parsons N. & B. 287, and note *b.* See Chapter on Checks, § 1618 a; Story on Bills, § 250.

² Cutts v. Perkins, 12 Mass. 206.

³ Cutts v. Perkins, 12 Mass. 210-211 (1815).

⁴ 1 Pars. N. & B. 287; Byles on Bills (Sharswood's ed.) [*185] 315; Billing v. De Vaux, 3 M. & G. 565.

⁵ Chitty on Bills [*295], 334; Byles on Bills (Sharswood's ed.) [*185], 315; Bayley on Bills, 193; Harvey v. Martin, 1 Camp. 425; see Jeune v. Ward, 2 Stark. 326, note; 1 B. & Ald. 653; Edwards on Bills, 418.

⁶ Mason v. Barff, 2 B. & Ald. 26; Koch v. Howell, 6 Watts & S. 350.

⁷ Mason v. Barff, *supra*.

been accepted or not; and if he does not call for it within a reasonable time, there would be no ground to insist that its retention was an implied acceptance.¹

§ 500. *Whether the destruction of the bill* by the drawee will amount to an acceptance has been a question upon which learned judges have differed in opinion. In an English case where the drawee refused acceptance, but retained and subsequently destroyed the bill, Lord Ellenborough though it amounted to acceptance; but Bayley, Abbott and Holroyd, JJ., thought otherwise, and it was so determined.² But the court seemed to be of the opinion that if there had not been a previous refusal to accept, the destruction of the bill would have been an implied acceptance.³

The drawer in such cases has his remedy of trover for the destruction of the bill;⁴ and it is singular, as is well observed by Chitty, that it should ever have been supposed that the tortious act of destroying a bill, which is calculated to defeat the remedy on the bill, should have been deemed evidence of a contract on the part of the drawee to pay the bill to the holder.⁵ In New York by Revised Statutes (Sec. 11, 2d ed. p. 757) it is provided that "every person upon whom a bill of exchange is drawn, and to whom the same is delivered for acceptance, who shall destroy such bill, or refuse within twenty-four hours after such delivery, or within such other period as the holder may allow, to return the bill, accepted or non-accepted, to the holder, shall be deemed to have accepted the same." This statute, it has been held, applies only to cases in which the acts of the drawee are of a tortious character, and imply an unauthorized conversion by him, and not to cases in which the bill is willingly left in his hands by the holder, and no demand therefor is made.⁶

¹ *Jeune v. Ward*, 2 Stark. 326; 1 B. & Ald. 654, Bayley, J.

² *Jeune v. Ward*, 1 B. & Ald. 653; 2 Stark. 326; see Edwards on Bills, 417.

³ *Jeune v. Ward*, *supra*, Holroyd, J.

⁴ *Story on Bills*, §248; 1 Parsons N. & B. 285; Johnson on Bills, 31.

⁵ Chitty on Bills, § [*296], 335; Edwards on Bills, 418.

⁶ *Matteson v. Moulton*, 18 N. Y. S. C. (11 Hun), 268. See also *Gates v. Erie*, 11 N. Y. S. C. (4 Hun), 96.

§ 501. It has been held that if the drawee of a bill, drawn and indorsed for his accommodation, procure the same to be discounted, and promise to pay it at maturity, he constitutes himself an acceptor;¹ and that a promise to pay a bill at maturity amounts to an acceptance.² Also, that authority "to draw on us or either of us," and "we hereby jointly and severally hold ourselves accountable for the acceptance and payment of such drafts," binds the signers jointly and severally to the payment of acceptances by each other.³

§ 502. If the drawee has expressly or impliedly promised the intended drawer to accept the bill, to be drawn upon him for a valuable consideration, and should afterward refuse to perform such contract, the drawer may recover re-exchange and damages consequent upon its dishonor.⁴ And where the drawee has funds of the drawer, very slight circumstances will support the presumption of a contract to accept.⁵

A promise to notify a party when he may draw a bill amounts to an undertaking to accept the bill when drawn in pursuance thereof.⁶

It has been said that the words "I will not accept this bill," written across the face of it, amounts to acceptance, but it is impossible to suppose that any such doctrine is maintainable unless it could be shown that the word "not" was unintentionally inserted.⁷ If it were inserted to deceive the holder, it has been suggested that the drawee might be bound.⁸ "I protest the within," written on the back of a draft by the drawee, has been considered sufficient evidence of due presentment and refusal.⁹

¹ *Bank of Rutland v. Woodruff*, 34 Vt. 89.

² *Spaulding v. Andrews*, 12 Wright, 411.

³ *Michigan State Bank v. Pecks*, 2 Williams, 200.

⁴ *Chitty on Bills* (13 Am. ed.) [*281], 319; *Smith v. Brown*, 2 Marsh. 41; 6 Taunt. 440.

⁵ *Laing v. Barclay*, 1 B. & C. 398; 2 Dow. & Ry. 530.

⁶ *Smith v. Brown*, 2 Marsh. 41; 6 Taunt. 340.

⁷ 1 Parsons N. & B. 283; *Roscoe on Bills*, 178.

⁸ *Roscoe on Bills*, 178.

⁹ *Pridgen v. Cox*, 13 Tex. 257.

§ 503. There is no doubt that an acceptance may be upon a separate paper, as in a letter, for instance, as well as upon the bill itself.¹ Thus a written promise to accept an existing bill, or "that it shall meet with due honor;" or that the drawee "will accept or certainly pay it"—or any other equivalent language has been held to amount to acceptance.² But if the language be equivocal—if it be merely stated "your bill shall have attention"—it is insufficient.³ Promises to accept are hereafter considered.

SECTION IV.

VERBAL AND WRITTEN ACCEPTANCES.

§ 504. Acceptance is usually effected by the drawer's writing his name across the face of the bill. And it seems that the holder may always insist on such an acceptance in writing, and in default thereof treat the bill as dishonored.⁴ But there is no doubt that a verbal as well as a written acceptance is, by the law merchant binding on the drawee.⁵ In England, by statute 19 and 20 Victoria, c. 97, § 6, it is provided that "no acceptance of a bill of exchange, inland or foreign, shall be sufficient to bind or charge any person, unless the same be in writing on such bill, signed by the acceptor or some person duly authorized by him." And it has been held that the word "accepted" written across

¹ *Billing v. De Vaux*, 3 Man. & G. 565; *Hatcher v. Stalworth*, 25 Miss. 376; *Fairlie v. Herring*, 3 Bing. R. 625; *Pierson v. Dunlap*, Cowp. 571; *Wynne v. Raikes*, 5 East, 514; *Grant v. Hunt*, 1 Man. Grang. & S. 44; *McEvers v. Mason*, 10 Johns. 207; *Greele v. Parker*, 5 Wend. 414.

² *Id.*

³ *Rees v. Warwick*, 2 B. & Ald. 113.

⁴ *Chitty on Bills* (13 Am. ed.) [*287], 326; *Edwards on Bills*, 417.

⁵ *Lumley v. Palmer*, 2 Strange, 1000; *Chitty, Jr.*, 275 (1735); *Sproat v. Matthews*, 1 T. R. 182 (1786); *Grant v. Shaw*, 16 Mass. 34; *Phelps v. Northrup*, 56 Ill. 156; *Sturges v. Fourth National Bank*, 75 Ill. 595; *Miller v. Neibaus*, 51 Ind. 401, case of an order. *Scudder v. Union N. B'k*, 91 U. S. (1 Otto), 406; *Pierce v. Kittredge*, 115 Mass. 374; *Chitty on Bills* (13 Am. ed.) [*289], 327; *Story on Bills*, § 242; *Edwards on Bills*, 417, 422; 1 *Parsons N. & B.* 285; *Byles* (Sharswood's ed.) [*184], 313; *Bayley*, ch. vi, sec. 1.

the face of the bill, but unsigned, did not satisfy the statute.¹ In the absence of statutory provision, any words used by the drawee to the drawer or holder, which by reasonable intendment signify that he honors the bill, will amount to such acceptance; though it would be different if the words were addressed to a stranger having no interest in the bill. Thus, where a foreign bill drawn on defendant was protested for non-acceptance and returned, and afterward the drawee told the plaintiff, "If the bill comes back I will pay it," was held an acceptance.² So, if the drawee say, "Leave your bill with me, and I will accept it."³ So, where the holder met in the street the drawee of the bill which had been sent to his counting-house, and returned unaccepted, and the drawee said, "If you will send it to the counting-house again, I will give directions for its being accepted," Lord Ellenborough held that if the bill had been sent accordingly, it would operate as an acceptance, but otherwise not, the words being conditional.⁴ So where the drawees requested that funds should be placed in their hands to meet a certain bill, and after the bill was left at their house and was not accepted, one of them, on being complained to, said: "What! not accepted! we have had the money; they ought to be paid, but I do not interfere in this business; you should see Mr. P.," Best, C. J., said: We are all of opinion that there has been a good acceptance of the bill."⁵

§ 505. Where the drawee, on hearing a bill read, says it is correct, and shall be paid, it is an acceptance.⁶ So where a bill is drawn on the faith of a consignment of goods, and the drawee refused to accept before the bill of lading and invoices came to hand, but after their arrival called on the holder's agent, and said that if he would get the bill back he

¹ Hindhaugh v. Blakey, 1 C. P. Div. 136.

² Cox v. Coleman, Chitty, Jr. on Bills, 274 (1732).

³ Chitty, Jr. 12; Bayley on Bills, ch. vi, sec. 1.

⁴ Anderson v. Hick, 3 Camp. 179 (1812).

⁵ Fairlie v. Herring, 11 Moore, 320; 3 Bing. 525, S. C. (1826).

⁶ Ward v. Allen, 2 Metc. 53.

would accept and pay it, and the bill was accordingly returned, it was held as an acceptance.¹ So if the drawee of a bill at sight promise to pay it on a subsequent day named, it is an acceptance.² The words, "will pay A. Harper draft \$2,300 for stock," by telegram, have been held an unconditional acceptance.³

§ 506. The words used must evince a clear intention on the part of the drawee to bind himself to the payment of the bill at all events, in order to amount to an acceptance, and equivocal language will not suffice. Therefore, where the drawee said, on the day after presentment for acceptance, when the plaintiff's clerk called for the bill, "there is your bill, it is all right," it was held no acceptance.⁴ So, saying, when a bill is presented for payment, that "it will be paid," if said with reference to immediate payment, will not amount to an acceptance, if the holder decline immediate payment on the terms proposed, because he makes an ulterior demand.⁵ So, saying, "The bill shall have attention,"⁶ or, "I will pay it, but I cannot now. I'll give you a bill at three months,"⁷ will not suffice. So it has been held that if the drawee of a bill say he cannot accept it without further direction from A. B., and A. B. afterward desire him to accept and draw upon C. D. for the amount, the mere drawing a bill upon C. D. will not amount to an absolute acceptance, nor can become such before the bill upon C. D. is accepted.⁸

§ 507. In order to amount to an acceptance, the words used must be addressed to the drawer or holder, or their agent, or to some one who takes the bill on the faith and credit imparted by them; and if the drawee say to a mere stranger, "I must accept and pay the bill," or, "I shall have

¹ Grant v. Shaw, 16 Mass. 341.

² Clarke v. Gordon, 3 Rich. (S. C.) 311. But see Peck v. Cochran, 7 Pick. 35.

³ Coffman v. Campbell (S. C. Ill.) Cent. L. J. July 12, 1878, p. 26.

⁴ Powell v. Jones, 1 Esp. 17 (1763), per Lord Kenyon.

⁵ Anderson v. Heath, 4 Maule & Sel. 303 (1815).

⁶ Rees v. Warwick, 2 Barn. & Ald. 113 (1818).

⁷ Reynolds v. Peto, 11 Exch. 410, s. c. 33 Eng. L. & Eq. 481.

⁸ Smith v. Nissen, 1 T. R. 269.

to accept or pay it," it is no acceptance.¹ For, as acceptance is a contract, it must be assented to by both parties, and a mere stranger has no privity with the drawee. And especially must a verbal acceptance be assented to by the holder, since in all cases he has a right to insist on an acceptance in writing on the bill itself, in order to avoid mistakes and prevent difficulties which may arise from mere parol proof thereof.²

SECTION V.

ABSOLUTE, CONDITIONAL AND QUALIFIED ACCEPTANCE.

§ 508. It is the right of the holder of the bill to require an absolute and unconditional acceptance—that is, an acceptance in conformity with the tenor of the bill—and may cause it to be protested unless it be so accepted.³ The holder may, however, at his risk, take a conditional or qualified acceptance, and in such cases the acceptor will, if the condition be complied with, or the qualification admitted, be bound

¹ *Martin v. Bacon*, 2 South Car. 132; *Bayley on Bills*, ch. vi, sec. i, 109; *Edwards on Bills*, 416; 1 *Parsons N. & B.* 286.

² *Story on Bills*, §§ 242, 247; *Edwards on Bills*, 417.

³ In *Boehm v. Garcias*, 1 Camp. 425, the bill was drawn on Lisbon, "payable in effective and not in val reals." The drawee offered to accept it payable in val denaros, another sort of currency. Lord Ellenborough, in suit brought by the holder against the drawee, said: "The plaintiff had a right to refuse this acceptance; the drawee of a bill has no right to vary the acceptance from the terms of the bill, unless they be unambiguously and unequivocally the same. Therefore, without considering whether a payment in denaros might have satisfied the term effective, an acceptance in denaros was not a sufficient acceptance of a bill drawn payable in effective. The drawee ought to have accepted generally, and an action being brought against them on the general acceptance, the question would probably have arisen as to the meaning of the term." *Parker v. Gordon*, 7 East, 385; *Gammon v. Schmoll*, 5 Taunt. 344; *Thomson on Bills*, 219; *Beawes*, No. 265; *Story on Bills*, § 272; *Chitty* (13 Am. ed.) [*287-8], 326. In Louisiana, it has been held that a dated acceptance to pay on a specified day, which is, in fact, the last day of grace, is according to the tenor of the bill. *Kenner v. Creditors*, 19 Martin, 540. See as to conditional acceptance by letter. *Shaver v. Western Union Tel. Co.* 57 N. Y. 459.

thereby; and the holder will likewise be bound by it.¹ The burden of proof is on the plaintiff to show performance of the condition;² and although absolute then it should be set out as conditional, with an averment of performance.³

§ 509. Acceptances "to pay as remitted for;"⁴ "to pay when in cash for the cargo of the ship Thetis;"⁵ "to pay when goods consigned to me are sold;"⁶ "to pay when a cargo of equal value is consigned to me;"⁷ "payable when house is ready for occupancy,"⁸ are examples of conditional acceptances. So, where on presentment of bills for acceptance the drawee said he would have accepted them if he had had certain funds which he had not been able to obtain from France, but that when he did obtain them he would pay the bill, it was held a conditional acceptance.⁹ And it has been held that the words "accepted payable on giving up a bill of lading" constituted a conditional acceptance, but not a further condition to the acceptor's liability that the bill of lading should be given up at the day of maturity of the bill.¹⁰ If drawee, on presentment, proposes to pay in fifteen days, it is an acceptance to pay at that time, if communicated to the holder.¹¹ If a drawee accept a bill in regular form, but upon an agreement with the drawer, that he should not negotiate it before complying with certain conditions, and the drawer proceed to negotiate it without performance of those conditions, the acceptor would be bound to a *bona fide* holder

¹ Smith v. Abbott, 2 Str. 1152; Julian v. Shorbrook, 2 Wills, 9; Mitchell v. Barring, 10 B. & C. 4; Ford v. Angelrodt, 37 Mo. 50; Wintersmith v. Post, 4 Zab. 420; Crowell v. Plant, 53 Mo. 145.

² Read v. Wilkinson, 2 Wash. C. C. 514; Gammon v. Schmoll, 5 Taunt. 344; Mason v. Hunt, 1 Doug. 297; Nagle v. Horner, 8 Cal. 358; Liggett v. Weed, 7 Kan. 273.

³ Langston v. Corry, 4 Camp. 176.

⁴ Banbury v. Lissett, 2 Stra. 1211.

⁵ Julian v. Shorbrook, 2 Wills, 9.

⁶ Smith v. Abbott, 2 Stra. 1152.

⁷ Mason v. Hunt, 2 Doug. 297.

⁸ Cook v. Wolfendale, 105 Mass. 401.

⁹ Byles on Bills [*187], 317; Mendizabal, v. Machado, 6 C. & P. 218; 25 E. C. L. R. ; 3 M. & Scott, 841.

¹⁰ Byles on Bills [*187], 317; Smith v. Vertue, 30 L. J. C. P. 56; 9 C. B. N. S. 214 (99 E. C. L. R.).

¹¹ Wylie v. Bryce, 70 N. C. 425.

without notice.¹ Where the drawer declines to accept unconditionally, but receives and keeps the bill on a promise to "try and save the amount for the holder," it does not amount to an obligatory acceptance.²

§ 510. On the offer of a conditional or varying acceptance, if the holder resolve to reject it altogether, he may protest generally, or give general notice of non-acceptance; but if he is willing to accept the offer, he should then give notice of its exact terms to all the parties, and state his readiness to accept the offer if they will respectively consent.³ A general or unqualified protest or notice of non-acceptance would, in such a case, evince that the holder did not acquiesce in the offer, and preclude him from afterward availing himself of it;⁴ but not if he was not aware of the acceptance when he caused the bill to be noted or protested for non-acceptance.⁵

§ 511. The rule above stated is in respect to the indorsers of a bill of absolute and invariable application.⁶ But in respect to the drawer, it is subject to qualification. The drawer warrants that the drawee is in funds, and that he will accept and pay the bill. And he is bound to know whether or not the drawee is in funds. Therefore, when he draws without having the right to do so, he is not entitled to notice of dishonor. And upon the same principle it is thought that he cannot be injured, and will not be discharged by the holder's taking a qualified acceptance payable at a future day.⁷ True, such an acceptance is a departure from the tenor of the bill; but the drawer, having improperly drawn the bill, cannot complain of the holder for taking those steps which seem essential to prevent its entire dishonor, and to secure its payment.⁸

Bayley says that "a neglect to give notice where there is

¹ *Merritt v. Duncan*, 7 Heiskell (Tenn.) 156.

² *McEowen v. Scott*, 49 Vt. 376.

³ Chitty's language [*301], 340.

⁴ *Sproat v. Mathews*, 1 T. R. 182.

⁵ *Fairlie v. Herring*, 3 Bing. 625; 11 Moore, 520.

⁶ *Edwards on Bills*, 428, 430.

⁷ *Walker v. Bank of the State*, 13 Barb. 636; *Edwards on Bills*, 429.

⁸ *Edwards on Bills*, 429.

a conditional acceptance, is done away with by the completion of those conditions before the bill becomes payable; and a neglect, where there is an acceptance as to part, and a refusal as to the residue only, discharges the persons entitled to notice as to the residue only.”¹ But he cites no authority for this doctrine. It seems obviously illogical, and has been justly criticised and dissented from.²

§ 512. Where a bill was drawn by a contractor on the postmaster general, and having been “accepted on condition that the drawer’s contracts be complied with,” was discounted by the defendants, it was held that such forfeitures as had occurred previous to such acceptance were not within the condition.³ “I will see the within paid eventually,” written on the back of a draft, was held a promise to pay in a reasonable time.⁴

§ 513. *Acceptances to pay “when in funds.”*—An acceptance to pay “when in funds,” renders the drawee liable only when he has funds;⁵ though it has been held that this implied when the drawee has funds which the drawer has a present right to demand and receive, and that it did not apply to wages for daily labor earned after acceptance, and needed for the daily subsistence of the laborer.⁶ “When in funds” means “when in cash,” and available securities will not answer this condition until actually converted into money.⁷ If the funds are not received in the acceptor’s lifetime, but are collected by the administrator, the latter is liable as representative of the deceased;⁸ but the condition of the word “administrator” to an acceptance does not make it a conditional one, nor qualify his liability.⁹

Where the acceptance is to pay out of the first money re-

¹ Bayley on Bills, ch. 7, § 2.

² Story on Bills, § 272, note 1.

³ United States v. Bank of the Metropolis, 15 Pet. 377.

⁴ Brannin v. Henderson, 12 B. Monroe, 62.

⁵ Marshall v. Clary, 44 Ga. 513.

⁶ Wintermute v. Post, 4 Zab. 420.

⁷ Campbell v. Pettengill, 7 Greenl. 126.

⁸ Swansey v. Breck, 10 Ala. 533; Gallery v. Prindle, 14 Barb. 186; Owen v. Iglanor, 4 Cold. 15.

⁹ Tassey v. Church, 4 Watts & S. 346.

ceived, the acceptor is bound to pay from time to time, on reasonable request, such funds as he receives from the drawer; and a judgment for a certain sum which he received is no bar to another action for a sum subsequently received.¹ An acceptance in the words "accepted for the full amount, provided there is this amount in my hands," is an absolute undertaking to pay all the money of the drawer in the drawee's hands, not exceeding the amount of the draft.² An acceptance to pay "if on settlement there is anything over" becomes on settlement an acceptance for what balance may be due if the condition be assented to by the holder.³

If the holder receive an acceptance to be paid "when in funds," he cannot resort to the drawer until the acceptor refuses to pay after he is in funds;⁴ and the conditional acceptor will not be liable if the funds are intercepted, or compliance with the condition is prevented, by operation of law.⁵

Where the drawee, upon presentment of a bill or order, says, "I must defer payment until in receipt of funds," the language implies that he accepts to pay when in funds, and the implication is the stronger when he receives and detains the instrument.⁶

§ 514. In a suit to recover on such an acceptance, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to show that the acceptor is in funds;⁷ and where a factor so accepted an order of a planter, it was held that he was only bound to pay out of the first funds coming to his hands, after deducting advances.⁸ Evidence is admissible to explain a conditional acceptance when its full meaning does not appear. Thus, an acceptance payable "when the lumber is run to market," is conditional, and the circumstances require explanation. What lumber?

¹ Perry v. Harrington, 2 Metc. 368.

² Ray v. Faulkner, 73 Ill. 469.

³ Stevens v. Androscoggin Water Power Co. 62 Me. 498.

⁴ Andrews v. Baggs, Minor, 173; Campbell v. Pettengill, 7 Greenl. 126; Knox v. Reeside, 1 Miles, 294; Gallery v. Prindle, 14 Barb. 186.

⁵ Browne v. Coit, 1 McCord, 408.

⁶ Pope v. Huth, 14 Cal. 407.

⁷ Owen v. Lavine, 14 Ark. 389; Andrews v. Baggs, Minor, 173; Knox v. Reeside, 1 Miles, 294; Atkinson v. Manks, 1 Cow. 691.

⁸ Hunter v. Ingraham, 1 Strob. 271; Owen v. Iglanor, 4 Cold. 15.

What market? By whom, and when to be run to market? All these are proper inquiries to be made.¹

§ 515. *As to qualified acceptances.*—As an acceptance may vary from the tenor of the order by introducing a condition, so it may vary from it as to the sum, time, place or mode of payment.² Such an acceptance is generally called a qualified acceptance, and the same principles govern it as govern a conditional acceptance.

By receiving such qualified acceptance the holder discharges all antecedent parties, unless he obtains their consent.³ Thus, if the bill be addressed to the drawees at their place of residence, and it is accepted, payable at a different town, it is a material variation if the holder receives it, and does not protest for non-acceptance;⁴ but a bill addressed generally to the drawee, in a city, may be accepted, payable at a particular bank in the city.⁵

§ 516. A bill drawn payable at a certain time may be accepted on condition of being renewed to a certain other time, and it will be properly declared on as payable at the time named in the acceptance.⁶ If accepted as to part of the amount drawn for, it is a good acceptance as to such part;⁷ and if accepted payable partly in money and partly in bills, it is a good acceptance as to the part payable in money.⁸ The holder may take a partial acceptance, but he will discharge the drawer and indorsers unless he protests as to the residue.⁹

§ 517. If any conditions are annexed to a written accept-

¹ Lamon v. French, 25 Wis. 37.

² See Byles on Bills [*186], 316; Chitty on Bills [*203], 342.

³ Byles on Bills [*186], 316; Chitty on Bills [*300], 339; Story, § 204; Sebag v. Abithol, 4 M. & Sel. 462.

⁴ Niagara Bank v. Fairman Co. 31 Barb. 403.

⁵ Troy City Bank v. Lauman, 19 N. Y. 477; Meyers v. Standart, 11 Ohio, N. S. 29; Niagara Bank v. Fairman Co. 31 Barb. 403.

⁶ Russell v. Phillips, 14 Q. B. 891; Clarke v. Gordon, 3 Rich. 311.

⁷ Weggessloffe v. Kerne, 1 Stra. 214; Thomson on Bills (Wilson's ed.) 225.

⁸ Petit v. Benson, Comb. 452; 1 Pars. N. & B. 312.

⁹ Marius, 68, 86; Thomson on Bills, 226.

ance, they should appear on its face. It has been laid down that acceptance may be rendered conditional by another contemporaneous writing,¹ but such condition could have no effect against a *bona fide* holder ignorant of it.² The terms of an acceptance in writing cannot be varied by any contemporaneous parol agreement, as that is against the first principles of the law of evidence.³

Sometimes the words which make the acceptance conditional are in the bill or order itself, as where the order ran, "Please pay, &c., out of the amount to be advanced to me, when the houses I am now erecting on your land are so far completed as to have the plastering done, according to our contract," and in such case if the work were never done, the condition upon which the defendant would be bound would not be complied with.⁴ And it matters not that the contract was canceled by agreement with the acceptor, provided there was no fraud. The acceptance of an order payable "If in funds," is regarded as an admission that the acceptor has funds to meet it, and he cannot afterward allege want of consideration against the holder.⁵

§ 518. Where a verbal acceptance is competent, a condition annexed to a verbal acceptance may be shown, because it does not vary or contradict the contract, but shows what the contract was.⁶ But the acceptor having once accepted absolutely, cannot by subsequent declarations annex a condition to his liability.⁷

§ 519. *Acceptances payable at a particular place.*—Before the statute 1 & 2 Geo. IV, c. 78, was enacted it was a point much disputed whether a bill or note drawn or made paya-

¹ Bowerbank v. Monteiro, 4 Taunt. 884.

² U. S. v. Bank of Metropolis, 15 Pet. 377; Montague v. Perkins, 22 E. L. & Eq. 516; Story, § 240; Edwards, 424; Thomson, 223.

³ Adams v. Wordley, 1 M. & W. 347; Besant v. Cross, 10 C. B. 896 (70 E. C. L. R.); Hoare v. Graham, 3 Camp. 57; Haverin v. Donnell, 7 Smed. & M. 244; Goodwin v. McCoy, 13 Ala. 271.

⁴ Newhall v. Clark, 3 Cush. 376. See Crowell v. Plant, 53 Mo. 145.

⁵ Kemble v. Lull, 3 McLean, 272; Edwards on Bills, 420.

⁶ Edwards on Bills, 426.

⁷ Wells v. Brigham, 6 Cush. 6.

ble at a particular place—or a bill accepted payable at a particular place—should be necessarily presented at such place in order to charge the acceptor, maker or other parties. Finally it was decided in the House of Lords that an acceptance payable at a particular place was a qualified acceptance, rendering it necessary, in an action against the acceptor, to aver and prove presentment at such place.¹ This led to the passage of the statute 1 & 2 Geo. IV, above referred to, called Sergeant Onslow's act, which provided that an acceptance payable at a particular place should be deemed a general acceptance, unless expressed to be payable there "only, and not otherwise or elsewhere." Since that statute, a bill may, in England, be accepted in three different forms when it is drawn generally on a party—that is: "First, it may be accepted simply without more. Secondly, it may be accepted payable at a particular banker's, which will be the same in effect as against the acceptor; or thirdly, it may be accepted payable at a particular banker's "only, and not otherwise or elsewhere." In this latter case, it will be deemed a qualified acceptance; and presentment at the banker's will be a condition precedent to the right of the holder to maintain an action against the acceptor thereon.²

¹ *Rowe v. Young*, 2 Brod. & Bing. 165; 2 Bligh, 391, s. c. overruling the opinion of eight of the twelve judges who were consulted.

² *Halstead v. Skelton*, 5 Ad. & El. 86.

In 1 Parsons N. & B. 309, 310, 311, it is said: "If a bill were accepted 'payable only at such a place,' it would be so entirely conditional under the English statutes, that if not demanded there, the acceptor would not be liable at all. We think this should be the rule in the United States, on the ground that such words are equivalent to 'accepted, provided that,' or 'on condition that;' but it is not certain that a bill accepted with the word 'only,' or possibly with express words of condition, might not be held by some courts as binding the acceptor to the amount of the bill, but discharging him from interest and costs, if he had funds at the proper place at the maturity of the bill, by which it would then and there have been paid. The principle upon which any such decision must be founded is, that the having the funds there for that purpose operates as a tender of them. The cases which we have been considering, are, as our notes show, in a curious state of conflict, confusion and uncertainty. A great number of fine subtle distinctions have been made on a comparatively narrow point, and it seems as if ingenuity and acuteness had been exerted to make refinements in an important commercial question, instead of an endeavor to carry

In an action against the drawer, or an indorser, if the bill be accepted and payable at a particular place named by the acceptor, it is still necessary to prove presentment there.¹ And so if the bill be drawn payable at a particular place, presentment must be made there in order to charge the drawer or indorser.² The statute 1 & 2 Geo. IV, does not extend to promissory notes, and, therefore, if a note be made expressly payable at a particular place, it is necessary, in England, to present it there for payment in order to charge the maker.³

§ 520. In the United States a different view from that expressed by the House of Lords has prevailed; and according to the ruling of the Supreme Court, and of the great current of decisions of the State courts of last resort, the effect and construction of an acceptance would accord with the act of 1 & 2 Geo. IV—that is, the acceptance will be regarded as general in all cases, save when the bill is drawn, or the acceptance expresses that it is payable at a particular banker's "only, and not otherwise or elsewhere."⁴ This subject will be more fully discussed when we come to consider the principles governing "presentment for payment."

out the real and honest intentions of the contracting parties, and to produce uniformity in the law precisely there where uniformity is eminently desirable."

¹ *Gibb v. Mather*, 8 Bing. 214 (21 E. C. L. R.); 1 M. & S. 387; 2 C. & J. 254, S. C.; *Saul v. Jones*, 28 L. J. Q. B. 37; 1 E. & E. 59 (102 E. C. L. R.) S. C. *Tindal, C. J.*, saying: "In cases between the indorsee and the drawee, upon a special acceptance by the drawee, no doubt appears to have existed, but that a presentment at the place specially designated in the acceptance was necessary in order to make the drawer liable upon the dishonor of the bill by the acceptor." "It appears to us that the statute neither intended to alter, nor has it in any manner altered, the liability of drawers of bills of exchange; but that it is confined in its operation to the case of acceptors alone."

² *Boydell v. Harkness*, 3 C. B. 168 (54 E. C. L. R.)

³ *Sanderson v. Bowes*, 14 East, 500; *Byles on Bills* (Sharswood's ed.) [*208], 344-5.

⁴ *Wallace v. McConnell*, 13 Peters, 136. Numerous cases are cited in the chapter on Presentment for Payment. Forms of declarations, and an excellent treatise on this subject, may be found in 4th Rob. Prac. (new ed.), 450-454.

SECTION VI.

ACCEPTANCE FOR HONOR, OR SUPRA PROTEST.

§ 521. There is a peculiar kind of acceptance called acceptance for honor, or *supra protest*. This most frequently happens when the original drawee (and the drawee *au besoin*, if any) refuses to accept the bill, in which case a stranger may accept the bill for the honor of some one of the parties thereto, which acceptance will inure to the benefit of all the parties subsequent to him for whose honor it was accepted.¹

§ 522. *As to the circumstances under which there may be such an acceptance*,—it is only allowable when acceptance by the drawee has been refused, and when the bill has been protested, and hence it is called acceptance *supra protest*.²

The reason assigned for this is that the drawers and indorsers have a right to say that the bill was not primarily drawn on the acceptor for honor; and the only proper proof of the refusal of the original drawee is by a protest, that being the known instrument, by the custom of merchants, to establish the facts.³

§ 523. *As to the method of acceptance for honor*, it is in this wise: the acceptor for honor, or *supra protest*, appears before a notary public, witnesses and declares that he accepts such protested bill in honor of the drawer or indorser, as the case may be, and that he will pay it at the appointed time.⁴ And then he subscribes his name to the words, “Accepted *supra protest* for the honor of A. B.,” or, as is more usual, “Accepts S. P.”⁵

Sometimes the form used is, “Accepted, under protest, for honor of Messrs. —, and will be paid for their account, if

¹ Bayley on Bills, 177; Story, §§ 255–6; *ex parte* Wackerbath, 5 Ves. 574; *Konig v. Bayard*, 1 Pet. 250; *Hussey v. Jacob*, 1 Ld. Raym. 88; *May v. Kelly*, 27 Ala. 497; *Hoare v. Cazenove*, 16 East, 391.

² *Ibid.*

³ Story on Bills, § 256.

⁴ *Gazzam v. Armstrong*, 3 Dana, 554.

⁵ Thomson on Bills, 323; Byles (Sharswood's ed.) [*265], 402; Chitty on Bills [*346], 387.

regularly protested and refused when due.”¹ And the acceptor *supra protest* must be particular to state for whose honor he accepts.²

It is the duty of the acceptor *supra protest*, as soon as he has made the acceptance, to notify the fact to the party for whose honor it is done;³ and the party paying a bill under protest for honor must give reasonable notice to the person for whose honor he pays, otherwise he will not be bound to refund.⁴

§ 524. *As to who may be acceptor for honor.*—A stranger may undoubtedly accept for honor; and by the word stranger in this connection is meant any third person not a party to the bill. It seems that acceptance for honor may also be made by the drawee, who, if he does not choose to accept the bill drawn generally on account of the person in whose favor, or on whose account, he is advised it is drawn, he may accept it for the honor of the drawer, or of the indorsers, or of all or any of them.⁵

But if the drawee were bound in good faith to accept the bill, he cannot change his relations to the parties, and accept it *supra protest* for the honor of an indorser; he must either accept or refuse.⁶

An acceptor *supra protest* for the honor of an indorser may, however, recover against such indorser, though he accepted at the instance of the drawee, and as his agent, provided the indorser were not thereby damnified. The indorser might avail himself of any defense which he could have made, had the drawee accepted for his honor, and then sued upon the acceptance.⁷ It is immaterial, indeed, as to the defenses which a drawer or indorser may make against an acceptor for honor, whether such acceptor acted at the instance of the drawer, or as the agent of the drawee.⁸

¹ Mitchell v. Baring, 10 B. & C. 4; 4 Car. & P. 35.

² Story on Bills, § 256.

³ Story on Bills, § 259; Edwards on Bills, 441.

⁴ Wood v. Pugh, 7 Ohio, Part 2, 156.

⁵ Story on Bills, § 259.

⁶ Schimmelpennich v. Bayard, 1 Pet. 264; Chitty on Bills [*345], 386.

⁷ Konig v. Bayard, 1 Pet. 250.

⁸ Gazzam v. Armstrong, 3 Dana, 554; Wood v. Pugh, 7 Ohio, 156.

§ 525. While there cannot be successive acceptors of a bill, generally speaking, there may be several acceptors *supra protest* for the honor of different parties¹—that is, one may accept for the honor of the drawer, another for the honor of the first indorser, and another for the honor of the second indorser, and so on.²

And the acceptor *supra protest* may accept for the honor of any one, or all, of the parties to the bill; and his acceptance should designate for whose honor it was made, in which case it could be at once perceived for whose benefit it inured.³ If the acceptance do not specify for whose honor it was made, it will be construed to be for the honor of the drawer;⁴ and if for the honor of the bill, or of all the parties, it should be so expressed.⁵

§ 526. *As to the rights of an acceptor for honor.*—By his acceptance for honor, the acceptor has recourse against the party for whose honor he accepts, and all parties whom the latter would have recourse against, and none others.⁶ But the acceptor for the honor of the drawer cannot recover against him without proof of a presentment for acceptance or payment, and refusal and notice to the drawer.⁷

If he accepts for the honor of the drawer only, he will in general, have no recourse against the indorsers; and if for the honor of an indorser, he will have no recourse against a subsequent indorser⁸—the exception arising in cases where

¹ Chitty on Bills, 375; Story on Bills, § 260; 1 Parsons N. & B. 315; Byles on Bills (Sharswood's ed.) [*255], 403; Beawes, 33.

² Chitty on Bills, 376; Story on Bills, § 260; Byles on Bills (Sharswood's ed.) [*255], 403.

³ Hussey v. Jacob, 1 Ld. Raymond, 86; Lewin v. Brunette, 1 Lutw. 896; 1 Parsons N. & B. 313; Story on Bills, § 256.

⁴ Chitty [*346], 387; 1 Parsons N. & B. 313.

⁵ Gazzam v. Armstrong, 3 Dana, 552.

⁶ Byles (Sharswood's Ed.), [*259], 406; Goodall v. Polhill, 1 C. B. 233.

⁷ Baring v. Clark, 19 Pick. 220; Schofield v. Bayard, 3 Wend. 488.

⁸ Gazzam v. Armstrong, 3 Dana, 554, Marshall, J., saying: "We are decidedly of opinion that he (the acceptor for honor) acquired no demand, or right of action, against any party subsequent to the one for whom he made the payment, and that, even as against the preceding parties, he was only substituted to the rights of that party in the same condition as if he paid the bill himself.

In Mertens v. Winnington, 1 Esp. 112, counsel contended that where a bill is

the person for whose honor he accepts the bill might have recourse against either, as when he is an accommodation drawer or indorser.¹

§ 527. *As to the liability of the acceptor for honor.*—The acceptance for honor or *supra protest* is not an absolute engagement like an ordinary acceptance for value. It is a conditional engagement, and to render it absolute, the performance of several acts as conditions precedent are essential.² Such an acceptance, says Lord Tenterden, C. J.: “Is to be considered not as absolutely such, but in the nature of a conditional acceptance. It is equivalent to saying to the holder of the bill, ‘keep this bill, don’t return it, and when the time arrives at which it ought to be paid, if it be not paid by the party on whom it was originally drawn, come to me and you shall have your money.’”³ The nature of such an acceptor’s undertaking is more analogous to that of an in-

taken up for honor of a party, only such party was liable. But Lord Kenyon was of opinion “that where a bill is so taken up, the party who does so is to be considered as an indorsee paying full value for the bill, and as such entitled to all remedies to which an indorsee would be entitled, that is to sue all the parties to the bill.” But this proposition is too broad; for there are cases in which the payor *supra protest*, stands on a very different footing from an indorsee. Thus, if he paid for honor of the acceptor, he could not sue the drawer, as the acceptor could not sue him.

¹ Story on Bills, § 256.

² Chitty on Bills [*347], 388.

³ Williams v. Germaine, 7 B. & C. 457; 1 M. & R. 394. In Hoare v. Caze-
nove, 16 East, 391 (1812), Lord Ellenborough, said: “It is an undertaking to pay if the original drawee, upon a presentment to him for payment, should persist in dishonoring the bill, and such dishonor by him be notified by protest to the person who has accepted for honor. * * * The use and convenience, and indeed the necessity of a protest upon foreign bills of exchange, in order to prove in many cases the regularity of proceedings thereupon, is too obvious to warrant us in dispensing with such an instrument in any case where the custom of merchants, as reported in the authorities of law, appears to have acquired it. And indeed the reason of the thing, as well as the strict law of the case, seems to render a second resort to the drawee proper, when the unaccepted bill still remains with the holder; for effects often reach the drawee who has refused acceptance in the first instance, out of which the bill may and would be satisfied, if presented to him again when the period of payment had arrived. And the drawer is entitled to the chance of benefit to arise from such second demand, or at any rate to the benefit of that evidence which the protest affords, that the demand has been made duly without effect, as far as such evidence may be available to him for purposes of ulterior resort.”

dorser;¹ than that of an ordinary acceptor, and to render him absolutely liable it is necessary :

First. To present the bill at maturity to the original drawee, notwithstanding his prior refusal, because between the time of such refusal and the time of maturity, effects may have reached the drawee, out of which he might, if the bill were again presented, pay it; and the drawer and other parties are entitled to the chance of any benefit which might arise from such second demand. And if it were not made (except in the case of a bill made payable at a place not being the residence of the drawee), the drawer and indorsers would be discharged; and as the acceptor *supra protest* would thereby lose recourse against them, he is also discharged.²

Second. Upon refusal by the original drawee to pay the bill when it is presented at maturity, it must be again protested for non-payment, and such protest and presentment must be alleged in the declaration against the acceptor *supra protest*.³ And *third*, it is then necessary to present the bill in due time to the acceptor *supra protest*.⁴

If on such presentment the acceptor *supra protest* refuses to pay there must be another formal protest, stating the presentment for payment to the drawee, the protest for his non-payment, the presentment of the bill and acceptance to the acceptor *supra protest*, and demand of payment of him, and the protest for his non-payment; and notice thereof must be forthwith forwarded to the drawer and indorsers.⁵

§ 528. There appears to be a conflict of opinion as to the extent of the admission of the acceptor *supra protest*. According to a recent eminent author, the acceptor *supra protest* does not admit the genuineness of the signature of any party for whose honor the acceptance is given, not even the drawer's, and therefore he could recover back money paid to the

¹ 1 Parsons N. & B. 315.

² Chitty [*348], 389-90; Story on Bills, § 261; Barry v. Clark, 19 Pick. 220.

³ Chitty [*350], 392; Story on Bills, § 261.

⁴ *Ib.*; Chitty [*351], 392.

⁵ Chitty [*352], 393; 1 Parsons N. & B. 320.

holder if the bill turned out to be a forgery.¹ The language of the case cited in support of this doctrine would seem to sustain it; but confined to the point decided, it determines no more than that acceptance for the honor of an indorser does not admit his signature.²

The reasoning of the judge which leads to this conclusion, however, would go to the full extent of the rule laid down by Professor Parsons. But it is at least subject to this modification, that one who accepts for the honor of the drawer is estopped from denying that the bill is a valid bill; and, consequently, it would not be competent for him to set up as a defense to an action by an indorsee that the payee is a fictitious person, and that he was ignorant of the fact at the time he accepted the bill.³

¹ 1 Parsons N. & B. 323.

² Wilkinson v. Johnson, 3 B. & C. 428. Abbott, C. J. (Lord Tenterden), said: "A bill is carried for payment to the person whose name appears as acceptor, or as agent of an acceptor, entirely as a matter of course. The person presenting very often knows nothing of the acceptor, and merely carries or sends the bill according to the direction that he finds upon it; so that the act of presentment informs the acceptor or his agent of nothing more than that his name appears to be on the bill as the person to pay it; and it behooves him to see that his name is properly on the bill. But it is by no means a matter of course to call upon a person to pay a bill for the honor of an indorser; and such a call, therefore, imports, on the part of the person making it, that the name of a correspondent, for whose honor the payment is asked, is actually on the bill; but still his attention may reasonably be lessened by the assertion that the call itself makes to him in fact, though no assertion may be made in words. And the fault, if he pays on a forged signature, is not wholly and entirely his own; but begins at least with the person who thus calls upon him. And though, where all the negligence is on one side, it may perhaps be unfit to inquire into the *quantum*; yet where there is any fault in the other party, and that other party cannot be said to be wholly innocent, he ought not, in our opinion, to profit by the mistake into which he may, by his own prior mistake, have led the other; at least, if the mistake is discovered before any alteration in the situation of any of the other parties, that is, while the remedies of all the parties entitled to remedy are left entire, and no one is discharged by laches."

³ Phillips v. Thurn, 18 Com. B. N. S. 694 (1865), Erle, C. J., said: "I take it to be clear that if the defendant had not intervened, and the action had been brought by the holder of the bill against the drawer, the drawer would have been by law compelled to admit that the bill was a valid bill payable to bearer.

* * * * It seems to me that there is good reason for saying that that which the drawer would be estopped from denying, the acceptor for honor should also

Why, indeed, the acceptor *supra protest* should not be bound by the same rules which apply to an ordinary acceptor in the usual course of business we cannot perceive. It is his own voluntary act, and unless he has been imposed upon by the holder of the bill to such an extent as to warrant a defense on the distinct ground of fraud, he should, we think, be held up to the strict performance of his engagement, and estopped from denying any fact—such as the validity of the signatures of parties—which it presupposes.¹ Certainly when the bill has passed into the hands of a *bona fide* holder for value after the acceptance *supra protest*, he could not then be permitted to open the question of forgery.²

§ 529. The holder is in no case bound to take an acceptance for honor;³ but if he receives it, and it is for the honor of a particular party, he cannot sue such party until the maturity of the bill, and its dishonor by the acceptor *supra protest*.⁴ And if the acceptance is for the honor of all the parties to the bill, he cannot sue any of them until it has matured and been dishonored.⁵

But there seems to be no reason why the holder may not sue prior parties, when the acceptance is for honor of a particular party, after giving them due notice.⁶

be estopped from denying. I think that he is equally bound to admit that the bill is a valid bill."

¹ In Byles on Bills (Sharswood's ed.) [*258], 406, it is said: "The acceptor *supra protest* admits the genuineness of the signature, and is bound by any estoppel binding on the party for whose honor he accepts. Thus, where a bill was drawn in favor of a non-existing person or order, but the name of the drawer, and the name of the payee and first indorser were both forged, and the defendant accepted for the honor of the drawer, it was held that the defendant was estopped from disputing that the drawer's signature was genuine, and that the bill was drawn in favor of a non-existing person, was negotiable, and had become payable to bearer." See also Story on Bills, § 262; Redfield and Bigelow's Leading Cases, 88-63.

² Story on Bills, § 262; Salt Springs Bank v. Syracuse Sav. Inst. 62 Barb. 101.

³ Chitty on Bills [*345], 387; Mitford v. Walcott, 12 Mod. 410; Ld. Raym. 575; Gregory v. Walcup, 1 Comyns, 76; Pillans v. Van Mierop, 3 Burr. 1663; Byles on Bills (Sharswood's ed.) [*256], 403; Edwards on Bills, 443.

⁴ Williams v. Germaine, 7 B. & C. 468; 1 Man. & R. 394.

⁵ Story on Bills, § 258; Chitty, p. 375.

⁶ Story on Bills, § 258.

§ 530. *Protest for better security.*—There is another species of acceptance for honor which occurs after acceptance and before the maturity of the bill, when the acceptor absconds or becomes a bankrupt or insolvent.¹ In this case the holder is not bound to protest the bill, and his neglect to do so will not affect his remedy against any prior party.² But he may make protest if he choose to do so, and it is then called protest for better security.³ Mr. Chitty says, on this subject: "The custom of merchants is stated to be, that if the drawee of a bill of exchange abscond before the day when the bill is due, the holder may protest it, in order to have better security for the payment, and should give notice to the drawer and indorsers of the absconding of the drawee; and if the acceptor of a foreign bill become bankrupt before it is due, it seems that the holder may also, in such case, protest for better security; but the acceptor is not, on account of the bankruptcy of the drawer, compellable to give this security. The neglect to make this protest will not affect the holder's remedy against the drawer and indorsers; and its principal use appears to be that, by giving notice to the drawers and indorsers of the situation of the acceptor, by which it is become improbable that payment will be made, they are enabled by other means to provide for the payment of the bill when due, and thereby prevent the loss of re-exchange, &c., occasioned by the return of the bill. It may be recollected that, though the drawer or indorsers refuse to give better security, the holder must, nevertheless, wait till the bill be due before he can sue either of those parties."⁴

§ 531. An acceptor for honor of the drawer thereby releases the accommodation acceptor of the bill, because an acceptor for honor can acquire only the rights of the party for whose honor he accepts, and the drawer could not sue the accommodation acceptor.⁵ If the bill be payable at a

¹ Chitty on Bills [*344], 385.

² *Ex parte* Wackerbath, 5 Ves. 574.

³ Chitty on Bills [*344], 385.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *McDowell v. Cook*, 6 Smedes & M. 420; *Gazzam v. Armstrong*, 3 Dana, 554.

certain time after sight, and is accepted for honor, the time runs from such acceptance, and not from the presentment to the drawee.¹

SECTION VII.

THE EFFECT OF ACCEPTANCE—WHAT IT ADMITS.

§ 532. The effect of the acceptance of a bill is to constitute the acceptor the principal debtor.² The bill becomes by the acceptance very similar to a promissory note—the acceptor being the promisor, and the drawer standing in the relation of an indorser.

But in respect to the acceptor's position with regard to the drawer, and the amount for which he renders himself liable by accepting the bill, it is well to observe that the acceptance does not entitle the acceptor to charge it in account against the drawer from the date of acceptance, unless he pays the whole amount at the time, or discharges the drawer from all responsibility.³

Like the maker of a note, the acceptor is bound by all the terms of the instrument, and if it contain a stipulation for payment of attorney's fees, he is bound by it.⁴

If the acceptance be for the drawer's accommodation, the acceptor does not thereby become entitled to sue the drawer upon the bill; but when he has paid the bill, and not before, he may recover back the amount from the drawer in an action for money had and received.⁵ If the acceptor put the bill in circulation, he is estopped from showing it was then paid.⁶

§ 533. *What acceptance admits.*—It follows from the fact that the acceptor assumes to pay the bill, and becomes the principal debtor for the amount specified, that acceptance is an admission of everything essential to the existence of such liability. Therefore, acceptance is, in the *first* place, an

¹ Williams v. Germaine, 7 B. & C. 463; 1 Man. & R. 394, 403.

² Thomson on Bills, 229.

³ Bracton v. Willing, 4 Call, 288.

⁴ Smith v. Muncie National Bank, 29 Ind. 158.

⁵ Planters' Bank v. Douglas, 2 Head, 699.

⁶ Hinton v. Bank of Columbus, 9 Porter (Ala.), 463.

admission of the signature of the drawer, the drawee being supposed to know his correspondent's handwriting, and, by accepting, to acknowledge it; and in a suit against the acceptor he would not be permitted to plead or show that the handwriting was not the drawer's, and would be bound by his acceptance even though the drawer's name were forged.¹

§ 534. In the *second* place, acceptance admits that the acceptor had funds of the drawer in his hands, for the drawing of the bill implies this, and acceptance in the usual course of business only follows when it is the fact. Therefore, the acceptor cannot deny that he was in funds when suit is brought by a holder of the bill;² though as between himself and the drawer it is only *prima facie* evidence that the drawer had funds in his hands, and he may rebut this presumption by showing that the acceptance was for the drawer's accommodation, or otherwise under circumstances which place him under no obligation to pay the bill to him.³ But, notwithstanding the presumption that the acceptor has funds of the drawer, yet, where bills have been drawn upon letters of credit to enable a party to purchase and ship merchandise, this presumption is rebutted, and the drawer becomes the primary debtor, and is liable to the acceptor for his advances. But if the acceptor has notice that one of two joint drawers of such a bill has merely loaned his name to give currency

¹ *Wilkinson v. Lutwidge*, 1 Strange, 648 (1726). Lord C. J. Raymond thought acceptance acknowledged handwriting of the drawer, but was not conclusive evidence. In *Jenys v. Fowler*, 2 Strange, 946 (1732), it was held that proof of forgery of drawer's handwriting was inadmissible. *Hoffman & Co. v. Bank of Milwaukee*, 12 Wall. 193; *Hortsmann v. Henshaw*, 11 How. 177; *Bank of U. S. v. Bank of Georgia*, 10 Wheat. 333; *White v. Continental Nat. Bank*, 64 N. Y. 316; *Goddard v. Merchants' Bank*, 4 Comst. 147; *Canal Bank v. Bank of Albany*, 1 Hill, 287; *Bank of Commerce v. Union Bank*, 3 Comst. 235; *Levy v. Bank of U. S.* 1 Binn. 27; *Peoria R. R. Co. v. Neill*, 16 Ill. 269; *Ellis v. Ohio Life, &c. Co.* 4 Ohio St. 628; *Whitney v. Bunnell*, 8 La. Ann. 429; *Leach v. Buchanan*, 4 Esp. 226; *Price v. Neal*, 3 Burr. 1354; *Smith v. Chester*, 1 Term R. 654; *Wilkinson v. Johnson*, 3 Barn. & Cres. 428; *Sanderson v. Coleman*, 4 Man. & G. 209.

² *Hortsmann v. Henshaw*, 11 How. 177; *Raborg v. Peyton*, 2 Wheat. 385; *Kemble v. Lull*, 3 McLean, 272; *Jordan v. Tarkington*, 4 Dev. 357.

³ See Chapter on Consideration, §§ 174-6; *Turner v. Browder*, 5 Bush (Ky.), 216.

to the bill, such drawer is no more liable to the acceptor than if he had merely indorsed the bill.¹

§ 535. In the *third* place, the acceptor admits the capacity of the drawer to draw the bill, for otherwise it would not be valid;² and therefore he cannot set up a plea, that the drawer of a bill, which he had accepted, was a body corporate having no legal authority to draw the bill,³ or was a bankrupt,⁴ infant,⁵ married woman,⁶ or fictitious person.⁷ When the bill is drawn in the name of a firm, acceptance admits that there is such a firm,⁸ and if it be drawn by a person as executor, it admits his right to sue in that character.⁹

§ 536. In the *fourth* place, the acceptor admits the capacity of the payee to indorse the bill when it is drawn payable to the payee's order, for by the very act of acceptance he agrees to pay to his order;¹⁰ and, therefore, he cannot show that at the time of acceptance the payee was an infant,¹¹ an insane person,¹² a married woman,¹³ a bankrupt,¹⁴ or

¹ Turner v. Browder, 5 Bash (Ky.), 216; *ante*, § 176.

² Story on Bills, § 113; Byles (Sharswood's ed.) [*193], 325; Thomson on Bills, 230, 231. ³ Halifax v. Lyle, 3 Welsby, Hurl. & G. (Exch.) 446.

⁴ Braithwaite v. Gardiner, 8 Q. B. 473; Lord Denman, C. J., quoting Lord Abinger's opinion in Pitt v. Chappellew, 8 Mees. & W. 616, said: 'Lord Abinger was a high authority on subjects of this kind. It is clear what his opinion was on the point of estoppel in Pitt v. Chappellew, and I think it rests on sound principles. In this case, all parties knowing the bankrupt's situation, the defendant accepts a bill drawn by him. He thereby admits that the bankrupt had power to draw upon him; and, therefore, on a short and simple ground, always the best, I am of opinion that the plaintiff has a right to maintain this action.'

⁵ Taylor v. Croker, 4 Esp. 187; Jones v. Darch, 4 Price, 300.

⁶ Smith v. Marsack, 6 C. B. 486; Cowton v. Wickersham, 54 Penn. St. 302.

⁷ Cooper v. Meyer, 10 Barn. & C. 468; 5 Man. & R. 387.

⁸ Bass v. Clive, 4 Maule & S. 13.

⁹ Aspinall v. Wake, 10 Bing. 51.

¹⁰ See *ante*, §§ 93, 242.

¹¹ Jones v. Darch, 4 Price, 300 (1817). The payee was an infant, and the acceptor knew it when he accepted; Taylor v. Croker, 4 Esp. 187 (1803). The drawers, who were infants, had drawn the bill payable to their own order. Lord Ellenborough held that the acceptance admitted their power to indorse, and the acceptor could not show they were infants. Byles (Sharswood's ed.) [*193], 325. ¹² Smith v. Marsack, 6 C. B. 486; see *ante*, §§ 93, 242.

¹³ Smith v. Marsack, 6 C. B. 486. But in Massachusetts it has been held that evidence of the insanity of the payee at the time the note was executed was admissible; Peaslee v. Robins, 3 Metc. 164; see *ante*, § 93.

¹⁴ Drayton v. Dale, 2 Barn. & C. 293 (1823), which was the case of a note

a corporation without legal existence.¹ It is a general principle, applicable to all negotiable securities, that a person shall not dispute the power of another to indorse such an instrument, when he asserts by the instrument which he issues to the world that the other has such power.² Indeed, there could be no reason why the acceptor should be interested to show that the payee was incompetent to make the order; for he has been guaranteed in that regard by the drawer, and may charge the amount in account against him whether the payee were competent or not.

§ 537. In the *fifth* place, if the bill be drawn by one professing to act as agent of the drawer, the acceptance admits his handwriting and authority as agent to draw.³

§ 538. *What acceptance does not admit.*—But beyond these admissions the acceptance does not go. In the *first* place, it does not admit the genuineness of the signature of the payee when it purports to bear his indorsement, or that of any other indorser, for with their handwriting he is not presumed to be familiar; and, therefore, if the signature of the payee or other indorser be forged, the acceptor will not be bound to pay the bill to any one who is compelled to trace title through such indorsements.⁴ And if he has gone so far as to pay the bill to any one holding it under such forged indorsement, he may, as a general rule, recover back the amount.⁵ The rule would not apply, however, where the drawer had issued the bill with the forged indorsement upon

made payable to the order of a bankrupt. Bayley, J., in *Drayton v. Dale*, *supra*. Approved in *Smith v. Marsack*, 6 C. B. 486; see *ante*, § 242.

¹ See *ante*, Chapter III, § 93. ² See Chapter XLII, on Forgery, Sec. III.

³ *Robinson v. Yarrow*, 7 Taunt. 455.

⁴ *Holt v. Ross*, 54 N. Y. 474; *Edwards on Bills*, 432. In *White v. Continental Nat'l Bank*, 64 N. Y. 320, Allen, J., says: "The plaintiffs as drawees of the bill, were only held to acknowledge the signature of their correspondents; by accepting and paying the bill they only vouched for the genuineness of such signatures, and were not held to a knowledge of the want of genuineness of any other part of the instrument, or of any other names appearing thereon, or of the title of the holder."

⁵ *Ib.*; *Canal Bank v. Bank of Albany*, 1 Hill (N. Y.) 287; *Dick v. Leverich*, 11 La. 573; *Williams v. Drexel*, 14 Md. 566.

it, for then the acceptor could charge the amount in account against him, and as the forged indorsement could in such case subject him to no loss, he would not be entitled to recover back the amount.¹ The acceptance does not admit the signature of the indorser, even when the bill is payable to the drawer's order, and purports to be indorsed by him, in the same handwriting as the drawer's.² But if the drawer is a fictitious person, and the bill is payable to the drawer's order, the acceptor's undertaking is that he will pay to the signature of the same person that signed for the drawer; and in such case the holder may show, as against the acceptor, that the signature of the fictitious drawer and of the first indorser are in the same handwriting.³

§ 539. In the second place, acceptance does not admit agency to indorser, which must be proved by the holder in order to recover against the acceptor, even though the acceptor acknowledges agency to draw the bill, and the indorsement was upon it at the time of acceptance. Thus, where a bill was drawn over the signature, "A. Henry p. proc. C. Staeben & Co.," and was expressed to be payable "to our order," and was indorsed in like manner as drawn: "A. Henry p. proc. C. Staeben & Co.," and was accepted by the defendant, and sued on by the plaintiff, it was held that, in order to recover, he must prove the procuration to indorse. And Park, J., said: "The mere acceptance proves the drawing, but it never proves the indorsement; it is not at all necessary that a power given to draw bills by procuration should enable the agent to indorse by procuration; the first is a power to get funds into the agent's hands, the other to pay them out."⁴

¹ See Chapter XLII, on Forgery, Sec. III; *Hortsmann v. Henshaw*, 11 How. 177; *Meacher v. Fort*, 3 Hill (S. C.) 227; *Coggill v. American Exchange Bank*, 1 Comst. 113.

² *Robinson v. Yarrow*, 7 Taunt. 455; *Canal Bank v. Bank of Albany*, 1 Hill, 257; *Beeman v. Duck*, 11 M. & W. 257; *Williams v. Drexel*, 14 Md. 566; see Chapter XLII, on Forgery, Sec. III.

³ *Cooper v. Meyer*, 10 Barn. & C. 468; *Beeman v. Duck*, 11 M. & W. 251.

⁴ *Robinson v. Yarrow*, 7 Taunt. 455 (1817).

§ 540. In the third place, the acceptance does not admit the genuineness of the terms contained in the body of the instrument at the time of the acceptance; and, therefore, if at that time they had been altered so as to purport to bind the drawer for a larger sum, or in a different manner than that in the original bill, he will not be bound by his acceptance to pay the amount, unless the drawer had by his own carelessness afforded opportunity for the alteration, and the acceptor could therefore charge him in account with the whole amount.¹ But where the drawer alters it himself, or acquiesces in an alteration, before acceptance, it binds him, and therefore the acceptor.²

If the drawer were not responsible for affording the opportunity for the alteration to be made, the acceptor could not only defend against a recovery upon the bill, but might himself recover back the amount paid upon it, or, at least, to the extent of the amount for which he would still remain liable to the drawer.³ If, however, the acceptor were himself responsible for issuing the bill in such a form as to admit of its being easily forged or altered—as where an acceptor wrote his acceptance in blank, on an agreement with the drawer that he should not draw for over \$1,000, and the latter inserted a larger sum and passed the bill to the plaintiff—he would be bound for the whole amount, and could not recover it back if paid.⁴

SECTION VIII.

EXTINGUISHMENT OF ACCEPTOR'S OBLIGATION.

§ 541. The obligation of the acceptor may be discharged, extinguished, or waived: (1) by operation of law; (2) by

¹ *Young v. Grote*, 4 Bing. 253; *White v. Cont. Nat. Bank*, 64 N. Y. 320; *Marine Nat. Bank v. National City Bank*, 59 N. Y. 68; see Chapter XLIX, on Checks, and Chapter XLII, on Forgery; also Chapter XLIII, on Alteration, Sec. VI.

² *Langton v. Lazarus*, 5 Mees. & W. 628-9; *Ward v. Allen*, 2 Metc. (Mass.) 57.

³ *Bank of Commerce v. Union Bank*, 3 Comst. 230; see Chapter XLIX, on Checks, Sec. XIII, and XLII, on Forgery, Sec. III.

⁴ *Van Duzer v. Howe*, 21 N. Y. 531.

payment; (3) by release; and (4) by express or implied waiver or agreement of the parties.

In the first place, as to discharge by operation of law, this occurs when the acceptor is discharged by force and effect of the laws of the place where the acceptance was made—as for example, by going into bankruptcy, or pleading successfully the statute of limitations.¹

In the second place, the acceptor may be discharged by payment of the bill according to its tenor. This branch of the subject is elsewhere fully considered,² as is also the discharge by release.³

§ 542. In the fourth place, as to when an acceptor may be discharged by the express or implied waiver or agreement of the parties, it is a general principle of law that an executory contract, whether sealed or unsealed, may be discharged before breach by mere verbal agreement, or by a waiver of the rights accruing under it.⁴ But after breach it can only be discharged by payment, release (under seal), or by taking some collateral thing in satisfaction, or by merger by operation of law, as by a judgment, or taking a higher security.⁵ But cases of bills of exchange are said to form an exception to this rule, and the liability of the acceptor, or other party, remote or immediate, though complete, may be discharged by an express renunciation of his claim on the part of the holder without consideration.⁶

¹ 1 Parsons N. & B. 328. ² See Chapter XXXVIII, on Payment, Vol. 2.

³ See Chapter XL, on Discharges, &c., Sec. II, Vol. 2.

⁴ Story on Bills, § 266; 1 Parsons N. & B. 324 *et seq.*; Chitty on Bills [*310], 349. See especially Byles on Bills [*192], 324; Sharswood's note 1; also Foster v. Dawber, 6 Exch. 850, Parke B.; Dobson v. Espie, 26 L. J. N. S. 240 (1857).

⁵ Story on Bills, § 266.

⁶ Byles on Bills (Sharswood's ed.), [*190-1], 322. It is therein said: "It is a general rule of law that a simple contract may, before breach, be waived or discharged, without a deed and without a consideration; but after breach there can be no discharge, except by deed, or upon sufficient consideration. To this rule it has been repeatedly held that contracts on bills of exchange form an exception, and that the liability of the acceptor, or other party remote or immediate, though complete, may be discharged by an express renunciation of his claim on the part of the holder without consideration. The exception seems at first to

§ 543. In the case of acceptances for accommodation, the principles upon which this doctrine rests are not difficult to discover. The acceptor is, indeed, according to the form and nature of his contract, primarily liable to the holder. But the debt which he has bound himself to pay, is in every respect the debt of another person to the payee, or the holder; and the payee or holder, while having the right to sue the acceptor as his principal debtor, has such relations to the party for whose accommodation the bill has been accepted, that it is not unnatural for him to be in negotiation with such party respecting its settlement. And when he relinquishes his claim against the acceptor, it is nothing more than a waiver of his right to hold him as primarily bound for another's debt, for which he may be regarded in some sort, though not to all intents and purposes, as a surety. Thus where the holder knowing that the acceptance was for accommodation, and himself possessed goods of the drawer from the proceeds of which he expected payment, told the acceptor and his creditors that he should look to the drawer, and not come upon the acceptor; and, in consequence, the acceptor assigned his property for the benefit of his creditors, it was held, that if by the facts an unconditional renunciation was established, it was a discharge of the acceptor, although the goods in the possession of the holder proved to be of little value, and the drawer was insolvent; but if

violate a fundamental rule, but the reason may be that the distinction between a release under seal, and a release not under seal, is quite unknown in foreign countries. An express and complete renunciation by the holder of his claim on any party to the bill is therefore, according to the law merchant, equivalent to a release under seal. And as it would be highly inconvenient to introduce nice distinctions, and nice questions of international law, all the contracts on a foreign bill, though negotiated or made in England, and all the contracts on an inland bill, depending, as they do, on the same law merchant, may be so released. And such a relaxation of the general rule on the case of bills of exchange is not unreasonable on another ground. The money due at the maturity of a bill of exchange is in practice expected to be paid immediately, and in many cases with remedies over in favor of the debtor. Parties liable who are expressly told that recourse will not, in any event, be had to them, are almost sure, in consequence, to alter their conduct and position."

the words imported only that the renunciation was conditional, and that the holder only looked to the drawer in the first instance, the acceptor was not discharged.¹ So where the holder arrested the acceptor, and finding that he had accepted for accommodation of Dallas, the drawer, his attorney, took security from Dallas, and wrote to the acceptor that "he had settled with Dallas, and he (the acceptor) need not trouble himself any further," it was held that the acceptor was discharged.² But where an accommodation acceptor applied to the holder to give up the bill, which he refused to do, but said the acceptor should not be troubled about it, it was held, under the circumstances, that the acceptor was not discharged.³

§ 544. The text writers generally concur in the doctrine that even where the acceptance is for value and in the usual course of business an express renunciation by the holder of the right to proceed against the acceptor, operates as a waiver of such right, and discharges the acceptor.⁴ And there is authority to support the doctrine. Where one Walpole, holding a bill accepted by Pulteney, agreed to consider his acceptance at an end, and wrote in his bill book the memorandum, "Mr. Pulteney's acceptance at an end," and kept the bill from 1772 to 1775 without calling on Pulteney, it was held that the latter was discharged.⁵ In the cases where the renunciation is express, it will discharge the acceptor although without consideration, for the reason that it would operate as a fraud upon him to hold otherwise. And the doctrine arises out of the peculiar relations of the parties.⁶ The acceptor enters into his engagement with funds of the drawer in his

¹ *Whatley v. Tricker*, 1 Camp. 35 (1807); *Chitty, Jr.*, 740; *Chitty on Bills* [*311], 350; *Story on Bills*, § 266; 1 *Parsons N. & B.* 324.

² *Black v. Peele*, cited in *Dingwall v. Dunster*, 1 *Douglas*, 247; *Chitty, Jr.*, 403; *Bayley on Bills*, 188.

³ *Adams v. Gregg*, 2 *Stark.* 531 (1819); *Chitty, Jr.*, 1076.

⁴ *Bayley on Bills*, 187, 188; *Story on Bills*, § 267; 1 *Parsons N. & B.* 325.

⁵ *Walpole v. Pulteney*, cited in *Dingwall v. Dunster*, 1 *Douglas*, 248; *Chitty Jr.*, 401; *Story on Bills*, § 267.

⁶ *Byles on Bills* [*191], 323; see remarks of that author quoted in note 6, § 542.

hands, or under some business arrangement according to his course of dealing, and if the holder expressly renounces claim against him, his hands are then untied, and he is left free to account to the drawer for the funds in his hands, or at least is no longer bound to appropriate them to the payment of the bill, or to carry out the arrangements contemplated for its payment. To permit the holder, after thus exonerating the acceptor, to recur to him for payment, would work in many cases the harshest injustice, and he is estopped from doing so.¹

§ 545. It is absolutely requisite according to some authorities that the renunciation of claim against the acceptor should be express.² In a case where the accommodation acceptor wrote to the holder that he had been informed that the drawer had taken up the bill, and given another to his (the holder's) satisfaction, and the holder took no notice of it, but received interest from the drawer for several years, and during that time did not call on the acceptor, it was held that the latter was not discharged. Ashurst, J., said: "An acceptor makes himself a debtor, and his case is different from that of the other parties to the bill. Nothing but an express discharge will do." Willes, J.: "I do not think silence can discharge the acceptor. No case of tacit discharge has been produced." Buller, J.: "Nothing but an express agreement can discharge an acceptor."³ But if an agreement may discharge the acceptor we do not see why it may not be implied as well as expressed. It is the fact and not the form that

¹ See Story on Bills, § 267; very nearly concurring with the text is the observation of Professor Parsons, in 1 Parsons N. & B. 326-7, note x, where it is said: "The true ground it is conceived is, that a waiver works by way of estoppel rather than by way of contract. We should prefer to state the rule thus: an express renunciation, founded upon a consideration, or honestly and fairly acted upon by the holder, so as to put him in a worse situation than if the renunciation had not been made; or any act upon the part of the holder, giving the acceptor reasonable ground to infer that the former had renounced all claim upon him, and acted upon, amounts to discharge."

² *Dingwall v. Dunster*, 1 Doug. 247; 13 East, 430 (1789); Byles on Bills (Sharswood's ed.) [*191], 323; Edwards on Bills, 435.

³ *Dingwall v. Dunster*, *supra*.

should be looked to. And all that is necessary to discharge the acceptor is that the renunciation of claim against him should be clearly made out whether by words or acts. What is meant by the declaration that the renunciation must be express is doubtless nothing more than that it must be unmistakable, distinct and direct, and is not to be inferred from the mere circumstance of delay. To say that "the circumstances must amount to an express renunciation" defines the correct doctrine—that it must be equally as clear.¹

§ 546. It is quite clear that, as the acceptor is the principal debtor, mere delay to proceed against him will not discharge him.² It was so held where, in a suit by an indorsee against the acceptor, no demand was proved till three months after the bill had fallen due, and the drawer had in the meantime become insolvent.³ Nor will receiving interest from the drawer or indorser;⁴ nor giving time to them when

¹ See *Farquhar v. Southey*, 2 Car. & P. 497; *Wintermute v. Post*, 4 N. J. 420. In *Parker v. Leigh*, 2 Stark. 228 (1817), indorsee sued acceptor. It appeared that when he threatened suit, the acceptor called to ascertain the amount, and the plaintiff showed an account containing several claims, among which was the bill sued on. The plaintiff said that as to the sum on the bill for £300, he should look to the drawer for it; that the sum of £160 was due upon it, and that he held the warrant of attorney of an Irish baronet for the amount. The defendant supposing that he was settling the whole of the plaintiff's claim paid the amount, which he said he should not otherwise have done. The court did not regard the renunciation as unconditional; but that the holder only intended to look to the drawer first. This is, we think, the gist of the decision. Lord Ellenborough said: "If he does not expressly renounce all claim upon the security, it still remains valid in point of law. If the party were to forego a bill in equity on that account, it would be a good consideration for a renunciation of part of his claim; but the ground of renunciation must be distinctly proved. The plaintiff probably might suppose that Williams (the drawer) would pay the bill, and that he should not have occasion to call upon the defendant. I am of opinion that in point of law the circumstances do not amount to an express renunciation, and nothing short of that will be sufficient to discharge the defendant from his acceptance of the bill." *Bayley on Bills*, 189.

² *Ante*, § 545.

³ *Anderson v. Cleveland*, 13 East, 430 (1779). Lord Mansfield said: "The acceptor of a bill or maker of a note always remains liable. The acceptance is proof of having assets in his hands, and he ought never to part with them, unless he is sure that the bill has been paid by the drawer."

⁴ *Farquhar v. Southey*, 2 Car. & P. 497; *Moody & M.* 14; *Dingwall v. Dunster*, 1 Doug. 247.

the acceptance is for value.¹ And when the acceptance is for accommodation, the case will not be altered, as we think,² though some cases take a different view.³ This branch of the subject is amply discussed in the chapter on Principal and Surety.⁴

§ 547. *Failure of consideration for acceptance.*—If the consideration inducing an acceptance afterward fail, it will, nevertheless, be binding to the payee or other holder, if such failure were not occasioned by his fault;⁵ and if by the acceptance the time of payment were extended, or the terms of the bill otherwise varied, the acceptor cannot object to the alteration;⁶ nor will his obligation be varied by the fact that the bill was accepted after the time of payment had passed.⁷

§ 548. An acceptor, being the primary debtor as to the holder, will not be discharged by taking security from the other parties, or giving them time to pay the bill.⁸ But taking a co-extensive security from the acceptor himself by specialty will discharge him,⁹ unless it recognizes the bill as still existing, in which case it will not.¹⁰ If the holder receive from the acceptor another bill indorsed by the acceptor, as satisfaction or security for the first bill, he discharges him both as acceptor and indorser, by neglect to give him notice of dishonor of the last bill;¹¹ but not if the last bill was given as collateral security and not indorsed by him.¹²

§ 549. A cancellation by the holder or by a third party is evidence of a waiver, and whether the cancellation in the latter case was by the holder's consent or not, is for the jury to

¹ Story on Bills, § 268; *post*, § 547.

² 1 Parsons N. & B. 325. See Chapter XLI, on Discharge of Surety, Vol. 2.

³ *Ibid*.

⁴ See Chapter XLI, Vol. 2.

⁵ Corbin v. Southgate, 3 Hen. & M. 319.

⁶ U. S. v. Bank of Metropolis, 15 Pet. 395; 2 Rob. Prac. (N. ed.) 151.

⁷ Mitford v. Wallcot, 1 Salk. 129.

⁸ Story on Bills, § 268, and numerous cases cited; see *ante*, § 546.

⁹ Ansell v. Baker, 15 Q. B. 20 (69 E. C. L. R.)

¹⁰ Twopenny v. Young, 3 B. & C. 208.

¹¹ Bridges v. Berry, 3 Taunt. 130.

¹² Bishop v. Rowe, 3 Maule & Sel. 362.

determine.¹ If the cancellation is by mistake, it does not operate as a discharge;² but if the holder, knowing the mistake, causes the bill to be noted for non-acceptance, he is estopped from saying it was accepted.³

¹ *Sweeting v. Halse*, 9 B. & C. 365 (17 E. C. L. R.); 4 Man. & R. 287.

² *Wilkinson v. Johnson*, 3 B. & C. 428; *Raper v. Birkbeck*, 15 East, 17; *Novelli v. Rossi*, 2 B. & Ad. 757.

³ *Sproat v. Matthews*, 1 T. R. 182; *Bentnick v. Dorrien*, 6 East, 199; 1 Parsons N. & B. 328.

CHAPTER XIX.

PROMISES TO ACCEPT BILLS OF EXCHANGE.—HOW AFFECTED BY THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

SECTION I.

WRITTEN AND VERBAL PROMISES TO ACCEPT EXISTING AND NON-EXIST- ING BILLS.

§ 550. *First. A written promise to the drawer to accept an existing bill which is communicated to a third party, and induces him to take the bill upon the credit thereby excited, is undoubtedly, by the decisions in England and in the United States, the same as an actual acceptance.* “The defendant,” said Lord Ellenborough, in such a case, “has thereby enabled another with truth to assert, and furnished him with the means of proving that assertion, by the production of the defendant’s letter, that he had undertaken to accept the bills, which in ordinary mercantile understanding amounts to an acceptance, and by that credit was attached to the bills. * * * It may be for the convenience of mercantile affairs that a bill may be accepted by a collateral writing, without the bill itself coming to the actual touch of the acceptor, which would sometimes create great delay. This acceptance being by writing comes within all the cases cited.”¹ And to this extent go all the decisions.²

¹ Clarke v. Cock, 4 East, 57 (1803).

² McEvers v. Mason, 10 Johns. 213; Goodrich v. Gordon, 15 Johns. 6; Wilson v. Clements, 3 Mass. 10; Greele v. Parker, 5 Wend. 514; Grant v. Shaw, 16 Mass. 341; Edson v. Fuller, 2 Foster, 183; 1 Parsons N. & B. 298; Cassel v. Dows, 1 Blatchf. C. C. 335; Cook v. Miltenberger, 23 La. Ann. 377; Steman v. Harrison, 42 Penn. St. 57; Vance v. Ward, 2 Dana, 95; Carrollton Bank v. Tayleur, 16 La. O. S. 490; Russell v. Wiggin, 2 Story C. C. 214; Storer v. Logan, 9 Mass. 58.

§ 551. *Second.* A written promise to the drawer to accept a non-existing bill, which is communicated to a third party, and induces him to take the bill, it is also agreed by the English and United States decisions to be the same as an actual acceptance. The United States Supreme Court declares that "upon a review of the cases which are reported, a letter written within a reasonable time before or after the date of a bill of exchange, describing it in terms not to be mistaken, and promising to accept it, is, if shown to the person who afterward takes the bill on the credit of the letter, a virtual acceptance."¹ And where the letter was written on the 17th of April, and the bills were drawn on the 1st of May following, and taken on the faith of the promise to accept contained in it, Lord Mansfield said :² "If one man, to give credit to another, makes an absolute promise to accept his bill, the drawer or any other person may show such promise on the exchange to get credit;" and held that the letter writer would be bound as an acceptor. To this extent the authorities generally concur.³ And a telegram, it has been held, would stand on the same footing as a letter.⁴ In a recent New York case where the defendant authorized in writing one Loveland as his agent to draw upon him, and money was advanced upon a bill drawn by the agent in pursuance of such authority, it was said : "The language of the instrument

¹ Coolidge v. Payson, 2 Wheat. 66; Boyce v. Edwards, 4 Pet. 111; Schimmelpennich v. Bayard, 1 Pet. 264.

² Mason v. Hunt, 1 Doug. 297 (1780).

³ Kennedy v. Geddes, 8 Porter (Ala.) 268; Kendrick v. Campbell, 1 Bailey, 552; Goodrich v. Gordon, 15 Johns. 11; Greele v. Parker, 5 Wend. 414; Storer v. Logan, 9 Mass. 58; Wilson v. Clements, 3 Mass. 10; Gates v. Parker, 43 Me. 544; Steman v. Harrison, 42 Penn. St. 57; Vance v. Ward, 2 Dana, 95; Russell v. Wiggin, 2 Story C. C. 214; Wildes v. Savage, 1 Story C. C. 22. But it is also held, in this case, that if the bill be payable after sight, and not after date, a promise to accept a non-existing bill does not amount to an acceptance.

⁴ Central Savings Bank v. Richards, 109 Mass. 414, Morton, J.: "The telegram sent to the St. Louis Zinc Company was an authority for it to draw the bill of exchange in suit, and necessarily implied a promise to accept it. This telegram was shown to the plaintiffs, who thereupon discounted the bill. They took the bill upon the faith of the defendants' promise, and are entitled to hold them as acceptors."

amounts to an unconditional written promise to accept the draft, plaintiff having discounted it upon the faith of the authority for a valuable consideration.¹

§ 552. *Third. As to a written promise to the drawer to accept an existing bill, which was not communicated to the holder, and therefore did not enter into the inducement to take it, the decisions are in a condition of inextricable confusion. In a number of them the inquiry whether or not the holder was induced by the promise to take the bill, is held the criterion of its effect, whether such promise be written or verbal. In others, it is considered immaterial. In an early case, where the bill was drawn April 3d, and the letter, declaring that "it should be duly honored and placed to the drawer's debit," within ten days after, but not communicated to the holder, it was held an acceptance, available to him.² Subsequently, where the plaintiffs, who were indorsees of the payee, sued the drawee of a bill, who had written a letter to the drawer, after the bill had been protested for non-acceptance while in the plaintiffs' hands, stating that they "would accept or certainly pay all the bills which have hitherto appeared," Lord Ellenborough adhered to this precedent, declaring that he only conformed an established rule of law "on a subject which, least of all others, endured uncertainty and change."³ But this view may be regarded as overruled, for the great preponderance of authority is to the effect that, unless the holder took the bill on the face of the promise, it is not an acceptance.⁴ And in Massachusetts, it has been held that a promise to accept a bill contained in a letter to the drawer, written after the holder took the bill, would not enable him to sue the drawee as acceptor, even though the bill was ex-*

¹ Merchants' Bank v. Griswold, 16 N. Y. S. C. (9 Hun), 565.

² Powell v. Monnier, 1 Atk. 611 (1737).

³ Wynne v. Raikes, 5 East, 514; 2 Smith, 98, S. C. (1804); see Fairlee v. Herring, 3 Bing. 525 (1826).

⁴ Pierson v. Dunlop, 2 Cowp. 571 (1777); Kennedy v. Geddes, 8 Porter (Ala.) 268; Lagrue v. Woodruff, 28 Ga. 649; McEvers v. Mason, 10 Johns. 207; Lewis v. Kramer, 3 Md. 289; Storer v. Logan, 9 Mass. 58; Wilson v. Clements, 3 Mass. 10.

pressed to be drawn "against twelve bales of cotton," and had been discounted on the credit thereof.¹ There are, however, cases in the United States which hold the contrary view as applied to existing bills, and maintain that they need not have been taken on faith of the promise to make it operate as an acceptance.²

§ 553. *Fourth. As to a written promise to the drawer to accept a non-existing bill, which was not communicated to the holder* before he received it, the decisions are, alike, jarring and perplexing. More than a century ago it was held that a written promise, contained in a letter, to honor a bill to be drawn, operated as an acceptance of it, although the credit on which the bill was drawn was given before the promise to accept was made; and the doctrine there recognized is that a naked promise to accept operates as an acceptance, whether the holder take the bill on the faith of it or not. Lord Mansfield said: "'I will give the bill due honor,' is the same as accepting it. If a man agrees that he will do the formal part, the law looks upon it (in the case of an acceptance of a bill) as if actually done. This is an engagement 'to accept the bill, if there was a necessity to accept it, and to pay it when due,' and they could not afterward retract. It would be very destructive to trade, and to trust in commercial dealing if they could." Mr. Justice Wilmot said: "*Fides servanda est*; an acceptance for the honor of the drawer shall bind the acceptor, and so shall a verbal acceptance. And whether this be an actual acceptance, or an agreement to accept, it ought equally to bind." Mr. Justice Yates said: "A promise to accept is the same as an actual acceptance; and a small matter amounts to an acceptance." Mr. Justice Aston declared that "a promise to accept was an implied acceptance."³

¹ Bank of St. Louis v. Rice, 98 Mass. 288; s. c. 107 Mass. 41.

² Mason v. Dousay, 35 Ill. 424; Jones v. Bank of Iowa, 34 Ill. 313; Read v. Marsh, 5 B. Monr. 8.

³ Pillan v. Van Mierop, 3 Burr. 1633 (1765); see *ante*, § 552.

In Read v. Marsh, 5 B. Mon. 10 (1844), Breck, J., said: "It seems to be now

§ 554. But Lord Mansfield soon qualified the opinion quoted, by observing in a subsequent case (where, however, the promise was made to the holder of an existing bill), that: "It has been truly said, as a general rule that the mere answer of a merchant to the drawer of a bill, saying, 'he will duly honor it,' is no acceptance unless accompanied with circumstances which may induce a third person to take the bill by indorsement. But if there are any such circumstances, it may amount to an acceptance, though the answer be contained in a letter to the drawer."¹ And this view generally obtains, that the promise to the drawer must induce the holder to take the bill, thereafter drawn, in order to amount to acceptance of it.²

§ 555. *Fifth. As to a verbal promise to accept an existing bill, which is communicated to the holder*, and induces him to take it, it was conceded by Le Blanc, J., in the case cited below,³ that it would amount to an acceptance (upon the authority of *Pierson v. Dunlop*, ante, § 554); but the bill in question having been drawn subsequent to the promise, this particular question did not arise.

§ 556. *Sixth. As to a verbal promise to accept a non-existing bill, which is communicated to the holder* and induces him to take it; this particular point was decided by the Court of Exchequer, which held that, notwithstanding the bill had been discounted on the credit of the promise, by the holder, it did not amount to an acceptance of it.⁴ And the same view has been taken in the United States.⁵

§ 557. *Seventh. As to a verbal promise to accept an existing bill, not communicated to the holder before he takes it.*—We

well settled that a letter, promising to accept or protect a bill, whether written before or after it is drawn, may operate as an acceptance, and that it may so operate, although the holder has not been induced by such letter or promise to take the bill."

¹ *Pierson v. Dunlop*, 2 Cow. 571 (1777).

² *Lewis v. Kramer*, 3 Md. 289; *Storer v. Logan*, 9 Mass. 58; ante, § 552.

³ *Johnson v. Collings*, 1 East, 98 (1800).

⁴ *Bank of Ireland v. Archer*, 11 M. & W. (1843), Parke, B.

⁵ *Kennedy v. Geddes*, 8 Porter (Ala.), 268; see 2 Rob. Prac. (N. ed.) 156.

know of no case in which this identical question has been decided. Its determination must be reached according to the principles stated under other heads.

§ 558. *Eighth. As to a verbal promise to accept a non-existing bill, not communicated to the holder*, this was held no acceptance in an English case; but Le Blanc, J., thought, if he had taken the bill on the faith of the promise, it would be different. Grose, J., declared that: "No authority has been cited to show that by the law merchant a mere promise to accept a bill to be drawn in future, amounts to an actual acceptance of the bill when drawn." Lord Kenyon, C. J., said that the fact that this was a non-existing bill varied the case from those previously decided, and that "he knew not by what law such a promise was binding as an acceptance."¹ And this view is generally concurred in.²

§ 559. From this review of the adjudicated cases it will be seen how vacillating and conflicting they have been. In some the criterion is declared to be, whether or not the holder took the bill on the faith of the promise. In others, this is deemed immaterial. In some, a distinction is taken between existing and non-existing bills; and in some between written and verbal promises. And it is often lamented that anything has been deemed to be an acceptance of a bill but an express acceptance in writing.³ Certainly this would have greatly simplified the law; but this is not the law. And, amid jarring opinions we are left to pursue the course which reason commends. As verbal acceptance is as effectual as written acceptance, it would seem to follow as a necessary sequence, that a parol promise to accept should be as effectual as a written promise—provided no statutory enactment discriminated between them. In either case, however, it is a sound view of the law, as it seems to

¹ Johnson v. Collings, 1 East, 98 (1800); see 2 Rob. Prac. (N. ed.) 153.

² Bank of Michigan v. Ely, 17 Wend. 508; Wilson v. Clements, 3 Mass. 10.

³ Johnson v. Collings, 1 East, 98 (1800), Lord Kenyon, C. J.; Boyce v. Edwards, 4 Pet. 122; Espy v. Bank of Cincinnati, 18 Wall. 620; 2 Rob. Prac. (N. ed.), 153.

us, to require either that the promise should be made to the holder of the bill then in possession of it, in which case he is brought in privity with the drawee;¹ or that the promise, when made to the drawer, should have been communicated to the holder, and entered into the inducement to his taking it. It is true, that if there had been an actual acceptance of the bill by parol, or otherwise, before the holder took it, it would be available to him, although he was unconscious of it until afterward. It would be the same as a faintly written acceptance on the bill, subsequently discovered—for it was engrafted on the bill in law at the time. But a promise to accept is different. When made to the drawer it may be construed as authority to him to tell the holder that the drawee will accept it. If the drawer exercises that authority the holder is brought in privity with the drawee, and the promise to accept may be regarded, in such a case, as an acceptance by anticipation. But if not communicated to the holder the drawer only is wronged by the breach of promise—the proposition from the drawee to the drawer, the authority from the drawee is unexercised—no new credit or obligation respecting the bill is created; and the drawer, in case of subsequent dishonor, must be left to sue the drawee for breach of promise to accept.

§ 560. In order that the promise to accept a non-existing bill shall amount to acceptance, there are two indispensable requisites: *First*, that it should be written within a reasonable time before the bill is drawn, for otherwise the drawer will be presumed to have declined to act on the authority granted him to draw, and the drawee will not be construed to have intended an indefinite liability.² And *second*, the promise must so describe the bill that there can be no doubt of its application to it. High authorities go further, and declare that the promise must put its finger, so to speak, upon the specific bill; and that otherwise, if the promise be

¹ Miln v. Prest, 4 Camp. 393 (1816).

² Coolidge v. Payson, 2 Wheat. 66; Greele v. Parker, 5 Wend. 414; Cassel v. Dows, 1 Blatch. C. C. 335.

broken, the promisor may be sued by the drawer for breach of promise to accept; but cannot be sued by any one as acceptor.¹ Thus where a letter of credit addressed to Mr. A. stated: "Mr. B. C., of D., is authorized to draw on us for the amount of any lots of cotton which he may buy and ship to us, as soon after as opportunity will offer; such drafts will be duly honored by, yours, &c., E. F.;" it was held that it did not operate as an acceptance of certain bills drawn by A. on E. F. The reasons assigned were, first, that it was written two years before the bill was drawn, and, further, "what is conclusive against its being considered an acceptance," said Thompson, J., "is, that it has no reference whatever to these particular bills, but is a general authority to draw at any time, and to any amount, upon lots of cotton shipped to them."²

§ 561. But, while it should clearly appear that the bill corresponds to the authority, or promise, we cannot perceive that there should be any nicety of description either as to number, amount, date, or otherwise. The burden of proof is upon the holder to establish that by comparing the face of the bill with the promise; or the bill in connection with the transaction in which it is drawn with the promise—that it comes fairly and reasonably within its terms. This done, there can be no reason why the promisor may not be sued as an acceptor, as well as for breach of promise to accept. In either case the correspondence of the bill with the promise must be proved, and a cause of action existing there does not seem to be any sufficient reason for determining that the character of the proof must shape its form, and also determine whether it shall be brought by the holder of the bill who has taken it on the faith of the promise, or by the drawer, whose just expectations have been disappointed. The doctrine that the drawer may sue for breach of promise

¹ Coolidge v. Payson, 2 Wheat. 66; Boyce v. Edwards, 4 Pet. 111; Schimelpennich v. Bayard, 1 Pet. 264; Cassel v. Dows, 1 Blatch. 335; Carrollton Bank v. Tayleur, 16 La. O. S. 490.

² Boyce v. Edwards, 4 Pet. 11.

to accept when the bill is not accurately described in the promise, but that such promise does not operate as an acceptance, has been well said to rest on a distinction without a difference.¹ And in New York the views here expressed have been adopted in numerous cases. Where the letter of credit addressed to the drawers ran, "I hereby authorize you to draw on me, at ninety days, from time to time, for such amounts as you may require, provided that the whole amount running and unpaid shall not exceed three thousand dollars, &c.," Bronson, J.,² after quoting the cases cited in the subjoined note,³ said: "These cases show that the written promise to accept need not contain a particular description or identification of the bill to be drawn. It is enough that it be drawn in pursuance of the authority. The plaintiff received and discounted the bill upon the faith of the letter, and it was drawn in pursuance of the authority; the judge was right in charging the jury that there was a sufficient acceptance." In a recent Illinois case this view was admirably stated and illustrated.⁴

¹ Bissell v. Lewis, 4 Mich. 450; Nelson v. First Nat Bank, 48 Ill. 39.

² Ulster County Bank v. McFarland, 5 Hill, 444 (1843); 3 Denio, 553 (1846).

³ Parker v. Greele, 2 Wend. 545; Greele v. Parker, 5 Wend. 414; Bank of Michigan v. Ely, 17 Wend. 508.

⁴ In Nelson v. First National Bank, 48 Ill. 39, it appeared that a party had taken a check upon the faith of a promise by the bank to pay the drawer's check. The Court said: "It is objected in the present case by counsel for appellee, that the promise to pay by the bank did not sufficiently identify the checks to which the promise was to be applied, and the case of Boyce v. Edwards, 4 Pet. 122, is cited as an authority in point. The authority of that case is certainly to the effect that the promise of the bank cannot be treated as a technical acceptance, for want of identification of the checks. We may be permitted to say, however, that the difference between a promise to accept a particular bill or check to be thereafter drawn, and a promise to accept all checks which a person might draw for a specific purpose, is so extremely technical and refined that we should be inclined, where the plaintiff had received the check or bill upon the faith of the promise, and had sued on the promise as an acceptance, to hold with the Supreme Court of Michigan, Bissell v. Lewis, 4 Mich. 450, that it was a distinction without a difference. It seems to us, a fair construction of the language of Chief Justice Marshall would require, not that the promise should describe the bill to be drawn and accepted, by its date and amount, and the name of the drawee, as that would be generally impossible; but merely in such a mode that there could be no possible doubt as to the application of the promise to the bill

§ 562. The rule that the promise to accept, designating the specific bill, amounts to an acceptance, seems applicable only to the cases of bills payable on demand, or at a fixed time after date, and not to bills payable at or after sight; for, in order to constitute an acceptance in the latter cases, a presentment is indispensable, since the time that the bill is to run cannot be otherwise ascertained.¹ And a mere promise to accept without more, it is thought, applies only to bills payable at the drawee's or payee's place of business.²

An offer to accept a draft which is still in the drawer's

to be drawn. A description of sufficient certainty could thus be made to apply to a series of bills, as well as to one bill. In the present case, for example, there can be no difficulty in applying the promise of the bank to the check under consideration. Indeed, in this very case of *Boyce v. Edwards*, the court, while giving so technical a construction to the language of Chief Justice Marshall, say the reason of the rule is, 'that the party who takes the bill upon the credit of such authority may not be mistaken in its application.' If that be the reason of the rule, it would seem that any description should be held sufficiently certain which would leave no doubt that a particular bill or series of bills was intended by the promise, and had been negotiated upon its faith."

"The question, however, whether the promise in this case can be considered a technical acceptance, we do not propose to decide, and it is, indeed, of no practical importance, for in this same case of *Boyce v. Edwards*, on which counsel for appellant rely as showing the promise not to be an actual acceptance, it is held that, though a recovery cannot be had upon the bill as an accepted bill, it may be had in an action founded upon a breach of the promise to accept. In an action of the latter character the court say, 'the evidence may be of a more general character, and the authority to draw may be collected from circumstances, and extended to all bills coming fairly within the scope of the promise.' The court further say, 'as respects the rights and the remedy of the immediate parties to the promise to accept, and all others who may take bills upon the credit of such promise, they are equally secure and equally attainable by an action for the breach of the promise to accept, as they could be by an action on the bill itself.' That a recovery may be had in an action of the character above indicated, is also held in *Cassel v. Dows*, 1 Blatch. 335; *Russell v. Wiggins*, 2 Story, 213; *Lonsdale v. Lafayette Bank*, 18 Ohio, 126; *Bissell v. Lewis*, 4 Mich. 450. See also *Storer v. Logan*, 9 Mass. 55; *Carnegie v. Morrison*, 2 Metc. 406; *Goodrich v. Gordon*, 15 Johns. 6; *Schimmelpennich v. Bayard*, 1 Pet. 264."

"That the promise of the bank in this case so far identified the checks to which it was to be applied as to enable the appellant to maintain an action for its breach, is settled by the foregoing authorities and by others which might be cited."

¹ See Story on Bills (Bennett's ed.), § 249; Edwards on Bills, 414; Wildes v. Savage, 1 Story C. C. R. 28.

² Michigan State Bank v. Leavenworth, 28 Vt. 209.

hands may be withdrawn at any time before it has been actually presented for acceptance.¹

§ 563. *In respect to the person who may avail himself of an acceptance*, it is obvious that if it be written upon the bill, every holder acquires it as constituting in chief the instrument itself. And there seems to be no difference in the law when the acceptance is contained in a separate writing, or has been by parol merely, and whether the holder has been informed of its existence or not. Thus, where a letter was written by the drawees of a bill in England to the drawer in America, stating that "they would certainly accept or pay the bill," it was held an acceptance in law, although the bill was refused payment, and the letter was not received by the drawer until after the bill became due.² And so, where there had been a parol acceptance of a bill, it was held that the acceptor was bound to the indorsee, although the latter had caused the bill to be protested in ignorance of such acceptance.

"It has been determined in a great variety of cases," said Best, C. J., "that if a bill comes into a man's hands with a parol acceptance, though the party who receives the bill does not know of that parol acceptance, he has a right to avail himself of it afterward. It is impossible for any man to doubt, on principles of common sense, that such ought to be the law; for if I take a bill, I take it with every advantage the holder had before it came into my hands. * * If the plaintiffs were ignorant of this (the parol acceptance), it is quite impossible that that which they have done in ignorance can prejudice any right which was before vested in them."³

§ 564. *The measure of damages for non-performance of an agreement to accept a draft for the drawer's accommodation*, which is still in his hands, is the inconvenience and loss thereby occasioned to him, and not the amount of the draft.⁴

¹ *Ilsley v. Jones*, 12 Gray, 260.

² *Wynne v. Raikes*, 5 East, 514 (1804).

³ *Fairlee v. Herring*, 3 Bing. 625; 11 Moore, 520, S. C. (1826).

⁴ *Ilsley v. Jones*, 12 Gray, 260.

In case a debt is lost by the negligence of an agent to present the bill for acceptance or payment, the measure of damages is *prima facie* the amount of the bill ; but evidence is admissible to reduce the amount to a nominal sum.¹

§ 565. If, by promise and liability to accept, a drawee induces a drawer to draw upon him, and then refuses to honor the bill, he will be liable for all damages incurred, including protest. In a case before the U. S. Supreme Court it appeared that the defendant had ordered the plaintiff to purchase salt for him, and draw on him for the amount, and he having so purchased and drawn, it was held that the defendant was bound to accept the bills, and having failed to do so, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the amount of the bills, with damages and costs of protest, upon a count for money paid and expended, and that the bills themselves were good evidence on that count.²

It seems that if a person should write a factor that he had consigned him certain goods, and would draw a bill on the credit thereof for a certain amount, the factor, if he accepted the consignment, would be bound to accept the bill ; and that the payee of such a bill could sue the factor as upon a breach of promise to accept.³

SECTION II.

HOW PAROL ACCEPTANCE IS AFFECTED BY THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

§ 566. In those States where there is no statute prescribing what shall constitute an acceptance, the question of the validity of a verbal acceptance may become referable to the statute of frauds, which declares that all promises to pay the debt of another shall be void unless in writing. An eminent legal writer says on this subject that : "The parol acceptance being no more than a parol promise, it seems to the author that whether or not the acceptance can be charged on such

¹ Allen v. Suydam, 20 Wend. 321 ; Van Wort v. Woolley, 5 Dow. & Ry.

² Riggs v. Lindsay, 7 Cranch, 500.

³ 1 Parsons N. & B. 291.

promise may depend on whether the promise is to pay a debt of his own, or to answer for the debt of another. For, in the latter case, no action can be lawfully brought unless the promise, or some memorandum or note thereof, be in writing and signed by the party to be charged thereby or his agent. Such is the provision of the Code of Virginia.”¹ This view has been taken in Maine, where it was held that a parol promise to accept an order from a debtor in favor of his creditor, between whom and the maker of the promise there was no privity, was invalid under the statute of frauds, as a promise to pay the debt of another.² And there are other authorities to the same effect—that acceptance must be in writing if it be to pay the debt of another, otherwise it will be void.³

§ 567. It may well be doubted, however, whether or not the statute of frauds applies to that class of engagements which are regulated by the peculiar doctrines of the law merchant, and the weight of reason and of authority incline us to the opinion that it does not. A recent discriminating writer on “Verbal Agreements” lays it down as a cardinal principle, that “contracts the construction, validity and evidence of which depend upon so much of the law merchant as the common law recognizes, or the provisions of some other statute, are exceptions to the operation of this clause of the statute of frauds;”⁴ and the numerous cases which have held a verbal acceptance or promise to accept as binding are generally based upon the open assertion or tacit acknowledgment of this theory. A standard author considers a bill of exchange as a preferable form of security, on the ground that the statute of frauds does not apply to it;⁵ and such is the

¹ Conway Robinson, in his Practice, Vol. 2, new ed. p. 153.

² Plummer v. Lyman, 49 Me. 229.

³ Wakefield v. Greenhood, 29 Cal. 600, Sawyer, J., dissenting; Manley v. Geagan, 105 Mass. 445.

⁴ Throop on Verbal Agreements, p. 159, § 85.

⁵ Chitty on Bills, page 4, in which it is said: “This security is in some respects preferable to many others of a more formal nature; for each of the parties to a bill, by merely writing his name upon it as drawer, acceptor, or indorser impliedly guarantees the due payment of it at maturity, and the consideration,

general understanding, as we believe, of the commercial world.¹

§ 568. It is not necessary, however, as it seems, to maintain that the statute of frauds is wholly inapplicable to the cases arising under the law merchant (although such is, as we think, the true doctrine), in order to sustain the validity of verbal acceptances and promises to accept. They may be enforced in some cases upon well established principles of estoppel. The theory of a bill of exchange is that the drawer puts the payee in his place, and gives him the right to receive funds in the drawee's hands belonging to him. When the drawee accepts or promises to accept, he says, in effect, to the payee, "It is true, I have funds of the drawer, and will pay them to you as he directs." Now, if he really has funds, he does not undertake to pay "the debt of another" than himself, but simply to pay his own debt "to another" than his

in respect of which he became a party to it, can rarely be inquired into; whereas, in the case of an ordinary guaranty, the statute against frauds requires the consideration to be expressed, and other matters of form which frequently render an implied guaranty wholly imperative." In *Nelson v. First National Bank of Chicago*, 48 Ill. 41, where a parol promise to pay checks of the drawer was held binding, the Court said, *per* Lawrence, J.: "If a parol promise to accept an existing though non-present check is binding, we are wholly unable to discover why it should not be equally so as to a non-existing bill, under the authority of the American cases, in none of which is any distinction made between parol and written promises of this character, except where a written promise is expressly required by statute." See *ante*, pp. 416, 417.

¹ *Butler v. Prentiss*, 6 Mass. 430, Parsons, C. J., says: "Neither a bill of exchange on its face nor the indorsements are within the statute of frauds." In *Pillans v. Van Mierop*, 3 Burr. 1674, the defendants, in expectation of having funds of the payee in their hands, agreed to honor the plaintiff's draft to be thereafter drawn to reimburse them for money lent him. After the loan, but before the draft was drawn, the payee failed, and the defendants notified the plaintiff that the draft would not be accepted; but it was drawn nevertheless and dishonored. The agreement being by written correspondence, no question arose as to the statute of frauds; but Lord Mansfield said he had no idea that "promises for the debt of another" were applicable to the present case; that this was a mercantile transaction, and credit was given upon a supposition "that the person who was to draw upon the undertakers within a certain time had goods in his hands, or would have them. Here the plaintiffs trusted to this undertaking, therefore it is quite upon another foundation than that of a naked promise from one to pay the debt of another." See *Spalding v. Andrews*, 48 Penn. St. 411.

original creditor, as is conceded;¹ and when an acceptance or promise to accept is communicated to the holder, and he takes the bill on the faith thereof, he has a right to presume the condition of things which the acceptor or promisor to accept impliedly asserts, and such acceptor or promisor should be estopped from denying it. A promise by A. to pay his debt to B., by paying B.'s debt to C., has been well said, in Wisconsin, by Dixon, C. J., not to come under the statute of frauds, because simply a promise to pay his own debt "in that particular way."²

§ 569. There are cases which hold that a verbal acceptance without funds, or promise to accept, would not be valid, no consideration being given to the inquiry whether or not the holder knew the fact that the acceptance or promise was for accommodation.³ When the holder knows such promise or acceptance to be for accommodation, it stands on the same footing as a promise to indorse, which must be in writing in order to be valid, being plainly an engagement to answer for the debt of another;⁴ but the inferences to be drawn without such knowledge are altogether different, and it would create rather than prevent fraud, to permit the drawee to repudiate his acknowledgment of funds after a third party has contracted upon the faith of it.

§ 570. Where there is a new and independent consideration moving at the time from the party to whom the promise is made, the statute of frauds does not apply.⁵ Thus, the United States Supreme Court held, that if a person verbally

¹ *Shields v. Middleton*, 2 Cranch, C. C. 205; *Van Reimsdyck v. Kane*, 1 Gall. C. C. 633; *Pike v. Irwin*, 1 Sand. (N. Y.) 14; *Strohecker v. Cohen*, 1 Spears (S. C.), 349; *Brown*, Statute of Frauds, §§ 172-174. Agreement to pay one's own debt "to another" is not agreement to pay debt of another. *Spadine v. Reed*, 7 Bush (Ky.), 455; *Besshears v. Rowe*, 46 Mo. 501; see also *Spalding v. Andrews*, 48 Penn. St. 411.

² *Putney v. Farnham*, 27 Wis. 187; see § 570, note 1.

³ *Pike v. Irwin*, 1 Sand. (N. Y.) 14; *Quin v. Hanford*, 1 Hill (N. Y.), 82; *Brown* on Statute of Frauds, 174; see *Towusley v. Sumrall*, 2 Pet. 170.

⁴ *Carville v. Crane*, 5 Hill (N. Y.), 583; *Taylor v. Drake*, 4 Strobb. (So. Car.) 431.

⁵ See *Brown* on Statute of Frauds, § 175, note.

undertake to accept a bill in consideration that another will purchase one already drawn, or to be thereafter drawn, and as an inducement to the purchaser to take it, and the bill is purchased upon the credit of such promise for a sufficient consideration, such promise to accept was binding upon the party, and that it was an original promise, and not a promise to pay the debt of another within the statute of frauds. In this case the suit was for damages for breach of the contract, and therefore it was not decided that such a promise constituted acceptance.¹

¹ *Townley v. Sumrall*, 2 Pet. 170. Story, J., said: "This is not a case falling within the object or mischiefs of the statute of frauds. If A. says to B., pay so much money to C., and I will repay it to you, it is an original, independent promise; and if the money is paid on the faith of it, it has been always deemed an obligatory contract, even though it be by parol, because there is an original consideration moving between the immediate parties to the contract. Damage to the promisee constitutes as good a consideration as a benefit to the promisor. In cases not absolutely closed by authority, this court has already expressed a strong inclination not to extend the operation of the statute of frauds so as to embrace original and distinct promises made by different persons at the same time upon the same general consideration. *D'Wolf v. Rabaud*, 1 Pet. 476. * * * The question whether a parol promise to accept a non-existing bill amounts to an acceptance of the bill when drawn, is quite a different question, and does not arise in this case. If the promise to accept were binding, the plaintiff would be entitled to recover, although it should not be deemed a virtual acceptance; and the point, whether it was an acceptance or not, does not appear to have been made in the court below."

CHAPTER XX.

PRESENTMENT FOR PAYMENT.

§ 571. The engagement entered into by the acceptor of a bill and the maker of a note is, that it shall be paid at its maturity—that is, on the day that it falls due, and at the place specified for payment, if any place be designated—upon its presentment. This engagement is absolute, but that of the drawer of a bill and the indorser of a bill or note is conditional, and contingent upon the due presentment at maturity, and notice in case it is not paid. The maker and acceptor are bound, although the bill or note be not presented on the day it falls due; but the drawer and indorsers are discharged if such presentment be not made, unless some sufficient cause excuses the holder for failure to perform that duty.¹ It is important, therefore, to ascertain how the presentment should be provided for by the holder of the bill or note, lest by failure to observe the necessary precautions, the drawer and indorsers may be discharged, and the solvency of his debt destroyed or impaired. We shall consider, therefore, in order :

(1.) The person by whom the bill or note should be presented.

(2.) The person to whom the bill or note should be presented.

(3.) The time of presentment.

(4.) Days of grace, and computation of time.

(5.) The place of presentment.

(6.) The mode of presentment.

¹ Chitty on Bills 13 Am. ed.) [*353], 395 ; Story on Notes, § 201 ; Bayley on Bills, ch. 7, § 1 ; Magruder v. Bank of Washington, 3 Pet. 92.

SECTION I.

BY WHOM PRESENTMENT FOR PAYMENT MUST BE MADE.

§ 572. Any *bona fide* holder of a negotiable instrument, or any one lawfully in possession of it for the purpose of receiving payment, may present it for payment at maturity.¹ A notary public, or any agent duly authorized, may make presentment of the instrument for payment; and it is well settled that his authority need not be in writing.²

§ 573. *The mere possession* of a negotiable instrument which is payable to the order of the payee, and is indorsed by him in blank, or of a negotiable instrument payable to bearer, is in itself sufficient evidence of his right to present it, and to demand payment thereof.³ And payment to such person will always be valid, unless he is known to the payor to have acquired possession wrongfully. And if the party holding possession of a negotiable instrument which is not indorsed by the payee, or has been indorsed by him specially to another, and has not been indorsed over by such indorsee, but has been placed in the holder's hands as agent for the purpose of receiving payment, such agent may present it for payment, and payment to him will be valid; even, as it has been held, although made in a manner different from that provided for in the instructions to the agent. The fact that the instrument is not indorsed by the owner is, as has been held, under such circumstances, of no importance. Such indorsement would be necessary to the negotiation of the instrument, but it would not be necessary to the validity of the payment.⁴

¹ Lefty v. Mills, 4 T. R. 170; Bachellor v. Priest, 12 Pick. 399; Sussex Bank v. Baldwin, 2 Harrison, 487.

² Seaver v. Lincoln, 21 Pick. 267, in which case presentment was made by a sheriff; Shed v. Brett, 1 Pick. 40; Hartford Bank v. Barry, 17 Mass. 94; Freeman v. Boynton, 7 Mass. 483; Sussex Bank v. Baldwin, 2 Harrison, 487; Hartford Bank v. Stedman, 3 Conn. 489; Bank of Utica v. Smith, 18 Johns. 230; Williams v. Matthews, 18 Cow. 252.

³ Bachellor v. Priest, 12 Pick. 399; Cone v. Brown, 15 Rich. (S. C.) 362 (1868).

⁴ See Doubleday v. Kress, 60 Barb. 196 (1871), and § 575.

§ 574. When, however, a bill or note unindorsed by the payee, or indorsed by the payee specially, and unindorsed by the indorsee, is in the possession of another person, the question whether or not its bare possession is evidence of his right to demand payment, is of a different character. Without the indorsement of the payee or special indorsee, such possession would clearly not entitle the holder to the privileges of a *bona fide* holder for value, as at best he would only hold the equitable title to the instrument,¹ and could not sue at law upon it as a ground of action.² But it might be contended (and we were at one time of the opinion) that such possession should be regarded as evidence of the holder's right to demand payment as the agent of the payee or special indorsee; and that a payment to him would be valid, although he was in fact not authorized to receive it.³ But this we are now satisfied was a misconception of the law.⁴ Certainly if he were in fact the owner's agent, a payment to him would be valid, although he had produced no other evidence of the fact than the unindorsed instrument at the time when he received it. But the payment without other evidence of ownership or agency would be at the payor's risk. Possession without the indorsement might have been acquired by fraud or theft, and alone could not constitute sufficient evidence of any right to the instrument whatever, being without transfer of title, or any collateral circumstance of a transfer in trust. Had the owner authorized the holder to act as his agent, an indorsement "for collection" in terms, an indorsement in blank, or a written authority to collect it, would be the natural and proper mode of communicating the fact.

§ 575. Mr. Chitty says that any person who happens,

¹ See Chapter XXII, on Transfer by Assignment; also Chapter XXIV, Sec. VI.

² *Hull v. Conover*, 35 Ind. 372 (1871); *Porter v. Cushman*, 19 Ill. 572.

³ See *Southern Law Review* for April, 1873, p. 273.

⁴ See *ante*, § 573; *Story on Agency*, § 98; *Doubleday v. Kress*, 50 N. Y. 413 (overruling same case in 60 Barb. 181), *Peckham, J.*, saying: "Mere possession of the note by the assumed agent, *Murray*, unindorsed, without any other sustaining facts, is not sufficient to authorize payment to him."

whether by accident or otherwise (as by the failure of an agent), to be the holder at the time the bill or note becomes due, and although he has no right to require payment for his own benefit, may and ought to demand payment, and give notice of non-payment so as to prevent loss.¹

Doubtless the act of such unauthorized person would be sufficient to prevent loss, as the owner's ratification of it would be presumed; but it is not probable that the learned author intended to intimate the opinion that a payment to him would be valid unless ratified, or that his mere possession of the instrument, unless it was payable to bearer or indorsed in blank, was in itself evidence of a right to act as or for the owner. The doctrine of the text is sustained by high authority;² and since the foregoing was written has been judicially established in New York,³ and found favor in Ohio.⁴ If the holder have, and exhibit extraneous evidence of his ownership of the instrument, such, for instance, as an assignment and mortgage duly executed, this will suffice without indorsement, and the party to whom it is presented would then have no right to insist on an indorsement.⁵

§ 576. *Presentment by indorser*.—Whether or not an indorser of a bill or note which has upon it a subsequent special indorsement, and no prior indorsement in blank, is shown by mere possession of the paper to be entitled to demand payment, has been much questioned. There are a

¹ Chitty on Bills (13 Am. ed.) [*365], 410; see also [*394], 445. In a very early case it is said: "If a wrong person do show the bill, by the custom of merchants this is a good payment." Anonymous, Styles, 366 (1652); Edwards on Bills, 494.

² Thomson on Bills, 245; Pothier, 168.

³ Wardrop v. Dunlop, 1 Hun (8 N. Y. S. C. R.), 325 (1874); Doubleday v. Kress, 50 N. Y. 410 (1872).

⁴ Dodge v. National Exchange Bank, 30 Ohio St. 1.

⁵ Pease v. Warren, 25 Mich. 9 (1874). The bank denied the right of the holder to insist on payment without proving the payee's indorsement. Cooley, J., said: "The indorsement would have been necessary to enable him (the holder) to sue at law on the notes in his own name, but if he was the real owner he was entitled to demand and receive payment whether they were indorsed or not, and the formal assignment, duly acknowledged and recorded, was the best possible proof of ownership."

number of cases which hold that such an indorser cannot demand payment, for the reason that it would seem from the face of the paper itself that he had parted with his title; and that a receipt from the last indorsee, or a re-indorsement to him would be necessary to re-establish it. This doctrine was laid down in an early case by the Supreme Court of the United States,¹ and some of the State tribunals have taken the same view;² but in a more recent case the Supreme Court of the United States expressed the opposite opinion, which seems to us the correct one.³ Some of the cases hold that possession of the bill by a prior indorser is sufficient where the subsequent indorsements are canceled;⁴ but the better view seems to be, and it is sustained by most respectable authority, that it makes no difference that the subsequent indorsements remain uncanceled.⁵ The party may not be still the proprietor in interest of the instrument, but his possession of it would be *prima facie* evidence that he had paid it himself to a subsequent indorsee, and had re-acquired the right to demand payment. And it would also be consistent with the idea that he was holding it and suing for the benefit of a subsequent indorsee.⁶

§ 577. It is intimated by Story that a different rule

¹ Welch v. Lindo, 7 Cranch S. C. 159.

² Thompson v. Flower, 13 Mart. (La.) 301, where it was held that the last indorsement being canceled was insufficient; see also Sprigg v. Cuny, 19 Ib. 253. In Dehers v. Harriott, 1 Show. 163, it was held that a bill payable to A., and indorsed by him to B., and by B. to C., might be sued on by B., it appearing, however, that C. had no interest. And in Mendez v. Carreroon, 1 Ld. Raym. 742, the prior indorser suing the acceptor was non-suited, it appearing that he had been sued by a subsequent indorser, and not appearing that he had paid the bill.

³ Dugan v. United States, 3 Wheat. 172 (1818); see Domingo Franca v. ———, 12 Mod. 345 (1699).

⁴ Bank of Utica v. Smith, 18 Johns. 230; Bowie v. Duvall, 1 Gill. & J. 175; Chautauqua Co. Bank v. Davis, 21 Wend. 584; Dollfus v. Frosch, 1 Denio, 367; Brinkley v. Going, Breese, 288; Kyle v. Thompson, 2 Scam. 422.

⁵ Dugan v. United States, 3 Wheat. 172; Lonsdale v. Brown, 3 Wash. C. C. 404; Picquet v. Curtis, 1 Sum. 478; Norris v. Badger, 6 Cow. 449.

⁶ See Batchellor v. Priest, 12 Pick. 399; Bank U. S. v. U. S. 2 How. 711; Jones v. Fort, 9 B. & C. 764; Merz v. Kaiser, 20 La. Ann. 377.

might apply where the note was not originally negotiable to order, or, if negotiable, had been indorsed restrictively to a particular person only; and where, of course, in either case, the holder in possession is not the payee or the special indorsee thereof. Under such circumstances he considers the mere production of the note is not ordinarily deemed a sufficient title or authority to demand payment.¹ This is not in accordance with the views of Chitty, or the *ratio decidendi* of cases already quoted; for while title to the instrument cannot pass without the indorsement, the possession, it has been thought, may still be evidence of agency to demand payment. For reasons already stated, we think the views of Story are correct.²

§ 578. *When holder is dead.*—If the holder die before the time for presentment for payment, it must be made by his personal representative.³ If there be no personal representative at the time, presentment and demand within a reasonable time after his appointment will be sufficient to charge subsequent parties, although presentment and demand were not made at maturity.⁴

If the holder's estate has passed to an assignee in bankruptcy, the assignee, or some person authorized by him, should make presentment.⁵

If the holder is a *feme sole*, and she has become a married woman at maturity, the presentment should be made by her husband; and a presentment by her, without his consent or authority, would be insufficient to charge the maker, or validate a payment. If the note belonged to a partnership, and one member be dead at maturity, presentment should be made by the survivor.

§ 579. *Whether or not demand of payment of a foreign bill by a notary's clerk is sufficient as ground of protest.*—

¹ Story on Notes, § 247.

² See *ante*, §§ 574, 575.

³ 1 Parsons N. & B. 360; Story on Prom. Notes, § 249.

⁴ White v. Stoddard, 11 Gray, 528.

⁵ 1 Parsons N. & B. 360; Edwards on Bills, 494

There is no doubt, as we have already seen, that any person, whether he be a notary or not, having a bill or note in possession, and whether the bill be foreign or inland, may demand payment and receive the amount due; and that a payment to such person by the drawee will discharge his obligation.

But in respect to foreign bills which are dishonored by refusal of acceptance or payment, the liability of the drawer and indorsers can only be preserved by a protest and notice—notice alone being necessary in the case of inland bills. And the custom is, when a foreign bill is dishonored, to cause it to be placed in the hands of a notary public, and again presented on the same day, if indeed it were not presented by a notary in the first instance, and to be protested by him for non-acceptance or payment, as the case may be.¹ The question has been much debated whether or not a presentment by a notary's clerk will suffice as the foundation of such protest, and the authorities are at war upon it.

§ 580. *English Authorities*,—In *Leftly v. Mills*,² Buller, J., said: "I am not satisfied that it was a proper demand, for it was only made by the banker's clerk. The demand of a foreign bill must be made by a notary public, because he is a public officer." This *dictum* led Mr. Chitty, in an early edition of his work, to give apparent approval of the doctrine that the notary in person must make the demand. A correspondence then ensued between him and the notaries of London, the latter insisting "not only that by mercantile usage such presentment is regular (by a notary's clerk), and is almost invariably adopted, but that as far back as the memory of the oldest notary here can extend, it has always been the custom so to present them." And further, that commercial business must instantly come to a stand if a different rule prevailed; "because it would be just as impossible for all the bills in this country to be presented in person by notaries as by bankers." In reply, Mr. Chitty insisted, after careful con-

¹ Brooks' Notary, 3d ed. 71 (1867).

² 4 Term R. 170 (1791).

sideration, that "it was clear, that strictly the notary himself must in all cases make demand of payment before he protests;"¹ though he observes elsewhere in his work, that "the number of bills requiring presentment is frequently so great as to render a presentment by the notary himself impossible; and the constant practice is for the clerk to make the presentment."² And in a recent edition, it is said in a note by the learned editor, that the practice to allow the notary's clerk to make the demand, "is amply justified by the law of principal and agent, and not questioned in any case which has occurred before the courts of England."³ Professor Parsons quotes this language with seeming approbation,⁴ and there are considerations which go far to show that at common law demand by the notary's clerk is sufficient. In Scotland it is considered sufficient,⁵ and sufficiency of such demand, it has been said, is implied from a case in the Common Pleas,⁶ but it seems that in that case the bill was not foreign.

And in another English case,⁷ reported more fully in *Chitty on Bills*⁸ than by the reporters, and cited in *New York*,⁹ it would seem that Buller's, *J. dictum* is considered the law of the realm. It appeared that the notary's clerk presented a foreign bill, drawn in Jamaica on London, and afterward drew up the certificate of protest, which was signed and sealed by the notary himself, in due form. It is stated in *Chitty*, though not by the reporters, that Lord Tenterden, C. J., said it was a void protest—that it was a false certificate—that the notary had signed a paper stating "I presented and demanded," when it appeared in evidence that only his clerk had presented the bill, and he himself knew nothing of it. And the predominant view is that in England the demand should be made by the notary in person.

¹ *Chitty on Bills* (13th Am. ed.) [*490], 519.

² *Chitty on Bills* (13th Am. ed.) [*333], 374.

³ *Chitty on Bills* (10th Eng. ed.) 355, note 4.

⁴ 1 Parsons N. & B. 360.

⁵ Thomson on Bills (Wilson's ed.) 311.

⁶ *Poole v. Dica*, 1 Bing. N. C. 649 (1835); see 1 Parsons N. & B. 641.

⁷ *Vandewall v. Tyrrell*, 1 Mood. & Malk. 87 (22 E. C. L. R.) 258.

⁸ *Chitty on Bills* (8th Lond. ed.) p. 495, note; 13th Am. ed. 519, note.

⁹ *Onondaga County Bank v. Bates*, 3 Hill, 57.

§ 581. *State of the authorities in the United States.*—If it were a question of original impression we should strongly favor the admissibility of demand by a notary's clerk; and upon principle we cannot perceive any sufficient reason why it should not be allowed. In point of fact, the custom is almost universal for the demand to be made by the clerk, and whenever such custom is proved as existing in a particular place, it is recognized as controlling. When the demand is made by the clerk, the responsibility of the notary is nevertheless as binding, as the clerk is merely his agent; and every consideration of convenience would seem to sustain the practice.

But in the United States the courts have, almost without dissent, held that at common law it is necessary that the notary himself should make the demand of a foreign bill; and that in order to establish the sufficiency of a demand by his clerk, a general custom, or a statutory enactment authorizing such practice, must be proved.¹

In a recent case decided in Missouri,² in an action upon a foreign bill drawn in St. Louis on New York, and in its sequel decided in New York³ in an action against the notary for negligence in not protesting it duly, the necessity of demand by the notary in person was illustrated in the most positive form.

In the first case (*Commercial Bank v. Barksdale*), it appeared that the bill was protested in New York city on the 5th of January, 1861; that payment was demanded by Turney, a notary; that the protest was made out by Varnum,

¹ *Sacridier v. Brown*, 3 McLean, 481 (1844); *Ocean National Bank v. Williams*, 102 Mass. 143; *Cribbs v. Adams*, 13 Gray, 597; *Chenowith v. Chamberlin*, 6 B. Mon. 60 (1845); *Bank of Kentucky v. Carey*, 6 B. Mon. 629 (1846); *McClane, v. Fitch*, 4 B. Mon. 600 (1844); *Carter v. Brown*, 7 Humph. 548; *Commercial Bank v. Barksdale*, 36 Mo. 563 (1865); *Wittenberger v. Spalding*, 33 Mo. 421; *Commercial Bank v. Varnum*, 3 Lans. 86 (1870); is overruled in 49 N. Y. 275 (1872); *Burch v. Hill*, 24 Tex. 153; *Locke v. Huling*, 24 Tex. 311; *Donegan v. Wood*, 49 Ala. 242.

² *Commercial Bank v. Barksdale*, 36 Mo. 563 (1865.)

³ *Commercial Bank v. Varnum*, 49 N. Y. 275 (1872); overruling same case in 3 Lans. 86.

also a notary, who was a copartner with Turney in the notarial business. Holmes, J., delivering the opinion, said: "It is well established that the presentment and demand must be made by the same notary who protests the bill; it cannot be done by a clerk, or by any other person as his agent, though he be also a notary. The protest is to be evidence of the facts stated in it, of which the notary is supposed to have personal knowledge, and credit is given to his official statements by the commercial world on the faith of his public and official character."¹

In court, the instrument speaks as a witness. Such statements made merely upon the information of another person would amount to hearsay only, if the notary were himself upon the stand as a witness.

¹ "The notarial protest must state facts known to the person who makes it, and he cannot delegate his official character or his functions to another. The presentment and protest are governed by the law of the place where the bill is payable; and on this principle it has been held that where the statute law of the State (as in Louisiana), authorizes notaries to appoint deputies, a protest made by such deputy, duly appointed, would be recognized as sufficient. *Carter v. Brown*, 7 Humph. 548. But no case seems to have gone further than this: Such deputy may be considered as having a semi-official character, and sufficient authority by force of the statute; but without some change in the general rule of law, one notary can neither delegate his functions nor impart his own official character to another. Here, two notaries were in partnership in general business, and one of them undertook to present the bill and make the demand, and the other to draw up the protest and give the notice. They were both notaries, but as such they were distinct public officers, and there can be no partnership in such matters. No law or custom was proved to have existed in the State or city of New York, which changes the general rule of the law merchant on this subject. It must follow that the protest made by Varnum can have no validity; nor will that made by Turney any more avail. It seems to be clearly established by the general current of authority that the protest must be made on the same day with the presentment and demand, though a noting of the protest on the bill itself may be regarded as an incipient protest, or preliminary step toward a protest which may be completed afterward, at any time, by drawing up the protest in form. Here there was no noting of the bill for protest, or any memorandum marked on the bill by Turney; nor is there any proof of any distinct note, entry or memorandum of protest made by him on that day, in any other way than upon the bill itself. It would appear that he did not make the demand for the purpose of protesting the bill himself, but as the agent of his partner, the other notary. He neither protested the bill nor noted it for protest at the time; and his drawing up of a protest, long afterward must be regarded as having no basis of contemporaneous fact or present authority, and as being entirely void."

§ 582. In the case in New York, the Commercial Bank sued the notary, Varnum, into whose hands the bill was placed for demand, and protest if necessary, for negligence in not duly performing his function. And it appeared that he gave the bill to his partner, Turney, who presented it for payment; and on the same day an entry was made in Varnum's protest book under the joint supervision of Turney and himself, stating that the bill was presented and protested by Varnum. This was signed by Varnum. Turney's name not being mentioned, but his initials were placed opposite. It was held that by the common law the defendant would be liable, but that evidence of a general custom would be admissible to show that in New York the practice for a notary's clerk to make the demand was recognized.¹

To the same effect are numerous cases,² and we know of

¹ Commercial Bank v. Varnum, 49 N. Y. 275 (1872), overruling same case in 3 Lans. 86 (1870), Peckham, J. saying: "Conceding the rule at common law to be, in the absence of any custom or usage on the subject, that the presentment and demand must be made by the notary in person, was the testimony offered, of the universal usage in the city of New York for the clerk of the notary to make such presentment and demand admissible?"

"It may be remarked that the usage of merchants has established the great body of the law in reference to bills of exchange.

"It gave grace to such bills, and this changed the contract. It has settled the particular time of demand by the notary. The rule of law that requires a protest of a foreign bill is wholly founded upon the custom of merchants. Dennistoun v. Stewart, 17 How. 606.

"In the absence of any established rule of law in this State, by decision of the court or by any statute requiring a demand to be made by the notary in person, it is not perceived why a usage such as was approved was not admissible as proof upon the subject. This was the view of the learned justice who tried this case, but he was of opinion that the law had been otherwise settled in this State. In this, I think, he was clearly in error. All the decisions referred to by him or upon the argument at bar were confined to the admissibility of certificates of protest, and notice of bills, and notes under the statute of 1833, p. 395. That statute made no provision as to what constituted a protest, but provided simply what the notary's certificate should *prima facie* prove, and had no reference whatever to the admissibility of this offered evidence, or to the duties of notaries at common law in protesting a foreign bill."

² Chenowith v. Chamberlin, 6 B. Mon. 60 (1845); Ellis' Adm'r v. Commercial Bank, 7 How. (Miss.) 294 (1843); Sacridier v. Brown, 3 McLean, 381 (1844).

no case in the United States in which a contrary doctrine has been distinctly held; so that however weighty may seem the considerations which uphold a contrary view, in this country the principle may be regarded as settled.

§ 583. *Distinction taken in Kentucky between clerk and deputy.*—In Kentucky a distinction exists between the inferences to be drawn from a demand by the notary's clerk and by his deputy, which seems to us too refining, and not to be sustained. There it was held that proof of a general custom for the notary's clerk to make demand prevailing in New Orleans was admissible, and proof of presentment by the clerk sufficient.¹ In a subsequent case, where the presentment was also made in New Orleans by a notary's clerk, it was held insufficient as foundation for the protest, because no evidence of the custom authorizing it appeared in the record.² These two decisions were doubtless correct; but in a still later case it was held that where the notary certified respecting a foreign bill that he "presented the bill for payment by his deputy Auguste Commandeur," it was sufficient, although there was no evidence that by the laws of Louisiana a deputy was authorized to perform such functions. The court held that official authority or authority of the principal might be implied in the deputy, when no such authority would be implied in a mere clerk. And while it could find no authority, as was observed, for presentation by a deputy, it considered that the impracticability of the notary acting in person in a great commercial city, in all cases, and the seeming necessity for authorizing action by deputy, furnished *prima facie* presumption that the presentation and protest were made in accordance with the law or usage of New Orleans.³

This decision is directly controverted by the cases in Missouri and New York, before cited, and seems to us objectionable, on the double ground that the notary who makes the

¹ *McClane v. Fitch*, 4 B. Mon. 600 (1844).

² *Chenowith v. Chamberlin*, 5 B. Mon. 60 (1845).

³ *Bank of Kentucky v. Gary*, 6 B. Mon. 629 (1846).

presentment must also make the protest, and that departures from the common law, whether by statute or custom, must be proved. Indeed, the courts of Kentucky could take no judicial notice of a statute of Louisiana, which must be placed before them in evidence in authentic form before it can be noticed.

§ 584. *The rule applies to protests of inland bills and promissory notes when protest of such instruments is allowable.*—The rule requiring the demand and protest to be made by the notary in person applies, in order to give it full force and effect, although the instrument protested may be an inland bill or a promissory note. As to them, no protest is necessary, but by statute in many of the States it may be made, and be accorded the same effect as in the case of a foreign bill. But in such cases, in order to possess the same effect, it must be made by the same person, and based upon the same preliminary notarial demand, as in the case of a foreign bill. For *quoad* the form and effect of the protest they are placed on the same footing as foreign bills. Thus, in New York, where the protest certified that the notary caused the note to be presented, it was held insufficient, because he could not delegate his functions to another; and that indeed such certificate would be objectionable as evidence of presentment, because the notary had no personal or official knowledge of the fact, and it was but hearsay evidence at most.¹ So it was held that certificate of the notary that the note was presented by his clerk would be defective on like grounds.²

§ 585. But it is to be observed respecting inland bills and promissory notes that as no protest is necessary, and although no protest when relied on will be valid unless made by the notary in person, yet demand of payment of an inland bill or of a promissory note may be made by the clerk, which will be sufficient as the foundation of notice from the notary,

¹ Onondaga County Bank v. Bates, 3 Hill, 56 (1842).

² Sheldon v. Benham, 4 Hill, 129 (1843); to same effect, Warnick v. Crane, 4 Denio, 460 (1847); Gawtry v. Doane, 51 N. Y. 90 (1872).

or other person acting for the holder. But the testimony of the clerk would be necessary to show the due presentment, and the testimony of the notary or other party acting for the holder to show due transmission or service of the notice.¹

§ 586. *Statutory authority or general custom may be proved.*—It is clear upon principle, and it is agreed by the authorities, that where there is a statute authorizing the demand or protest to be made by a notary's deputy or clerk, or by any other official, or where there is a general custom recognizing such practice, it may be proved, and that in such cases it will be sufficient to show that the statute or custom was observed. Thus, it has been held by the United States Supreme Court that where, as in Mississippi (as was proved), a justice of the peace is authorized by statute to perform the functions and duties of a notary, his act of protest is equally valid as that of a notary. "*Quoad hoc*," said the court, "he acts as a notary."² And so, where it was in evidence that, by the laws of Louisiana, each notary was authorized to appoint one or more deputies to assist him in making protests and delivering notices, and the protest on its face stated that the notary A., by his deputy B., presented the bill, etc., it was held sufficient.³

So, it has been held in a number of cases, that evidence of a custom for a notary to act by his clerk is admissible,⁴ and in Massachusetts the doctrine was well expressed by Bigelow, J.⁵

¹ Hunt v. Maybee, 3 Seld. 269 (1852).

² Burke v. McKay, 2 How. 66 (1844).

³ Carter v. Union Bank, 7 Humph. 548 (1847).

⁴ Commercial Bank v. Varnum, 49 N. Y. 275 (1872), overruling s. c. 3 Lans. 86 (1870); Commercial Bank v. Barksdale, 36 Mo. 563; Willenberger v. Spalding, 33 Mo. 421; Nelson v. Fotteral, 7 Leigh, 179. See *ante*, § 582, note.

⁵ In Cribbs v. Adams, 13 Gray, 600, Bigelow, J., said: "By the common law, as we understand it, and according to the uniform practice in the commonwealth, the duties of a notary must be performed personally, and not by a clerk or deputy. He is a sworn officer, clothed with important public duties, which in their nature imply a public confidence and trust. Doubtless, by well settled usage in some places, and in others by express provision of statute, notaries are authorized to employ clerks or deputies to perform official acts coming within

In Virginia, the Court of Appeals was unanimous as to this doctrine, but divided equally as to whether or not, at common law, presentment by the notary's clerk was sufficient.¹

It is quite clear that in no case can the clerk make the protest, however it may be determined as to the presentment and demand.²

§ 587. *Custom for notary's clerk to make presentment must be shown to relate to foreign bills.*—There may be a custom for notaries' clerks to make presentment as foundation of protest of inland bills and of promissory notes, and yet it may not extend to include foreign bills. And when a protest of a foreign bill has been based on presentment by a notary's clerk, the plaintiff must not only show a general custom or practice for the clerk to make presentment of bills and notes, but must show distinctly that the custom extended to foreign bills. As said in a recent case in Massachusetts, by Ames, J.:³ "The plaintiff wholly failed to prove the the existence of any well settled local usage in New York that would authorize a notary in the case of a foreign bill to make a presentment and demand of payment by his clerk or deputy, and to certify and authenticate notarial acts so performed, in the same manner as if he had performed them himself. The witnesses who testify that it is customary in the city of New York for the clerks of notaries to present and demand payment of drafts, and for notaries to protest upon such presentment and demand, wholly fail to give any information upon the point whether

the sphere of their duty, and are employed to certify and authenticate their acts by their own notarial certificates in like manner as if such acts had been performed by themselves personally. But such usage or provision of law is a fact to be proved by evidence. At the trial of this case the plaintiff offered no evidence that a notary in Louisiana (where the bill was protested) was authorized, either by usage or statute, to employ a deputy, or to authenticate his acts by his own certificate."

¹ Nelson v. Fotteral, 7 Leigh, 180.

² Sacridier v. Brown, 3 McLean, 481 (1844).

³ Ocean National Bank v. Williams, 102 Mass. 143.

that custom applies to and includes the case of foreign bills. One of them says that his attention had never been called to that distinction, and the other makes no allusion to it. It hardly need be said that a local usage, in derogation of the general rules of law, requires clearer and better evidence of its existence and validity."

In Pennsylvania, where a promissory note was dishonored, and the plaintiff offered in evidence the certificate of a notary, by which it was certified that the notary had given the indorser notice of non-payment; but the notary, on the trial, testified that the certificate was in the handwriting of his son, then absent in the West Indies; that his son had attended to the presentment and notice, and he himself had no personal knowledge on the subject. This testimony was not objected to, and it was held that, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, and the Pennsylvania statute making notarial certificates competent evidence, that the certificate was admissible as matter of evidence, to be weighed with the rest of the testimony by the jury.¹

SECTION II.

TO WHOM PRESENTMENT FOR PAYMENT MUST BE MADE.

§ 588. Presentment for payment must be made to the drawee or acceptor of the bill, or maker of the note, or to an authorized agent. A personal demand is not necessary, and it is sufficient to make the demand at his usual residence or place of business, of his wife or other agent; for it is the duty of an acceptor or promisor, if he is not present himself, to leave provision for the payment of his bills or notes.²

There is no doubt that a clerk found at the counting room of the acceptor or promisor is a competent party for presentment for payment to be made to, without showing any special authority given him.³ But where the protest stated

¹ Stewart v. Allison, 6 Serg. & R. 324.

² Mathews v. Haydon, 2 Esp. 509; Brown v. McDermott, 5 Esp. 265.

³ Stainback v. Bank of Virginia, 11 Grat. 260; Nelson v. Fottterall, 7 Leigh,

the mere fact of presentment "at the office of the maker," it will be considered insufficient, as not showing that the paper was presented to party at the office authorized to pay or refuse payment.¹ A demand upon the servant of the owner "who used to pay money for him," was held sufficient in England.²

§ 589. It has been indicated by Chitty, in his work on Bills,³ that while in making presentment for acceptance the holder should, if possible, see the drawee personally, in the presentment for payment it is not necessary, it being sufficient if it be made at the house of the acceptor. But we concur with Story,⁴ that there is no just foundation for the distinction. If, indeed, the drawee does not happen to be present when the call is made at his house or counting room to present the bill for acceptance, the holder, it seems, is not bound to consider it as a refusal to accept, but may wait a reasonable time for the return of the drawee who has as yet incurred no obligation respecting the bill, and may indeed be ignorant of its existence. The holder may even wait until the next day to renew his call to present for acceptance.⁵ But no such delay is allowable in making presentment to the acceptor for payment.

It is the duty of the acceptor, who is the principal debtor, to provide for the payment of the bill; and if he is not in himself, and there is no one present to answer for him, when the holder calls at his house or counting room, the bill should be treated as dishonored, and protested for non-payment.

§ 590. If presentment be made at the place specified in the instrument, or in the case of one payable generally at the

180; *Draper v. Clemons*, 4 Mo. 52; *Stewart v. Eden*, 2 Caines, 121; *Reynolds v. Chettle*, 2 Camp. 596.

¹ *Nave v. Richardson*, 36 Mo. 130.

² *Bank of England v. Newman*, 12 Mod. 241; s. c. 1 Lord Raym. 442.

³ Chitty on Bills (13th Am. ed.) [*366], 412.

⁴ Story on Bills (Bennett's ed.), § 350.

⁵ *Ibid.*; *Bank of Washington v. Triplett*, 1 Pet. 25; *Mitchell v. De Grand*, 1 Mason, 176.

place of business of the acceptor or maker during business hours, or at his domicile during a reasonable hour of the day, it is sufficient if it be made to any person to be found upon the premises, especially if the maker be absent or inaccessible.¹ Where presentment was made to the wife of the maker, she informing the holder that her husband was out of town, it was held sufficient.² And so it was deemed sufficient to charge the indorser where the holder presented the bill to an inmate of the maker's house, who was coming out, and who stated that the acceptor had removed—the holder leaving a card containing notice for the acceptor of the maturity of the bill.³ Where there is no one to answer, presentment at the maker's dwelling is sufficient.⁴

The general rule as to the presentment and demand of commercial paper may be stated as follows: The presentment and demand must be made within reasonable hours on the day of maturity. For the purpose of fixing the liability of indorsers, the note or bill is payable on demand at any time during those hours. What are reasonable hours will depend upon the question whether or not the note or bill is payable at a place or bank, where, by the established usage of trade, business transactions are limited to certain stated hours. If there are such stated hours where the note or bill is payable, the presentment and demand must be made within those hours; but if there are no stated hours, and no place of payment is designated in the note or bill, the presentment and demand may be made either at the place of business or residence of the maker or acceptor; if at his place of business, it must be within the usual business hours of the city or town; if at his residence, then within those hours when the maker or acceptor may be presumed to be in a condition to attend to business.⁵

¹ *Cromwell v. Hynson*, 2 Camp. 596; *Phillips v. Astberg*, 2 Taunt. 206; *Draper v. Clemons*, 4 Mo. 52.

² *Moodie v. Morrall*, 1 Const. R. 367.

³ *Buxton v. Jones*, 1 Man. & G. 83; 1 Scott N. R. 19; *Story on Bills* (Bennett's ed.), § 350, note, 1.

⁴ *Stivers v. Prentice*, 3 B. Mon. 461.

⁵ *McFarland v. Pico*, 8 Cal. 631.

§ 591. *When acceptor or maker is dead.*—If the acceptor or maker be dead at the time of the maturity of the bill or note, it should be presented to his personal representative, if one be appointed, and his place of residence can, by reasonable inquiries, be ascertained.¹ If there be no personal representative, then presentment should be made, and payment demanded, at the dwelling-house of the deceased, if the instrument were payable generally.² But if it was drawn payable at a particular place, then it will be sufficient that it was presented at such place.³

§ 592. *In partnership cases.*—Presentment of a bill drawn upon or accepted by, and of a note executed by, a copartnership firm, is sufficient, if made to any one of the members of such firm.⁴ And if the signature of the parties entitled to presentment be apparently that of a partnership, as, for instance, if signed “Waller & Burr,” presentment to either is sufficient.⁵

Even after the dissolution of the firm, presentment to any one of the partners is sufficient, for as to the bill or note upon which they are liable, the liability continues until duly satisfied or discharged.⁶ As said in Maryland, where presentment of a partnership note was made to one of the firm after dissolution, by Archer, C. J.:⁷ “It might be sufficient to say that this dissolution had, by no evidence in the case, been brought home to the knowledge of the holder of the note.

¹ Gower v. Moore, 25 Me. 16; Price v. Young, 1 Nott & McC. 438; Story on Notes, §§ 241–253; Magruder v. Union Bank, 3 Pet. 87; Juniata Bank v. Hale, 16 Serg. & R. 167.

² Ibid.; Story on Notes, § 253; Story on Bills, § 346; see Chapter XVII, § 458.

³ Boyd's Adm'r v. City Savings Bank, 15 Grat. 501; Price v. Young, 1 Nott & McC. 438; Philpot v. Bryant, 1 Moore & P. 754; 3 Carr. & P. 244; 4 Bing. 717; Holtz v. Boppe, 37 N.Y. 634; Thomson on Bills (Wilson's ed.), 285. See *ante*, § 455.

⁴ Branch of State Bank v. McLeran, 26 Iowa, 306; Shed v. Brett, 1 Pick. 401, Thomson on Bills (Wilson's ed.), 281.

⁵ Erwin v. Downs, 15 N. Y. (1 Smith), 375.

⁶ Crowley v. Barry, 4 Gill, 194; Fourth Nat. Bank v. Heuschuk, 52 Mo. 207; Hubbard v. Matthews, 54 N. Y. 50; Brown v. Turner, 15 Ala. N. S. 632; Coster v. Thomason, 19 Ala. N. S. 717.

⁷ Crowley v. Barry, 4 Gill, 194.

But we do not desire to determine the question on this ground, because we are clearly of opinion that a demand on one of the partners was sufficient, as each partner represents the partnership. Before a dissolution, it clearly would not be necessary to make a demand on both, nor could it be necessary after a dissolution, for the partnership as to all antecedent transactions continues until they are closed."

And it has been held that demand on the agent of one partner, after dissolution, in the absence of the other partner, was sufficient.¹

§ 593. In the event of the death of one of the members of the firm to which presentment should be made before the maturity of the bill or note, the presentment should be made to the survivors, and not to the personal representative of the deceased, because the liability devolves upon the surviving partner.²

§ 594. *Where there are several promisors not partners.*—When the note is executed by several joint promisors who are not partners, but liable only as joint promisors, it has been held, and, as we think, correctly, that presentment should be made to each, in order to fix the liability of an indorser.³ But a difficulty presents itself which might seem to characterize this doctrine as harsh and unreasonable, and which has caused it to be held that *quoad hoc* the promisors are to be regarded as partners, and presentment to one equivalent to presentment to all. "Now, suppose," it has been said, in Ohio, by Hitchcock, J.,⁴ "the makers resided in differ-

¹ Brown v. Turner, 15 Ala. 832.

² Cayuga County Bank v. Hunt, 2 Hill, 635 ; Story on Bills, §§ 346-362 ; 1 Parsons, N. & B. 362.

³ Blake v. McMillen, 22 Iowa, 258 ; s. c. 33 Iowa, 150 (1871) ; Union Bank v. Willis, 8 Metc. 504 ; Arnold v. Dresser, 8 Allen, 435. Nelson, J. C., in Willis v. Green, 5 Metc. 232, a case respecting notice to joint indorsers, says: "I do not see but the case of joint indorsers, not partners, stands on the same footing as that of joint makers of a note who are not partners ; and in respect to them, it is settled that presentment must be made to each, in order to charge an indorser." See also *ante*, § 455, and Gates v. Beecker, 60 N. Y. 523.

⁴ Harris v. Clark, 10 Ohio, 5.

ent States, or in different and distant parts of the same State, how could demand be made of all in order to charge an indorser? It must be made on the day the note falls due, or, where days of grace are allowed, on the last day of grace. Will it be said that the demand can be made at different and distant places on the same day, through the agency of letters of attorney? I believe such a practice has not been heard of, at least we have found nothing like it in the books." And the court concluded that they were to be regarded as partners.

§ 595. These views are more plausible than satisfactory, and the argument *ab inconvenienti* is well presented. But joint promisors are no more partners than joint indorsers. To construe them to be partners is to make a new contract between them, and to vary the condition precedent of the indorser's liability. And although it might be more convenient if they were partners, the inconvenience in enforcing their contract does not change it.

If they were in different places at the maturity of the note, and it could be only presented to one, due diligence would only require its presentment to the others in such time as they could be reached; and the impossibility of presenting to all on the day of maturity, would excuse non-presentment to those at other places. Such, at least, is our conception of the true solution of the question, and it is borne out by high authority, and certainly by much more satisfactory reasoning than that above quoted.¹

§ 596. Where the note is several as well as joint, the indorser might be held as indorser of the maker to whom the note was duly presented, as the holder would have the right to treat the note as the several note of each maker. But he would have lost recourse against the indorser as upon the joint note of the co-makers, or the several note of the maker, as to whom no presentment was made or excuse given.²

¹ See 1 Parsons N. & B. 363, note w; Story on Notes, § 239, and especially § 255, and note 2. There seems to be no English precedent on the question.

² Story on Promissory Notes, § 255, note 2.

In the event of the death of a joint maker, presentment should be made to the survivor, upon whom the debt devolves. If the note were several also, it might be different, as the holder is at liberty to elect "upon whom he will make demand."¹

SECTION III.

TIME OF PRESENTMENT FOR PAYMENT.

§ 597. *Upon what day presentment should be made.*—In respect to the maker of a note and the acceptor of a bill, it is not important upon what day the presentment is made, provided it be made at some time before the statute of limitations bars action against them.² And provided, also, that the note is not made, nor the bill drawn or accepted, payable at a certain place. In such cases only is it desirable that, as respects the maker or acceptor, the bill or note should be presented on the exact day of its maturity; and even in such cases it makes no difference that the presentment was not punctually made on that very day, unless the maker or acceptor should suffer some loss or damage by the delay.

§ 598. In respect, however, to the drawer of a bill and the indorser of a bill or note, it is essential to the fixing of their liability that the presentment should be made on the day of maturity, provided it is within the power of the holder to make it.³ If the presentment be made before the bill or note is due, it is entirely premature and nugatory, and, so far as it affects the drawer or indorser, a perfect nullity.⁴ And if it be made after the day of maturity, it can, as matter of course, be of no effect, as the drawer or indorser will already have been discharged, unless there were sufficient legal excuse for the delay.⁵ The evidence must be distinct as

¹ Story on Promissory Notes, § 256.

² Chitty on Bills (13th Am. ed.) [*354], 396.

³ 1 Parsons N. & B. 373.

⁴ Griffin v. Goff, 12 Johns. 423; Jackson v. Newton, 8 Watts, 401; Farmers' Bank v. Duvall, 7 Gill & J. 78; Mechanics' Bank v. Merchants' Bank, 6 Metc. 13.

⁵ Windham Bank v. Norton, 22 Conn. 213.

to the promptness of the presentment or the excuse for delay.¹

§ 599. *If a note be payable in installments*, the presentment should be made on each consecutive installment as it falls due, as if it were (as in fact it is legally considered) a separate note in itself.² It would be different, probably, if the condition were annexed to the note that upon failure to meet any installment, the whole should fall due, in which case notice should be communicated to the drawer or indorser that the whole sum was due, and the holder looked to him for payment.³ If no time for payment be named in the bill or note it is payable on demand;⁴ and payable "on demand at sight," is equivalent to payable "at sight."⁵ "On call," or "when called for," means the same as "on demand."⁶

§ 600. *At what hour of the day presentment should be made.*—When the bill or note is made payable at a bank, it should be presented during banking hours, the parties executing their paper payable at a particular place, being bound by its usage; and in such case a presentment after banking hours is sufficient.⁷ But it is settled that when a bill or note is payable at a bank, a demand made at the bank after banking hours, the officers being there, and a refusal, the cashier or teller stating that there were no funds, is sufficient.⁸

And likewise, if any person is left at the bank to give an

¹ Robinson v. Blen, 20 Me. 109.

² Oridge v. Sherborne, 11 M. & W. 374.

³ See 1 Parsons N. & B. 374.

⁴ Thompson v. Ketcham, 8 Johns. 189; Cornell v. Moulton, 3 Denio, 12; Michigan Ins. Co. v. Leavenworth, 30 Vt. 11; Piner v. Clary, 17 B. Mon. 663; Bowman v. McChesney, 22 Grat. 609; Whitlock v. Underwood, 2 B. & C. 157. See *ante*, §§ 88, 89.

⁵ Bowman v. McChesney, 22 Grat. 609.

⁶ Dixon v. Nutall, 1 Crompt. M. & R. 307.

⁷ 1 Pars. 419; Parker v. Gordon, 7 East, 385; Elford v. Teed, 1 Maule & S. 28; Thomson on Bills (Wilson's ed.) 302; Byles on Bills (Sharswood's ed.), 340. Story on Bills, §§ 236, 349; Story on Notes, § 235.

⁸ Salt Springs Nat. Bank v. Burton, 58 N. Y. 432; Bank of Syracuse v. Hollister, 17 N. Y. 46; Bank of Utica v. Smith, 18 Johns. 230; First National Bank v. Owen, 23 Iowa, 185; Goodloe v. Godley, 13 Smedes & M. 227; Cohen v. Hunt, 2 Id. 227; Flint v. Rogers, 15 Me. 67.

answer,¹ and it matters not that the notary making the presentment enters by the back door.² It seems that if the maker of a note payable at a bank goes, and remains there during business hours, prepared to pay, or places funds in bank and holds them there until the close of business, and then withdraws them, in consequence of the non-presentment of the note, the indorser would be discharged, notwithstanding presentment to an officer found at the bank after business hours.³

In an action against the acceptor on a bill payable in London, and accepted payable at D. & Co.'s, a presentment at D. & Co.'s between 7 and 8 o'clock in the evening, was proved, and that a boy returned, as answer, "no orders." Lord Ellenborough said that if the banker appointed a person to give an answer, a presentment at any time while that person was in attendance, was sufficient.⁴

Where, by usage of the bank at which the instrument is payable, the payor is allowed until the expiration of banking hours for payment, a demand made before that time, unless the instrument continues in bank until banking hours have expired, is sufficient.⁵

§ 601. *If the bill or note be payable generally "at bank"*—no particular bank being named—the hour will be determined by the usual banking hours at the several banks of the place where it is payable.⁶ It is for the jury to say what are business hours, and in fixing them otherwise than in respect to the banks, they are to have reference to the general hours of business at the place, rather than to the custom of any particular trade.⁷ The courts of England take judicial notice

¹ Garnett v. Woodcock, 1 Stark, 475; 6 Maule & S. 44; Salt Springs Nat. Bank v. Burton, 56 N. Y. 432.

² Commercial Bank v. Hamer, 7 How. (Miss.) 448.

³ Salt Springs Nat. Bank v. Burton, 56 N. Y. 431.

⁴ Garnett v. Woodcock, *supra*.

⁵ Planters' Bank v. Markham, 5 How. (Miss.) 397; Harrison v. Crowder, 6 Smedes & M. 464.

⁶ U. S. Bank v. Carneal, 2 Pet. 543; Church v. Clark, 21 Pick. 310.

⁷ Thomson on Bills, 302.

of the banking hours of London,¹ but not of outside cities or places.² Morse says: "American courts are wont to take judicial notice of the banking hours of any large city lying within the area of the jurisdiction of the court; though there is no authority for supposing that the banking hours of the city of New York would be considered as judicially known to the courts of Boston or Chicago, or *vice versa*. Unquestionably proof would have to be introduced."³

§ 602. *When the instrument is not payable at a bank*, presentment may be made at any reasonable hour during the day—during what are termed "business hours," which, it is held, range through the whole day to the hours of rest in the evening.⁴ But the mere fact that the payor had retired to rest would not vitiate the presentment, unless it was at an hour when, according to the habits and usages of the community, it might be expected that he had retired.⁵ If the presentment be during the hours of rest it will be entirely unavailing.⁶

§ 603. When presentment is at the place of business it must be during the hours when such places are customarily open,⁷ or at least while some one is there competent to give an answer. It is only when presentment is at the residence

¹ Parker v. Gordon, 7 East, 385; Jameson v. Swinton, 2 Taunt. 225.

² Hare v. Henty, 10 C. B. N. S. 65.

³ Morse on Banking, 371.

⁴ Nelson v. Fotterall, 7 Leigh, 194; Cayuga County Bank v. Hunt, 2 Hill, 635; Salt Springs National Bank v. Burton, 58 N. Y. 432.

⁵ Farnsworth v. Allen, 4 Gray, 453, in which case presentment was made at 9 P. M., at the maker's residence, ten miles from Boston. He and his family had retired. *Held*, sufficient. In Barclay v. Bailey, 2 Camp. 527, Lord Ellenborough sustained a presentment made as late as 8 P. M., at the house of a trader.

⁶ Wilkins v. Jadis, 2 B. & Ad. 188, in which case the bill was presented at the place named in the acceptance, between 7 and 8 P. M., but the door was shut and no one answered. Dana v. Sawyer, 22 Me. 294, in which presentment was a few minutes before midnight, the maker being waked up at his residence.

⁷ Lunt v. Adams, 17 Me. 230, in which case presentment at 8 A. M., at the maker's storehouses was held insufficient; see Dana v. Sawyer, 22 Me. 244. Presentment at 8 P. M. at an attorney's office, was held sufficient in Triggs v. Neuenham, 1 Car. & P. 631; and in Morgan v. Davison, 1 Stark. 114, presentment at a counting-room between 6 and 7 P. M. was held sufficient.

that the time is extended to the hours of rest.¹ But presentment at any hour cannot be considered unreasonable if any person competent to answer be found there who gives an answer refusing to pay.²

Where, however, a bill was presented for payment at a bank in the morning, and refused for want of effects, and afterward presented at six o'clock in the evening (effects being lodged in the meantime), and again refused, business hours having closed at five o'clock, it was decided that they were not liable in damages to the drawer, their customer, for the refusal—they had paid the bill and expense of notary next day.³

§ 604. *Within what time bills and notes specifying no time of payment must be presented for payment.*—All the text writers and the adjudicated cases tell us that a bill payable at sight, or at a fixed time after sight, or on demand, and a note payable on demand, must be presented for acceptance or payment, as the case may be, "within a reasonable time." But in determining what is reasonable time we are left a riddle which it is difficult to solve. The maker of the note, who is the principal debtor, is bound to pay whenever payment is demanded (unless it be barred by limitation), no matter what period of time may have elapsed since its execution, and when a bill payable at so many days after sight has been presented and accepted, the acceptance fixes the period at which it must be presented to the acceptor for payment. But within what time such a bill must be presented in order to preserve the liability of the drawer and indorsers; and the note presented in order to preserve that of the indorsers is a problem which has puzzled courts and juries no little. And an eminent jurist has said in respect to the time within which it is necessary to present for payment a note

¹ In *Barelay v. Bailey*, 2 Camp. 427, presentment at 8 P. M. at the maker's residence was held sufficient.

² *Henry v. Lee*, 2 Chitty's Rep. 125; *Garnett v. Woodcock*, 1 Stark. R. 475; 6 Maule & S. 44; Thomson on Bills, 303; Chitty (13th Am. ed.) [*387], 438.

³ *Whitaker v. Bank of England*, Tyrwh. 268.

payable on demand in order to charge an indorser, that "it depends upon so many circumstances to determine what is a reasonable time in a particular case, that one decision goes but little way in establishing a precedent for another."¹ Some of the text writers treat of bills, promissory notes, bankers' cash notes and checks, as falling within one rule; and a failure to discriminate between these various classes of commercial paper has confused the decisions upon the subject, and left them in a state of contrariety and antagonism which it is impossible to reconcile. In a previous chapter on presentment for acceptance we have discussed the question of reasonable time in respect to the presentment for acceptance of bills; and the doctrines there laid down are almost entirely applicable to the presentment of bills for payment.² The reasonable time for presentment of checks, which are of a different nature, will hereafter be discussed;³ and we shall endeavor here to give the principles which determine within what time a bill or note payable on demand must be presented for payment.

§ 605. *In the first place, respecting bills payable on demand.*—Such instruments would seem to be closely assimilated to bank checks, and to contemplate the immediate payment of the amount called for. They are payable immediately on presentment, without grace, and if the drawee and the payee or indorsee reside in the same place, it is laid down by a number of the authorities that they must be presented within business hours of the day on which they are drawn in order to hold the drawer in the event of the failure of the drawee to honor them.⁴ And that if the drawee resides in a different place they must be forwarded by the regular post of the day after they are received.⁵ But these rules are not inflexible. What is reasonable time must de-

¹ Shaw, C. J., in *Seaver v. Lincoln*, 21 Pick. 267.

² Chapter XVII, Sec. III. ³ Chapter XLIX, on Checks, Sec. III. Vol. 2.

⁴ Byles on Bills (Sharswood's ed.) 337-8; Thomson on Bills (Wilson's ed.), 297; Chitty on Bills (13 Am. ed.) 431; *Piner v. Clary*, 17 B. Mon. 645.

⁵ *Ibid.*; Chitty, 432.

pend upon circumstances and in many cases upon the time, the mode and the place of receiving the bills, and upon the relations of the parties between whom the question arises.¹ Where the draft required indorsement by a school board, which had to be convened, delay of a week to forward it was held justifiable.² The question, in so far as it relates to sight drafts, has been heretofore considered, and the cases collated.³

§ 606. *Promissory notes payable on demand* would seem to stand on a different footing. It is difficult to perceive why the maker should execute his promise to pay on demand if immediate payment were contemplated; and although the holder may present it at once for payment, if he be so inclined, this would seem to be a privilege rather than a duty. Why not pay the money at once, if the note must be presented at once in order to charge the indorser? In England, a note on demand is regarded as a continuing security, which it is not necessary to present for payment on the next day when the parties reside in the same place; or to send by the post of the next day when they reside in different places;⁴ but in the United States, as a general rule, a different view is taken, and payment must be speedily demanded, in order to preserve recourse against the indorser, and to preserve the note from defenses which may be made against overdue paper.⁵ It is better in all cases where the question is not settled, to decline taking a note on demand by indorsement, or if taken to present it with the utmost dispatch.

§ 607. *When note given for a loan*.—When the note payable on demand has been given for a loan of money, it would then seem clear that it was intended as a continuing security, and the immediate presentment would not be necessary in

¹ Story on Notes, § 493. See *ante*, § 468 to § 478 inclusive.

² Muncy Borough School Dist. v. Commonwealth, 84 Penn. St. 464.

³ *Ante*, § 472. Montelius v. Charles, 76 Ill. 305.

⁴ Brooks v. Mitchell, 9 M. & W. 15; Stat. of Lim. runs from date of note on demand. Wheeler v. Warner, 47 N. Y. 519.

⁵ See 1 Parsons N. & B. 376-7; Keys v. Fenstermaker, 24 Cal. 331; delay of two weeks held to discharge indorser.

order to charge the indorser.¹ In Scotland, as well as in the United States,² this view has been taken; and though high authority has maintained a different doctrine,³ we can but regard it as one that strikes the mind with the utmost force. Where demand was not made for twenty-one months, it has been considered sufficient in such a case;⁴ and in Scotland, where a bill on demand was granted as a loan, and not as a remittance, presentment six months after date was held sufficient.⁵

§ 608. *Notes payable on demand "with interest."*—When the note is payable on demand with interest, it would seem to have been intended as a continuing interest bearing security; but upon this question, as upon those already discussed respecting notes payable on demand, the authorities are in painful contrariety.

In England, where a note of £1,000 payable on demand with interest had been indorsed and transferred several years after its date, and the question was whether the indorsee took it subject to equities between prior parties, the Court said: "If a promissory note, payable on demand, is after a certain time to be treated as overdue, although payment has

¹ Thomson on Bills (Wilson's ed.), 301, citing *Leith Banking Company v. Walker's Trustees*, 14 S. D. B. 332.

² *Vreeland v. Hyde*, 2 Hall, 429, the Court saying: "The rule requiring presentment within a reasonable time was intended for and is applicable to negotiable instruments made for commercial purposes only. It was not intended for cases of suretyship, or notes of a like description, and the present one is evidently excluded from the rule by the peculiar circumstances attending it. Here the holder was an old man, not connected with business, residing at some distance from the city. The defendant knew the circumstances, and cannot claim any peculiar indulgence from a consideration of these facts, as each case must be governed by the circumstances attending it. In this there must be judgment for the plaintiff."

³ 1 Parsons N. & B. 380, note d; Bayley on Bills, ch. vii. p. 142, note; Perry v. Green, 4 Harr. 61; *Sice v. Cunningham*, 1 Cow. 397, in which case a delay of five months, all the parties residing in New York city, was held to discharge the indorser; *Martin v. Winslow*, 2 Mason, 241, seven months' delay held fatal; *Field v. Nickerson*, 13 Mass. 131, seven months' delay held fatal, although the accommodation indorser was told by one of the makers that the note would not be demanded immediately.

⁴ *Vreeland v. Hyde*, 2 Hall, 429.

⁵ Note *supra*, Thomson, 301.

not been demanded, it is no longer a negotiable instrument. But a promissory note, payable on demand, is intended to be a continuing security. It is quite unlike the case of a check, which is intended to be presented speedily."¹ The circumstance that the note bore interest did not control the decision of the court; but in New York that feature was considered material; and where such a note was transferred three or four weeks after date, it was said, "it would be contrary to the general course of business to demand payment short of some proper point for computing interest, such as a quarter, half a year, a year, &c.," and it was held that the note was not overdue so as to admit a plea of want of consideration.² But in a late case, where the note, payable on demand, with interest, was transferred nearly three months after date, the parties having their places of business in the same street of the same city, it was held overdue, so as to admit equities;³ and in an earlier case a similar note, transferred two and a half months after date, was held open to defense of part payment before transfer.⁴ In Vermont the note was held overdue at time of indorsement, ten months after date.⁵ In Connecticut, a note payable "on demand, with interest," need not be demanded for four months, by statute.⁶

§ 609. In respect to the time within which a note, payable on demand, with interest, must be presented, in order to charge an indorser, the like contrariety exists. Eight months' delay was held to discharge an indorser in one case;⁷ seven months in another;⁸ five months and a half in another, all the parties residing in the same place.⁹

On the other hand, a delay of twenty-one months to present a note payable on demand with interest, has been held not to discharge the indorser.¹⁰ And in a later case, in New

¹ Brooks v. Mitchell, 9 M. & W. 15; see also Borough v. White, 4 B. & C. 225; Gascoyne v. Smith, 1 M. & Y. 338. ² Wethey v. Andrews, 3 Hill, 582.

³ Herrick v. Woolverton, 41 N. Y. 581.

⁴ Losee v. Dunkin, 7 Johns. R. 70.

⁵ Morey v. Wakefield, 41 Vt. 24.

⁶ Rhodes v. Seymour, 36 Conn. 6.

⁷ Field v. Nickerson, 13 Mass. 131.

⁸ Martin v. Winslow, 2 Mason, 241.

⁹ Sice v. Cunningham, 1 Cow. 397; see, also, Perry v. Green, 4 Harr. 61.

¹⁰ Yreeland v. Hyde, 2 Hall, 429; see *ante*, § 607, note 2.

York, where the note, payable on demand, with interest, was indorsed for accommodation at the time of its date, which was the 5th of May, 1852, and the interest was paid by the maker for three years, and demand of payment was made and refused, and notice given on the 24th of December, 1855, it was held that the indorser was still bound.¹

Seven days' delay was not considered too long in Massachusetts, under the circumstances, the court not paying consideration to the fact that the note bore interest.²

§ 610. *The true principle to be deduced.*—Where these questions remain undetermined, the authorities are so much at war that it would be difficult to predict what rule would commend itself to the court. It seems to us that where the note was indorsed at the time of making, and whether it bore interest or not, it should be regarded as a continuing security, and would not be overdue in the hands of the payee, either so as to open equities or to discharge the indorser until payment was demanded and refused. But when transferred by indorsement, it would become, by the very act of indorsement, a draft by the indorser upon the maker; and the indorsee holding it should regard it, as it is in fact, a demand through him for the amount due the indorser. And it should, therefore, be presented immediately, subject only to such qualifications as apply to a bill payable at sight.

The following observations, in "Byles on Bills,"³ on this subject, seem to us worthy of quotation. Says the author: "A common promissory note payable on demand differs from a bill payable on demand, or a check, in this respect: the bill and check are evidently intended to be presented and paid immediately, and the drawer may have good reasons for desiring to withdraw his funds from the control of the drawee without delay; but a common promissory note payable on demand is very often originally intended as a continuing security, and afterward indorsed as such. Indeed, it

¹ Merritt v. Todd, 23 N. Y. 28 (1861).

² Seaver v. Lincoln, 21 Pick. 267.

³ Sharswood's ed. 338.

is not uncommon for the payee, and afterward the indorsee, to receive from the maker interest periodically for many years on such a note. And sometimes the note is expressly made payable with interest, which clearly indicates the intention of the parties to be, that though the holder may demand payment immediately, yet he is not bound to do so. It is, therefore, conceived that a common promissory note payable on demand, especially if made payable with interest, is not necessarily to be presented the next day after it has been received in order to charge the indorser; and when the indorser defends himself on the ground of delay in presenting the note, it will be a question for the jury whether, under all the circumstances, the delay of presentment was or was not unreasonable."

§ 611. *Presentment for payment when the instrument was overdue at time of indorsement.*—When a negotiable instrument is indorsed after maturity, payment must be demanded of the payor within a reasonable time, and notice, in the event of a refusal, given to the indorser, in order to charge him—it being regarded as equivalent to one payable on demand.¹

The same circumstances and considerations which determine the question whether or not a bill or note payable on demand has become overdue, so as to let in equitable defenses by the original parties against the transferee, alike determine the question whether or not the presentment has been in a reasonable time so as to charge the drawer or indorser.²

¹ Light v. Kingsbury, 50 Mo. 331; McKewer v. Kirtland, 33 Iowa, 352; Tyler v. Young, 6 Casey, 143; McKinney v. Crawford, 8 Serg. & R. 351; Patterson v. Todd, 18 Penn. St. 426, overruling Bank of N. A. v. Barriere, 1 Yeates, 360; Leavitt v. Putnam, 1 Sandf. 199; Berry v. Robinson, 9 Johns. 121; Beebe v. Brooks, 12 Cal. 308; Bishop v. Dexter, 2 Conn. 419; Goodwin v. Davenport, 47 Me. 112; Dwight v. Emerson, 2 N. H. 159; Levy v. Drew, 14 Ark. 334; Jones v. Middleton, 29 Iowa, 188; Benton v. Gibson, 1 Hill (S. C.) 56; Poole v. Tolle-son, 1 McCord, 199; Course v. Shackleford, 2 Nott. & McC. 283; Ecpert v. Con-dres, 3 Const. R. 69; Union Bank v. Ezell, 10 Hum. 385; Stothart v. Parker, 1 Tenn. 260. See 2 vol. § 996.

² Field v. Nickerson, 13 Mass. 131; Berry v. Robinson, 9 Johns. 121; Sice v. Cunningham, 1 Cow. 397; Bishop v. Dexter, 2 Conn. 417; Course v. Shackleford,

Such at least is the doctrine in the United States according to the weight of authority, though there are cases which dissent from it. Some of them maintain that when the note is overdue at the time of transfer, the rule requiring presentment is to be less stringent than where it has some time to run.¹ While by others a more stringent rule is applied;² and it has been said that, "if the indorsement be made after the note falls due, the demand of payment must be made as if the note fell due the day of indorsement."³

§ 612. *How question of reasonable time determined.*—Many of the authorities hold that the question of reasonable time is for the jury to determine as matter of fact;⁴ while others maintain that it is matter of law for the court.⁵ But neither is strictly correct. It is a mixed question of law and fact in most cases, to be determined upon hypothetical instructions of the court, like all other contested matters. And those authorities seem to us unassailable which hold that when the facts are few and simple, or are presented upon a special verdict or demurrer to evidence, it is within the province of the court to determine.⁶ When they are complicated and doubtful, and are not so presented, they must, of course, be left for the ascertainment and judgment of the jury, under

2 Nott. & McC. 283; Kennon v. McRea, 7 Port. (Ala.) 175. "A bill negotiated after day of payment is like a bill payable at sight." Dehers v. Harriott, 1 Show. 163; 1 Parsons N. & B. 372-376, 382; Bayley on Bills, ch. vii, sec. 1, p. 125.

¹ Rugby v. Davidson, 4 Const. R. (S. C.) 33; Hall v. Smith, 1 Bay (S. C.) 330; McKinney v. Crawford, 8 S. & R. 351.

² Nash v. Harrington, 2 Aik. 9; Aldis v. Johnson, 1 Vt. 136.

³ Aldis v. Johnson, 1 Vt. 136.

⁴ Field v. Nickerson, 13 Mass. 181; Hankey v. Trotman, 1 W. Bl. 1; Goupy v. Harden, 7 Taunt. 159; Straker v. Graham, 4 M. & W. 721. In case of notes indorsed after maturity, it has been so held in Eccles v. Ballard, 2 McCord, 388; Gray v. Bell, 2 Rich. 67, and other decisions in South Carolina.

⁵ Himmelman v. Hotaling, 40 Cal. 111; Gray v. Bell, 2 Rich. 67; Sylvester v. Crapo, 15, Pick. 92; Sice v. Cunningham, 1 Cow. 408; Dennntt v. Wyman, 13 Vt. 485.

⁶ See Chapter XVII. on Presentment for Acceptance, Sec. III; Darbishire v. Parker, 6 East, 3; Tindal v. Brown, 1 T. R. 167 (reasonable notice which stands on same footing); Mellish v. Rawdon, 9 Bing. 416; Wyman v. Adams, 12 Cush. 210; Taylor v. Breden, 3 Johns, 136 (case of notice); Anderson v. Royal Exchange Assurance Co. 7 East, 43; Ball v. Wardell, Willes, 204.

instructions from the court. When the facts are ascertained it is for the court to determine what is reasonable time as matter of law.¹

SECTION IV.

DAYS OF GRACE AND COMPUTATION OF TIME.

§ 613. A bill of exchange, or a negotiable promissory note importing in its language to be payable upon a certain day, is not in reality payable to all intents and purposes upon that day; but ordinarily not until three days after, according to the rules of the law merchant, as it prevails in England and the United States. This period of extension of time of payment is termed "Days of Grace."

§ 614. They were originally days allowed by way of favor to the drawee of a foreign bill to enable him to provide funds for its payment without inconvenience; and were called "days of grace," or "respite days," because they were gratuitous, and dependent on the holder's pleasure, and not to be claimed as a right by the person on whom it was incumbent to pay the bill.² By custom, however, they became universally recognized; and although still termed "days of grace," they are now considered wherever the law merchant prevails as entering into the constitution of every bill of exchange and negotiable note, both in England and the United States, and form so completely a part of it that the instrument is not due in fact or in law until the last day of grace.³ Therefore a demand of payment on the day before or after the third day of grace would not authorize a protest, or charge drawer or indorser.⁴ And interest is chargeable on the period of grace allowed without impeachment as usu-

¹ Muncy Borough School District v. Commonwealth, 84 Penn. St. 471.

² Chitty on Bills (13th Am. ed.) [*374], 422.

³ Chitty, p. 422; Bank of Washington v. Triplett, 1 Pet. 25; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213.

⁴ Bank of Washington v. Triplett, 1 Pet. 25; Donegan v. Wood, 49 Ala. 242.

rious.¹ This indulgence was often important to the drawee, who might not be instantly in funds, nor advised that the bill would at that time be presented for payment; and also even when it was accepted, because of the scarcity of the precious metals in which payment was to be made. And they fixed a limit to the time which the holder might indulge the payor without being guilty of laches in not protesting it.²

§ 615. *All the parties to the bill or note*, being parties to the same contract, are bound by one construction, and the law which fixes grace for drawer or maker fixes it also as to the indorser, and *vice versa*;³ and a special usage varying the allowance of grace from that recognized by the law merchant, as to notes discounted in bank, will be binding upon indorser as well as maker, although he had no knowledge of it.⁴

§ 616. *Inland bills and promissory notes*.—It was doubtful at one time whether grace was allowable on inland bills as well as foreign;⁵ but this was in the remote past.⁶ In England it was also at one time questioned whether or not promissory notes were entitled to grace;⁷ but it was long since settled that they were, the statute of 3 & 4 Anne (1704) placing them on the same footing as bills.⁸ In the United States some cases have denied that grace was allowable on inland bills,⁹ or promissory notes;¹⁰ but they have generally

¹ Bank of Utica v. Wager, 2 Cow. 712; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213.

² Story on Bills, § 333.

³ Central Bank v. Allen, 16 Me. 41; Hogan v. Cuyler, 8 Cow. 203; Love v. Nelson, Mart & Yerger, 237.

⁴ Mills v. Bank U. S. 11 Wheat. 431.

⁵ Cramlington v. Evans, 2 Vent. 307 (1691), no mention of grace; Tassell v. Lewis, 1 L. Raym. 743 (1696).

⁶ Brown v. Harraden, 4 Term R. 148 (1791), Lord Kenyon, C. J., said: "It has been settled for more than half a century that they are payable at the same time as foreign bills of exchange." Leftly v. Mills, 4 T. R. 170 (1791).

⁷ May v. Cooper, Fortescue, 376 (1722); Dextraux v. Hood, Buller N. P. 274 (1752).

⁸ Brown v. Harraden, 4 T. R. 148 (1791).

⁹ 1 Parsons N. & B. 322.

¹⁰ Jones v. Fales, 4 Mass. 245; Cook v. Gray, Hempstead C. C. 47 (1827); Harrel v. Bixler, Walk. 176.

been declared to be as much entitled to it as foreign bills, and except where statute provides otherwise they are so everywhere regarded.¹

§ 617. All bills of exchange and negotiable notes are entitled to grace;² except those payable on demand³ or without specification of time, in which case on demand without grace is understood,⁴ or those expressly payable without grace.⁵ The authorities are uniform in support of this statement of the law, except in respect to its inclusion of sight bills and notes, which by some is denied and by others doubted. In England there has not been, that we are aware of, a direct decision of the question; but it has been taken for granted in some cases, and distinctly intimated in others, that a sight bill or note is entitled to three days' grace;⁶ and the authority of text writers, both foreign and American, as well as of adjudicated cases in this country, greatly preponderates in favor of such allowance. It seems clearly reasonable that bills at sight should have grace, as they are never presented for acceptance, but for payment; and the

¹ *Ogden v. Saunders*, 12 Wheat. 213, note; *Norton v. Lewis*, 2 Conn. 478 (1818), note; *Cook v. Darling*, 2 R. I. 385, note; *Hudson v. Matthews*, Morris, Iowa, 94 (1841), note; *Crenshaw v. M'Kiernan*, Minor, 295, note; *Beck v. Thompson*, 4 Harr. & J. 531 (1819), note.

² *Brown v. Harraden*, 4 T. R. 148; *Cook v. Darling*, 2 R. I. 385; 1 *Parsons N. & B.* 404; *Story on Bills*, § 342; *Story on Notes*, § 224.

³ *Ibid.*; *Chitty* (13 Am. ed.) [*377], 426; *Byles* [*201]; *Edwards*, 523; *Oridge v. Sherborne*, 11 M. & W. 374; *Barbour v. Bayen*, 5 La. Ann. 303; *Cammer v. Harrison*, 2 McCord, 246; *Woodruff v. Merchants' Bank*, 25 Wend. 673.

⁴ *Story on Bills*, § 343.

⁵ See *post*, § 633.

⁶ In *Webb v. Fairmauer*, 3 M. & W. 473, Bolland, B., said: "In the case of a bill payable at sight, it has been decided over and over again that the holder cannot sue upon it until after the expiration of the third day after sight." In *Coleman v. Sayer*, 1 Barn. 303, the chief justice said that by the custom of London grace was allowed on sight bills. In *Debers v. Harriott*, 1 Show. 163 (1691), it seemed agreed that sight bills should be demanded on the third day of grace. In *Jansen v. Thomas*, 3 Doug. 421 (1784), Lord Mansfield said: "I believe there is great doubt as to the usage about the three days' grace." Buller, J., said: "In a case before Willes, C. J. (1743), a special jury certified that on bills at sight three days were allowed. That was an action on an inland bill. I know that they differ about it in the city, but in general it is taken." The decision was that a bill at sight should have been stamped, not coming within the provision of the stamp act excluding bills on demand.

theory of indulgence to the drawee, upon which grace is allowed upon drafts payable at a specified time after date, or after sight, would apply with greater force to those payable at sight. And we have no hesitation in saying, in concurrence with the doctrine expressly stated, or to be derived from what is said by Chitty, Chitty, Jr., Bayley, Byles, Maxwell, Roscoe, Edwards, Story, Parsons, Kent and others, that negotiable instruments payable at sight are, and should be, entitled to grace,¹ though there is respectable authority and opinion to the contrary.² The weight of authority in the United States is to this effect.³ In Scotland the question does not appear to have been decided, but the inclination of opinion is to the allowance of grace.⁴ A bill payable one day after sight is really payable four days after sight, three days' grace being added.⁵

§ 618. Such being the rule of the law merchant, it will be presumed that a bill or note payable at sight is entitled to grace. In a number of the States, however, it is provided by statute that such instruments shall not have grace, and in others that they shall have grace. In some States it may be that well established custom or usage has settled the practice to disallow it.⁶ If such be the law or custom of a particular State or locality, it will be incumbent on the party

¹ In Chitty on Bills (13th Am. ed.) 426, and Bayley on Bills, 151, it is so distinctly laid down. Chitty, Jr., on Bills, 50. In Byles on Bills (Sharswood's ed.) 336, it is said: "The weight of authority has been considered to incline in favor of such an allowance." Maxwell on Bills, 81-2; Roscoe's Digest, 162; Edwards on Bills, 523; Story on Notes, § 224; Story on Bills, §§ 228, 342; in § 342 Story says: "The doctrine seems now well established, both in England and America, that days of grace are allowed on bills payable at sight." 1 Parsons N. & B. 405-6; 3 Kent Com. 103; Redfield & Bigelow's Lead. Cas. 307; See also 1 Bell Com. 416; Selwyn's N. P. Bills of Exch. 6.

² Johnson on Bills, 9; Kyd on Bills, 10; Beawes, by Chitty, Vol. 1, p. 608; Trask v. Martin, 1 E. D. Smith, 505.

³ The following cases are to this effect; Walsh v. Dart, 12 Wis. 635; Cribbs v. Adams, 13 Gray, 597; Hart v. Smith, 15 Ala. 807; Knott v. Venable, 42 Ala. 186; Lucas v. Ladew, 28 Mo. 596; Nimick v. Martin, 1 Monthly Law Mag. 15; 17 West. Law. J. 380.

⁴ Forbes on Bills, 142.

⁵ Craig v. Price, 23 Ark. 634.

⁶ This is supposed to be the case in Virginia.

alleging to show it; and otherwise the rule of the general law merchant prevailing throughout the United States must govern.¹

§ 619. The expression "after sight" in a bill of exchange has a different signification from the like expression in a promissory note. In a bill of exchange it means after acceptance, or protest for non-acceptance, and not after a mere private exhibition to the drawee, for the sight must appear in a legal way.² But a note is incapable of acceptance, and the words "at or after sight" used in it would merely import that payment was not to be demanded until it had been again exhibited to the maker.³ Marius says: "A bill payable so many days after sight is to be accounted so many days next after the bill shall be accepted, or else protested for non-acceptance, and not from the date of the bill, nor from the day that the same came to hand or was privately exhibited to the party on whom it is drawn, to be accepted, if he do not accept thereof; for the sight must appear in a legal way, which is approved either by the parties underwriting the bill, acceptance thereof, or by protest made for non-acceptance."⁴

§ 620. *Only those instruments which are negotiable* by the law merchant, or those which are placed upon the same footing by statute, and are, strictly speaking, commercial instruments, are entitled to grace. In England, where, under the statute of 3 & 4 Anne, a note payable to a particular person is negotiable, although the words "or order" or "or bearer" be not added, it would have grace;⁵ and so whenever such a note is negotiable;⁶ but where such a note is not negotiable, it would be otherwise.⁷

¹ See *Cribbs v. Adams*, 13 Gray, 497.

² *Campbell v. French*, 6 T. R. 212; *Mitchell v. De Grand*, 1 Mason, 176; *Byles* [*76], 170; [*201], 336.

³ *Holmes v. Kerrison*, 2 Taunt. 323; *Sutton v. Toomer*, 7 B. & C. 416; *Dixon v. Nuttall*, 1 C. M. & R. 307.

⁴ Marius, 19, cited and approved in *Campbell v. French*, *supra*, by Lord Kenyon.

⁵ *Smith v. Kendall*, 6 T. R. 123 (1794).

⁶ See *Dutchess Cotton Man. Co. v. Davis*, 14 Johns. 238; *Downing v. Backenstoos*, 3 Caines, 137.

⁷ *Backus v. Danforth*, 10 Conn. 297; *Avery v. Stewart*, 10 Conn. 69; *Lamkin v. Nye*, 43 Miss. 241.

§ 621. If the bill or note be payable in installments, it is entitled to grace on each installment, for it is really so many instruments in one form.¹ If it is payable "on demand at sight," it is the same as if payable "at sight."²

The days are always calculated exclusively of the nominal day of payment.³

§ 622. *Number of days allowed by law merchant and by custom.*—The law merchant, as it prevails in England and the United States, limits the allowance of grace to three days,⁴ and, although it is settled that by special established usage in a particular locality it may be denied altogether, or a different number of days may be granted,⁵ the courts take judicial notice of the period fixed by the law merchant, and will recognize that only unless the usage varying it is alleged and proved.⁶ In the District of Columbia, the usage at one time prevailed to allow four days, and it was sustained as binding upon parties to negotiable instruments there payable, by the United States Supreme Court.⁷ It extended, however, only to notes discounted in bank.⁸ In Louisiana, at one time, ten days were allowed; but this was changed by statute to conform to the law merchant in the United States,⁹ and of course no custom can affect a positive enactment.¹⁰

¹ *Oridge v. Sherborne*, 11 M. & W. 374.

² *Dixon v. Nuttall*, 1 Crompt. M. & R. 307.

³ *Story on Bills*, § 335.

⁴ *Chitty on Bills* (13 Am. ed.); *Hill v. Lewis*, Skin. 410 (1694); *Wood v. Corl*, 4 Metc. 203.

⁵ *Jackson v. Henderson*, 3 Leigh, 197; *Renner v. Bank of Columbia*, 9 Wheat. 581; *Mills v. Bank U. S.* 11 Id. 431; *Wood v. Corl*, 4 Metc. 203; *Kilgore v. Bulkley*, 14 Conn. 362; *Bank of Columbia v. Magrader*, 6 Har. & J. 172; *City Bank v. Cutter*, 3 Pick. 414; *Morse on Banking*, 335; but *contra*, *Woodruff v. Merchants' Bank*, 25 Wend. 673; 6 Hill, 174; *Bowen v. Newell*, 4 Seld. 190; *Edwards on Bills*, 520, 521.

⁶ *Jackson v. Henderson*, 3 Leigh, 197; *Renner v. Bank of Columbia*, 9 Wheat. 581; *Bank of Columbia v. Magrader*, 6 Harr. & J. 172; *Dollfus v. Frosch*, 1 Den. 367; *Wood v. Corl*, 4 Metc. 203; *Lucas v. Ladero*, 28 Mo. 242. In Kentucky it has been held to be entirely a matter of local custom. *Godwin v. Shepley*, 7 B. Mon. 575.

⁷ *Renner v. Bank U. S.* 11 Wheat. 431; see *Fowler v. Brantley*, 14 Pet. 318.

⁸ *Cookendorfer v. Preston*, 4 How. 317.

⁹ In 1805, and see statutes of 1855-1858; *Dubreys v. Farmer*, 22 La. Ann. 478.

¹⁰ *Perkins v. Franklin Bank*, 21 Pick. 483.

§ 623. The Supreme Court of the United States has, by several decisions, sanctioned the usages of banks in particular localities, in making demand, and giving notice of non-payment, in a manner or at a time varying from the general law merchant,¹ and its views are concurred in by other high authorities. The following principles on this subject may be regarded as established: *First*, That the usage must be notorious, in order that an inference may be drawn that it is known to the public, and especially to those dealing with the bank, and therefore create the further inference of expressed or implied assent. *Second*, That when a usage has been sanctioned by judicial decision it becomes settled law. No further proof is necessary to establish it, and no evidence is admissible to controvert the law laid down by the court.² *Third*, That it should apply to a place rather than to a particular bank.³ *Fourth*, That it need not be known to the party dealing with the bank at a particular place.⁴

§ 624. *The term "month."*—By the common law of England, a month is deemed a lunar month, and is computed accordingly in construing common law contracts and statutes;⁵ but by the law merchant, both in England and the United States, a month is construed to mean a calendar month in all cases of negotiable instruments, and of mercantile contracts.⁶ Therefore a bill dated the first day of January, and payable one month after date, would be payable (grace included) on the fourth day of February; and one dated February first, payable one month after date, would

¹ Renner v. Bank of Columbia, 9 Wheat. 587; Adams v. Otterback, 15 How. 539.

² Cookendorfer v. Preston, 4 How. 317; Edie v. East India Co. 2 Burr. 1221.

³ Renner v. Bank of Columbia, 9 Wheat. 587; Mills v. Bank U. S. 11 Wheat. 430; Adams v. Otterback, 15 How. 539; Dorchester, &c. Bank v. Milton Bank, 1 Cush. 177.

⁴ Mills v. Bank U. S. 11 Wheat. 431; Fowler v. Branily, 14 Pet. 318; Lime Rock Bank v. Hewett, 52 Me. 531; Morse on Banking, 372-3.

⁵ Chitty on Bills (13 Am. ed.), [*373], 420.

⁶ Thomas v. Shoemaker, 6 Watts & S. 179; McMurchey v. Robinson, 10 Ohio, 496; Lang v. Gale, 1 Maule & S. 111; Matter of Swonford, 6 Id. 226.

likewise be payable (grace included) on the fourth day of March, although February is two, or three days (in leap year), shorter than January. When one month is longer than the next succeeding month, the computation of a month does not carry it into a third month. Thus a month dating from the thirty-first of January would expire on the 28th or 29th of February, as the case might be; and in leap year, a month counting from the thirty-first, thirtieth, or twenty-ninth of January, would end on the twenty-ninth of February, and the last day of grace would be March the third. But if a bill or note were dated January twenty-eighth, a month therefrom would terminate on February twenty-eighth, and presentment should be on March the second.¹ The general rule was recently stated in a New York case² by Folger, J. : "In computing the time when a note, payable at a certain number of months after date will become due, the rule is to exclude the day of the date from the calculation, and include the day of payment, when no days of grace are allowed.³ When a promissory note is dated on a day of any month, and made payable at a specified number of months after date, without days of grace, it accrues due and payable on the same day in the stipulated number of months afterward with the day of the date of the note."⁴

§ 625. And whenever a note is made on the last day of a month, the corresponding day of the next month is estimated as the termination of a month from date. Thus if payable a month from February 29th, in leap year, presentment should be on the first of April, and if on the 30th of September, presentment should be on the second of November.⁵ If dated on an impossible date, such as the 31st of September,

¹ *Wagner v. Kenner*, 2 Rob. (La.) 120; *Chitty* (13 Am. ed.), [*373], 421; 1 *Parsons N. & B.* 409.

² *Roehner v. Knickerbocker Life Ins. Co.* 63 N. Y. 163 (1875).

³ Citing *Bellasis v. Hester*, 1 Ld. Raym. 280; *Campbell v. French*, 6 T. R. 212.

⁴ Citing *Hartford Bank v. Barry*, 17 Mass. 94; *Ripley v. Greenleaf*, 2 Vt. 129.

⁵ *Wagner v. Kenner*, 2 Rob. (La.) 129; *Wood v. Mullen*, 3 Rob. (La.) 299; *Chitty*, [*373], 421; 1 *Parsons N. & B.* 409; *Story on Notes*, § 213 a; *Story on Bills*, § 330; *Edwards*, 515.

the law adopts the nearest day by the doctrine of *cy pres* (as near as may be); and the computation will be from the 30th of September.¹

§ 626. *As to the computation of days.*—In computing the number of days which a bill or note, payable at or in so many days from date, has to run, the day of date is always excluded;² and if payable at so many days after sight, after demand, or after a particular event, the day of sight,³ demand, or of the happening of the event is likewise excluded.⁴ So if it be presented on one day, and accepted on another, the day of acceptance is excluded.⁵ The expression, “in thirty days;”—“in thirty days from date;”—“at thirty days;”—and “thirty days after date,” are synonymous.⁶ As said in Maine, by Howard, J.: “If there be several notes of the same date, some payable in six months, some in six months from date, and some in six months after date, they all have the same pay day. In all of them the day of the date is excluded.”⁷

§ 627. *How Sundays and days of religious observance and holidays counted.*—There is a peculiarity about the calculation of grace, which denotes its origin as arising from indulgence. If a bill or note without grace, or any non-commercial instrument for payment of money, falls due on a Sunday or a legal holiday, it is not payable until the next regular

¹ Wagner v. Kenner, 2 Rob. (La.), 120; 1 Parsons N. & B. 410.

² Coleman v. Sayer, 1 Barn. 303; Henry v. Jones, 8 Mass. 453; Ammidown v. Woodman, 31 Me. 580; Taylor v. Jacoby, 2 Penn. St. 495; Hill v. Norvell, 3 McLean, 583. Formerly otherwise, Bellasis v. Hester, 1 Ld. Raym. 303.

³ Coleman v. Sayer, 1 Barn. 303; Lester v. Garland, 15 Ves. 248; Sturdy v. Henderson, 4 B. & Ald. 592; Loring v. Halling, 15 Johns. 120; Mitchell v. De Grand, 1 Mason, 176.

⁴ Ibid.; Barlow v. Planters' Bank, 9 How. (Miss.) 129.

⁵ Mitchell v. De Grand, 1 Mason, 176.

⁶ Ammidown v. Woodman, 31 Me. 580; Henry v. Jones, 8 Mass. 453. In this case the Court said: “In the case at bar the note was made payable at sixty days, without adding, as is customary, from the date. But the intention is apparent, and the Court will supply the omission. The meaning must be the same as in sixty days from the date, otherwise a note payable in one day would be payable immediately, which would be an absurdity.”

⁷ Ammidown v. Woodman, *supra*.

business day, for the payor is not compellable by law to pay on the exact day named, and the next day is the first day that the creditor can demand payment.¹ But the debtor cannot require the creditor to extend his indulgence beyond three calendar days; and therefore when grace on a bill or note entitled to it expires on a Sunday or other non-business day, the bill or note would fall due on the day preceding. Thus, if grace expired on Sunday, it would fall due on Saturday;² and if a holiday (such as Christmas day) fell on the Saturday before the Sunday of its maturity, it would fall due on the Friday preceding.³ The latest business day within or before the period of grace is the day of payment,⁴ even though all grace be excluded.⁵ If a holiday or Sunday intervenes, or is the nominal day of grace, it is counted as one of the days of grace.⁶

§ 628. Days observed according to the religious usages of a race or sect differing from those which generally prevail, as days of religious worship, fasts or festivals, stand on the same footing as the Christian Sabbath, in respect to those who belong to such race or sect. Religious liberty and freedom of conscience require this. Thus, a Jew, it is said, could not be compelled to pay or receive payment on Saturday, if he observed it as a day of abstinence from secular business.⁷ "The law merchant respects the religion of different people."⁸

§ 629. *What days are legal holidays* are determined by statute law and by the decisions of the courts in the various States. Christmas is universally regarded as a legal holiday. The fourth of July is everywhere regarded so in the United States; and in many of them the twenty-second of February

¹ Avery v. Stewart, 2 Conn. 69; Salter v. Burt, 20 Wend. 205; Kuntz v. Tempel, 48 Mo. 75; Barrett v. Allen, 10 Ohio, 426.

² Bussard v. Levering, 6 Wheat. 192; Kuntz v. Tempel, 48 Mo. 75; Barrett v. Allen, 10 Ohio, 426; Tassell v. Lewis, 1 Ld. Raym. 743.

³ Story on Bills, § 338.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ 1 Parsons N. & B. 402.

⁶ Wooley v. Clements, 11 Ala. 229.

⁷ Story on Bills, § 340; 1 Parsons N. & B. 530.

⁸ Lindo v. Unsworth, 2 Camp. 602, Lord Ellenborough.

and fast and thanksgiving days and new year's day, likewise. In most of the States there are statutes specifying the legal holidays, and prescribing the practice with respect to them; but, independent of them, usage would determine whether any day was to be so regarded, and also the regulations concerning it.¹ In Massachusetts, it has been held that although commencement day at Harvard University was not a legal holiday, yet that a usage of any bank in respect to notes falling due on that day, to make a demand and to send notice the day previous, would bind an indorser, connusant of the usage of a note discounted for him at that bank; and whether the note was payable at the bank or not was immaterial.²

But the usage of a bank in a particular city to regard new-year's day as a holiday, would not justify a demand the day previous, so as to charge an indorser, unless he had express knowledge of the usage, or previous dealings with the bank, from which such knowledge could be inferred.³

It has been held that a law making a legal holiday, and thereby affecting notes as to grace, does not impair the obligation of a contract.⁴ This view, however, has been recently questioned.⁵

§ 630. *A bill or note operates as from its date* as soon as it is delivered, whether it be truly dated, or ante-dated, or post-dated, although it does not become an operative contract until it is delivered.⁶ When there is no date or an impossible one, it operates from its delivery;⁷ and if no date or delivery is shown, from the time when it appears to have first been in existence.⁸ The object of the date is simply to fix the time of maturity;⁹ and parol evidence cannot be admitted to vary it,¹⁰ unless between the immediate parties

¹ 1 Parsons N. & B. 403.

² City Bank v. Cutter, 3 Pick. 414.

³ Dabney v. Campbell, 9 Humph. 680; see 11 Wheat. 430.

⁴ Barlow v. Gregory, 31 Conn. 261.

⁵ See Duerson's Adm'r v. Alsop, 27 Grat. 238 (1876), Staples, J.

⁶ Powell v. Waters, 8 Cow. 699; see *ante*, § 83-4-5.

⁷ Mechanics' Bank v. Schuyler, 7 Cow. 337.

⁸ Mahier v. Le Blanc, 12 La. Ann. 207.

⁹ Brewster v. McCordle, 8 Wend. 478.

¹⁰ Huston v. Young, 33 Me. 85.

upon application to equity on the ground of fraud or mistake.

§ 631. *As to usance.*—When bills are drawn in one country of Europe upon another, they are frequently made payable at one, two, or more usances, instead of at so many months or days. “Usance” is a French term, and signifies the time which, according to the usage of the countries between which the bills are drawn, is appointed for payment of them.¹ The length of the usance differs in different countries; and what period it signifies is not taken judicial notice of by foreign courts, but must be averred and proved.² Between the United States and the European nations, it seems that no usances are established;³ and in Europe the practice of drawing bills at a certain number of days or months is taking the place of drawing at usance.⁴ When a month constitutes the usance, a half usance is fifteen days, and bills may be drawn at half, or double, or treble usance.⁵ Usance is calculated exclusively of the day of date, and grace is allowed as in other cases.⁶

§ 632. *Style.*—The Gregorian calendar, or new style of computing time, is adopted in the United States, and everywhere else, except in Russia and those countries where the Greek church is the established religion. They use the Julian calendar, or old style, as it is called. There is the difference of twelve days between the two styles; and the addition of that number to the old makes the new style. The 1st of January in St. Petersburg, Russia, is therefore the 13th of January in England and the United States. The style of the place of payment, however, always prevails; and if a bill were drawn in London on the 1st of September, payable in St. Petersburg on the 1st of January, it would fall due on the day corresponding to the 13th of January in England; and *vice versa*.⁷ This is because the par-

¹ Chitty on Bills (13 Am. ed.) [*371], 418; Story on Bills, §§ 50, 144, 332.

² Chitty [*371], 418.

³ 1 Parsons N. & B. 389.

⁴ Chitty, p. 418.

⁵ Chitty, p. 418.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Story on Bills, § 331; 1 Parsons N. & B. 388.

ties are to be regarded as contracting in reference to the meaning of terms at the place of their fulfillment.¹

§ 633. *How grace dispensed with.*—By any language in the bill or note of that import, grace may be disallowed. And such words as “without grace,” or “no grace,” obviously disallow it;² and the word “fixed” has been held to have the same import.³ But the expression “without defalcation” does not;⁴ nor would a mere marginal memorandum of the day of the month and year on which the time after date at which the instrument was expressed to be payable fell due.⁵ But where a bill at sixty days’ sight was accepted on September 14th, payable November 16th, it was held that November 16th was indicated by the acceptor to be the absolute day of payment, he having intended to allow for grace in his calculation; and that presentment on that day was necessary.⁶

§ 634. The allowance of grace is always determined by the law of the place where the bill or note is payable.⁷ But the law merchant allowing grace, and fixed it at three days, will be followed, unless it be affirmatively proved that the law of such place is different. Thus if executed and sued on in this country, where three days are allowed, and payable in France where grace is abolished,⁸ three days’ grace would be accorded, unless the law of France were proved.⁹

SECTION V.

PLACE OF PRESENTMENT.

§ 635. *At what place presentment should be made, when bill or note is payable generally.*—The presentment of the

¹ Chitty on Bills [*369], 417. ² Perkins v. Franklin Bank, 21 Pick. 483.

³ Durnford v. Patterson, 7 Mart. (La.) 460. ⁴ McDonald v. Lee, 12 La. 435.

⁵ Perkins v. Franklin Bank, 21 Pick. 483.

⁶ Kenner v. Creditors, 19 Mart. (La.) 540; 20 Id. 36.

⁷ Chitty on Bills (13 Am. ed.), [*376], 425; Story on Notes, § 216; Story on Bills, § 324; Bryant v. Edson, 8 Vt. 325; Bowen v. Newell, 3 Kern. 290; Bank of Washington v. Triplett, 1 Pet. 25; Kilgore v. Buckley, 14 Conn. 362.

⁸ Code of Commerce, art. 135.

⁹ Dollfus v. Frosch, 1 Denio, 367.

bill or note for payment should be made at the city, town or other place in which the acceptor or maker has his home or domicile, or his place of business, provided there be no place designated in the instrument or agreed upon by the parties as the place where it shall be paid at maturity.¹ If such place is designated or agreed upon, it will be sufficient to make presentment there.² And averment of presentment there is always sufficient, without any addition.³ If the maker or acceptor has both a dwelling-house, and a business house in the same city, town or other place, the presentment may be made at either.⁴ And if the maker or acceptor have a dwelling-house or domicile in one city, and a place of business in another, it will, as it seems, be sufficient to present the instrument at either.⁵ If a bill be payable in a particular town, a presentment at all of the bankers' houses there will suffice.⁶ In an action upon a draft upon N. F. Mills, "care of M. S. & Co., No. 114 South Main st., St. Louis, Mo.," the notarial certificate stated that the notary presented it "at the place of business of N. F. Mills, St. Louis, to the person in charge thereof." It appeared that N. F. Mills had two places of business in St. Louis, one of which was No. 114; and it was held that the certified presentment was insufficient to show due diligence, to charge the indorsers.⁷

When the bill is presented for acceptance, the drawee may detain it for twenty-four hours, if he desire, before acting, to examine his accounts; but when a bill or note is presented for payment, it must be paid immediately; and the

¹ Oakey v. Beauvais, 11 La. 487; Mitchell v. Baring, 10 Barn. & C. 11.

² Brent's Ex'r v. Bank of Metropolis, 1 Pet. 92; Eason v. Isbell, 47 Ala. 456 (1868).

³ Hawkey v. Borwick, 4 Bing. 136 (13 E. C. L. R.)

⁴ Story on Bills, § 236.

⁵ Story on Bills, §§ 236, 351; 1 Pars. N. & B. 422, note m.

⁶ Hardy v. Woodroffe, 2 Stark. 319; Byles [*207], 323.

⁷ Brooks v. Higby, 18 N. Y. S. C. (11 Hun), 236 (1877), Smith, J: "As it appeared that the acceptor had two places of business in St. Louis, the certificate furnished no evidence whatever that the presentment and demand were at the place where the draft was payable. The proof was fatally defective."

place of presentment for payment would, therefore, seem more important than the place of presentment for acceptance. Presentment for acceptance at the private dwelling of the drawee is sufficient;¹ and the authorities support the doctrine that it is equally sufficient to make presentment there for payment.² In New York, the rule is thus stated by Folger, J.: "Demand of payment at the usual place of business of the maker, though he be absent, is sufficient; or at his residence; or to him in person."³

§ 636. When, however, the maker or acceptor has a well-known house or place of business where he is accustomed to transact his financial affairs, and where demand may be made, it would be safer and more appropriate to present it there. Certainly it would seem unreasonable to expect, during the business hours of the day, to find any one at a private residence to answer respecting the payment of a negotiable instrument, when the maker or acceptor, if he have any place of business, would be presumably there; and during such business hours due diligence would not appear to have been exerted in demanding payment at his house.⁴ If, however, business hours had closed, a presentment at the dwelling would seem sufficient. It is undoubted that a presentment and demand of payment at the place of business of the maker or acceptor is sufficient.⁵ Where it was contended that the demand should have been made at the maker's house, it was held otherwise.⁶ But if the place of

¹ Chitty on Bills (13th Am. ed.) [*278], 316.

² *M'Gruder v. Bank of Washington*, 9 Wheat. 198, the Court saying: "It is enough if the demand be made at his place of abode, or generally at the place where he ought to be found." *Sanderson v. Judge*, 2 H. Bl. 509, it being said, "It is sufficient if it (demand) be made at the house of the maker of the note." *Shamburgh v. Comagere*, 10 Mart. (La.) 18; *Stivers v. Prentice*, 3 B. Mon. 461.

³ *Gates v. Beecher*, 60 N. Y. 522.

⁴ 1 *Parsons N. & B.* 423.

⁵ *Lanussa v. Massicot*, 3 Mart. (La.) 361.

⁶ *Sussex Bank v. Baldwin*, 2 Harrison, 487. In this case it was contended that demand should have been at the dwelling, but the Court said: "It appears by the evidence that the office in question was the regular place of business of the maker; and I have no doubt where a person has an office, or known and settled place of business for the transaction of his moneyed concerns, whether he

business cannot be found, then demand should be made at the maker's house.¹ If a bill be accepted payable at a banker's, and the banker is holder at maturity, that fact alone amounts to presentment; ² so if it be left there for collection.³

§ 637. The place of business must be the "usual place of business" of the party, and not that used for a mere temporary occupation; ⁴ though if it be really the place where he transacts his financial concerns, it matters not that it is a mere office, or desk-room in an office with others, and a demand there in his absence made during business hours will be sufficient.⁵ If the party has closed and abandoned his place of business at the time the bill or note matures, but has a place of residence in the city or other place where his business was conducted, which could be ascertained by reasonable inquiry, the presentment for payment should be made at his residence, and a presentment at the former place of business will not suffice.⁶ And, of course, where the party has no place of business other than the dwelling, the presentment must be at the dwelling.⁷ And so, if a partnership place of business be closed and abandoned when the note matures, and one of the partners resides in the town or city, present-

be a banker, broker, merchant, manufacturer, mechanic, or dealer in any other way, a presentment and demand at that place, as well as a presentment and demand at his residence is sufficient. It must not, however, be a place selected and used temporarily for the transaction of some particular business, as settling up some old books or accounts merely, but his regular and known place of business for the transaction of his moneyed concerns. The counting-room of a banker or merchant may be a proper place for a demand, though the manufactory or workshop would not. Yet, if the manufacturer or mechanic have an office or known place of business for the purpose aforesaid, a good demand may be made there."

¹ *Jarvis v. Garnett*, 39 Mo. 271.

² *Bailey v. Porter*, 14 M. & W. 44.

³ *Nichols v. Goldsmith*, 7 Wend. 160.

⁴ *Sussex Bank v. Baldwin*, 2 Harrison, 457.

⁵ *West v. Brown*, 6 Ohio St. 542; *Williams v. Hoogewerff*, 25 Md. 128; *Bank of Commonwealth v. Mudgett*, 44 N. Y. 514 (case of protest).

⁶ *Granite Bank v. Ayres*, 16 Pick. 392. See Vol. II, § 1118.

⁷ *Packard v. Lyon*, 5 Duer, 82. Maker was a married woman who kept a boarding-house, but her name was not in the directory. Demand at a bank when note was deposited, with inquiry as to place of residence, was held insufficient, and indorser was discharged.

ment at his residence must be made.¹ But ordinarily the statement of the notary's certificate that he called at the place of business of the acceptor or maker to make demand, during the usual hours of business, and found it closed, is sufficient.²

§ 638. When the presentment is made to the maker or acceptor personally, the place is not important, provided there is an express or implied refusal to pay. Presentment at the barn-yard has been held sufficient, the party "making no objection, and intimating no readiness to pay;"³ and even in the street presentment would seem to be usually good, unless objected to as improper, or some reason were given for the refusal.⁴ This view seems to us correct.⁵ But it would be more business like not to make demand at such a place, and there are authorities which hold that the party is not bound to pay any attention to a demand so entirely outside of the custom of merchants.⁶ In a case in Maine demand on the street of the maker, he having no place of business, and raising no objection, was held sufficient to charge the indorser, and the law was laid down with discrimination and sound judgment by Virgin, J., who said:⁷ "It would seem that such a demand would be more satisfactory than a mere formal ceremony of a demand gone through at his place of residence during the maker's absence. And we have no

¹ Granite Bank v. Ayres, 16 Pick. 392.

² See Vol. II, § 1118.

³ Baldwin v. Farnsworth, 1 Fairfax, 414.

⁴ 1 Parsons N. & B. 421.

⁵ King v. Crowell, 61 Me. 244 (1873).

⁶ King v. Holmes, 11 Penn. St. 456, Rogers, J., saying: "The Court correctly instructed the jury that a demand in the street of an acceptor of a bill of exchange is not a sufficient demand: that when a bill is payable generally, and not at a particular place, the demand must be at the place of business of the acceptor. But if the notary, on his way to the place of business of the acceptor, meets him on the street, and informs him of his business and where he is going, and the acceptor offers, if he will go to his place of business, to give him only a check on a broker, it is not necessary for the notary to proceed further. The demand at the place of business is waived by the payor or acceptor. It is, in effect, a refusal to pay, for an offer to pay by a check on a banker, in legal contemplation, is nothing. It is not such a tender as the notary would be justified in accepting. In this case, the acceptor had no cause of complaint, for the notary offered to receive a check on one of the banks in payment of the bill."

⁷ King v. Crowell, 61 Me. 244 (1873).

hesitation in declaring the demand sufficient under the circumstances, so far as the place is concerned, to charge the defendant (an indorser). We are aware that Byles on Bills, 196, declares that a demand on the street is not sufficient. Such is the doctrine expressed too in the author's notes in Lead. Cas. on Bills, 329, 328. And there are several cases containing the *dictum* in general terms that a demand must be made either at the maker's place of business or place of residence. But our attention has been called to the case, neither have we, after considerable research, been able to find any wherein the court having the question before it, decided adversely to a demand made on the street, under circumstances similar to those in this case."

§ 639. *Place of date prima facie place of payment.*—The place of date in a note does not, of itself, make it payable there, and when a note is payable generally, the parties may agree upon the place where it shall be presented, and parol evidence is admissible to prove such an agreement.¹ It has been held that where the maker and indorsers have agreed where a note payable generally shall be presented for payment, presentment at such place is sufficient to charge the indorsers as well as the maker;² and the grounds upon which

¹ 1 Parsons N. & B. 424; Redfield v. Bigelow's Leading Cases, 326; *contra*, Story on Notes, 49; Pierce v. Whitney, 29 Me. 188.

² Brent's Ex'rs v. Bank of the Metropolis, 1 Pet. 92, Marshall, C. J., saying: "The plaintiffs in error contend that the testimony ought not to have been admitted, because it was an attempt by parol proof to vary a written instrument. But this is not an attempt to vary a written instrument. The place of demand is not expressed on the face of the note, and the necessity of a demand on the person, when the parties are silent, is an inference of law, which is drawn only when they are silent. A parol agreement puts an end to this inference, and dispenses with a personal demand. The parties consent to a demand, at a stipulated place, instead of a demand on the person of the maker, and this does not alter the instrument so far as it goes, but supplies extrinsic circumstances which the parties are at liberty to supply. No demand is necessary to sustain a suit against the maker. His undertaking is unconditional; but the indorser undertakes conditionally to pay, if the maker does not, and this imposes on the holder the necessity of taking proper steps to obtain payment from the maker. This contract is not written, but is implied. It is, that due diligence to obtain payment from the maker shall be used. When the parties agree what this due diligence shall be,

the decisions to this effect are based are broad enough to establish the sufficiency of presentment at any place agreed upon by the maker. The contract of the indorsers is to pay if due diligence to obtain payment from the maker is used without effect. Due diligence requires presentment to the maker at his dwelling or place of business; and if the maker designates a place of payment, it is as much as to say, I will accept presentment at the place named, and make it my place of business so far as this transaction is concerned. Every object which would require presentment at the place of business is attained.¹

§ 640. *Due diligence in seeking maker to make presentment.*—Whether or not due diligence to find the maker of a note at the place where it is dated, will be sufficient, has been debated. The place of date is *prima facie* evidence that it is the place of the maker's residence and place of business; and it is sufficient, we should say, to charge an indorser to have the note in that place at the time of maturity, and to make proper inquiry after the place of the maker's residence or place of business, provided that the holder does not know that his residence is elsewhere.² And if it were proved that

they do not alter the written contract, but agree upon an extrinsic circumstance, and substitute that agreement for an act which the law prescribes only where they are silent." This case was based on evidence that the indorsers, as well as the maker, had agreed that demand should be made at a particular place—the Bank of the Metropolis. *State Bank v. Hurd*, 12 Mass. 171; *Meyer v. Hibscher*, 47 N. Y. 265; *Thompson v. Ketchum*, 4 Johns. 285; but see *Anderson v. Drake*, 14 Johns. 114.

¹ 1 Parsons N. & B. 424; *Sussex Bank v. Baldwin*, 2 Harrison, 487, on the ground of estoppel. This doctrine is doubted in *Redfield & Bigelow's Leading Cases*, 327.

² In *Meyer v. Hibscher*, 47 N. Y. 270, it is said by the Court, *per* Folger, J.: "In such case (the note being dated at a place and payable generally) the note must be presented and payment asked for at the place of business therein of the maker, if he has one; and if he has no place of business, then at his place of residence. And if he have neither place of business nor residence, then, if the holder of the note is at the place where it is in general made payable, on the day of payment, with the note, ready to receive payment, it is sufficient to constitute a presentment and demand." *Apperson v. Bynum*, 5 Cold. 348; *Staylor v. Williams*, 24 Md. 199; *Moodie v. Morrall*, 3 Const. R. 367; *Stewart v. Eden*, 2 Caines, 121. But see *Apperson v. Pritchard*, 9 Heiskell, 793.

the maker resided elsewhere, it would not devolve upon the holder the burden of showing that he made inquiries as to his residence.¹ This doctrine is sustained by high authority in America, and is that adopted in Scotland;² and it seems to us correct, notwithstanding that there are cases in which a contrary view is taken, and that it has been criticised by an eminent author.³ It is true that the execution of a note, and the dating of it at a particular place, does not make it necessarily payable there,⁴ and this is the ground on which Professor Parsons bases the opinion that due diligence is not exercised in presenting it there without inquiry; but the question seems to us not one as to the contract of payment, but simply as to the likelihood of the maker's whereabouts.

¹ *Smith v. Philbrick*, 10 Gray, 252, Merrick, J., said: "This is an action brought by indorsers against a prior indorser to recover the contents of a promissory note. At its maturity the holder placed it in the hands of a notary public, who, by his direction, went with it to the place of business which the maker formerly occupied in the city of Boston, and there made inquiry for him, in order, if he were found, to present it to him for payment. He was not found, and no demand of payment was made. The defendant insists that he is not liable as indorser, and that this action cannot be maintained. The note is dated and was made at Boston, where the maker then was on a visit for a temporary purpose only. He then, and has ever since, resided at Port Lavacca, in the State of Texas, where he had his only place of business. At the trial no evidence was produced to show whether the plaintiff, or any of the subsequent holders of the note, knew that the maker's residence and place of business were in Boston or elsewhere; there was no evidence whatever upon that question. * * * The defendant insists that the plaintiffs ought to have been required, if they would avail themselves of that rule, to show affirmatively that both they and all the subsequent holders of the note were ignorant of the fact that the maker of the note had no residence or place of business in the city of Boston. This is not so. The presumption is, as has been before stated, in the absence of all other evidence upon the subject, that the residence of the promisor is at the place where the paper to which he subscribes his name is dated. Either party may controvert this presumption, and overcome it by proofs introduced. But no evidence to the contrary having been laid before the court, this presumption is to stand."

² Thomson on Bills (Wilson's ed.) 286.

³ 1 Parsons N. & B. 458. But see p. 453 of the same volume, in which the opinion concords with the text substantially, and varies from that subsequently given; also p. 442. And see Chapter XXIX, on Notice, Section VI. *Mason v. Pritchard*, 9 Heiskell, 797. In this case the maker signed himself as "Captain of the Steamboat Southerner."

⁴ *Taylor v. Snyder*, 3 Denio, 145; *Lightner v. Hill*, 2 Watts & S. 140; *Anderson v. Drake*, 14 Johns. 114; *Fisher v. Evans*, 5 Binn. 541.

And in the absence of other information, it seems reasonable to presume that he will be found at the place where he executes his business paper, and that if it had been intended that it should be payable elsewhere, it would be so expressed on its face.

And when the bill or note is made on terms payable in a city, without specification of a particular place, and the acceptor or maker has no residence or place of business there, it will certainly be sufficient to charge the drawer or indorser if the holder have the bill or note in the city at maturity, ready to be presented and delivered up, if the maker or acceptor should appear.¹ And, indeed, it seems that it would be idle to make a bill payable in a particular city, without naming a particular place therein, if the drawee does not reside or have a place of business there. The law requires no useless ceremony, and the absence of the party from the place of payment would dispense with the necessity of going where it is known he would not be found, and it is not necessary that the bill should be sent there and protested.²

§ 641. *Presentment of notes made, and of bills drawn or accepted, payable at a particular place in England.*—In England the steps necessary to fix the liability of parties to notes and bills made, drawn or accepted, payable at a particular place, were for a long time the subject of much dispute, the history of which it is no longer necessary to follow minutely in order to appreciate fully the settled condition of the law, or to understand its bearings upon the decisions in the United States. A case came finally before the House of Lords, in which the effect of an acceptance in the following language was discussed: "Accepted, payable at Sir John Perring & Co., bankers, London;"³ and that body, overruling the views of eight of the twelve judges whose opinion had been taken on the question, decided that

¹ Root v. Franklin, 3 Johns. 207; Mason v. Franklin, Id. 202; Edwards on Bills, 500.

² Ibid.; Edwards on Bills, 158.

³ Rowe v. Young, 2 Brod. & Bing. 165; s. c. Bligh, 391.

the acceptance was conditional, restricting the place of payment, and that the holder was bound to present the bill at the bankers named in order to charge the acceptor. If the holder brought an action against the acceptor, it was held necessary that he should aver and prove such presentment, otherwise the declaration would be bad upon demurrer. This decision led to the passage of the statute 1 & 2 Geo. IV (generally called Sergeant Onslow's act), by which it was enacted that an acceptance payable at the house of a banker, or other place, without further expression, should be deemed a general acceptance; but if it were expressed payable at a banker's, or other place, "only, and not otherwise or elsewhere," it should be a qualified acceptance, and the acceptor should not be liable except upon due demand at the place named.

§ 642. This statute, it will be observed, did not apply to promissory notes,¹ and the liability of the drawer or indorser of a bill remained unchanged.² Where the place, therefore, is mentioned in the body of a note, presentment must, in England, be averred and proved,³ but if the place were mentioned in a memorandum beneath the maker's signature, it would be regarded as directory only.⁴ Where a bill is drawn with the expression of a particular place only, and not elsewhere, in the body, and accepted without further expression in the acceptance, it would be within the rule of the statute making it a qualified acceptance.⁵ And the words, "and not elsewhere," alone would be sufficient to incorporate the qualification.⁶

The same principles apply where the place of payment is specified in the body of the bill, and the acceptance is simply according to its tenor; and it will be necessary, in order to

¹ *Emblem v. Dartnell*, 12 M. & W. 830.

² *Gibb v. Mather*, 8 Bing. 214.

³ *Sanderson v. Bowes*, 14 East. 500.

⁴ *Sanderson v. Judge*, 2 H. Bl. 509; 1 Pars. N. & B. 428; but *see post*, as to rule in United States.

⁵ *Halsted v. Skelton*, 5 Q. B. 86.

⁶ *Higgins v. Nichols*, 7 Dowl. 551.

charge the drawer, to present the bill at the particular place, if one be named.¹

§ 643. *Presentment at a particular place in the United States.*—The Supreme Court of the United States, and almost all the courts of last resort of the several States, have coincided with the views presented by a majority of the judges in the case of *Rowe v. Young* (quoted in a note to the foregoing paragraph), and differed from the decision of the House of Lords in that case; and in the United States it may be considered as settled, that where a note is made payable at a particular banker's, or other place,² or a bill is drawn or accepted, payable in like manner,³ it is not necessary, in respect to the maker or acceptor, to aver or prove presentment or demand of payment at such place on the day the instrument became due or afterward, in order to maintain an action against him.⁴ The only consequence of neglect of the holder to present, as said by President Tucker, in a Virginia case is,⁵ "that the maker, if he was ready at the time and place to make the payment, may plead the matter

¹ *Boydell v. Harkness*, 3 C. B. 168 (54 E. C. L. R.); *Selby v. Eden*, 3 Bing. 611; 11 J. B. Moore, 511; *Fayle v. Bird*, 6 B. & C. 531; 2 Car. & P. 303; 9 Dow. & R. 639. See the decisions as to Promissory Notes, *Byles on Bills* (Sharswood's ed.) [*246]. 342; 1 Pars. N. & B. 308, note z.

² *Wallace v. McConnell*, 13 Pet. 136; *Armistead v. Armistead*, 10 Leigh, 525; *Watkins v. Crouch*, 5 Leigh, 522; *Ruggles v. Patten*, 8 Mass. 480; *Caldwell v. Cassady*, 8 Cow. 271; *McNairy v. Bell*, 1 Yerg. 502; *Thiel v. Conrad*, 21 La. Ann. 214; *Hills v. Place*, 48 N. Y. 520 (1872); *Howard v. Bowman*, 17 Wis. 459; *McCullough v. Cook*, 34 Ind. 334; *Montgomery v. Tutt*, 11 Cal. 307; *Reeve v. Pack*, 6 Mich. 240; *Yeaton v. Berney*, 62 Ill. 62; *Hill v. Allen*, 37 Ind. 541. Kent and Story inclined to the English rule. Story on Notes, §§ 227, 229; 3 Kent Com. 99; *Picquet v. Curtis*, 1 Sumner, 478; *Merchants' Bank v. Evans*, 9 W. Va. 373; *Baltzer v. Kansas P. R. R. Co.* 3 Mo. App. 574; *Yeaton v. Berney*, 62 Ill. 61.

³ *Foden v. Sharp*, 4 Johns. 183; *Blair v. Bank of Tenn.* 11 Humph. 84.

⁴ Contrary decisions have been rendered in a few cases in the United States. In Indiana, *Palmer v. Hughes*. 1 Blackf. 328; *Gilly v. Springer*, Ib. 257; *Alden v. Barbour*, 3 Ind. 414, agreed with the English doctrine, but are now overruled; *Hall v. Allen*, 37 Ind. 541. The decisions in Louisiana, formerly of the same tenor, have been overruled, and the general doctrine now prevails there also.

⁵ *Armistead v. Armistead*, 10 Leigh, 525, reaffirming *Watkins v. Crouch*, 5 Leigh. 322.

in bar of damages and costs; but he must, at the same time, bring the money into court which the plaintiff will be entitled to receive. A further consequence, indeed, might follow, if any loss had been sustained by his failure to present; but this must be set up as matter of defense."¹ If the maker has funds in the bank, and withdraws them after time of payment, the holder is entitled to principal and interest against him.²

§ 644. *Liability of indorser and drawer.*—In respect to the indorser of a bill or note, or the drawer of a bill, payable at a particular bank or other place, the rule is different. He is not the original debtor, but only a surety. His undertaking is not general, but conditional upon due diligence being used against the principal debtor, and such diligence requires presentment at the place specified, where it is to be presumed that funds have been provided to meet the bill or note at maturity.³ When it is necessary to present the paper at the bank it is insufficient to show a demand of the cashier.⁴ It has been held that presentment at a different place from that at which the note is payable, and an absolute refusal of the maker to pay, and a statement that any further presentment at the place specified would be useless, because there were no funds there, would not charge an indorser.⁵ And where a note payable at one bank was by the consent of an indorser negotiated at another, it was held that demand at the latter would not charge the indorser, although there were no funds in the bank where the note was made payable.⁶

§ 645. *Where the instrument is payable "on demand," or "on demand after a certain time."*—A distinction has been

¹ To the same effect, see Story on Bills, § 356.

² Hills v. Place, 48 N. Y. 520 (1872).

³ Bank U. S. v. Smith, 11 Wheat. 171; Watkins v. Crouch, 5 Leigh, 522; Shaw v. Reed, 12 Pick. 132; Nichols v. Pool, 2 Jones (N. C.) 23; Lawrence v. Dobyns, 30 Mo. 196; Ferner v. Williams, 37 Barb. 9; Chitty on Bills (13th Am. ed.) 409; Story on Notes, § 230.

⁴ Seneca Co. Bank v. Neass, 5 Denio, 329.

⁵ Smith v. McLean, 2 Taylor (N. C.) 72.

⁶ Watkins v. Crouch, 5 Leigh, 522.

taken by some of the courts in respect to bills and notes payable "on demand," or payable "on demand after a specified time," and the opinion expressed that in such cases averment and proof of demand are necessary as well against the acceptor or maker as against the drawer or indorser. In Virginia, the Supreme Court of Appeals, while deciding according to the current of American authority in respect to a note payable at a fixed time, expressly restricted its application, and Stanard, J., said :¹ "This decision does not embrace the case of a note or obligation payable in terms on demand, at a particular place after the lapse of a specified time. In such cases it would probably be held, that there is no default of the maker or acceptor, until such demand be made, and consequently, that no action would accrue to the payee until such demand should be made."

In England, it was said by Lord Ellenborough, that in such cases "the time of payment depends entirely on the pleasure of the holder of the note,"² and that consideration seemed to him to render it impracticable for the maker or acceptor to set up the defense of readiness to pay. The Supreme Court of the United States has followed the same line of opinion, Thompson, J., saying :³ "Where the promise is to pay on demand at a particular place, there is no cause of action until the demand is made, and the maker of the note cannot discharge himself by an offer of payment, the note not being due until demanded."

§ 646. Striking as these views may seem, they do not appear to us to bear analysis as affording ground for departure from the general principle. A bill or note payable on demand is payable immediately, and if on demand after a certain time, immediately upon that time arriving. Although payable at a particular place, the payor may, if he appre-

¹ Armistead v. Armistead, 10 Leigh, 521.

² Sanderson v. Bowes, 14 East, 500.

³ Wallace v. McConnell, 13 Pet. 136; Savage, C. J., to same effect in Caldwell v. Cassidy, 8 Cow. 271, but overruled by Haxtun v. Bishop, 3 Wend. 1, same judge.

hends loss by delay, or desires to discharge it, pay it anywhere. And the mere circumstance that it might be more difficult for the payor to show a loss resulting from a failure to present when his liability was continuing to be always ready, than when he is only required to shoulder the responsibility of being ready at a fixed time, does not seem to us sufficient to change the rule. He has the advantage of not being subjected to a protest until demand is made; he may pay at any time if he pleases, and thus avoid all contingency of loss; he may still show loss if any occurs. Suit brought is itself a demand; and as presentment at the particular place, although it be expressed, is no condition precedent as to him, we cannot perceive how the words "on demand," which relate to time and not to place, can impliedly create a condition which even express words without the addition of "not elsewhere" do not create. The difficulty of the defense does not change the principle which requires it; and the cases which so determine seem to us to adopt the true philosophy of the subject.¹

§ 647. *In respect to bank notes*, it has been held that when payable on demand—or on demand after a certain time—at a designated place, the demand must be averred and proved against the bank;² and they have been distinguished from individual notes by some of the cases.³ But there are also express decisions the other way; and we can perceive no sufficient reason for the distinction.⁴ Loss, if any, may be shown by the bank as well as by the individual.

§ 648. *When instrument is payable at either of several places*. If a bill of exchange be drawn payable at either of two places, and is accepted accordingly, as for example, if drawn payable at Maidstone or London, the holder has his choice to present

¹ McKinney v. Whipple, 21 Me. 98; Gammon v. Everett, 25 Me. 66; New Hope D. B. v. Perry, 11 Ill. 467; Cook v. Martin, 5 Smedes & M. 379 (note payable on demand five months after date).

² Bank of North Carolina v. Bank of Cape Fear, 13 Ired. 75.

³ Dougherty v. Western Bank, 13 Ga. 87.

⁴ Montgomery v. Elliott, 6 Ala. 701; Haxtun v. Bishop, 3 Wend. 1.

it at either place for payment ; and the like rule applies to a note made payable at either of two places. If the bill or note be not duly paid at the place where it is presented, the holder may protest it and give notice to the drawer and indorsers, who will be bound by its presentment and dishonor at the place of his election ; although if presented at the other place it would have been duly paid ; for in such cases all the parties agree to pay the bill or note upon due presentment at either place.¹

§ 649. *Bills and notes payable at either of several banks.*—Sometimes a promissory note is made payable at any or either of the banks in a particular place, by some such expression as “payable at bank in Boston,”² or “at either of the banks in Boston,”³ or “at any bank in Boston.”⁴ In all such cases, the stipulation as to the place of payment is understood to be for the accommodation of the payee or holder, who is given the right to elect the bank at which the note should be presented in order to charge the indorsers ; and if, upon presentment at any or either bank in the place named, payment is refused, the indorsers, as well as the maker, are bound. The maker’s promise is to pay the note at any of the banks in the place, and the duty is imposed upon him to look at all the banks for it, or provide funds to pay it at all of them when it is due.⁵ The office of a private banker is not a bank within the terms of a note payable “at any bank in Boston.”⁶

§ 650. A bill of exchange accepted, payable in like manner, stands upon the same footing as a promissory note, and the drawer and indorsers, as well as the acceptor, will be bound if it be presented at any or either of the banks in the

¹ Beeching v. Gower, 1 Holt, 313 ; Story on Bills, § 354 ; Story on Notes, § 231.

² Malden Bank v. Baldwin, 13 Gray, 154.

³ Page v. Webster, 15 Me. 249 ; Freeman’s Bank v. Ruckman, 16 Grat. 126.

⁴ Langley v. Palmer, 30 Me. 467 ; Brickett v. Spalding, 33 Vt. 109 ; Boit v. Corr, 54 Ala. 113.

⁵ Malden Bank v. Baldwin, 13 Gray, 154, and cases cited above.

⁶ Way v. Butterworth, 108 Mass. 509.

place named.¹ This principle applies to large cities with many banks, as well as to small cities with few;² and the opinion once intimated that where there are several banks in a large city, the holder must give notice to the promisor where the paper is,³ may be regarded as overruled.

It has been urged against this doctrine in every case which has adopted it, that the holder should give notice at what particular bank he elected to make the demand. But it has been well answered that "to require the holder to give such previous notice would not only defeat the object of relieving him from trouble and risk, but would subject him to much greater than if the bill or note were made payable at one bank only;"⁴ and that "if the parties wish for more certainty as to the place of payment, let them be more explicit in the bill."⁵

§ 651. *When drawee or acceptor resides in one place, and bill is payable in another.*—Where the drawee of a bill resides in one place, and it is drawn payable in another place, it would be sufficient to present the bill for acceptance to the drawee at the place where he resides, and if acceptance were refused, it might be there protested.⁶ And if the bill, not accepted, were presented to the drawee at his place of residence for payment, and payment refused, and there is no particular place designated in the bill for presentment, it would be sufficient, although the bill was payable in a certain city. Thus, where a bill was drawn in Liverpool, and was payable in London, and was protested for non-acceptance, and also for non-payment in Liverpool, where the drawee resided, Kent, C. J., said:⁷ "A general refusal to pay was a refusal to pay according to the face of the bill. It was equivalent to a refusal to pay in London. We do not mean

¹ Jackson v. Packer, 13 Conn. 342.

² Langley v. Palmer, 30 Me. 467.

³ North Bank v. Abbott, 13 Pick. 465, Shaw, C. J., expressed this opinion, but the question was not directly before the court.

⁴ Page v. Webster, 15 Me. 24, Shepley, J.

⁵ Jackson v. Packer, 13 Conn. 342, Waite, J.

⁶ Mason v. Franklin, 3 Johns. 202.

⁷ Mason v. Franklin, 3 Johns. 202.

to say that the demand for payment at Liverpool was indispensable. The bill being payable at London, it would have been sufficient for the holder to have been there when the bill fell due, ready to receive payment. In the present case, a protest at London, or a demand and protest at Liverpool, were sufficient, and the holder might take either course." So, if the bill, drawn upon the drawee in one place and payable in another, be not accepted by the drawee, but is accepted *supra protest* for his honor by a third person, the presentment and demand should be made of the drawee at the place where he resides, and not at the place where it is made payable, because there has been no acceptance of the bill, and consequently the drawee has not authorized any presentment upon him, except at his place of residence.¹

§ 652. When the bill has been accepted by the drawee, and is drawn payable in another place, the case is different. There the acceptor only authorizes the presentment at the place designated, and the drawer or indorsers will be discharged if the bill be not there presented, or ready for presentment at maturity.²

§ 653. While it is not necessary in a declaration to aver that a bill or note, when due, was presented at the place of payment and not paid; the place of payment is a material part in the description of the note, and must be set out in the

¹ Mitchell v. Baring, 10 B. & C. 6, 7. The decision in this case led to the passage of the act of 2 and 3 Will. IV, ch. 98, by which it was provided that "all bills of exchange wherein the drawer or drawers thereof shall have expressed that such bills of exchange are to be payable in any place other than the place by him or them therein mentioned to be the residence of the drawee or drawees thereof, and which shall not, on the presentment for acceptance thereof, be accepted, shall, or may be without further presentment to the drawee or drawees, protested for non-payment in the place in which such bills of exchange shall have been by the drawer or drawers expressed to be payable, unless the amounts owing upon such bills of exchange shall have been paid to the holder or holders thereof on the day on which such bills of exchange would have become payable had the same been duly accepted." Chitty on Bills (13th Am. ed.) [*349], 390. This act seems practically to affect only acceptors *supra protest*. See Chapter XXVIII, on Protest, Sec. II. Vol. 2.

² Mitchell v. Baring, 10 B. & C. 7; Story on Bills, §§ 282, 353.

declaration.¹ And it has been said by the United States Supreme Court: "Nothing is better established, both upon principle and authority, than that if the place where a note is payable is omitted in the declaration, it is fatal."² As to the allegations of the declaration, however, it has been held, that if the legal effect of the instrument be that it is payable only at a particular place, it must be so averred in the declaration; when on the other hand, if according to its legal effect, it be payable generally, it would be a misdescription to aver it to be payable only at a particular place.³

SECTION VI.

MODE OF PRESENTMENT FOR PAYMENT.

§ 654. Presentment of the bill or note, and demand of payment, should be made by an actual exhibition of the instrument itself;⁴ or at least the demand of payment should be accompanied by some clear indication that the instrument

¹ Covington v. Comstock, 14 Pet. 43.

² Seabee v. Dorr, 9 Wheat. 558.

³ Childs v. Laffin, 55 Ill. 159. In this case the note was payable "to the order of Laffin, Butler & Co., at their office," and was dated at Chicago, which is in Cook County, Illinois. McAllister, J., said: "The note in question is not payable generally, but at the office of the appellees. If they had offices in two counties, as it appears they had, these extrinsic facts might show an ambiguity which would require explanation. But is it the legal effect of this instrument, that it is payable only at their office in Cook County? There is nothing upon the face of the instrument itself, except the place of the date, which has any tendency to such a conclusion. But the place of date is not part of the contract. It is not material to the validity of the note, and is always open to be explained. It does not make the place of payment."

"The place of the date being only *prima facie* evidence, and subject to be rebutted, has no tendency to establish the legal effect of the instrument, that it was payable only at their office in Cook County, because it is a well established principle, that the legal effect of an instrument in writing can no more be varied by parol evidence than its express terms."

⁴ Musson v. Lake, 4 How. 262. In Draper v. Clemens, 7 Mo. 52. demand was held insufficient because the bill was not produced. In Freeman v. Boynton, 7 Mass. 483, the demand was held insufficient because it appeared that the party demanding payment did not have the bill with him. To same effect see Shaw v. Reed, 12 Pick. 132; Arnold v. Dresser, 8 Allen, 435; Posey v. Decatur Bank, 12 Ala. 802; Nailor v. Bowie, 3 Md. 251; Smith v. Gibbs, 2 Smed. & M. 479.

is at hand, ready to be delivered, and such must really be the case.¹ This is requisite in order that the drawee or acceptor may be able to judge (1) of the genuineness of the instrument; (2) of the right of the holder to receive payment; and (3) that he may immediately reclaim possession of it upon paying the amount. If, on demand of payment, the exhibition of the paper is not asked for, and the party to whom demand is made declines to pay on other grounds, a more formal presentment by actual exhibition of the paper will be considered as waived.² Where the note was in bank, a few rods from the maker's house, and the maker was informed by note from the cashier that it was there and requested payment, it was held sufficient;³ and it was likewise so held, where the statement in the protest was that the notary went, with the draft, to the bank and demanded payment.⁴ So, if the maker calls on the holder on the day of payment, at his place of business, declares his inability to pay it, and requests him to give notice to the indorser, it is sufficient to charge the indorser, as an exhibition of the paper would have been useless.⁵ But it is better in all cases to make an actual exhibition of the paper, in order to avoid all question. Presentment and demand of payment cannot be made by letter through the post office.⁶ It seems that delivery of written demand to a servant at the house of the promisor is insufficient.⁷ The demand of payment should not vary from the tenor of the paper; and if it be payable simply in

¹ *Crandall v. Schroepfel*, 1 Hun, 557 (8 N. Y. S. C. R.); *Ethebridge v. Ladd*, 44 Barb. 69; see *ante*, §§ 462, 463.

² *Lockwood v. Crawford*, 18 Conn. 361; *King v. Crowell*, 61 Me. 244. See *Fall River Union Bank v. Willard*, 5 Metc. 216, and Chapter XVII, on Presentment for Acceptance, § 463.

³ *Tredick v. Wendell*, 1 N. H. 80.

⁴ *Bank of Vergennes v. Cameron*, 7 Barb. 143.

⁵ *Gilbert v. Dennis*, 3 Metc. 495.

⁶ *Stuckert v. Anderson*, 3 Whart. 116; *Gillespie v. Hannahan*, 4 McCord, 503; *Hartford Bank v. Green*, 11 Iowa, 476; *Barnes v. Vaughn*, 6 R. I. 259.

⁷ *Duke of Norfolk v. Howard*, 2 Show. 235 (1681). But query in cases of sickness when the promisor is inaccessible on account of sickness. See 1 Parsons N. & B. 271, 272, note *y*.

money, without specifying the kind, a demand for gold coin would be insufficient to charge an indorser.¹

§ 655. A bill or note, when presented for payment, cannot be left in the debtor's hands as when presented for acceptance; and if it is so left, presentment cannot be considered as made until payment is demanded. And if, in the meantime, the debtor has stopped payment, the holder would suffer to the extent of the difference between the value of the instrument at the time it was handed the debtor and the time payment was actually demanded.² The earlier cases take a contrary view, and seem to us more reasonable, for the physical presentment of the paper would seem to imply in itself a demand of payment.³

§ 656. *As to mode of presentment of negotiable paper payable at a bank.*—When a bill or note is made payable at a bank, it is considered a sufficient presentment of it if it is actually in the bank at maturity, ready to be delivered up to any party who may be entitled to it on payment of the amount, due; and if, at the close of business hours, the bill or note remains unpaid, it is considered as dishonored, and notice should be immediately given to the proper parties.⁴ Such also is the case when the instrument is payable at a particular place.⁵ Sometimes a formal presentment of the bill or note, in such cases, at the bank, or upon the maker is made; and the cases are uniform in holding that such a presentment at the bank is sufficient,⁶ even when the place is mentioned

¹ Langenberger v. Kroeger, 48 Cal. 147.

² Hayward v. Bank of England, 1 Str. 550; Thomson on Bills (Wilson's ed.), 304.

³ Turner v. Mead, 1 Str. 416; Hoar v. Da Costa, 2 Str. 910.

⁴ Chicopee Bank v. Philadelphia Bank, 8 Wall. 641; Bank U. S. v. Carneal, 2 Pet. 543; Fullerton v. Bank U. S. 1 Pet. 604; People's Bank v. Brooks, 31 Md. 7; Graham v. Sangston, 1 Md. 68; Goodloe v. Godley, 13 Sm. & M. 233; Allen v. Miles, 4 Harr. (Del.) 234; Woodin v. Foster, 16 Barb. 146; Nichols v. Goldsmith, 7 Wend. 160; Folger v. Chase, 18 Pick. 63; Berkshire Bank v. Jones, 6 Mass. 524; Apperson v. Union Bank, 4 Cold. 445; State Bank v. Napier, 6 Humph. 270; Ward v. Northern Bank, 14 B. Mon. 351; Reynolds v. Chettle, 2 Camp. 596; Saunderson v. Judge, 2 H. Bl. 509; Huffaker v. National Bank, 13 Bush. (Ky.) 649.

⁵ Hunt v. Maybee, 3 Seld. 266.

⁶ Ibid. See also, Woodbridge v. Brigham, 13 Mass. 556; Bank of Utica v.

in the memorandum;¹ but it is settled that nothing more than the presence of the paper there is necessary.²

But it has been held by the United States Supreme Court,³ that though commercial paper be physically in the bank at which it is payable, yet if the bank is ignorant of this by reason of the fact that the letter in which it was sent slipped through a crack in the cashier's desk and disappeared before it had been seen by him, then there would be no presentment, though the acceptor had no funds there, and did not mean to pay the bill. And such a disappearance carried with it a presumption of negligence in the collecting bank, and threw upon it the burden of proof to rebut it; and that in the absence of such proof the bank would be responsible to the holder for the amount of the bill or note.

§ 657. *When paper is property of bank.*—If the paper is the property of the bank at which it is payable, its presence there at maturity need not be proved by the plaintiff, as the presumption of law is that the paper was in the bank, and the burden rests on the defendant to show the contrary.⁴ Even when it is not the property of the bank, it is not necessary to show that it was in the hands of the proper officer;⁵ nor is this material, its presence in the bank being sufficient.⁶ Sometimes the accounts of the promisor are ex-

Smith, 18 Johns. 230; *Anderson v. Drake*, 14 Johns. 114; *Bank of Syracuse v. Hollister*, 17 N. Y. 46; *Gale v. Kemper*, 10 La. 205; *Commercial Bank v. Hamer*, 7 How. (Miss.) 448; *Jenks v. Doylesburg*, 4 Watts & S. 505; *Rahm v. Philadelphia Bank*, 1 Rawle, 335; *Cohen v. Hunt*, 2 S. & Mm. 227; *Evans v. St. John*, 9 Port. (Ala.) 186; *Apperson v. Union Bank*, 4 Cold. 445.

¹ *Saunderson v. Judge*, 2 H. Bl. 509.

² *State Bank v. Napier*, 6 Humph. 270; *Gillett v. Averill*, 5 Den. 85; *Ogden v. Dobbin*, 2 Hall, 112; *Gilbert v. Dennis*, 3 Metc. 495; *Fullerton v. Bank U. S.* 1 Pet. 604; *Merchant's Bank v. Elderkin*, 25 N. Y. 178; *First Nat. Bank v. Crittenden*, 2 Thomp. & C. (N. Y.) 118.

³ *Chicopee Bank v. Philadelphia Bank*, 8 Wall. 641.

⁴ *Chicopee Bank v. Philadelphia Bank*, 8 Wall. 641; *Fullerton v. Bank U. S.* 1 Pet. 604; *Bank U. S. v. Carneal*, 2 Pet. 543; *Seneca Co. Bank v. Neass*, 5 Den. 329; *State Bank v. Napier*, 6 Humph. 270; *Folger v. Chase*, 18 Pick. 63; *Berkshire Bank v. Jones* 6 Mass. 524.

⁵ *Folger v. Chase*, 18 Pick. 63.

⁶ *State Bank v. Napier*, 6 Humph. 270.

amined to see if there are funds to meet the paper payable at the bank;¹ but this is unnecessary, any competent evidence being available to show that there were no funds there to meet it, and that no one offered payment.² It is doubtful, at least, whether the mere fact that the bank had funds of the promisor in its possession would constitute any defense for the indorser, as the direction of the promisor is necessary to give the right to appropriate the money to the payment of the paper; but it is conceived that if the bank in such case has become the owner of the paper, it would constitute a defense to the indorser. Such is the opinion of Professor Parsons.³ Where a note was payable at the "Union Bank at Memphis," and there was no such bank there but a "Branch of the Union Bank," it was held sufficient to make presentment at such branch.⁴ If, upon repairing to the bank at which the paper is made payable, during business hours, it is found closed, without any one there to answer, the protest may be made without demand or farther inquiry.⁵

§ 658. *Conventional demand by notice that bill or note is held in bank.*—In some of the States it has become customary for banks of a particular place, which are the holders of negotiable paper, to issue a notice to the promisor a few days before maturity, informing him that the paper is in bank, setting forth the date when it will become payable, and requesting him to come there and pay it. Such notice constitutes a conventional demand, and a neglect to comply with it is such a refusal as amounts to dishonor of the paper. The custom prevails where the paper is payable at the bank giving the notice,⁶ and has been sustained by judicial decision, as well where it is not made so payable, but is placed

¹ *Saunderson v. Judge*, 2 H. Bl. 509; *Bank of S. C. v. Flagg*, 1 Hill (S. C.) 177; *Maurin v. Perat*, 16 La. 276.

² *State Bank v. Napier*, 6 Humph. 270; *Gillett v. Averill*, 5 Den. 85.

³ Vol. 1, N. & B. 437.

⁴ *Worley v. Waldran*, 3 Sneed, 548.

⁵ *Thompson v. Commercial Bank*, 3 Cold. 46; *Carter v. Union Bank*, 7 Humph. 548.

⁶ *Lincoln & Kennebec Bank v. Page*, 9 Mass. 155; *Same v. Hemmatt*, 9 Mass. 159; *Camden v. Doremus*, 3 How. 515.

there for collection.¹ In Massachusetts, this custom has become so general and universal that every one who incurs the liability of maker and indorser is presumed to have contracted in reference to it, and knowledge on his part may be presumed.² Before the law had there become so settled, it was held that proof of the party's being conversant with the usage was requisite;³ but where, by the usage, demand was made in this form upon the maker, it was immaterial to the indorser to prove that he was acquainted with it—it being sufficient that he received due notice of dishonor.⁴ Evidence of the usage is sufficient in proof of an averment of presentment to the maker.⁵ In Maine, the custom is sanctioned by judicial decisions,⁶ but it has been held with adverse expressions in New Hampshire;⁷ and in Maryland, the evidence of its existence was regarded as insufficient, with a distinct intimation from the court that it would not be respected if proved.⁸ When a bill or note is payable at a bank, a presentment to a bank officer must be taken to have been at the bank.⁹

¹ Jones v. Fales, 4 Mass. 245; Widgery v. Munroe, 6 Mass. 449; Weld v. Gorham, 10 Mass. 366; Whitwell v. Johnson, 17 Mass. 449.

² Grand Bank v. Blanchard, 23 Pick. 505. Shaw, C. J., said, respecting this customary notice, as constituting a demand, that "it has become so universal and continued so long, that it may well be doubted whether it ought not now to be treated as one of those customs of merchants of which the law will take notice, so that every man who is sufficiently a man of business to indorse a note may be presumed to be acquainted with it, and assent to it, at least until the contrary is expressly shown. It is to be recollected that the rules respecting presentment, demand and dishonor of bills of exchange and promissory notes, and indeed the *lex mercatoria*, generally originated in the custom of merchants, which custom was a matter of fact to be proved by the party relying on it, and to be determined by the jury. But when a custom has been definitely settled by judicial decisions, it is taken notice of as a part of the law of the land, and need not be proved as a fact in each case."

³ Weld v. Gorham, 10 Mass. 366; so held also in Leavitt v. Simes, 3 N. H. 14; Edwards on Bills, 509.

⁴ Whitwell v. Johnson, 17 Mass. 449.

⁵ North Bank v. Abbot, 13 Mass. 466; Boston Bank v. Hodges, 9 Mass. 420; City Bank v. Cutter, 3 Pick. 414.

⁶ Marine Bank v. Smith, 18 Me. 99; Gallagher v. Roberts, 2 Fairf. 489; 1 Parsons N. & B. 370, 371.

⁷ Moore v. Waite, 13 N. H. 415. ⁸ Farmers' Bank v. Duvall, 7 Gill & J. 78.

⁹ Barbaroux v. Waters, 3 Metc. (Ky.) 304.

§ 659. *In respect to the maker of a note or the acceptor of a bill* in terms payable at a particular place, this custom to inform him that his paper is there, and that he is requested to meet it, amounts to nothing more than a reminder from creditor to debtor that it is hoped he will comply with his agreement. When the bill or note, however, is payable generally, the acceptor or maker can only discharge his contract by seeking the payee or holder, at maturity, and paying the amount; and notification that his paper may be paid at a particular place is information where his agent to receive payment may be conveniently found. But it is difficult to see how the holder can restrict the acceptor or maker to payment at that particular place, except upon the ground that the bank itself is to be regarded as in law the holder, and it is the duty of the principal party to pay such holder at its only locality—its place of business.

§ 660. *In respect to the drawer or indorser*, the holder's contract, when the bill or note is payable generally, is, that he will present the instrument to the acceptor or maker. It is the holder's duty, in order to hold the drawer or indorser, to go to the acceptor or maker with the bill or note, and demand payment; and it is stretching the principle which authorizes proof of custom in certain cases very far to permit the holder to reverse the established rule of law in respect to drawer or indorser, and notify the acceptor or maker to come to him, at a place designated by himself, to suit his own convenience.¹

The theory upon which the custom is regarded as controlling, is that the holder is bound to use due diligence to demand payment—that the maker or acceptor waives any further demand than at the place designated by the maker—and that the drawer or indorser consents to this customary waiver by entering into the contract where the custom exists. Its convenience, as a commercial usage—and the fact that the apprehension of dishonor in bank will probably

¹ Edwards on Bills, 510.

operate as forcibly to constrain prompt payment by the maker or acceptor as a demand at his counting room or residence—have doubtless gone far to gain it countenance from the courts which have sustained it.

§ 661. We regard those decisions more in consonance with principle, which have not admitted this relaxation. Where the instrument is in terms payable at a bank in a particular place, or it has been agreed by the drawer or indorsers that it shall be presented in a particular place, where a custom prevails as to the mode of presentment, an entirely different principle applies. By consenting to presentment there, the drawer or indorser consents to the established customary mode which prevails there, and should for that reason be bound by it.¹ It is carrying the doctrine too far to hold that he is bound by such custom when the paper has been merely placed in a bank there for collection, but it is not payable there in terms or by agreement.² And the usage cannot be applied by one bank alone, but must be a prevalent custom of the place;³ otherwise the arbitrary will of an individual banker or banking institution would prevail over the established law or custom of a whole community.

§ 662. Knowledge by the drawer or indorser of the custom has been regarded as essential to its establishment as against him in some cases.⁴ But the United States Supreme Court say that parties are bound by an established usage of a bank at which the paper is payable “whether they have a

¹ *Mills v. Bank U. S.* 11 Wheat. 431; *Camden v. Doremus*, 3 How. 515; *Edwards on Bills*, quoted *supra*.

² *Pearson v. Bank of Metropolis*, 1 Pet. 89; *Morse on Banking*, 336, 337.

³ *Dorchester, &c. Bank v. Milton Bank*, 1 Cush. 177; *Morse on Banking*, 372; *Adams v. Otterback*, 15 How. (S. C.) 539. Question, whether demand of payment could be postponed to fifth day of grace by usage of two years' standing, changed from former usage, the Court said: “To constitute a usage, it must apply to a place rather than to a particular bank. It must be a rule of all the banks of a place, or it cannot consistently be called a usage. If every bank could establish its own usage, the confusion and uncertainty would greatly exceed any local convenience resulting from the arrangement.”

⁴ *Leavitt v. Simes*, 3 N. H. 14.

personal knowledge of it or not;"¹ and as the custom must be general, in order to obtain recognition as such, we cannot perceive that knowledge of it enters into the question any more than knowledge of any other rule of law. A custom is not a special personal contract, but a general and controlling rule. "The parties are presumed by implication to be governed by the usage of the bank at which they have chosen to make the security itself negotiable."²

¹ Mills v. Bank U. S. 11 Wheat. 431. [This decision is misquoted in Morse on Banking, p. 336.]

² Mills v. Bank U. S. *supra*, Story, J.

CHAPTER XXI.

TRANSFER OF BILLS AND NOTES BY INDORSEMENT.

§ 663. A bill or note payable to bearer, or indorsed in blank, may be transferred like currency by mere delivery; other bills and notes, by indorsement of the transferrer's name thereon, and delivery to the individual named, unless they are not expressed to be payable to the order of any person, or to bearer,¹ in which case, unless by statute, they are not negotiable in the United States and in England;² but it is otherwise in Scotland.³ But if the paper be payable to A. B., or order, and A. B. indorse it to C. D., without adding "or order," C. D. may, nevertheless, transfer it by indorsement, and it retains its original negotiable character.⁴

While commercial paper payable to bearer, or indorsed in blank, may be transferred by delivery merely, yet if the payee put his name upon it, and transfers it, he is liable as an indorser, such indorsement being valid between the indorser and subsequent indorseees;⁵ and the holder of paper payable to bearer and indorsed, may sue upon it as bearer or indorsee at his election.⁶ A note payable to A. B. or bearer is in legal effect the same as if payable simply to bearer, and

¹ *Wookey v. Poole*, 4 B. & A. 1; *Myers v. Friend*, 1 Rand. 13; *Rees v. Conococheague Bank*, 5 Rand. 326; *Johnson v. Stak. Co.* 24 Ill. 75; *Jones v. Nellis*, 41 Ill. 482.

² *Byles on Bills* (Sharswood's ed.) [*142-3], 258; *Arnold v. Sprague*, 34 Vt. 402; *Richards v. Daily*, 34 Iowa, 428.

³ *Thomson on Bills* (Wilson's ed.) 173.

⁴ *Muldrow v. Caldwell*, 7 Mo. 563; *Lea v. Branch Bank*, 8 Porter (Ala.) 119; *Seull v. Edwards*, 8 Eng. 24; *Potter v. Tyler*, 2 Metc. 58; *Blackman v. Green*, 24 Vt. 17.

⁵ *Bates v. Butler*, 46 Me. 387; *Hodge v. Steward*, 1 Salk. 125; *Hill v. Lewis*, 1 Salk. 132; *Burmester v. Hogarth*, 11 M. & W. 97; *Brush v. Reeves*, 3 Johns. 439; *Gilbert v. Nantucket Bank*, 5 Mass. 97; *Eccles v. Ballard*, 2 McCord, 388; *Gwinnell v. Herbert*, 5 Ad. & E. 436 (31 E. C. L. R.)

⁶ 3 Kent Com. 44; *Story on Notes*, § 132; *Bayley*, 466.

no indorsement is necessary to pass the legal title; but if indorsement of a note payable to bearer be alleged, it must be proved.¹

§ 664. If a note be non-negotiable, because payable to a certain person only, should he indorse it, it will be binding upon him; and his liability to his immediate indorsee will be the same as upon the indorsement of a negotiable note; but the principle is not extended to subsequent indorsees.² And if indorsed by the payee payable "to order of" indorsee, it will be negotiable as between the holder and indorsers, though not as to the maker.³

When the instrument is made payable to "order," the indorsement of the payee is necessary to transfer the legal title;⁴ and the transferee, without indorsement, takes it as a mere chose in action, and must aver and prove the consideration.⁵ And he takes it subject to all equities that attached to it in the hands of his transferrer.⁶ The negotiability of a note is not affected by the fact that a corporation indorses it through its seal.⁷

§ 665. Delivery by the indorser is essential to completion of his contract; and delivery implies its acceptance by the indorsee. If a transferee of a bill or note by indorsement send it back to his indorser as worthless, the indorsement is declined, and becomes invalid; and he acquires no new title by merely getting possession, without a new transfer; but

¹ *Wayman v. Bend*, 1 Camp. 175; *Chitty on Bills* (12 Am. ed.) 227 [*198]. In Illinois, under statute, a note payable to A. B. or bearer must be indorsed to pass the legal title. *Garvin v. Wiswell*, 83 Ill. 218; *Wilder v. De Wolf*, 24 Ill. 191; *Roosa v. Crist*, 17 Ill. 191; *Hilborn v. Artus*, 3 Scammon, 314.

² See *Story on Notes*, §§ 128, 129, 130; *Story on Bills*, §§ 119, 199, 202; see *Carruth v. Walker*, 8 Wis. 252; *Hackney v. Jones*, 3 Humph. 612; *ante*, § 105.

³ *Carruth v. Walker*, 8 Wis. 252.

⁴ *Hopkirk v. Page*, 2 Brock. 20; *Hestone v. Williamson*, 2 Bibb. 83; *Russell v. Swan*, 16 Mass. 314; *Blakely v. Grant*, 6 Mass. 386.

⁵ *Van Eman v. Stanchfield*, 10 Minn. 255.

⁶ *Hadden v. Rodkey*, 17 Kansas, 429, *Valentine, J.*: "If the plaintiff in such a case should desire the benefit that an indorsement would give him, he should plead and prove an indorsement."

⁷ *Rand v. Dovey*, 83 Penn. St. 280.

there need not be a new indorsement, because the former indorsement is capable of becoming again valid by ratification or confirmation.¹ An offer to indorse for another must be accepted in a reasonable time.²

SECTION I.

NATURE OF THE CONTRACT, AND LIABILITIES OF INDORSER.

§ 666. *As to the meaning of the term.*—Indorsement, in its technical sense, is applicable only to negotiable paper;³ and it is important to bear this in mind, as the effect of indorsing a negotiable instrument, and assigning or becoming the surety or guarantor of one non-negotiable is very different. In common parlance, the word is indifferently applied to bonds, bills and promissory notes, whether negotiable or otherwise, and confusion of ideas will only be avoided by holding in view its definite legal signification.

§ 667. Indorsing an instrument, in its literal sense, means writing one's name on the back thereof; and, in its technical sense, it means writing one's name thereon with intent to incur the liability of a party who warrants payment of the instrument, provided it is duly presented to the principal at maturity, not paid by him, and such fact is duly notified to the indorser. When we speak of a negotiable instrument being indorsed to a party, the idea of its being transferred and delivered to him is included—the term indorsement including delivery to the indorsee;⁴ but it is otherwise as to

¹ Cartwright v. Williams, 2 Stark. 340.

² Claffin v. Briant, 58 Ga. 414.

³ Orrick v. Colston, 7 Grat. 195; Bank of Marietta v. Pindall, 2 Rand. 475.

⁴ Freeman's Bank v. Ruckman, 16 Grat. 129; Bank of Marietta v. Pindall, 2 Rand. 475; Thomas v. Watkins, 16 Wis. 478; Dann v. Norris, 24 Conn. 333; Adams v. Jones, 12 Ad. & El. (40 E. C. L. R.) 455; Lloyd v. Howard, 20 L. J. Q. B. 1 (69 E. C. L. R.); 14 Q. B. 995; Marston v. Allen, 8 M. & W. 493; Green v. Steer, 1 Q. B. 707 (41 E. C. L. R.); Hayes v. Caulfield, 5 Q. B. 81 (48 E. C. L. R.)

an instrument not negotiable.¹ Neither indorsement nor acceptance are complete before delivery.²

Accordingly, where A. specially indorsed certain bills to B., sealed them up in a parcel, and left them in charge with his own servant to be given to the postman, it was held that the special indorsement did not transfer the property in the bills till delivery, and that delivery to the servant was not sufficient, though it would have been otherwise had the delivery been made to the postman.³ But where A. & B., being partners, and indebted to C., A., who acted as C.'s agent, with B.'s concurrence, indorsed a bill in the name of the firm, and placed it among the securities which he held for C., but no communication of the fact was made to C. personally, it was held a good indorsement of the firm to C.⁴

§ 668. *An indorsement cannot be partial.*—A bill or note cannot be indorsed for part of the amount due the holder, as

¹ In *Bank of Marietta v. Pindall*, 2 Rand. 475, Cabell, J., said: "The term indorse, when applied to bills of exchange, negotiable by the custom of merchants, or to papers made negotiable by our statutes, may *ex vi termini* import a legal transfer of the title. But as to bonds and notes not negotiable, the legal title to them passes by assignment only, and as to them indorsement is not equivalent to assignment. As to them assignment means more than indorsement; it means by one party, with intent to assign, and an acceptance of that assignment by the other party. The notes in question are not negotiable according to our laws, but assignable only. They might well be indorsed in Virginia and assigned in Ohio. The pleas, therefore, that they were indorsed in Virginia tendered immaterial issues, and were properly demurred to." But "indorsed and delivered" would be sufficient allegation of assignment as to non-negotiable paper. *Free-man's Bank v. Ruckman*, 16 Grat. 129. In *Commonwealth v. Powell*, 11 Grat. 830, there was an indictment against Powell for forging the name of a party before the payee's on the back of a negotiable note, Lee, J., said: "There is no reason for restricting the term 'indorsement' to the technical sense applied to it in the *lex mercatoria*. The primitive and popular sense of something written on the outside or back of a paper on the opposite side of which something else had been written, should be given to the word whenever the context shows it to be proper, or it is necessary to give effect to the pleading or other instrument in which it may occur. And such is the sense in which it should be understood in this indictment."

² *Rex v. Lambton*, 5 Price, 528; *Lysaght v. Bryant*, 9 C. B. 46 (67 E. C. L. R.)

³ *Rex v. Lambton*, 5 Price, 428; *Bayley on Bills*, 137; *Byles on Bills* (Sharswood's ed.) [*146], 265.

⁴ *Lysaght v. Bryant*, 9 C. B. 46 (67 E. C. L. R.)

the law will not permit one cause of action to be cut up into several, and such an indorsement is utterly void as such,¹ but when it has been paid in part, it may be indorsed as to the residue.² And an indorsement of part of the amount due would give the intended indorsee a lien on the instrument.³ If the indorsement on its face is of the whole instrument, without any apparent limitation, so that the holder could enforce it against the parties liable thereon, it would be immaterial that, as between the indorser and his immediate indorsee, a part of the amount only was to be received for the latter's benefit, and the residue as trustee for his indorser.⁴

Where it was indorsed upon a negotiable note by the payee, "pay one-half of the within note to S. F., and the other half to E. B.," and the note was at the time delivered to one of the indorsees for the benefit of both, it was held that a valid title was vested in both, although the other did not accept the transfer until afterward, and that it was proper for them as joint indorsees to bring a joint action against the maker.⁵ And where distinct shares in a note are sold to different persons, they are co-owners, and one co-owner may maintain trover against the other for conversion.⁶

¹ *Lindsay v. Price*, 33 Tex. 282; *Frank v. Kuigler*, 36 Tex. 305; *Planters' Bank v. Evans*, 35 Tex. 592. In this case, on a note for five hundred dollars, the payee indorsed "Pay to L. four hundred dollars out of this note." Suit being brought by a subsequent indorsee in his own name, alleging that he was the legal and equitable owner, but exhibiting the note and indorsements, as part of his petition, the maker and defendant demurred. *Held*, that the demurrer was properly sustained. *Hawkins v. Cardy*, 1 *Ld. Raym.* 160; *Bayley on Bills* (Am. ed.), 92; *Thomson on Bills* (Wilson's ed.), 184; *Hughes v. Kiddell*, 2 Bay, 324, in which case it was held that where two indorsements for parts of the amount were made they were invalid, though together they purported to transfer the whole.

² *Ibid*.

³ *Byles on Bills* (Sharswood's ed.) 291.

⁴ *Reid v. Furnival*, 1 C. & M. 538; 5 C. & P. 499 (24 E. C. L. R.)

⁵ *Flint v. Flint*, 6 Allen, 36, Dewey, J., saying: "This action was properly instituted in the names of the present plaintiffs the indorsement of the entire note being made to the two indorsees, and the claim, as respects the maker, not being divisible into two separate causes of action. The delivery to one of the indorsees, and a suit instituted and carried on for the benefit of both, with their concurrence, show a sufficient acceptance of the transfer to them."

⁶ *Conover v. Earl*, 26 Iowa, 167.

It has been held in Indiana that an assignment of a half interest in a note by one of the joint payees passed his interest in equity; and under the peculiar statute of Indiana, that the assignee might join in a suit with the other joint payee against the maker.¹ Where a note is payable to "A. and B.," an indorsement by one as "A. and B.," is good if the other consents thereto.² Joint indorsements are hereafter considered.³

§ 669. *Nature of the contract of indorsement, and what liabilities are assumed by the indorser.*—The indorsement of a bill or note is not merely a transfer thereof, but it is a fresh and substantive contract, embodying all the terms of the instrument indorsed, in itself. The indorsement of a bill is equivalent to the drawing of a new bill by the drawer upon the drawee (or acceptor, if it be accepted) in favor of the indorsee; and the indorsement of a note is equivalent to the drawing of a bill upon the maker, who stands in the relation of acceptor, as it were, in favor of the indorsee.⁴ He engages (1) that the bill or note will be accepted or paid, as the case may be, according to its purport; but this engagement is conditioned upon due presentment or demand, and notice: he also engages: (2) that it is in every respect genuine; (3) that it is the valid instrument it purports to be; (4) that the ostensible parties are competent; (5) and that he has lawful title to it and the right to indorse it. And if it turns out that any of these engagements but that first named are not fulfilled, the indorser may be sued for recovery of the original consideration which has failed,⁵ or be held liable as a party,⁶ without proof of demand and notice.⁷

¹ Groves v. Ruby, 24 Ind. 418.

² Cooper v. Bailey, 52 Me. 230.

³ See § 701, A.

⁴ Ingalls v. Lee, 9 Barb. 947; Cundy v. Marriott, 1 B. & A. 696; Billgerry v. Branch, 19 Grat. 418; Evans v. Gee, 11 Pet. 80; Hill v. Lewis, 1 Salk. 132; Suse v. Pompe, 98 E. C. L. R. 538; Edwards on Bills, 283; Chitty (13th Am. ed.) [*82], 98.

⁵ Chitty on Bills [*95], 116.

⁶ Story on Bills, § 108; Edwards, 287; Chitty (13th Am. ed.) [*243], 277; Lake v. Haynes, 1 Atk. 291 (1736); Heylin v. Adamson, 2 Burr. 669 (1758); Ballingalls v. Gloster, 3 East, 483 (1820).

⁷ Copp v. M'Dugall, 9 Mass. 1; Chitty (13th Am. ed.) [*82], 69; see Chapter XXXIII, Sec. I, Vol. 2.

§ 670. When the indorsement is “without recourse” the indorser specially declines to assume any responsibility as a party to the bill or note; but by the very act of transferring it, he engages that it is what it purports to be—the valid obligation of those whose names are upon it. He is like a drawer who draws without recourse; but who is nevertheless liable if he draws upon a fictitious party, or one without funds. And, therefore, the holder may recover against the indorser “without recourse,” (1) if any of the prior signatures were not genuine;¹ or (2) if the note was invalid between the original parties, because of the want, or illegality of, the consideration;² or if (3) any prior party was incompetent, or (4) the indorser was without title. In a Virginia case where a party agreed to have a bond assigned “without recourse” to another, those words were held not to exempt the contractor from liability when it afterward appeared that it had been previously paid, Carr, J., saying: “The very possession of the bond, the claiming it as property, as something binding the obligors, precluded the idea that it was at that moment discharged or satisfied; for then it was no bond: it bound nobody, it was not the representative of money. The bond, too, was payable at a future date; who could have dreamed that it was already mere wax and paper—not a cent due on it?”³ In another case, where a party transferred a negotiable note, after maturity, pending suit, and “without recourse” it was considered, on the authority of the case just quoted, that it appearing that the indorser was already discharged by failure in respect to notice, and the maker proving insolvent the transferrer was bound for the amount of the note. But the court held otherwise, laying some stress however on the peculiar circumstances of the case.⁴

§ 671. *In the first place, as to acceptance and payment.*—The indorser of a bill contracts to pay it at maturity,

¹ Dumont v. Williamson, 18 Ohio, N. S. 515.

² Blething v. Lovering, 58 Me. 437; Hannum v. Richardson, 48 Vt. 508. See *post*, § 700. *Contra*, Rayne v. Dillo, 27 La. Ann. 622.

³ Mays v. Callison, 6 Leigh. 230. ⁴ Ober v. Goodridge, 27 Grat. 878.

if, on presentment for acceptance, it is not accepted according to its purport, and he is duly notified of the dishonor.¹ And the indorser of an accepted bill, or of a note, likewise contracts to pay it, if it be not duly paid by the acceptor or maker.² It matters not what may be the cause of the drawer's or maker's refusal. The indorser contracts to pay on being duly notified that he refuses to pay. He therefore warrants the solvency of the parties—or, in short, warrants that it will be paid, either by them or by himself on receiving notice of their failure.

§ 672. *In the second place, as to genuineness.*—The indorser contracts that the bill or note is in every respect genuine, and neither forged, fictitious, or altered. Undoubtedly, and by universal admission, this principle applies to the signatures of the drawer, acceptor, and maker of the bill or note, who are the original parties, and it is often expressed in language to the effect that the indorser warrants that it is a genuine instrument.³ This rule, however, would not apply where the holder procured the indorsement of a forged note with knowledge of the forgery, and represented to the indorser that it was genuine, or where the holder has received the paper after maturity and without consideration.⁴ Whether or not the indorser's engagement extends to the genuineness of prior indorsements is not so well settled. Undoubtedly the indorser admits their genuineness, as he is estopped to deny his

¹ Ballingalls v. Gloster, 3 East, 481; 4 Esp. 268. Lord Ellenborough, C. J., said, "There is no distinguishing the case of an indorser from that of the drawer." Smith v. Johnson, 27 L. J. Ex. 363; 3 H. & N. 222; Chitty on Bills [*241], 576.

² Ogden v. Sanders, 12 Wheat. 313; Story on Notes, § 135; Chitty on Bills (13 Am. ed.) [*241], 276.

³ Edwards on Bills 188, 289; Story on Bills § 111; Coghill v. American Ex. Bank, 1 Coms. 113; Murray v. Judah, 16 Cow. 484; McIntosh v. Haydon, R. & M. 362; Howe v. Merrill, 5 Cush. 83; Bell v. Dagg, 60 N. Y. 528; Hannum v. Richardson, 48 Vt. 508; Condon v. Pearce, 43 Md. 83; Chapman v. Rose, 56 N. Y. 137; Misher v. Carpenter, 20 N. Y. S. C. (13 Hun), 604.

⁴ Turner v. Keller, 66 N. Y. 66; Misher v. Carpenter, 20 N. Y. S. C. (13 Hun), 604.

title, which would otherwise be invalid,¹ and notwithstanding the doubts and dissents which have been expressed, it is clear upon principle that the indorser warrants the instrument throughout. If there be any forged indorsement the indorser cannot recover against any party prior to it,² and the subsequent indorser has transferred a thing to which he himself had no right or title. He should plainly be regarded as representing by the act of ownership, a right of ownership,³ and be held bound accordingly. In Bayley on Bills it is said, "an indorsement is no warranty that prior indorsements are genuine;" but the case cited does not satisfactorily sustain that view, and the authorities greatly preponderate against it.⁴

§ 673. *In the third place, as to validity.*—The indorser engages that the bill or note is a valid and subsisting obligation, binding all prior parties according to their ostensible relations; and he may be held liable, although the instrument be entirely null and void as between prior parties themselves; and also as between prior parties and even *bona fide* holders without notice.⁵ In an early English case, where the suit was by the indorsee against the maker of a note void for gaming, Lee, C. J., said: "The plaintiff is not without remedy, for he may sue Church (the indorser) upon his indorsement."⁶

§ 674. In another English case, in an action against the drawer of a bill, it was held no defense that it was drawn and

¹ Ogden v. Sanders, 12 Wheat. 313; Chitty on Bills [*242], 277; Story on Bills, §§ 110, 111.

² Chitty on Bills [*260, 261], 297.

³ State Bank v. Fearing, 15 Pick. 533; Harris v. Bradley, 7 Yerg. 310; Oliver v. Andry, 7 La. 496; Bruce v. Bruce, 1 Marsh. 165, s. c. 5 Taunt. 485; Redington v. Wood, Cal. Law Times, January, 1873, p. 12; 1 Parsons N. & B. 25; 2 Parsons N. & B. 588; Story on Bills, § 111; Story on Notes, §§ 135, 380; Dalrymple v. Hillenbrand, 2 Hun, 488 (9 N. Y. S. C. R.), affirmed, 60 N. Y. 5; White v. Continental Nat. Bank, 64 N. Y. 320.

⁴ Bayley, ch. 5, p. 170 (5th ed. 1833), citing East India Co. v. Tritton, 3 B. & C. 280.

⁵ Chitty on Bills (13th Am. ed.) [*82, 90, 95], 98, 111, 116; Roscoe on Bills, 123; Bayley on Bills, ch. 12, p. 369; Byles (Sharswood's ed.) [*135], 250; Johnson on Bills, 32; Thomson on Bills, 82; 1 Parsons N. & B. 218; Edwards on Bills, 289, 350; Story on Notes, § 193; Story on Bills, § 190.

⁶ Bowyer v. Bampton, 2 Strange, 1155 (1741).

accepted for a gaming debt, it having been indorsed over by the drawer for a valuable consideration to a third person, by whom the suit was brought;¹ and, in Pennsylvania, that the indorsee of a note given on such a consideration may sue the indorser.² And, in Virginia, in an action against the maker and four indorsers of a note, it was held that the holder could recover against the fourth indorser, of whom he was the indorsee for value, although it was indorsed for accommodation of the maker by the first three indorsers, and had been purchased by the fourth at a usurious rate of interest.³

Upon these principles it has been decided in Georgia, where the Supreme Court has held valid the article of the State constitution which provides that "no court of this State shall try or give judgment, or enforce any debt the consideration of which was a slave;" that the courts should enforce payment by the indorser of a note given for a slave. Brown, C. J., saying: "The payee of a promissory note given for a slave, who, for a valuable consideration, which was in no way connected with the slave, indorsed and

¹ Edwards v. Dick, 4 Barn. & Ald. 212 (6 E. C. L. R.)

² Unger v. Boas, 1 Harris, 601 (1850).

³ Moffett v. Bickel, 21 Grat. 283, Moncure, J., saying: "If there were any doubt upon this question, I think it would be removed by the case referred to by the learned counsel of the plaintiff in error of Edwards v. Dick, decided by the Court of King's Bench in 1822, and reported in 4 Barn. & Ald. 212; 6 Eng. C. L. R. 405. Abbott, C. J., and Bayley, Holroyd, and Best, JJ., composed the court, and were unanimous. Such a decision of such a court is entitled to our highest respect. But the reasons assigned by the learned judges command more of our respect in weighing its authority than does their high judicial character. * * That, it is true, was a case in which the question arose as to the statute of gaming; while here the question arises in regard to the statute of usury. But the statute of gaming is very broad and sweeping in its terms, just as much so as the statute of usury. And, indeed, Abbott, C. J., in his opinion, places the case upon the same ground as that of usury, and says: 'There is no case upon the statute of usury where a drawer, having parted with a bill for a good consideration, can afterward set up as a defense an antecedent usurious contract between himself and the acceptor. For, if so, a court of justice would enable him to commit a gross fraud upon an innocent party.'"

To same effect, see Morford v. Davis, 28 N. Y. 484; Brown v. Wilcox, 7 Iowa, 414; Frank v. Longstreet, 44 Ga. 185; Burrill v. Smith, 7 Pick. 291.

delivered the note to the plaintiff, is liable. The indorsement is a new contract, and the court has jurisdiction to enforce the judgment against him on that contract."¹

In such cases the indorsee may not only sue the indorser upon the paper itself, but also upon a count for money had and received.² But if the holder have any privity in the illegal consideration, he cannot hold the indorser.³ It seems that where a corporation is prohibited from availing itself of the defense of usury, an indorser or other surety upon its paper, cannot avoid liability thereon, upon the ground of usury.⁴

§ 675. *In the fourth place, as to competency of original parties.*—The indorser contracts that the original parties to the bill or note were competent to bind themselves, whether as drawer, acceptor, or maker; for otherwise, although ostensible, they would not be real parties to it. Therefore, if the drawer, acceptor, or maker be an infant, lunatic, or married woman, the indorser's contract is broken,⁵ and he may be sued for recovery of the original consideration which has failed, or upon the instrument itself, without proof of demand and notice.⁶ So, if the instrument purported to be signed by procuration, he engages that there is competent authority in the agent.⁷ Thus, in Massachusetts, where the note was executed by the agent, who, as also the

¹ *Graham v. Maguire*, 39 Ga. 531. To same effect, see *Succession of Weil*, 24 La. Ann. 193.

² *Ingalls v. Lee*, 9 Barb. 947; *Edwards on Bills*, 289; *Cundy v. Marriott*, 1 B. & A. 696 (1831).

³ *Ackland v. Pearce*, 2 Camp. 599; *Edwards v. Dick*, 4 B. & Ald. 212.

⁴ *National Bank of Pittsburg v. Wheeler*, 60 N. Y. 612.

⁵ *Haly v. Lane*, 2 Atk. 181. The Lord Chancellor said: "Though a note given by a wife to her husband is void, yet if it is endorsed over by the husband, as between him and the indorsee, it is certainly good." To same effect, see *Robertson v. Allen*, 59 Tenn. 233; *Archer v. Shea*, 21 N. Y. S. C. (14 Hun), 493.

In *Erwin v. Downs*, 15 N. Y. 575, a note was made by two married women, and indorsed by the defendant for their accommodation. He was held bound to a *bona fide* indorsee, although the latter knew that the makers were married women when he took it. *Prescott Bank v. Caverly*, 7 Gray, 217.

⁶ See *ante*, § 669.

⁷ *Edwards on Bills*, 289; *Story on Bills*, § 110.

payee, was ignorant that his principal was dead, and the latter indorsed it, he was held, Parker, C. J., saying:¹ "The indorser always warrants the existence and legality of the contract which he undertakes to assign. The indorsee takes it on the credit chiefly of the indorser. Thus, if a note, void between promisor and payee, on account of usury or other illegal consideration, is indorsed *bona fide* for valuable consideration, the indorser must make it good. So, if the indorsement is of a note made by a minor or of a *feme covert*, and even if the name of the promisor is forged, the indorser is held upon his contract to pay the indorsee."

§ 676. Whether or not this engagement extends to all antecedent parties is questioned. It is thought by some that prior indorsements are warranted to be by competent parties, as well as to be genuine;² while others entertain the contrary view.³ The considerations which conduce to the opinion that he warrants genuineness of prior indorsements, apply also to their competency, and lead us to the same conclusion that it is warranted. In New York the doctrine of the text has been established by recent decisions. There it has been held that one who indorses a note purporting to be executed by a copartnership, impliedly warrants that it was made by the firm, and cannot in a suit against him dispute it.⁴

§ 677. *In the fifth place, as to title.*—The indorser con-

¹ Burrill v. Smith, 7 Pick. 291.

² 1 Parsons N. & B. 25; Story on Bills, § 110; Story on Notes, § 380, and note; see also Harris v. Bradley, 7 Yerg. 310.

³ Chitty on Bills (13 Am. ed.) [*243], 277. But the only authorities cited are East India Co. v. Tritton, 3 Barn. & C., and dissenting opinion of Chambre, J., in Smith v. Mercer, 6 Taunt. 83. The latter citation is no authority; and the former was decided on the ground that the party accepted the bill with knowledge of the circumstances respecting the agent's authority. See Story on Bills, § 110, note 1; 2 Parsons N. & B. 588 (where Chitty's view is criticised); Bayley (5th ed.), ch. 5, p. 170.

⁴ Dalrymple v. Hillenbrand, 2 Hun, 488 (9 N. Y. S. C. R.), affirmed in 62 N. Y. 5; Turner v. Keller, 66 N. Y. 66, but held in this case not to apply where the holder had procured a subsequent indorsement with knowledge of the antecedent forgery.

tracts that he has a lawful title to the bill or note, and a right to transfer it.¹ If he has stolen or found the instrument, or otherwise acquired possession without title, and it be payable to bearer or indorsed in blank, he might, before its maturity, invest a *bona fide* indorsee without notice, with a perfect title, although not himself possessing it; and even after maturity, the *bona fide* indorsee might get from him some superior rights to his own. But the indorsee might be involved in controversy, or be placed in the distasteful attitude of compelling payment by those who did not owe; and the indorser should not be protected while he brings mischief upon others. A forged instrument carries no title to the indorsee; and where the thief or finder of negotiable paper payable to order which has been indorsed, and put in circulation by the payee, erases the indorsement, and, subsequently, personating the payee, forges his signature, and transfers the paper to a *bona fide* purchaser for value, no title passes as against the true owner.²

§ 678. An indorsement falls under the general rule that the obligations of a personal contract are to be determined by the law of the place of its execution, and therefore an indorser may become responsible for a much higher rate of damages and of interest, upon the dishonor of a note, than he can recover from the drawer;³ and the jurisdiction of the Federal Courts of the United States attaches upon an indorsement as a distinct contract, independently of the residence of the original and remote parties to the instrument.⁴

The indorsement or assignment of a bill or note being an independent contract, the circumstances which would invalidate any other contract apply to it with like effect. Thus, a war between the countries of which the indorsee and in-

¹ Ibid; Redington v. Wood, Cal. Law Times, Jan'y 1873, p. 12; Edwards on Bills, 289; Story on Bills, § 111; Story on Notes, §§ 135, 380.

² Colson v. Arnot, 57 N. Y. 253; Graves v. American Exchange Bank, 17 N. Y. 205.

³ Slocum v. Pomeroy, 6 Cranch, 221; Powers v. Lynch, 3 Mass. 77; see *post*, Chapter XXVII, Sec. VIII.

⁴ Coffee v. Planters' Bank, 13 How. 183.

dorser are citizens, rendering them alien enemies, any commercial transaction between them, such as drawing a bill upon, or making or indorsing or assigning a note to the other, is void.¹

In a Virginia case, it appeared that checks were drawn by a bank in Richmond, Va., upon a bank in New Orleans, and were indorsed in Petersburg, Va., in February, 1863, while the late war between the United States and Confederate States was in progress, to a resident of Vicksburg, Miss. Petersburg, Richmond and Vicksburg were then in the Confederate lines, whilst New Orleans was in the permanent possession of the Federal forces. It was held that the indorsement was illegal and void, and that the indorsee could not recover against the indorser, in an action brought after the war.²

§ 679. There must be a consideration for an indorsement as between the immediate parties, and while it is *prima facie* evidence in itself of a consideration, the presumption as between immediate parties may be rebutted.³ Where the indorser makes the indorsement after the instrument is delivered, it would be void for want of consideration.⁴ By the general law merchant the indorser of a negotiable instrument is bound instantly, and may be sued after maturity, upon demand and notice. But by the statutes of some of the States the maker must be first sued, and his property first subjected.⁵

¹ Billgerry v. Branch, 19 Grat. 417, 437; Griswold v. Waddington, 16 Johns. 438; Willison v. Pattison, 7 Taunt. 439 (2 E. C. L. R.), s. c. 1 J. B. Moore, 133; McCaughy v. Berg, 4 Heisk. 695; see *ante*, § 218.

² Billgerry v. Branch, 19 Grat. 417, 437.

³ See *ante*, § 174.

⁴ Collier v. Mahan, 21 Ind. 110.

⁵ As in Colorado—Watson v. Kahn, 1 Col. 385. Illinois—Mason v. Burton, 54 Ill. 349; Booth v. Storrs, Id. 472. Mississippi—Harrison v. Pike, 48 Miss. 46.

SECTION II.

BY WHOM AND TO WHOM INDORSEMENT OR ASSIGNMENT MAY BE
MADE.

§ 680. *In the first place, as to who may indorse or transfer negotiable paper.*—Any person legally competent to enter into a contract may be the indorser, or transferrer by delivery of negotiable paper.¹ If payable to the order of the payee, he or his legal representative must be the transferrer. In case of the bankruptcy of the payee of a bill or note, all his rights become vested in the assignee, who may transfer it in their own name;² and the bankrupt cannot;³ and in the case of the death of the payee the like right devolves upon his executors or administrators.⁴ But if payable to several persons “as executors,” all must concur.⁵ In Louisiana where suit was brought against the executors of Mary C. Moore and John Moore, who were in their lifetime tutrix and cotutor of D. Magill, to recover judgment on two drafts which said tutrix and cotutor drew payable to their own order, it was held that they were not personally bound by their indorsement, although they omitted therein to state their fiduciary capacity.⁶

§ 681. *In the case of the marriage of a woman who is*

¹ 2 Pars. N. & B. 3; Story on Bills, § 195.

² Chitty, 227; Story on Notes, § 123; *ex parte* Brown, 1 Glyn & J. 407.

³ Ashurst v. Bank of Australia, 37 Eng. L. & Eq. R. 149.

⁴ Watkins v. Maule, 2 Jac. & Walk. 237; Rawlinson v. Stone, 3 Wils. 1; Rand v. Hubbard, 4 Metc. 252; Malbon v. Southard, 36 Me. 147; Dwight v. Newell, 15 Ill. 333.

⁵ Johnson v. Mangum, 65 N. C. 146.

⁶ Lapeyre v. Weeks, 28 La. 665. The Court said: “We do not regard Mary C. Moore and John Moore as indorsers of the drafts. In indorsing the drafts they omitted adding their capacity as tutrix and cotutor. In their fiduciary capacity the drafts were not indorsed and completed by the drawers, unless we regard the signatures of Mary C. Moore and John Moore as made in that capacity. Bills drawn by a fiduciary to his own order are not completed unless indorsed in the same capacity as drawn. We regard these drafts as completed, and must therefore consider that Mary C. Moore and John Moore indorsed them in the same capacity in which they drew them.”

payee or indorsee of a bill or note, the property thereof vests in her husband, and he alone can indorse or transfer it; and in like manner, if the paper be made payable to her after marriage, her husband alone can indorse or transfer it.¹ But this principle is subject to the limitation that the wife may, with the consent of the husband, indorse a bill or note made payable to her, and pass a good title to the indorsee.²

The law being based upon the distinction that coverture of the wife creates a disability on her part to enter into a contract which the assent of the husband may remove.³ The indorsement of the wife, under such circumstances, is equivalent to that of her husband. Her act becomes in law his act, and the indorsee must claim through the husband by a title derived from him.⁴ If a woman who is the payee of a note payable to her order assigned it by delivery and afterward married the maker, her indorsement after marriage transfers the legal title.⁵

§ 682. An infant is not bound upon his indorsement of a bill or note, being incapable of making a contract; but he may, by his indorsement (which is voidable—not absolutely void), transfer the paper to any subsequent holder, against all the parties thereto, except himself.⁶

¹ See *ante*, § 254; *Mason v. Morgan*, 2 Ad. & El. 30 (29 E. C. L. R.); *Chitty* 26; *Story on Notes*, § 124; *Barlow v. Bishop*, 1 East, 433; *Conner v. Martin*, 1 Stra. 516; *Miles v. Williams*, 10 Mod. 243; *Savage v. King*, 5 Shep. 301; *Miller v. Delamater*, 12 Wend. 433.

² See *ante*, §§ 252, 253.

³ *Chitty on Bills*, 21, 200; *Stevens v. Beals*, 10 Cush. 291; *Miller v. Delamater*, 12 Wend. 433; *Hancock Bank v. Joy*, 41 Me. 568; *Reakert v. Sanford*, 5 Watts & S. 164; *Leeds v. Vail*, 15 Penn. St. 185; *Fredd v. Eves*, 4 Harr. (Del.) 385; *Cotes v. Davis*, 1 Camp. 485; *Prestwick v. Marshall*, 7 Bing. 565; 4 Car. & P. 594; *Prince v. Brunatte*, 7 Bing. N. C. 435; 2 Bright, Husb. and Wife, 42; *Lindus v. Bradwell*, 5 Com. B. 583; *Lord v. Hall*, 8 Com. B. 627; see *ante*, §§ 252, 253.

⁴ *Stevens v. Beals*, 10 Cush. 291; and cases in note *ante*; see also *ante*, §§ 252, 253.

⁵ *Guptill v. Horne*, 63 Me. 405. *Appleton, C. J.*: "As the wife would have been compelled by a court of equity to indorse, her voluntary act is as effectual to transfer to the indorsee the right to sue as if it had been the result of legal compulsion."

⁶ *Story on Bills*, § 196; *Story on Notes*, § 124; *Bayley on Bills*, 44; *Chitty*, 21; 2 *Parsons N. & B.* 3; *Nightingale v. Withington*, 15 Mass. 272; *Taylor v.*

§ 683. *When a bill or note is payable or indorsed to a copartnership*, any member of the firm may transfer it during the continuance of the firm, and indorse it in the firm name;¹ and upon the death of a member of the firm, the survivor may indorse it in his own name.² But the indorsement by a partner to his copartner, or to another person, of a bill or note payable to the firm, in his individual name, will not pass the title to the paper, nor enable the indorsee to bring a suit on it in his own name.³ It has been held, however, that such an indorsement would pass the equitable title.⁴

If there be a dissolution of the copartnership (otherwise than by the death of a partner), the survivor cannot indorse in the firm name a bill or note payable to the firm;⁵ even though the surviving partner had power to settle the partnership affairs;⁶ but the contrary had been held if the dissolution were unknown to the indorsee,⁷ and the rule does not apply where the bill or note of the firm was made payable to the partner who, after dissolution, indorsed it.⁸

§ 684. *If several persons, not partners, are payees or indorsees of a bill or note*, it should be indorsed by all of them.⁹ Either one of the joint payees may authorize the other to indorse for him, and an assignment of this interest in the

Crocker, 4 Esp. 187; *Jeune v. Ward*, 2 Stark. 326; *Grey v. Cooper*, 3 Doug. 65; see *ante*, §§ 227 *et seq.*

¹ *Story on Notes*, § 125; *Bayley on Bills*, 53; *Barrett v. Russell*, 45 Vt. 43.

² *Jones v. Thorne*, 14 Martin, 463.

³ *Estabrook v. Smith*, 6 Gray, 570; *Robb v. Bailey*, 13 La. Ann. 446; *Fletcher v. Dana*, 4 Blackf. 377; *Desha v. Stewart*, 6 Ala. 852; *Moore v. Denslow*, 14 Conn. 235; *Absolem v. Marks*, 11 Q. B. 19; *Russell v. Swan*, 16 Mass. 314; *Hooker v. Gallagher*, 6 Fla. 351.

⁴ *Alabama Co. v. Brainard*, 35 Ala. 476.

⁵ *Sanford v. Mickles*, 4 Johns. 224; see *ante*, § 370.

⁶ *Abel v. Sutton*, 3 Esp. 108; *Humphries v. Chastain*, 5 Ga. 166; *Foltz v. Pouree*, 2 Desaus. Eq. 40; *Parker v. Macomber*, 18 Pick. 505; see *ante*, § 372.

⁷ *Cony v. Wheelock*, 33 Me. 366; *Lewis v. Reilly*, 1 Q. B. 349; see *ante*, § 373.

⁸ *Semple v. Seaver*, 11 Cush. 314.

⁹ *Brown v. Dickinson*, 27 Grat. 693; *Smith v. Whiting*, 9 Mass. 334; *Sneed v. Mitchell*, 1 Haywood, 289; *Carvick v. Vickery*, 2 Doug. 653. See *Sayre v. Frick*, 7 Watts & S. 383; *Culver v. Leavy*, 19 La. Ann. 202, and *post* §§ 701 a. 704.

paper from one to the other carries with it such authority.¹ But there is no presumption of law that one may indorse for the other.²

§ 685. *A note payable to an executor may be transferred for a debt of the estate.*³—If the instrument be payable to two or more persons as executors or administrators, all must indorse;⁴ but it seems that in other cases one of the personal representatives might indorse.⁵ An executor or administrator will be personally bound by his indorsement, although he add “executor” or “administrator” to his name, unless he expressly specify that recourse is to be had only against the estate of the deceased.⁶ A negotiable note transferred by the payee, by delivery only, may be indorsed by his personal representative with the same effect as if done by the payee in his lifetime.⁷

When a bill or note is payable at a bank, an indorsement by “A. B., Pres’t,” binds the bank.⁸ And so an indorsement by “A. B., Cashier.”⁹ If payable to A. or order for the use of B., it can be indorsed by A. only, as the legal interest is in him, not in B.¹⁰

§ 686. *In the second place, as to whom transfer may be made.*—The transfer of a bill or note may be made, of course, to any party who may legally contract with the transferrer. It may also be made to an infant, or to a married woman; but in the latter case the interest will vest in her husband, who may treat it as payable to himself, or to himself and wife.¹¹ In the

¹ Russell v. Swan, 16 Mass. 314; Goddard v. Lyman, 14 Pick. 268.

² 2 Parsons N. & B. 5.

³ Moses v. Clark, 46 Ala. 226.

⁴ Smith v. Whiting, 9 Mass. 334.

⁵ Wheeler v. Wheeler, 9 Cow. 34. See 2 Pars. N. & B. 6.

⁶ See Beals v. See, 10 Barr, 56; Seaver v. Phelps, 11 Pick. 304; Serle v. Waterworth, 4 M. & W. 487.

⁷ Molbin v. Southard, 36 Me. 149; Hersey v. Elliott, 67 Me. 527. See Watkins v. Maule, 2 Jacob & Walker, 148.

⁸ Aiken v. Marine Bank, 16 Wis. 679; see Leavitt v. Connecticut Peat Co. 6 Blatch. 139, and *ante*, § 394.

⁹ See *ante*, §§ 392, 417. ¹⁰ Evans v. Cramlington, 2 Show. 509; 1 Show. 4.

¹¹ Story on Notes, § 126; Richards v. Richards, 2 Barn. & Ad. 477; Burrough v. Moss, 10 Barn. & Cres. 558; Philliskirk v. Pluckwell, 2 M. & Selw. 393.

latter case, should she survive him, she may sue in her own name. It may also be made to a trustee, or personal representative, in which case it will operate as a transfer to them personally, although the trust may attach to the proceeds in their hands.¹ The transfer cannot be made by the husband to his wife,² except to act as his agent and convey title to another.³

If the transfer be to an executor or trustee, it will operate as a transfer to him personally, although the trust may attach to the proceeds in his hands.⁴ If a principal make an indorsement in blank to his agent, the latter may fill it up to himself individually, and it will be regarded as between him and all other parties, except his principal, as his own; or he may fill it for his principal, and act in his name.⁵ The indorsee must, of course, be living at the time of the indorsement; and if he be dead, and the indorsement be with intention to invest his personal representative with the legal property in the instrument, it is null and void.⁶

A promissory note payable to "J. C., Sh'ff" (sheriff), and indorsed "J. C., Sh'ff," does not of itself impart notice to the indorsee that the money was payable to J. C. in his official capacity as sheriff, or as trustee for other parties.⁷ So a note to A. B., receiver, indorsed by him "as receiver," is *prima facie* his individually, and he may sue upon it in his own name.⁸

§ 687. If a bill or note be made payable to a party as "cashier," it will be regarded *prima facie* as payable to his bank; and if so indorsed, as indorsed by his bank.⁹ In cases

¹ Ibid.

² Gay v. Kingsley, 11 Allen, 345.

³ Slawson v. Loring, 5 Allen, 340; see *ante*, § 241.

⁴ Richards v. Richards, 2 Barn. & Ad. 447.

⁵ Clark v. Pigot, 1 Salk. 126; Story on Bills, § 207.

⁶ Valentine v. Holloman, 63 N. C. 475.

⁷ Fletcher v. Schaumberg, 41 Mo. 501.

⁸ Davis v. Peck, 54 Barb. 425.

⁹ Bank of the State v. Muskingum Branch Bank, 29 N. Y. (2 Tiffany) 619; Collins v. Johnson, 16 Ga. 458; Bank of Manchester v. Slasen, 13 Vt. 334; Folger v. Chase, 18 Pick. 63; Fleckner v. Bank U. S. 8 Wheat. 360; Minor v. Mechanics' Bank, 1 Pet. 46; Wild v. Passamaquoddy Bank, 3 Mason, 505; see *ante*, § 417.

of indorsement to a cashier of a bank as cashier, for example, "to A. B., Cashier," the bank may sue on it, or the cashier may do so for the use of the bank, or in his own name.¹ And if the indorsement be to the treasurer of the United States, in his official capacity, it will be regarded as to the United States in point of fact, and they may sue upon it in their name.² And the same principle applies to other governmental officers.³

SECTION III.

FORM AND VARIETIES OF INDORSEMENT.

§ 688. *Firstly. As to the form of the indorsement.*—The indorsement is generally made by writing the transferrer's name on back of the paper, but it may be written—although unusual and irregular—on any other portion of it, even on the face and under the maker's name.⁴ The full name should be written, but the initials will suffice,⁵ as will also any mark instead of the name, made to represent it.⁶

Writing on the paper, "pay the contents to A.," is a transfer, so far as it authorizes payment to be made to A., but it does not render the writer liable as an indorser.⁷

It has been held that the figures "1, 2, 8," written in pencil, was sufficient, connected with evidence tending to show that the party who placed them on the paper intended to

¹ McHenry v. Ridgely, 3 Scam. 309; Porter v. Neckervis, 4 Rand. 359; Fairfield v. Adams, 16 Pick. 381; see *ante*, § 417, and *post*, Chapter XXXVII, Sec. II, Vol. 2.

² Dugan v. U. S. 3 Wheat. 172.

³ See *ante*, § 433.

⁴ Gibson v. Powell, 6 How. (Miss.) 60; Quin v. Sterne, 26 Ga. 223; Herring v. Woodhull, 29 Ill. 92; Partridge v. Davis, 20 Vt. 449; Rex v. Begg, 3 P. Wms. 419; 1 Stra. 18; Thomson on Bills, 181.

⁵ Merchants' Bank v. Spicer, 6 Wend. 443; Palmer v. Stephens, 1 Denio, 471; Bank v. Flanders, 6 N. H. 239; Rogers v. Colt, 6 Hill, 322; Williamson v. Johnson, 1 Barn. & C. 146; Corgan v. Frew, 39 Ill. 31.

⁶ George v. Surrey, 1 M. & M. 516; Baker v. Denning, 8 Ad. & El. 94; Addy v. Grix, 8 Ves. 504; Flint v. Flint, 6 Allen, 34; Brown v. Butchers', &c. Bank, 6 Hill, 443.

⁷ Vincent v. Horlock, 1 Camp. 442.

bind himself as an indorser.¹ This decision is questioned by Prof. Parsons (vol. 2 N. & B. 17); but with the utmost respect for that eminent jurist, it seems to us sound, on the ground that it was intended as a mark to represent the indorser's name.² And it is well settled that any mark which is shown to have been intended as the maker's name, is as valid to bind him as the name itself. "A very small matter," says Cunningham, in his *Law of Exchange*, p. 26, "will amount to an acceptance;" and he gives as an example the mere memorandum of the date of presentment. The same may be said of an indorsement. It is the intention which gives significance to the mark.

A written agreement to pay a note "as if by me indorsed," written on it, is considered an indorsement, in the legal sense.³ It is settled that the writing may be done in any legible way, by pen or pencil.⁴

§ 689. The indorser may write his own name, or he may authorize any one to write it for him. If the name be in the handwriting of the paper, but the indorser receives notice, is sued, suffers default and makes no defense or denial until after the maker absconds, he cannot deny his signature; or if he does, proof that he had assumed other paper similarly indorsed would be conclusive against him.⁵

The indorsement must, as a general rule, be somewhere on the paper itself, or attached thereto, and unless it is, the party cannot be held liable as an indorser,⁶ but a promise made on a sufficient consideration will sustain an action upon its breach.⁷

When a note is transferred with guaranty, the transfer may be good, though the guaranty be void under the statute of frauds.⁸

¹ *Brown v. Butchers' Bank*, 6 Hill, 443.

² *Redfield & Bigelow's Leading Cases*, 110, 111.

³ *Pinnes v. Ely*, 4 McLean, 173.

⁴ *Geary v. Physic*, 5 Barn. & C. 234; *Brown v. Butchers' Bank*, 6 Hill, 443; *Closson v. Stearns*, 4 Vt. 11.

⁵ *Weed v. Carpenter*, 10 Wend. 403.

⁶ *Fenn v. Harrison*, 3 T. R. 757.

⁷ *Moxon v. Pulling*, 4 Camp. 51.

⁸ *Crosby v. Roub*, 16 Wis. 616.

§ 690. It is not necessary, however, that the indorsement should be upon the original bill or note, in order to constitute such, in the full sense of the term. It sometimes happens, that by rapid circulation from hand to hand, the back of the paper is completely covered by indorsements; and in such cases the holder may tack or paste on a piece of paper sufficient to bear his own and subsequent indorsements, and thereon the indorsements may be made. Such addition to the original instrument is called an *allonge*, and it becomes, for the purposes above named, incorporated as a part of it.¹

§ 691. *Secondly. As to the varieties of indorsement.*—There are various liabilities which may be engrafted on a negotiable instrument, evidenced by the terms of the indorsement thereon. An indorsement may be (1) in full or (2) in blank; it may be (3) absolute or (4) conditional; it may be (5) restrictive; it may be (6) without recourse on the indorser; and there may be (7) joint indorsements of the instrument, (8) successive indorsements, and also (9) irregular indorsements.

§ 692. (1) *In the first place, an indorsement in full* is one which mentions the name of the person in whose favor it is made; and to whom, or to whose order, the sum is to be paid. For instance: "Pay to B., or order," signed A., is an indorsement in full by A., the payee or holder of the paper, to B. An indorsement in full prevents the bill or note from being indorsed by any one but the indorsee.² And none but the special indorsee or his representative can sue upon it.³ Where the payee wrote on the back of a note which he transferred, "I this day sold to Catherine M. Adams the within note," it was held an indorsement to the purchaser, Peters, J., saying: "We think that the defendant thereby

¹ Crosby v. Roub, 16 Wis. 622, 626 (1863); Folger v. Chase, 18 Pick. 68; French v. Turner, 15 Ind. 59; Story on Notes, §§ 121, 151, 172; Story on Bills, §§ 204, 218; Byles on Bills [*145], 263; Edwards on Bills, 267.

² Mead v. Young, 4 T. R. 28.

³ See Vol. II. § 1181. Lawrence v. Fussell, 77 Penn. St. 460; Reamer v. Bell, 79 Id. 292.

assumed all the liabilities of an ordinary indorsement of the note. No word in the writing indorsed upon the note negatives or qualifies such an idea. * * The only restriction is that the indorsement is made special to Catherine M. Adams.”¹

§ 693. (2) *In the second place, an indorsement in blank* is one which does not mention the name of the indorsee, and consists, generally, simply of the name of the indorser written on the back of the instrument. When the bill or note is indorsed in blank, it is, as has been said, transferable by mere delivery to the transferee; but one indorsed in full must be indorsed again by the indorsee, in order to render it transferable to every intent—for he who indorses to a particular person, declares his intention not to be made liable except by that person’s indorsement over. As to an indorsement in blank, it was said by Lord Mansfield, in *Peacock v. Rhodes*, 2 Doug. 633: “I see no difference between a note indorsed in blank and one payable to bearer. They both go by delivery, and possession proves property in both cases.”²

§ 694. The receiver of a negotiable instrument indorsed in blank, or any *bona fide* holder of it, may write over it an indorsement in full to himself, or to another, or any contract consistent with the character of an indorsement;³ but he could not enlarge the liability of the indorser in blank by writing over it a waiver of any of his rights, such as demand and notice.⁴ The indorsement may be before or after the instrument itself is completed; and while it is yet in blank; and the indorser will be bound according to its terms when

¹ *Adams v. Blethen*, 66 Me. 19 (1876).

² See *Palmer v. Nassau Bank*, 78 Ill. 380; *Gaar v. Louisville B. Co.* 11 Bush. (Ky.) 180; *Carter v. Sprague*, 51 Cal. 239.

³ See *ante*, §§ 142 *et seq.*; *Evans v. Gee*, 11 Pet. 80; *Rees v. Conocheague Bank*, 5 Rand. 329; *Hance v. Miller*, 21 Ill. 636; *Hunter v. Hempstead*, 1 Mo. 67; *Riker v. Cosby*, 2 Penn. 911; *Central Bank v. Davis*, 19 Pick. 376; *Tenney v. Prince*, 4 Pick. 385; *Condon v. Pearce*, 43 Md. 83.

⁴ 2 *Parsons N. & B.* 20; *Edwards on Bills*, 273; *Central Bank v. Davis*, 19 Pick. 376.

filled up, the indorsement of a blank paper being considered "a letter of credit for an indefinite sum."¹

Where there are several indorsements in blank, the holder may fill up the first one to himself, or he may deduce his title through all of them.² He may also strike out any number of several indorsements. Thus, if there were six, he might strike out the fourth, fifth and sixth, and sue the others;³ but if he strikes out any intermediate one he releases all who indorsed subsequently, as he deprives them of their recourse against him.⁴ But where there is a special indorsement to a particular person, it has been held that the holder cannot strike it out and insert his own name; for being payable to the order of the special indorsee, the law cannot presume that it has come rightfully into the hands of the holder until there is a special indorsement to him, or an indorsement in blank. To hold otherwise would defeat the very object of the special indorsement, which is to notify the world that it can only be transferred to a stranger by the actual indorsement of the special indorsee, and especially is it notice to the maker not to pay to any one but the special indorsee. And if he pays it to a stranger when it is without indorsement by the special indorsee he acts at his own risk.⁵ And if the special indorsee or his assignee strike out his name in the special indorsement and insert his own, it is a material alteration of the special indorser's contract, and no recovery can be had against him.⁶

It has been held, that if a holder through several indorsements fills up an early blank indorsement payable to himself, without striking out the subsequent indorsements, he

¹ *Violett v. Patton*, 5 Cranch, 142; *Lord Mansfield*, in *Russell v. Langstaffe*, 2 Doug. 514. See *ante*, § 142.

² *Ritchie v. Moore*, 5 Munf. 388; *Craig v. Brown*, Pet. C. C. R. 171; *Ellsworth v. Brewer*, 11 Pick. 316; *Cole v. Cushing*, 8 Pick. 48; *Emerson v. Cutts*, 12 Mass. 7, 8.

³ *Ritchie v. Moore*, 5 Munf. 388.

⁴ *Curry v. Bank of Mobile*, 8 Port. (Ala.) 360.

⁵ *Porter v. Cushman*, 19 Ill. 572; see *ante*, Chapter XX, Sec. I.

⁶ *Grimes v. Piersol*, 25 Ind. 246.

does not discharge such subsequent indorsers; but that he may, after suing unsuccessfully those prior to the one filled up to himself, sue the subsequent indorsers.¹

§ 695. In a Virginia case,² Green. J., said, in delivering the opinion of the Court: "A blank indorsement does not *per se* transfer a title;³ but is an authority to the holder, either to hold it as the agent of the indorser, or to claim it as his own by assignment, at his election, without any further act to be done by the assignor. The blank indorsement is conclusive proof of the assent of the indorser to transfer the note to the holder, if he elects to take it as a transfer. The assent and election of the holder to treat the indorsement as a transfer, is proved as well by suing upon it in his own name as by writing over it an assignment to himself, and it is the assent of both parties to the transfer which perfects it, and not the form in which that assent is evidenced."

§ 696. If a bill or note be once indorsed in blank, though afterward indorsed in full, it will still, as against the drawer, acceptor, maker, payee, the blank indorser and all indorsers before him be payable to bearer, though as against the special indorser himself, title must be made through his indorsee.⁴

The holder under a blank indorsement cannot fill it up so as to make the note payable in part to one person and in part to another. The indorser's contract is single and entire to pay the note to the party, or to that person named by him; and it is no part of his contract that the sum shall be broken into fragments, and he obliged to pay in fractions to different persons.⁵

§ 697. (3 & 4) *In the third and fourth, as to absolute and conditional indorsements.*—An absolute indorsement is one by

¹ 2 Parsons N. & B. 19; Cole v. Cushing, 8 Pick. 48. See 2 Parsons N. & B. 19, note, and the observations of the author on the case cited.

² Rees v. Conococheague Bank, 5 Rand. 329.

³ See Clark v. Pigot, 1 Salk. 126; Lucas v. Haynes, Id. 130.

⁴ Smith v. Clarke, Peake, 225; Walker v. McDonald, 2 Exch. 527.

⁵ Erwin v. Lynn, 16 Ohio, N. S. 547.

which the indorser binds himself to pay, upon no other condition than the failure of prior parties to do so, and of due notice to him of such failure (protest preceding it when necessary, as in the case of a foreign bill). A conditional indorsement is one by which the indorser annexes some other condition to his liability. Sometimes the condition is precedent, and sometimes subsequent. Thus, "Pay to A. B., or order, if he arrives at twenty-one years of age," or, "if he is living when it becomes due," is an indorsement upon a condition precedent. "Pay A. B., or order, unless, before payment, I give you notice to the contrary," is upon a condition subsequent. The condition attached to the indorsement in no manner affects the negotiability of the paper.¹

Where a bill was indorsed, payable to the indorsee or transferee on a certain condition, and was afterward accepted and passed through several hands, and was finally paid by the acceptor before the condition was satisfied, it was held that the acceptor was liable to pay the bill again to the payee.² But it seems that a bill cannot be indorsed with a condition that in a certain event the indorsee shall not retain the power of indorsing it to another.³

"The drawer is bound to take notice of the condition annexed to an indorsement, for when a person accepts a bill after a conditional indorsement, and pays it to an indorsee of this conditional indorsee while the condition of the first indorsement is unfulfilled, he is liable in second payment to the first indorser, being bound to look at the conditional indorsement as a limitation *ex facie* of the bill, in the title of the party claiming payment."⁴

§ 698. (5) *In the fifth place, as to restrictive indorsements.*—An indorsement may be worded so as to restrict the farther negotiability of the instrument, and it is then called a restric-

¹ Story on Notes, § 149; Story on Bills, § 217.

² Robertson v. Kensington, 4 Taunt. 30; Savage v. Aldren, 2 Stark. 232 (3 E. C. L. R.)

³ Soares v. Clyn, 14 L. J. Q. B. 313; 8 Q. B. 24 (35 E. C. L. R.)

⁴ Thomson on Bills, 232.

tive indorsement. Thus, "Pay the contents to J. S., only," or "to J. S., for my use," or "to order, for my use," are restrictive indorsements, and put an end to the paper's transferability.¹ But "pay J. S., or order, value in account with H. C. D.," would not be restrictive.² Where a bill was indorsed "pay A. B., or order, for the account of C. D.," A. B. pledged it with the defendant, who advanced money upon it to A. B. personally, it was held that the form of the indorsement was in itself notice to the defendant that A. B. had no authority to raise money on the bill for his own benefit, and that C. D. could recover against him in an action of trover.³ So where a bill was indorsed, "pay J. C. or order on account of B. G. & S.," it was held, that it operates as notice that J. C. held it in trust for B. G. & S., and that neither he nor his indorsee had any property in it.⁴ So where a bill was indorsed by A. "pay B. or his order for my use," and B. discounted it with his bankers, who received payment of the acceptors, it was held, in an action for money had and received, that the bankers were bound to refund the amount to A.⁵ So "credit my account (signed), James B. Scott, cashier," is a restrictive indorsement, and prevents further negotiation of the bill.⁶ The words "for collection," which are frequently inserted on paper put in bank to be collected, makes the indorsement restrictive, and the indorser is competent to prove that he is not the owner of it, and did not mean to give title to it, or its proceeds when collected.⁷

¹ *Power v. Finnie*, 4 Call, 411; *Brown v. Jackson*, 1 Wash. C. C. R. 512; *Ancher v. Bank of England*, Doug. 615; *Robertson v. Kensington*, 4 Taunt. 30; *Sigourney v. Lloyd*, 8 B. & C. 622; *Snee v. Prescott*, 1 Atk. 247. The following case arose in Texas. L. & M. made a note payable "to B. S. & Co. for the use of E. & M. S." At the time the note was made B. S. & Co. indorsed it in blank and delivered it to the usees, E. & M. S., who, alleging the insolvency of L. & M., sued B. S. & Co. as original obligors. The consideration of the note was money used by the usees. B. S. & Co. were held liable as original promisors or sureties. *Harrison v. Sheirburn*, 36 Tex. 73.

² *Buckley v. Jackson*, L. R. 3 Exch. 135.

³ *Treuttel v. Barandon*, 8 Taunt. 100.

⁴ *Blaine v. Bourne*, 11 R. I.

⁵ *Sigourney v. Lloyd*, 8 B. & C. 622 (15 E. C. L. R.); 5 Bing. 525; 3 Y. & J. 220.

⁶ *Lee v. Chillicothe Branch Bank*, 1 Bond. 387.

⁷ *Sweeney v. Easter*, 1 Wall. 166.

Such an indorsement merely makes the indorsee agent for the indorser to collect the note, but it has been held does not invest him with such title as to make him a proper party plaintiff in a suit.¹

The negotiability of an instrument having been restricted, it may be revived by a subsequent indorsement.²

If the paper be originally negotiable, an indorsement, in order to be restrictive, must be made so by express words, and if it simply direct payment to a certain person by name, without adding the words, "or order," it will not be considered a restrictive indorsement and payable to him only.³

§ 699. An indorsement "for my use," or "for collection"—not being an actual transfer of the amount—may be recalled at pleasure.⁴ All the presumptions are against restrictions to negotiable paper, and unless clearly restrictive the indorsements will be held otherwise.⁵ An indorsement "for collection" made by the payee is canceled by his subsequent indorsement to another indorsee for value.⁶

It is clear that a parol agreement on the indorsement of a promissory note to the effect that the transfer should be without recourse upon the indorser, cannot be interposed as a defense against a subsequent *bona fide* holder without notice. Nor would the case be varied by the fact that it was transferred to such holder by mere delivery, and that he declared on the prior indorsement as though made to himself.⁷

§ 700. (6) *In the sixth place, as to qualified indorsements, or indorsements without recourse.*—An indorsement qualified by the words "without recourse," "*sans recours*," or "at the indorsee's own risk," renders the indorser a mere assignor of the title to the instrument, and relieves him of all responsi-

¹ Rock Co. Nat. Bank v. Hollister, 21 Minn. 385.

² Holmes v. Hooper, 1 Bay, 160.

³ Leavitt v. Putnam, 3 Coms. 494; Story on Notes, § 142; Story on Bills, §§ 19, 56.

⁴ Thomson on Bills (Wilson's ed.) 184; Marius, 72.

⁵ Potts v. Read, 6 Esp. 57; Treuttel v. Barandon, 8 Taunt. 100.

⁶ Atkins v. Cobb, 56 Ga. 86.

⁷ Skinner v. Church, 36 Iowa, 91; see *post*, § 719.

bility for its payment,¹ though not from certain liabilities which have been already enumerated.² But such an indorsement does not throw any suspicion upon the character of the paper. As said in Virginia,³ Green, J.: "An indorsement without recourse is not out of the due course of trade. The security continues negotiable, notwithstanding such an indorsement. Nor does such an indorsement indicate, in any case, that the parties to it are conscious of any defect in the security, or that the indorsee does not take it on the credit of the other party or parties to the note. On the contrary, he takes it solely on their credit, and the indorser only shows thereby, that he is unwilling to make himself responsible for the payment."

"I transfer all my right and title to the within note, to be enjoyed in the same manner as may have been by me," has been held in effect an indorsement without recourse.⁴ The words "without recourse," written under the signature of one not the payee, upon the back of a note, are regarded as surplus and ineffectual.⁵ In New York where the firm of Brander & Hubbard discontinued business save the adjustment and liquidation of its affairs, and was succeeded by a new firm of same name wherein Hubbard was a partner, and the latter indorsed a note on account of the old firm as follows: "Brander & Hubbard, old firm in liquidation," it was insisted that the form of the indorsement showed that it was made merely for the purpose of transferring title, and precluded the idea of any assumption of liability upon the indorsement. But it was held otherwise, Grover, J., saying: "To relieve one who

¹ Welch v. Lindo, Cranch, S. C. 159; Chitty on Bills [*235], 268; Byles on Bills [*147], 266; Wilson v. Codman's Ex. 3 Cranch, 192; Rice v. Stearns, 3 Mass. 225; Upham v. Prince, 12 Id. 13; Richardson v. Lincoln, 5 Metc. 201; Mott v. Hicks, 1 Cow. 512; Craft v. Fleming, 56 Penn. St. (10 Wright), 140; Lawrence v. Dohyn, 30 Mo. 196; Fitchburg Bank v. Greenwood, 2 Allen, 434; Cady v. Shepard, 12 Wis. 639; Davenport v. Schram, 9 Wis. 119; Lyon v. Ewing, 17 Wis. 61; Borden v. Clark, 26 Mich. 410.

² See *ante*, § 670.

³ Lomax v. Picot, 2 Rand. 260; see also Stevenson v. O'Neil, 71 Ill. 314.

⁴ Halley v. Falconer, 32 Ala. 536.

⁵ Childs v. Wyman, 44 Me. 433; Lowell v. Gage, 38 Me. 35.

indorses paper from liability as such, he must insert in the contract itself words clearly expressing such an intention.”¹

§ 701. In Iowa, where a promissory note was indorsed by a subsequent holder, as follows: “I, the undersigned, do agree that I will not sell or dispose of a note given by R. R. P.” (the maker of the note in question), it was held, that such indorsement did not destroy the negotiability of the note, nor render it, in the hands of a holder subsequently acquiring it, subject to defenses existing against it, of which he had no notice, and Cole, J., said: “The agreement not to sell or dispose of the note was then an independent agreement, upon breach of which, if made for a consideration, the obligor might be liable; but it could not have the effect to destroy the negotiability of the note.”²

In Texas, this case occurred: The executor of a decedent, acting in his fiduciary capacity, bought out the interest of the widow in the decedent's estate, and, in part payment for it, indorsed to her certain overdue notes executed by third parties to the decedent in his lifetime. The indorsement was in blank, and was signed “W. W., executor of D. W.,” and it was made in pursuance of a written contract between the parties, which showed that the widow entirely released her husband's estate, and did not stipulate for any indorsement of the notes, or for recourse on any one besides the makers of them. *Held*, that, under the circumstances, neither the executor individually, nor the estate he represented was liable on the indorsement, which must be regarded as nothing more than a mere transfer of the right of action on the notes.³

§ 701 *a*. *In the seventh place, as to joint indorsements.*—If a bill or note be made payable to several persons not partners, the transfer can only be made by a joint indorsement of all of them; ⁴ and as Chitty says, “If a bill has been trans-

¹ Fassin v. Hubbard, 55 N. Y. 470 (1874).

² Leland v. Parriott, 35 Iowa, 454.

³ Wade v. Wade, 36 Tex. 529.

⁴ See *ante*, § 684, *post*, § 704; also § 668; Story on Bills, § 197. Edwards on Bills, 254.

ferred to several persons not in partnership, the right to transfer is in all collectively, and not in any one individually.”¹ Where, however, one of two or more joint payees, or transferees undertake to transfer the instrument, the extent of the transfer will depend upon the nature of his interest. Such interest whatever it is passes to his indorsee or assignee; but nothing beyond that, as against his co-party, unless indeed there be some other element in the transaction in the nature of fraud, agency, or other circumstance, modifying the rights of the parties.² No action could be maintained on the indorsement of one of the joint parties,³ the interest passing thereby being equitable merely.

§ 702. *Forms of indorsements.*—The following are samples of the different modes or forms of indorsements:

1 Indorsement in full by payee to a copartnership.

“*Pay Charles Davis & Co., or order.*”

“*Abraham Coles.*”

2. Absolute indorsement in blank by indorsee :

“*Charles Davis & Co.*”

3. Indorsement upon a condition precedent :

“*Pay to Edward Francis, or order, provided he arrives at twenty-one years of age.*”

“*Abraham Coles.*”

4. Indorsement upon a condition subsequent :

“*Pay George Henry, or order, unless before maturity I notify you to the contrary.*”

“*Edward Francis.*”

5. Indorsement by an agent :

“*Per procuration Edward Francis.*”

“*Isaac Jacobs.*”

or,—

“*As agent for Edward Francis.*”

“*Isaac Jacobs.*”

6. Restrictive indorsement :

“*Pay to Kenneth Lampkin only.*”

“*Isaac Jacobs.*”

or,—

“*Pay to Kenneth Lampkin for my use.*”

“*Isaac Jacobs.*”

¹ Chitty on Bills (13th Am. ed.) [*201], 232.

² Brown v. Dickinson, 27 Grat. 693, Staples J.

³ Caverick v. Vickery, 2 Doug. 652.

7. Restrictive indorsement for collection :

“ *Pay to Central City National Bank for collection.*

“ *Kenneth Lampkin.*”

8. Indorsement without recourse :

“ *Moses Newcomb,*

without recourse.”

or,—

“ *Moses Newcomb, with intent to transfer title only, and not to incur liability as indorser.*”

9. Indorsement in full, with direction *au besoin* :

“ *Pay to Richard Steele, or order.*

“ *Oliver Perry.*”

“ *Au besoin,*

“ *No. 100 Wall St.*”

10. Indorsement waiving protest :

“ *Return without protest,*” or, “ *waiving protest.*”

“ *Thomas Urquhart.*”

§ 703. (8) *In the eighth place, as to successive indorsements.*

—When several persons indorse a bill or negotiable note in succession, the legal effect is to subject them as to each other in the order they indorse. The indorsement imports a several and successive, and not a joint obligation, whether the indorsements be made for accommodation or for value received, unless there be an agreement *aliunde* different from that evidenced by the indorsements. The indorsers for accommodation may make an agreement to be jointly and equally bound, but whoever asserts such an agreement must prove it. In cases, therefore, in which no such agreement is proved, the indorsers are not bound to contribution amongst themselves, but each and all are liable to those who succeed them.

This doctrine rests upon very clear and satisfactory principles. Each indorser places his name upon the instrument, whether for accommodation or otherwise, knowing that he renders himself conditionally liable to every subsequent and successive indorsee; and that he has his recourse against every antecedent party, for the whole amount which he may be obliged to pay. With such knowledge of his liabilities and his remedies he voluntarily assumes his relation to the instrument with others who assume a different relation, ac-

accompanied by increased or diminished risk of loss. And contribution does not arise between such successive indorsers by operation of law, but only when established by special agreement.¹ Where there are two accommodation indorsers of a note, and the maker provides the second indorser with the means to make payment, a trust is created in favor of the first indorser as well as the holder to have the fund so applied, and the first indorser may sue to enforce it.²

§ 704. The indorser is not necessarily bound according to the actual date of indorsation, but according to the contract; and if it appear that the instrument was indorsed by one party with the agreement that another should become prior indorser, the latter will be held responsible first in point of contract though second in point of time.³

Where a note is indorsed by payee and by a third party, the legal inference is that the payee is prior indorser, but it may be proved otherwise by parol evidence.⁴ And if there be any mistake by which one indorser signs before another, the true intention of the parties may, as between themselves, be shown by parol evidence, and corrected in equity;⁵ or in

¹ *Hogue v. Davis*, 8 Grat. 4; *Bank U. S. v. Beirne*, 1 Grat. 265; *Farmers' Bank v. Vanmeter*, 4 Rand. 553; *Chalmers v. McMurdo*, 5 Munf. 552; *McCarty v. Roots*, 21 How. 432; *Rey v. Simpson*, 22 Id. 350; *McDonald v. Magruder*, 3 Pet. 470; *Clapp v. Rice*, 13 Gray, 403; *Gore v. Wilson*, 40 Ind. 206; *Ross v. Espy*, 66 Penn. St. 481; *Shaw v. Knox*, 98 Mass. 214; *Smith v. Merrill*, 54 Me. 48; *Syme v. Brown*, 19 La. Ann. 147; *McCune v. Belt*, 45 Mo. 174; *Moody v. Findley*, 43 Ala. 167; *Woodward v. Severance*, 7 Allen, 340; *Kirkner v. Conklin*, 40 Conn. 81; *Easterly v. Barber*, 66 N. Y. 433; *Coolidge v. Wiggins*, 62 Maine, 568. In *Givens v. Merchants' Nat. Bank*, 85 Ill. 443, where after the payee's name indorsed in the note, there were the names of two other parties indorsed in blank, the Court said that this, "instead of raising the presumption that the undertaking was joint, authorizes the presumption that it was not joint, but that of successive indorsers."

² *Price v. Trusdell*, 28 N. G. (Eq.) 20.

³ *Chalmers v. McMurdo*, 5 Munf. 552; *Slack v. Kirk*, 67 Penn. St. 380.

⁴ *Slagle v. Rust*, 4 Grat. 274; *Caddy v. Sheppard*, 12 Wis. 639.

⁵ *Cabal v. Frierson*, 3 Humph. 411; *Brockway v. Comparree*, 11 Humph. 355. A third indorser having indorsed a note on the faith of the solvency of a prior indorser, and on a renewal of the note the order of the indorsements having been changed without the consent of this third indorser, who for the convenience of renewing the note, left his blank indorsement with the makers; a court of

a suit against the indorser who appears as prior, he may show that he signed above the second indorser unintentionally, and if he has paid part of the amount to the holder, he may recover it back from the indorser, apparently second, but really prior.¹

The parties will not be regarded as successive indorsers where they are joint payees of a note, and themselves indorse it. In such a case it matters not which signs first, the note being payable only to their joint order, and transferable only by their joint act, they will be considered joint indorsers.²

§ 705. (9) *In the ninth place, as to irregular indorsements.*—There are some cases of irregular indorsements that call for attention. Thus, suppose a bill be indorsed specially to A., and then, before A.'s indorsement, there appears the indorsement of B. In such a case, Alderson, B., said: "The indorsement only operates as against the party making it, and then as a fresh drawing."³ Upon such an indorsement of a note, the party cannot be sued as a maker. Littledale, J., said, in such a case: "It may be correct to say, that an indorsement of a bill is in the nature of a new drawing. But supposing the indorser of a bill to be strictly in the situation of a drawer, it does not follow that the indorser of a note is a maker." It was held, therefore, that the party must be sued as an indorser; but that a prior party could not be sued at all, as a link in the chain of title was lacking.⁴

§ 706. In the United States Supreme Court it has been held that where a promissory note was payable to the order of several persons, the name of one of whom was inserted by mistake, or inadvertently left on when the note was indorsed

equity will relieve him as against the indorser who should have preceded him. So held in *Slagle v. Rust*, 4 Grat. 274; *Slagle v. Bank of Valley*, Id.

¹ *Slack v. Kirk*, 67 Penn. St. 380.

² *Lane v. Stacy*, 8 Allen, 41. See *Culver v. Leovy*, 19 La. An. 202, and *ante*, §§ 70, 684.

³ *Penny v. Innes*, 1 Crompt. Mees. & Ros. 439, s. c. 5 Tyr. 107; see *Birchard v. Bartlett*, 14 Mass. 279.

⁴ *Gwinnell v. Herbert*, 5 Ad. & El. 430 (31 E. C. L. R.)

and delivered by the real payees, one of whom was also the maker of the note, the indorsee had a right to recover upon the note, although the names of all the payees were not upon the indorsement, and had a right also to prove the facts by evidence.¹ In Michigan, where G. made a note payable to the order of J., and while it was unindorsed by G. procured M. to indorse it, agreeing to procure the indorsement of G. the payee before negotiating it; and then transferred it to the plaintiff without procuring J.'s indorsement, it was held that M. was not bound as indorser.²

SECTION IV.

WHETHER OR NOT THE PARTY IS INDORSER, MAKER OR GUARANTOR.

§ 707. There is no doubt that, if a note be made payable to the order of the payee, and is indorsed by him, that his liability will be that of an indorser, and not that of a maker.³ If subsequent to his name, there appears the name of another person indorsed upon it, such person cannot be regarded in any other light than as an indorser, and no parol evidence will be admissible, as against a *bona fide* holder without notice, to show that he intended to bind himself in a different character. This view of the law rests upon the fact that there is no ambiguity in the position of his name, and none in his relation to subsequent parties to the instrument. Upon its face, the instrument evidences that he intended to bind himself as an indorser, for it purports to have been regularly transferred to him, by the payee's indorse-

¹ Pease v. Dwight, 6 How. 190.

² Gibson v. Miller, 29 Mich. 355 (1874), Graves, C. J.: "In receiving it as it then was, and without indorsement by the payee, he (the holder) accepted paper which he was bound to know would be open in his hands, when thus irregularly taken, to any defense of the nature of that made here, which Miller might make to it." See also Morton v. Preston, 18 Mich. 60; Lancaster Nat. Bank v. Taylor, 100 Mass. 18; Whistler v. Forster, 18 C. B. (N. S.) 248; 1 American Rep's 71.

³ Finley v. Green, 85 Ill. 535, Breese, J.: "He being the payee of the note could not at the same time be the maker, and be bound by a promise to pay himself."

ment, and by him transferred, by his own indorsement, to the indorsee. And unless he has indicated an intention to become liable as a surety or guarantor, by some expression to that effect, he will very clearly be bound as an indorser, and be entitled to require demand and notice as a condition precedent to his determinate liability.¹ And, in like manner, if the note be payable to bearer either in terms or becomes so in effect by being made payable to the maker's order, and then being indorsed by him, in either case the party who places his name on the back of it will be deemed an indorser only.² Such a case as this, as said by Bigelow, J., in *Massachusetts*,³ in a case where the note was payable to and indorsed by the maker, "does not fall within that anomalous class of cases where a third person, neither maker nor payee, puts his name on the back of a note before its indorsement by the payee, but is the ordinary case of an indorsement of a note payable to bearer, the effect of which cannot be varied or controlled by parol proof." And so, if he indorses before the payee, but the payee afterward indorse over his name, the third party is then deemed liable as an indorser, and his liability as such cannot be altered by parol evidence.⁴

§ 708. In New York, where P. made a note payable to S. or bearer, with a view of borrowing money from him, and before delivery it was indorsed thus: "J. I. H., backer, Schoharie," it was held that J. I. H. seemed "to have added the word 'backer' for the purpose of declaring still more explicitly that he was not to be regarded as an indorser."⁵ And it has been also held, in the same State, that the addition of the words "surety" or "security," by the indorsers of a note, to their names, does not divest them of their character as indorsers. The only effect is to give them the privilege of

¹ *Roberts v. Masters*, 40 Ind. 463; *Vore v. Hurst*, 13 Ind. 551; *Dale v. Moffitt*, 22 Ind. 114; *Clapp v. Rice*, 13 Gray, 403; *Moies v. Bird*, 11 Mass. 436; *Howe v. Merrill*, 5 Cush. 80; *Rickey v. Dameron*, 48 Mo. 61.

² *Camden v. M'Koy*, 3 Scam. 437.

³ *Bigelow v. Colton*, 13 Gray, 309.

⁴ *Clapp v. Rice*, 13 Gray, 403; *Redfield & Bigelow's Leading Cases*, 131.

⁵ *Seabury v. Hungerford*, 2 Hill, 80 (1841), *Bronson, J.*

sureties, in addition to their rights as indorsers. As indorsers they could not be made liable without demand and notice; as sureties they were entitled to all the privileges of that character.”¹

§ 709. *Whether or not one not payee writing his name on back of paper before him is an indorser.*—When a note is made payable to the order of the payee, and the name of another appears indorsed in blank upon it, and was then indorsed before the note was delivered to, or indorsed by the payee, a very different question, and one upon which the authorities are very much at issue, arises. In such cases such person does not appear upon the face of the paper to have held, and to have transferred the title, but rather to have placed his name upon its back to add strength and credit to it, and thus render it more easy of circulation; and the inquiry is presented whether he intended to bind himself for its payment as a joint maker or surety, as a guarantor, or only as an indorser, whose liability can only be fixed by due demand and notice.

If the note be not negotiable, it is plain that such party cannot be regarded as an indorser, for the simple reason that there is no such thing as an “indorsement,” in its strict and proper commercial sense, of any other than negotiable paper.²

§ 710. When the note is negotiable the question is by no means capable of such easy and satisfactory solution, but whatever diversities of interpretation may be found in the authorities on the subject, they very generally concur, though not with entire unanimity, that, as between the immediate parties, the interpretation ought to be in every case such as will carry their intention into effect, and that their intention may be made out by parol proof of the facts and circum-

¹ *Bradford v. Corey*, 5 Barb. 461 (1849). To same effect, see *Kamm v. Holland*, 2 Oregon, 59 (1863); see on this subject Chapter XLI, on Principal and Surety, Vol. 2.

² *Watson v. Hurt* 6 Grat. 644; *Hall v. Newcomb*, 7 Ill. 416; *Griswold v. Slocum*, 10 Barb. 402; *Orrick v. Colston*, 7 Grat. 189; *Commonwealth v. Powell*, 11 Grat. 826; *Comparree v. Brockway*, 11 Humph. 358; *Fear v. Dunlap*, 1 Greene (Iowa), 324; *Gorman v. Ketchum*, 33 Wis. 427.

stances which took place at the time of the transaction.¹ If the person who places his name on the back of the note before the payee intended at the time to be bound to the payee only as a guarantor of the maker, he shall not be deemed to be a joint promisor, or an absolute promisor to the payee.² If he intended to bind himself as a surety or joint maker of the note, he will not be permitted to claim afterward that he was only a guarantor.³ And if he intended to be bound only as an indorser, the better opinion is that this also may be shown as between him and the payee.⁴

§ 711. The ground upon which parol proof of intention and agreement in such cases is admitted is, that the position of the name upon the paper is one of ambiguity in itself—that it is not a complete contract, as is the case of an indorsement by the payee, which imports a distinct and certain liability; but rather evidence of authority to write over it the contract that was entered into; and that parol proof merely discloses and brings to light the terms of the unwritten contract that was made between the parties.

§ 712. Whether or not there is the same liberty in the use of parol proof when the note has been passed to a *bona fide* holder for value, and without notice, is a question upon

¹ Good v. Martin, 95 U. S. (5 Otto) 95 (1877); Sylvester v. Downer, 20 Vt. 355 (1848); Quin v. Sterne, 26 Ga. 224 (1858); Chaddock v. Van Ness, 35 N. J. Law, 571. *Held*, that such a signature imports no implied or commercial contract whatever, but it may be shown by parol what was intended. Jennings v. Thomas, 13 Smedes & M. 617; Comparree v. Brockway, 11 Humph. 358; Ives v. Bosley, 35 Md. 262; Nurre v. Chittenden, 56 Ind. 465; Iser v. Cohen, 57 Tenn. 421.

² Camden v. McKoy, 3 Scam. 437 (1842); Seymour v. Farrell, 51 Mo. 95.

³ Rey v. Simpson, 22 How. 341; Walz v. Alback, 37 Md. 404.

In Scotland, if one not payee indorse a bill in his own name, he is liable as a new acceptor; and if such a person indorse a note, he is liable as a joint maker. Thomson on Bills (Wilson's ed.) 174.

⁴ Mammon v. Hartman, 51 Mo. 169. Wagner, J.: "When a party writes his name on the back of a note, of which he is neither payee nor indorsee, in the absence of extrinsic evidence, he is to be treated as the maker thereof. But parol evidence is admissible to show that he did not sign as maker, but as indorser. Lewis v. Harvey, 18 Mo. 474; Western Boatmen's Benevolent Ass'n v. Wolff, 45 Mo. 104; Kuntz v. Tempel, 48 Mo. 71.

which the authorities are by no means so uniform. Some of them confine parol proof to cases in which the note is still in the hands of the original party to whom it was first delivered as a valid instrument;¹ but others declare that it is equally competent in a suit by a *bona fide* holder, on the ground that a contract is ambiguous; and that whenever a written contract is presented for construction, and its terms are ambiguous or indefinite, it is always allowable to weigh its language in connection with the surrounding circumstances, in order to reach the true intention of the parties.² In a recent case before the U. S. Supreme Court, where the question arose between a *bona fide* indorsee and the original party so signing his name, the Court, while recognizing "irreconcilable conflict" of the authorities, said: "But there is one principle upon the subject almost universally admitted by them all, and that is, that the interpretation of the contract ought in every case to be such as will carry into effect the intention of the parties, and in most cases it is admitted that proof of the facts and circumstances which took place at the time of the transaction are admissible to aid in the interpretation of the language employed."³

§ 713. When nothing appears but the instrument itself, bearing a third person's name before the payee's, in a suit by an indorsee of the payee, the question next arises, what is to be presumed to have been the contract and liability of such person? It will be presumed, in the first place, from the fact that the name is before that of the payee in order, that it was placed there before his in point of time, and was placed upon the note in its inception with a view to strengthening its credit with the payee, and inducing him to take it;⁴

¹ *Houston v. Bruner*, 39 Ind. 383; *Whitehouse v. Hansen*, 42 N. H. 18; *Schneider v. Schiffman*, 20 Mo. 571.

² *Gresnough v. Smead*, 3 Ohio St. 415. See *Rey v. Simpson*, 22 How. 341.

³ *Good v. Martin*, 95 U. S. (5 Otto) 95 (1877.) See *Cavazos v. Trevino*, 6 Wall. 773; *Denton v. Peters*, 5 Q. B. 475.

⁴ *Union Bank v. Willis*, 8 Metc. 504 (1844); *Western Boatmen's, &c. Ass'n v. Wolff*, 45 Mo. 104 (1869).

and for the reason, heretofore stated, that such third person never was the legal holder of the paper, it is held by a number of authorities that he cannot be deemed an indorser, and must be regarded *prima facie* as a joint maker.¹ By

¹ *Sylvester v. Downer*, 20 Vt. 355 (1848); *Union Bank v. Willis*, 8 Metc. 504 (1844); *Drapèr v. Weld*, 13 Gray, 580; *Hawkes v. Phillips*, 7 Gray, 284. In *National Pemberton Bank v. Longee*, 108 Mass. 371, the note ran "we, A. & B., as principal, and C. & P. as surety, promise to pay to the order of ourselves, &c." It was signed on the face by A. & B. only, and was indorsed by A., B., C. & D. Held, that D.'s liability was that of surety and joint promisor. *Perkins v. Barstow*, 9 R. I. 507; *Baker v. Robinson*, 63 N. C. 191; *Robinson v. Bartlett*, 11 Minn. 410; *Massey v. Turner*, 2 Hous. (Del.) 79; *Weatherwax v. Paine*, 2 Mich. 555; *Childs v. Wyman*, 44 Me. 433; *Martin v. Boyd*, 11 N. H. 385; *Carpenter v. Oaks*, 10 Rich. (S. C.) 17; *Peckham v. Gilman*, 7 Minn. 449; *McComb v. Thompson*, 2 Id. 139; *Schley v. Merrit*, 37 Md. 352; *Norris v. Despard*, 18 Md. 491; *Walz v. Alback*, 37 Md. 404; *Ives v. Bosley*, 35 Md. 262; *Houghton v. Ely*, 26 Wis. 181. In *Commonwealth v. Powell*, 11 Grat. 828, Lee, J., said: "If a third party put his name in blank upon the back of a negotiable promissory note made payable to another party, and to which he is a stranger, while the same remains in the hands of the maker he will be presumed, in the absence of controlling proof to the contrary, to have intended to give the note credit and currency; and if the indorsement was at the time of the making of the note, he may be treated by the payee as an original promisor, or joint maker of the note. If the indorsement were after the date of the note, however long, the payee may treat him as a guarantor, and may write over the signature a guaranty consistent with the nature of the case. And the fair and reasonable if not necessary inference from cases which have occurred in this court will bring us to the same result." See *Douglas v. Scott*, 8 Leigh, 43; *Watson v. Hurt*, 6 Grat. 633; *Orrick v. Colston*, 7 Grat. 189; *Woodward v. Foster*, 18 Grat. 213; *Mammon v. Hartman*, 51 Mo. 168; *Rotschild v. Grive*, 31 Mich. 150 (1875); *McGee v. Connor*, 1 Utah, 92; *Woodman v. Boothy*, 66 Me. 389 (1876); *Gilpin v. Marley*, 4 Houston, 284; *Schneider v. Schiffman*, 20 Mo. 571. In this case the note was payable to P. Burg or order, and by him indorsed to plaintiff. Schiffman's name appeared on the back before Burg's. The Court said: "Negotiable paper, it is said, carries its own history upon its face, so that nothing can be alleged against it, while it continues in circulation undishonored, as against an innocent purchaser, other than what is there apparent. This defendant has placed his name upon the note in such position as, under our law, to impose upon himself the obligations of a maker, and he is irrevocably bound as such to all who take the note for value and without notice, upon the faith of what they find upon it, although it is otherwise with reference to those who are bound by the real transaction between the parties. It is no answer to this to say that it was the duty of the holder, when he saw the position of the defendant's name upon the note, to have inquired into the matter, and satisfied himself before he took it whether the party was to be considered chargeable as maker, or only as indorser. The policy of the law in reference to negotiable paper requires that it shall tell its own story,

others it is held that he is *prima facie* a surety or guarantor, using those terms as the equivalent of joint maker.¹ Others consider that he is *prima facie* only secondarily liable as a guarantor;² while very many regard him as assuming the liability of a second indorser.³ The rule in New York has

and have effect in the hands of innocent holders for value according to what appears upon it." *Semple v. Turner*, 65 Mo. 696. See also *Seymour v. Farrell*, 51 Mo. 95; *Good v. Martin*, 2 Col. T. 218, approved by U. S. Supreme Courts in *Good v. Martin*, 95 U. S. (5 Otto) 90 (1877); *Cohn v. Dutten*, 60 Mo. 297; *Martin v. Cole*, 3 Col. 139; *Best v. Hoppie*, 3 Col. 139.

¹ *Cook v. Southwick*, 9 Tex. 615; *Carr v. Rowland*, 14 Tex. 275; *McGuire v. Bosworth*, 1 La. Ann. 248; *Killian v. Ashley*, 24 Ark. 512; *Chandler v. Westfall*, 30 Tex. 477.

² *Camden v. McCoy*, 3 Scam. (Ill.) 437, Douglas, J. [In California he is deemed a guarantor, but a guarantor is entitled to prompt notice. *Ford v. Henderson*, 34 Cal. 673; *Geiger v. Clark*, 13 Id. 579; *Riggs v. Waldo*, 2 Id. 485.] *Cushman v. Dement*, 4 Scam. 497; *Carroll v. Weld*, 13 Ill. 482; *Klein v. Currier*, 14 Ill. 237; *Webster v. Cobb*, 17 Ill. 459; *White v. Weaver*, 41 Ill. 409; *Lincoln v. Hinsey*, 51 Ill. 437; *Clark v. Merriam*, 25 Conn. 576; *Dietrich v. Mitchell*, 43 Ill. 40; *Parkhurst v. Vail*, 73 Ill. 343; *Glickauf v. Kaufman*, 73 Ill. 378; *Boyn-ton v. Pierce*, 79 Ill. 145, where it was held that an indorsement in blank before the payee is authority to the holder to fill up the blank with a guaranty. *Stowell v. Raymond*, 83 Ill. 120; *Fuller v. Scott*, 8 Kansas, 32; *Van Doren v. Tjader*, 1 Nev. 380; *Robinson v. Abell*, 17 Ohio St. 36; *Seymour v. Mickey*, 15 Ohio St. 515.

³ *Eilbert v. Finkbeimer*, 68 Penn. St. 247 (1871), Sharswood, J.: "Nobody ever doubted that when a man puts his name on the back of negotiable paper before the payee has indorsed it, he means to pledge, in some shape, his responsibility for the payment of it; *Kyner v. Shower*, 1 Har. 446. This court finally settled, that in the absence of legal evidence of any different contract, he assumes the position of a second indorser; and that, to render his engagement binding as to any holder of the note, the implied condition that the payee shall indorse before him must be complied with, so as to give him recourse against such payee. *Shafer v. The Farmers' and Mechanics' Bank*, 9 P. F. Smith, 144. Prior to January 1st, 1856, when the act of April 26th, 1855, Pamph. L. 308, went into effect, it could have been shown by parol evidence that the intention of the irregular indorser was to guarantee the payment of the note to the payee. *Leech v. Hill*, 4 Watts, 448; *Taylor v. McCune*, 1 Jones, 460. The act of 1855, by providing that no action shall be brought 'whereby to charge the defendant upon any special promise to answer for the debt or default of another, unless the agreement upon which such action shall be brought, or some memorandum or note thereof, shall be in writing, and signed by the party to be charged therewith, or some other person by him authorized,' made parol evidence of such a guaranty unlawful. *Jack v. Morrison*, 12 Wright, 113. But surely, under the statute, a memorandum in writing signed by the party is admissible, to show that the agreement upon which the indorsement was made was a guaranty that the note should be

been thus recently stated by Church, C. J.: "In this State it has been repeatedly held, and is too strongly settled by au-

paid to the payee; and not that the payee should stand between the indorser and ultimate responsibility." *Fear v. Dunlap*, 1 Greene (Iowa), 335.

In New York, the earlier cases of *Herrick v. Carman*, 12 Johns, 159; *Campbell v. Butler*, 14 Johns. 349, and others maintained a different doctrine, but now in that State such a party is regarded as an indorser; and in *Cottrell v. Conklin*, 4 Duer. 45, *Campbell, J.*, said that they "stood upon no ground of principle, and must now be regarded as corrected and exploded." To the same effect, see *Spies v. Gilmore*, 1 Com. 321; *Ellis v. Brown*, 6 Barb. 282; *Waterbury v. Sinclair*, 26 Barb. 455; *Phelps v. Vischer*, 50 N. Y. 69; *Edwards on Bills*, 274.

In *Hall v. Newcomb*, 7 Hill, 416, it appeared that Peter Farmer made a promissory note to Samuel Hall, the plaintiff, payable to his order, on demand, with interest, on the back of which note the defendant indorsed his name in blank, at the request of Farmer, to enable him to get the money. It was held that he was to be regarded as an indorser. The Court said: "The question for our consideration is, whether a person who puts his name in blank upon the back of a negotiable note, which is drawn in a form that he may be charged as indorser in the usual mode, if a demand is made and notice given of non-payment, can be charged as a general surety, without such demand and notice, by parol evidence morely.

"The courts have gone far enough in repealing the statute to prevent frauds and perjuries, by introducing parol evidence to charge a mere surety for the principal debtor, by showing that his written agreement means something else than what, upon its face, it purports to mean. And I fully concur in the opinion expressed by Mr. Justice Bronson, in *Seabury v. Hungerford*, 2 Hill, 80, that where a man writes his name in blank upon the back of a negotiable promissory note, he only agrees that he will pay the note to the holder, on receiving due notice that the maker, upon demand made at the proper time, has neglected to pay it. Mere proof that he indorsed the paper, to enable the maker to raise money on it, does not change the nature of his legal liability as indorser, where the note is in the hands of a *bona fide* holder for a good consideration. Such was the whole effect of the parol proof in this case. And for the courts to allow proof by parol to charge a mere surety, beyond the legal effect of his written blank indorsement on such paper, would bring them in direct conflict with the provisions of the statute of frauds." 2 Rev. Sts. 145, § 2, sub. 2.

"Here there was no difficulty in charging Newcomb as indorser of the note in favor of Hall, from whom it appears the maker intended to get the \$250, to enable him to take up a former note. It does not appear in this case whether the former note had been protested, so as to charge Newcomb as indorser or not, or who was the holder of that note. All that appears is, that Newcomb knew that Hall would lend Farmer the \$250, to enable him to take it up, and that Newcomb indorsed this note for Farmer as a mere accommodation indorser, when the name of Hall, to whose order the note was made payable, was not indorsed thereon. Where a note is made payable to an individual or his order, and is indorsed by him in blank, and in that situation is presented to another person for his accommodation indorsement, who indorses it accordingly,

thority to be disturbed, that a person making such an indorsement is presumed to have intended to become liable as second indorser, and that on the face of the paper without explanation he is to be regarded as second indorser, and of course not liable upon the note to the payee, who is supposed to be the first indorser. As the paper itself furnishes only *prima facie* evidence of this intention, it is competent to rebut the presumption by parol proof that the indorsement was made to give the maker credit with the payee. Such among others was the case of *Moore v. Cross*, 19 N. Y. 227, where the indorsement was made to enable the maker to purchase coal of the payee; and it was held that the person making it was liable as first indorser, and that the payee could maintain an action against him upon the note, or if the payee transferred it, he might indorse it without recourse."¹

the legal effect of his indorsement is to make him liable in the character of second indorser merely; and he can, in no event, be made legally liable to the first indorser. And if the maker, or the first indorser, or any other person into whose hands the note might subsequently come, should, without the consent of the second indorser, fill up the first indorsement specially, without recourse, to such first indorser, so as to deprive the second indorser of his remedy over, in case he should be compelled to pay the note, it would be a gross fraud upon him, if not a forgery. But when such a note is presented to the accommodation indorser, and is indorsed by him without having been previously indorsed by the person to whose order the same is made payable, the latter may, at the time he puts his indorsement upon it, indorse it specially, without recourse, to himself, so as to leave the second indorser liable to any person into whose hands it may subsequently come for a good consideration, and without any remedy over against the first indorser. Or, if the object of the second indorser was to enable the drawer, as in this case, to obtain money from the payee of the note, upon the credit of such accommodation indorser, he may indorse it in the same way, without recourse, and by such indorsement may either make it payable to the second indorser or to the bearer. And such original payee may then, as the legal holder and owner of the note, recover thereon against such second indorser, upon a declaration stating such special indorsement by him, and subsequent indorsement of the note to him by the second indorser. Or he may recover on the common money counts, under the statute, by serving a copy of the note and of the indorsements so made thereon, with his declaration. But as the second indorser, if he has not waived notice of the demand of, and non-payment by, the maker, cannot be made liable upon his indorsement, without proof of such demand and notice, the plaintiff, at the trial, must prove the same, or he cannot recover." See *Woodruff v. Leonard*, 1 Hun, 632 (8 N. Y. S. C. R.) 69; *Brinkley v. Boyd*, 9 Heisk. 149.

¹ *Coulter v. Richmond*, 59 N. Y. 479 (1874); *Phelps v. Vischer*, 50 N. Y. 71

§ 714. It would seem to us that such a party ought to be regarded as a first indorser. If he intended to be a second indorser, he should have refrained from putting his name on the note until it was first indorsed by the payee. By placing it first he enables the payee to place his own afterward; and *prima facie* the facts would seem to indicate such intention. There is nothing in the objection that there is no title in him to indorse away. Prior parties could not be sued without the payee's indorsement; but he being an indorser can be sued by any one deriving title under him. In fact, his position seems to render his liability strictly analogous to that of the drawer of a bill upon the maker in favor of the payee; and so to regard him simplifies, as it seems to us, a question which, unless such analogy be followed, is exceedingly complicated and difficult.¹ The Supreme Court of the United States has recently held that such party is presumably bound as a joint maker.²

§ 715. What parol evidence determines the liability of the person signing before the payee is also a matter upon which opinion is diverse. Many authorities take the ground that when it appears that the note was intended for the payee, or that the name was placed upon the back of the note before its delivery to the payee, that circumstance fixes the liability contracted as that of joint maker,³ and excludes

(1872). See *Paine v. Noelke*, 53 Howard Pr. R. 273. In *Nurre v. Chittenden*, 56 Ind. 465, it is said: "By placing his name upon the back of the note, Nurre became liable as indorser, and nothing more." See also *Bronson v. Alexander*, 43 Ind. 244; *Roberts v. Masters*, 4 Ind. 460.

¹ See *Penny v. Innes*, 1 Crompt. M. & R. 439; *Gwinnell v. Herbert*, 5 Ad. & El. 430 (31 E. C. L. R.)

² *Good v. Martin*, 95 U. S. (5 Otto) 92 (1877.)

³ *Good v. Martin*, 95 U. S. (5 Otto) 94 (1877); *Way v. Butterworth*, 108 Mass. 512 (1871). *Ames, J.*, said: "If A. F. Butterworth signed his name upon the back of the note at the time when it was made, or at any time before it was delivered as a valid and binding contract to Manuel, he must be considered as an original promisor, and parol evidence would not be admissible to show that such was not his real contract. *Union Bank v. Willis*, 8 Metc. 504; *Brown v. Butler*, 99 Mass. 179. In favor of a *bona fide* holder, it is presumed that the promise of such an indorser was made at the same time with the note. This,

further inquiry. But this does not seem to us sufficient.¹ Others regard that circumstance as only determining that he cannot be held regarded as an indorser, because he could not have had title to the note as indorsee, and as leaving it open for further inquiry whether he intended to be a joint maker or a guarantor.² In some cases it is held that he will be presumed to have signed for the payee's accommodation.³ In Kentucky it has been held that proof of intention is confined to the question whether the party designed to be guarantor or indorser.⁴

Others consider that if the note was not intended for the payee, that then such party shall be regarded as an indorser.⁵

If the name were signed subsequent to the making of the note, and as an independent transaction, the signer, it has been held, is a guarantor.⁶ And this is the settled doctrine

however, is not a conclusive presumption. This defendant would have a right to show that the fact was otherwise, and that his contract was not made until after the note had taken effect as a binding contract; and if he should succeed in proving it to be so, he might either not be chargeable at all, or chargeable as surety or guarantor, according to the facts proved. *Wright v. Morse*, 9 Gray, 337. If he placed his name in blank upon the back of the note after it was given, he could not be held as an original promisor. *Mcconney v. Stanley*, 8 Cush. 85; *Courtney v. Doyle*, 10 Allen, 122. Upon the report, we cannot say that there was no evidence to rebut the presumption that his name was placed there as a part of the original transaction. It was wholly a question of fact, to be decided by the jury. It was therefore a mistake on the part of the court to rule that, as a matter of law, the defendant was liable as a joint promisor, and that the plaintiff was entitled to a verdict on that ground against this defendant. *Rey v. Simson*, 22 How. 341. Under the declaration, there is no occasion to consider whether he could be held liable as a guarantor." *Essex Co. v. Edmunds*, 12 Gray, 273; *Bigelow v. Colton*, 13 Gray, 309; *Pearson v. Stoddard*, 9 Gray, 199; *Lake v. Stetson*, 13 Gray, 310; *Good v. Martin*, 1 Col. 165; *Chaddock v. Van Ness*, 35 N. J. L. R. 518.

¹ *Price v. Lavender*, 33 Ala. 390; *Hall v. Newcomb*, 7 Hill 416; *Schneider v. Schiffman*, 20 Mo. 571; *Irish v. Cutter*, 31 Me. 536.

² *Greenough v. Smead*, 3 Ohio St. 415 (1854).

³ *Barto v. Schenck*, 4 Casey, 447; *Schollenberger v. Nehf*, 4 Casey, 189.

⁴ *Kellogg v. Dunn*, 2 Metc. (Ky.) 215.

⁵ *Greenough v. Smead*, 3 Ohio St. 415.

⁶ *Good v. Martin*, 95 U. S. (5 Otto) 95 (1877); *Benthall v. Judkins*, 13 Metc. 265; *Irish v. Cutter*, 31 Me. 536. In *Rey v. Simpson*, 22 How. 241, the U. S. Supreme Court said: "When a promissory note, made payable to a particular person or order, as in this case, is first indorsed by a third person, such third

of the U. S. Supreme Court; but with the qualification that if the note were intended for discount, and he put his name on the back of it with the understanding of all the parties that his indorsement would be inoperative until it was indorsed by the payee, he would then be liable only as a second indorser in the commercial sense, and as such would clearly be entitled to the privileges which belong to such indorsers.

§ 716. When the note is sued upon by the payee it is held that the idea of the party before him being bound as an indorser is excluded.¹ But this doctrine does not seem to us correct. The indorsement; it is true, is an irregular one; but it is quite similar to a bill drawn by the indorser on the maker, and to follow that analogy in all regards seems to us the simplest and most reasonable solution of the question. And there are a number of cases which regard such a party's liability as *prima facie* that of an indorser.² Where a note is payable to the maker's own order, it can have no validity until it is indorsed by him; and in such a case the party signing his name on the note while it is unindorsed by the

person is held to be an original promisor, guarantor or indorser, according to the nature of the transaction, and the understanding of the parties at the time the transaction took place.

"I. If he put his name at the back of the note at the time it was made, as surety for the maker and for his accommodation, to give him credit with the payee, or if he participated in the consideration for which the note was given, he must be considered as a joint maker of the note.

"II. On the other hand, if his indorsement was subsequent to the making of the note, and he put his name there at the request of the maker, pursuant to a contract with the payee for further indulgence or forbearance, he can only be held as a guarantor.

"III. But if the note was intended for discount, and he put his name on the back of it with the understanding of all the parties that his indorsement would be inoperative until it was indorsed by the payee, he would then be liable only as a second indorser in the commercial sense, and as such would be clearly entitled to the privileges which belong to such indorsers."

¹ *Quin v. Sterne*, 26 Ga. 223; *Brinkley v. Boyd*, 9 Heisk. 149.

² *Price v. Lavender*, 38 Ala. 390 (1862); *Wells v. Jackson*, 6 Blackf. 43; *Vore v. Hurst*, 13 Ind. 554; *Sill v. Leslie*, 16 Ind. 236; *Dale v. Moffitt*, 22 Ind. 114; *Roberts v. Masters*, 40 Ind. 462; *Comparree v. Brockway*, 11 Humph. 358; *Clouston v. Barbiere*, 4 Sneed, 338; *Jennings v. Thomas*, 13 Smedes & M. 617; *Kamm v. Holland*, 2 Oreg. 59.

payee is presumed to contemplate that the payee is to sign before him, and that when the note takes effect he will, he himself will appear as second indorser. All persons taking such a note are apprised of the apparent obligations of the parties, and if they rely on any other, they must ascertain and prove them.¹

If any person whose name is upon a negotiable instrument describes himself as surety, guarantor or indorser, he will thus notify all persons who may come into possession of it, of the character in which he binds himself, and as it is a written contract, no parol evidence will be permitted to qualify or vary it.²

If a note in the maker's hands payable to his own order be indorsed for his accommodation, and he substitute the indorser's name as payee, it is a material alteration.³

SECTION V.

HOW FAR PAROL EVIDENCE IS APPLICABLE TO ASCERTAINED INDORSEMENTS.

§ 717. It is a general principle of law that parol evidence is inadmissible to contradict or vary the terms of a valid written contract,⁴ but while it is conceded on all sides to be applicable to all contracts written out in full, it has been considered by some authorities not to extend to those which are raised from implication by operation of law—such as indorsements in blank.⁵ And this latter view has been adopted by

¹ *Kayser v. Hull*, 85 Ill. 513; *Blatchford v. Milliken*, 35 Ill. 434.

² *Tinker v. McCauley*, 3 Mich. 188, overruling *Higgins v. Watson*, 1 Mich. 428; *Whitehouse v. Hanson*, 42 N. H. 9.

³ *Stoddard v. Penniman*, 108 Mass. 366.

⁴ *Greenleaf on Evidence*, §§ 277, 281, 282.

⁵ *Ross v. Espy*, 66 Penn. St. 487, *Agnew, J.*: "The contract of indorsement is one implied by law for the blank indorsement, and can be qualified by express proof of a different agreement between the parties, and is not subject to the rule which excludes proof to alter or vary the terms of an express agreement." *Susquehanna Bank v. Evans*, 4 Wash. C. C. 480; *Johnson v. Martinus*, 4 Halst. 144 (but see *Chaddock v. Van Ness*, 35 N. J. L. R. 521; *Davis v. Morgan*, 64 N. C. 381; 2 *Parsons N. & B.* 519.

Byles, in his treatise on Bills, upon the authority of an English case, which does not fully bear out his interpretation of it.¹ It is true that there are some ambiguous positions in which parties' names appear on the back of negotiable instruments, which justify the introduction of parol evidence to ascertain whether or not they are indorsers. But when it appears from an inspection of the paper that the party is an indorser, there seems to us no just ground for the distinction taken between the implied contract arising from his mere name thereon written, and contracts written out *in extenso*. The indorsement seldom consists of anything more than the indorser's signature; but if the agreement imported by that signature were written over it in full, the undertaking of the indorser would not be more clearly defined than it is by the signature itself. Its presence and position upon the instrument are as plain a manifestation of the intention of the party as if it were set forth in express words, and parol evidence should not be admitted to vary or contradict it.

§ 718. For, in fact, though there be nothing but the indorser's signature, the indorser's contract is as fully expressed as that of the drawer of a bill payable to bearer. He is a new drawer on the drawee, if it be a bill; a drawer on the maker if it be a note; and the instrument itself, with his

¹ Pike v. Street, 1 Mood. & Malk, 226 (22 E. C. L. R.) In Byles on Bills (Sharswood's ed.) [*147], 267, it is said: "The contract between indorser and indorsee does not consist exclusively of the writing popularly called an indorsement. The contract consists partly of the written indorsement, partly of the delivery of the bill to the indorsee, and may also consist partly of the mutual understanding and intention with which the delivery was made by the indorser, and received by the indorsee. That intention may be collected from the words of the parties to the contract, either spoken or written, from the usage of the place, or of the trade from the course of dealing between the parties or from their relative situation." Kidson v. Dilworth, 5 Price, 564; Castrique v. Batting, 10 Moore, P. C. C. 94. See Bruce v. Wright, 3 Hun, 548 (10 N. Y. S. C. R.), where it is held that an agreement of an indorsee not to sue his indorser is admissible in evidence, and is a good defense, and that the contract between indorser and indorsee consists partly in the written indorsement, partly in the delivery of the paper to the indorsee, and partly of the actual understanding and intention with which delivery was made.

name signed as indorser, constitutes his written contract, from which he can only be absolved by failure of demand or notice, or other delinquency of the holder. The following general view may, therefore, be stated, to wit: that in an action by immediate indorsee against an indorser, no evidence is admissible that would not be admissible in a suit by a party in privity with the drawer against him. We have never seen this rule laid down in these words, and the cases exhibit a painful contrariety of opinion. But it goes toward reconciling many which have been deemed at variance, and embodies the true principle, as we conceive, of the subject. Many cases speak of an indorsement in blank as only an implied contract. This misconception often gives rise to error. It is expressed in the body of the instrument, and in the case of a bill the only difference between drawer and indorser, as a general rule, is that the drawer is an originating drawer, signing usually on the face, and the indorser, a transferring drawer, signing on the back.

§ 719. Accordingly, the indorser cannot show by parol evidence against his indorsee that it was agreed that he should not be liable, and that his indorsement was "without recourse" on him.¹ If so intended, it should be so expressed, and a drawer might as well offer evidence that the holder agreed to look only to the drawee. Nor could he show that his liability, according to agreement, was to be that of a gua-

¹ *Brown v. Spofford*, 95 U. S. (5 Otto), 483 (1877); *Eaton v. Dennis*, 42 Wis. 56; *Eaton v. McMahon*, 42 Wis. 487 (disapproving *obiter dictum* in *Merdock v. Aradt*, 1 Pin. 70); *Doolittle v. Ferry*, 20 Kan.; *Dale v. Gear*, 38 Conn. 15 (1872), s. c. 39 Conn. 89; *Law Reg. Jan. 1873*, p. 14 (Vol. 12, new series, No. 1), explaining and limiting *Downer v. Cheesebrough*, 36 Conn. 39; *Woodward v. Foster*, 18 Grat. 205; *Lee v. Pile*, 37 Ind. 107; *Campbell v. Robins*, 29 Ind. 271 (1868); *Wilson v. Black*, 6 Blackf. 509; *Odam v. Beard*, 1 Ibid. 191; *Crocker v. Getchell*, 23 Me. 392; *Barry v. Morse*, 3 N. H. 132; *Bank of Albion v. Smith*, 27 Barb. 489; *Fuller v. McDonald*, 8 Greenl. 213; *Hoare v. Graham*, 3 Camp. 57; *Bank U. S. v. Dunn*, 6 Pct. 51, *McLean, J.* In *Brown v. Spofford*, 95 U. S. (5 Otto), 481 (1877), the U. S. Supreme Court said per Clifford, J. *Contra*, *Mendenhall v. Davis*, 72 N. C. 150. In *Skinner v. Church*, 36 Iowa, 91, held such evidence is admissible between immediate parties, but not others. See *ante*, § 699.

rantor,¹ or a surety,² or a maker,³ or that his signature was written under that of the payee, merely in order to identify him;⁴ nor that it was stipulated that he was to be liable only when certain estates were sold;⁵ nor that the paper was only to be negotiated at a certain bank;⁶ nor that it was to be renewed for two months;⁷ nor that the liability was otherwise conditional or different from what the indorsement imported.

It has also been held that it cannot be shown that the indorser agreed at the time of indorsement to be absolutely liable without demand and notice;⁸ but we concur with the authorities which sustain his freedom to waive his right to demand and notice at any time.⁹ He merely relieves the indorsee of the ordinary duties of diligence. A written agreement making the indorsement "without recourse" might be shown, as between the parties;¹⁰ and also a written agreement to exhaust the mortgage before providing against the indorser.¹¹

§ 720. The language of the rule implies its limitation, for it does not extend to exclude evidence offered to show want or failure of consideration, or to impeach the original or present validity of the indorsement on the ground of fraud.¹² There are three classes of cases in which evidence for this purpose is admissible, and it will be seen that it does not contradict or vary the contract imported by the indorsement,

¹ *Howe v. Merrill*, 5 Cush. 80; *Dibble v. Duncan*, 2 McLean, 353; *Fuller v. McDonald*, 8 Greenl. 213.

² *Hauer v. Patterson*, 84 Penn. St. 275; *Barnard v. Guslin*, 23 Minn. 194.

³ *Finley v. Green*, 85 Ill. 536.

⁴ *Prescott Bank v. Caverly*, 7 Gray, 217.

⁵ *Free v. Hawkins*, 8 Taunt. 92; *Holt's R.* 550; 1 Moore, 535.

⁶ *Stubbs v. Goodall*, 4 Ga. 106.

⁷ *Hoare v. Graham*, 3 Camp. 57.

⁸ *Bank of Albion v. Smith*, 27 Barb. 489; *Barry v. Morse*, 3 N. H. 132; see *Free v. Hawkins*, 3 Camp. 57, which is quoted for this doctrine, but is not clearly in support of it by any means; *Story on Notes*, § 148; 2 *Parsons N. & B.* 520, note.

⁹ See Chapter on Excuses for want of Presentment, *ante*, and Notice, vol. 2.

¹⁰ *Davis v. Brown*, 94 U. S. (4 Otto), 423.

¹¹ *Planters' Bank v. Houser*, 57 Ga. 140.

¹² *Kirkham v. Boston*, 67 Ill. 599.

but impeaches it as a valid indorsement to the extent claimed by the indorsee. Thus, *firstly*, it may be shown that the indorsement was without consideration, as for instance that it was for the indorsee's accommodation.¹

§ 721 *Secondly*, it might be shown that the indorsement was upon trust for some special purpose, as from a principal to an agent, to enable him to use the instrument or the money in a particular way;² or for collection merely;³ or as an escrow upon an express condition that has not been complied

¹ Woodward v. Foster, 18 Grat. 205. Joynes, J., saying: "When the legal import of a contract is clear and definite, the intention of the parties is for all substantial purposes as distinctly and as fully expressed as if they had written out in words what the law implies. It is immaterial how much or how little is expressed in words if the law attaches to what is expressed a clear and definite import. Though the writing consists only of a signature, as in the case of an indorsement in blank, yet, where the law attaches to it a clear, unequivocal and definite import, the contract imported by it can no more be varied or contradicted by evidence of a contemporaneous parol agreement than if the whole contract had been fully written out in words. The mischiefs of admitting parol evidence would be the same, in such cases, as if the terms implied by law had been expressed. * * * In Pike v. Street, 1 Mood. & Malk. R. 226 (22 E. C. L. R. 299), tried before Lord Tenderden at Nisi Prius, the action was brought by the indorsee of a bill of exchange against his immediate indorser. The defense was, that though the plaintiff gave value to the defendant, it was upon a verbal agreement that he should sue the acceptor only, and that he should not sue the defendant as indorser. Lord Tenderden held that such an agreement, if proved, would be a good bar to the action. This case was cited by counsel in Foster v. Jolly, 1 C. M. & R. 703, as an authority to show that evidence of a contemporaneous parol agreement might be given to vary the written contract of an indorser. But Parke, B., said that that case fell within the cases in which the consideration is contradicted; the evidence went to show that there was no consideration as between the plaintiff and the defendant. Whether this observation was or was not justifiable by the facts of the case, it indicates the ground upon which alone, in the opinion of a judge of the greatest learning and eminence, the opinion of Lord Tenderden can be sustained." Case v. Spaulding, 24 Conn. 578; Dale v. Gear, 38 Conn. 15; Smith v. Carter, 25 Wis. 283; Denton v. Peters, 5 Q. B. L. R. 457; Chaddock v. Van Ness, 35 N. J. L. R. 520.

² Pollock v. Bradbury, 8 Moore, P. C. 227; Dale v. Gear, 38 Conn. 15; Chaddock v. Van Ness, 35 N. J. L. R. 520.

³ Lawrence v. Stonington Bank, 6 Conn. 521; Dale v. Gear, 38 Conn. 15; 39 Conn. 89; Smith v. Childress, 27 Ark. 328; Ricketts v. Pendleton, 14 Md. 320; Hill v. Ely, 5 Serg. & R. 363; Manley v. Boycot, 2 El. & Bl. 46 (75 E. C. L. R.); see also McWhirt v. McKee, 6 Kan. 412. But see Martin v. Cole, 3 Colorado, 114, where the contrary is held, Stone, J., saying that the offer to prove an in-

with.¹ In such cases the indorsement is really without a legal consideration; and the evidence does not vary its effect as to a third person, but only discloses relations of trust which might be shown against the drawer of a bill, or other party with whom the holder is in privity. Indeed, such evidence is competent even between parties to deeds absolute on their face. It has been held that it cannot be shown by parol evidence that an indorsement "for collection" was absolute, its very terms importing the restriction.²

§ 722. *Thirdly*, it may be shown that there were representations made at the time of the indorsement, which were relied on by the indorser, and which, if his liability were enforced, would operate as a fraud upon him.³ In Pennsylvania, where defendant purchased coffee of plaintiff, upon an agreement that the latter should receive certain notes in payment, without defendant assuming any responsibility, the latter handed plaintiff the notes, when he said, "Hill, you must indorse those notes." Defendant replied, "That is not our understanding." The plaintiff rejoined, "They are made payable to you; how will you convey them to me? You must indorse them, in order that I may collect them." Defendant then said, "I indorse them; but, remember, I am not to be held responsible for their payment." The Court said: "The evidence went to prove a direct fraud in obtaining the indorsements, or their perversion to a use never intended—a fraudulent purpose."⁴ This case is distinguished from those in which a mere agreement that the indorser shall not be responsible is offered to be shown, no circumstances which

dorsement in blank, was "for collection" was "an attempt to make a general indorsement a restrictive indorsement."

¹ Chaddock v. Van Ness, 35 N. J. L. R. 520; Ricketts v. Pendleton, 14 Md. 320; Goggerty v. Guthbert, 2 B. & P. N. R. 170; Wallis v. Little, 14 C. B. 369; Bell v. Lord Ingestre, 12 Q. B. 317 (64 E. C. L. R.)

² Third Nat. Bank v. Clark, 23 Minn. 263; Rock Co. Nat. Bank v. Hollister, 21 Minn. 385.

³ Kirkham v. Boston, 67 Ill. 599.

⁴ Hill v. Ely, 5 Serg. & R. 363. In New York it has been held that if there be a written or verbal agreement not to sue the indorser, it may be shown. Bruce v. Wright, 3 Hun, 548 (10 N. Y. S. C. R.); Benton v. Martin, 52 N. Y. 570.

would otherwise render the transactions fraudulent or showing a secret trust, appearing.¹ So, evidence has been held admissible to show that the indorsement was made on the indorsee's assurance that it was merely as a receipt.² And in a case (going too far, as we think) it has been held that one of two accommodation indorsers might show that only one was to be liable, and his own indorsement was required merely for formal compliance with a rule of the bank.³

§ 723. The cases prohibiting the introduction of parol evidence to vary the contract implied in an indorsement are in direct conflict with others; but there is no conflict between them and the cases which permit such evidence in order to ascertain the circumstances under which the indorsement was made, and whether or not it was accompanied by a transfer in the usual course of business. It would be useless to attempt to reconcile the authorities on the subject; but the true line of distinction which should be observed is this: when it appears that the indorsement was accompanied by a transfer for value, and is unimpeached by fraud, it imports a distinct liability, which cannot be varied; but when several indorse for accommodation, or the indorsement was made for any of the peculiar purposes which we have already described, extrinsic evidence is admissible to show them.

A parol agreement between the first and second indorser of a note by which the latter undertakes to pay the note, provided the former would deliver him goods to the amount so paid, would be valid; and is not within the statute of frauds as an undertaking to answer the debt, default, or miscarriage of another.⁴

¹ Dale v. Gear, 38 Conn. 15, is a very able and instructive case on this question, and takes this distinction. In a note in the Law Register, Judge Redfield criticises it as "thin" and untenable (Law Reg. Jan. 1873, p. 21). It is nice, undoubtedly, and difficult, perhaps, in some cases to apply; but, if not recognized, the departure should be in ruling out such evidence altogether (see s. c. 39 Conn. 30).

² Morris v. Faurot, 21 Ohio, N. S. 155.

³ Rockhill v. Moore, 1 Penn. Law Jour. Rep. 392.

⁴ Sanders v. Gillespie, 59 N. Y. 250 (1874).

SECTION VI.

THE TIME AND DATE OF TRANSFER.

§ 724. *As to time of transfer.*—Negotiable paper, whether made for accommodation or otherwise, may be transferred by indorsement or by delivery (as the case may be) either before it has fallen due or afterward.¹ Negotiable paper does not lose its negotiable character by being dishonored for non payment or non-acceptance.²

It still passes from hand to hand *ad infinitum* until paid. Moreover, the indorser, after maturity, writes in the same form, and is bound only upon the same condition of demand upon the drawer and notice of non-payment as any other indorser. The paper retains its commercial attributes, and circulates as such in the community; but there is this vital distinction between the rights of a transferee who received the paper before, and of one who received it after maturity; The transferee of negotiable paper to whom it is transferred after maturity, acquires nothing but the actual right and title of the transferrer;³ and the like rule applies to the

¹ Dehers v. Harriott, 1 Show. 163; Mitford v. Walcott, Ld. Raym. 575; Charles v. Mursden, 1 Taunt. 224; Graves v. Kay, 3 B. & Ad 313; Stein v. Yglesias, 3 Dowl. 252. The fact of its being an accommodation bill does not prevent its being negotiable when overdue. 2 Rob. Pr. (new ed.) 252. Thomson on Bills (Wilson's ed.) 178.

² Davis v. Miller, 14 Grat. 1; Baxter v. Little, 6 Metc. 7; Britton v. Bishop, 11 Vt. 70; Leavitt v. Putnam, 3 Coms. 494; Powers v. Neeson, 19 Mo. 190; Long v. Crawford, 18 Md. 320; McSherry v. Brooks, 46 Md. 118; Morgner v. Bigelow, 3 Mo. App. 592; National Bank v. Texas, 20 Wall. 72.

³ Texas v. Hardenburg, 10 Wall. 68; Murray v. Lardner, 2 Wall. 110; Smith v. Foley, 6 Wall. 492; Arents v. Commonwealth, 18 Grat. 750; Davis v. Miller, 14 Grat. 1; Clark v. Deaderick, 31 Md. 148; Merrick v. Butler, 2 Lans. (N. Y.) 103; Livermore v. Blood, 40 Mo. 48; Brainard v. Reavis, 2 Mo. App. 490; Thomas v. Kinsey, 8 Ga. 421; Fields v. Tunston, 1 Cold. 40; Barker v. Valentine, 10 Gray, 341; Flint v. Flint, 6 Allen, 34; Diamond v. Harris, 33 Tex. 634. In California it has been held that the contract of one who indorses a promissory note after it falls due, and as additional security to prevent legal proceedings from being taken against the payee and indorser, is that of a guarantor, and even if based on a valid consideration, is defective, unless the writing express the consideration. Crooks v. Tully, 50 Cal. 254.

transferee who takes the paper after a refusal to accept by the drawee, provided he had notice of such refusal.¹ In other words, the transferee of negotiable paper refused acceptance (with notice thereof), or overdue, takes it subject to all the equities with which it was encumbered in the hands of the party from whom he received it; for it comes, to use Lord Ellenborough's words, "disgraced to him." Thus, if he took it from a thief or finder, he could not recover on it, inasmuch as the thief or finder could not,² so if it were without consideration in the hands of the transferee,³ or had been paid,⁴ he could not recover. It is competent against the transferee after maturity to show any equities attaching to the paper itself, but not to show by parol evidence that it was not to be negotiated, or not sued on until a certain event, for this would be to contradict the written contract by mere parol.⁵

Where several notes are secured by mortgage, and the indorsee receives one overdue, he is not thereby affected with equities as to the other.⁶

§ 725. *Defenses subject to which the indorsee of overdue paper takes it.*—The modern English doctrine is that the indorsee of an overdue bill or note takes it subject to equities arising out of the transaction in which the instrument was executed, and existing at the time of the transfer, and not to a set-off arising out of collateral matters; in other words, he takes the paper subject to its existing equities. This doctrine was settled in England by the case of *Burrough v. Moss*, 10 Barn. & C. 558 (21 E. C. L. R. 128), 1830, and has been uniformly followed,⁷ and applies even though the in-

¹ *O'Keefe v. Dunn*, 6 Taunt. 305 (1 E. C. L. R.) 5 M. & S. 282; *Whitehead v. Walker*, 11 L. J. Exch. 168; 9 M. & W. 506; *Bartlett v. Benson*, 14 M. & W. 738.

² *Byles on Bills* (Sharswood's ed.) [*161, 162], 284.

³ *McSherry v. Brooks*, 46 Md. 118.

⁴ *Halsey v. Lange*, 28 La. Ann. 248.

⁵ *McSherry v. Brooks*, 46 Md. 118.

⁶ *Boss v. Hewitt*, 15 Wis. 260.

⁷ *Stein v. Yglesias*, 1 Crompt. M. & R. 565; *Holmes v. Kidd*, 28 L. J. 113; 3 H. & N. 891; *Whitehead v. Walker*, 10 Mees. & Wel. 696; *Edwards on Bills*, 259.

dorsee had notice, gave no consideration, and took the paper on purpose to defeat the set-off.¹ But no equity arising after the transfer can affect the holder.²

The doctrine of *Burrough v. Moss* has been followed in most of the United States in which the question has been presented, as remarked in Virginia, and may be considered a fixed principle of commercial law.³ In Mississippi it has been held that one who bought a bill or note after maturity, for value and without notice, was not bound by any secret equity in favor of a third person not connected with the legal title; as, for instance, the interest of a beneficiary in a note which a trustee has sold in violation of his trust.⁴

§ 726. The general rule, that the purchaser of overdue paper can stand in no better position than his transferrer, does not apply so far as to invalidate bills and notes drawn, indorsed, or accepted for accommodation, overdue at the time they are negotiated or transferred, it being considered that parties to accommodation paper hold themselves out to the public, by their signatures, to be bound to every person who shall take the same for value, the same as if it were paid to themselves.⁵ And the fact that the purchaser knew that the

¹ Byles on Bills (Sharswood's ed.) [*263], 286; *Oulds v. Harrison*, 24 L. J. Exch. 66, s. c. 10 Exch. 572.

² *Fields v. Tanston*, 1 Cold. 40; *Baxter v. Little*, 6 Metc. 7; *Heywood v. Stearns*, 39 Cal. 58; *Edwards on Bills*, 261.

³ See *Davis v. Miller*, 14 Grat. 8; also, 1 Rob. Prac. (new ed.) 252; *Annon v. Houck*, 4 Gill, 332; *Hughes v. Large*, 2 Barr. 103; *Epler v. Fank*, 8 Barr. 468; *Clay v. Cottrell*, 6 Harris, 413; *Britton v. Bishop*, 11 Vt. 70; *Barlow v. Scott*, 12 Iowa, 63; *Bates v. Kemp*, 12 Iowa, 99; *Way v. Lamb*, 15 Iowa, 79; *Arnot v. Woodburn*, 35 Mo. 99; *Gullett v. Hoy*, 15 Mo. 399; Byles on Bills (Sharswood's ed.) [*263], 286; *Flint v. Flint*, 6 Allen, 34; *Trafford v. Hall*, 7 R. I. 104; *Richards v. Daily*, 34 Iowa, 429; *Wilkinson v. Jeffers*, 30 Ga. 153; *Barker v. Valentine*, 10 Gray, 341; *Baxter v. Little*, 6 Metc. 7; *Woods v. Viozca*, 26 La. Ann. 716.

In New York, the doctrine of the text does not obtain. See *Edwards on Bills*, 260; *Driggs v. Rockwell*, 11 Wend. 504. And there are other States in which offsets stand on the same footing as equities. *Odiorne v. Woodman*, 39 N. H. 544; *Davis v. Neligh*, 7 Neb. 78.

⁴ *Hibernian Bank v. Everman*, 52 Miss. 500.

⁵ *Charles v. Marsden*, 1 Taunt. 224; *Sturtevant v. Ford*, 4 M. & G. 101 (43 E. C. L. R.); *Carruthers v. West*, 11 Q. B. 143 (63 E. C. L. R.); see *Stien v. Yglesias*, 1 C. M. & R. 565; Byles on Bills (Sharswood's ed.) [*262], 285. The earlier

paper was so drawn, indorsed, or accepted for accommodation, does not weaken his position.¹ This principle is well established in England,² and it is to be regretted that the decisions in the United States do not uniformly follow the English rule.³ In England, a plea that it was agreed by the parties that the paper should not be negotiated overdue has been held bad, knowledge of the purchaser not being alleged.⁴ If the accommodation bill or note had been paid at maturity, the position of the purchaser would be altered, for a defense is then established which goes to the merits of the case.⁵ It is a settled principle, however, that if the party who transferred the instrument to the holder acquired the note before maturity, and was himself unaffected by any infirmity in it, the holder acquires as good a title as he held, although it were overdue and dishonored at the time of transfer.⁶ Thus, it has been held that in an action by a second indorsee of a bill given for a smuggling debt, he could recover against the

authorities were otherwise, see *Tensen v. Francis*, 1 Camp. 19; *Brown v. Davis*, 3 T. R. 80; 7 T. R. 429; *Chitty on Bills* (13th Am. ed.) §47; *Story on Bills*, §192.

¹ *Charles v. Marsden*, 1 Taunt. 224; *Brown v. Mott*, 7 Johns. 361, overruled by *Chester v. Dorr*, 41 N. Y. 279. In *Redfield and Bigelow's Leading Cases*, 217, it is said: "The indorser (for accommodation) is equally bound, whether the transfer is made before or after the paper falls due, or whether the purchaser knew the indorsement was made for accommodation or not. To hold otherwise would be to encourage fraud, and to relieve the party from the very responsibility which he expected to meet, and which, upon every principle of justice and fair dealing, he should be compelled to abide by." *Powell v. Waters*, 17 Johns. 176; *Grandin v. Leroy*, 2 Paige, 509; *Bank of Ireland v. Beresford*, 6 Dow. 237.

² See the cases cited in preceding notes.

³ As dissenting from the doctrine of the text, see *Hoffman v. Foster*, 43 Penn. 137; *Bower v. Hastings*, 12 Casey, 285; *Chester v. Dorr*, 41 N. Y. 279 (overruling *Brown v. Mott*, 7 Johns. 361); *Battle v. Weems*, 44 Ala. 105.

⁴ *Carruthers v. West*, 11 Q. B. 143 (63 E. C. L. R.)

⁵ *Lazarus v. Cowie*, 3 Q. B. 459 (43 E. C. L. R.); *Parr v. Jewell*, 16 C. B. 684 (81 E. C. L. R.)

⁶ *Woodman v. Churchill*, 52 Me. 58; *Roberts v. Lane*, 64 Me. 108; *Riegel v. Cunningham*, 9 Phil. (Penn.) 177; *Bissell v. Gowdy*, 31 Conn. 48; *Wilson v. Mechanics' Sav. Bank*, 45 Penn. St. 494; *Bassett v. Avery*, 15 Ohio St. 299; *Peabody v. Rees*, 18 Iowa, 171; *Richert v. Koerner*, 54 Ill. 306; *Bradley v. Marshall*, 54 Ill. 173; *Lock v. Tulford*, 52 Ill. 166; *Howell v. Crane*, 12 La. Ann. 126; *Smith v. Hiscock*, 14 Me. 449; *Thompson v. Shepherd*, 12 Mete. 311; *Chitty on Bills* (13th Am. ed.) §250; *Fairclough v. Pavia*, 9 Exch. 690.

acceptor, although he took it overdue, his indorser having acquired it *bona fide*, without notice before it fell due.¹

§ 727. If a party indorses a bill or note "without recourse," and should re-acquire it after maturity, his ownership not arising out of, or being referable to, his previous indorsement, would stand in no higher ground than that of any other party acquiring after maturity, and equities could be pleaded against him.² In the absence of special circumstances equity will not compel the surrender of a past due note, on the ground that it was paid but not taken up, the maker having an available defense, that of payment, as against any one who might thereafter acquire it.³ But special circumstances might exist authorizing its interference to compel surrender of the paper.⁴

§ 728. *As to the date of indorsement.*—If the indorsement of a bill or note be undated, it will be presumed, when the paper is in the hands of a third party, to have been made at the time of execution, or at least before maturity and dishonor.⁵ It is difficult to see how a more definite presump-

¹ Chalmers v. Lanion, 1 Camp. 383. See *post*, §§ 782, 786, 803.

² Calhoun v. Albin, 48 Mo. 304.

³ Fowler v. Palmer, 62 N. Y. 533. See Allerton v. Belden, 49 N. Y. 373.

⁴ McHenry v. Hazard, 45 N. Y. 583.

⁵ New Orleans, &c. v. Montgomery, 95 U. S. (5 Otto) 18 (1877); Swayne, J.: "It is not shown in the proofs when the notes were transferred. * * * In the absence of such proof, the law presumes they were taken underdue, in good faith, and without notice of any infirmity attaching to them." Good v. Martin, 95 U. S. (5 Otto) 94 (1877); Collins v. Gilbert, 94 U. S. (4 Otto) 753; Frazer's Adm'r v. Frazer, 13 Bush (Ky.) 400; Cripps v. Davis, 12 M. & W. 165; Lewis v. Lady Parker, 4 Ad. & E. 838 (31 E. C. L. R.); Parkin v. Moon, 7 C. & P. 408 (32 E. C. L. R.); Snyder v. Oatman, 16 Ind. 265; Stewart v. Smith, 28 Ill. 397; Leland v. Farnham, 25 Vt. 553; Hopkins v. Kent, 17 Md. 387; McDowell v. Goldsmith, 6 Id. 319; Dickerson v. Burke, 25 Ga. 225; Webster v. Lee, 5 Mass. 334; Hendricks v. Judah, 1 Johns. 319; Pinkerton v. Bailey, 8 Wend. 600; Watson v. Flannagan, 14 Tex. 354; Mason v. Noonan, 7 Wis. 609; Smith v. Clopton, 4 Tex. 109; Barrick v. Austin, 21 Barb. 241; Mobley v. Ryan, 14 Ill. 51; Burnham v. Wood, 8 N. H. 334; Noxon v. DeWolf, 10 Gray, 346; Alexander v. Springfield, 2 Metc. (Ky.) 534; Webster v. Calden, 56 Me. 204; New Orleans Canal v. Templeton, 20 La. Ann. 75; White v. Weaver, 41 Ill. 409; Depuy v. Schuyler, 45 Ill. 506; Rhode v. Alley, 27 Tex. 443; Johnson v. Josey, 34 Tex. 533. (In Arkansas, it is held otherwise. Ruddell v. Landers, 25 Ark. 238.)

tion than that the indorsement was before maturity can be sustained, and this seems to be all that is necessary to the protection of commercial paper.¹ As said in *Ranger v. Carey*, 1 Met. 369, "a negotiable note being offered in evidence duly indorsed, the legal presumption is that such indorsement was made at the date of the note, or at least antecedently to its becoming due; and if the defendant would avail himself of any defense that would be open to him only in case the note were negotiated after it was dishonored, it is incumbent on him to show that the indorsement was in fact made after the note was overdue."

If any question should arise, however, in which the date of the indorsement during some period of the currency of the instrument was put in issue, the presumption, according to the authorities, would fix the date at the time of the execution, there being no evidence to the contrary.

An indorsement will also be presumed to have been made at the place where the bill or note is dated.²

A bill or note becomes merged in a judgment, and cannot be indorsed or assigned afterward,³ but it may be transferred, as we think, pending suit.⁴ In Chapter XXIV, Sec. IV, the rights of the holder who acquires overdue paper, and when it is deemed overdue, are more fully treated.

¹ 2 Parsons N. & B. 9, 10; *Burnham v. Wood*, 8 N. H. 334; *Parkin v. Moon*, 7 C. & P. 408; *Lewis v. Parker*, 4 Ad. & El. 838.

² *Maxwell v. Vansant*, 56 Ill. 58.

³ *Wooten v. Maullsby*, 69 N. C. 462.

⁴ See § 1199; *Ober v. Goodridge*, 27 Grat. 888.

CHAPTER XXII.

TRANSFER OF BILLS AND NOTES BY ASSIGNMENT.

§ 729. *As to transfer of negotiable instruments by assignment.*—The term assignment is usually applied to denote the transfer of bonds and notes not negotiable, and also the transfer of instruments which are negotiable, without indorsement. If the bill or note be payable to bearer in express terms upon its face, or has become in legal effect payable to bearer by being indorsed in blank, it is then transferable by delivery; and the assignment by mere delivery is in accordance with the custom of merchants. If the bill or note be payable to order of a particular person, it may be transferred by him without indorsement. But in such case the assignment is not in the usual course of business, in accordance with mercantile custom, only the equitable title passing to the assignee. We shall, therefore, distinguish the two classes of assignors by the terms: I. Assignors of the legal title; and, II. Assignors of the equitable title.

SECTION I.

LIABILITY OF THE ASSIGNOR OF THE LEGAL TITLE TO BILLS AND NOTES.

§ 730. *As to the liability of the assignor of the legal title to negotiable instruments.*—Although not a party to the bill or note, the assignor of the legal title to bills and notes payable in terms to bearer, or indorsed in blank, incurs certain responsibilities, not so numerous, but equally as binding as the responsibilities of an indorser. He warrants by implication, unless otherwise agreed, that its face is a true description of its character, both in respect (1) to its genuineness; (2) to its validity and legal operation; (3) to the compe-

tency of the parties; and also (4) that he is a lawful holder, having a valid title and a right to transfer it, and (5) that he had no knowledge of any facts which prove the paper, if originally valid, to be worthless, either by the insolvency of the principal, or by having been paid, or otherwise by having become void and defunct.

§ 731. *In the first place, as to the genuineness of the bill or note.*—It is well settled that the transferrer by delivery of the bill or note is liable for failure of consideration, if it turn out that it was fictitious, or originally forged or subsequently altered either in the signatures, or in the amount.¹ As said in Rhode Island by Ames, C. J.:² “If the signatures or either of them be forged, what he sells is not what upon its face it purports to be, and what therefore he affirms and thus warrants it to be; and he is liable to the vendee for what he has received from him for it, on the ground of failure of consideration.” Where the defendant sold the plaintiff a navy bill purporting to be for £1,800, and it turned out that it had been altered to that amount from £800, which real sum the British Government paid, it was held that the plaintiff could recover the balance for which it was altered from his vendor.³ And when there has been a forgery in the signatures, it matters not that some are genuine. Where the bill was sold on which all the signatures were forged but that of the last indorser, it was sought to distinguish the case from the one just quoted, on the ground that as the last indorser was bound, the bill was of some value. But it was held that the

¹ Bell v. Dagg, 60 N. Y. 530; Whitney v. Nat. Bank, 45 N. Y. 305; Ross v. Terry, 63 N. Y. 613; Lyons v. Miller, 6 Grat. 439 (1849); Merriam v. Wolcott, 3 Allen, 258; Bell v. Cafferty, 21 Ind. 411; Cabot Bank v. Morton, 4 Gray, 158; Coolidge v. Brigham, 1 Metc. (Mass.) 547; 5 Id. 68; Barton v. Trent, 3 Head, 167; Snyder v. Reno, 36 Iowa, 329; Markle v. Hatfield, 2 Johns. 455; Swanzy v. Parker, 50 Penn. St. 441; Jones v. Ryde, 5 Taunt. 488; Bigelow on Estoppel, 446; Chitty on Bills (13 Am. ed.) [*245], 279; Byles on Bills (Sharswood's ed.) [*157], 278; Story on Notes, § 118; Bayley, 179; Story on Bills, § 111; *contra*, see Baxter v. Duren, 29 Me. 434.

² Aldrich v. Jackson, 5 R. I. 218; see Lyons v. Miller, 6 Grat. 440; *ante*, § 284.

³ Jones v. Ryde, 1 Marsh. 157.

seller of a bill offers it as an instrument drawn, accepted, and indorsed according to its purport.¹

In some cases the distinction has been taken between transfers of papers on which a name is forged, by agreement of exchange for a commodity, and transfers where it is taken in lieu of money, for accommodation—it being considered that in the latter case only is the transferrer by delivery liable.² But this distinction has been justly deemed unsound, and in Massachusetts, where it was obtained, it has been overruled,³ and now cannot be said to obtain in Maine as formerly.⁴ Unless the negotiation upon the sale or transfer of the paper by assignment is so framed as to exclude such warranty—and especially where it is so sold or transferred for a full and fair price—the transferrer will be deemed to warrant the genuineness of the preceding endorsement upon it.⁵ “But it is equally certain that the contract of sale may be made in such form as to exclude the warranty of genuineness, which would be implied by law in case of a contract silent upon that subject.”⁶

§ 732. *In the second place, as to the validity and legal operation.*—If the bill or note is not a valid subsisting obligation, binding in law according to its purport, the transferrer is liable, because the article is not that which it was held out to be.⁷ Thus where a bill dated as at Sierra Leone, and drawn upon London, was sold without indorsement; and it turned out afterward that it was

¹ Gurney v. Womersley, 4 E. & B. 133; 24 L. J. Q. B. 46; Hurst v. Chambers, 12 Bush. (Ky.) 155; Merriam v. Wolcott, 3 Allen, 258; Allen v. Clark, 49 Vt. 390.

² Ellis v. Wild, 6 Mass. 321; Baxter v. Duren, 29 Me. 434.

³ Merriam v. Wolcott, 3 Allen, 258.

⁴ Hussey v. Sibley, 66 Me. 192 (1876). Danforth, J.: “It would appear that the distinction noticed in Ellis v. Wild and Baxter v. Duren is, to say the least, somewhat shadowy.”

⁵ Giffert v. West, 37 Wis. 115.

⁶ Bell v. Dagg, 60 N. Y. 530; Ross v. Terry, 63 N. Y. 615.

⁷ Bell v. Dagg, 60 N. Y. 530; Littaner v. Goldman, 16 N. Y. S. C. (9 Hun), 234; Fuke v. Smith, 7 Abb. N. Y. N. S. 106; Ross v. Terry, 63 N. Y. 614; Hurd v. Hall, 12 Wis. 112.

really drawn within the kingdom of Great Britain, and was therefore an inland bill, and void because without a stamp, which a foreign bill did not require—it was held that the assignee could recover back the price paid, of the assignor, the consideration having failed. Lord Campbell, C. J., and Coleridge and Wightman, JJ., agreed, and Coleridge J., said: ¹ “The vendor was not bound to see that he sold a bill of good quality, or to answer for the insolvency of the parties” (who had become bankrupt); “but the vendee is still entitled to have an article answering the description of that which he bought. Here he bought as a foreign bill what turns out not to be a foreign bill, and therefore valueless. Common justice requires that he should have back the price.” Lord Campbell, C. J., said: “This is not a case in which an article answering the description by which it is sold has a latent defect, but one in which the article is not of the kind which was sold. I think, therefore, that the money paid for it may be recovered, as paid in mistake of facts.”

§ 733. So, where the defendant sold as Guatemala bonds, in 1836, bonds which had been repudiated by the Government of that State in 1829, because unstamped, and which were valueless, it was held that the price should be refunded, Tindal, C. J., saying, that the contract was for real Guatemala bonds, and that the case was just as if the contract had been to sell foreign coin, and the defendant had delivered counters instead. And that “it is not a question of warranty, but whether the defendant has not delivered something which, though resembling the article contracted to be sold, is of no value.” ²

So where the holder of a note transferred it without indorsement, and it was void for usury as between original parties. ³ “In this case,” said Comstock, J., “the defendant held a promissory note which was void, which he had him-

¹ Gompertz v. Bartlett, 2 El. & B. 854 (1853).

² Young v. Cole, 3 Bing. N. C. 724.

³ Delaware Bank v. Jervis, 20 N. Y. 228; Webb v. Odell, 49 N. Y. 583; Lettner v. Goldman, 16 N. Y. S. C. (9 Hun), 232 (1876).

self taken in violation of the statutes of usury. When he sold the note to the plaintiffs, and received the cash therefor, by that very act he affirmed, in judgment of law, that the instrument was sustained, so far at least as he had been connected with its origin." In another case, Davis, P. J., says: "There is an implied warranty that the note is what it purports to be,—a legal, valid instrument. It is nothing unless it be this.¹ So, though a certificate of deposit be void as between the original parties, because constituting a transaction between alien enemies, yet the assignor thereof is bound.² In such cases the transferee can recover not only the amount paid for the paper, with interest, but also his costs of suit against prior parties, the defendant was notified of the pendency of suit, and the defense made.³

§ 734 *In the third place, as to competency of parties.*—If a prior party be not competent to contract, the paper is not in fact his bill, note or indorsement, as the case may be, and the transferrer, for reasons already stated, is bound. Thus, if the drawer, or acceptor, or prior indorser, be an infant, lunatic, married woman, or otherwise be under incapacity to contract, the transaction lacks the consideration agreed upon as existing, and the transferee may recover back the money paid.⁴ In Massachusetts where the defendant, knowing that one Swan was an infant, put in circulation a note with his blank indorsement upon it, he was held bound, and Shaw, C. J., said: "Whoever takes a negotiable note is understood to ascertain for himself the ability of the contracting parties; but he has then got to believe, without inquiring, that he has the legal obligation of the contracting parties appearing on the bill or note. Unexplained, the purchaser of such a note has a right to believe, upon the faith of the security itself, that it is indorsed by one capable of

¹ Lettaner v. Goldman, 16 N. Y. S. C. (9 Hun), 234 (1876).

² Morrison v. Lovell, 4 West Va. (Hagans), 350 (1870).

³ Lettaner v. Goldman, 16 N. Y. S. C. (9 Hun), 232.

⁴ Baldwin v. Van Deusen, 37 N. Y. 487; Lobdell v. Baker, 1 Metc. 193; 3 Metc. 469.

binding himself by the contract which an indorsement by law imparts. It is an averment to that effect on the part of him who procures such an indorsement and puts the note bearing it into circulation.”¹ On the principle stated in the text, it was held in Maine that the transferrer was bound where a town order was transferred in payment of a debt, and it turned out to be worthless on account of the incapacity of the drawers and acceptors to draw or accept for the town.² And so in Wisconsin the assignor was held where the note assigned bore an indorsement which was void for usury.³

§ 734 *a*. In the Supreme Court of the United States the following case recently arose. The Legislature of Kansas passed two acts under which the city of Topeka was authorized to issue bonds for certain purposes, which were afterward held to be private purposes, and the bonds were consequently invalid.⁴ Some of these coupon bonds were sold by the First National Bank of Topeka, and default being made in payment of interest, suit was brought against the receiver of the bank to recover back the amount paid for the invalid bonds, on the ground of failure of consideration. The Supreme Court held that the seller was not bound by any implied warranty of the bonds,⁵ and maintained doc-

¹ *Lobdell v. Baker*, 3 Metc. 472 (1842), 1 Metc. 547.

² *Hussey v. Sebley*, 66 Me. 192 (1876).

³ *Giffert v. West*, 37 Wis. 117 (1875); 33 Wis. 623 (1873).

⁴ See *Loan Association v. Topeka*, 20 Wall. 655.

⁵ *Otis v. Callum*, 2 Otto (92 U. S.), 448 (1875); Swayne, J., saying: “In *Lambert v. Heath*, 15 Mees. & Wels. 486, the defendant bought for the plaintiff certain “certificates of Kentish-Coast Railway scrip,”—and received from him the money for them. Subsequently the directors repudiated the scrip upon the ground that it had been issued by the secretary without authority. The enterprise to which it related was abandoned. The action which was for money, had and received, was thereupon brought to recover back what had been paid for the scrip. The court put it to the jury to say whether the scrip bought was “real Kentish railway scrip.” A verdict was found for the plaintiff upon this issue. A new trial was moved for, the defendant insisting the court had misdirected the jury. After hearing the argument, the Court said: “The question is simply this:—was what the parties bought in the market Kentish-coast railway-scrip. It appears that it was signed by the secretary of the company, and if this was

trines in conflict with those which had been conceived applicable to the question. It is quite clear from the decisions quoted in the text that the transferrer of a bill or note by delivery is bound, if it be invalid by reason of the incompetency of anterior parties, or by reason of any contract between them which prevents the transferee from enforcing it against them. The Court, without commenting on that doctrine, evidently regards it as not to be extended to public securities, in so far as the competency of the corporation to issue them is concerned.

§ 735. *In the fourth place, as to title and right to transfer.*—If the transferrer had no lawful title to the instrument, the transfer of it as his property is a fraud both upon the owner and upon the transferee.¹ And the transferee, if

the only Kentish-coast railway-scrip in the market, as appears to have been the case, and one person chooses to sell and another to buy, that then the latter has got all that he contracted to buy. That was the question for the jury; but it was not so left to them. The rule must therefore be absolute for a new trial."

The judges were unanimous.

Here also the plaintiffs in error got exactly what they intended to buy and did buy. They took no guaranty. They are seeking to recover as it were upon one while none exists. They are not clothed with the rights which such a stipulation would have given them. Not having taking it they cannot have the benefit of it. The bank cannot be charged with a liability which it did not assume.

Such securities through the channels of commerce which they are made to seek, and where they find their market. They pass from hand to hand like bank notes. The seller is liable *ex delicto* for bad faith; and *ex contractu*, there is an implied warranty on his part that they belong to him, and that they are not forgeries. When there is no express stipulation, there is no liability beyond this. If the buyer desires special protection, he must take a guaranty. He can dictate his terms and refuse to buy unless it be given. If not taken he cannot occupy the vantage-ground upon which it would have placed him.

It would be unreasonably harsh to hold all those through whose hands such instruments may have passed, liable according to the principles which the plaintiff in error insists shall be applied in this case. *Judgment affirmed.*

¹ *Baxter v. Duren*, 29 Me. 434; see *Story on Notes*, § 118. In 2 *Parsons N. & B.* 187, this doctrine is denied. "Why," says the learned author, "should this be so (that is, a warranty of title), when an honest transferee need give no such warranty? For, as we have seen, property follows possession; and the mere possession of the transferrer is enough to give a perfect title to the honest taker of the paper, negotiable by delivery only. We hold that the doctrine of implied warranty in sales is applicable to the sale of bills and notes only to the extent that one who sells indorsed notes warrants the indorsement genuine."

unable to recover against the owner, might sue the transferrer for the consideration paid.

And indeed, we perceive no good reason why the transferee might not, on discovering the fraud, return the bill or note to the true owner, and recover back the consideration from the transferrer, for no man can take advantage of his own wrong.

But in most cases he would likely be indisposed to do this, as he would, if himself a *bona fide* transferee without notice, acquire a better title than his transferrer, and be thus enabled to hold the paper against the true owner.

§ 736. *In the fifth place, as to knowledge respecting the bill or note.*—If the transferrer knew that there was a defense to the recovery upon the bill or note, or that the amount could not be realized because of insolvency of the parties to it, his suppression of such knowledge was a fraud upon the transferee, and the latter may hold him responsible.¹ And if, knowing the paper to be worthless, he represents it to be good, his fraud is all the greater, and the transferee may recover against him.²

Thus, in Massachusetts, where the notes of a third person were passed off by a purchaser of goods to the vendor in payment, with fraudulent assurance that they were valid, and that the maker was solvent, and they were made by an insolvent without consideration, it was held that the vendor might disregard them altogether, and sue the purchaser for the value of the goods.³

§ 737. *Whether or not he warrants solvency of the principal.*—The transferrer of a bill or note without indorsement is clearly not liable on the bill or note; but there is conflict of authority upon the question whether or not he is bound to refund the consideration, if it should happen without his knowledge that at the time of the transfer the maker or prin-

¹ Fenn v. Harrison, 3 T. R. 759; Popley v. Ashley, 6 Mod. 147; Holt, 121; Camidge v. Allenby, 6 Barn. & Cres. 373; Story on Bills, § 225; 2 Parsons N. & B. 41; *post*, § 739.

² Kennedy v. O'Conner, 35 Ga. 199.

³ Bridge v. Batchelder, 9 Allen, 294.

principal party to the bill or note was insolvent, and the instrument in fact worthless.

It is contended by some of the text writers, and has been decided in a number of cases, that the loss under such circumstances should fall upon the party who held the bill or note at the time the insolvency occurred;¹ while others maintain, and, as we think, with correctness, that the loss should fall upon the party holding the bill or note at the time when the insolvency was made known to him.² After acquiring knowledge of the insolvency of the principal party, it would be a fraud to conceal it when transferring the bill or note; but until it is known to them the transferor and transferee mutually take the chances as to its value.³

¹ Roberts v. Fisher, 43 N. Y. 159; Lightbody v. Ontario Bank, 11 Wend. 1; 13 Wend. 107; Harley v. Thornton, 2 Hill (So. Car.) 509; Fogg v. Sawyer, 9 N. H. 365; Wainwright v. Webster, 11 Vt. 576; Thomas v. Todd, 6 Hill (N. Y.) 340; Townsends v. Bank of Racine, 7 Wis. 185; Westfall v. Braley, 10 Ohio St 188; Story on Notes, § 119; Story on Bills (Bennett's ed.) § 225; see Chapter L, on Bank Notes, Sec. III. vol. 2.

² Edmonds v. Digges, 1 Grat. 359; Young v. Adams, 6 Mass. 182; Scruggs v. Cass, 8 Yerg. 175; Lowry v. Murrell, 2 Port. 282; Bayard v. Shunk, 1 Watts & S. 92; Corbet v. Bank of Smyrna, 2 Har. (Del.) 235; Ware v. Street, 2 Head. 609; Barton v. Trent, 3 Head. 167; see Story on Bills, § 225; Thomson on Bills (Wilson's ed.) 187, 188. In Chitty on Bills [*247], 281, it is said: "When a transfer by delivery without indorsement is made, merely by way of sale of the bill, as sometimes occurs, or exchange of it for other bills, or by way of discount, and not as security for money lent, or where the assignee expressly agrees to take it in payment, and to run all risks, he has in general no right of action whatever against the assignor in case the bill turns out to be of no value. But there can be no doubt, that if a man assign a bill for any sufficient consideration knowing it to be of no value, and the assignee be not aware of the fact, the former would, in all cases, be compellable to repay the money he had received."

In Byles on Bills (Sharswood's ed.) [*154], 275, it is said: "It is conceived to be the general rule of the English law and the fair result of the English authorities, that the transferor is not even liable to refund the consideration, if the bill or note so transferred by delivery without indorsement turn out to be of no value, by reason of the failure of other parties to it. For the taking to market of a bill or note payable to bearer without indorsing it, is, *prima facie*, a sale of the bill. And there is no implied guaranty of the solvency of the maker, or of any other party. Judge Sharswood, concurring with the text of Byles on Bills, says in his note (5th Am. ed.) p. 275, "it is conceived that the confusion has arisen from neglecting to distinguish between the abstract question of law, and question of fact in the particular case." See Redfield and Bigelow's Lead. Cas. p. 634; and Chapter L, on Bank Notes, Sec. III, vol. 2.

³ *Ante*, § 736; *post*, § 739.

The transferrer declines to bind himself as a party by declining to indorse. The transferee impliedly relies on the bill or note itself, by not requiring an indorsement. And if thus, both being innocent, a loss by insolvency arises, there seems to us no more reasonable rule than to let it rest where it falls. These, at least, would be the presumptions of law, whether the transfer was by way of sale of the bill or note, or an exchange, or discount; but there being no written contract, any special agreement might be given in evidence to rebut them.¹ And it has been said that there is an exception to the general rule when the bill or note is transferred in payment of a precedent debt, of which we shall presently speak.

There is no fraud in the transferrer when he assigns the bill or note without being aware that the principal is insolvent, and there is no failure of consideration, for the consideration is the principal's promise to pay. The value of that promise must be judged of by the transferee when he acquires it.

§ 738. The doctrine of the text was well expressed, in Rhode Island, in a case arising out of the barter of cotton for the notes of third persons, which were taken without indorsement, Ames, C. J., saying:² "The well-known common law principle, applicable alike to sales and exchanges of personal things, is, that fraud or warranty is necessary to render the exchanger or vendor liable, in any form, for a defect in the quality of the thing sold or exchanged. Applying this principle to the sale or exchange of the note of a third person, transferred by indorsement without recourse, or by delivery merely, the vendee or person taking it in exchange takes the risk of the past or future insolvency of the maker or other party to it; unless, indeed, in case of past insolvency, the vendor or exchanger is guilty of the fraud of passing it off with knowledge of that fact."

§ 739. In England, the doctrine to this effect is well

¹ *Monroe v. Hoff*, 5 Denio, 360.

² *Bicknall v. Waterman*, 5 R. I. 43; see also *Burgess v. Chapin*, 5 R. I. 225; *Beckwith v. Farnum*, 5 R. I. 230; *Aldrich v. Jackson*, 5 R. I. 218.

settled, and when the transfer is without indorsement, whether it be a sale of the bill or note, or an exchange, or by way of discount, or where the assignee agrees expressly to take it in payment, he can neither recover against the assignor upon the bill, or recover back the amount given for it, on account of failure in the consideration ; unless, indeed the assignor knew the bill or note to be that of an insolvent when he assigned it. Thus, it has been said by Lord Kenyon :¹ “ It is extremely clear that if the holder of a bill send it to market without indorsing his name upon it, neither morality nor the laws of this country will compel him to refund the money for which he sold it, if he did not know at the time he sold it that it was not a good bill. If he knew the bill to be bad, it would be like sending out a counter into circulation to impose upon the world, instead of the current coin.” And, in another case, where the party discounted bills with a banker, and received in part of the discount other bills, without the banker’s indorsement, and they turned out to be bad, the same high authority said :² “ Having taken them without indorsement, he has taken the risk on himself. The bankers were the holders of the bills, and by not indorsing them, have refused to pledge their credit to their validity, and the transferee must be taken to have received them on their own credit only.”

§ 740. When the bill or note of a third party is transferred without indorsement, in payment of an antecedent debt, it has been held that, if dishonored, the prior debt revives, because the instrument was given as money, and did not produce it.³ But this distinction does not seem to us tenable. The transferrer, by not indorsing, has declined to warrant that it will produce money, and the transferee has consented to take the security instead of money, and without such war-

¹ *Fenn v. Harrison*, 3 T. R. 759.

² *Fyde v. Clark*, 1 Esp. 447 ; see also *Emly v. Lye*, 15 East, 7 ; *Bank of England v. Newman*, 1 Ld. Raym. 442.

³ *Camidge v. Allenby*, 6 B. & C. 373 ; see Chapter L, on Bank Notes, Sec. III, vol. 2 ; see 2 Pars. N. & B. 104, note ; 156, note m ; also Chapter XXXIX, vol. 2.

ranty.¹ Still this is to be observed: The law presumes, in the absence of proof, that the instrument was passed as conditional payment only, in which case the pre-existing debt is only suspended during its currency, and revives on its dishonor;² but if there was an express contract, or circumstances implying a contract, on the part of the creditor, to accept the stranger's paper in payment, then he would be held to his bargain, although it threw upon him an entire loss—the burden of proof to this effect being upon the transferrer.³ The transferrer by delivery is not entitled in such cases to notice of dishonor; but if there is unreasonable delay in informing him of it, he may show in defense any injury he has sustained by the actual laches of the creditor.⁴

SECTION II.

LIABILITY OF THE ASSIGNOR OF THE EQUITABLE TITLE BY DELIVERY.

§ 741. We have already seen that where a bill or note payable "to order" is transferred without indorsement, the transferee does not acquire the legal, but only the equitable title.⁵ The holder under such a transfer must aver and prove the assignment, for the mere possession of the instrument unindorsed is not evidence of ownership, and its exhibition in a suit not sufficient ground of recovery.⁶ And he can only stand in the shoes of his assignor, and recover sub-

¹ In *Tjmmins v. Gibbins*, 18 Q. B. 722 (14 Eng. L. & Eq. 64), Lord Campbell said: "I feel great difficulty in seeing any distinction between payment for goods sold at the time, and payment for them at a future day. In both cases it is a transaction of buying and selling; and even where the money is paid over the counter, there must be some interval during which the buyer was debtor." *Dennis v. Williams*, 40 Ala. 633; see Chapter XXXIX, vol. 2.

² *Marsh v. Pedder*, 4 Camp. 257; *Taylor v. Briggs*, *Moody & M.* 28; *Robinson v. Read*, 9 B. & C. 449; see Chapter XXXIX, vol. 2.

³ *Eagle Bank v. Smith*, 5 Conn. 71.

⁴ 2 *Parsons N. & B.* 184.

⁵ *Ante*, Chapter XXI.

⁶ *Hull v. Conover*, 35 Ind. 372; *Prescott v. Hull*, 17 Johns. 284; *Van Eman v. Stanchfield*, 10 Minn. 255; see Chapter XX, on Presentment for Payment, Sec. I.

ject to such defenses as were available against him.¹ Therefore, if the party who transfers a note payable to the order of another, but unindorsed by him to whose order it is payable, and it turn out that the transferrer had no title, the transferee could not recover, there being no equitable right to which he can claim succession.² In such a case in Indiana it was said by Blackford, J.: "Whether the property in this note could pass without indorsement under any circumstances need not be considered. Supposing it could, the transfer in such case must be governed, not by commercial law, but by the rules which govern the sale of ordinary goods out of market overt."³ It is quite well settled that delivery of such an instrument may operate as an assignment,⁴ but the assignee would have to sue in the name of the assignor, unless permitted by statute to sue in his own.⁵ The *bona fide* holder by assignment, while not protected against existing defenses, is protected against all defenses subsequently arising.⁶

§ 742. These principles apply to bills and notes which are not drawn payable to bearer, or to order, and are not negotiable. The party who becomes transferee of such instruments takes only the right and title of his transferrer—can sue only in the name of such transferrer—and is subject to all offsets, equities, and other defenses, which might have been pleaded against him up to the time when the debtor first receives notice of the assignment. As soon as a transferee receives such an instrument, he should therefore notify the debtor, in order to protect himself. He need not, however, exhibit the security to the debtor, or offer him other evidence than his own information of the assignment; for

¹ Hedges v. Sealy, 9 Barb. 218; Haskell v. Mitchell, 53 Me. 468; Boeka v. Nuella, 28 Mo. 181; Terry v. Allis, 16 Wis. 478.

² Myers v. Friend, 1 Rand. 13; see *ante*, § 441.

³ Elliott v. Armstrong, 2 Blackf. 212.

⁴ Jones v. Witter, 13 Mass. 304.

⁵ Wheeler v. Wheeler, 9 Cow. 34; Grand Gulf Bank v. Wood, 12 Sm. & M. 482; Amherst Academy v. Cows, 6 Pick. 427; Smalley v. Wight, 44 Me. 442; Pease v. Hirst, 10 B. & C. 125; 5 Man. & R. 88.

⁶ Beard v. Dedolph, 29 Wis. 142 (1871).

although the debtor may require evidence of the assignment before he makes payment to the assignee, the notice is a mere measure of precaution to put him upon inquiry.¹ If the debtor finds the original creditor still retaining the evidence of the debt, he may still make payment to him; but if he cannot produce it, there would be the best reason to believe the notice of the assignment.² Where the assignee sues in the assignor's name, the defendant may set off a debt due from the assignee to him, in like manner as if the suit had been brought in his own name.³

§ 743. Bills and notes which are not payable to bearer, or to order, cannot be so transferred, either by indorsement or delivery, so as to substitute the transferee for the transferor, and enable the former to sue in his own name, unless he be empowered to do so by statute.⁴ Anciently, transfers of all choses in action, which term includes bills and notes, were forbidden by the common law, but courts of equity have long since disregarded the rule, and in that forum all assignees of choses in action are permitted to enforce their rights in their own name.⁵ It is otherwise in courts of law, where the assignee (unless permitted by statute) can only sue in the name of the assignor, or of his executor or administrator, according to the ancient rule, when the assignor is dead.⁶ But the doctrine of equitable assignments has been constantly extending to meet the conveniences of trade and business; and it has long been settled that the assignee of a

¹ Davenport v. Woodbridge, 8 Greenl. 17.

² Ibid.

³ Corser v. Craig, 1 Wash. C. C. 424.

⁴ Tassell v. Lewis, 1 Ld. Raym. 743; Hill v. Lewis, 1 Salk. 132; Backus v. Danforth, 10 Conn. 297; White v. Heylman, 34 Penn. St. 142; *ante*, § 741.

⁵ Coles v. Jones, 2 Vern. 692; Wright v. Wright, 1 Ves. Sr. 411; Hughes v. Nelson, 29 N. J. (Eq.) 549 (1878). In this case the transferrer contracted to indorse, but omitted to do so. Defeated in suit at law, the transferee sued in equity. Judgment against him at law was held no bar to the suit in equity, and Vice-Chancellor Van Fleet said: "The delivery of the note under the circumstances stated, constituted the complainant an indorsee in equity, with all the rights of a *bona fide* holder for value before maturity. * * Equity looks upon that as done which ought to have been done."

⁶ Skinner v. Somes, 14 Mass. 107; Amherst Academy v. Cows, 6 Pick. 427.

chose in action may sue in a court of law in the name of his assignors, and recover, subject, however, to such defenses as were available against the assignor at the time the debtor received notice of the assignment.¹

§ 744. If the transferee delivers a bill without indorsing it, where it was upon good consideration agreed or understood that it should be indorsed by him, and afterward he refuse to indorse, he may be sued for damages for breach of contract.² And he, or his personal representatives, may be compelled by bill in equity to indorse.³ But the transferee, by delivery under such circumstances, has no right to sign his transferrer's name as indorser.⁴

§ 745. It has been thought that where an assignment of a note or bill payable to order has been made for a valuable consideration, an indorsement thereof, whenever made, will relate back to the time of assignment, and operate as if then made.⁵ This doctrine may be, and doubtless is, true when the indorsement at the time of the assignment was agreed upon and intended, but omitted by mistake, accident or fraud.⁶ But beyond this it cannot go. If the instrument be payable to order, an assignment is not in the usual course of business. It transfers the equitable, but not the legal title; and an indorsement after maturity, or after notice of a defense, cannot effectuate an anterior imperfect transaction,

¹ Gibson v. Cooke, 20 Pick. 15.

² Rose v. Sims, 1 B. & Ad. 521 (20 E. C. L. R.)

³ Watkins v. Maule, 2 Jac. & Walk. 242; Rolleston v. Hibbert, 3 T. R. 411; *ex parte* Greening, 13 Ves. 206; Byles [*150], 270; 1 Parsons N. & B. 279; Hughes v. Nelson, 29 N. G. (Eq.) 549; Story on Notes, § 120; 1 Story Eq. Juris. § 99, 729.

⁴ Rose v. Sims, *supra*; Harrop v. Fisher, 30 L. J. C. P. 263; Byles [*150], 270; Story on Bills, § 201.

⁵ Baker v. Arnold, 3 Caines, 283 (1805), Livingston, J.; 1 Parsons N. B. 279.

⁶ Southard v. Porter, 43 N. H. 380 (1861). The party had notice of the defense at the time of the indorsement, but not at time of assignment. But see Haskell v. Mitchell, 53 Me. 468. In Watkins v. Maule, 2 Jacob & Walker, 237, it is said by Lord Eldon: "When a note is handed over for a valuable consideration the indorsement is a mere form; the transfer for consideration is the substance; it creates an equitable right and entitles the party to call for the form." Hughes v. Nelson, 29 N. J. (Eq.) 549.

and exclude equitable defenses which had become available.¹ In Wisconsin it is held that a post indorsement relates back to delivery in respect to any equity outside of the note itself.²

In Maine it has been held that where an assignment is made before maturity, a contemporaneous promise of the payee to indorse, if not complied with until after maturity, will not avoid the defense of want of consideration, made by the maker against the indorsee.³

§ 746. In respect to set-off a different principle applies. An indorsement at any time before suit brought, whether before or after maturity, cuts out the right of the maker or acceptor to plead it, for a set-off is not an equity.⁴

§ 747. A second assignee who gives immediate notice of his assignment will be protected against a prior one who failed to give notice,⁵ or who is guilty of any neglect or

¹ Lancaster National Bank v. Taylor, 100 Mass. 24 (1868); Clark v. Whitaker, 50 N. H. 474; Southard v. Porter, 43 N. H. 380; Whistler v. Forster, 14 J. Scott, N. S. (108 E. C. L. R.) 254 (1863). Erle, C. J.: "Griffiths, at the time he so handed the bill over to the plaintiff, omitted to indorse it. Under these circumstances, the condition of things was this, that the plaintiff had at that time the same rights as if an ordinary chattel had passed to him by an equitable assignment: he would have all the rights which Griffiths could convey to him. Now, Griffiths having defrauded the defendant of the bill, he could pass no right by merely handing over the bill to another. According to the law merchant the title to a negotiable instrument passes by indorsement and delivery. A title so acquired is good against all the world, provided the instrument is taken for value and without notice of any fraud. The plaintiff's title, under the equitable assignment here, therefore, was to be rendered valid by indorsement; but, at the time he obtained the indorsement, he had notice that the bill had been fraudulently obtained by Griffiths from the defendant, and that Griffiths had no right to make the indorsement. Assuming, therefore, that there may be conflicting equities between the plaintiff and the defendant, I think the right should prevail according to the rules of law, and that the plaintiff had no title as transferee of the bill at all."

² Beard v. Dedolph, 29 Wis. 136.

³ Haskell v. Mitchell, 53 Me. 468 (1866).

⁴ Ranger v. Carey, 1 Metc. 369 (1840); *contra*, Odiorne v. Woodman, 39 N. H. 544 (1859). The case of Ranger v. Carey is often quoted in support of the doctrine that indorsement relates back to the assignment; but the contrary is expressly decided in Lancaster National Bank v. Taylor, 100 Mass. 24, and that case is there explained.

⁵ Judson v. Corcoran, 17 How. 612.

fraud which enables the assignor to make a second assignment to a *bona fide* assignee.¹

The assignee may sue the debtor in his own name, when the assignor has discharged him, and the debtor, in consideration thereof and of the assignment, has promised the assignee to pay the debt to him.² And the debtor, after making such promise to pay the assignee, could not make defenses available against the assignor which he did not reserve in his promise to the assignee.³

§ 748. *Equitable assignment*.—There is a peculiar kind of assignment which remains yet to be noticed. It is an assignment which arises not from the direct act of the person from whom the beneficial interest in the thing assigned passes; but is effected by operation of law, and is called equitable assignment.

The assignment of any particular claim is considered an equitable assignment of all securities held by the assignor to assure it. Thus the assignment of a debt by whatever form of transfer, carries with it any bill or note by which it is secured;⁴ and the converse of the proposition is equally true, that the transfer by indorsement or assignment of a bill or note carries with it all securities for its payment,⁵ whether a mortgage or otherwise.⁶ A renewal note has the benefit of any security for the payment of the original, whether by way of mortgage, deed of trust, or otherwise, and the holder may enforce it.⁷

¹ Maykin v. Kirby, 4 Rich. Eq. 105.

² Tatlock v. Harris, 3 T. R. 174; Weston v. Barker, 12 Johns. 276; Doty v. Wilson, 14 Johns. 378; Murry v. Todd, 12 Mass. 281; Currier v. Hodgdon, 3 N. H. 82; Myers v. York, &c. R. R. Co. 43 Me. 232.

³ Wiggin v. Damrell, 4 N. H. 69; Thompson v. Emery, 7 Foster, 269.

⁴ Marston v. Allen, 8 M. & W. 494; Adams v. Jones, 12 Ad. & E. 455; Hayes v. Caulfield, 5 Q. B. 81.

⁵ Freeman's Bank v. Ruckman, 16 Grat. 129; see *post*, § 834, Mechanics' Building Ass'n, 29 La. 549.

⁶ Dunn v. Snell, 15 Mass. 485; Titcomb v. Thomas, 5 Greenl. 282; Jones v. Witter, 13 Mass. 282; Waller v. Tate, 4 B. Mon. 529; Miller v. Ord, 2 Binn. 382; Fox v. Foster, 4 Penn. St. 119; Croft v. Bunster, 9 Wis. 503; Johnson v. Carpenter, 7 Minn. 183; Holmes v. McGinty, 44 Miss. 94; see *post*, § 834, Murray v. Jones, 50 Ga. 118; Fisher v. Otis, 3 Chandler, 83; Dodge v. Bank, 1 McArthur, 420.

⁷ Gleason v. Wright, 53 Miss. 247.

Negotiable instruments may also be assigned by a separate and distinct paper, although not delivered, as by deed or mortgage, conveying them specifically, or all "choses in action;"¹ but it has been held that such an assignment carried only the equitable and not the legal title.² For such mode of transfer separates the evidence of ownership from the paper itself.³ The deed, or other instrument by which the assignment is made, operates as a constructive delivery of the paper, and the transferrer holds it as agent of the transferee.⁴ Where a person who has made a voluntary assignment for the benefit of creditors, retains certain promissory notes which passed by the assignment, he may be sued by the assignee in trover for their conversion.⁵

¹ McGee v. Riddlesgarber, 39 Mo. 365; Grand Gulf Bank v. Wood, 12 Smed. & M. 482; Ducarse v. Keyser, 28 La. 419.

² Franklin v. Twogood, 18 Iowa, 517; French v. Turner, 15 Ind. 62; Grand Gulf Bank v. Wood, 12 Smed. & M. 482.

³ Hopkirk v. Page, 2 Brock, 41 Marshall, C. J.

⁴ Byles on Bills (Sharswood's ed.) [*143], 260, note 1.

⁵ Burrows v. Keays, 37 Mich. 431.

CHAPTER XXIII.

THE SALE AND DISCOUNT OF BILLS AND NOTES, AND THE AMOUNT OF RECOVERY.

SECTION I.

THE VALIDITY OF THE ORIGINAL NEGOTIATION.

§ 749. When suit is brought upon a negotiable instrument by the payee, or indorsee, or by an assignee without indorsement where it is payable to bearer, he is presumed to have paid therefor its full face value, and is therefore *prima facie* entitled to recover the whole amount of all the parties bound to him for its payment.¹ But suppose the indorsee, where such an instrnment is payable to order, or the assignee, by delivery where it is payable to bearer, has paid his immediate transferrer less than its face value, there are then several important questions presented. The *first* is, is the transaction of such a character as to constitute the instrument usurious in its inception? *Second*, if there be no usury, what is the amount of recovery as against the maker or acceptor? *Third*, is the contract of transfer usurious as between the parties thereto? And *fourth*, what is the amount of recovery against the indorser?

§ 750. *Is transaction usurious?*—In the first place, is the transaction of such a character as to render the instrument usurious in its inception? There is no doubt that if a note be executed by A. to B. for a valuable consideration, that B. may sell it to C. for any amount, and that C., regardless of the amount he pays for it, may recover its full face value of

¹ Lee v. Pile, 39 Ind. 109; Youse v. McCreary, 2 Blackf. 246; Duncan & Sherman v. Gilbert, 20 N. J. L. R. (5 Dutch.) 521; Allaire v. Hartshorne, 1 Zab. 673.

the maker.¹ And where B. transfers the note without indorsement (or by indorsement without recourse), the transaction is clearly the mere sale or assignment of a debt due to him, which he has as much right to sell as he has to dispose of any other species of property.² But if A. had made his note to B. for B.'s accommodation, and C., knowing the fact, were to purchase it from B., the transaction would wear a different complexion. In such a case B. does not sell an article of which he himself possesses full ownership. And if the amount paid for it by C. is at a greater rate of discount than allowed by law, the contract is usurious, as it is really a loan of money by C. upon the undertaking of A. to pay him back a sum so far greater that it exceeds the rate of interest which C. may legally receive upon his advancement.³

§ 751. Hence this rule may be laid down: if no party prior to the holder could himself bring an action upon the note, and the holder knew that fact at the time he received it, then no prior party owned, or seemed to own it, and the holder who is the first owner must be taken to have loaned the money to the maker. And consequently, if the consideration paid for it amounts to usury, such holder cannot recover at all.⁴ Many authorities go further than this, and declare that although the holder when he took the note did not know that no prior party could sue upon it, that, nevertheless, if such were the fact, he must be held to have loaned the money to the maker; and that if the sum to be paid amount to more than the legal rate of interest on the amount paid, the holder can have no recovery against the maker.⁵ In New York this

¹ *Nichols v. Pearson*, 7 Pet. 109; *Freeman v. Britton*, 2 Har. 209; *Newman v. Williams*, 29 Miss. 222; *Cowles v. McVickar*, 3 Wis. (Smith) 731.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Whitworth v. Adams*, 5 Rand. 333 (1827); *Overton v. Hardin*, 6 Coldw. 378.

⁴ *Whitworth v. Adams*, 5 Rand. 333 (1829); *Veazie Bank v. Paulk*, 40 Me. 109 (1855); *Richardson v. Scobee*, 10 B. Morr. 12 (1849); *May v. Campbell*, 7 Humph. 450 (1846).

⁵ *Sweet v. Chapman*, 14 N. Y. S. C. (7 Hun), 576 (1876); *Munn v. Commission Co.* 15 Johns. 53 (1818), bill of exchange; *Powell v. Waters*, 17 Johns. 177 (1819); affirmed in 8 Cow. 669 (1826), promissory note;

view has been taken in numerous cases, it being said that the note "to be the subject of such sale must have a pre-existing vitality. Its breath of life cannot be imparted through a usurious transaction."¹ But it is there also held that usury in the inception of a note is no defense to the maker against the accommodation payer and indorser who takes up the note after protest with no notice of the usury.² The question of the inception of the paper and the time it took place is a question of fact, and if evidence be conflicting, should be submitted to the jury.³

§ 752. It has been there also held that the principle does not apply where a note has been obtained by fraud by the payee from the maker, and has been actually delivered to him as and for a valid security,⁴ although it would apply where there was no delivery by the maker but an obtaining of possession, and putting of it in circulation by fraudulent means.⁵ These decisions are exceedingly refining in the dis-

Williams v. Storm, 2 Duer, 52 (1853), a note; Catlin v. Gunter, 6 Kern. 368 (1854), a note; Hall v. Wilson, 16 Barb. 548 (1853), a note; Bossange v. Ross, 29 Barb. 576 (1859), a note; Clark v. Loomis, 5 Duer, 468 (1858), a note; Eastman v. Shaw, 65 N. Y. 522; Belden v. Lamb, 17 Conn. 452 (1846), a note; Holman v. Hobson, 8 Humph. 129, 130 (1847), a note; Overton v. Hardin, 6 Coldw. 378, a note; Corcoran v. Powers, 6 Ohio St. 19 (1856), bill of exchange; Bock v. Lauman, 24 Penn. St. 448 (1855), bill of exchange; Van Schaack v. Stafford, 12 Pick. 565 (1832), a note; Saltmarsh v. Planters', &c. Bank, 14 Ala. 668 (1848), bill of exchange; Simpson v. Fullenwider, 12 Ired. Law, 335 (1851), a note; Fleming v. Mulligan, 2 McCord, 173 (1822), a note; see § 758.

¹ Powell v. Waters, 8 Cow. 669, affirming same case in 17 Johns. 176. Cassebeer v. Kalbfleisch, 18 N. Y. S. C. (11 Hun), 120.

² Cassebeer v. Kalbfleisch, 18 N. Y. S. C. (11 Hun), 123.

³ Sweet v. Chapman, 14 N. Y. S. C. (7 Hun), 577.

⁴ Harger v. Wilson, 63 Barb. 237 (1872). The note was obtained from the maker by the payee on fraudulent representations on the sale of a worthless patent right. It was for \$1,000, and was sold for \$900 to the holder, the rate of discount amounting to twenty-six per cent. interest. It was held not usury, as the note was delivered as a valid security.

⁵ Hall v. Wilson, 16 Barb. 548 (1853). In this case the note for \$120 payable to bearer was never delivered, but was stolen from the maker's desk by a laborer, and sold to Bigelow for \$115. It was held that the latter could not recover, as the transaction constituted a loan, the note having no existence as such until it came into the hands of Bigelow upon a consideration that amounted to usurious interest.

In Iowa, it is held that the fact that the *bona fide* holder of a promissory note

inctions taken, and the better opinion, it seems to us, is, that in all cases, if the holder at the time he received the note did not know the fact that it was not a valid subsisting security, there is no intention of borrowing and lending, which is necessary to create usury; and the holder may recover upon it against the maker.¹ And to hold otherwise, it has been well said, "would reverse the general and sound principle of law and justice, that whenever one of two persons must suffer by the act of a third, he who has enabled that third person to occasion the loss must sustain it himself."²

§ 753. *If a note is offered for discount by the maker*, it is plainly usurious as between him and the party to whom it is delivered if the discount from its face value were greater than that allowed upon a loan; and if it be already indorsed, its presence in the maker's hands is evidence that the indorsement was for accommodation, and that it is not a valid security which may be the subject of sale.³ An accepted bill offered for sale by the acceptor would stand upon the same footing, as the acceptor is the party primarily bound for its payment, and could not himself sue any party to it.⁴ It is also clear that if the payee of a bill or note whose name appears indorsed thereon prior to other indorsers, offers it for discount, the subsequent indorsers must be taken to have indorsed for such prior indorser's accommodation, and that it would be usurious if the party discounting it deducted more than legal discount as between him and the indorsers for accommodation, of whose character the nature

obtained originally by fraud and without consideration, purchased it for a considerably less amount than its face, will not affect or limit his right of recovery. *Lay v. Wissman*, 36 Iowa, 305.

¹ *Whitworth v. Adams*, 5 Rand. 333; *Taylor v. Bruce*, Gilmer (Va.), 42; *Brammel v. Enders*, 18 Grat. 873; *Gimmi v. Cullen*, 20 Grat. 439; *Gaul v. Willis*, 26 Penn. St. 259.

² *Coalter, J.*, in *Whitworth v. Adams*, *supra*.

³ *Whitworth v. Adams*, 5 Rand. 411, *Cabell, J.*; *Wallace v. Branch Bank*, 1 Ala. 565; *Overton v. Hardin*, 6 Cold. 376; *Hendrie v. Berkowitz*, 37 Cal. 113. See also *Fielden v. Lahens*, 2 Abb. (N. Y.) App. 111.

⁴ *Carlisle v. Hill*, 16 Ala. 405; *Saltmarsh v. Planters' &c. Bank*, 14 Ala. 668; see *Witte v. William*, 8 Rich. (S. C.) 304.

of the transaction gives notice.¹ Whether or not the same rule would apply where a bill is offered for discount by the drawer is a question upon which the authorities differ, some taking the view that the transaction would be a usurious loan,² others that it would be a mere sale of a debt due the drawer by the drawee or acceptor.³ The latter opinion seems to us correct, for reasons elsewhere stated.⁴

An individual negotiating for the purchase of a bill or note from one having it in possession, and whose name is upon it, must assume that the title of the holder, as well as the liability of all prior parties, is precisely that indicated by the paper itself.⁵ Where the maker of a note places it in the hands of a broker to be sold, without any restrictions as to the manner in which such sale is to be made, he is bound by the broker's representations to a *bona fide* purchaser, that it is good business paper, and he cannot maintain suit against such purchaser to have the note canceled on the ground that it never had legal inception until it came in such purchaser's hands, by whom it was discounted at a greater rate than allowed by law.⁶

§ 753 *a*. By the common law, a contract for the sale of specific ascertained goods vests the property therein immediately in the buyer, and a right to the price in the seller, unless it can be shown that such was not the intention of the parties; and title passes without delivery.⁷ This principle is applicable to the sale of bills and notes; and where the payee of a note has made a contract to sell it to one Parks, and the plaintiff was aware of the fact when he purchased the note, it was held that by the agreement made title passed

¹ *Mauldin v. Branch Bank*, 2 Ala. 513.

² *Lowes v. Mazaredo*, 1 Stark. 385 (3 E. C. L. R.); *Comyn on Usury*, 181; see, on this subject, *King v. Ridge*, 4 Price, 50, copied in Appendix, 5 Rand. 617; *Whitworth v. Adams*, 5 Rand. 333; *Noble v. Walker*, 17 Ala. 456.

³ *Lloyd v. Keach*, 2 Conn. 175.

⁴ See *post*, §§ 168, 767.

⁵ *Central Bank v. Hammett*, 50 N. Y. 158; *Hoge v. Lansing*, 35 N. Y. 136; see also *post*, §§ 781, 812.

⁶ *Ahern v. Goodspeed*, 16 N. Y. S. C. (9 Hun), 265.

⁷ *Benjamin on Sales* (2d ed.), 226.

to Parks, and that the plaintiff was not a *bona fide* holder, and could not recover.¹

SECTION II.

AMOUNT OF RECOVERY AGAINST MAKER OR ACCEPTOR.

§ 754. *In the second place*, as to the amount of recovery against the maker or acceptor, we have seen already that the holder may recover the full amount if the note was made, or bill accepted, upon a valuable consideration. And even if there was no consideration, as between the original parties, but a mere becoming a party for accommodation, the holder, although he knew the fact, could recover the whole amount, provided he paid full value.² But if he paid less than value, it is a matter of dispute whether or not he is limited, in his recovery, against the maker, to the amount advanced.

§ 755. *English authorities.*—The view taken in England on this subject has been stated by Mr. Chitty as follows: “With respect to the principal money, or that sum which is payable on the face of the bill or note, many instances occur in which, although the plaintiff may not have given full value for the bill, &c., he may, nevertheless, recover the whole sum, holding the overplus beyond his own demand as trustee for some other party to the bill, &c., entitled to receive such overplus. Thus, if a bill be drawn in the regular course of business, as for money really due from the drawee to the drawer, in such case, in order to avoid several actions, an indorsee, although he has not given the full value of the bill, may recover the whole sum payable, and be the holder of the overplus as a trustee for the indorser. * * This rule, permitting the holder of a bill to recover more than is due to himself, only applies where there is some other person entitled to receive from the defendant the overplus of what is due to the plaintiff, and if there be no such person, the

¹ Sheldon v. Parker, 10 N. Y. S. C. (3 Hun), 499.

² Charles v. Marsden, 1 Taunt. 224.

plaintiff will be permitted only to recover what is due to himself.”¹ And he is certainly sustained by judicial authority; but the cases are in a state of confusion, without following clearly defined principles.

§ 756. In the Court of King’s Bench, where it appeared that the bill for £86 was for accommodation as between the drawer and acceptor, and was indorsed by the payee to another for £29, and the indorsee, who knew the circumstances, brought suit against the accommodation drawer, it was held that he could only recover the £29 paid.² So where the bill for £415 was accepted for the drawer’s accommodation, and indorsed by him to the plaintiff for £265, the plaintiff’s assignees, it was held, could only recover £265 from the accommodation acceptor.³

It has been observed, however, in respect to the *nisi prius* decision of Lord Kenyon referred to in the notes, that he proceeded upon the fact, probably proved in the cause, that the bill was not sold out and out to the plaintiff, but was only pledged as a security for the money advanced; and that the case of a deposit or transfer of a bill for the security of money advanced upon its credit, and not for its absolute purchase, is the only case in which the holder can be trustee for the indorser for a part of the bill, unless he has repaid to the holder, on account of the bill, a part of its amount.⁴ And this is, we think, clearly a correct view of the law. And it

¹ Chitty on Bills (13th Am. ed.) [*677], 757.

² Wiffen v. Roberts, 1 Esp. 261 (1795), Lord Kenyon, C. J., saying: “Where a bill of exchange is given for money really due from the drawee to the drawer, or is drawn in the regular course of business, in such case the indorsee, though he has not given to the indorser the full amount of the bill, yet he may recover the whole, and be the holder of the overplus above the sum he has really paid to the use of the indorsee; but where the bill is an accommodation one, and that known to the indorsee, and he pays but part of the amount, in such case he can only recover the sum he has actually paid for the bill; and if the plaintiff in this case, was entitled to recover, he could only do it to the amount of £29, the sum he really paid for it.”

³ Jones v. Hibbert, 2 Stark. 271 (1817); see Barber v. Backhouse, Peake’s Cases, 61.

⁴ Whitworth v. Adams, 5 Rand. 377 (1827), Green, J., dissenting on main point decided, but not on this proposition.

may be further observed that, unless this explanation be correct, the transaction would have been usurious and void.

§ 757. *Authorities in the United States.*—In the United States, the authorities are directly at war. But the true doctrine, as it seems to us, is, that the party paying less than its face value for paper made, accepted, drawn, or indorsed for accommodation, and not knowing the fact at the time of purchase, is entitled to recover the full amount against the accommodation parties, because they have deliberately and intentionally put forth themselves to be treated as being bound in the manner indicated.¹ But the view has been taken in a number of cases that he is only a *bona fide* holder to the extent of the consideration paid by himself or a prior party, and can recover that only against the accommodation parties.² And even if he knew they were accommodation parties at the time of purchase, it would make no difference, provided the party he purchased it from was a *bona fide* holder, who could himself enforce it,³ or was a subsequent holder to the parties between whom the accommodation existed, and appeared to the purchaser to be himself a *bona fide* holder, and not an agent for any of the parties to the accommodation.⁴ It will be observed that if the purchaser of a bill accepted, on note made for accommodation, gives for it an amount less than the discount allowed by law, he will come within the provision of the statutes against usury, provided he knew its accommodation character.⁵ Where no question of usury arises, and there is no question of fraud, we think that it matters not what the purchaser pays, and that he may recover the whole amount against anterior parties accommodation, or otherwise.

¹ Moore v. Baird, 30 Penn. St. 138; Gaul v. Willis, 26 Penn. St. 259.

² Holcomb v. Wyckoff, 35 N. J. L. R. (6 Vroom), 37 (1870); Allaire v. Hartsborne, 1 Zab. 665; Stoddard v. Kimball, 6 Cush. 469; Story on Bills (Bennett's ed.), § 188.

³ Holcomb v. Wyckoff, 35 N. J. L. R. 37.

⁴ Whitworth v. Adams, 5 Rand. 333; Gimmi v. Cullen, 20 Grat. 439.

⁵ See *ante*, § 751.

§ 758. *When bill or note has inception in fraud.*—When the execution of the bill or note has been induced by fraud, a different rule, according to a number of authorities, would apply. The *bona fide* holder of it for value, and without notice is undoubtedly entitled to be protected against a loss which would befall him if the party defrauded were permitted to set up the defense of fraud on the part of the payee against him, as we have already seen. But it does not, therefore (as has been considered), follow that he may recover of such party the whole amount, when he has paid a less sum. For his protection and security against loss, it is only necessary that he should be paid back the amount which he was induced to give for the instrument by its appearance of validity; and therefore such amount is the limit of his recovery against the drawer or maker who was defrauded into the execution of the instrument.¹ Thus, in New York, where the payee obtained a note for \$1,000 by fraud, for a worthless patent right, and sold it to the plaintiff for \$900 two days afterward, it was held that only \$900 could be recovered against the maker.²

And in the same State, where the payee obtained a note from the maker by false and fraudulent representations made on the sale of a patent right, and passed it to the holder with another note for a span of horses, worth but half as much as the amount of the note, it was held that the value of the consideration only could be recovered against the maker.³

¹ Holcomb v. Wyckoff, 35 N. J. L. R. 38; Story on Bills, § 188.

² Harger v. Wilson, 63 Barb. 237 (1872), Talcott, J.: "A majority of the Court think that the *bona fide* holder of a note thus fraudulently obtained, has no equity as against the party defrauded, beyond the amount of the advances he has made upon the faith of the note."

³ Huff v. Wagner, 63 Barb. 230 (1872), Talcott, J., saying in the course of his opinion: "The plaintiff had a verdict under the instruction of the court that he was a *bona fide* holder, and was entitled to recover on the note, notwithstanding the fraud practiced by Ferguson in obtaining the note. The special term granted a new trial upon the exception to the ruling as to the admission of the evidence, and upon the principle that a *bona fide* holder of commercial paper, to which, as between maker and payee, there is a good defense, is entitled to be protected only to the extent of the value which he has paid. This, I think, is correct.

Again, where a note for \$10,000 was left at the payee's place of business, in contemplation of a settlement between him and the maker, but was not delivered to the payee or to any one for his use, and no settlement was effected, and the note was taken by the payee and indorsed by him to the plaintiff for the sum of \$1,500, it was held that the latter's recovery against the maker was limited to the sum paid, with interest. Daniels, J., quoting numerous authorities said: "Accordingly, it has been held that the indorser of commercial paper, not valid as a legal obligation in the hands of the payee negotiating, must be restricted in his recovery to the value

The protection of the holder for value in such cases, as in other cases, where the law protects *bona fide* purchasers against latent claims, is founded upon the idea of protecting such *bona fide* purchaser for value against any possible loss. And this is the precise reason why a *bona fide* holder of such paper, which has been transferred to him to secure an antecedent debt, cannot recover against the party who has been defrauded, namely, that he has lost nothing by his reliance upon the face of the paper.

"These principles are discussed and laid down in a very elaborate opinion of the late chancellor, delivered in the Court of Errors, in the leading case of *Stalker v. McDonald*, 6 Hill, 93, in which he expressly holds that, if the holder of such paper has paid but a part of the consideration or value of the property, he is only entitled to be considered as a *bona fide* purchaser *pro tanto*, and refers with approbation to the case of *Edwards v. Jones*, 7 Car. & P. 633, in which, in an action on a note for £100, the consideration of which was impeached by a plea, the plaintiff replied that it was indorsed to him for the consideration of £49. And he was only permitted to recover the £49 advance.

"The proposition sought to be maintained by the counsel for the appellant in this case, namely, that whatever may have been the consideration of the transfer of a negotiable note, if it was a valuable one, the holder without notice of the invalidity of the note may recover the entire face thereof, without reference to the amount paid by him for it, would produce most unjust and startling results. It would enable the holder of a stolen note for \$1,000 to recover the entire amount thereof from the maker, from whom it had been stolen, although the holder had purchased the same without notice for only \$100—a result revolting to common sense, and going far beyond affording that protection which public policy requires should be extended to parties who purchase negotiable paper for value. I see no reason for any distinction between the case of a purchaser for money, and one where the note is exchanged for property. If such a distinction could be made, the maker of the note could have no protection. Such notes would then be used in the purchase of property, as in this case, instead of sold for money. The purchaser is fully protected against loss by being enabled to recover the full value of the property parted with on the purchase." *Moore v. Ryder*, 65 N. Y. 443.

with interest advanced by the payee upon the faith of it. These authorities fully sustain that proposition, and they are in no sense in conflict with the rule that allows a recovery for the full amount of paper improperly negotiated when an adequate consideration has been advanced in good faith upon it. The paper derives its vitality wholly from the circumstance that it has been obtained for value without notice by an innocent purchaser. For his protection it is maintained in his hands as a legal obligation. The object of the law is to save him from loss; and to do that a recovery of the amount he may have advanced is all that can be required. To go beyond it would be inequitable and unjust to the party, after that, equally entitled to be protected from unnecessary loss."¹ But in the same State it has been also held that if there was no intent to deliver the paper, and in fact no delivery, and the holder should acquire it from the payee at a price less than the discount allowed by law, the transaction would be usurious, and the holder could not recover at all.² Where some legal consideration exists in the inception

¹ Todd v. Shelbourne, 15 N. Y. S. C. (8 Hun), 512 (1876).

² Hall v. Wilson, 16 Barb. 548 (1873); *ante*, § 751; Eastman v. Shaw, 65 N. Y. 522. In this case the defendant signed a note and put it in the hands of the payee to show to others as evidence that he would contribute that amount to a certain proposed enterprise. The company to carry it on was never formed as proposed, and the payee sold the note at a discount greater than legal interest. In an action by the holder against the maker it was held that the note had no inception until the sale, and was usurious and void; and therefore, that the holder could recover nothing. Dwight, C., said: "These authorities serve to show that a note must have had an inception, to make it the subject of sale, is not confined to the case of accommodation paper, but extends to all cases where the paper, though in the similitude of a note, has no existence as between the immediate parties to it. This point is well shown by the case of Marvin v. McCullum, 20 Johns. R. 288. * * On this ground it appears to me that the case of Hall v. Wilson, 16 Barb. 548, was correctly decided. * * It is not necessary in reaching this conclusion to disagree with such cases as Howe v. Potter, 61 Barb. 356, and Harger v. Wilson, 63 Id. 237. In each of these cases the transaction had all the elements of a contract. In Harger v. Wilson the maker of the note intentionally issued the note and put it in circulation, though induced to do so by the fraud of the payee. Here was a valid contract, though in its nature defeasible. The payee could have brought an action on the note, though the fraud might have been urged as a defense. It was properly held that the note

of the paper, it seems that in New York the *bona fide* holder may recover the full amount, no matter what amount he may give for it.¹ This seems to us the true distinction in such cases. If the paper is issued in fraud without consideration, the *bona fide* purchaser should be limited in recovery to the amount paid with interest.² But if there was an original valid consideration, or the paper was issued fairly and intentionally without consideration, then he is entitled to recover the whole amount regardless of the amount he pays.³

§ 758 *a. Conflicting authorities.*—There are authorities which conflict with the doctrine of the text, and there is no doubt that some of these cited in support of it, by the courts

had an inception in the hands of the payee. Such a case is plainly no authority, for the decision of one where the defense is, that the note never took effect at all, because there was no intent to deliver, and in fact no delivery.”

¹ *Howe v. Potter*, 61 Barbour, 357 (1872). In this case nothing is said as to the amount reserved by the holder, but it appears to have been a full recovery upon the draft. As to the rule in Tennessee see *Coliger v. Francis*, 58 Tenn. 423; *post*, § 778, note; and *Holman v. Holson*, 8 Humph. 107; *Petty v. Hiuman*, 2 Humph. 102.

² *Holcomb v. Wyckoff*, 35 N. J. (L. R.) 33 (1870), Depue, J., saying: “The case now before the Court cannot be distinguished from *Allaire v. Hartshorne* upon any principle founded on reason or justice. In both cases the notes were void in the hands of the original parties, and the only vitality they possessed was that which they acquired from the consideration for which they were transferred. In the one case a portion of the sum mentioned in the note being a trust for the payee, as to whom the note was void, it was manifest that for so much the plaintiff ought not to recover; in the other case, the note being equally void, the plaintiff has no equity to recover, beyond what will be indemnity for the money prepaid for it.”

³ See *Daniels v. Wilson*, 21 Minn. 530 (1875). In this case a note for \$280 79, with accumulated interest, was sold by indorsement to the holder for \$150. It was without consideration. Berry, J., said: “The familiar general rule is that an indorsee of negotiable paper, for value, before maturity, without notice of any infirmity, takes it clear of all equities and defenses between antecedent parties, and is, of course, entitled to full amount of the same, according to its tenor. When the original consideration of the paper is illegal or fraudulent, or it is taken as collateral security, and perhaps in some other instances, an exception to this rule has been recognized, so as to restrict the right of recovery to the consideration actually paid by the indorsee, or to the amount of the debt to which the paper is collateral. The defendant contends for a like exception in this case, in which it appears that the note was without consideration, and the plaintiff purchased it for less than its face. But in our opinion no such exception is admissible upon principle.

which adopt it as sound law, are not strictly applicable as precedents. They are cases in which the holder took the paper invalid between original parties as security for a debt, and would hold the residue after discharging it as a trustee for the transferrer; and in such cases it has been properly held that as the transferrer could not himself recover, there could be no recovery as a trustee for his benefit, and therefore no recovery beyond the amount due the plaintiff.¹

While we reject these cases as authoritative in support of the text, yet its conclusions seem to rest upon broad principles of equity, and to extend a just and sufficient protection to purchasers of commercial paper while not too rigorously pursuing those who have been innocently defrauded into its execution.

In Iowa, the contrary doctrine has been distinctly held in a case where a note for \$150 obtained by fraud was indorsed to a purchaser for \$80. Day, J., saying: "The defense that a note has been obtained fraudulently, or without consideration does not avail against a *bona fide* holder. If, however, the recovery of such holder may be limited to the amount paid, it is apparent that the defense does avail, for without such defense he would recover the amount evidenced by the note."² And the like view seems to have obtained in other cases, though the question as to the limitation of the amount of recovery was not particularly presented but rather assumed not to exist, if there could be any recovery at all.³

The United States Supreme Court, in a recent decision, expresses itself in favor of the doctrine that "the purchaser of a negotiable security before maturity, in cases where he is not personally chargeable with fraud, is entitled to recover its full amount against its maker, though he may have paid

¹ Allaire v. Hartshorne, 1 Zabriskie, 663; see § 832.

² Lay v. Wissman, 36 Iowa, 305 (1873). See Article in Albany L. J. vol 18, No. 13, Sept. 28, 1878, p. 247; Vinten v. Peck, 14 Mich. 296 (1866); Campbell, J.: "The maker of a note has no concern with the amount paid for it by a *bona fide* holder."

³ Bailey v. Smith, 21 Ohio St. 396 (1863); Mathews v. Rutherford, 7 La. An.

less than its par value, whatever may have been its original infirmity.¹

§ 758 *b*. If the purchaser has paid only part of the amount agreed upon for the paper, and the contract remains unexecuted as to the residue, when he receives notice of fraud in the inception of the paper, it is clear that he can then recover only the amount which he had paid before such notice was received. As to what he pays after such notice he is not a purchaser in good faith.² And a portion of the contract be entirely unexecuted when he receives notice of the fraud he can recover nothing.³

§ 759. *When there is usury established as between indorser and indorsee* of a bill or note, the indorsee cannot sustain action against the indorser, because the contract is void. But it is held by some authorities that he may sue prior parties, tracing title through his indorser, because, in so far as it transfers title, it is an executed contract; and as a party claiming a stolen horse could recover him from the thief, although in proving it to be his property it appears that he acquired title under a usurious bargain, so the holder may prove his right to recover the amount due from those not implicated in the usury.⁴ By other authorities the doctrine is denied; but

225, quoted for this doctrine, was a case of accommodation paper, and not of paper obtained by fraud.

¹ *Cromwell v. County of Sac.* 96 U. S. (6 Otto), 60 (1877).

² *Dresser v. Misso. &c. R. R. Co.* 93 U. S. (3 Otto), 95; *Hubbard v. Chapin*, 2 Allen, 328; *Lay v. Wissman*, 36 Iowa, 309.

³ *Crandell v. Vickery* 45 Barb. 156.

⁴ *Armstrong v. Gibson*, 31 Wis. 66 (1872); *Collier v. Nevill*, 3 Dev. 31; *Knights v. Putnam*, 3 Pick. 185, *Wilde, J.*: "It is manifest that the maker of a note is not affected by a usurious agreement between the indorser and indorsee. He is liable on his contract, and it is immaterial to him whether the action be brought in the name of the indorser, or that of the indorsee. But I hold further that the transfer of a note on a usurious consideration is neither void nor voidable. So far as the indorsement operates as a transfer of the note, it is an executed contract, and the statute against usury is not applicable. It only applies to the implied promise or guaranty of the indorser, which, being an executory contract, may be avoided. But in no case can an executed contract be set aside on the plea of usury. It is not, however, necessary to insist on this distinction or the purpose of sustaining the present verdict. It is sufficient for this pur-

it seems to us sound, though the views expressed against it are weighty.¹

§ 760. *Right to trace title through usurious indorsements.*—The authorities also differ upon the question whether or not a subsequent indorsee who is not a party to the usury, may recover against parties prior to it, tracing title through the indorser who was a party to it. The difficulty may be avoided by such subsequent indorsee striking out the usurious indorsement, and all subsequent indorsements, where there is an indorsement in blank prior to the usury, under which he might then deduce title and enforce payment.² But this may not be practicable, or not desirable; and the better opinion, as it seems to us, is, that the holder without notice may sue and recover against all the parties save the indorser, from whom the usury was exacted. As to him, in so far as his contract is an assurance for the payment of money, it cannot be enforced. But, nevertheless, in so far as it evidences the fact that he has transferred the legal title, it seems to us that the indorsement would be sustained as valid for that purpose, upon the ground that the object and spirit of the statute would be subserved, and no violence done to its letter fairly interpreted. The objection to this view lies in the difficulty in distinguishing a note usurious as between the maker and payee, from an indorsement usurious as between the indorser and indorsee. In the first case, the note would be void in the hands even of an innocent holder; and some of the authorities have held, that as the indorsement would in like manner be void, no title could be traced through it, and no recovery had against the indorser. That no recovery could be had against him we concede; but if the indorsement be declared so far void that title could not be traced through it, it would throw the forfeiture of the debt, not upon the usurer, as the law throws

pose that the transfer is voidable only, and that it is not competent for the defendant, he not being a party to the transfer, to avoid it." See *post*, § 764, notes.

¹ Lloyd v. Keach, 2 Conn. 175; Nichols v. Pearson, 7 Pet. 103.

² Story on Notes, § 190; 2 Parsons N. & B. 431.

it, but upon the innocent holder; and to construe the statute to contemplate and design such a result would reverse the rule that courts should construe statutes so as to favor the remedy. The instrument being valid in its inception, stands on the same footing as a chattel, which the holder may sell at any price; and if operated with, like a horse or goods, under a usurious contract, a subsequent purchaser without notice would be protected, at least so far as the title is concerned, upon the principle that the wrong-doer will not be heard to deny rights acquired under executed contracts to which he is a party, although when void he might be permitted, on grounds of public policy, to resist their enforcement so far as they are executory. If this be not true, the legal debtor would be exonerated from the debt, and the usurer escape punishment, while the innocent holder alone would suffer. No such result can have been contemplated. The title having actually passed from the indorser, we think he could be no more heard to controvert it against an innocent party, than he would be to recover back money paid under a usurious bargain, or to recover in trover the instrument itself.¹ The opposite view has been taken by the United States Supreme Court, and is concurred in by other authorities.²

So where a bill was given by defendant to plaintiff in

¹ Parr v. Eliason, 1 East, 92 (1800); Daniel v. Cartony, 1 Esp. 275 (1795), [But these cases have been overruled. See Lowes v. Mazaredo, 1 Stark 385 (1816); Chapman v. Black, 2 B. & Ald. 588 (1819);] Whitworth v. Adams, 5 Rand. 395, 396, Coalter, J.; but see Id. 419, Cabell, J.; Braman v. Hess, 13 Johns. 52; Munn v. Commission Co. 15 Johns. 44; Bush v. Livingston, 1 Caines' Cases in Error, 66; Foltz v. Mey, 1 Bay, 486; King v. Johnson, 3 McCord, 365; Harick v. Jones, 4 McCord, 402. See *post*, § 764, and notes.

² Nichols v. Pearson, 7 Pet. 103; Lloyd v. Scott, 4 Pet. 205; Gaither v. Farmers', &c. Bank, 1 Pet. 43; Johnson, J.: "Suppose a note given to a woman who marries, and then indorses it without her husband's authority, such an indorsement would be void, and the indorsee could not recover, yet the husband and wife could recover." Lloyd v. Keach, 2 Conn. 175; Lowes v. Mazaredo, 1 Stark. 385; Chapman v. Black, 2 B. & Ald. 588; Whitworth v. Adams, 5 Rand. 419, 420; Cabell, J. [and see, also, opinions of Carr & Greene, JJ., who dissented on general grounds from the judgment of the court; on this point see, also, same case, p. 395-6, Coalter, J., *contra*;] Story on Notes, § 190.

consideration of his entering into a copartnership with him, and the contract was broken, it was held that he could not recover the whole amount, but only, as Lord Kenyon, C. J., said, "the damages which he had really sustained by non-performance of the contract."¹

§ 761. When, however, there has been a novation of the debt, the case is different. Thus where the indorsee gave \$900 for a note of \$1,000, indorsed first by its vendor, and then by L. & K., who indorsed it for accommodation of the vendor, at the indorsee's instance, and when the note matured, the indorsee accepted two notes of the vendor for \$400 and \$600 respectively, indorsed for the vendor's accommodation by L. & K., and surrendered up the note for \$1,000, it was held that he could recover the whole amount of L. & K., though he knew they were accommodation indorsers.²

SECTION III.

VALIDITY OF TRANSFER AND AMOUNT OF RECOVERY AGAINST TRANSFERRER.

§ 762. The *third* question, whether or not there is usury upon the transfer of the instrument; and the *fourth* question, what is the amount of recovery against the indorser, if there be no usury—remained to be considered, and may be better presented in connection with each other.

It is quite clear, and universally conceded, that, if the transferrer does not indorse the instrument, the mere selling of it at any price is unobjectionable, as the transferrer does not bind himself for the repayment of the amount paid him in any event.³ And the same principle would apply if there were an indorsement "without recourse."⁴ And if the

¹ Ledger v. Ewer, Peake's Cases, 217.

² Ingalls v. Lee, 9 Barb. 647.

³ See *ante*, § 751.

⁴ Freeman v. Britton, 2 Har. 191; Durant v. Banta, 3 Dutch. 630. But see Ruffin v. Armstrong, 2 Hawks, 411.

holder received the instrument from an agent of the indorsee, not knowing the fact of his agency, there would then be no usury, as the apparent owner does not himself indorse it; but appears as the mere seller of a security valid in his hands, without warranting anything but its genuineness.¹ It is also quite clear that the transfer of a bill or note by delivery, or by indorsement, may be a feature of a usurious contract, as for instance where a note is indorsed as collateral security for a usurious loan of money, in which case it is not the indorsement *per se* which constitutes usury, but its entering into a usurious transaction as a component part thereof.² But when there is an indorsement of a bill or note upon its transfer for an amount less than the legal rate of discount upon an advancement of money, its effect *per se* gives rise to a disputation in which many views have been presented.

§ 763. The *first* view is, that as between indorser and indorsee the contract is usurious, and that the indorsee, who is a party to the usury, cannot sue any prior party, because he holds the instrument under a contract absolutely void.³ Every indorser of a bill or note, it is said, is in law a new drawer; and that as the drawer of a bill, who discounts it at less than the rate allowed by law, binds himself for repayment of the amount, and in fact procures a loan upon the faith of the bill as security, such discount by the drawer is

¹ Whitworth v. Adams, 5 Rand. 333; Gaul v. Willis, 26 Penn. St. 261; Taylor v. Bruce, Gilmer (Va.), 42.

² Levy v. Gadsby, 3 Cranch, 180. Where upon a usurious negotiation for a loan in reference to a pre-existing debt the note was indorsed to the plaintiff, and thus came within the description of "an assurance for forbearance." See also Gaither v. Farmers', &c. Bank, 1 Pet. 37; Nichols v. Pearson, 7 Pet. 108; Newman v. Williams, 29 Miss. 212.

³ Whitworth v. Adams, 5 Rand. 419 (1827). Cabell, J., said: "If the note had passed from the payee to the person who paid the money, on a contract of indorsement, by which the payee received for the bill less than its nominal amount, deducting legal interest, I should be decidedly of opinion that the indorsement was usurious and void, on the ground mentioned by Bailey, J., in Lowes v. Mazaredo, 1 Stark. 385; Comyn's Usury, 181, that 'every indorsement is considered in law as a new drawing.'" Freeman v. Britton, 2 Har. 191, overruled in Durant v. Banta, 3 Dutch. 624.

usurious;¹ and so, in like manner, the indorsement of a bill or note for a less amount than the legal rate of discount is usurious.²

§ 764. The *second* view is, that although, as between indorser and indorsee, the transaction is usurious,³ and the contract of the former, so far as it binds him to repay the money, is void, yet that so far as it has been executed by a transfer of the title, and right to sue prior parties, the courts should respect it, and enforce a recovery against them for the full amount.⁴

§ 765. The *third* view is that it is not usurious, because such indorsement shall be held to have been made for the purpose of transfer merely; and that although he thus makes himself liable to all the world but the purchaser, it is, as between them, a simple indorsement for the accommodation of the purchaser. And such purchaser, while he cannot recover at all against the indorser, may recover the whole amount of the maker, acceptor and prior parties.⁵

¹ *Lowes v. Mazaredo*, 1 Stark. 385 (2 E. C. L. R.); *Comyn on Usury*, 181; *King v. Ridge*, 4 Price, 50 (1817), copied in Appendix, 5 Rand. 617; *Whitworth v. Adams*, 5 Rand. 419; *Saltmarsh v. Planters', &c. Bank*, 14 Ala. 668; *Noble v. Walker*, 17 Ala. 456.

² This doctrine is denied in *Lloyd v. Keach*, 2 Conn. 175. See *post*, § 767.

³ *Ballinger v. Edwards*, 4 Ired. Eq. 449 (1847); *Ray v. McMillan*, 2 Jones Law, 227 (1854); *Bynum v. Rogers*, 4 Jones Law, 399 (1859); *McElwee v. Collins*, 4 Dev. & B. (N. C.) 210 (1839). Daniel, J., said: "There is a distinction between taking a bill and advancing money on it, with an indorsement or guaranty, and one without. The last is a purchase, and may be for less than the real value; the other is a loan, and within the operation of statute of usury.

⁴ *Collier v. Nevill*, 3 Dev. 31. Ruffin, J., said: "The discounting of a bill or bond and taking the general indorsement of the holder does *ex vi termini* constitute a loan; and if the rate of discount exceed that fixed by statute, it is a usurious loan. * * But upon the strength of the authorities, and the opinion heretofore generally received by the country at large and the profession, the court feels constrained to decide that the defendants cannot avail themselves of any intermediate illegality. The bond was available between the obligor and obligees. The former is not privy to the usurious agreement between the latter and the present holder." See, also, *Littell v. Hord*, Hard. R. 232; *Cowles v. McVickar*, 3 Wis. 725; *Armstrong v. Gibson*, 31 Wis. 61.

⁵ *Whitworth v. Adams*, 5 Rand. 388; *Coalter, J.* (not concurred in on this point by the other judges). *Cowles v. McVickar*, 3 Wisc. (Smith), 731, does not decide this, as seems to have been thought by Prof. Parsons, vol. 2 N. & B. 428;

§ 766. The *fourth* view is that it is not usurious, because although the indorsee, who is regarded in the light of a purchaser, and not as a lender, may recover against the maker, acceptor,¹ or other prior parties,² the whole amount, as against the indorser who is the seller, he can only recover the amount paid with legal interest.³ And so as against any party, in whatever form he may find himself, upon the transfer the assignee can only recover back the consideration paid.⁴

§ 767. The *fifth* view is that it is not usurious, for the reason that the contract between indorser and indorsee is at best but a conditional or provisional contract, the indorser not being bound save upon the condition of due presentment and notice, and being regarded in the light of a guarantor against the insolvency of the promisor; and that the validity of the transaction turns upon the inquiry, was it an unaf-

but merely that the indorsement may be only to pass the title, where the transaction was by agreement a mere sale of the note.

¹ Munn v. Commission Co. 15 Johns. 44 (1818), Spencer, J.: "The drawer and acceptor in a suit by the indorsee have nothing to do with the consideration paid for the bill by such indorsee to the drawer. They are bound to pay the bill; but as respects the payee and first indorsee, if he be sued by his immediate indorsee, it will be competent for him to show the real consideration paid: and if it be less than the face of the bill and the legal interest for the time the bill had to run, then he can claim to have the difference deducted." Ingalls v. Lee, 9 Barb. 650; Cobb v. Titus, 13 Barb. 47; Cram v. Hendricks, 7 Wend. 569.

² Ingalls v. Lee, 9 Barb. 651, Parker, J.: "It is now settled, that an indorsee, who buys a note at less than its face, can recover against the indorser no more than the sum for which he bought the note, with interest; though he may recover the full amount of the note against the maker. Whether the rule thus limiting the recovery would apply to third persons who indorse for the accommodation of the payee, and who are not parties to the transfer, has not been decided. * * I think the rule referred to applies only as between the parties to the sale, and rests upon the consideration of recovering back the consideration paid." Belden v. Lamb, 17 Conn. 453.

³ Brown v. Mott, 7 Johns. 360 (1811); Braman v. Hess, 13 Johns. 52 (1816); Ingalls v. Lee, 9 Barb. 647; Cobb v. Titus, 13 Barb. 47; Cram v. Kendricks, 7 Wend. 569; Huff v. Wagner, 63 Barb. 215; Harger v. Wilson, 63 Barb. 237; Lane v. Steward, 20 Me. 104; Farmer v. Sewall, 16 Me. 456; French v. Grindle, 15 Me. 163; Brock v. Thompson, 1 Bailey (S. C.) Law, 329; Noble v. Walker, 32 Ala. 456; Hutchins v. McCann, 7 Porter (Ala.) 99; Coge v. Palmer, 16 Cal. 158; Stevenson v. Unkefer, 14 Ill. 105.

⁴ Cobb v. Titus, 13 Barb. 47; Mazuzan v. Mead, 21 Wend. 285.

fectured sale of the instrument, or merely a color for a loan.¹ And further, that if a *bona fide* sale, the indorsee may recover the full amount of all the parties.²

§ 768. Our own views coincide with that last presented, although the authorities to the contrary are weighty and numerous. The statutes against usury confine themselves to the interdiction of excessive interest for the "loan or forbearance of money." And while the indorsement of a bill or note for less than its face value may often be used as a part of the shift to evade the law, it does not seem to us to import *per se* either a direct usurious loan or a screen to hide it. No direct or imperative obligation to return the amount or any part thereof is entered into by the indorser. And it does not seem to us to come within the meaning of the terms usually employed, which declare void "all contracts or assurances made directly or indirectly for the loan or forbearance of money," as it does not indirectly bind the indorser for repayment of a loan by means of any shift or device. It only binds him directly to pay the full amount of a debt for which another is primarily bound, and for which he himself can only become bound by strictest diligence on the part of the holder in making presentment and giving notice. Loans of money to be returned with excessive interest are plainly contradistinguished from amounts paid for securities which are transferred in the usual course of business by indorsement; and as the statutes against usury are to be strictly construed, they do not seem to us to have contemplated commercial transactions of this kind, which partake rather of the nature

¹ Lloyd v. Keach, 2 Conn. 175 (1817), in which it was held that the drawer may discount bills, or the indorser bills or notes at any price, and that it will only be usurious when a shift to evade the statute. Nichols v. Pearson, 7 Pet. 109; but the court expressly declined to decide whether the whole amount might be recovered. State Bank v. Coquillard, 6 Ind. 232; Newman v. Williams, 29 Miss. 223; Gaul v. Willis, 26 Penn. St. 261; Moore v. Baird, 30 Penn. St. 139; Roark v. Turner, 29 Ga. 458

² National Bank of Michigan v. Green, 33 Iowa, 141 (1871); Durant v. Banta, 3 Dutch, 624 (1858), overruling Freeman v. Britton, 2 Har. 191 (1839); Roark v. Turner, 29 Ga. 458.

of sales accompanied by a peculiar and conditional warranty. Prof. Parsons has expressed a similar opinion, in which he compares the indorsement to a sale of a chattel with warranty of its value at a certain future time.¹ The same reasons which induce these conclusions respecting an indorsement for less than the legal rate of discount from the face value of the paper, would apply where the drawer of a bill parts with it for less than the legal rate of discount. The debt due him by the drawee or acceptor is his property, and that property he may sell for any price. And the fact that he warrants its value "at a certain future time," does not, as it seems to us, impart to the transaction the nature of a loan. The drawer does not borrow the money, engaging to repay it with illegal interest, but simply sells a debt due to him by another, engaging that, if that other does not pay it, and peculiar acts of diligence are observed by the purchaser, he will make the debt good. The responsibility, trouble, and expense of pursuing the drawee or acceptor first, is an independent and often a most important consideration; and where such additional consideration enters into the negotiation, it is sufficient to prevent it from being usurious.

¹ 2 Parsons N. & B. 429, 430.

CHAPTER XXIV.

NATURE AND RIGHTS OF A BONA FIDE HOLDER OR PURCHASER.

§ 769. It is a general principle of the law merchant that, as between the immediate parties to a negotiable instrument—parties between whom there is a privity—the consideration may be inquired into; and that as to them the only superiority of a bill or note over other unsealed evidences of debt is, that it *prima facie* imports a consideration.¹

We propose herein to consider the relations of the purchaser or holder of the instrument, who has acquired the instrument from or through an original party, and to show when, and under what circumstances, he may be affected by fraud or illegality in or failure of the original consideration.

By “purchaser” and “holder” of a negotiable instrument² is included any one who has acquired it in good faith for a valuable consideration, from one capable of transferring it, and the following propositions may be considered as settled principles of commercial law—principles which have been, for the most part, reiterated by the Supreme Court of the United States, and prevail throughout the Union:

First. That the purchaser or holder of a negotiable instrument, who has taken it (1) *bona fide*, (2) for a valuable consideration, (3) in the ordinary course of business, (4) when it was not overdue, (5) without notice of its dishonor, and (6) without notice of facts which impeach its validity as between antecedent parties, has a title unaffected by those

¹ See *ante*, § 161 *et seq.* and § 174 *et seq.*

² It was recently held in Massachusetts that the defense that a note was purchased by a National Bank in violation of the National Banking Act could not be availed of by the parties—that if *ultra vires* for the bank to purchase, it was, nevertheless, not one of those things which it lay in the mouth of the parties to the note to object to. *National Pemberton Bank v. Porter*, S. C. of Mass., Sept., 1878; *Bankers' Magazine*, January, 1879, p. 563; *Central Law Journal*, Oct. 25th, 1878, Vol. 7, No. 17, p. 324.

facts, and may recover on the instrument, although it may be without any legal validity as between the antecedent parties, as, for example, though it was without consideration originally,¹ or was subsequently released² or paid,³ and even though it was originally obtained by fraud, theft, or robbery.⁴

Second. That the possession of a negotiable instrument payable to bearer, indorsed in blank, or specially indorsed to the holder, carries title with it to the holder. The possession and title are one and inseparable.⁵

Third. That the burden of proof lies on the person who assails the right claimed by the party in possession.⁶

Fourth. That suspicion of defect of title or knowledge of circumstances which would excite such suspicion in the mind of a prudent man, or gross negligence on the part of the taker at the time of the transfer, will not defeat his title.

But these propositions are subject to the following limitations or qualifications: *First.* That when it was shown by the defendant that the instrument originated in fraud or illegality, the burden of proof will be shifted to the holder, and he must then show that he is a *bona fide* holder for value.⁷ *Second.* When it is shown that the instrument was given for a consideration which by statute is declared void, the original taint follows it, and it is void in the hands of every holder, however innocent.⁸ And *Third.* That no party can enforce a negotiable instrument if it be not genuine, or if it be executed by a party incapable of entering into the contract in which it was given.⁹

¹ See *ante*, § 165 *et seq.*, and *post*, § 810 *et seq.*

² *Schoer v. Houghlin*, 50 Cal. 528; *Palmer v. Marshall*, 60 Ill. 289.

³ *Swall v. Clarke*, 51 Cal. 227.

⁴ See Chapter on Consideration, § 135 *et seq.*; *Kinyon v. Wohlford*, 17 Minn. 240; *Brown v. Spofford*, 95 U. S. (5 Otto), 481 (1877); *Goodman v. Simonds*, 20 How. 343; *Central Bank v. Hammett*, 50 N. Y. 159; *Belmont Branch Bank v. Hoge*, 35 N. Y. 65; *Franklin Savings Bank v. Heusman*, 1 Mo. App. 336; *Johnson v. Way*, 27 Ohio St. 374; *Ogden v. Marchand*, 29 La. 61; *Taylor v. Bowles*, 28 La. 295.

⁵ See *post*, § 812.

⁶ See *post*, § 1503.

⁷ See *ante*, § 166.

⁸ See *ante*, § 197, *post*, § 807.

⁹ *Post*, § 807.

Let us consider now these principles in their order. In some respects, they are so interwoven with each other that it is impossible to sever and disconnect them. But we will endeavor to present as nearly as practicable, under separate heads, the several elements which must combine to panoply with the full protection of the law the party who acquires a negotiable instrument. And first we will endeavor more particularly to define who is a *bona fide* purchaser or holder for value.

SECTION I.

BONA FIDES AND GROSS NEGLIGENCE.

§ 770. In the *first* place, the holder, in order to be entitled to protection against offsets and equities and defenses based upon frauds, pleaded by prior parties, must have acquired the paper in good faith from his predecessor. "Fraud cuts down everything,"¹ and although the holder may pay value, yet, if his acquisition of the paper be in any respect fraudulent—as where it is made or transferred to give him preference over other parties to a compromise of creditors—he cannot claim the position of a *bona fide* holder.² In pleading, *mala fides* must be distinctly alleged, and an allegation that the party is not the *bona fide* holder is not sufficient.³ It is the *bona fides* of the holder alone that is to be considered, not that of his transferrer, and the fact that the payee had an interest to part with the paper, is not a circumstance which affects the rights of his indorsee.⁴

§ 771. The earlier English authorities regarded the *bona fides* of the acquisition of a negotiable as the crucial test by which it was determined whether or not the party so acquiring it by purchase or discount was entitled to stand upon a better footing than his transferrer, and be entitled to

¹ Rogers v. Hadley, 32 L. J. Exch. 248.

² See Chapter VII, on Consideration, *ante*, § 193.

³ Uther v. Rich, 10 Ad. & El. 784.

⁴ Helmer v. Krolick, 36 Mich. 373.

full protection against equitable or other defenses which would otherwise have been valid against him. In a case before Lord Kenyon, where it appeared that a bill had been lost, and advertised in the newspapers, and had been discounted for one who found it, and fraudulently offered it, it was contended that the banker could not recover without using due diligence in inquiring into the circumstances as well respecting the bill as of the person who offered to discount it. But Lord Kenyon said:¹ "I think the point in this case has been settled by the case of *Miller v. Race*, in *Burrow*. If there was any fraud in the transaction, or if a *bona fide* consideration had not been paid for the bill by the plaintiffs, to be sure they could not recover; but to adopt the principle of the defense to the full extent stated would be at once to paralyze the circulation of all the paper in the country, and with it all its commerce. The circumstance of the bill having been lost, might have been material, if they could bring knowledge of that fact home to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs might or might not have seen the advertisement, and it would be going great length to say that a banker was bound to make inquiry concerning every bill brought to him to discount; it would apply as well to a bill for £10 as for £10,000."²

§ 772. For a long period this doctrine remained the undoubted law of England, until, in the case of *Gill v. Cubitt*, Lord Chief Justice Abbott (Lord Tenterden) laid down the principle that, although the holder had given value for the bill or note, yet, if he took it under circumstances which ought to have excited the suspicions of a prudent and careful man, he could not recover; and while professing "unfeigned reverence" for Lord Kenyon, from whom the previously accepted view had emanated, he declared that he could not regard it as the correct one.³

¹ *Lawson v. Weston*, 4 E-s. 56 (1801). ² See *Miller v. Race*, 1 Bur. 452.

³ *Gill v. Cubitt*, 3 Barn. & Cres. 466 (1824), Bayley and Holroyd, JJ., concurring; *Strange v. Wigney*, 6 Bing. 677 (1830), 19 E. C. L. R.; *Snow v. Peacock*, 2 Car. & P. 215 (1825); *Beckwith v. Corral*, 2 Car. & P. 259 (1826).

§ 773. This cautious ruling (as observed by Read, J., in a well considered case in Pennsylvania),¹ although carped at and quarreled with, remained the law for ten years, when, as it seems, the discredit of Bank of England bills on the European continent, and the complaints of the mercantile community, led to a modification of the doctrine of Chief Justice Abbott. And Lord Denman, C. J., told the jury, in a case where it was contended that the plaintiff had not used due caution, and had taken the bill under circumstances that ought to have excited the suspicions of a prudent man, to find for the plaintiff, if they thought that he had not been guilty of gross negligence.²

§ 774. *Gross negligence* was thus established as the test of the holder's right to recover. But it did not long remain so. For, two years later, the Court of King's Bench, which seems to have been impatient under the restriction which even that test imposed on the circulation of negotiable instruments, decided that, while gross negligence might be evidence tending to show *mala fides*, and as such admissible, it did not in itself amount to proof of *mala fides*, and was not sufficient to deprive the holder of his right to recover.³ Thus the *bona*

¹ See *Phelan v. Moss*, 67 Penn. St. 63 (1870). Lord Campbell says in his *Lives of the Chief Justices*, 3d vol. 310 (quoted in 2 Parsons N. & B. 273), that Lord Tenterden's rule died with its author. "It was soon much carped at; some judges said that fraud and gross negligence were terms known to the law, but of 'the circumstances which ought to excite suspicion, there was no definition in Coke or in Cowell;' and the complaint of bill brokers resounded from the Royal Exchange to Westminster Hall, that they could no longer carry on their trade with comfort or safety."

² *Crook v. Jadis*, 5 Barn. & Ad. 909 (27 E. C. L. R.) 1834. Lord Denman, C. J.: "I used the expression gross negligence advisedly, because I thought nothing less ought to have prevented the plaintiff from recovery on the bill." Littledale, J.: "There must be gross negligence, at least, in a case like the present, to deprive a party of his right to recover on a bill of exchange." Taunton, J.: "I think the case was properly submitted to the jury. I cannot estimate the degree of care which a prudent man should take. The question put by the Lord Chief Justice, whether the plaintiff was guilty of gross negligence, was more definite and appropriate." Patteson, J.: "I never could understand what is meant by a party's taking a bill under circumstances which ought to have excited the suspicion of a prudent man." *Backhouse v. Harrison*, 5 Barn. & Ad. 1098 (1834).

³ *Goodman v. Harvey*, 4 Ad. & El. 870 (1836).

fides of the purchaser or holder was restored as the test of his right to recover, and, after a wide departure, the law re-established upon the original basis established by Lord Kenyon. And Lord Denman, C. J., said: "The question I offered to submit to the jury was whether the plaintiff had been guilty of gross negligence or not. I believe we are all of opinion that gross negligence only would not be a sufficient answer where the party has given consideration for the bill. Gross negligence may be evidence of *mala fides*, but it is not the same thing. We have shaken off the last remnant of the contrary doctrine. Where the bill has passed to the plaintiff without any proof of bad faith in him, there is no objection to his title."

The rule thus finally re-established in England has been followed and approved there in subsequent cases,¹ and has met with the approbation of most all of the writers on negotiable instruments, on the ground that it relieves them of the clog which the contrary doctrine imposes on their negotiability, and presents at once the clear and intelligible question of *bona fides* for the consideration of the jury; whereas, to leave it to a jury to determine as to the degree of caution which a prudent man must exercise on taking such an instrument, would lead to much perplexity and to frequent injustice.²

§ 775. *American authorities.*—In the United States, the decisions of the courts have varied, some following the rule declared in *Gill v. Cubitt*,³ but by far the greater number

¹ *Raphael v. Bank of England*, 33 Eng. L. & Eq. 278 (1855); *Arbounin v. Anderson*, 1 Ad. & El. N. S. 498 (1841); *Uther v. Rich*, 10 Ad. & El. 784 (1839); *Easeley v. Crockford*, 10 Bing. 243 (25 E. C. L. R. 116), (1833).

² *Story on Notes*, §§ 197, 382; *Story on Bills*, § 416; *Edwards on Bills*, 506; 2 *Parsons N. & B.* 277-279; see preface of *Chitty & Hulme to Chitty on Bills*.

³ *Hamilton v. Marks*, 52 Mo. 81 (overruled), *Adams, J.*, saying: "We think the old doctrine the better rule, and is supported by the weight of authority and reason both in England and America," 63 Mo. 167; *Buckner v. Jones*, 1 Mo. App. 538; *Edwards v. Thomas*, 2 Mo. App. 283 (overruled); *Holbrook v. Mix*, 1 E. D. Smith, 154 (1851); *Pringle v. Phillips*, 5 Sand. 157 (1851) (now overruled, see below); *Beltzhoover v. Blackstock*, 3 Watts, 20 (1834) (now overruled); *Sanford v. Norton*, 14 Vt. 231 (1842); *Varin v. Hobson*, 8 La. 50; *Nicholson v. Patton*, 13 La. O. S. 216 (1838); *Lapice v. Clifton*, 17 La. 152; *Marsh v. Small*, 3

concurring in the principle which has been finally established as the law of England.¹ Chancellor Kent, in his Commentaries, embodies the views taken in *Gill v. Cubitt*; but at that time the present prevailing doctrine had not been re-established, and it is to be supposed that he merely incorporated in his text the then existing decisions of the English courts.² But both upon principle and authority, it is safe to say that the experience of the commercial world, and of the courts before which the doctrines here discussed have so often passed in review, have satisfied jurists, as well as men of business, that the interests of commerce are best subserved by the liberal view which promotes the circulation of negotiable instruments; and that the *bona fides* of the transaction should be the decisive test of the holder's rights.³ It is not

La. An. 402; *Lanfear v. Blossman*, 1 La. An. 148; *Ayer v. Hutchins*, 4 Mass. 370 (1808) (overruled); *Wiggins v. Bush*, 12 Johns. 306 (1815) (overruled); *Adkins v. Blake*, 2 J. J. Marsh. 40 (1829); *Hall v. Hale*, 8 Conn. 336 (overruled); *Hunt v. Sandford*, 6 Yerg. 3.7; *Cone v. Baldwin*, 12 Pick. 545; *Ryland v. Brown*, 2 Head, 273; *Merrill v. Duncan*, 7 Heisk. 164; *McConnell v. Hodson*, 2 Gilm. 640; *Russell v. Haddock*, 3 Gilm. 233 (1846).

¹ *Phelan v. Moss*, 67 Penn. St. 62 (1870); *Murray v. Lardner*, 2 Wall. 110 (1864); *Mabie v. Johnson*, 15 N. Y. S. C. 309 (1876); *Welsh v. Sage*, 47 N. Y. 147 (1872); *Belmont v. Hoge*, 35 N. Y. 67 (1866); *Magee v. Badger*, 34 N. Y. 247 (1859); *Birdsall v. Russell*, 29 N. Y. 249; *Hall v. Wilson*, 16 Barb. 548 (1853); *Seybel v. Nat'l Currency Bank*, 54 N. Y. 288 (1873); *Swift v. Tyson*, 16 Pet. 1 (1842); *Goodman v. Simonds*, 20 How. 367 (1857); *Bank of Pittsburgh v. Neal*, 22 Id.; *Citizens' Nat. Bank v. Hooper*, 47 Md. 88; *Maitland v. Citizens' Nat. Bank*, 40 Md. 540; *Commercial, &c. Nat. Bank v. First Nat. Bank*, 30 Md. 11 (1868); *Ellicot v. Martin*, 6 Md. 509 (1854); *Mathews v. Poythress*, 4 Ga. 287 (1848); *Brush v. Scribner*, 11 Conn. 388 (1836); *Craft's Appeal*, 42 Conn. 146; *Hamilton v. Vought*, 34 N. J. L. R. (5 Vroom), 190 (1870); *Spooner v. Holmes*, 162 Mass. 503 (1869); *Worcester County Bank v. Dorchester, &c. Bank*, 10 Cush. 488 (1852); *Wyer v. Dorchester, &c. Bank*, 11 Cush. 51 (1853); *Smith v. Livingston*, 111 Mass. 342; *Lake v. Reed*, 29 Iowa, 258 (1872); *Gage v. Sharp*, 24 Iowa, 19 (1867); *Grenaux v. Wheeler*, 6 Tex. 526 (1851); *Spreeves v. Allen*, 79 Ill. 553; *Johnson v. Way*, 27 Ohio St. 374; *Comstock v. Hannah*, 76 Ill. 530; *Edwards v. Thomas*, 66 Mo. 483 (1877) (overruling former decisions). *Semble Davis v. Miller*, 14 Grat. 5 (1857).

² 3 Kent Com. 103, 104.

³ The admirable remarks of Chief Justice Beasley, of New Jersey, in *Hamilton v. Vought*, 34 N. J. L. R. 187, are eminently worthy of quotation: "From this brief review of the cases, I think it may be safely said that the doctrine introduced by Lord Tenterden stands, at the present moment, marked with the dis-

the duty of parties about to purchase negotiable paper to make any inquiries not required by good faith, as to possible defenses of which they have no notice, either from the face of the paper, or facts communicated at the time.¹

§ 776. A case before the United States Supreme Court, in 1864, fully illustrates the doctrine of the text, and shows the gradual growth of the principle. In that case it appeared that Lardner, who did business in Philadelphia, owned certain negotiable coupon bonds of the Camden & Amboy R. R. Company; and that, on the night of the 23d of February, 1859, they were stolen from his office in Philadelphia, and on the next day negotiated to Murray, a broker in New York,

approval of the highest judicial authority. Nor does such disapproval rest upon merely speculative grounds. That doctrine was put in practice for a course of years, and it was thus, from experience, found to be inconsistent with true commercial policy. Its defect—a great defect, as I think—was, that it provided nothing like a criterion on which a verdict was to be based. The rule was, that to defeat the note, circumstances must be shown of so suspicious a character that they would put a man of ordinary prudence on inquiry; and by force of such a rule it is obvious every case possessed of unusual incidents would, of necessity, pass under the uncontrolled discretion of a jury. An incident of the transaction from which any suspicion could arise was sufficient to take the case out of the control of the court. There was no judicial standard by which suspicious circumstances could be measured before committing them to the jury. And it is precisely this want which the modern rule supplies. When *multi fides* is the point of inquiry, suspicious circumstances must be of a substantial character, and if such circumstances do not appear, the court can arrest the inquiry. Under the former practice, circumstances of slight suspicion would take the case to the jury; under the present rule, the circumstances must be strong, so that bad faith can be reasonably inferred. Thus the subject has passed from the indefinite to the comparatively definite; from the intangible to the comparatively tangible. From a mere matter of fact, the question, to some extent, has become one of law. I cannot doubt, when we recollect that inquiries of this nature always attend that class of cases where judgments are sought against innocent and unfortunate parties, that the change is most beneficial. All experience has shown how hard it is to prevent juries from seizing on the slightest circumstance, to avoid giving a verdict against the maker of a note which had been obtained by fraud or theft. To preserve the negotiability of commercial paper and guard the interests of trade, it is absolutely necessary that large power should be placed in the judicial hand when the question arises as to what facts are sufficient to defeat the claim of the holder of a note or bill which has been taken before maturity, and for which value has been paid. It is only in this mode that the requisite stability in transactions of this kind can be retained.”

¹ Murray v. Beckwith, 81 Ill. 43; Houry v. Eppinger, 34 Mich. 29.

for value. Lardner sued in detinue to recover the bonds, in the United States Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York, and obtained judgment. To the instructions of the court that the burden of proof rested on the defendant to show that he received the paper without notice of the theft, and that it was for the jury to say whether there were such circumstances in the negotiation as would warrant the inference that there was ground of suspicion, Murray excepted, and the Supreme Court sustained his exception. Mr. Justice Swayne, who delivered the opinion, disapproved *Gill v. Cubitt*, 3 Barn. & C. 466, and quoted with approval *Goodman v. Harvey*, 4 Ad. & El. 870, in which Lord Denham said: "I believe we are all of opinion that gross negligence only would not be a sufficient answer where the party has given a consideration for the bill. Gross negligence may be evidence of *mala fides*, but is not the same thing. We have shaken off the last remnant of the contrary doctrine. Where the bill has passed to the plaintiff without any proof of bad faith in him, there is no objection to his title." And considering that the good faith of Murray in the transaction had not been impeached, decided in his favor.¹ The same doctrine has been applied to coupons of United States bonds, and coupons.²

§ 776 *a*. The party who has been defrauded into the execution of a note may recover damages of the payee to whom he has delivered it. If the note at the time of trial be overdue, the damages would be nominal only, as it would then be open to defenses even if transferred thereafter to a *bona fide* holder; but if not due, it might bind the maker for the full amount in such a holder's hands, and the damages awarded should be the face value of the note.³

¹ *Murray v. Lardner*, 2 Wall. 710; see Chapter XLVII, on Coupon Bonds, Sec. III, vol. 2; and *Collins v. Gilbert*, 94 U. S. (4 Otto), 757.

² *Spooner v. Holmes*, 102 Mass. 503; *Seybel v. National Currency Bank*, 54 N. Y. 288.

³ *Thayer v. Manley*, 15 N. Y. S. C. (8 Hun), 551 (1876).

SECTION II.

WHAT IS MEANT BY VALUABLE CONSIDERATION.

§ 777. In the *second place* he must have acquired the instrument for a valuable consideration.¹ In some cases it is said that the holder must have parted with "full value," sometimes "fair value," and sometimes the expression, "for value" is used.

In New York it has been said that "the consideration for the transfer must be full and fair as well as valuable,"² while in another it is said that "when a parting with value is proved, the amount of the consideration is not otherwise important than as bearing on the question of actual or constructive notice."³ This latter view seems to us the correct one. The owner of a bill or note has as much right to sell it as he has to sell his horse. The prior parties, by making it negotiable, have warranted the right of the payee or indorsee to make title to another.

And if he does so at any price, the holder acquires full rights and interests in the instruments as against all parties, unless he had notice of defects, or willfully abstained from inquiry under circumstances which justify the imputation of bad faith. The price at which the paper is offered may amount *prima facie* to notice, and create the presumption of bad faith in the purchaser. If a person were to offer a fine horse for sale for five cents, the very nature of the offer would warn the purchaser that he acted at his peril. And so if the amount which the holder offers to take for a negotiable instrument is totally insignificant as compared to its face value, it might be under the circumstances implied notice that there was something wrong about it; and if he took it without inquiry, he should not be protected. There is no conflict between this view and the cases which hold that gross negli-

¹ See as to consideration of Neg. Instr., Vol. 7, §§ 160 to 207, inclusive.

² *Goldsmid v. Lewis County Bank*, 12 Barb. 410.

³ *Gould v. Segee*, 5 Duer, 270, Duer, J. (1856).

gence will not of itself be sufficient to impeach the holder's or purchaser's title. This is not merely gross negligence, but may be regarded as willful or fraudulent blindness, and abstinence from inquiry, so great as to amount to evidence of bad faith. For it is the obvious suggestion of reason that a *bona fide* owner would not throw away his property for a mere song, and that the purchaser acted in bad faith when he acquired it for comparatively nothing.

§ 778. Where the plaintiff, knowing that the maker was able to pay, bought his note for \$300 from a third party, paying only \$5, and the note had been executed without consideration, it was held that the mere nominal price charged him with constructive notice of the defect.¹ Like decisions have been rendered where the plaintiff bought a note for \$333 33, paying only \$125;² and where the plaintiff purchased a \$300 note for \$50;³ but the grounds of decision in the latter cases were simply that there was gross negligence, which alone is not now deemed a sufficient defense.

§ 779. It is difficult, indeed impossible to lay down the exact line of demarcation and state what proportion the amount paid must bear to the face of the paper in order to charge the purchaser *prima facie* with notice, or raise the presumption of bad faith on his part. But, in general terms, it may be said that the consideration should be so utterly trifling as to bear upon its face the impress of fraud—to leave open no reasonable conjecture but that the purchaser must

¹ Dewitt v. Perkins, 22 Wis. 474 (1868), Dixon, C. J.: "The buying of a note against a solvent maker, the purchaser knowing him to be such, for a mere nominal consideration, is very strong, if not conclusive evidence of *mala fides*. It is constructive notice of the invalidity of the note in the hands of the seller, such as to put the purchaser upon inquiry, which if he fails to make he acts at his peril." See also Lay v. Wissman, 36 Iowa, 305.

² Hunt v. Sanford, 6 Yerg 387 (1834).

³ Gould v. Stevens, 43 Vt. 125 (1870). In Coliger v. Francis, 58 Tenn. 423, the holder paid \$355 for an overdue note for \$1,650 to a party in embarrassed circumstances, the purchaser had means of ascertaining approximate value of the note. It was held that while there was no proof of fraud the circumstances were suspicious, and the holder was restricted in his recovery against the indorser's estate to the amount paid with interest. See also Petty v. Hinman, 2 Humph. 102; Holman v. Hobson, 8 Humph. 107.

have known, from the very nature of the facts, that they could not have originated from any but a corrupt source.¹ The known solvency of prior parties would of course strengthen the argument of implied notice and bad faith wherever they were alleged.

In Pennsylvania the sale of a \$250 note of a maker known to be solvent, by a stranger to the plaintiff for \$100, was considered legitimate, and to constitute the purchaser a *bona fide* holder without notice;² and so in Ohio, the purchase of a note for \$2,500, secured by mortgage, for just half the amount (\$1,250) was viewed in the same light.³

SECTION III.

THE ORDINARY OR USUAL COURSE OF BUSINESS.

§ 780. In the *third place*, the holder must have acquired the paper in the ordinary or usual course of business, by which phrase is meant to describe a transfer according to the usages and customs of commercial transactions. Whether or not a transfer in payment of pre-existing debt is of this character, was for a long time questioned; but the doctrine is now settled, that it is.⁴ And when the paper is transferred as collateral security for a contemporaneous or pre-existing debt, there are many variations of the question, and many views taken, as to whether or not it is in the usual course

¹ See *post*, §§ 795, 796.

² *Phelan v. Moss*, 67 Penn. St. 59 (1871), overruling *Beltzhoover v. Blackstock*, 3 Watts. 20.

³ *Bailey v. Smith*, 14 Ohio St. 402, Ranney, J., saying: "There is very little difficulty in saying that the rule does not require the full face of the paper to be paid. No decision to that effect has ever been made, and the strongest expressions customarily used do not import anything more than that the holder must have given for the paper what it was reasonably and fairly worth. To hold otherwise would be to deprive all paper, for any cause not worth its face, of one of the most essential and valuable incidents of negotiability, and most effectually to stop its circulation. A moment's reflection will satisfy any one how deeply and disastrously such a holding would affect the business and commerce of the country." See *post*, §§ 795, 796.

⁴ See Chapter VII, on Consideration, *ante*, § 184.

of business for a valuable consideration, according to the mercantile use of those terms.¹ There are some transfers, however, in which the legal or equitable title to the instrument passes, but which are not in the usual course of business.

§ 781. Thus, a receiver appointed by a court, and who comes in possession of a bill or note of a litigant by operation of law, acquires no better title than such litigant possessed, for, as said in New York, "he acquires title by legal process, and not in the regular course of dealing in commercial paper."² The like decision was rendered in Connecticut, in respect to the receivers of assets of a bank, for the benefit of its creditors.³ So the assignment of a bill or note by operation of a bankrupt or insolvent law, is an instance out of the usual course of commercial business.⁴ So also is a transfer by the payee or holder to a trustee for the benefit of creditors.⁵ But under statute in the State of Iowa, it has

¹ See Chapter XXV, Sec. 1.

² *Briggs v. Merrill*, 58 Barb. 379 (1870). As to assignments, see *ante*, Chap. XXII.

³ *Litchfield Bank v. Peck*, 29 Conn. 384.

⁴ *Billings v. Collins*, 44 Me. 271.

⁵ *Roberts v. Hall*, 37 Conn. 205. A. obtained a note from B. by fraud, and transferred it to C. as trustee for certain creditors in part, and the balance for A.'s wife. The creditors accepted the transfer, and directed the trustee to bring suit. B. had demanded the note back before the transfer, and pleaded fraud against the trustee. It was held not a transfer in the usual course of business, and the defense was allowed. Carpenter, J., saying: That commercial paper may be properly used as security for a pre-existing debt. "The purpose for which the paper was used is exceptional and unusual. We apprehend that cases like this are rarely to be met with in business circles. Let us examine it more carefully. A man has a piece of negotiable paper, with which he wishes to pay or secure certain debts. If there is but one debt, he can transfer it directly to the creditor, and the law protects the transaction. This is according to the usual course of business. But if he transfers it to a friend, to hold till due, and then collect it, and with its avails pay the creditor, that is unusual and suspicious upon its face, and requires explanation. Unless some good reason can be shown for such a proceeding, the law ought not to protect it. But it is said there were several creditors, which, it is claimed, sufficiently explains the fact, that the security was effected through the intervention of a trustee. Let us test this position. If the paper is right and free from defects why not sell it in market, or get it discounted, and with its avails pay the debts at once? Or, if

been held, that an indorsement of a note by the sheriff, who had levied upon it, had the same effect as if made by the holder himself.¹

§ 781 *a*. A bill or note in the hands of one not the payee, and unindorsed where it is not payable to the payee or bearer, would be open to defenses in the hands of the

the debts are not to be paid until the paper is due and collected, why not retain it in his own hands until due, and if necessary sue and collect it in his own name? Such a course would be natural and usual. But what honest reason can be suggested, why it should be transferred to a third party, who has no interest in the matter, to be sued in his name? Such a course is unusual, and not in the course of trade. The transaction at once suggests the idea that there is some equity in favor of the maker, inherent in the note itself, and which can be made available against the payee, and which the payee is seeking to avoid! * * * The fact that a part of this money was payable to the wife of Yale (the payee), is worthy of notice, also in this branch of the case. To that extent, as we have already seen, the plaintiff was the agent of Yale. * * The fact that Yale himself is still interested in this note, either in his own right or the right of his wife, should suggest to all parties concerned an inquiry as to the reason and occasion of this conveyance."

¹ Earhart v. Gant, 32 Iowa, 481, Cole, J., saying: "The note was payable to John Walker, but was then, or afterward became, the property of Isaac Walker, against whom John Morford had a judgment. Under execution issued thereon, John Walker, still holding the note, was garnished; and such legal proceedings were had as that the note was indorsed by the sheriff to John Morford, pursuant to order of the court. Morford agreeing to take the same at its face. It is now and here claimed, by appellee's counsel, that such transfer did not operate as an indorsement under the law merchant by the payee, to transfer the note discharged of its infirmity. Our statute says (Rev. § 3272): 'Bank bills and other things in action may be levied upon and sold, or appropriated as hereinafter provided, and assignments thereon by the officer shall have the same effect as if made by the defendant, and may be treated as so made.' And it is further provided, by section 3222, that money, promissory notes, etc., may be appropriated without being advertised or sold, if the plaintiff will receive them at their par value. The precise point made is, that the transfer by the officer is to have the same effect as if made by the defendant, and that Isaac Walker, and not John Walker, was the execution defendant. We think this too narrow a construction to place upon the statute, which is surely a remedial one. In our view, the garnishee, holding such paper, and having legal title in himself, may properly be said to be the defendant, at least in the garnishment proceedings. A fair construction of the sections, when their purpose is considered, will make the defendant include not only the execution defendant, but also the garnishee defendant. The indorsement by the officer is to have the same effect as if made by the defendant in the garnishment. Such an indorsement will, therefore, have the same effect in this case as an indorsement by the legal holder under the law merchant."

transferee, for such possession and transfer are not in the usual course of business.¹ A bill in the hands of the drawer, and payable to his order, might be properly acquired from him, and the holder under his indorsement would be protected against defenses, for the acceptor is the primary debtor, and the drawer the original creditor.² Whether or not a bill in the hands of the acceptor before maturity could be acquired from him under an indorsement in blank by the payee, so as to protect the indorsee from defenses available between anterior parties is a disputed question. In New York, it has been held that it cannot, on the ground that the presumption in such a case is that the acceptor either holds it for acceptance, or after payment, in either of which cases he would have no authority to negotiate it.³ In England it has been held that the party acquiring the bill for value under such circumstances is entitled to protection as a *bona*

¹ *Gilson v. Miller*, 29 Mich. See *post*, § 812; *Mills v. Porter*, 11 N. Y. S. C. (4 Hun), 524.

² *Merritt v. Duncan*, 7 Heisk. 156. See *post*, § 812.

³ See *ante*, § 753, and *post*, § 812; *Central Bank v. Hammett*, 50 N. Y. 158 (1872). In this case, Balch & Co. being indebted to defendants, gave them an acceptance upon a draft drawn by them, and made payable to order of B. & Co. Failing to get it discounted, they returned the bill to B. & Co., who gave them another acceptance. Instead of canceling the first draft as instructed, Balch & Co. negotiated it to the Central Bank, before maturity. Held, that the Central Bank could not recover against the drawers. No notice is taken in the opinion of the court, of the case of *Morley v. Culverwell*, 7 M. & W. 174 (1840), where the contrary doctrine is held, and has been well expounded by Lord Abinger. *Central Bank v. Hammett*, 50 N. Y. 686 (1872). The Court saying: "The possession of a bill or note payable to bearer, or indorsed in blank by one not a party to the instrument, is presumptive evidence of ownership. But a possession of such an instrument by a party to it only authorizes a presumption of such rights and obligations of the several parties as are indicated by the paper itself. The actual relations to each other of the several parties to the instrument, are presumed to be precisely such as the law declares, in the absence of any special circumstances to take the instrument out of the general rule, and vary the liabilities of the parties as between each other. An individual negotiating for the purchase of a bill or note from one having it in possession, and whose name appears upon it, must assume that the title of the holder, as well as the liability of all the parties, is precisely that indicated by the instrument; that is, he cannot assume that the person in possession has any other or different rights, or that the liability of the parties is other or different from that which the law would imply from the form and character of the instrument." •

fide holder without notice, on the ground that he has a right to presume that the bill has been drawn for accommodation of the acceptor, and Lord Abinger, C. B., in giving judgment to this effect has forcibly expressed this view, which seems to us correct.¹

SECTION IV.

THE PHRASE "BEFORE MATURITY."

§ 782. In the *fourth place*, the holder, in order to acquire a better right and title to the paper than his transferrer, must become possessed of it before it is overdue. For if it were already paid by the maker or acceptor, and had been left outstanding, it would be already discharged, and they would not be bound to pay it again to any one who acquired it after the period when payment was due. And if it were not paid at maturity, it is then considered as dishonored; and although still transferable in like manner and form as before, yet the fact of its dishonor, which is apparent from its face, is equivalent to notice to the holder that he takes it subject to its infirmities, and can acquire no better title than his transferrer.² The doctrine applicable to this subject has been ad-

¹ *Morley v. Culverwell*, 7 M. & W. 174 (1840). Lord Abinger, C. B., saying: "Suppose mutual accommodation acceptances to be given, and to be exchanged before they have been negotiated, the names remaining on them:—the parties may circulate them so as to give a title to a *bona fide* holder, before they became due; and wherein does this case differ from that? Therefore a bill is not properly paid and satisfied according to its tenor unless it be paid when it is due; and consequently if it be satisfied before it is due, by an arrangement between the drawer and acceptor, that does not prevent the acceptor from negotiating it, or an innocent indorsee for value from recovering upon it." To same effect see the late case of *Witte v. Williams*, 8 Rich. (S. C.) 304, and opinion of Moses, C. J., which disapproves of the conclusion in *Central Bank v. Hammett*, 50 N. Y. 158. In the first edition of this work the author stated the law upon the authority of the New York decision as therein laid down. Examination of the English authorities, and of the South Carolina case, has satisfied him of the error; and that the English view is correct.

² *Texas v. Hardenberg*, 10 Wall. 58; *Davis v. Miller*, 14 Grat. 1; *Arents v. Commonwealth*, 18 Grat. 750; *Marsh v. Marshall*, 53 Penn. St. 396; *Kellogg v. Schnaake*, 56 Mo. 137; *Kittle v. De Lamater*, 3 Neb. 325; *Goodson v. Johnson*, 35 Tex. 622. See *ante*, § 724.

mirably stated by Chief Justice Shaw, who says: "Where a negotiable note is found in circulation after it is due, it carries suspicion on the face of it. The question instantly arises, why is it in circulation? why is it not paid? Here is something wrong. Therefore, although it does not give the indorsee notice of any specific matter of defense, such as set-off, payment, or fraudulent acquisition, yet it puts him on inquiry; he takes only such title as the indorser himself has, and subject to any defense which might be made if the suit were brought by the indorser."¹ But there is this limitation to this doctrine: that if the holder acquired the paper after maturity, from one who became a *bona fide* holder for value, and without notice before maturity, he is then protected by the strength of his transferrer's title.²

§ 783. It is said by Professor Parsons in respect to bills on sight, and bills or notes payable on demand: "A reasonable time must elapse before mere non-payment dishonors the bill or note. What this time is, has not been and cannot be fixed by any definite and precise rule. One day's delay of paper on demand certainly would not dishonor it; five years certainly would. And in each case, how many days, or weeks, or months are requisite for this effect, must depend upon the test, whether so long a time has elapsed, that it must be inferred from the particular circumstances and the general conduct of business men, both of which should be considered, that the paper in question must have been intended to be paid within this period, and if not paid, must have been refused."³ And again the same learned author observes: "If the paper be demanded and refused within that period before the termination of which there is no presumption of dishonor, a taker after such demand, and within that period, having no notice or knowledge of the demand or refusal, cannot be affected by it. For example, suppose a note on demand so circumstanced that the court would say the

¹ Fisher v. Leland, 4 Cush. 456.

² See *ante*, § 726, and *post*, 786, 803, 805.

³ 1 Parsons N. & B. 263, 264.

lapse of one month is not sufficient to dishonor it, and the lapse of two months is sufficient, and a transferee takes it on the twenty-fifth day without notice or knowledge that on the twenty-fourth day it had been demanded and refused. We should say that the law would allow him the right of presuming non-dishonor during the whole of that month, and would protect his rights accordingly.”¹

§ 784. There is always a presumption when the payee's or an indorser's name is indorsed upon the bill or note, that it was done before its maturity; and likewise the presumption that the holder required the instrument before maturity, whether the legal title be transferable by indorsement, or by delivery merely.² Indeed, the law will presume in favor of the holder, according to many authorities, that the indorsement or assignment was of even date with the instrument itself;³ but it can rarely be the case that any stronger or more definite presumption will be needed than that he acquired it before maturity, as he is then protected against defenses available to his transferrer. We can conceive, however, of cases in which the further presumption that the transfer was of even date might be desirable to the holder—as where it were proved that at a certain time after date of the paper he had notice of a defect which would prevent his better title, if it were not then established.

But the presumption as to the time of acquiring the instrument is not a strong one. The indorsement is almost invariably without date, and without witnesses. The transfer by delivery merely leaves no footprint upon the paper by which the time can be traced. And the presumption in favor of the holder as to the time of transfer being without any written corroborative testimony, is of the slightest nature, and open to be blown away by the slightest breath of suspicion.⁴

¹ 1 Parsons N. & B. 270; see also *Bartrum v. Caddy*, 9 Ad. & E. 275-8; *Cripps v. Davis*, 12 M. & W. 159, 165.

² See *ante*, § 728; *New Orleans, &c. v. Montgomery*, 95 U. S. (5 Otto), 16 (1877).

³ See *ante*, § 728.

⁴ *Gibson, J., in Snyder v. Riley*, 6 Barr. 164; *Hill v. Kraft*, 29 Penn. St. 186.

§ 785. The presumption that the holder of a note acquired it before maturity has been held not to apply where the note is payable in so short a time as one day after date, on the ground, as stated, that the time run is so short that it is not probable that it would be put into circulation before maturity—at least, not sufficiently so to raise a presumption in favor of the holder; that such paper is rather evidence of a debt than a promise made with expectation of payment at the time named, and does not belong to the class of paper intended for negotiation and circulation for commercial purposes.¹ But this departure from the general principle, which relieves the holder from nothing but the burden of proof, is not sanctioned by the law merchant; and although the time is brief, the execution of a negotiable instrument payable at so brief a period is in itself evidence of a need of money for the period named. And we know of no reason why a party may not use negotiable instruments for a short loan as well as a long one.

§ 786. *Accommodation paper*.—While it is the general rule that if the paper be overdue at the time of the transfer, that circumstance of itself is notice, and he can acquire no better title than his indorser, yet, if the indorser's title were unimpeachable, the fact that the paper was executed for accommodation without consideration, and that the indorsee knew it, is no defense even when the paper was overdue at the time of the indorsement, it being considered that parties to accommodation paper hold themselves out to the public by their signatures to be bound to every person who shall take the same for value, to the same extent as if paid to him personally.² If the holder received the paper after maturity from

¹ Beall v. Leverett, 32 Ga. 104, Lyon, J.

² This doctrine seems just, and is sustained by numerous authorities, though not without conflict. Favoring it, see Story on Notes, § 194; Story on Bills (Bennett's ed.), §§ 188, 191; 2 Rob. Prac. (new ed.), 253; Byles on Bills (Sharswood's ed.), 285; Davis v. Miller, 14 Grat. 6; Sturtevant v. Ford, 4 M. & G. 101; 4 Scott, 608; Charles v. Marsden, 1 Taunt. 224; Lazarus v. Cowie, 3 Q. B. 459 (43 E. C. L. R.); Caruthers v. West, 11 Ad. & El. 144. In Redfield & Bigelow's Leading Cases, 216, 217, it is said: "To hold otherwise would be to encourage

an indorser who took it *bona fide* before maturity, there is no question as to his right to recover;¹ but if he takes it after maturity from the party for whose accommodation it was made, indorsed or accepted, there is conflict of decision on the subject;² but the doctrine of the text is sustained by the highest authority.³

§ 787. A note payable by installments is overdue when the first installment is overdue and unpaid, and he who takes it afterward, takes it subject to all equities between the original parties;⁴ and if any installment of interest on the note be overdue and unpaid, which fact is disclosed on the face of the note, the like rule applies.⁵ But where more than one note is executed upon the same consideration, they are not all to be regarded as dishonored when one is overdue and unpaid.⁶

A purchaser of a negotiable instrument, before the close of business hours, on the last day of grace, and before its dishonor, has been held, and, as we think, correctly, to be fully protected as having received it while current;⁷ but a contrary view has been taken in Massachusetts.⁸ The effect of a purchase pending suit is hereafter considered.⁹

SECTION V.

WHAT IS MEANT BY "PURCHASER WITHOUT NOTICE."

§ 788. In the *fifth* place, the holder must have acquired the paper without notice of its dishonor. Sometimes a bill

fraud, and to relieve the party from the very responsibility which he expected to meet, and which, upon every principle of justice and fair dealing, he should be compelled to abide by." See *ante*, §§ 726, 782.

¹ Howell v. Crane, 12 La. Ann. 126; Riegel v. Cunningham, 9 Phila. (Penn.), 177; Story on Bills, § 188. See *ante*, §§ 726-782; *post*, §§ 803-805.

² Chester v. Dorr, 41 N. Y. 279; Coghlin v. May, 17 Cal. 506.

³ See *ante*, § 726, and note 1, *supra*.

⁴ Vinton v. King, 4 Allen, 562; Field v. Tibbetts, 57 Me. 359; Hart v. Stickney, 41 Wis. 630 (1877).

⁵ Hart v. Stickney, 41 Wis. 630 (1877).

⁶ Boss v. Hewitt, 15 Wis. 260.

⁷ Crosby v. Grant, 36 N. H. 273.

⁸ Pine v. Smith, 11 Gray, 38. It did not appear in this case whether or not the transfer was during business hours, nor did the court seem to attach any importance to the inquiry.

⁹ See § 1199, Vol. II.

payable at so many days after sight, or after a certain event, is presented for acceptance, and dishonored before the time of payment by non-acceptance; and in such cases, the party acquiring it with notice of such dishonor stands upon the same footing as one who acquires it after maturity, and is chargeable in like manner with constructive notice of any flaw in the right or title of his transferrer.¹ Sometimes the instrument bears upon its face the marks of its dishonor for non-acceptance, and in such cases it bears, as has been said, "a death wound apparent on it."² If it has been dishonored for non-payment when payable on demand or at sight, the like rule applies; but it is only when the bill or note is payable at a day certain that the purchaser can perceive, by the very fact that it is overdue, that it has been dishonored. The United States Supreme Court has observed on this subject that "a person who takes a bill which, upon the face of it, was dishonored, cannot be allowed to claim the privileges which belong to a *bona fide* holder. If he chooses to receive it under the circumstances, he takes it with all the infirmities belonging to it, and is in no better condition than the person from whom he received it."³ And the doctrine was enforced in another case, where, in speaking of a promissory note so marked as to show for whose benefit it was to be discounted, and that discount had been refused, the same tribunal held that all those dealing in paper "with such marks on its face must be presumed to have knowledge of what it imported."⁴

§ 789. *Notice of fraud, defect of title, and illegality.*—In the *sixth* place, in order to stand upon a better footing than his transferrer, the holder must acquire the instrument without notice of fraud, defect of title, illegality of consideration, or other fact which impeaches its validity in his transferrer's

¹ Crossly v. Ham, 13 East, 498.

² Goodman v. Harvey, 4 Ad. & El. 870; Byles [*160], 283.

³ Angle v. N. W. &c. Ins. Co. 92 U. S. (2 Otto), 341-2; Andrews v. Pond, 13 Pet. 65.

⁴ Fowler v. Brantly, 14 Pet. 318; Angle v. N. W. &c. Ins. Co. 92 U. S. (2 Otto), 342.

hands; and the word notice in this connection signifies the same as knowledge. Knowledge of fraud or illegality impeaches the *bona fides* of the holder, or at least destroys the superiority of his title, and leaves him in the shoes of the transferrer.¹ And any fraud upon the transferrer incapacitates the transferee, or one acquiring from him with notice, from recovering against the transferrer.² If notice of fraud be communicated to the holder before he pays for the paper, although the contract has been entered into, he cannot stand upon the footing of *bona fide* holder without notice,³ and if he has paid a part of the amount agreed upon when he receives notice of fraud, he will only be protected to that extent, and no more.⁴ Actual notice of the defect is not required, where the evidence of the infirmity consists of matters apparent on the face of the instrument. Constructive notice in such cases is held sufficient, upon the ground, that, when a party is about to perform an act which he has reason to believe may affect the rights of third persons, an inquiry as to the facts is a moral duty, and diligence an act of justice.⁵

§ 790. *Notice of accommodation paper.*—It is to be observed, however, that knowledge of the mere want of consideration as between the original parties will not alone prevent the purchaser from becoming a *bona fide* holder and occupying a better position than his transferrer. Accommodation paper is daily placed in market for discount or sale, and an indorsee or purchaser who knows that a bill or note still current was drawn, made, accepted, or indorsed without consideration is as much entitled to recover as if he had been ignorant of the fact,⁶ and even where he acquires it

¹ Hanauer v. Doane, 12 Wall. 342; Fisher v. Leland, 4 Cush. 456; Norvell v. Hudgins, 4 Munf. 496; Kasson v. Smith, 8 Wend. 437; Skilding v. Warren, 15 Johns. 270; Harrisburg Bank v. Meyer, 6 Serg. & R. 537; Ryland v. Brown, 2 Head, 270.

² Lenheim v. Fay, 27 Mich. 70. ³ Crandell v. Vickery, 45 Barbour, 156.

⁴ Dresser v. Misso. &c. R. R. Co. 93 U. S. (3 Otto), 93; see *ante*, § 757.

⁵ Angle v. N. W. &c. Ins. Co. 92 U. S. (2 Otto), 342; see Vol. II. § 1408.

⁶ Thatcher v. West River Nat. Bank, 19 Mich. 196; Jones v. Berryhill, 25 Iowa, 289; Grant v. Ellicott, 7 Wend. 227; Powell v. Waters, 17 Johns. 176;

overdue.¹ Nor is it a good ground of defense against a *bona fide* holder for value that he was informed that the note was made or the bill accepted in consideration of an executory contract, unless he was also informed of its breach.² If he has such knowledge he cannot recover.³ And if any one purchase accommodation paper with knowledge that the terms and conditions on which the accommodation was given have been violated, he is not a *bona fide* holder as against the party who lent his name for accommodation.⁴ The defense must not only show that the paper was diverted from its purpose, but also that such diversion was known to the holder when he receives it, misapplication not being such fraud as shifts the burden of proof.⁵

§ 791. The rule in New York is different, and there it is

Grandin v. Leroy, 2 Paige, 509; *Bank of Ireland v. Beresford*, 6 Dow. 237; *Mentross v. Clark*, 2 Sandf. 115; *Cronise v. Kellogg*, 20 Ill. 11; *Charles v. Marsden*, 1 Taunt. 224. In *Thatcher v. West River Nat. Bank*, 19 Mich. 202, *Christianity, J.*, said: "The want of consideration, and the assurance of Sprague that the note would be taken care of, do not affect the right of the bank as indorsee, though taking it with notice. Mere accommodation paper is generally, at least, without consideration, and such assurances, express or implied, are always given or relied upon when such accommodation paper is given. Such facts might constitute a good defense as against the party for whose accommodation it is given, but to allow them to defeat a recovery by an indorsee who advances money upon it—when that is the purpose for which it is given—would defeat the very purpose for which such paper is made, and render the transaction absurd."

¹ See *ante*, §§ 726, 782, 786; *post*, §§ 803, 805.

² *Patten v. Gleason*, 106 Mass. 439; *Davis v. McCready*, 17 N. Y. 230; *Croix v. Sibbett*, 15 Penn. St. 238; *Bend v. Wietze*, 12 Wis. 611.

In *Harris v. Nicholls*, 26 Ga. 413, it is held that failure of consideration may be pleaded against a transferee who took the note with knowledge of the contract, and that the consideration was liable to fall. The doctrine of the text, however, seems sound in reason and authority.

³ *Wagner v. Diedrich*, 50 Mo. 484; *Coffman v. Wilson*, 2 Metc. (Ky.) 542; *Bonman v. Van Kuren*, 29 Wis. 218.

⁴ *Small v. Smith*, 1 Den. 583; *Thompson v. Posten*, 1 Duvall, 415; *Daggett v. Whiting*, 35 Conn. 372; *Fetters v. Muncie Nat. Bank*, 34 Ind. 251; *Hickerson v. Raiguell*, 2 Heisk. 329; *Evans v. Kymer*, 1 B. & Ad. 528; *Roberts v. Eden*, 1 Bos. & P. 398; *Buchanan v. Findley*, 9 B. & C. 738; *Key v. Flint*, 8 Taunt. 21; *Hidden v. Bishop*, 5 R. I. 29.

⁵ *Stoddard v. Kimball*, 6 Cush. 469; *Robertson v. Williams*, 5 Munf. 331; *Gray v. Bank of Kentucky*, 29 Penn. St. 365; *Clark v. Thayer*, 105 Mass. 216; *Mohawk Bank v. Corey*, 1 Hill, 513.

held that a diversion is such fraud as to shift the burden of proof upon the holder.¹ But the principle of the text is, we think, in conformity with the current and weight of authority and the true theory of the law merchant. The fraud which shifts the burden of proof must be in the consideration, or representations used in obtaining the execution of the instrument, and not an after breach of trust in diverting it from the uses for which it was intended.

§ 792. *What amounts to diversion of accommodation paper.*—It is immaterial that paper executed or indorsed for accommodation is not used in precise conformity with agreement, when it does not appear that the accommodation party had any interest in the manner in which the paper was to be applied. No change in the mere mode or plan of raising the money, though not applied to the purpose intended by the accommodation party, will constitute a misappropriation. In order to constitute a misappropriation, there must be a fraudulent diversion from the original object and design; and it is now well settled that where a note is indorsed for the accommodation of the maker, to be discounted at a particular bank, it is no fraudulent misappropriation of the note, if it is discounted at another bank or used in the payment of a debt or otherwise, for the credit of the maker. If the note has effected the substantial purpose for which it was de-

¹ *Farmers' & Citizens' National Bank v. Noxon*, 45 N. Y. 762; *Grocers' Bank v. Penfield*, 14 N. Y. S. C. (7 Hun), 279; see *Moore v. Ryder*, 65 N. Y. 439; *Edwards on Bills*, 319, 321. In *Wardell v. Howell*, 9 Wend. 170, the note was indorsed for accommodation of the maker, to be used in renewal of a former note due at a bank. It was transferred by the maker as collateral security for another debt, which negotiation is held, in New York, not to constitute the creditor a *bona fide* holder for value. Sutherland, J., said: "Where a note has effected the substantial purpose for which it was designed by the parties, an accommodation indorser cannot object that it was effected in the precise manner contemplated at the time of its creation. * * But where a note has been diverted from its original destination, and fraudulently put in circulation by the maker or his agent, the holder cannot recover upon it against an accommodation indorser, without showing that he received it in good faith, in the ordinary course of trade, and paid for it a valuable consideration." *Spencer v. Ballou*, 18 N. Y. 331; *Schepp v. Carpenter*, 51 N. Y. 604.

signed by the parties, an accommodation maker or indorser cannot object that the accommodation was not effected in the precise manner contemplated, where there is no fraud, and the interest of the indorser is not prejudiced.¹

§ 793. Thus, where a bill was indorsed for accommodation, for the purpose of enabling the maker to get the note discounted at a particular bank, and the maker used it to take up notes on another bank, the Court said: "Within the proper legal sense of the term, there has been no diversion of the note from the purpose for which it was made and indorsed. The indorsers lent their names for the purpose of giving the maker credit, generally, and without any concern with the use which should be made of that credit."² Nor would it be a misappropriation to discount a note with a private person that was intended to be discounted at a particular bank, the proceeds being applied to the purpose intended.³

And so where a bill was indorsed for accommodation, to enable one to raise money, and he applied it to the payment of a pre-existing debt, it was held immaterial, Downey, J., saying: "The accommodation party must have some interest in the application of the money, otherwise he is not in condition to contend successfully that there has been a misapplication of it, or of the security on which it was to be raised."⁴ It has been said, in Pennsylvania, by Black, C. J.: "The maker of an accommodation note cannot set up the want of consideration as a defense against it in the hands of a third person, though it be there as collateral security merely. He who chooses to put himself in the front of a negotiable in-

¹ *Duncan & Sherman v. Gilbert*, 29 N. J. L. R. (5 Dutch.) 521; *Briggs v. Boyd*, 37 Vt. 538; *Purchase v. Mattison*, 6 Duer, 87; *Wardell v. Howell*, 9 Wend. 170. See *Schepp v. Carpenter*, 51 N. Y. 604; *Reed v. Trentman*, 53 Ind. 438.

² *Mohawk Bank v. Corey*, 1 Hill, 513.

³ *Powell v. Walters*, 17 Johns. 176; *Bank of Chenango v. Hyde*, 4 Cow. 567.

⁴ *Quinn v. Hard*, 43 Vt. 375; *Fetters v. Muncie National Bank*, 34 Ind. 254; see *Schepp v. Carpenter*, 51 N. Y. 602. But it has been held otherwise where the paper was made payable to the party to whom it was to be discounted, and was passed to another for a pre-existing debt. *Farmers' &c. Bank v. Hathaway*, 36 Vt. 539.

strument, for the benefit of his friend, must abide the consequence, and has no more right to complain if his friend accommodates himself by pledging it for an old debt, than if he had used it in any other way.”¹ In accordance with these principles, an accommodation indorser cannot complain that a creditor of the holder, with whom the latter has deposited as collateral security for his own debt, has sold the note to a *bona fide* purchaser for value, in violation of the rights of the payee and depositor; for if the payee could pledge the note as collateral security the subsequent sale does not increase the indorser’s liability.² In Iowa, D. & R. executed a note to J. or bearer. The note was joint, but D. was in fact a surety. The understanding was that R. was to negotiate the note to J. for a yoke of cattle, and execute a chattel mortgage to D. to indemnify him. R., instead, traded the note to L. for a yoke of cattle, the latter knowing that the note was designed to be negotiated to J. for a yoke of cattle, and suspecting D. was a surety, but having no knowledge that he was to have the chattel mortgage. It was held that D. was liable to R. on the note.³

§ 794. Where, however, the note is designed to be discounted for the purpose of taking up other paper of the person giving the accommodation, or was otherwise intended for his benefit, the failure to have it discounted would be a misappropriation,⁴ and if the bank refused to discount it, the holder should return it to the accommodation maker or indorser.⁵ When there is a full consideration for acceptance of a bill, it matters not whether it be applied according to original agreement, or to another purpose.⁶

¹ Lord v. Ocean Bank 20 Penn. St. 384; see also Kimbro v. Lytle, 10 Yerg. 417; Rutland Bank v. Buck, 5 Wend. 66. In this case, a person signed a note as surety for accommodation of other parties, the note to be discounted at a certain bank. The bank refused to discount it, and it was passed off by the principals as collateral for the payment of a judgment. *Held*, no misappropriation. But see Merchants’ Nat. Bank v. Comstock, 55 N. Y. 24.

² Dawson, v. Goodyear, 43 Conn. 548.

³ Laub v. Rudd, 37 Iowa, 618.

⁴ Wardwell v. Howell, 9 Wend. 170; Moore v. Ryder, 65 N. Y. 440.

⁵ Kasson v. Smith, 8 Wend. 437; Denniston v. Bacon, 10 Johns. 198.

⁶ Moore v. Ward, 1 Hilt. 237.

§ 795. *Express and implied notice.*—It is quite certain that if the notice or knowledge of the transferrer's defective title be express, it will destroy the purchaser's better position; for if he is actually informed of the infirmity—as when he is told by the maker that it is without consideration, and that it will not be paid—he errs willingly if he perseveres in negotiating for the paper, and has no claim whatever for peculiar protection.¹ But express notice is not indispensable. The circumstances of the transaction may be of such a character as to intimate strongly a defect in the title, and if they are such as to invite inquiry they will suffice, provided the jury think that abstinence from inquiry arose from a belief or suspicion that inquiry would disclose a vice in the paper.² Then indeed his *bona fides* would be impeached. But further than this, gross negligence, which is not in itself proof of *mala fides*, may be so great as to amount to proof of notice. "I agree," says Baron Parke, "that notice and knowledge mean not merely express notice, but knowledge or the means of knowledge to which the party willfully shuts his eyes."³

§ 796. Story says that "it will be sufficient if the circumstances are of such a strong and pointed character as necessarily to cast a shade upon the transaction, and to put the holder upon inquiry."⁴ But this statement of the rule is not clear and satisfactory, for it means that if the circumstances are of such a nature as to cast a shade of suspicion upon the transaction (and it seems to us it can mean nothing less), it contradicts the principle laid by the author in the same paragraph, that suspicious circumstances, and gross negligence as to inquiry into them, are not sufficient to impeach the holder's title. And it is remarkable that this very proposition

¹ Norvill v. Hudgins, 4 Munf. 496; Dogan v. Dubois, 2 Rich. Eq. 85.

² See *ante*, § 777 *et seq.*

³ May v. Chapman, 16 Mees. & W. 355; Hamilton v. Vought, 34 N. J. Law, 187; Edwards v. Thomas, 66 Mo. 486, Sherwood, C. J.: "Neither courts nor juries are allowed to shut their eyes to natural and rational inferences, clearly deducible from proven facts."

⁴ Story on Promissory Notes, § 197.

of Story has been taken by one authority as concurrent with the view of *Gill v. Cubitt*, heretofore commented on ;¹ while another follows it as adopting the very contrary precedent.² And the more correct opinion, as it seems to us, is, that the circumstances must be so pointed and emphatic as to amount to proof of *mala fides* in the abstinence of inquiry, or such as to be *prima facie* inconsistent with any other view than that there is something wrong in the title, and thus amount to constructive notice. In other words, we would say that if the circumstances are of such a character as to create such a distinct legal presumption and *prima facie* proof of fraud, or of some equity between prior parties, it would operate as legal information and constructive notice to the transferee. This rule fixes a criterion for judgment which is definite, and seems to us the one which should be adopted.³ The proof of the existence of the circumstances amounting to implied notice must be clear. As said by Woodbury, J.: "It must clearly appear that the indorsee was apprised of such circumstances as would have avoided the note in the hands of the indorser."⁴

§ 797. *The mere statement of the consideration in a bill or note* does not put the holder upon inquiry whether or not it really passed, or has failed in any respect. It is rather assuring than otherwise, for it is evidence, if the note be genuine, that it was given for value; and the specification of what value can no more challenge the holder's investigation than the omission of such specification.⁵ In legal effect

Bayne, 52 Mo. 533 (*post*, p. 600, note 1), which seems inconsistent with the case above cited.

¹ *Hamilton v. Marks*, 52 Mo. 80 (1873); see *ante*, § 775. But see *Horton v.*

² *Grenaux v. Wheeler*, 6 Tex. 526 (1851).

³ In Missouri it was said in the recent case of *Horton v. Bayne*, 52 Mo. 533, that "unless there be such a combination of suspicious incidents as would in legal contemplation afford ground for the presumption that the purchaser of the paper was aware at the time of its acquisition of some equity between the original parties thereto," he would not be affected by them.

⁴ *Perkins v. Challis*, 1 N. H. 254.

⁵ *Hereth v. Merchants' Nat. Bk.* 34 Ind. 380; *Bank of Commerce v. Barrett*, 38 Ga. 126; *Doherty v. Perry*, 38 Ind. 15; see *ante*, §§ 41, 51.

it does not qualify the paper in any manner.¹ But in North Carolina, where the note was expressed to be for "the Rocky Swamp tract of land," those words were held to put the holder on inquiry, and to fix him with notice that it could not be collected unless a title to the land were made. "In this way," said the court, "significance is given to the words referred to, otherwise they must be treated as idle and superfluous."² And it has been held that a party taking a note, knowing the consideration, is subject to any defense arising out of it.³ But this cannot be, and has been held not to be law.⁴ Where a note to an insurance company bears on its face the memorandum "on policy, No. 33,386," it is nowise affected, although the policy contains a provision for allowance as set-off of notes due the company.⁵ In New York where the expressed consideration of a note was "one knitting machine, warranted," it was held that breach of a parol contract warranting the article could not be pleaded against a *bona fide* holder before maturity, Boardman, J., saying: "Giving to the words the broadest meaning possible they do not imply that there has been a breach of the warranty. They cannot be construed as notice to the purchaser of a defense to the note in the hands of the payee. If they do, it must be because the law will presume a breach wherever there is a warranty. That would be preposterous."⁶ Notice that a note was given for a certain patent right has been held insufficient to put the purchaser on inquiry.⁷

§ 798. The fact that one who takes a promissory note in

¹ Beardslee v. Horton, 3 Mich. 560; Doherty v. Perry, 38 Ind. 15.

² Rand v. State, 645 N. C. 175.

³ Thrall v. Horton, 44 Vt. 386; see Harris v. Nichols, 26 Ga. 414, as to case where party knows consideration to be doubtful.

⁴ Borden v. Clark, 26 Mich. 410; Sackett v. Kellar, 22 Ohio St. 554.

⁵ Taylor v. Curry, 109 Mass. 36; see §§ 41, 51.

⁶ Loomis v. Monry, 15 N. Y. S. C. 312 (1876).

⁷ Borden v. Clarke, 26 Mich. 412; Miller v. Finley, 26 Mich. 255. Campbell, J.: "Whatever may have been the experience of our people with itinerant patent vendors, it cannot be properly assumed as a fact that a patent regularly issued by the department lacks either novelty or utility. And as fraud can never be presumed without proof, the jury could not properly be charged upon any theory, supported by no evidence at all."

good faith for value, and before maturity, knew that the maker was dead, but did not know it was made for accommodation, may recover on it against the maker's estate, even if the indorser for whose accommodation it was made, put it into circulation fraudulently as against the maker. And it will be assumed that he did not know it was made for accommodation.¹ A father who bought a note of his daughter, who told him that her betrothed had given it to her, has been held a *bona fide* holder.²

§ 799. *Particular and general notice.*—It is quite clear and well settled that the purchaser need not have notice of the particular fraud, or equity or illegality, in order to be affected by it. It is sufficient that there be notice, actual or constructive, that there is some fraud, or equity or illegality affecting the original parties. "Thus, if when he took the bill he were told in express terms that there was something wrong about it, without being told what the vice was, or if it can be collected by a jury, from circumstances fairly warranting such an inference that he knew, or believed, or thought that the bill was tainted with illegality or fraud, such a general or implicit notice will equally destroy the title."³ So if he knows that the maker denies his liability or refuses to acknowledge it.⁴

§ 800. *Public records.*—Parties negotiating for negotiable instruments are not bound to take notice of public records, and litigations, which would affect them with notice were they dealing with the subject-matter. And therefore when there is nothing on the face of the bill or note to give notice of any defects, the fact that a deed of trust securing its payment contains recitals which show that equities or offsets exist between the original parties does not weaken the position of a *bona fide* holder without actual notice.⁵ And if it be not overdue, the fact that it was in litigation at the time of transfer does not affect the transferee's rights; nor will a

¹ Clark v. Thayer, 105 Mass. 217.

² Benoin v. Paquin, 40 Vt. 199.

³ Byles (Sharswood's ed.) [*119] 226; citing Oakley v. Ooddeen.

⁴ Boyce v. Geyer, 2 Mich. N. P. 71.

⁵ Minell v. Read, 26 Ala. 736.

decree when rendered, as a general rule, affect them, the doctrine of *lis pendens* not applying to negotiable instruments.¹ But when transferred overdue pending litigation, it is subject to the issue of the suit, as it is then subject to all equitable defenses.² There is this also to be specially noted: If under the laws of the State where the note is payable, the defendant is compelled by due process of law to pay the note to another party—even though the plaintiff be a *bona fide* holder without notice—he cannot recover. This not unfrequently happens when the maker is compelled by garnishee or trustee process to pay the amount of the note to a creditor of the payee; and in such case an indorsee of the payee cannot recover of the maker notwithstanding he acquired the note for value before maturity.³ Mere proof of an advertisement in a newspaper cautioning parties against purchasing a bill or note, even when made in the place of residence of the purchaser, it is not sufficient itself to show notice on his part of any fraud affecting its validity.⁴

§ 801. Notice of fraud, or defect of title, or of defense valid between prior parties may be derived from circumstances, and be as effectual as personal observation, or hearing of the facts in question. Thus where the assignee of a note, at the time of assignment, requests and receives, as security from the transferrer, a conveyance of land for the purchase money of which the note is given, with a provision in the deed that the assignee is to comply with the terms of the contract of sale to the prior purchaser, the assignee will be chargeable with notice of the character of the note.⁵

§ 802. *Notice to agent.*—It is a general principle of law that notice to an agent is notice to the principal, and there-

¹ Day v. Zimmerman, 68 Penn. St.; Hill v. Kraft, 29 Penn. St. 186; Wintons v. Westfeldt, 22 Ala. 760; Kellogg v. Fancher, 23 Wis. 21; *Re* Great Western Tel. Co. 5 Biss. 363.

² Kellogg v. Fancher, 23 Wis. 21.

³ Simon v. Huot, 15 N. Y. S. C. (8 Hun), 378 (1876). See also Hull v. Blake, 13 Mass. 153; Meriam v. Rundlett, 13 Pick. 511; Trubee v. Alden, 13 N. Y. S. C. (6 Hun), 75; 2 Parsons on Cont. 606-608.

⁴ Kellogg v. French, 14 Gray, 354.

⁵ Packwood v. Gridley, 39 Ill. 383.

fore if the holder in taking the bill employs an agent, though he be unaffected with notice to himself personally, yet notice to the agent so employed, express or implied, is notice to the holder.¹ And notice to a subagent whose appointment has been authorized by the principal is equally notice to the principal.² But this rule is subject to the qualification that the knowledge of the agent, in order to affect his principal, should either have been acquired in the same transaction, or at least so recently as that it may be presumed to have remained in his memory; and it must be knowledge of a fact material to the transaction, and which it would be the duty of the agent to communicate to his principal.³ That the principal is bound by such knowledge or notice as his agent obtains in negotiating the particular transaction is everywhere conceded. Constructive notice to an agent is not to be extended.⁴

SECTION VI.

•WHEN PURCHASER OR HOLDER STANDS ON SAME FOOTING AS HIS TRANSFERRER.

§ 803. We have seen under what circumstances the purchaser of a negotiable instrument may acquire a better right and title than his transferrer. It is to be observed further, that, as a general rule, the purchaser can never be placed on a worse footing than his transferrer, although he himself could not in the first instance have acquired the vantage ground occupied by such transferrer. And, therefore, even if he have notice that there was fraud in the inception of the paper, or that it was lost or stolen, or that the consideration has failed

¹ *Livermore v. Blood*, 40 Mo. 48; *Lawrence v. Tucker*, 7 Greenl. 195; *Bank v. Whitehead*, 10 Watts, 397; *Geer v. Higgins*, 8 Kan. 520; *Wiley v. Knight*, 27 Ala. 336; *Varnum v. Milford*, 4 McLean, 93; *Patten v. Merchants' Ins. Co.* 40 N. H. 375; 2 Kent Com [*630], 849; Angell and Ames on Corporations, 247; Byles on Bills (Sharswood's ed.) [*120], 226, 227; Story on Agency, § 140.

² *Boyd v. Vanderkemp*, 1 Barb. Ch. Rep. 273.

³ *The Distilled Spirits*, 11 Wall. 366 (1870).

⁴ *Wyllie v. Pollen*, 32 L. J. Ch. 782.

between some anterior parties, or the paper be overdue and dishonored, he is, nevertheless, entitled to recover, provided his immediate indorser was a *bona fide* holder for value unaffected by any of these defenses. As soon as the paper comes into the hands of a holder, unaffected by any defect, its character as a negotiable security is established; and the power of transferring it to others, with the same immunity which attaches in his own hands, is incident to his legal right, and necessary to sustain the character and value of the instrument as property, and to protect the *bona fide* holder in its enjoyment.¹ To prohibit him from selling as good a right and title as he himself has, would destroy the very object for which they are secured to him—would indeed be paradoxical. And it has been justly said that this doctrine “is indispensable to the security and circulation of negotiable instruments, and is founded on the most comprehensive and liberal principles of public policy.”² Nor is it a hardship to the maker or acceptor of the instrument. For, as said by Beck, C. J., in Iowa: “The maker of the note would be liable to the transferrer; his condition is made no harder by the note coming into the hands of one having notice of its infirmities.”³ Like principles prevail in courts of equity in respect to parties acquiring defective titles to estates.⁴

¹ Commissioners v. Clark, 94 U. S. (4 Otto), 285; Riley v. Schawhacker, 50 Ind. 592; Cromwell v. County of Sac, 96 U. S. (6 Otto), 51; Hoffman v. Bank of Milwaukee, 12 Wall. 181; Hereth v. Merchants' National Bank, 34 Ind. 380; Morner v. Cooper, 35 Iowa, 257; Simonds v. Merritt, 33 Iowa, 537; Peabody v. Rees, 18 Iowa, 571; Howell v. Crane, 12 La. Ann. 126; Hascall v. Whitmore, 19 Me. 102; Smith v. Hiscock, 14 Me. 449; Woodman v. Churchill, 52 Me. 58; Roberts v. Lane, 64 Me. 108; Hogan v. Moore, 48 Ga. 156; Woodworth v. Huntoon, 40 Ill. 131; Cotton v. Sterling, 10 La. Ann. 282; Bassett v. Avery, 15 Ohio St. 299; Boyd v. McCann, 10 Md. 118; Watson v. Flanagan, 14 Tex. 354; Prentice v. Zane, 2 Grat. 262; Haly v. Lane, 2 Atk. 182; Robinson v. Reynolds, 2 Q. B. 196; Lickbarrow v. Mason, 2 T. R. 63; Chalmers v. Lanier, 1 Camp. 383; Cook v. Larkin, 10 La. Ann. 507; Masters v. Ibberson, 18 L. J. C. P. 348; 8 C. B. 100 (65 E. C. L. R.); Roscoe on Bills, § 111; Kyd. 277; Byles (Sharswood's ed.) 236, 255; Johnson on Bills, 80; see *ante*, §§ 726, 782, 786.

² Story on Promissory Notes, § 191; see also Story on Bills, 188; 1 Parsons, N. & B. 161.

³ Simon v. Merritt, 33 Iowa, 537.

⁴ Story's Eq. Juris. §§ 409, 410.

§ 804. As illustrations of this doctrine, it has been held in Louisiana, where the courts held that Confederate notes were an illegal consideration, that the purchaser for value of a negotiable note given for a loan of Confederate money, could recover against the maker, notwithstanding he knew the nature of the consideration when he took it—the party who transferred it to him having acquired it *bona fide*, and without such notice.¹ So in Indiana, the plaintiff, who knew when he acquired the note that the defendant was induced by fraud to give it for a worthless patent, was held entitled to recover, his immediate indorser not having possessed such knowledge when he acquired it.²

§ 805. But this rule is subject to the single exception that if the note were invalid as between maker and payee, the payee could not himself by purchase from a *bona fide* holder, become a successor to his rights; it not being essential to such *bona fide* holder's protection to extend the principle so far.³ And the like exception is made by courts of equity in determining the rights of persons having defective titles to estates.⁴ If the payees of the note were the agents

¹ Cotton v. Sterling, 20 La. Ann. 282.

² Hereth v. Merchants' National Bank, 34 Ind. 380.

³ Sawyer v. Wiswell, 9 Allen, 42; Kost v. Bender, 25 Mich. 516 (1872), Cooley, J.: "I am not aware that this rule has ever been applied to a purchase by the original payee, nor can I perceive that it is essential to the protection of the innocent indorsee, that it should be. It cannot be very important to him, that there is one person incapable of succeeding to his equities, and who consequently would not be likely to become a purchaser. If he may sell to all the rest of the community, the market value of his security is not likely to be affected by the circumstance that a single individual cannot compete for its purchase, especially when we consider that the nature of negotiable securities is such that their market value is very little influenced by competition. Nor do I perceive that any rule or principle of law would be violated by permitting the maker to set up this defense against the payee, when he becomes indorsee, with the same effect as he might have done before it had been sold at all, or that there is any valid reason against it." See *ante*, § 176.

⁴ In Story's Equity Jurisprudence, §§ 409, 410, it is said: "This doctrine in both of its branches has been settled for nearly a century and a half in England, and it arose in a case in which A. purchased an estate with notice of an incumbrance and then sold it to B., who had no notice, and B. afterward sold it to C., who had notice, and the question was whether the incumbrance bound

of the real party in interest they could not become the owners of the note so as to be held purchasers without notice of the transaction in which the defense inhered.¹

§ 806. *As to the defenses against which a bona fide holder is not protected.*—There are some defenses which are as available against a *bona fide* holder for value, and without notice, as against any other party. They are those which go to show that the instrument was absolutely and utterly void, and not merely voidable, (1) by reason of the incapacity of the party assuming to contract; or, (2) by reason of some positive interdiction of law; or (3) by reason of the want of consent of the party sought to be bound to the particular contract.

Thus (1) if the maker of the note were an infant, a married woman, a lunatic, or a person under guardianship, the signature would impart no validity to it, and the *bona fide* holder could not recover against him, or her, however ignorant of the incapacity when he took the paper.

§ 807. (2) So if the statute law pronounces the contract evidenced by the bill or note to be void, because made upon a gambling, usurious, or other illegal consideration, it is an absolute nullity; and, although in form negotiable, no currency in the market, and no degree of innocence or ignorance on the part of the holder can impart any validity to it.² But although the party executing such bill or note cannot be bound even to a *bona fide* holder, the indorser will be liable upon his indorsement, which warrants its validity, and is a

the estate in the hands of C. The then Master of Rolls thought that although the equity of incumbrance was gone while the estate was in the hands of B., yet it was revived upon the sale to C. But the Lord Keeper reversed the decision, and held that the estate in the hands of C. was discharged of the incumbrance, notwithstanding the notice of A. and C." *Harrison v. Firth*, Prec. Ch. 61.

¹ *Boit v. Whitehead*, 50 Ga. 76.

² *Town of Eagle v. Kohn*, 84 Ill. 292; *Hatch v. Burroughs*, 1 Woods, 439; *Bayley v. Taber*, 5 Mass. 286; *Aurora v. West*, 22 Ind. 88; *Vallett v. Parker*, 6 Wend. 615; *Taylor v. Beck*, 3 Rand. 316; *Weed v. Bond*, 21 Ga. 195; *Hall v. Wilson*, 16 Barb. 548; *Ramsdell v. Morgan*, 16 Wend. 574; see *ante*, §§ 197, 198.

separate and independent contract.¹ And in many localities negotiable instruments executed upon gaming or usurious² considerations are upon the same footing as those executed for other illegal considerations—that is, void between the parties, but valid in the hands of a *bona fide* holder.

§ 808. Sometimes the statute declares a note void only as between original parties, and in such cases the *bona fide* purchaser is not affected by the illegality;³ and when the instrument was executed upon an illegal consideration, especially if illegal by statute (but not absolutely avoiding the instrument), it throws upon the holder the burden of proving *bona fide* ownership for value.⁴ But a failure of consideration does not throw this burden upon him.⁵ And in all cases where the statute does not declare the instrument void, *bona fide* ownership for value being proved, the holder is entitled to recover.⁶

§ 809. (3) So where the party has never in fact signed the instrument as it then stands, as, for instance, where it was forged in its inception, and is not genuine,⁷ or was subsequently materially altered.⁸ In such cases the *bona fide* holder cannot enforce it, for the defendant has only to say: "This is not my contract," "*non hæc in fœdera veni.*" So if executed by one acting as agent of the principal, but exceeding his authority, the *bona fide* holder cannot recover unless the principal were in fault in inducing him to believe that

¹ See *ante*, § 671 *et seq.*

² *Haight v. Joyce*, 2 Cal. 64.

³ *Paton v. Coit*, 5 Mich. (1 Cooley), 505; see *ante*, § 198.

⁴ *Paton v. Coit*, 5 Mich. (1 Cooley), 505; *Wyat v. Campbell*, 1 Mood. & M. 80; *Bailey v. Bidwell*, 13 Mees. & W. 74; *Northam v. Latouche*, 4 Car. & P. 140; *Harvey v. Towers*, 6 Exch. 656; *Smith v. Braine*, 16 Q. B. 201; *Fitch v. Jones*, 32 Eng. L. & Eq. 134; *Vallett v. Parker*, 6 Wend. 615; *Story on Bills*, § 193; *Doe v. Burnham*, 11 Fost. 426; *Johnson v. Meeker*, 1 Wis. 436; *Norris v. Langley*, 19 N. H. 423; *Bottomley v. Goldsmith*, 36 Mich. 27.

⁵ *Wilson v. Lazier*, 11 Grat. 478, and cases cited; see *ante*, §§ 165, 198, and *post*, § 810 *et seq.*

⁶ *Williams v. Cheney*, 3 Gray, 215; *Hubbard v. Chapin*, 2 Allen, 328; *Story on Promissory Notes*, § 192.

⁷ See Chapter XLII, on Forgery, Vol. 2.

⁸ See Chapter, XLIII, on Alteration, Vol. 2.

the agent had authority.¹ So if the party signed under duress he would not be bound.²

SECTION VII.

THE BURDEN OF PROOF AS TO BONA FIDE OWNERSHIP.

§ 810. We come now to consider how the holder of a negotiable instrument must proceed to establish his right to a recovery against the parties thereto. And first, it is to be observed that as between him and his immediate predecessor, or party between whom and himself a privity exists, he stands upon the same footing as the payee of a note against the maker. Fraud, illegality, want or failure of consideration may be pleaded against him by such immediate party as freely as if the instrument were not negotiable; and the only difference is, that the negotiable instrument imports a valid consideration not only as between the original parties, but also as between the immediate parties to its transfer, and that the burden of proof devolves upon the party who impeaches such consideration.³

§ 811. As to anterior parties to the transfer of the instrument, the rule is, as between them on the one part and the holder on the other, altogether different. They are not in privity with him, and they cannot set up against him defenses which might be valid as between them and any party prior to him, unless he is affected by such defenses through *mala fides*, notice, or otherwise having taken the paper without value, or without the usual course of business; which circumstances have been already discussed. But still, circumstances of defense, valid as against prior parties, may affect his position in respect to the measure of proof necessary to establish that he is not affected by them. And the

¹ *Andover Bank v. Grafton*, 7 N. H. 298; *Weathered v. Smith*, 9 Tex. 622; *Fearn v. Filica*, 7 Man. & G. 514; *The Floyd Acceptance*, 7 Wall. 636.

² See Chapter XXVI, Section VIII.

³ See *ante*, Chapter VII, on Consideration, Sec. I.

course of legal procedure in presenting such proof may be stated to be as follows:

§ 812. *First*. The mere possession of a negotiable instrument, produced in evidence by the indorsee, or by the assignee where no indorsement is necessary, imports *prima facie* that he acquired it *bona fide* for full value, in the usual course of business, before maturity, and without notice of any circumstance impeaching its validity; and that he is the owner thereof, entitled to recover the full amount against all prior parties. In other words, the production of the instrument and proof that it is genuine (where indeed such proof is necessary), *prima facie* establishes his case; and he may there rest it.¹ Bills and notes payable to bearer do not differ in this respect from others, and the bearer is entitled to all the presumptions that apply to an indorsee in his favor.² But the presumption of *bona fide* ownership does not apply where the instrument is not payable to bearer, unless it be indorsed specially to the holder, or in blank.³ The holder, however, could not recover against subsequent parties, as his possession of the bill or note would be *prima facie* evidence that he had paid it to some subsequent party, to whom he was liable. Therefore, where A. brought suit against B. on a note made by C. payable to A., and by A. indorsed to B., and by B. indorsed back to A., it was held A. could not recover against B.⁴ But special circumstances, showing that it had been indorsed back to A. for a valid consideration, would enable him to recover against B.⁵ And if a prior indorser offered a note for discount on his own account, the transaction would import that the subsequent indorsement was made for the accommodation of the prior indorser, and

¹ Brown v. Spefford, 95 U. S. (5 Otto), 478 (1877); Collins v. Gilbert, 94 U. S. (4 Otto), 753; Commissioners v. Clark, 94 U. S. (4 Otto), 285; Vallett v. Parker, 6 Wend. 615; Davis v. Bartlett, 12 Ohio St. 544; Holme v. Karsper, 5 Binn. 469; McCann v. Lewis, 9 Cal. 246; Hall v. Allen, 37 Ind. 541; Horton v. Bayne, 52 Mo. 531; Palmer v. Nassau Bank, 78 Ill. 380.

² Faulkner v. Ware, 34 Ga. 372.

³ See Chapter XXXVII, on Action, vol. 2, Sec. IV; Dorn v. Parsons, 56 Mo. 601.

⁴ Palmer v. Whitney, 21 Ind. 61.

⁵ Ibid.

the party discounting it could recover against him.¹ Possession of a note by the personal representative of the deceased payee, payable to the decedent, and unindorsed, would be evidence of ownership;² and so possession of a bill by a drawer payable to his own order.³ Possession of a bill or note unindorsed by the payee would not be.⁴

§ 813. It is not competent for the defendant to deny that the plaintiff is the owner and holder of a note upon which he brings suit as such, without traversing the signature, the indorsement, or the delivery of the note; and in such case, evidence is inadmissible to prove that the plaintiff never owned the note, never employed counsel, and had no interest in the suit.⁵

§ 814. *Second.* That countervailing proof that the instrument was executed without consideration as between the original parties—as, for instance, where it was executed for accommodation as between them, or that the consideration, originally valid, has subsequently failed—does not impair the holder's superiority of position, and he may still rest his case upon the instrument itself, from which it will still be presumed that he acquired it in a manner entitling him to stand upon the vantage ground of a *bona fide* holder for value.⁶ Nor will proof of mere misapplication of the instru-

¹ Mauldin v. Branch Bank, 2 Ala. 502.

² Scoville v. Landon, 50 N. Y. 686.

³ Merritt v. Duncan, 7 Heiskell, 156. See *ante*, §§ 781, 753.

⁴ Gibson v. Miller, 29 Mich. 355. See *ante*, § 781 *a*.

⁵ Way v. Richardson, 3 Gray, 412.

⁶ Commissioners v. Clark, 94 U. S. (4 Otto), 285; Collins v. Gilbert, 94 U. S. (4 Otto), 757; Duerson's Adm'r v. Alsop, 27 Grat. 248; Goodman v. Simonds, 20 How. 343; Bank of Pittsburg v. Neal, 22 Id. 96; Murray v. Lardner, 2 Wall. 110; Wilson v. Lazier, 11 Grat. 478; Ross v. Bedell, 5 Duer, 462; Fletcher v. Cushee, 32 Me. 587; Ellicott v. Martin, 6 Md. 509; Knight v. Pugh, 4 Watts & S. 445; Grenaux v. Wheeler, 6 Tex. 515; Mathews v. Poythress, 4 Ga. 287; Holman v. Hobson, 8 Humph. 127; Cook v. Helms, 5 Wis. 107; Magee v. Badger, 34 N. Y. (7 Tiff.) 247; and Belmont Branch Bank v. Hoge, 35 N. Y. (8 Tiff.) 65, overruling Pringle v. Phillips, 5 Sand. 157; Whitaker v. Edmonds, 1 Mood. & R. 366; Mills v. Barber, 1 Mees. & W. 425; Low v. Chifney, 1 Bing. N. C. 267; Smith v. Braine, 14 Q. B. 244; Baxter v. Ellis, 57 Me. 180; Story on Bill (Bennett's ed.), § 193; Cummings v. Thomson, 18 Minn. 252 (1872); Sloan v. Union Bank-

ment, where it has subserved its substantial purpose, shift the burden of proof, as has been already indicated.¹

§ 815. *Third.* There may be at this juncture a shifting of the burden of proof from the defendant to the plaintiff, for the principle is well established that if the maker or acceptor, who is primarily liable for payment of the instrument, or any party bound by the original consideration, proves that there was fraud or illegality in the inception of the instrument; or if the circumstances raise a strong suspicion of fraud or illegality, the owner must then respond by showing that he acquired it *bona fide* for value, in the usual course of business, while current, and under circumstances which create no presumption that he knew the facts which impeach its validity. This principle is obviously salutary, for the presumption is natural that an instrument so issued would be quickly transferred to another; and unless he gave value, which could be easily proved if given, it would perpetrate great injustice, and reward fraud to permit him to recover.² "In the nature of things" it is remarked

ing Co. 67 Penn. St. 479; Davis v. Bartlett, 12 Ohio St. 537 (1861); Grocers' Bank v. Penfield, 14 N. Y. S. C. (7 Hun), 279; Mechanics', &c. Bank v. Crow, 60 N. Y. 85. See *ante*, §§ 165 *et seq.*

¹ *Ante*, §§ 790, 791; Holme v. Karsper, 5 Binn. 469, Tilghman, C. J., saying: "In the first instance, it is presumed that every man acts fairly. It lies on the defendant, therefore, to show some probable ground of suspicion, before the plaintiff is expected to do anything more than produce the note on which he founds his action. But this being done, it is reasonable that the holder should be called on to rebut the suspicions. All that is asked of him is to show that he acted fairly, and paid value."

² Commissioners v. Clark, 94 U. S. (4 Otto), 285; Collins v. Gilbert, 94 U. S. (4 Otto), 761; Duerson v. Alsop, 27 Grat. 249; Fitch v. Jones, 32 E. L. & Eq. 134; Smith v. Braine, 3 Id. 380; 16 Q. B. 244; Smith v. Sac County, 11 Wall. 139; McClintick v. Cummins, 2 M'Lean, 98; Vathir v. Zane, 6 Grat. 246; Hutchinson v. Bogg, 28 Penn. St. 294; Perrin v. Noyes, 39 Me. 384; Sistermans v. Field, 9 Gray, 331; Woodhull v. Holmes, 10 Johns. 231; McKesson v. Stanberry, 3 Ohio, N. S. 156; Thompson v. Armstrong, 7 Ala. 256; Ross v. Drinkard, 35 Ala. 434; Devlin v. Clark, 81 Mo. 22; Kelly v. Ford, 4 Iowa, 140; Hall v. Featherstone, 3 Hurl. & N. 284; Bailey v. Bidwell, 13 M. & W. 73; Story on Bills, § 193; Byles on Bills (Sbarwood's ed.) 222; Perkins v. Prout, 47 N. H. 387; Harbison v. Bank of Indiana, 28 Ind. 133; Fuller v. Hutchings, 10 Cal. 526; Boyd v. McIver, 11 Ala. 822; Horton v. Bayne, 52 Mo. 531; Cummings v. Thompson, 18

by Staples, J., in a late Virginia case, "it is impossible to lay down any fixed unvarying rule, as to the circumstances which will be deemed sufficient to throw upon the holder the burden of showing that he has given value for the note. The courts must determine in each whether the transaction is of such a character as to rebut the presumption usually arising from the possession of the instrument." Long delay which continued until the death of an indorser whose estate was sought to be charged, coupled with a variety of peculiar circumstances, was held in the particular case to rebut the presumption in the holder's favor, and to require of him proof that he gave value.¹

The holder is not bound, however, to show that he acted cautiously in inquiring into the history of the instrument in proving his *bona fides*. If the defendant plead that the paper was made on an illegal consideration, and that the plaintiff gave no value, and the plaintiff put the whole plea in issue, it will be sufficient for the defendant to prove the illegality, and the plaintiff must then prove the consideration. And in case of fraud, the burden will be equally cast upon the plaintiff of proving consideration, if the defendant prove so much of the plea as alleges that he, the defendant, was defrauded of the bill.²

§ 816. In Virginia,³ it appeared that J. R. Johnson met Platoff Zane in Philadelphia, and induced him to purchase certain lots situated in South St. Louis, an addition to the city of St. Louis, Missouri, Johnson represented them to be of great value, and likely to become a part of that city, and that he could make an unencumbered title to the purchaser. Confiding in these representations, Zane executed his promissory notes for about \$14,000, and Johnson assigned one of said notes for \$652 40 to John L. Vathir, who brought suit upon it, and recovered judgment against Zane. Zane obtained an

Minn. 246; Sloan v. Union Banking Co. 67 Penn. St. 470; Roberts v. Lane, 64 Me. 108; Sperry v. Spaulding, 45 Cal. 544; Redington v. Wood, 45 Cal. 406.

¹ Duerson's Adm'r v. Alsop, 27 Grat. 249 (1876).

² Byles on Bills, 223.

³ Vathir v. Zane, 6 Grat. 246.

injunction to this judgment; and it appeared that Johnson's representations as to the value of the lots were false; and besides that, he could make no title to them, it having reverted to the city of St. Louis in default of his payment of the purchase money. Said Allen, J.: "As a general rule, the indorsement of a negotiable note is of itself, *prima facie* evidence that the indorsee has paid value for it. But when the payee has procured the note by fraud, this general presumption is rebutted, and the holder cannot recover without proving that he has paid value. The reason on which this exception to the general rule rests is briefly stated by Parke B., in *Bailey v. Bidwell*, 13 Mees. & Wels. 73: 'It certainly,' he says, 'has been the universal understanding since the later cases, that if the note were proved to have been obtained by fraud, or affected by illegality, that afforded a presumption that the person who had been guilty of the illegality would dispose of it, and would place it in the hands of some other person to sue upon it; and that such proof casts upon the holder the burden of showing that he was a *bona fide* holder for value.'¹

"Nor is the requisition for such proof confined to cases in which the note was put into circulation by fraud, as where it was lost or stolen. In the case of *Rogers v. Morton*, 12 Wend. 484, the note was voluntarily given for an assumed balance, on a settlement of accounts. The balance was in part made up by a charge for a draft, of which the creditor was never holder; and proof of this fraud committed on the makers at the time the note was given, was held sufficient to throw upon the plaintiffs the burden of showing that they were *bona fide* holders for value."² It was held incumbent on Vathir to give proof accordingly to this view.

§ 817. In another case it appeared that Rector sold to Wilson & Mills, with general warranty, real estate in Washington county, Ohio, and received in part payment the note

¹ See *Monroe v. Cooper*, 5 Pick. 412; *Rogers v. Morton*, 12 Wend. 484; *Holme v. Karsper*, 5 Binn. 469.

² See also *Thomas v. Newton*, 2 Carr. & P. 606.

of Wilson, which he transferred as a gift to the trustees of Rector College, in Taylor county, Virginia. Previous to the assignment, Rector had mortgaged the real estate aforesaid to the Ohio Life and Trust Company, and it had been sold, and so the consideration had entirely failed.

The trustees of the college assigned the note to Wright & Baldwin, who sold it to William Lazier, who indorsed it to another party, and was sued upon, and paid it. The bill prayed that the contract for the sale of the land might be rescinded, and the note canceled. Daniel, J., said: "There is no evidence of fraud in the origin or negotiation of the note; and the mere failure of consideration does not impose on the innocent holder the onus of showing the consideration he gave for the note." In note to Chitty on Bills, 10th Am. ed., p. 648, we have a report of the case of *Whitaker v. Edmonds*, 1 Mood. & Rob. 366. In that case, Paterson, J., said: "Since the decision of *Heath v. Sansom*, 2 Bar. & Ad. 291 (22 Eng. C. L. R. 78), the consideration of the judges has been a good deal called to the subject; and the prevalent opinion among them is that the courts have of late gone too far in restricting the negotiability of bills and notes. If, indeed, the defendant can show that there has been something of fraud in the previous steps of the transfer of the instrument, that throws upon the plaintiff the necessity of showing under what circumstances he became possessed of it. So far I accede to the case of *Heath v. Sansom*, for there were, in that case, circumstances raising a suspicion of fraud; but if I added on that occasion that, even independently of these circumstances of suspicion, the holder would have been bound to show the consideration which he gave for the bill, merely because there was an absence of consideration as between the previous parties to the bill, I am now decidedly of opinion that such doctrine was incorrect."¹

In England it has been held, that where the drawer of a bill, which he indorsed in blank, delivered it to W. to get it

¹ *Wilson v. Lazier*, 11 Grat. 478.

discounted for him, and W. went off with the bill promising to get and bring him the money, but never returned with the bill or the money, and the drawer never heard of the bill until called upon by H. to pay it, it was held that H. must prove that he gave value in order to recover on the bill.¹

§ 818. It is to be observed, however, that the fraud which shifts the burden of proof upon the holder of the note, and renders it necessary for him to establish *bona fide* ownership for value, must be a fraud committed upon the maker; and fraud against the payee or any intermediate holder is insufficient.²

§ 819. *Fourth.* That when the holder responds by showing that he did acquire the instrument *bona fide*, for value, in the usual course of business, while it was current, and under circumstances which do not operate as constructive notice of the facts which impeach the original validity, the defendant must then prove that he had actual notice of such facts; otherwise the holder's right to a recovery against him is perfected. This principle is obviously correct, for to require the plaintiff to show absolutely that he had no knowledge of facts would be to burden him with the necessity of proving an impossible negative.³

¹ Hall v. Featherstone, 3 Hurl. & Norm. 284; Duerson v. Alsop, 27 Grat. 249.

² Kinney v. Kruse, 27 Wis. 183; see Atlas Bank v. Doyle, 9 R. I. 76.

³ Davis v. Bartlett, 12 Ohio St. 541 (1861). In this case, Sutliff, C. J., said: "The case of Monroe v. Cooper, 5 Pick. 412, is also relied upon by the defendants in this case as an authority. That was an action by the indorsee upon a negotiable note against the members of a partnership company, by whom the note purported to be made. Two of the three partners appeared, and pleaded the general issue, and, on the trial, offered to prove that the note was made by the other partner, who had made default in the case, for his own benefit, and not for the benefit or on account of the company or with the knowledge of the other partners; but as the defendants did not offer to prove, also, that the note was due when indorsed to the plaintiff, or that he had knowledge of the facts, the judge, on the trial of the case, was of the opinion that the facts so proposed to be proved did not amount to a defense, and excluded the proof. The Supreme Court, in revising this opinion, by Wilde, J., held that the defendants had the right to prove, if they could, that fraud was practiced in the inception of the note, or that it was fraudulently put in circulation. And the judge adds: 'This fact being established, will throw upon the plaintiff the burden of proof, to show

that he came by the possession of the note fairly and without any knowledge of the fraud.' There can be no doubt that the judgment of the Supreme Court, in this case also, was strictly correct; and by the burden of proof to show possession of the note fairly and without knowledge of the fraud, be only meant that upon the defendants proving the note to have been fraudulently executed and put in circulation, that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove that he received the negotiable paper before due in the usual course of trade, upon a valuable consideration, the remark of Judge Wilde is strictly correct, and consonant with the authorities to which he refers; but if his remark is to be understood as intimating that the rule in such a case imposes any further burden upon the plaintiff than to prove he purchased and received the transfer of the negotiable paper before due, in the usual course of trade, *bona fide*, and upon a valuable consideration, it is not only not sustained by, but is opposed to, the authorities to which he refers."

CHAPTER XXV.

HOLDER OF BILLS AND NOTES TRANSFERRED TO HIM AS COLLATERAL SECURITY; AND HOLDER OF BILLS AND NOTES SECURED BY MORTGAGE.

SECTION V.

RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF HOLDER OF A NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT AS COLLATERAL SECURITY FOR A DEBT.

§ 820. Bills and notes are frequently transferred and pledged as collateral securities for debts of the pledgor, and many questions have arisen as to the rights of the various parties concerned in such transactions. And whether or not the indorsee or pledgee becomes a *bona fide* holder, and is protected against defenses which would be available against the indorser or pledgor, is often difficult to determine. Great contrariety of opinion is found in the decisions on the subject. But by keeping in view a few well fixed principles, we think that every case which can arise may be satisfactorily solved.

§ 821. In the *first place*, it should be determined whether or not the party holding the instrument has the form of the legal title. If the instrument be transferable by delivery (by being payable to bearer, or bearing an indorsement in blank), he is then its *prima facie* proprietor and owner. If it be payable to order and unindorsed, he then holds only the equitable title, and cannot claim the rights of an indorsee.¹

§ 822. In the *second place*, if the holder be an indorsee, or a transferee by delivery of a bill or note payable to bearer, let it be ascertained whether or not he is merely the agent of the real owner or has himself an interest in the instru-

¹ See *ante*, §§ 741 *et seq.*

ment; whether or not he has a bare authority or an authority coupled with an interest. If he were only authorized to collect the proceeds for the indorser, or transferrer by delivery, and then to apply the proceeds to the payment of a debt due to himself, this would not give him an interest in the paper itself. It would be much the same as if he were to apply the proceeds to the payment of some other debt due from the principal; nor could he have the rights of a principal instead of agent, unless there has been an actual assignment to him.¹ For if he is agent of the owner, any defense available against the owner is available against him; and this even in the case where the owner owes his agent more than the amount of the paper.²

§ 823. If it turn out that the holder is agent, the principal may revoke that agency at any time and recall the paper from his hands. And he cannot set up then, as we have seen, any better right than his principal. The test question then is simply this: has there been a change in the legal rights of the parties? If so the transfer is irrevocable without the holder's consent. If so there has been a consideration for the transfer—either of damage to the holder, or of benefit to the transferrer. And if so the holder is a pledgee and *bona fide* proprietor of the paper, and is entitled to recover upon it even against those who might have made a defense against his pledgor—at least to the extent of the debt of which the instrument is collateral security.

In California, where, by the provisions of the law in force, the right to proceed against a debtor by attachment was forfeited by taking such a collateral, the pledgee of a negotiable instrument was held to be, by that circumstance—if none other—a holder for value, and protected against equitable defences.³

We will now enter more minutely into the various rami-

¹ 2 Parsons N. & B. 42, 43.

² Solomons v. Bank of England, 13 East, 135, note; Lowndes v. Anderson, 1 Rose, 99.

³ Naglee v. Lyman, 14 Cal. 455; Payne v. Bensley, 8 Cal. 260.

fications which this question assumes, applying the test above stated.

§ 824. (1) *In the first place, as to collateral for debt contracted at the time.*—When the bill or note of a third party, payable to order, is indorsed as collateral security for a debt contracted at the time of such indorsement, the indorsee is a *bona fide* holder for value in the usual course of business, and is entitled to protection against equities and offsets and other defenses available between antecedent parties—provided, of course, that the bill or note transferred as collateral security is itself at the time not overdue. And the same principle applies where the collateral bill or note is payable to bearer, and is transferred to the creditor by delivery. This doctrine rests upon clear grounds. There is an evident present consideration for the transfer of the collateral bill or note; a present change in the legal rights of the parties. And the text-writers, supported by an almost unbroken train of decisions, agree that the indorsee is entitled to protection to the extent of the debt secured.¹

§ 825. (2) *In the second place, as to collateral for debt not yet due.*—When the debt is not yet due and the collateral bill or note is indorsed as security, and there is an agreement for delay until the collateral shall mature, such agreement by the creditor constitutes a consideration and makes him a holder for value.

If the collateral had its maturity fixed at a time later than the maturity of the debt, there would be no implied agreement for delay, because the occasion for delay would not have arisen. And the presumption would be that the indorsement of the collateral was merely intended to add by

¹ Bowman v. Van Kuren, 29 Wis. 219; Lyon v. Ewing, 17 Wis. 70 (1863); Curtis v. Mohr, 18 Wis. 619 (1864); Jenkins v. Schaub, 14 Wis. 1; Slotts v. Byers, 17 Iowa, 303; Griswold v. Davis, 31 Vt. 390; Chicopee Bank v. Chapen, 8 Metc. 40; Louisiana State Bank v. Gaennie, 21 La. Ann. 551; Munn v. McDonald, 10 Watts, 270; Williams v. Smith, 2 Hill, 301; Ferdon v. Jones, 2 E. D. Smith, 106; Bank of New York v. Vanderhorst, 32 N. Y. 553; Watson v. Cabot Bank, 5 Sand. 423; State Savings Associations v. Hunt, 17 Kan. 532; Mechanics' Ass'n v. Ferguson, 29 La. 549.

its security to the assurance that the debt would be paid. This presumption would be all the stronger if the collateral matured before the debt. And it has led to the opinion that such an indorsee would not be a holder for value. "If," says Redfield, C. J., in *Atkinson v. Brooks*,¹ "one holds a debt due six months hence, and his debtor, as a mere volunteer service, indorses a current note or bill as collateral security, the collateral being due in three months, it could not be made to appear that such transaction, before the indorsee had been at any pains in the matter, was a contract upon consideration. The prior debt not being due, the creditor could forego nothing, and the debtor receive no advantage from the transaction. And the agreement to apply the collateral upon a debt not yet due—being without consideration—would probably, in the first instance, be revocable at will; and so also as long as the parties remained in the same situation."

§ 826. This reasoning is wrong, but withal, does not seem to us conclusive. If it is the intention of the debtor to transfer the title to and property in the instrument at the time when he so makes it collateral security, we should say that the pre-existing indebtedness would be a sufficient consideration. It is well established that a transfer of a bill or note in payment of a pre-existing debt is upon a sufficient consideration if made when the debt is due, and we can see no good ground for distinguishing the two cases. When the indorsee receives title to the collateral, he has imposed upon him the strict responsibilities and duties of a holder. If he fails to take due steps for the collection of the paper by making prompt demand, and giving notice of dishonor, the indorsers are discharged, and the loss *pro tanto* of the debt secured devolves upon him.² Besides, he is in the nature of things lulled into security by possession of the collateral, and after transferring it to him we do not think it would be in the power of the indorser to recall it. A debt barred by limita-

¹ 26 Vt. 564 (1854); see also *Bowman v. Van Kuren*, 29 Wis. 218.

² *Jennison v. Parker*, 7 Mich. 355.

tion is a good consideration for a new promise to pay it; a retraction of that promise cannot be made. And a debt still current should be esteemed as well a good consideration for a conditional appropriation to its payment by anticipation. Nor is it true that the creditor could forego nothing, and the debtor receive no advantage from the transaction. The latter receives the advantage of shifting the duties and responsibilities of holder on the indorsee, and the former, if indeed he actually foregoes nothing, is certainly under inducement to forego that watchfulness and concern about his debtor which he would otherwise exercise—and even if he foregoes nothing the advantage to the debtor is sufficient. Prior parties cannot justly complain when suit is brought that defenses available against the payee or prior holder are excluded. By the very form of their contract they have put it on the world to circulate like cash—barring the gates behind it and shutting out such defenses. And if the creditor has taken them by their word they—not he—should suffer. The question seems to us simply one of intent. If the holder takes the paper only as an agent, he simply steps in the shoes of his transferrer; but if he takes it as the proprietary holder, he takes its burdens and benefits in full.

In New York it is held that something must be paid in money or property, or some subsisting debt satisfied or suspended, or some new responsibility incurred, in consequence of the transfer of the paper, in order to protect the purchaser against equities,¹ and that receiving the paper as collateral security for a precedent debt is insufficient.

¹ Bay v. Coddington, 20 Johns. 637; Wardell v. Howell, 9 Wend. 174. In Grocer's Bank v. Pentfield, 14 N. Y. S. C. (7 Hun), 281, the payee of notes made for his accommodation indorsed them to a bank to secure a balance due. The Court held that an agreement for an extension of time was implied; that the preceding debt was suspended; and that although the bank parted with neither money nor property for the note, it could recover against the maker as a *bona fide* holder for value. Moore v. Ryder, 65 N. Y. 441, Earl, C., saying: "In case the holder has not parted with any value or incurred any binding obligation, or changed his position to his detriment on the faith thereof, he cannot recover therein against the party wronged or defended."

§ 827. (3) *In the third place, when pre-existing debt is novated, or other securities surrendered.*—In the next place, when a pre-existing debt has matured, and the creditor surrenders securities formerly held and receives the collateral bill or note in their stead; or the debtor renews the debt by executing a new bill or note and transfers the collateral bill or note as security to the creditor—then the latter receives it in the usual course of business upon a present consideration, and is a *bona fide* holder in the full sense of the term. A leading case on this point is that of *Goodman v. Simonds*.¹ There it appeared that upon a settlement of a pre-existing debt prior securities were surrendered, and the collateral bill transferred as security for two new notes, at sixty and seventy-five days respectively, their maturity being twelve or fifteen days before the maturity of the bill. Clifford, J., said: “When the settlement was made the new notes were given in payment of the prior indebtedness, and the collaterals previously held were surrendered to the defendant, and the time of payment was extended and definitely fixed by the terms of the notes, showing an agreement to give time for the payment of a debt already overdue, and a forbearance to enforce remedies for its recovery; and the implication is very strong that the delay secured by the arrangement constituted the principal inducement to the transfer of the bill. Such a suspension of an existing demand is frequently of the utmost importance to a debtor, and it constitutes one of the oldest titles of the law under the head of forbearance, and has always been considered a sufficient and valid consideration.² The surrender of other instruments, although held as collateral security, is

¹ 20 How. 343 (1857). In Pennsylvania unless the holder pays something for the bill or note he is not deemed entitled to protection as a *bona fide* holder for value, and the fact that he renews a debt, and takes the bill or note as collateral security, does not protect him. See *Roger v. Keystone Nat. Bank*, 83 Penn. St. 248; and cases cited, *Cummings v. Boyd*, 83 Penn. St. 372; *Knox v. Clifford*, 38 Wis. 651; *Heath v. Silverthorn Lead Mining Co.* 39 Wis. 147.

² *Etting v. Vanderlyn*, 4 Johns. 237; *Morton v. Burn*, 7 Ad. & El. 19; *Baker v. Walker*, 14 Mees. & Wels. 465; *Jennison v. Stafford*, 1 Cush. 163; *Walton v. Mascall*, 13 Mees. & Wels. 453; *Wheeler v. Slocum*, 16 Pick. 62.

also a good consideration; and this, as well as the former proposition, is now generally admitted, and is not open to dispute.”¹

It seems now to be agreed, that if there was a present consideration at the time of the transfer, independent of the previous indebtedness, that a party acquiring a negotiable instrument before its maturity as a collateral security to a pre-existing debt, without knowledge of the facts which impeach the title as between the antecedent parties, thereby becomes a holder in the usual course of business, and that his title is complete, so that it will be unaffected by any prior equities between other parties—at least to the extent of the previous debt for which it is held as collateral.² And the better opinion seems to be in respect to parol contracts, as a general rule, that there is but one measure of the sufficiency of a consideration, and consequently whatever would have given validity to the bill as between the original parties is sufficient to uphold a transfer like the one in this case. We are not aware that the principle, as thus limited and qualified, is now the subject of serious dispute anywhere, and that is amply sufficient for the decision of this cause. Whether the same conclusion ought to follow where the transfer was without any other consideration than what flows from the nature of the contract at the time of delivery, and such as may be inferred from the relation of debtor and creditor in respect to the pre-existing debt, is still the subject of earnest discussion, and has given rise to no small diversity of judicial decision. It seems it is regarded as sufficient in England, according to a recent case.³ A contrary rule prevails in New

¹ *Dupeau v. Waddington*, 6 Whar. 220; *Hornblower v. Prond*, 2 Barn. & Ald. 327; *Rideout v. Bristow*, 1 Crompt. & Jer. 231; *Bank of Salina v. Babcock*, 21 Wend. 499; *Youngs v. Lee*, 2 Kern. 551.

² *White v. Springfield Bank*, 3 Sand. (S. C.) 222; *New York M. Iron Works v. Smith*, 4 Duer, 362.

³ In *Poirier v. Morris*, 20 Eng. L. & Eq. 103, Lord Campbell, C. J., said: “There is nothing to make a difference between this and a common case where a bill is taken as security for a debt, and in that case an antecedent debt is a sufficient consideration.” Crampton, J., said: “Whether the bill was a collateral

York, according to several decisions, and also in Tennessee.¹ It is settled that it is a sufficient consideration in Massachusetts, Vermont and New Jersey; and such was the opinion of the late Justice Story, in *Swift v. Tyson*, and in his valuable treatise on "Bills of Exchange."²

§ 828. In a recent English case³ where the defendant indorsed to the plaintiff a bill, of which he was indorsee, as collateral security for a debt of greater amount, then due, the residue of which he paid in cash, and the plaintiff failed to make presentment or to give notice, it was held that he had lost recourse upon his indorser, both upon the bill and upon the original debt. Byles, J., said: "That as they had the rights, so they had the duties of holders." Willis, J., said: "The bill may be taken for or on an account of the debt, but with an understanding that the party receiving it is to have the option of suing for the debt before the maturity of the bill."

Adopting the view of Byles, J., we might say as well, that "as the indorsee has the duties, so he has the rights of a holder." And as those duties, as indicated by Willis, J., do not depend upon whether or not there is a suspension of the original debt, neither should the rights of the holder turn upon that question.

§ 829. (4) *In the fourth place, when there is no novation of pre existing debt, and no securities surrendered.*—When the

security, or whether it has the effect of suspending the payment of the antecedent debt, is quite immaterial."

¹ *Coddington v. Bay*, 20 Johns. 637; *Stalker v. McDonald*, 6 Hill, 93; *Napier v. Elam*, 5 Yerg. 108.

² *Stoddard v. Kimball*, 6 Cush. 469; *Story on Bills*, § 192; *Chicopee Bank v. Chapen*, 8 Metc. 40; *Blanchard v. Stevens*, 3 Cush. 162; *Atkinson v. Brooks*, 26 Vt. 569; *Allaire v. Hartshorne*, 1 Zab. 665; *Prentiss v. Graves*, 33 Barb. 631; *Ontario Bank v. Worthington*, 12 Wend. 593; *Prentice v. Zane*, 2 Grat. 262; *Bertrand v. Barkman*, 8 Eng. (Ark.) 150; *Cullum v. Branch Bank*, 4 Ala. 21; *Roxborough v. Messick*, 6 Ohio St. 443; *Cook v. Helms*, 5 Wis. 107; *Payne v. Bensley*, 8 Cal. 260; *Park Bank v. Watson*, 3 Hand, 490 (42 N. Y.); *Brown v. Leavitt*, 31 N. Y. 113; *Fenby v. Pritchard*, 2 Sand. 151; *Ayrault v. McQueen*, 32 Barb. 305; *Palmer v. Richards*, 1 Eng. L. & Eq. 529.

³ *Peacock v. Purcell*, 14 C. B. N. S. 728.

pre-existing debt has fallen due, and there is no novation of it by the execution of a new security, and no surrender of other securities held for its payment, the question whether or not the bill or note then transferred as collateral is received upon a consideration in the usual course of business, may be more difficult of solution. If there is, then, an express agreement on the part of the creditor to forbear suit until the collateral should mature, or until he should have endeavored to realize from it, there is no doubt that the case would then come within the principle of *Goodman v. Simonds*, and that the agreement to delay would constitute the transferee, a holder for value in the usual course of business. And it has been so held in many cases,¹ and recognized as a sound principle in others.² As said by Redfield, C. J.:³ "The transaction possesses both the cardinal ingredients of a valuable consideration; it is a detriment to the promisee, and an advantage to the promisor. And it is no satisfactory answer to say, that the party who takes such bill or note is in the same condition he was before. This is by no means certain. He has for the time foregone the collection of his debt, and in such matters time is of the essence of the transaction. And the debtor thereby gains time—it may be more or less—but of necessity, some time is thereby gained; and in such matters this is always accounted an advantage, and is often of the most vital consequence to the debtor." The doctrine was enunciated with great force by Story, J., in *Swift v. Tyson*,⁴ though the question was not there distinctly presented, as it is in the case just quoted.

§ 830. But when the collateral bill or note is simply indorsed by the debtor to the creditor, who holds his overdue paper, and no express agreement is entered into, the

¹ *Atkinson v. Brooks*, 26 Vt. 574 (1854); *Manning v. McClure*, 36 Ill. 498; *Benman v. Millison*, 58 Ill. 36; *Worcester Nat. Bank v. Cheney*, 5 C. Ill. Sept. Term, 1878; *The Reporter*, Dec. 4, 1878, p. 710; *Faulette v. Brown*, 40 Mo. 54 (1867). See *ante*, § 827.

² *Swift v. Tyson*, 16 Pet. 1 (1842).

³ *Atkinson v. Brooks*, 26 Vt. 574.

⁴ 16 Pet. 1.

question whether or not the indorsee is a holder for value has been thought to turn upon the question, whether or not there is an implied suspension of the prior debt until the collateral should become due.¹ If there is an agreement for forbearance of the prior debt, it is as binding when implied as when expressed in terms; and in the United States, as well as in England, the doctrine is settled, that the indorsee of the bill or note of a third party, who takes it on account of a precedent debt, takes it by implication as conditional payment, and the antecedent debt is not extinguished but suspended until the bill or note given in conditional payment has fallen due.² When the new bill or note so received

¹ Manning v. McClure, 36 Ill. 489.

² See Chapter XXXIX, on Conditional and Absolute Payment, vol. 2, sec. 1269 *et seq.*; Blanchard v. Stevens, 3 Cush. 168 (1849). The Court thought that the note was taken in payment of a pre-existing debt, but said, *per* Dewey, J.: "If, however, the case had been one of a note taken as collateral security, it is difficult for us to perceive any sound reason for a different result. All of the cases, those of the New York court inclusive, concur in this, that if the party receiving the note, parts with anything valuable, he is entitled to enforce the payment of the note, irrespective of the equities as between the original parties. But may you not as well show a legal consideration by showing forbearance to act as by showing an act done? A damage to the promisee is all that is necessary to show a consideration for a promise; and ought not the same rule to apply in protection of a note transferred to him? If the party had not received the note as collateral security, he might have pursued other remedies to enforce the security or payment of his debt. He might have obtained other securities or perhaps payment in money. It is a fallacy to say, that, if the plaintiffs are defeated in their attempt to enforce the payment of these notes, they are in as good a situation as they would have been if the notes had not been transferred to them. That fact is assumed, not proved, and from the very nature of the case, is matter of entire uncertainty. The convenience and safety of those dealing in negotiable paper seem to require and justify the rule that when a person takes a negotiable note not overdue or apparently dishonored, and without notice, actual or otherwise, of want of consideration or other defense thereto, whether in payment of a precedent debt, or as collateral security for a debt, the holder would have the legal right to enforce the same against the parties thereto, notwithstanding such defense might not have been effectual as between the original parties thereto."

In Manning v. McClure, 36 Ill. 498, Lawrence, J., said: "It is said that the position of the indorsee, in cases of this kind, is not different from that of a general assignee for the benefit of creditors. What we have already said shows wherein, in our opinion, the difference consists. In the case of a general assignment, there is no ground for presuming forbearance as one of the objects, or any implied agreement to forbear on the part of the creditors. Indeed, these general

falls due, the creditor may bring suit upon the original debt or upon the new bill or note, or upon both, at his election; so that the new bill or note is a collateral in any case, unless there be an express agreement or a special usage, as in some of the States, that the acceptance of the new bill or note shall, *prima facie*, extinguish the debt.

§ 831. But this implication, that the precedent debt is suspended until the maturity of the collateral bill or note, only arises in cases where the latter is equal¹ or greater in

assignments are ordinarily made without the wish or knowledge of the creditors, and where the object is not fraud, it is generally to secure an equal distribution of the assets. The assignee is a mere trustee, to collect what may be due the assignor, for the benefit of his creditors.

"We have stated why, in our opinion, the equity is with the indorsee, to wit, that by the almost universal usage of the world of commerce, a transaction of this sort is understood by the parties to imply further forbearance on the pre-existing debt, and thus the indorsee is lulled into a false security by means of an instrument which the person sought to be held liable has made and put in circulation.

"We have only to add, that the line of decisions which we follow contributes to that stability in negotiable paper which is so important a consideration in a mercantile community. To accomplish this has been the constant tendency of judicial decisions, from the time of Chief Justice HOLT to the present day. The value of this stability to commerce is acknowledged by all courts, and by all writers upon mercantile law. It is easy to see how much it strengthens credit and facilitates the multitudinous transactions of a commercial people.

"We are led, then, by what we consider the equities between the parties, and by the acknowledged policy of giving stability to negotiable paper, to hold that the indorsee of such paper, before its maturity, taking it as payment or security for a pre-existing debt, and without any express agreement, shall be deemed a holder for a valuable consideration, in the ordinary course of trade, and shall hold it free from latent defenses on the part of the maker." See also *Worcester National Bank v. Cheney*, S. C. Illinois, Sept. Term, 1878, approving the text.

Contra, *Bowman v. Van Kuren*, 29 Wis. 220, Dixon, C. J.: "We forbear to express any opinion, further than that the mere transfer of the collateral raises no presumption of a stipulation for further time to pay a pre-existing debt, which will operate to defeat the equities of the maker or indorser, as the same existed before the transfer was made; which is all it is necessary to decide in this case." In Tennessee, it is held that the transfer of negotiable paper before maturity as collateral for a mature debt, is not, in the due course of trade, and that if it were paid before such transfer, the holder cannot recover. *Richardson v. Rice*, S. C. of Tenn. April, 1878; *Central Law Journal*, vol. 7, No. 12, Sept. 20, 1878, p. 225, citing *Gosling v. Griffin*, which overrules *Vatterlien v. Howell*, 5 Sneed. 441.

¹ See *Michigan State Bank v. Leavenworth*, 28 Vt. 209.

amount than the debt which it is given to secure.¹ And therefore, where the collateral is less in amount, there cannot be any inferred consideration of forbearance or delay to constitute the holder, on that ground, a holder for value. And unless the becoming a party to the bill is in itself a consideration, the right of the holder, as for value, cannot be sustained. This alone is, in our judgment, sufficient. The maker has sent out a negotiable contract to pay the bearer or indorsee a certain sum. It has been acquired before maturity for a valuable consideration, and the burden of fixing the liability of the indorser (if any) assumed. The holder is naturally lulled into security and inactivity, by crediting the face of the note; and he should not be made to suffer by the maker for confidence which his own promise created. In Maryland this subject has been fully considered and the views of the text approved.² In New York, the holder of a

¹ See *Redfield v. Bigelow's Leading Cases*, 203.

² *Maitland v. Citizens' National Bank*, 40 Md. 540 (1874). Alvey, J., after quoting *Swift v. Tyson*, and the New York cases, said: "Subsequently the doctrine has been mooted in the Supreme Court of the United States, upon the theory that the case of *Swift v. Tyson* did not call for the decision of the broad and comprehensive question, whether the holder of a negotiable note, received simply as collateral security for a pre-existing debt, should be regarded as a holder for value, and, if received *bona fide*, protected against antecedent equities. In the case of *Goodman v. Simonds*, 20 How. 343, the question was much discussed, and though the facts of that case did not require the expression of a direct opinion upon the subject, yet it is not difficult to perceive the inclination of the court in favor of the principle of their former decision; as they take care to fortify it by showing that it is in accordance with the decisions in England, and in many of the States of this country. In the later case of *McCarty v. Roots*, 21 How. 432, 439, which arose on the indorsement of an accommodation bill, and where the defendant pleaded that the bill has been delivered to the plaintiff by the indorser as collateral security for a pre-existing liability of the indorser, and for no other consideration, upon demurrer to the plea, and the demurrer being sustained by the court below, the Supreme Court held the demurrer properly sustained, and expressly declared that the delivery of the bill to the plaintiff as collateral security for a pre-existing debt, under the decision of *Swift v. Tyson* was legal, and consequently the plaintiff was entitled to recover. The principle, therefore, may be taken to be established in the Supreme Court, and, indeed, in the entire Federal jurisdiction of the country; as upon commercial questions the State adjudications are not accepted by the Federal courts as binding rules of decision.

In this State, there has been no decision of the appellate court, going to the

bill or note indorsed to him as collateral security for a pre-existing debt of the indorser, is not deemed a *bona fide*

extent of maintaining fully the doctrine of the cases in the Supreme Court, to which we have referred. In the case of the Cecil Bank v. Heald, *et al.*, 25 Md. 563, this court held that a *bona fide* holder of negotiable paper, for value, without notice, will be protected against the antecedent equities existing between the original parties, and that such holder is entitled to protection where he has received the paper in payment of an antecedent debt, regarding such debt as a valuable consideration; and the case of Swift v. Tyson was so far approved, as it declared that the receiving of negotiable paper in payment of a pre-existing debt, is according to the known usual course of trade and business. The court, however, declined expressing any opinion upon the right of a holder of a negotiable instrument received by him as security for a pre-existing debt.

The case of Miller v. The Farmers' and Mechanics' Bank of Carroll Co., 30 Md. 392, has been relied on by the counsel of defendants, as maintaining a doctrine somewhat in variance with that maintained in Swift v. Tyson. But we are not of that opinion. The case of Miller v. The Bank was the ordinary case of a bank asserting its lien upon security in its hands for the payment of balances due from its customers. According to the law of the land, the bank, a kind of factor in pecuniary transactions, was entitled to a lien upon all the securities for money of its customers in its hands for its advances to such customers, in the ordinary course of business, without reference to the true ownership of such securities, if the bank was without knowledge upon the subject (Davis v. Bowsher, 5 T. R. 488; Collins v. Martin, 1 B. & P. 648; Barnett v. Brandao, 6 M. & Gr. 630); and the question was, whether the bank had received the note from its customer in its usual course of dealing, without notice of the true ownership, and whether any credit had been given on the faith of it.

There being, then, no adjudication in the State to restrict the application of the principle as maintained in the decisions of the Supreme Court to which we have referred, we have no hesitation in giving to it our full approval; believing it to be supported by reason and the usual and ordinary course of dealing in the commercial community, as well as by a decided preponderance of judicial authority. Indeed, so well established is the principle, as applicable to accommodation paper, that we find Mr. Parsons, in his works on Notes and Bills, Vol. I, p. 226, stating that it is universally conceded, that the holder of an accommodation note, without restriction as to the mode of using it, may transfer it, either in payment or as collateral security for an antecedent debt, and the maker will have no defense. See also Lord v. Ocean Bank, 20 Penn. St. 384.

Applying the principle just stated to the case before us, and there can be no doubt of the sufficiency of the consideration for the transfer of the note to the plaintiff, whether it was as collateral security for a pre-existing or a contemporaneous debt, or to secure future discounts or advances, or all combined. In either case, the consideration would be valuable in the sense of the rule which protects the holder of negotiable paper, and the plaintiff be entitled to the full benefit of the security, unless *mala fides*, or notice of such facts as will impeach its title to the note, be shown. And this brings us to the consideration of the second question, raised by the prayers of the defendant.

holder, entitled to full protection, unless an agreement for forbearance be proved.¹

§ 832. *Amount and mode of recovery.*—When it appears that the bill or note was acquired by the holder as collateral security for a debt, and he is deemed entitled to recover upon it, he is still limited to the amount of the debt which it secures, if there be a valid defense against his transferrer, being regarded as, at all events, a *bona fide* holder, and entitled to stand upon a better footing only *pro tanto*.² Thus such a holder could recover against an accommodation party no more than the consideration actually advanced;³ but in the absence of proof he will be deemed to have advanced the full amount of the paper.⁴ In Maryland, however, it has been said in respect to an accommodation note, which was transferred as collateral security merely: "Such being the case, it was clearly incumbent upon the plaintiff to show what debts were embraced by the security, and the amount due thereon."⁵ Although the debt secured by the collateral be less in amount, yet if there be no defense to the collateral note, the holder may in general recover the full amount.⁶ If the paper has been pledged to a *bona fide* pledgee in fraud of the true owner, as the pledgee has only a lien for the amount of his debt, the true owner may, by paying that debt and discharging the lien, repossess himself of the instrument.⁷

There is no doubt, we think, that if the paper be indorsed, that in payment of a pre-existing debt, the purchaser is pro-

¹ Merchants' Nat. Bank v. Comstock, 55 N. Y. 24; Atlantic Nat. Bank v. Franklin, 55 N. Y. 238; see *ante*, § 826.

² Vallette v. Mason, 1 Smith (Ind.) 89; Williams v. Smith, 2 Hill. 301; Allaire v. Hartshorne, 21 N. J. L. R. 665; Duncan & Sherman v. Gilbert, 30 N. J. L. R. (5 Dutch.) 527; Fisher v. Fisher, 98 Mass. 303; Stoddard v. Kimball, 6 Cush. 469; Chicopee Bank v. Chapin, 8 Metc. 40; Story on Notes (7th ed.), § 195, note.

³ Duncan & Sherman v. Gilbert, 30 N. J. L. R. (5 Dutch.) 527; Atlas Bank v. Doyle, 9 R. I. 276; Maitland v. Citizens' Nat. Bank, 40 Md. 540; Mechanics' & C. Bank v. Barnett, 27 La. Ann. 177.

⁴ Duncan & Sherman v. Gilbert, 30 N. J. L. R. (5 Dutch.) 527.

⁵ Maitland v. Citizens' Nat. Bank, 40 Md. 540 (1874); Alvey, J.

⁶ Tooke v. Newman, 75 Ill. 215.

⁷ Stoddard v. Kimball, 6 Cush. 469; Chicopee Bank v. Chapin, 8 Metc. 40.

tected against equities,¹ though there are authorities which hold otherwise.²

§ 833. In ordinary cases of pledges as collateral security for debts, the pledgee may file a bill in chancery to have a judicial sale, and this has been frequently done in the case of stock, bonds, plate, and other chattels; or he may himself sell upon giving reasonable notice to the debtor to redeem.³ Commercial paper pledged as collateral security in an exception to this rule in part, that is to say, the holder is not authorized to sell such paper so pledged in the absence of a special power for that purpose, at either a public or private sale; but he is bound to hold and collect such paper as it falls due, and apply the momey to the payment of the debt.⁴ But he may, if he chooses, file a bill in chancery to have it sold under the directions of the court.⁵ Where defendant was sued as an indorser upon a note containing a statement that the maker had deposited with the payee certain collaterals with authority to the latter to sell, without notice, in case of non-payment, and these collaterals came to plaintiff's hands when it became the holder, it was held that the maker was entitled to the return of the collaterals when payment was

¹ *Brown v. Leavitt*, 31 N. Y. 113; *Youngs v. Lee*, 18 Barb. 187; 2 Kern. 511; *Carlisle v. Wishart*, 11 Ohio, 172; *Norton v. Waite*, 20 Me. 175; *Bostwick v. Dodge*, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 413; *Brush v. Scribner*, 11 Conn. 388; *Barney v. Earle*, 13 Ala. 106; *Bush v. Peckard*, 3 Harr. 385; *Dixon v. Dixon*, 21 Vt. 450; *Emanuel v. White*, 34 Miss. 56; *Stevens v. Campbell*, 13 Wis. 315; *Struthers v. Kendall*, 5 Wright, 214; *Kellogg v. Fancher*, 23 Wis. 21; *Holmes v. Smyth*, 16 Me. 177; *May v. Quimby*, 3 Bush. 96; *Reddick v. Jones*, 6 Ired. 107; *McKnight v. Knisley*, 25 Ind. 336; *Bank of Republic v. Carrington*, 5 R. I. 515; *Vatterlien v. Howell*, 4 Sneed, 441 (but see *ante*, § 830, and note); *King v. Doolittle*, 1 Head, 77; *Wormley v. Lowry*, 1 Humph. 468; see *ante*, § 184; *Swift v. Tyson*, 16 Pet. 1.

² *Buhrman v. Bayles*, 21 N. Y. S. C. (14 Hun), 608; *Weaver v. Borden*, 49 N. Y. 293.

³ *Alexandria, Loudoun, &c. R. R. Co. v. Burke*, 22 Grat. 261; 2 Story Eq. Juris. § 1008; 2 Kent Com. [*582].

⁴ *Wheeler v. Newbould*, 16 N. Y. 392; 5 Duer, 29; *Alexandria, &c. R. R. Co. v. Burke*, 22 Grat. 262.

⁵ *Donohoe v. Gamble*, 38 Cal. 341. But *quære*? See *Brown v. Ward*, 3 Duer, 660; *Atlantic, &c. M. Ins. Co. v. Boies*, 6 Duer, 583; *Wheeler v. Newbould*, 16 N. Y. 392; 5 Duer, 29.

demand; and that a presentment to him of the note for payment by a notary, who was not in readiness to procure or surrender the collaterals, in response to the maker's demand for them, was insufficient to charge an indorser.¹

SECTION II.

HOLDER OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS SECURED BY MORTGAGE.

§ 834. There is no doubt that any security for the payment of a bill or note passes by a transfer to the transferee.² The doctrine has been laid down by a number of cases, and is stated by Mr. Hilliard, in his Treatise on Mortgages, that if a mortgage is given to secure a negotiable note, and both the mortgage and the note are transferred before maturity to a *bona fide* indorsee, such indorsee takes the benefit of the mortgage as well as of the note, clear of any equities between the original parties.³ "It is the debt which gives character to the mortgage, and gives the rights and remedies of the parties under it, and not the mortgage which determines the nature of the debt."⁴

But this doctrine is denied, on the ground that the mortgage is simply a chose in action, and is taken subject to the accounts between mortgagor and mortgagee; and while it is an incident to the debt, the benefit of which, so far as the assignor is concerned, passes with it, the assignee cannot rely on the privileged character of the note to insure him the ad-

¹ Ocean Nat. Bank v. Faut, 50 N. Y. 474.

² See *ante*, § 748.

³ Hilliard on Mortgages, p. 526, sec. 49, a; Reeves v. Scully, Walker Ch. 248; Croft v. Bunster, 9 Wis. 503; Cornell v. Hichens, 11 Wis. 353; Fisher v. Otis, 3 Chand. (Wis.) 94; Martineau v. McCollum, 4 Chand. 153; Cicotte v. Gagnier, 2 Mich. 381; Updegraff v. Edwards, 45 Iowa, 515; Preston v. Morris, 42 Iowa, 549; Farmers' Nat. Bank v. Fletcher, 44 Iowa, 256; Duncan v. Louisville, 13 Bush. (Ky.) 385; Dutton v. Ives, 5 Mich. 515; Kelmer v. Krolick, 36 Mich. 373; Murray v. Jones, 50 Ga. 109, *held* that *bona fide* holder of the note, without notice, was protected against defense, that the mortgage was made by the debtor in anticipation of bankruptcy, to defraud creditors.

⁴ Croft v. Bunster, 9 Wis. 510.

vantage of the mortgage.¹ The doctrine stated by Mr. Hilliard seems to us equitable and just, especially in cases where the mortgage uses such terms as show an intention to secure the note to the holder. The security of the mortgage may impart to the paper its marketable value, as in the case of corporation coupon bonds, which rest mainly upon the basis of such security for their payment. And to sever the basis of credit from the obligation to pay would most frequently defeat the negotiation of these, or similar instruments, at anything like their par value.

§ 834 *a*. In Massachusetts, where note and mortgage were upon illegal consideration and void, it was held that as a *bona fide* holder without notice could enforce the note, he could also enforce the mortgage assigned with it, Metcalf, J., saying: "We know of no principle which makes the mortgage less valid than the note in the plaintiff's hands."² In a case before the United States Supreme Court where failure of consideration between maker of a note secured by mortgage, was pleaded against enforcement of the mortgage, it was held that the *bona fide* holder of the note, without notice, could enforce it, and Swayne, J., said: "The contract as regards the note was that the maker should pay it at maturity to any *bona fide* indorsee without reference to any defense to which it might have been liable in the hands of the payee. The mortgage was conditioned to secure the fulfillment of that contract."³ A deed of trust stands on the same footing as a mortgage; and as an incident and accessory to the paper, the transfer of the latter carries with it to the transferees the benefit of the security.⁴ The holder of a bill

¹ Johnson v. Carpenter, 7 Minn. 183; (1862); Walker v. Dement, 42 Ill. 278; Heller v. Meis, 2 Cin. (Ohio) 287; Petillon v. Noble, 73 Ill. 537 (1874); Bryant v. Vix, 83 Ill. 14 (1876); see Morris v. White, 28 La. 855 (1876).

² Taylor v. Page, 6 Allen, 86 (1863).

³ Carpenter v. Longan, 16 Wall. 273 (1872); Sawyer v. Prickett, 19 Wall. 166 (1873). See to same effect Logan v. Smith, Sup. Ct. Mo. 3 Cent. L. J. 384 (1876); 62 Mo. 455.

⁴ New Orleans, &c. v. Montgomery, 95 U. S. (5 Otto), 16 (1877); Potts v. Blackwell, 4 Jones, (N. C. Eq.) 58.

or note secured by mortgage or deed of trust may proceed at law and in equity at the same time.¹ Where a mortgage was made to secure the indorser of a note, it was held, in Maryland, that it secured to the benefit of every *bona fide* holder; and that the mortgagee could not release the mortgagor so as to deprive the holder of its benefit.²

§ 834 *b*. But the doctrine of the text is subject to this limitation: that if the land conveyed by the mortgage was subject to a prior lien of a third party, the indorsee of the note would only acquire the right to enforce his claim against the land subject to such lien whether he had notice of it or not. This doctrine arises from the very nature of such a case, as the indorser himself could not by a negotiable, or other contract, supersede the pre-existing rights of a third person not a party to his act.³ And wherever the assignee is chargeable with constructive notice of an equity prior to the mortgage under which he claims, he must yield to it.⁴ If the transfer of a note payable to order, and of the mortgage to secure it be by delivery merely, both note and mortgage are open to equities.⁵

§ 835. It has been held that where a promissory note and a mortgage securing its payment have been executed to a corporation by A., and such corporation executed to C. its negotiable bond for a sum equal to the note, attaching thereto the note and mortgage, and reciting in the bond that the corporation transferred the note and mortgage to C. as security, and that both should be transferable in connection with the bond, and not otherwise; that this was a sufficient indorsement within the law merchant to pass to C. the legal title to the note, and that he became thereby a *bona fide* holder, and was entitled to protection against equitable defenses existing against it in the hands of the corporation.⁶ Where a note is

¹ Ober v. Gallagher, 93 U. S. (3 Otto), 199.

² Boyd v. Parker, 43 Md. 782; see McCracken v. German Fire Ins. Co. Id. 471.

³ Linville v. Savage, 58 Mo. 248; Logan v. Smith, 62 Mo. 455 (1876).

⁴ Simo v. Hammond, 33 Iowa, 368; English v. Waffles, 13 Iowa, 57.

⁵ Crum v. Corby, 11 Kansas, 464.

⁶ Crosby v. Roul, 16 Wis. 625 (1863), Paine, J.: "The intent to pass the

secured by mortgage, and there is a provision in the mortgage not contained in the note, the mortgage will control.¹ In Massachusetts it has been held that if one who holds by assignment duly recorded a mortgage and a note indorsed in blank purporting on its face to be secured by it, "the same being collateral to" a certain note, assigns the mortgage, and afterward indorses the note for which it was collateral, retaining the mortgage note to another by an assignment in like words duly recorded, he conveys a title to the mortgage debt, except as against an innocent purchaser for value without notice, and one to whom he subsequently passes the mortgage note and fraudulently assigns the mortgage upon a separate paper as collateral security for a loan, is not such a purchaser.² Where a deed of trust given to secure sundry notes maturing at different times, provides that none of them shall become due, and that the deed shall not be foreclosed, till the maturity of the note made latent payable, the holder purchasing one of the notes, with knowledge of such provisions, cannot recover judgment until the last note matures.³

title and make the note transferable by delivery afterward as a note payable to order, and duly indorsed by the payee, is beyond question. And this contract, like all others, must take effect according to the intent of the parties, if it is sufficient in law to express that intent. And the fact that the parties contracted for an absolute liability by the vendor, evidenced by a distinct negotiable instrument on the back of the one transferred, cannot, upon any rational principle, be held to distinguish the case, so far as the mere question of a transfer is concerned, from a case where they contract for no liability, or for the conditional liability of a indorser, or the absolute liability of a guarantor. I conclude, then, that if the bond had been written on the back of the note, it would have been fully sufficient to pass the legal title within the law merchant." *Bange v. Flint*, 25 Wis. 546; see *ante*, § 689, and *post*, § 855.

¹ *Dobbins v. Parker*, 46 Iowa, 358; see *ante*, § 156.

² *Strong v. Jackson*, 123 Mass. 60.

³ *Brownlee v. Arnold*, 60 Mo. 79.

CHAPTER XXVI.

RIGHTS OF A BONA FIDE HOLDER OR PURCHASER OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ORIGINATING IN FRAUD, DURESS, OR VIOLATION OF AUTHORITY.

§ 836. There are numerous cases in which the line of demarcation between the fraud which does not affect the *bona fide* holder for value, and without notice, and that which utterly vitiates the instrument in all hands whatsoever, is narrow and difficult to distinguish. The distinctions taken are frequently very refined and metaphysical; but the test questions to be applied, we think, are these: (1) Has the party sought to be charged created an agency or trust, by means of which the fraud has been committed? (2) Has he deliberately given the appearance of validity to the instrument? (3) Has he committed negligence respecting it, by means of which an opportunity for the fraud has been created? And whenever either of these questions can be answered affirmatively upon a fair consideration of all the circumstances of the case, the balance of equity is in favor of the *bona fide* holder for value, and without notice, the axiomatic principle of law then applying, that where one of two innocent persons must suffer, the one who creates the trust, or does the act from which the loss results, must bear it.

SECTION I.

HOLDER OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS COMPLETED, BUT NOT DELIVERED.

§ 837. (1) The *first* class of cases of the description above mentioned are those in which a completed bill or note is obtained from the maker or drawer, without any delivery on his part, actual or constructive. We have seen that delivery is necessary in the case of a bill or note, as it is in

the case of every other contract, in order to consummate its validity between the parties to it. Suppose, however, that a bill, or promissory note, or bank note, has been fully completed in form and signed by the drawer or maker, and before delivery is stolen from the possession of the party who has signed it, and passed by the thief to a *bona fide* holder for value in the usual course of business, would the fact that the party signing had never delivered it afford him a defense against such *bona fide* holder? Whether the instrument be payable to bearer, or to the order of the thief, if it be indorsed by him, we can see no reason why the *bona fide* holder should not be entitled to recover. The want of delivery is a defect not apparent on the face of the bill or note. The party has given the appearance of validity to his paper. His signature is itself an assurance that his obligation has been perfected by delivery; and it being necessary that the loss should fall upon one of two innocent parties, it should fall upon the one whose act had opened the door for it to enter.¹ In Massachusetts, this doctrine has been applied in favor of the holder of bank notes which were signed and ready for use, and which were stolen before they had been issued from the vault of the bank in which they were deposited;² and in Illinois, against the maker of a note who signed it as a mere matter of amusement, and from whom it was stolen by one who saw him sign it, and who passed it to an innocent indorsee, the Court saying, per Walker, J.:³ "The maker evidently intended to sign such a note as this, and she knew its contents when she signed the instrument. This case does not materially differ from any other note or bank bill which may be stolen and negotiated after it has been made." And in a later case, where the maker drew his note for \$108, intending to insert a condition that it should not be valid unless the plows for which it was executed were delivered,

¹ Kinyon v. Wohlford, 17 Minn. 239.

² Worcester County Bank v. Dorchester, &c. Bank, 10 Cush. 488; see Thomson on Bills (Wilson's ed.), 92; 1 Parsons N. & B. 114, and *post*, § 839, note 1.

³ Shipley v. Carroll, 45 Ill. 285.

and the payee snatched it from his hand, ran off, and transferred it to a *bona fide* holder for value, without notice, this case was re-affirmed, and its principle applied.¹

§ 838. There are cases which take a different view. Thus in Michigan, where the maker of a note payable to the order of B. signed it and left it on a table in a room where his sister and B. remained together, enjoining B. not to take it, as the negotiation pending was not concluded; but B., nevertheless, took it and transferred it to an innocent purchaser, it was held that the maker was not liable, not having been guilty of "culpable negligence."²

In this particular case it would seem that the maker, by trusting the paper in the custody of B., rendered himself liable for the consequences; and that the facts hardly justified the conclusion that the maker was guilty of no culpable negligence. But if the paper had been snatched from the maker's hand, as in one of the Illinois cases above cited, then having trusted no one, having been guilty of no negligence, and not having deliberately concluded the act which imparted the appearance of validity to it, it would seem too extreme an extension of the doctrine in favor of a *bona fide* holder of a negotiable instrument to subject the maker to its payment. All purchasers must incur some risk; and to protect them, after the maker has done some act which, in equity and good conscience, should seal his mouth, is all that seems to us is necessary to guard their rights, without inflicting great injustice on the innocent party. It is the case of one innocent party against another equally so; and when the latter has done nothing to lower the grade of his claim to protection, we do not see that the former stands upon any superior footing.

§ 839. Where the maker has perfected the instrument, and left it undelivered in a safe, desk, or other receptacle, it should then be at his hazard. Such papers are made for use, and not for preservation. The maker creates the risk of their being eloigned, by keeping them on hand, and places

¹ Clarke v. Johnson, 54 Ill. 296.

² Burson v. Huntington, 21 Mich. 415.

them on the same basis as negotiable papers which have been put upon the market. When once issued, the purchaser is protected and the owner loses, even though he had guarded his property with bolt and bar; and, if bankers and others who must necessarily be in possession of negotiable securities in the course of trade are not protected, we can discover no principle which can be invoked to protect one who holds his own paper contrary to the ordinary wants and usages of trade.¹

§ 840. In New York the cases on this point do not seem to us reconcilable. In one case, where a note for \$120, made payable to A. or bearer, for the purpose of being given in renewal of another, was stolen out of the maker's desk, and sold to the holder for \$115, it was held the maker was not liable. W. F. Allen, J., saying: "The note never had any inception so as to enable any person to become a *bona fide* holder of it. It was an imperfect instrument, wanting delivery to give it validity as the promissory note of the defendant. The holder has taken a blank piece of paper, not a promissory note."² But in a later case, where the note was indorsed by the payee, for whose accommodation it was made, and left in his desk, and it was eloiigned therefrom and passed to a *bona fide* holder, for value, and without notice, it was held that the fact it had never been delivered as a valid security was no defense.³

¹ Thomson on Bills (Wilson's ed.), 92; 1 Parsons N. & B. 114, in which it is said: "If a person sign notes in blank, and lock them up in his safe, whence they are stolen, filled up and negotiated, without fault or negligence on his part, he is not liable. Possibly it might be held otherwise, if he make and sign a perfect note, payable to bearer, and it be stolen under similar circumstances; on the ground that, when the instrument is once perfected (although it has never passed out of the maker's hand, and consequently has had no inception as a contract), it is like money; and any one who receives it in good faith, and for a valuable consideration, acquires a perfect title."

² Hall v. Wilson, 16 Barb. 556 (1853).

³ Gould v. Segee, 5 Duer, 270 (1856).

SECTION II.

HOLDER OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS INCOMPLETE AND UNDELIVERED.

§ 841. (2) The *second* class of cases arises when an incomplete instrument has been signed and stolen, without any delivery to an agent in trust, or otherwise, intervening. In such cases, no trust for any purpose has been created. No instrument has been perfected. No appearance of validity has been given it. No negligence can be imputed. Therefore, if the blank be filled, it is sheer forgery, in which the maker is in nowise involved, and he is not therefore bound, even to a *bona fide* holder without notice.¹

§ 842. In New York, it has been held that where coupon bonds of a railroad corporation, negotiable in form, and containing a provision on their face that "the president of the company is authorized to fix by his indorsement the place of payment of the principal and interest, in conformity with the tenor of this obligation," and also bearing the following indorsement: "I hereby agree that the within bonds and the interest coupons thereto attached shall be payable in ———, G. C. Young, president," were not valid in the hands of *bona fide* holders for value, and without notice, they having been stolen from the safe of the company by the soldiers of the United States, and issued into the world in this imperfect form. The ground of the decision is that the blank as to place of payment not having been filled, was notice to the world that the instrument had not been completed, and that no one was clothed with authority by the president of the company to complete it.² In England, where the defendant gave his blank acceptance to H, who returned it, and it was then stolen from the chamber of the defendant, and C. filled in his own name and negotiated it, it was held that a *bona fide* holder could not recover.³

¹ 1 Parsons N. & B. 114; see *ante*, § 839, note 1.

² *Ledwick v. McKim*, 53 N. Y. 315 (1873); see *Redlick v. Doll*, 54 N. Y. 236.

³ *Baxendale v. Bennett*, L. R. 3 Q. B. D. 525, 47 L. J. Q. B. 624, 26 W. R.

SECTION III.

HOLDER OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS INTRUSTED TO ANOTHER WITH
BLANKS.

§ 843. (3) The *third* class of cases comprises those in which the party sought to be charged upon the negotiable instrument has been betrayed by his agent, or some other party to whom he has intrusted his signature on a blank paper, and who has fraudulently written over it a bill or note. There is no doubt that if the bill or note were complete with the exception that there was a blank left for the sum, the parties who had signed, accepted, or indorsed it would be bound to pay any sum with which it might be filled up to a *bona fide* holder without notice of the limitation of authority to the agent or other person having it in hand,¹ and it is immaterial that such holder knew that it had been signed, accepted, or indorsed in blank, unless he was also cognizant of its being fraudulently filled up.² If he knew when he took the paper that authority as to filling it up was exceeded, he could not recover.³

It seems, also, to be well settled that if the party sought to be charged has intrusted his blank signature to an agent or other person, and has authorized such agent or other person to fill the blank in some form, for some purpose, that he would be bound to a *bona fide* holder if the agent or person wrote over such signature a bill or note. Thus, where papers indorsed in blank were left with a clerk, with authority to use them for certain purposes, and they were fraudulently obtained from him and used differently, the indorser was held liable.⁴

¹ *Michigan Bank v. Eldred*, 9 Wall.; *Russell v. Langstaffe*, 2 Dougl. 514; *Violet v. Patton*, 5 Cranch, 142; *Orrick v. Colston*, 7 Grat. 189. In *Fullerton v. Sturgis*, 4 Ohio St., A. and B., as sureties of C., signed an instrument payable to D. or order, in blank as to date, amount, and time of payment, and delivered it to C., the principal, with the agreement that it should not be filled up for more than \$1,000 or \$1,500. C. filled it up for \$10,000, and discounted it, and it was held that the parties were bound. See *Redlick v. Doll*, 54 N. Y. 236; and see *ante*, § 842, and §§ 142, *et seq.*

² *Huntington v. Branch Bank*, 3 Ala. 186.

³ *Clewer v. Wynn*, 59 Ga. 246.

⁴ *Putnam v. Sullivan*, 4 Mass. 45; see 1 Parsons, N. & B. 114.

§ 844. In all these cases the first test stated by the text obviously applies. The party sought to be charged has created the agency or trust by means of which the fraud has been committed. Holding the agent out to the world, by confiding his signature into his hands, and accrediting him with that "letter of credit for an indefinite sum,"¹ he who has thus told others to trust him, cannot throw the burden of loss on them when they have complied with that request. To hold otherwise would be to punish confiding innocence, and to protect the authors of the fraud. In Maine, where suit was brought by a *bona fide* holder against the maker of a note who alleged that it was a forgery, and his evidence tended to show that the instrument when delivered contained blanks unfilled, which were afterwards fraudulently filled, it was held that it was for the jury to determine whether the instrument was delivered as an incomplete paper with blanks to be filled, and that if it was so delivered for any purpose, the person receiving it had implied authority to fill the blanks, and the maker would be liable thereon to a holder in good faith.² So where the maker of a note for \$300 left a blank between "hundred" and "dollars," and "twenty" was inserted so as to make the note for \$320, a *bona fide* holder was held entitled to recover, the maker having afforded the opportunity of alteration.³ Cases of this kind are elsewhere more fully cited and discussed.⁴

SECTION IV.

HOLDER OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS WRITTEN OVER BLANK SIGNATURES.

§ 845. (4) The *fourth* class of cases comprises those in which the signature of the party has been written on a blank paper, and no authority has been given to the persons in whose hands it is intrusted, or to whose it may come, to write any contract over it; as, for instance, if such signature were written on the flyleaf of a book loaned to such person, or in an album, or were left with him for any legitimate purpose,

¹ See *ante*, § 142.

² *Abbott v. Rose*, 62 Me. 194.

³ *Yocum v. Smith*, 63 Ill. 321.

⁴ See vol. II, Chapter XLIII, on Alteration, Sec. VI, §§ 1405 to 1409 inclusive.

such as to be used as a means of identifying the writer's handwriting; and in such cases, if a bill or note be written over the blank signature, the party would not be bound.¹ Thus, where the party wrote his name on a blank paper, and it was taken from his table by another, who caused a note to be written over it, and put in circulation, these views were taken, Collier, C. J., saying:

"If a recovery were allowed upon such a state of facts, then every one who ever indulges in the idle habit of writing his name for mere pastime, or leaves sufficient space between a title and his subscription, might be made a bankrupt by having promises to pay money written over his signature."²

§ 846. In these cases, no trust or agency was reposed in the holder of the blank. No appearance of validity was given to the paper as a note. And it could hardly be said that the party was guilty of any negligence in exercising his right to do so simple a thing as the mere writing of his name, when he attached no words to it to give it any significance. In Iowa, the doctrines above stated have been adopted, and there, in a case where A. wrote his name on a piece of blank paper, and sent it to B., who was his agent respecting certain matters, in order that he might use it in identifying his signature, and B. had a note printed over it, and passed it to C. before maturity, in the usual course of business, it was held that the latter could not recover.³

¹ *Caulkins v. Whisler*, 29 Iowa, 495; *Nance v. Lary*, 5 Ala. 370.

² *Nance v. Lary*, 5 Ala. 370.

³ *Caulkins v. Whisler*, 29 Iowa, 495, in which case Beck, J., said: "The case differs materially in its facts from the case cited in support of plaintiff's right to recover. In these cases blanks were filled up contrary to the direction of the maker or without his authority. But in all of such cases the makers intended to execute an instrument which should be binding upon them. Blanks were filled up contrary to the authority given by the makers, or in some other way the instruments were made so that they did not correspond with the intention of the makers; but in all such cases there were makers and instruments, and through the frauds of those to whom the instruments were intrusted, they were thus made to be of different effect than was designed by the makers. In these cases it is correctly held, that while the parties perpetrating the fraud in some cases

SECTION V.

HOLDER OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS PROCURED BY IMPOSITION ON INFIRM OR ILLITERATE PERSONS.

§ 847. (5) The *fifth* class of cases are those in which some natural infirmity or defect of education has been imposed upon, and the party deceived into signing a note under the impression that it was for a different amount, or was a contract of a different character. Thus, if a note were fraudulently or falsely read to a blind man, and he were to sign it believing it to have been correctly read;¹ or if the party were unable to read, and signed a note under the assurance that it was an agreement of a different kind, we should have a new element entering into the consideration of his liability. In such cases the want of faculties to detect the fraud shields the party from its consequences, and the authorities justly exonerate him.

He has created no agency or trust. He has not intentionally or knowingly given the appearance of validity to the paper. It cannot be said that he has acted negligently, because his infirmities prevented that diligence which men of ordinary faculties and of education possess.

may have been guilty of forgery, yet the makers were bound upon the instruments as against holders in good faith and for value.

"The reason is obvious. The maker ought rather to suffer on account of the fraudulent act of one to whom he intrusts his paper, or who is made agent in respect to it, than an innocent party. The law esteems him in fault in thus putting it in the power of another to perpetrate the fraud, and requires him to bear the loss consequent upon this negligence. In the case under consideration no fault can be imputed to defendant. He did not intrust his signature to the possession of the forger for the purpose of binding himself by a contract. He conferred no power upon the party who committed the crime to use it for any such purpose. He was not guilty of negligence in thus giving it, for it is not unusual, in order to identify signatures, and for other purposes, for men thus to make their autographs. The defendant cannot be regarded as being so far in fault in the transaction that he ought to bear the loss resulting from the crime." See *Kline v. Guthrie*, 42 Ind. 227; *Deturler v. Besh*, 44 Ind. 70.

¹ *Putnam v. Sullivan*, 4 Mass. 45, *Parsons, C. J.*, saying: "That, perhaps, if a blind man had a note falsely and fraudulently read to him, and he indorsed it supposing it to be the note read to him, he would not be liable as indorsee, because he is not guilty of any laches." See *Schuylkill County v. Copley*, 67 Penn. St. 386 (a bond).

§ 848. In New York,¹ where a *bona fide* holder for value, and without notice of any defect, brought suit on a promissory note, the defendant offered to prove in evidence that he was unable to read, and that, when he signed the note, it was represented to him, and he believed that it was a certain other contract, offered to be also produced in evidence, and which purported to be of an entirely different character. The Supreme Court of New York (overruling the decision of the lower court) held that the evidence was admissible, and presented a sufficient defense, Talcott, J., saying: "A *bona fide* holder of commercial paper, for value and before maturity, is protected, in many cases, against defenses which are perfectly available against the original parties, such as that the signature was obtained by false and fraudulent representations; that the paper has been diverted; that a blank bill or acceptance has been filled up for a greater amount than the party to whom it was delivered was authorized to insert, &c. But, in all these cases, the party intended to sign and put in circulation the instrument as a negotiable security; where this is the case, he is bound to know that he is furnishing the means whereby third parties may be deceived and innocently led to part with their property on the faith of his signature, and in ignorance of the true state of facts. But while this is a rule of great convenience and propriety, there are and must be some limits to its application, some defenses as to which even a *bona fide* purchaser purchases at his peril. * * *

The true distinction was tersely stated by Bovill, C. J., in *Foster v. McKinnon* (38 Law Journal Rep. N. S. 310), interrupting counsel *arguendo*, who was stating the proposition that where the plaintiff proves he is a *bona fide* holder for value, it is immaterial that the signature of the defendant was obtained by fraud." "That," said the Chief Justice, "is where the defendant intended to put his name to an instrument which was a bill." In another New York case evidence was given tending to show that the note was signed by the

¹ *Whitney v. Snyder*, 2 Lans. (N. Y.) 477. See *Chapman v. Rosz*, 56 N. Y. 137; and *post*, § 850.

maker at his own house; that he and two of his sons were present who could read; that defendant attempted to read the paper, but did not understand it well, and that it was then read over by the person presenting the paper, an entire stranger to the defendant and his family, and was signed by defendant. The note was held by a *bona fide* holder, and the defendant claimed to have signed it under the belief that it was a contract to act as agent for a patent cultivator. It was held that the case turned on the question of the defendant's negligence; that it was improper in the inferior court to direct a verdict for the plaintiff; and that whether the maker was negligent or not was a question of fact for the jury.¹

§ 849. In Wisconsin, where a German, unable to read or write the English language, was induced to sign a note on the fraudulent representation that it was a contract of agency respecting a patent machine; he was likewise protected against a *bona fide* holder, on the ground that he had no intention of signing a note, and was guilty of no negligence in affixing his signature.² So it was held, in the same State, that where the maker of a note was induced by fraud to sign a negotiable note, supposing it to be non-negotiable, notwithstanding laches on his part, he was not bound to a *bona fide* holder.³ But this case seems to go too far.

SECTION VI.

HOLDER OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS EXECUTED UNDER MISTAKE AND MISREPRESENTATION.

§ 850. (6) The *sixth* class of cases are those in which the party possesses the ordinary faculties and knowledge, and is betrayed into signing a bill or note by the assurance that it is an instrument of a different kind. It is generally agreed that if the party is guilty of any negligence in signing the paper

¹ Fenton v. Robinson, 11 N. Y. S. C. (4 Hun), 252.

² Walker v. Ebert, 29 Wis. 196 (1871); to same effect see Puffer v. Smith, 57 Ill. 527; Griffiths v. Kellogg, 39 Wis. 290 (1870); see also First Nat. Bank v. Lierman, 5 Neb. 247; Van Brunt v. Singley, 85 Ill. 281.

³ Kellogg v. Steiner, 29 Wis. 627 (1871); see also Butler v. Carns, 37 Wis. 61 (1875).

he is bound;¹ and the act itself, it seems to us, can hardly be committed without negligence. A man has no right to have eyes and see not; or ears and hear not; and while the law should protect those who suffer from the want of the senses in their proper development, or ordinary education, it should not permit those who have both capacity and education to throw the burden of their failure to use them upon innocent third parties. In such cases we should say the act of signing the paper without intending to do so, as a general rule, imported negligence *per se*, and rendered the party liable. If he has full and unrestricted means of ascertaining the true character of the instrument before signing it, but neglecting to avail himself of such means of information, and relying on others' representations, he signs and delivers a negotiable paper, instead of a different paper, which he intended to sign, he cannot be heard to impeach it, when it has been passed to a *bona fide* holder.² In accordance with this doctrine, it was held in Iowa that where one Matting was induced to sign a promissory note under the false representation that it was a contract of agency, respecting a certain

¹ Chapman v. Rose, 44 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 364; 56 N. Y. 137 (1874), Johnson, J.: "In such case the rule is, that he is bound by the act of him whom he has trusted, in favor of a holder in good faith." See Central Law Journal, July 2d, 1875, p. 423; see *post*, § 851; Fenton v. Robinson, 11 N. Y. S. C. (4 Hun), 252; Putnam v. Sullivan, *ante*, § 847; Ross v. Doland, 29 Ohio St. 473; Nebeker v. Cut-singer, 48 Ind. 436.

² Douglass v. Matting, 29 Iowa, 498, Beck, J. said: "The defendant trusted the one with whom he was dealing with the preparation of the instrument. The instrument as prepared was not what defendant had agreed to sign, but was voluntarily executed by him. The act of the agent was a fraud whereby the defendant was induced to make the note, and not the false making of it, which is necessary to constitute a forgery. * * * Now it would be manifestly unjust to permit the maker, while admitting the genuineness of his signature, to defeat the note, on the ground that, through his own culpable carelessness while dealing with a stranger, he signed the instrument without reading it or attempting to ascertain its true contents. The law will favor as between the holder and maker in such a case, the more innocent and diligent. The maker had it in his power to protect himself from the fraud, but failed to do so. When the consequences of this act are about to be visited upon him, he seeks to make another bear it, on the ground that he was defrauded through his own gross negligence. He can certainly claim protection neither on the ground of his innocence or diligence.

patent seeder and cultivator, he was bound to a *bona fide* holder.¹

Again, in Iowa, where a party's signature was fraudulently obtained to a printed form or blank, under pretense of getting an order for a machine, and the payee filled it up as a negotiable note for \$75, payable to T. H., or bearer, the like decision was rendered.² In New York, similar views now prevail;³ and in Illinois, where the maker of a note for \$180 signed it without reading it, under representations that it contained a condition that it should not be paid until a certain number of hay-loading devices were sold, he was held bound to the *bona fide* holder, upon the same principles.⁴

"The rule contended for by the appellee would tend to destroy all confidence in commercial paper. It is better that defendant, and others who so carelessly affix their names to paper, the contents of which are unknown to them, should suffer from the fraud which their recklessness invites, than that the character of commercial paper should be impaired, and the business of the country interfered with and unsettled."

¹ *Shirts v. Overjohn*, 60 Mo. 305; *Fredericks v. Clemens*, Id. 313; *Citizens' Nat. Bank v. Smith*, 55 N. H. 393.

² *McDonald v. Muscatine National Bank*, 27 Iowa, 319 (1869), Cole, J., saying: "This conclusion is based upon the fact, as shown by plaintiff's own evidence, that the signature of the plaintiff was placed to the blank instrument, and it was delivered and intrusted by him to the payee, for some purpose. In such case the rule may well be applied."

³ *Chapman v. Rose*, 56 N. Y. 137 (1874), overruling same case in 44 How. Prac. R. 364 (1873), and explaining *Whitney v. Snyder*, 2 Lans. 477; *Fenton v. Robinson*, 11 N. Y. S. C. (4 Hun,) 354, see *ante*, § 848. See, to same effect, *Shirts v. Overjohn* (Supreme Court of Missouri, May, 1875, Central Law Journal, July 2d, 1875, p. 423), 60 Mo. 315; *Fredericks v. Clemens*, Id. 313.

⁴ *Leach v. Nichols*, 55 Ill. 273, *McAllister, J.*: "The case of *Foster v. McKinnon*, decided in the English Common Pleas, in July, 1869, and reported in 38 Law Journal Reports, New Series, p. 310, is one, where the plaintiff was an indorsee of a bill of exchange for £3,000, and sued the defendant as indorser. The plaintiff was a holder for value before maturity, and without notice of the fraud. Callow, the acceptor of the bill, testified that he produced the bill to the defendant (a gentleman far advanced in life), for him to put his signature on the back, after that of one Cooper, who was payee and first indorser of the bill, Callow not saying it was a bill, but told the defendant the instrument was a guaranty. The defendant did not see the face of the bill at all, but the bill was of the usual shape, and bore a bill stamp, the impress of which stamp was visible at the back of the bill. The defendant signed his name after Cooper, he, the defendant, as the witness stated, believing the document to be a guaranty only. The Lord Chief Justice told the jury, that if the indorsement was not the defendant's signature, or if, being his signature, it was obtained upon a fraudulent representation

So in Missouri, the *bona fide* holder was sustained in his right to recover where the maker signed a negotiable note, though supposing it was a receipt for plows. In this case he was also deemed bound by a subsequent ratification.¹ Now,

that it was a guaranty, and the defendant signed it without knowing that it was a bill, and under the belief that it was a guaranty, and if the defendant was not guilty of any negligence in so signing the paper, the defendant was entitled to a verdict. The jury found for the defendant. A rule *nisi* was obtained for a new trial, and the cause was fully argued, and carefully considered by the court, upon examination of all the authorities which could be found bearing upon the question. The instruction was sustained by the whole court, in a very elaborate opinion, delivered by Byles, J., who says: 'It seems plain, on principle and on authority, that if a blind man, or a man who cannot read, or a man who for some reason (not implying negligence) forbears to read, has a written contract falsely read over to him, the reader misreading to such a degree that the written contract is of a nature altogether different from the contract pretended to be read from the paper, which the blind or illiterate man afterward signs, then, at least if there be no negligence, the signature so obtained is of no force, and it is invalid, not merely on the ground of fraud, where fraud existed, but on the ground that the mind of the signer did not accompany the signature; in other words, that he never intended to sign, and, therefore, in contemplation of law, never did sign the contract to which his name is appended. The authorities appear to support this view of the law. In *Thoroughgood's Case*, 2 Rep. 96, it was held, that if an illiterate man have a deed falsely read over to him, and he then seals and delivers the parchment, that parchment is, nevertheless, not his deed.

"In a note to *Thoroughgood's Case*, 2 Rep. 96, in Frazer's edition of Coke's Reports, it is suggested that the doctrine is not confined to the condition of an illiterate grantor, and a case in Kelway's Reports, p. 70, is cited in support of this observation. On reference to that case, it appears that one of the judges did there observe, that it made no difference whether the grantor were lettered or unlettered. That, however, was a case where the grantee himself was the defending party; but the position, that if a grantor or covenantor be deceived or misled as to the actual contents of the deed, the deed does not bind him, is supported by many authorities (see Com. Dig. tit. "Fait," 62) and is recognized by Bayley, J., and the Court of Exchequer, in the case of *Edwards v. Brown*, 1 Cr. & J. 312. Accordingly, it has recently been decided in the Exchequer Chamber, that if a deed be delivered, and a blank left therein be thereafter improperly filled up (at least if this be done without the grantor's negligence), it is not the deed of the grantor. *Swan v. The North British Australasian Co.* 2 Hurl. & C. 175; 32 L. J. R. N. S. Exch. 273. These cases apply to deeds, but the principle is equally applicable to other contracts. * * * It was not his design, and, if he was guilty of no negligence, it was not even his fault that the instrument he signed turned out to be a bill of exchange.'" See *Sims v. Bice*, 67 Ill. 88, where party was imposed upon, and fraudulently induced to sign a note, supposing it to be an agreement of agency, and was interrupted in the course of the transaction. He was unable to read readily, and a verdict in his favor was sustained.

¹ *Shirts v. Overjohn*, 60 Mo. 315; *Fredericks v. Clemens*, Id. 313. See *Kemble v. Christie*, 55 Ind. 140.

in Illinois, under statutory enactments, whether signature of a note is obtained by fraud of the payee, or by inducing him to believe it is not a note, but a different instrument, it is void even in the hands of a *bona fide* holder.¹ But if he was acquainted with its language, or might have been by the exercise of ordinary prudence and caution at the time he signed it, false and fraudulent representations of the payee as to its legal effect will not render it void in such a holder's hands.²

In Ohio, negligence is the test. If the maker is charged with negligence, as when he signs a paper containing blanks capable of being filled up as a note, or signs it without reading it, relying on what is told him, he is bound, notwithstanding he was deceived and did not intend to make a note;³ but if not chargeable with negligence he is not.⁴

In Nebraska it is considered that the party to an instrument is not guilty of negligence where he relies on the reading of it by another party thereto.⁵ If such party were a stranger, we should say it was negligence;⁶ and, indeed, it seems that it is negligence when one can read not to read for himself.⁷

§ 851. In other States the courts go far to protect the defrauded parties to the paper rather than the innocent holders. In Michigan, where the maker of a note, of defective eyesight, in the dusk of evening, was induced by an impostor to sign several papers adroitly arranged to overlie each other, under the assurance that they were contracts respecting the agency for a patent hayfork, and amongst them was a negotiable note for \$120, which was passed to a *bona fide* holder, the holder was not permitted to recover. The defective eyesight, was not referred to as exempting the maker from the charge of negligence, but the broad doctrine was asserted, that, as he did not intend to make a negotiable paper, he was not bound.⁸

¹ Hubbard v. Rankin, 71 Ill. 129; Richardson v. Schirtz, 59 Ill. 313.

² Hornes v. Hale, 71 Ill. 552. See also Swannell v. Watson, 71 Ill. 456; Mead v. Munson, 60 Ill. 49.

³ Ross v. Doland, 29 Ohio St. 473.

⁴ De Camp v. Hanna, 29 Ohio St. 467.

⁵ Palmer v. Largent, 5 Neb. 223.

⁶ See Swannell v. Watson, 71 Ill. 456.

⁷ See *ante*, § 850.

⁸ Gibbs v. Linabury, 22 Mich. 492 (1871); Graves, J., said: "Now, when a

And the like view was at one time taken in Missouri, in a case differing only in the circumstance that there was no physical infirmity in the maker, and that the patent machine about which the negotiation took place was a pump instead of a hayfork ;¹ but this case was subsequently overruled, and the doctrine of the text adopted.² In another Michigan case it was held, that while there may be cases where one signing and putting in circulation an instrument, should be bound by the terms thereof, even though different from what he supposed them to be, that rule would not apply where a party signed in good faith what he had heard read, and what purported to be a power of attorney, contract, deed, or other similar instrument, in case a negotiable note of that date, of which he had no notice or intimation, should have been mysteriously lurking in the depths of the instrument so signed, and should afterward turn up with his signature attached thereto.³

§ 851 *a*. In England, it would seem, from the case of *Foster v. McKinnon*,⁴ that the holder, under such circumstances, is not protected. In that case, the party was induced to indorse a bill upon the assurance that it was a guaranty, and it was held that he was not bound. It appears from the evidence, however, that he was a gentleman far advanced in life, and that circumstance may have been of some weight in

party never designed to put, or cause to be put, any sort of negotiable paper in circulation, when the thought of doing so never entered his mind, when he had never bargained to do so, when he has never consciously been privy to any attempt to set such paper afloat, how can it be said that his will in any way assented to the concoction of such a contract so as to make him an object of the rule?

“So far as this principle is concerned, it is not perceived how the instance here supposed would differ from that when the act leading to the mischief is done by an insane man, or is compelled by duress. The point is, that the will does not go with the act.” See *Deturler v. Bish*, 44 Ind. 70.

¹ *Briggs v. Ewart*, 51 Mo. 251 (1873); followed in *Martin v. Smylee*, 55 Mo. 577, and *Corby v. Weddle*, 57 Mo. 452.

² *Shirts v. Overjohn* (May, 1875, reported in *Central Law Journal*, July 2d, 1875, p. 423), 60 Mo. 315.

³ *Anderson v. Walter*, 34 Mich. 113.

⁴ 4 C. B. 704; 38 L. J. N. S. 310; see *ante*, § 850, note 3; and *Chapman v. Rose*, 56 N. Y. 137.

relieving him from the imputation of negligence. We certainly cannot concur in the doctrine that the intention of the party signing the paper should determine the question of his responsibility. Third parties can have no opportunity to scrutinize his intention, which is a sealed book to all but himself; and he should not be permitted to escape the responsibility of what he did by pleading what he designed to do.

But the language of Lord Chief Justice Bovill is consonant with the principle of the text. He said: "If the defendant's signature to the document was obtained upon a fraudulent representation that it was a guaranty, and if he was not guilty of any negligence in so signing the paper, he was entitled to the verdict."

§ 852. In Indiana, a very strong decision has been rendered protecting the maker against a *bona fide* holder.¹ There, where the maker of a negotiable promissory note, payable at a bank in that State, was induced, by the fraud and circumvention of the payee, to sign his name to such note, when he honestly supposed and believed that he was writing his name on a blank piece of paper, to enable the payee to see how his name was spelled or written, and the maker did not, after he discovered that he had so signed his name to the note, voluntarily deliver it to the payee, but it was taken possession of wrongfully and forcibly by the payee, and by him carried away against the consent of the maker and negotiated; it was held (1), That the maker was no more bound by his signature than if it were a total forgery, although the person to whom it was negotiated was a purchaser and holder in good faith and for a valuable consideration before maturity; and also (2), That admitting that the maker signed his name to the note, with full knowledge of its character, it was nevertheless invalid and void, even in the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, for the want of delivery; nor was the maker liable on the ground that when one of two innocent persons must suffer by the act of a third, he

¹ Cluse v. Guthrie, 42 Ind. 227. See also Deturler v. Bish, 44 Ind. 70.

who has enabled such third person to occasion the loss must sustain it. But in another case in that State the maker was held liable to a *bona fide* holder, for value, notwithstanding he was led to execute the note by fraudulent and false representations of the payee that it was a different sort of instrument, and signed it not supposing it was a negotiable note, nor intending to make one.¹

§ 853. It is quite remarkable that throughout the north-western States so many cases have occurred almost identical in circumstances, and in which, in fact, the names of the parties are frequently the only distinguishing elements. The peddlers of patent machines and patent rights seem to have practiced a particular trick upon their victims, and have flooded the courts with litigations arising out of it. These cases are notable instances of the contagion and imitativeness of fraud. In some of the States, legislation has been deemed necessary to protect society against frauds committed through such instrumentalities as those herein discussed.²

SECTION VII.

HOLDER OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT DELIVERED BY THIRD PARTY IN VIOLATION OF INSTRUCTIONS.

§ 854. Still another class of cases, presenting a question somewhat different from any yet discussed, has arisen where parties have signed their names to bills and notes, either perfect in form, or in blank, with authority only to deliver them as complete and valid instruments upon condition that

¹ Kimble v. Christie, 55 Ind. 140. See also Nebeker v. Cutsinger, 48 Ind. 436. See Wisconsin Cases, *ante*, § 849, note.

² In New York, by statute, where a note is given in whole or in part for the right to make, use or vend a patent right, the words "given for a patent right" are required to be prominently written or printed on the face before execution, and it is subject to all defenses as if in the hands of the original taker. The sale of a note so given without a compliance with the statute is a misdemeanor. 1 Laws, 1877, Ch. 65, p. 68. In some other States there are also provisions as to notes given for patent rights. See Pendar v. Kelley, 48 Vt. 27; Moses v. Comstock, 4 Neb. 516.

some other person shall become a party, or some contingency be fulfilled. In these cases it will be observed the person with whom such instrument is left is its mere custodian, and not an agent having any absolute power to dispose of it. He is not, as to the instrument, an agent with limited powers, but the agency itself is conditioned upon the happening of the event upon which he is to become the agent to deliver. In such cases there is the high authority of the English Court of Exchequer of Pleas, that the party whose name is upon the instrument will not be bound if the custodian of it issue it to a *bona fide* holder before the condition is fulfilled; but the weight of authority in the United States, with reason, as we think, supports the opposite view. In the Court of Exchequer of Pleas, where it appeared that A. agreed to join his brother B. in making a promissory note for his accommodation, provided C. would also join; and with a view to carrying out the arrangement a note, blank as to date and as to the payee, and running, "We jointly and severally promise to pay Mr. ———, or order, £1,000," was signed by A., leaving room before his name for C.'s—another handed it to B.; and B. without procuring C. to sign, also passed the note to D., filling up the blanks, and inserting D.'s name as payee, it was held that D. could not recover against A. upon the ground that the refusal of C. to join was a countermand of authority to B. to issue; and that B. then had no authority to deal with it.¹ This is the *ratio decidendi*

¹ *Awde v. Dixon*, 6 Exch. 869 (1851), Parke, B., said: "It is unnecessary to say whether this instrument is a forgery or not, but there is certainly ground for contending that the making of it complete, contrary to the directions of the defendant, renders it a false instrument as against him. I do not gainsay the position, that a person who puts his name to a blank paper impliedly authorizes the filling of it up to the amount that the stamp will cover. But this is a different case. Here, the instrument, to which the defendant's name is attached, is delivered to his brother, with power to make it a complete instrument, on one condition only, that is, provided Robinson would be a joint surety with him. This, therefore, is an instance of a limited authority, where, in case of a refusal by Robinson to join, there is a countermand. Robinson refused to join, and consequently the defendant's brother had no authority to make use of the instrument. A party who takes such an incomplete instrument cannot recover upon it, unless the person

of the case, as will be seen by reference to the opinion of Parke, B. In Vermont, however, where A. signed a joint and several note with B., as his surety, payable at a bank, with the agreement that he should not use it unless he obtained another surety upon it, the court held that the bank to which B. passed the note, without procuring another security, could recover against A., A. being without knowledge of the agreement; but distinguished the case from that just quoted.¹ But there is no distinction that we can discover

from whom he receives it had a real authority to deal with it. There was no such authority in this case, and unless the circumstances show that the defendant conducted himself in such a way as to lead the plaintiff to believe that the defendant's brother had authority, he can take no better title than the defendant's brother could give. The maxim of law is, '*nemo plus juris in alium transferre potest quam ipse habet.*' It is a fallacy to say that the plaintiff is a *bona fide* holder for value; he has taken a piece of blank paper, not a promissory note. He could only take it as a note under the authority of the defendant's brother, and he had no authority, consequently the instrument is void as against the defendant." Alderson, B., and Platt, B., concurred. Rule absolute.

¹ *Passumpsic Bank v. Goss*, 31 Vt. 315 (1858). Barrett, J.: "The case of *Awde v. Dixon*, 5 L. & E. Rep. 512, upon a first impression, seems to come nearer to the present case, and to countenance the defense here made. But on examination it clearly stands on a different ground. In that case, the payee's name was left blank when the defendant signed the note as surety. It was inserted at the time the note was delivered, and the money was advanced upon it, the principal 'stating falsely that he had authority to deal with it.' Moreover, the defendant signed leaving a space for the name of the person who was to sign as co-surety. With the note in this condition when presented to the plaintiff, he becomes the payee by having his name inserted, and receives it. It is obvious, from the report of the case, that the court deemed the insertion of the payee's name, and the passing off of the note, to be a forgery upon the defendant, the same as if the sum had been left blank when signed by the surety, and afterward had been filled with a larger sum than had been agreed between the principal and surety." * * * Same Judge, p. 321; "The propriety of this view is strongly illustrated by the well known course of this kind of business. The instance has hardly occurred of a bank making inquiry when paper, genuine and apparently designed for discount, is presented at the counter, whether, as against the makers, it is entitled to be used. If the court should sustain this defense in this case, it would become necessary for banks, and equally for all persons, upon the offer of a note with sureties, in the usual course of business, to call before them all the makers, and ascertain, by personal inquiry, whether it was 'all right,' and not subject to some side agreement or reservation in favor of some of the sureties, that might render it invalid as against them. We think such a rule of law would not only contravene the well established usages of business, but would surprise, if not shock, the judgment of the community upon this subject." See also *Farmers' &c. Bank v. Humphrey*, 36 Vt. 554.

in the principles of the two, though the facts, as to the particular instruments, vary. In Kentucky, where a party signed as surety, and left the note with the principal, with the agreement that it should not be obligatory until a certain other surety had signed, the surety was held; and the grounds of the decision seem to us at once comprehensive and conclusive.¹ In such cases notice to the holder of the condition, and its violation, is necessary to a defense.² So in Missouri, where one indorsed a note upon agreement that another should indorse also.³ And the same views have prevailed, justly as we think, in Indiana,⁴ New Hampshire,⁵ and Iowa,⁶ and have been recognized in other States.

§ 855. In none of the cases, however, it is maintained that a bill or note, either in full or in blank, intrusted to the payee,

¹ *Smith v. Moberly*, 10 B. Mon. 269 (1850), *Simpson, J.*, saying: "But a delivery of a writing of this character, under such circumstances, to the principal, does not have the effect of characterizing it as a mere escrow; but, on the contrary, the principal should be considered as the agent of the surety, and empowered by him to pass the writing to the person to whom it may be made payable. and his delivery as being sufficient to make it effectual, unless the payee had notice of the special terms upon which it was signed. The implied discretionary authority to use the note, arising out of its possession by the principal, uncontradicted by its terms or anything apparent on its face, cannot be restricted by any agreement between the payors themselves, of which the payee had no notice. The same principle is substantially decided in the case of the *Bank of the Commonwealth v. Curry*, 2 Dana, 142.

"The law in relation to the execution of deeds and specialties is not applicable to promissory notes. In the language of this court, in the case of *Taylor, &c. v. Craig*, 2 J. J. Marsh. 246, 'promissory notes are *quasi* mercantile, but are not in this country, as they are in England, since the statute of Anne, negotiable precisely as bills of exchange. But, for many purposes the doctrine of bills of exchange applies to promissory notes, because the reason of it applies equally to both kinds of paper. The law in relation to the execution of both is the same; and justice and the exigencies of commerce require that the drawer of a bill, or payor in a note, should be bound sometimes, when if the instrument were a deed, he would not be liable.' " See also *Taylor v. Craig*, 2 J. J. Marsh. 449.

² *Bonner v. Nelson*, 57 Ga. 433.

³ *Bank of Missouri v. Phillips*, 17 Mo. 30 (1852); see *Ayres v. Milroy*, 53 Mo. 516. *Held*, that in the case of a non-negotiable note it is different.

⁴ *Deardorff v. Foresman*, 28 Ind. 481 (1865).

⁵ *Merriam v. Rockwood*, 47 N. H. 81.

⁶ *Gage v. Sharp*, 24 Iowa, 15, the condition being the execution of a mortgage to protect the surety; see also *McCramer v. Thompson*, 21 Iowa, 244.

to be valid upon a condition, will not be binding if the condition is violated. Such delivery to the payee is in law absolute and complete; and whether the instrument be negotiable or under seal, the doctrines which apply when third parties are the custodians do not extend to them.¹ An instrument under seal deposited with a third party, to be delivered upon condition, is called an escrow; and according to the English precedent referred to, and to some of the American decisions, which have either followed it as an adjudication or recognized the doctrine which it asserts, a negotiable instrument may also be deposited with a third party as an escrow, and the parties to it will not be bound if the depositary issue it in breach of the trust reposed in him.² In a Wisconsin case, where a promissory note and a mortgage to secure it were placed in the hands of a stranger to be delivered to the payee upon the happening of a certain event, and he delivered them to the payee without authority, and without waiting for such event, it was held that neither the mortgage nor the note were valid although the latter was in the hands of a *bona fide* holder for value without notice.³ A material alteration of a note made by one of the promisors before delivery avoids it as against the other, although done without fraudulent intent.⁴

In Arkansas, it was said by Oldham, J., respecting a note: "If delivered to a third person, it is not binding until the condition upon which it was delivered be performed; but, if directly to the promisee, it is binding from delivery, whether the condition be performed or not."⁵

§ 856. It should be borne in mind that there is a cardinal

¹ Massman v. Holscher, 49 Mo. 87 (1871), *post*, § 856.

² Babcock v. Beman, 1 Root (Conn.), 87; Couch v. Meeker, 2 Conn. 302; Chipman v. Tucker, 38 Wis. 50.

³ Chipman v. Tucker, 38 Wis. 43 (1875), Cole, J.: "Delivery of a promissory note by the maker is necessary to a valid inception of the contract, and until there is a delivery, the note has no vitality, and the rules of commercial paper have no application to it." See also Roberts v. McGrath, 38 Wis. 52; Roberts v. Wood, 38 Wis. 60.

⁴ Draper v. Wood, 112 Mass. 315.

⁵ Scott v. State Bank, 9 Ark. 36.

distinction between the perversion of instruments in form negotiable, or capable and intended to be made so in a certain contingency, and that of instruments under seal. The latter, when completed, may be delivered to third persons—that is, to others than the parties—with authority only to deliver them upon condition; and in such case, if the condition be violated, the party intending to be only conditionally bound will be bound absolutely.¹ A sealed instrument so delivered to a third person is called an escrow.

But negotiable instruments, as it seems to us, stand on a different footing entirely. They are letters of credit, and proclamations that all is right to every purchaser or transferee; and one who chooses to put his name on an instrument possessing these characteristics, instead of confining his liability by shaping it in a form expressive of his meaning, should not be permitted to ensnare others, and escape himself unscathed. To hold otherwise would be a wide departure from the principles which ramify the law merchant, and would be as repugnant to reason as a decision that an instrument absolute on its face might be varied by a parol condition. And even as to sealed instruments the doctrine now finds favor that, if complete, and signed by sureties with condition that other sureties shall join, the signing sureties will be bound if they leave them with the principal obligors, and then deliver them without procuring the additional sureties;² though it is otherwise where such instruments, when left with the obligors, indicate on their face that they are incomplete, and that additional parties are contemplated.³ If the sealed instrument perfect on its face be left with the obligee, upon condition that it should be valid only upon its execution by a third person, the delivery is complete, and it is valid and operative though not so executed.⁴

¹ *Nash v. Fugate*, 24 Grat. 202. See Vol. I, § 68.

² *Dair v. United States*, 16 Wall. 1; *Nash v. Fugate*, 24 Grat. 202; *Cutter v. Roberts*, 7 Neb. 637; *State v. Potter*, 63 Mo. 212; *State v. Peck*, 53 Me. 284. *Contra*, *People v. Bostwick*, 32 N. Y. 445; *State Bank v. Evans*, 3 Green, N. J. 155.

³ *Ward v. Churn*, 18 Grat. 801.

⁴ *Miller v. Fletcher*, 27 Grat. 403; *Simonton's Est.* 4 Watts, 180; *Duncan v.*

SECTION VIII.

HOLDER OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS EXECUTED UNDER DURESS.

§ 857. Any contract entered into under duress lacks the first essential of validity—the consent of the contractor—and bills and notes form no exception to the rule. As between immediate parties, proof of duress at once annuls the instrument, or rather enables the party who was under duress to avoid it, at his option;¹ but whether or not in the hands of a *bona fide* holder for value without notice, the duress in its inception renders it voidable, is a question upon which the authorities do not altogether agree. It has been held in England that where it appeared that the defendant gave the bill while under duress abroad, and under a threat of personal violence and confiscation of property, and without consideration, that it was incumbent on the plaintiff to give some evidence of consideration,² and all the authorities go so far as to require evidence of consideration. But the party who signs a bill or note under such threats and dangers of personal violence as would naturally impel a man of reasonable firmness and courage, is certainly not a free agent, and in nowise in default; and we can but think that the better doctrine is that held in Scotland, where force used to obtain the subscription of a bill or note nullifies the subscription, since the subscriber's consent is wanting. The party is not bound by such a subscription, more than if it had been forged, in which case the obligation being originally null, even an indorsee can acquire no right to enforce it.³ The principle there

Pope, 47 Ga. 445; Ward v. Lewis, 4 Pick. 518; Currie v. Donald, 2 Wash. (Va.) 59.

¹ Bush v. Brown, 49 Ind. 573 (1875), and authorities cited.

² Duncan v. Scott, 1 Camp. 100. In England, the old authorities held that the duress sufficient to avoid a contract must be such as to create reasonable fear of death or mayhem; and that fear of battery or trespass upon property is insufficient. See 4 Cruise, Dig. 260. And this old rule has been adhered to in modern English cases. But in the United States it is relaxed, according to many decisions. See Sasportas v. Jennings, 1 Bay, 470; Collins v. Westbury, 2 Bay, 211; Forshay v. Ferguson, 5 Hill. 158; United States v. Huckabee, 16 Wall. 431.

³ Thomson on Bills (Wilson's ed.), 62.

is not extended to all cases where the party consented under such circumstances as to raise a good objection against the original payee—for instance, where the bill or note was obtained by fraud, or by a mixture of deception and terror, though without such a degree of violence as would influence a man of ordinary constancy. Thus, where a party whose cattle had broken into another's field was intimidated by the threat of a law suit to give him a bill for an unreasonable amount of damages, it was held that the bill must be reduced in so far as the damages were exorbitant.¹ But it does not appear that the grounds of reduction in this case could have been pleaded against an indorsee suing on the bill or note, for there was a real consent, and consequently an obligation which, till reduced, was transmissible to a third party.

§ 858. The English doctrine is cited by many text writers on bills and notes without criticism or dissent, and as a correct statement of the law;² but at least one English author seems to agree with us,³ as does also the most recent and thorough of the American writers on bills and notes.⁴

Indeed, we can discern no principle which would compel any person, whether a party to a negotiable or other kind of instrument, to pay it, when under violent duress—that is, under the compulsion of force with the only alternative of submitting to great bodily injury or indignity. Consent is

¹ Thomson on Bills (Wilson's ed.), 62.

² Byles on Bills (Sharswood's ed.), 220; Bayley on Bills, ch. ix, p. 318; Chitty on Bills (13th Am. ed.), 85; Edwards on Bills, 325; Story on Notes, § 188; Story on Bills, § 185.

³ In Roscoe's Digest of Bills and Notes, note 20, p. 117, it is said, in commenting on *Duncan v. Scott*, 1 Campb. 100: "It may be doubted whether the defendant in this case was liable even to a *bona fide* indorsee for value. The bill being drawn under duress, no contract arose, and it resembles the case of a bill drawn by a *feme covert*, who is under a disability to contract."

⁴ Prof. Parsons says, in vol. 1, N. & B. p. 276: "A note or bill obtained by duress might not be available in any hands against the party so compelled; and if the note were a good note, and a subsequent party indorsed it by duress, he would not be bound to any one; but a subsequent indorsee who indorsed it over for value would be bound to his own indorsee, or those deriving title from him." But in a previous portion of his work he follows in the rut of the authorities already quoted in a previous note. 1 Parsons N. & B. 188.

of the essence of every contract, and if it is not given, the party should not be bound if he had no alternative but to seem to give it, or suffer grievous wrong. He creates no trust, he commits no negligence, whereby the confidence of another can be betrayed. He is in no default, having a right of self-defense in preferring his own life and safety to the chances of pecuniary injury to others; and his extorted act is nothing more or less than the act of the wrong-doer who uses his person as the instrument of forging his name. Threats to inflict slighter wrongs would, as we have seen, stand on a different footing.

In a recent case in New York, where a married woman was coerced by her husband with threats of violence to sign a promissory note, in such form as to charge her separate estate, the Court of Appeals held it absolutely void.¹

SECTION IX.

WHEN HOLDER OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS IS PROTECTED BY ESTOPPEL
IN PAIS.

§ 859. There are some cases in which defenses which would avoid the instrument in any one's hands, are rendered unavailable to the defendant by his own conduct—cases in which, to use the legal phrase, he is “estopped” from pleading the particular defense which he endeavors to set up. “An estoppel,” says Lord Coke, “is where a man is concluded by his own act or acceptance to say the truth.” Thus, if a person who is negotiating with the payee or indorsee of a note for the purchase of it, inquires concerning its validity of the maker, and the latter assures him that the note is good, that he has no defense against it, that it is good business paper, or that it is all right and will be paid, the maker could not afterwards plead that it was usurious or otherwise illegal.² His mouth is closed by his previous representation,

¹ Loomis v. Ruck, 56 N. Y. 465 (1874).

² Davis v. Thomas, 5 Leigh, 1; Tobey v. Chipman, 13 Allen, 133; Vaughn v. Terrall, 57 Ind. 182; Rose v. Hurley, 39 Ind. 82; McCabe v. Raney, 32 Ind. 312;

and the law will not assist him to lead another into a pitfall, and then to make him a scapegoat for himself. And so, if the holder purchased the note with the defendant's knowledge and consent, it has been held that the latter cannot set up prior payment, or other defense against it.¹

§ 860. But such representations, referring only to the then existing status of the instrument, will not exclude defenses subsequently arising.² And where they are made by an indorser, and not by the maker, they bind the former, but not the latter.³ This plea, on the part of the plaintiff, which excludes the right of the defendant to set up the true condition of affairs as a defense, is called "estoppel in pais," it being an extraneous matter *dehors* the record. And whenever it is relied upon where the system of common law pleading prevails, it has been held that it must be specially pleaded.⁴

§ 861. It is to be observed respecting estoppel that while it exacts good faith from the party bound, it likewise exacts good faith in the party dealing with him. Therefore, if the latter is himself cognizant of a fraud upon the maker at the time of the purchase, and knows, also, that the maker is ignorant respecting it, good faith would require that he should inform the maker of it, and if he does not so inform

Vanderpool v. Brake, 28 Ind. 130; Plant v. Voegelin, 30 Ala. 160; Cloud v. Whiting, 38 Ala. 57; Lynch v. Kennedy, 34 N. Y. 151; Crout v. De Wolf, 1 R. I. 393; Brooks v. Martin, 43 Ala. 360. Peters, J.: "It is difficult to conceive what would make a note 'all right' that could not be collected by suit, or that would not be paid at maturity, if the maker was able. * * Had there been a suit pending on the note between Brooks and Martin, and the latter had come into court, and pleaded that the note was 'all right,' the court could not have refrained from giving judgment against him. Now, by his words, he puts in this plea before suit is brought, and the law will not permit him to withdraw it after suit is brought."

¹ Downer v. Reed, 17 Minn. 493. But it has been held, in Mackay v. Holland, 4 Metc. 69, that where the maker of a note for the accommodation of the payee said that it was good, in answer to a question put by an indorser who acquired it after maturity, was not precluded from showing that he made the admission in ignorance of the fact that his liability had been ended by the payment of the debt for which it had been indorsed in the first instance.

² Maury v. Coleman, 24 Ala. 381; Cloud v. Whiting, 38 Ala. 57.

³ Dowe v. Schutt, 2 Den. 621.

⁴ Davis v. Thomas, 5 Leigh, 1.

him, the maker will not be estopped by having told the purchaser that the note was all right, and would be paid at maturity, from setting up the fraud of which the purchaser had notice.¹ And so the holder will not be protected if he knew of any illegality in the instrument.² In other words, estoppel is a plea that is born of, and must be nourished by, equity, and he that asks equity must do equity. If he conceals facts from the maker he acts inequitably and cannot recover.³ And so if the plaintiff rely upon an estoppel in pais, in order to recover against the defendant who has really a defense, equity only requires that he should be indemnified to the full extent of the amount he has invested on the faith of the defendant's representation, and in the absence of fraud on the part of the defendant, the plaintiff can only recover that amount with legal interest.⁴ An indorser who signs the name of a firm is estopped to deny its existence, in order to protect himself.⁵ The maker of a note to a company to pay

¹ Sackett v. Kellar, 22 Ohio St. 554.

² Watson v. Hoag, 40 Iowa, 143 (1874), Beck, J.

³ Platt v. Jerome, 2 Blatchf. C. C. 186.

⁴ Campbell v. Nicholls, 33 N. J. L. (4 Vroom) 88, Beasley, C. J., saying: "If the drawer of a note should, through mistake, admit its validity to a person who, to the knowledge of such drawer, was about to purchase it, after such purchase for full value, it is clear he could not aver his mistake and set up the invalidity of the note as a defense. In such a case it is right that he should bear the loss whose carelessness occasioned it. But suppose the purchaser gave only part value for the note, upon what principle should he be allowed to recover more than the money thus paid of the drawer, who, although he inadvertently admitted his liability, in point of fact owes nothing on the paper. The true measure is, that the party acting on the faith of a representation should be indemnified from loss, by the application of the doctrine of estoppel in pais, and these limits, as I think, take the whole field of the doctrine. The rule is designed to protect against fraud, either in fact or in law; but the remedy does not extend beyond the injury. Neither good policy nor honest dealing requires that one who has made an admission which has influenced the conduct of another, should be estopped by such admission from showing the truth of the case, except to the extent of permitting the person misled from recovering indemnification. For it is to be remembered, that the principle of estoppel applies as well to cases of unintentional deceptions as to designed and actual frauds, and it would certainly seem plain, that, in the former class of cases, the limitation of the doctrine above indicated is absolutely necessary for the accomplishment of the ends of justice."

⁵ Hubbard v. Mathews, 54 N. Y. 43.

assessments on his real estate is not estopped to deny that the assessments were void, and that he was not informed as to the facts vibrating them when he made the note.¹

§ 862. *Certificates of validity*.—Sometimes the practice is resorted to of annexing the maker's certificate to the note that the same is given for value and will be paid when due, or that it is business paper; and it has been held in New York that if it be afterward sold to a third person for an amount less than should have been paid for it if discounted at legal interest (which in New York would be usurious), the maker is estopped by his certificate from setting up the defense of usury.² This doctrine is questionable at best, and, as we think, erroneous. If one about to pay a note inquires touching its character, it is right that the maker's representations should bind him. They are given in the usual course of business in answer to a pertinent inquiry, and there is nothing to excite the buyer's suspicions, but everything to allay them. But when a note has annexed to it a certificate proclaiming that it is valid and will be paid, this is no more than its face purports without any additional certificate. It is too much like a man having "I am honest" chalked on his back; and as the words "value received,"³ or others equally importing value received, and obligation to pay, do not estop the maker from showing that the consideration was usurious, or otherwise illegal and void, so should not the mere repetition of words to the like effect, in another form. On the contrary, the over zeal to create an appearance of legality would be in itself a circumstance of suspicion which should put the purchaser on his guard.⁴

¹ Madry v. Sulphur Springs, &c. Turnpike Co. 57 Ind. 149.

² Chamberlain v. Townsend, 26 Barb. 611; Mechanics' Bank v. Townsend, 29 Barb. 569; Truscott v. Davis, 4 Barb. 495; Clark v. Sisson, 4 Duer, 408.

³ Gaul v. Willis, 26 Penn. St. 259.

⁴ Jaqua v. Montgomery, 33 Ind. 46 (1870). In this case the maker of a non-negotiable note wrote a certificate contemporaneous with its execution, that it was "all right and will be paid by me when due." But this was held not to estop the maker from showing, against a *bona fide* holder who acquired it for value before maturity, that the note was fraudulently obtained. Gregory, C. J., said:

“The instrument signed at the time the note was executed has not the first element of an estoppel. It is no more than what the note itself imported on its face. It was obtained by the same fraudulent act that proved the execution of the note. It was a part of the same contract, and was as much a part of the note as if it had been incorporated in it. It was a statement upon which the appellant had no right to rely. Indeed, I think that such a paper accompanying an ordinary promissory note should have the effect of exciting suspicion that all was not right. It looks too much like the act of the thief in attempting to cover up his crime.”

CHAPTER XXVII.

THE CONFLICT OF LAWS.—THE LAW OF PLACE AS APPLICABLE TO NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.

SECTION I.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PLACE.

§ 863. Each one of the United States is, in contemplation of its own and of the Federal Constitution, a distinct and independent sovereignty, with its own peculiar code of laws and system of judicature. And while, in the aggregate, they compose one integral confederacy, which is itself an independent nation, paramount in certain respects to the States, in all other respects the States retain their separate autonomies, and are deemed as much foreign to each other as if not in anywise associated together. The regulation of contracts comes peculiarly within the province of the States, and therefore contracts between citizens of the different States, while they may be enforced by process in the Federal courts, nevertheless, are to be construed and effectuated, not by a general system of laws which overspread the whole country, but in accordance with the principles of international law which govern transactions between parties of different nations.

§ 864. As long as all the parties to a bill or note are confined within the limits of a single State, the local law alone determines their rights and liabilities. No suit can be brought in a Federal court, and any question which may be litigated begins and ends with the local tribunals. But the vast and constant traffic between the States, and the general use of bills and notes as a medium of exchange, give circulation to those instruments from hand to hand, and from State to State; and questions of nicety are often presented

in the inquiry by what law the rights and liabilities of the parties are to be ascertained. In some of the States, as in Maryland, the English statute of 3 and 4 Anne is in force. In others, as in Virginia, where none but notes payable at bank are negotiable, there are peculiar statutory provisions respecting commercial paper. In all of the States, each recognizes the precedents of its own courts, as independently of the rulings of the Supreme Court of the United States as of those of Great Britain; which may, indeed, shed great light on all commercial questions, but are of no binding authority. When suit is brought in one of the Federal courts, it, on the other hand, will be guided by the general law merchant in questions referable to it, and will follow its own views about it, unless the nature of the liability contracted has already been determined, in the particular State of the contract, at the time it was entered into.

It is therefore important, in any treatise upon negotiable instruments, to discuss the principles by which the liabilities of parties are to be determined, when they have been contracted in different States. A party whose domicile is in Maine, may make a contract in Maryland for the purchase of real estate in Virginia, and may in Maryland execute his negotiable note therefor, payable in Texas; and suit might be brought against him in California. And the question might arise whether or not the law of the maker's domicile, the *lex domicilii*, as it is termed; or the law of the place where the contract was made, *lex loci contractus*; or the law of the situs of the property purchased, *lex loci rei sitæ*; or the law of the place where the note was made payable, *lex loci solutionis*; or the law of the place where suit was brought, *lex fori*, were applicable to the transaction.

§ 865. *General principles.*—The following general principles on this subject may be regarded as established:

First. Every contract is, in respect to its formalities, and authentication to be regulated by the laws of the State or country in which it is entered into; and it is also regulated by the laws of the State or country in which it is made, in

respect to its nature, validity, interpretation and effect, except when it is to be performed in another State or country.

Second. When a contract is made in one State or country to be performed in another State or country, it is to be regulated by the laws of the place of performance, without regard to the place at which it was written, signed or dated, in respect to its nature, validity, interpretation and effect.

Third. In determining the place where a contract is made, the place where it was delivered, as consummating the bargain, controls; and not the place where it was written, signed or dated.

Fourth. If a party contracts while *in transitu*, and without identity with any other place, the place of his domicile is deemed the place of the contract.

Fifth. If a contract be illegal and void at the place where it is made, it is void everywhere.

Sixth. The laws of a State or country have no extra-territorial force, *proprio vigore*; and are only executed by other States and countries from considerations of courtesy or policy, termed the comity of nations.

Seventh. The laws of a State or country being only executed in another by comity, they will be executed only so far as they may be consistent with religion, good morals, and with the public rights and interests of the State or country in which the remedy is sought.

Eighth. The courts of a State or country cannot take judicial notice of the laws of a foreign State or country; and when such laws are sought to be applied, they must be alleged and proved.

Ninth. The law of the place where suit is brought, the *lex fori*, as it is termed, regulates the form of the action and the nature and extent of the remedy.

§ 866. *The comity of nations.*—It results from the principle that the laws of a country have no binding force beyond its own boundaries, that the appeal for their enforcement addresses itself entirely to the comity and discretion of the forum in which suit is brought. That comity is

freely exercised by civilized countries, which look for and receive reciprocal courtesies from other nations; and the close relations of the several States of the Union with each other, the family likeness of their institutions, and the homogeneity of their people, are powerful incentives to the exercise between them of a comity peculiarly liberal and expansive.¹ But, nevertheless, a State must be just before it is generous; and therefore no State should exercise comity in favor of contracts which violate its own laws, or the law of nature, or the law of God.² It must consult sound morals and the interests and public policy of its own people, and if to enforce the laws of another State or country would lead to their infringement, it would be treacherous to its own duties to lend aid to their execution.³ As an illustration: "in many countries a contract may be maintained by a courtesan for the price of the prostitution; and one may suppose an action to be brought here upon such a contract which arose in such a country. But that would never be allowed in this country,"⁴ as was well said in England, and might be said here.

SECTION II.

LEX LOCI CONTRACTUS.

§ 867. We shall now endeavor to illustrate these general principles by applying them to the various liabilities which arise upon negotiable instruments. The rule is of general acceptance that the law of the place where the contract is made regulates the formalities of its execution and authentication and the consideration necessary to its validity; and also regulates its interpretation, nature, obligation and effect.⁵

¹ *Lathrop v. Commercial Bank*, 8 Dana, 118.

² *Forbes v. Cochrane*, 2 Barn. & C. 448.

³ *Ohio Ins. Co. v. Edmundson*, 5 La. 295; *Armstrong v. Toler*, 11 Wheat. 258; *Pearsall v. Dwight*, 2 Mass. 84; *Mahorner v. Hooe*, 9 Sm. & M. 247; *Donovan v. Pitcher*, 53 Ala. 411.

⁴ *Robinson v. Bland*, 2 Burr. 1077, Wilmot, J.

⁵ *Hyde v. Goodnow*, 3 Coms. 266; *Evans v. Anderson*, 78 Ill. 558.

If formally executed upon a legal consideration there, it is valid everywhere;¹ and if defective there in either respect, it is invalid everywhere.² These doctrines are absolutely necessary to healthful commercial intercourse between States and nations, and they find various illustration in numerous cases. Thus, where a bill was made and indorsed in blank in France, and sued in England, and it appeared that by French law the blank indorsement, without additional formalities, did not pass the property to the holder, it was held that there could be no recovery in England, although by the English law the indorsee in blank could sue.³ But in a subsequent case it has been shown that, while the legal principle of this decision is correct, the view taken of the French law was erroneous, an indorsement by procuration meaning only that just such title as indorser had should pass.⁴ So, where a note was made in Mississippi, for a slave, and lacked a certain certificate, which was necessary by the laws of that State to its validity, it was held void in Arkansas, where suit was brought.⁵ So, where a bill was drawn in Michigan upon a drawee in Chicago, Illinois, it was held that a parol acceptance valid in Chicago was binding, although by the laws of Michigan an acceptance must be in writing.⁶ So, where a bill was drawn in Chicago upon a firm of St. Louis, Mo., and was verbally accepted by a member of the firm at the time in Chicago, it was held to be governed by the laws of Illinois, and binding.⁷

§ 868. The place where a contract is made depends not

¹ *Ford v. Buckeye Ins. Co.* 6 Bush (Ky.) 133; *Fant v. Miller*, 17 Grat. 47; *Andrews v. Pond*, 13 Pet. 65; *Palmer v. Yarrington*, 1 Ohio St. 253; *Andrews v. Herriott*, 4 Cow. 510; *Smith v. Mead*, 3 Conn. 253.

² *Thayer v. Elliott*, 16 N. H. 102; *Ansted v. Sutter*, 30 Ill. 164; *Pearsall v. Dwight*, 2 Mass. 84; *Van Schaick v. Edwards*, 2 Johns. Cas. 355; *Kanaga v. Taylor*, 7 Ohio St. 134; *Robinson v. Bland*, 2 Burr. 1077.

³ *Trimbey v. Vignier*, 1 Bing. N. C. 151.

⁴ *Bradlaugh v. De Rin*, 5 C. P. L. R. [*476], 475.

⁵ *Moore v. Clifton*, 22 Ark. 125.

⁶ *Mason v. Dousay*, 35 Ill. 424; see, also, *Bissell v. Lewis*, 4 Mich. 450.

⁷ *Scudder v. Union Nat. Bank*, 91 U. S. (1 Otto), 406.

upon the place where it is written, signed or dated, but upon the place where it is delivered as consummating the bargain.¹ Thus, the law of the place where a bill or note is written, signed or dated does not necessarily control it, but the law of the place where it is delivered from drawer or maker to payee, or from indorser to indorsee. A note drawn and dated in Maryland, but delivered in New York, in payment of goods there purchased, or money loaned, is payable in and governed by the laws of New York.² And if a note be dated and signed in blank in Virginia, and sent to Maryland, and there filled up and negotiated, it is a Maryland, and not a Virginia, note.³ So, where a note is indorsed for accommodation in one State, and delivered in another, the indorsement is governed by the laws of the latter, for the accommodation indorser makes that party to whom he lends his signature his agent for putting the instrument into circulation, and his own contract with those to whom it is negotiated must consequently be judged on the principles of agency, which refer it to the place where the circulation commences.⁴ And a bill accepted in New York for accommodation of a drawer in Massachusetts, and there put in circulation, would be governed by Massachusetts law.⁵

§ 869. But however this doctrine may be as a general rule (and we by no means intend to discredit it as such), it should not be regarded as without exceptions. And where the parties acquiring a bill for value, and in the usual course of business,

¹ Freese v. Brownell, 35 N. J. L. R. (6 Vroom), 286; Campbell v. Nichols, 33 Id. 81; Overton v. Bolton, 9 Heisk. 762.

² Cook v. Moffat, 5 How. 295; Re Conrad, 1 Penn. Legal Gazette Rep. 284; Hyde v. Goodnow, 3 Coms. 266; Davis v. Coleman, 7 Ired. 424. On same principle, if a merchant orders goods from England, and the English merchant executes the contract, it is governed by English law. Whiston v. Stodder, 8 Mart. (La.) 95.

³ Fant v. Miller, 17 Gratt. 47.

⁴ Cook v. Litchfield, 5 Sand. 330; Stanford v. Pruet, 27 Ga. 243; Davis v. Clemson, 6 McLean, 622; Wharton Confli. of Laws, § 459; 2 Parsons N. & B. 380.

⁵ First National Bank v. Morris, 1 Hun, 680 (8 N. Y. S. C. R.), overruling Jewell v. Wright, 30 N. Y. 259, and approving Bank of Georgia v. Lewin, 45 Barb. 340, and Bowen v. Bradley, 9 Abb. N. S. 395.

have no knowledge that it was not issued and delivered as a subsisting instrument at the place where it bears date, it is but just that they should be entitled to regard its ostensible as its real character, and should at least not be permitted to suffer by reason of the after-discovered fact that it was not there delivered.¹

In consonance with this view, it has been held in Pennsylvania, that where a drawer in Philadelphia there dated and wrote a bill, blank as to the payee, and sent it to London, where a payee's name was inserted, his indorsement procured, and the bill negotiated to a bank which had no "notice of the manner in which it originated, or of the fact that it was issued in London, and not in Philadelphia"—such drawer was bound in damages to the holder, as upon a bill actually drawn and delivered in Philadelphia. For, as said by Lewis, J.: "It bore the dress of a bill of exchange drawn in Pennsylvania; and upon the principle that every one is presumed to produce all the consequences to which his acts naturally and necessarily tend, the presumption is that the defendants intended that the purchasers of it should receive it under the belief that it was a bill drawn in Philadelphia, in the usual course of business."²

And where it appeared, in England, that parties resident in Ireland signed and indorsed a copper-plate impression of a bill, leaving blanks for the date, sum, time when payable, and name of the drawee, and transmitted it to B. in England for his use; and B. dated it "Waterford," a place in Ireland, filled up the blanks, and negotiated it to the plaintiff who had no knowledge that the history of the bill was not exactly what its face purported—it was held, that it was to be considered an Irish bill, by relation from the time it was signed in Ireland, and consequently that an English stamp was not necessary.³

¹ 1 Parsons N. & B. 57; see *National Bank v. Smoot*, 1 McArthur, 371.

² *Lennig v. Ralston*, 23 Penn. St. 139.

³ *Snaith v. Mingay*, 1 Maule & Sel. 87. Grose, J., said: "The question is, whether this is to be considered as an Irish or an English bill of exchange. The

§ 870. A bill sketched out and accepted in England, but afterward signed by the drawer abroad, would be considered as made abroad; or *vice versa*, if signed by the drawer abroad and filled up in England.¹ Where a bill was drawn in Jamaica, on a stamp of that island only, and a blank was left for the payee's name, it was held that an English stamp was not necessary to the validity of the insertion of the bearer's name in England.² And where a British subject residing in Florence, signed a joint and several note as one of its makers, and sent it by post to his brother in England, the other maker, who also signed it, and paid it into bank,—it was held that a cause of action arose in England, upon its delivery there to the payee.³ It is to be observed that courts do not take judicial notice of the divisions of foreign States and countries into counties, towns and cities.⁴

§ 871. The ascertainment of the true meaning and intention of the parties is the prime object of the interpretation of contracts, and as the same words are used with different significations in different communities, and import different obligations—it follows that the interpretation placed upon them must be according to the signification and effect attached to them in the State or country in which the contract is made—otherwise the intention of the parties will be defeated, instead of effectuated. Thus by the word “month” is sometimes meant a lunar, and sometimes a calendar month, and if it were used in a contract entered into in a foreign State or county, evidence would be admissible to show in what sense the term was there understood. So the word “pounds” when employed in England would mean pounds sterling; while in the United States it would mean pounds in Ameri-

case seems to me to be this: a piece of paper signed by a person in Ireland, is given for the purpose of being filled up, and operating as a bill of exchange; and although it was imperfect at the time when it was signed, yet when it became perfect by being filled up, it operated as a bill of exchange, from the time when it was signed and intended to have such operation.” See *National Bank v. Smoot*, 1 McArthur, 371.

¹ *Barker v. Sterne*, 9 Exch. 684.

² *Crutchley v. Mann*, 5 Taunt. 529.

³ *Chapman v. Cotterell*, 34 L. J. Exch. 186.

⁴ *Ante*, Chap. I, § 11.

can currency which is a fourth less in value. So the term usance in different countries signifies different periods of time, varying from half a month to several months in duration. It is obvious that in such cases the contract must be enforced according to the meaning of the several terms in the countries wherein they are respectively used. The law in force at the time the contract is made must apply to it in respect to its interpretation and effect, otherwise the legislature would itself make a contract for the parties. Therefore a State enactment, making notes payable at a designated place negotiable, would only relate to notes executed after its passage.¹

§ 872. By the nature of the contract is meant those qualities which pertain to it. Thus, whether it be joint or several; or joint and several; whether absolute or conditional; whether of principal or surety; whether personal or real, are points which concern the nature of the contract, and are to be governed by the law of the place at which it is entered into. This is well illustrated in an English case, where suit was brought in England upon a bill accepted at Leghorn, where the law is, that if the acceptor have not in his hands sufficient funds of the drawer, and the drawer then fail, the acceptance is thereupon vacated. It was held that the law of Leghorn should prevail.²

§ 873. In speaking of the obligation of contracts, Story says: "It would be easy to multiply illustrations under this head. Suppose a contract, by the law of one country, to involve no personal obligation (as was supposed to be the law of France in a particular case which came in judgment), but merely to confer a right to proceed *in rem*, such a contract would be held everywhere to involve no personal obligation. Suppose, by the law of a particular country, a mortgage for money borrowed, should, in the absence of any express contract to pay, be limited to a mere repayment thereof out of the land, a foreign court would refuse to en-

¹ Cook v. Citizens' Mut. Ins. Co. 53 Ala. 37; see § 970 a.

² Burrows v. Jemimo, 2 Strs. 733.

tain a suit giving it a personal obligation. Suppose a contract for the payment of the debt of a third person in a country where the law subjected such a contract to the tacit condition that payment must first be sought against the debtor and his estate; that would limit the obligation to a mere accessorial and secondary character, and it would not be enforced in any foreign country, except after a compliance with the requisitions of the local law. Sureties, indorsers and guarantors are therefore everywhere liable only according to the law of the place of their contract. Their obligations, if created by such local law as an accessorial obligation, will not anywhere else be deemed a principal obligation. So, if by the law of the place of a contract, its obligation is positively and *ex directo* extinguished after a certain period, by the mere lapse of time, it cannot be revived by a suit in a foreign country, whose laws provide no such rule, or apply it only to the remedy. To use the expressive language of a learned judge, it must be shown, in all such cases, what the laws of the foreign country are, and that they create an obligation which our laws will enforce.¹

§ 874. A defense or discharge—any plea which impeaches the original validity, or declares the subsequent extinguishment, of the contract—must be governed by the law of the place where the contract was made. Thus, infancy,² coverture,³ tender or payment,⁴ or discharge by insolvent laws,⁵ if a valid defense by the *lex loci contractus*, will be a valid defense everywhere. And if by the *lex loci* payment by bill or note is conditional payment only, it will be so regarded even in States which hold such payment absolute,⁶ and *vice versa*.⁷

§ 875. But the discharge of a contract by the law of a place where it was not made, or to be performed, will not operate as a discharge of it in any other country.⁸

¹ Story on Bills, § 143.

² *Male v. Roberts*, 3 Esp. 163; 2 Parsons N. & B. 350.

³ *Ibid*.

⁴ *Searight v. Callright*, 4 Dall. 325; *Warder v. Arell*, 2 Wash. (Va.) 282.

⁵ *Sturgis v. Crowninshield*, 4 Wheat. 122; *Ogden v. Saunders*, 12 Wheat. 213.

⁶ *Bartsch v. Atwater*, 1 Conn. 409; *Vancleef v. Therasson*, 3 Pick. 12.

⁷ *Ward v. Howe*, 38 N. H. 42.

⁸ *Smith v. Buchanan*, 1 East, 6; *M'Millan v. M'Neil*, 4 Wheat, 209; *Sherrill v.*

Thus a discharge under the insolvent laws of Pennsylvania would be no bar to a suit brought by an indorsee against the indorser of a note, the indorsement having been made in another State where action is brought, and where the indorsee resides, although the indorser resides in Pennsylvania.¹

They who are infants in one country, may lawfully and validly contract in another, where by law they are of full age.²

SECTION III.

LEX DOMICILII.

§ 876. There are some peculiar circumstances under which the domicile of the contracting parties becomes an important element of consideration, both for the purpose of ascertaining their intention, and of determining whether or not such intention may be legally effectuated. Thus, where a Virginian transiently in California, contracts a debt there with a Californian, or with a Kentuckian, there transiently also, the question would at once arise, by what law shall the contract be governed? If the contract were in express terms to be performed in California, it would seem clear that the law of California would govern it, it being the *lex loci solutionis*, and California being thus indicated as the place with reference to which the contract was made.³ And if the circumstances of the contract were such that it would be inferentially to be performed in California, the like rule would apply. Thus, if it were a debt for board at a hotel, or articles of personal subsistence or necessity, it would be payable by

Hopkins, 1 Cow. 103, overruling Penniman v. Meigs, 9 Johns. 325; Green v. Sarmiento, Pet. C. C. 74; Frey v. Kirk, 4 Gill & J. 509; Smith v. Smith, 2 Johns. 235; Urton v. Hunter, 2 Hag. (W. Va.) 83; Pratt v. Chase, 44 N. Y. 597; Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wall. 223; Story on Bills, §§ 165-9; 2 Parsons N. & B. 325; but see Braynard v. Marshall, 8 Pick. 194, where it was held otherwise.

¹ Van Raugh, v. Van Arsdaln, 3 Caines, 154.

² Saul v. Creditors, 17 Mar. (La.) 569.

³ See *post*, § 879.

usage before the sojourner left the place, and therefore payable there, and controlled by its laws.¹

But suppose there was a business transaction between the Virginian and Kentuckian, and the former were to accept the bill of the latter, payable in future, but not expressly at any particular place, would it be deemed a Virginia or a California acceptance? The criterion to apply would be, whether or not the acceptance was to be paid in California or in Virginia.² If the Virginian were *in transitu*—that is, merely there for a particular negotiation, or for convenience, or merely casually passing through the State, without any local business established there, the single transaction would be governed by the law of his domicile, where it would be presumed he would be, and where it is presumable he would discharge his obligation at maturity; but otherwise the law of California would govern.

§ 877. In a case in Georgia, it appeared that the plaintiffs were residents of New York, and that the makers and indorsers of the note resided in Georgia, and that the indorsements were made and delivered in Tennessee to the agents of the plaintiffs. It was contended that it was accordingly a Tennessee contract; but the court held that, as it was known and understood that the indorsers resided in Georgia, and were in Tennessee only for the purpose of effecting negotiations, and as a matter of convenience, and the plaintiff's agent only happened to be there at the time, the parties must be deemed to have contemplated Georgia as the place of performance, and to be governed by its laws.³

§ 878. If the transaction, however, were between a Virginian and a Californian, resident of course in California, there would be strong reason to hold it a California contract, upon the principle stated by Grotius, and quoted approvingly by Story, that "if a foreigner makes a bargain with a native, he shall be obliged by the laws of his (the native's) State;

¹ Wharton Conf. of Laws, §§ 414, 415, 416, also § 426, rule D.

² Wharton Conf. of Laws, § 402; 2 Parsons N. & B. 351.

³ Vanzant v. Arnold, 31 Ga. 210; see Bullard v. Thompson, 35 Tex. 318.

because he who enters into a contract in any place is a subject for the time being, and must be obedient to the laws of that place;"¹ which would, in such a case, seem justly applicable.

But it has been held in Massachusetts, that where the member of a Boston firm, at the time in Manchester, England, there accepted a bill drawn on his firm, by a drawer in Manchester, it was to be deemed a bill accepted in Boston, because the domicile of the firm was there, and that damages were recoverable at ten per cent., as they would be upon a like bill accepted in Boston.² But this case, although quoted, without apparent disapproval, by several high authorities,³ is not in consonance with principles generally recognized. It has been sharply criticised by Story;⁴ and in New York, upon the like state of facts, an opposite decision was rendered.⁵ This latter decision the same learned author regarded as in entire harmony with the general principles on the subject, and prophesied that it would obtain general credit in the commercial world.⁶

In Scotland, it seems that an acceptance is deemed payable at the place of the acceptor's domicile at the time when it becomes due.⁷

¹ Story Conf. of Laws, § 274.

² *Grimshaw v. Bender*, 6 Mass. 157, Parsons, C. J., saying: "It is manifest that the remedy contemplated by the parties, in the event of the bill being dishonored, must be sought in this State, where the acceptors lived. The instrument must be considered as a foreign bill, having the same effect as if the payee had sent it to Boston, and it had been accepted here payable in London."

³ Wharton Conf. of Laws, § 451; 2 Parsons N. & B., 351; but see *Ibid.* p. 339, note j.

⁴ Story Conf. of Laws, § 319, where it is said: "There was nothing on the face of the bill that alluded to an acceptance in Boston, and nothing in the circumstances that pointed in that direction. It was certainly competent for the firm to contract in England, and to accept in England; and beyond all question, if the bill had been drawn solely on the person who accepted it, the acceptance must have been deemed to be made in England, notwithstanding his domicile in Boston."

⁵ *Foden v. Sharp*, 4 Johns. 183.

⁶ Story Conf. of Laws, § 320.

⁷ *Don v. Lippman*, 5 Clark & F. 12, where a bill payable generally was accepted in Paris by a Scotchman domiciled in Scotland.

SECTION IV.

LEX LOCI SOLUTIONIS.

§ 879. If, by the law of the State or country where the contract is made, it is formal and legal, it is valid everywhere, as we have already seen. But the law of the place where it is made yields, in certain respects, to that of the place of performance; for it is in view of and in reference to the laws of the place of performance, that it is to be presumed the terms of the contract were selected, and its stipulations entered into.¹ "The general principle as to contracts made in one place to be performed in another," says Chief Justice Taney, "is well settled. They are to be governed by the law of the place of performance."² Such, also, is the rule of the civil law: "*Contraxisse uniusquisque in eo loco intelligitur, in quo ut solveret se obligavit.*" Thus, in Massachusetts, a note payable to A. or order at any or either bank in a city, is negotiable; but if such a note were made in Massachusetts, and were payable in Virginia, it would not be negotiable, because not payable at a particular bank, as the Virginia statute requires.³ Where a part of the contract is to be performed in one country, and a part in another, each part is to be governed by the law of the place where it is performable.⁴ The question whether or not a note is negotiable is determined by the law of the State where it was made, and payable, not by that of the State where suit is brought.⁵

¹ Andrews v. Pond, 13 Pet. 65; Belle v. Bruen, 1 How. 182; Stricker v. Tinkham, 35 Ga. 176; Prentiss v. Savage, 13 Mass. 23; Goddin v. Shipley, 7 B. Mon. 575; Smith v. Mead, 3 Conn. 253; Fanning v. Consequa, 17 Johns. 511; Hyde v. Goodnow, 3 Const. 266; Chapman v. Robertson, 6 Paige, 627; Thompson v. Ketchum, 4 Johns. 285; Robinson v. Bland, 2 Burr. 1077; Blodgett v. Durgin, 32 Vt. 361; Thorp. v. Craig, 10 Iowa, 461; Hunt v. Standart, 15 Ind. 33; Freese v. Brownell, 35 N. J. L. R. 285; Byles (Sharswood's ed.) [384], 563.

² Andrews v. Pond, *supra*.

³ Freeman's Bank v. Ruckman, 16 Grat. 126; see, also, Thompson v. Ketchum, 4 Johns. 285, where a note made in Jamaica, payable in New York, was held to be governed by New York law.

⁴ Pomeroy v. Ainsworth, 22 Barb. 118; Young v. Harris, 14 B. Mon. 556.

⁵ Stix v. Mathews, 63 Mo. 371.

§ 880. Whenever it is alleged that a bill is payable by the acceptor, or a note by the maker, at a place different from that at which such acceptance or making took place, it is necessary to show it, either by the express language of the instrument itself, or by intendment and construction of law arising from the attendant circumstances. And if the note be dated at a particular place and payable generally—that is, without designation of a particular place—the law attaches to it the presumption that it is to be paid where made.¹ So it is to be presumed that an acceptance of a bill, naming no place of payment, is to be paid where made; and the address of the drawee generally indicates where such place of acceptance is.²

Such are the general principles sustained by text writers, and adjudicated cases.

§ 881. It has been held in Massachusetts, that if a bill or note be payable generally, and be negotiated by one holder to another in a foreign country, it becomes a promise to pay such holder, and is consequently a contract of the place of such negotiation to the holder and is governed by its laws.³ But although a debt payable generally is payable anywhere, and, if negotiable, is payable to anybody to whom it may be transferred, nevertheless, a contract to pay generally is governed by the law of the place where it is made, for the debt is payable there as well as in every other place.⁴ Being payable everywhere cannot render it subject to the laws of every place. The parties must have had in view the law of some place, and that is presumed to be the place where their contract is made. The holder does not make a new contract with the maker or acceptor, but becomes beneficiary of the contract as originally made, with certain additional privileges which arise, not from his location, but from his character

¹ *Wilson v. Lazier*, 11 Grat. 477; *Blodgett v. Durgin*, 32 Vt. 361; *Thompson v. Ketchum*, 8 Johns. 189; 4 Johns. 285; *Short v. Trabue*, 4 Metc. (Ky.) 299; *Backhouse v. Selden*, 29 Grat. 586.

² *Todd v. Bank of Kentucky*, 3 Bush (Ky.) 626.

³ *Braynard v. Marshall*, 6 Pick. 194.

⁴ *Story on Bills*, § 158.

as holder. Where a note is payable generally, no evidence would be admissible to show that in fact it was agreed to be paid in some special place.¹

SECTION V.

LEX FORI.

§ 882. It is a settled principle of law, that the remedies for breach of any contract must be pursued according to the law of the place where suit is brought. Those remedies are devised by the State in consonance with its own views of justice, public policy and convenience; and comity does not require that it should depart from the courses of procedure which it applies to its own inhabitants, and extend greater or different privileges to strangers.² The foreigner who sues must take the law as he finds it.³

This doctrine extends to the determination of (1) the parties who may sue and be sued; (2) the time within which suit may be brought; (3) the form of action; and (4) the nature, effect and extent of the remedy applied.

§ 883. *Who may sue.*—Who may sue is generally a question of the remedy; and the mere designation of the plaintiff is always made by reference to the *lex fori*. And as a general rule, if allowed by the *lex fori*, an assignee may sue in his own name, although he cannot so sue at the place of the assignment.⁴ And if not allowed by the *lex fori*, he cannot sue in his own name, although he might do so at the place of assignment.⁵ But we think this doctrine should not be pushed farther than to indicate the mere nominal parties to the suit when it is purely a question of remedy. Thus, if a

¹ Frazier v. Warfield, 9 Sm. & M. 220.

² Scoville v. Canfield, 14 Johns. 338; Bank U. S. v. Donally, 8 Pet. 372; Hyder v. Goodnow, 3 Com. 266; Van Reimsdyk v. Kane, 1 Gall. 371; Smith v. Spinolla, 2 Johns. 198; Wharton Conf. of Laws, § 747.

³ De la Vega v. Vianna, 1 B. & Ad. 284.

⁴ Foss v. Nutting, 14 Gray, 484; see Pearsall v. Dwight, 2 Mass. 84; also, 2 Parsons, 368, 369, note g, and cases cited; Wharton Conf. of Laws, § 457.

⁵ Fisk v. Brackett, 32 Vt. 798; Folcott v. Ogden, 1 H. Bl. 135; Wharton Conf. of Laws, § 735; 2 Parsons N. & B. 368.

note were non-negotiable in Virginia, and could not be there indorsed or assigned, yet if negotiable and actually indorsed in Kentucky, so as to completely vest title in the indorsee, the holder would then have an absolute right to recover the amount, and the *lex loci contractus* should govern.¹ So if by the law of the place of transfer, an executor or administrator may indorse or assign a note, so as to vest title and right to sue completely in his transferee, the latter should be permitted to sue anywhere.² This is due to a liberal comity. But the authorities predominate in number the other way.³

§ 884. *Time within which suit may be brought.*—The time within which suit may be brought is purely a question of the forum. Thus suit may be brought immediately in one State by attachment, although at the time no action would lie in the State where the cause of action arose.⁴ And in like manner the statute of limitations of the forum prevails;⁵ and no suit can be maintained if it be barred there, although by the law of the contract there was no limitation,⁶ or a less restricted limitation.⁷ And suit may be maintained where the limitation of the *lex fori* has not attached, although by the *lex loci contractus* action has been formally barred.⁸ This doctrine rests upon the ground that the time of suit is purely a matter for local municipal regulation. It may be different in cases where the right, in contradistinction

¹ Story on Bills, § 173; Conf. of Laws, § 354; Trimbey v. Vigmer, 1 Bing. N. C. 159; O'Callaghan v. Thomond, 3 Taunt. 82.

² Owen v. Moody, 29 Miss. 79; Harper v. Butler, 2 Pet. 239; Barrett v. Barrett, 8 Greenl. 353; 2 Parsons N. & B. 373, note v; Story Conf. of Laws, § 350; Wharton Conf. of Laws, § 457.

³ Goodwin v. Jones, 3 Mass. 514; Thompson v. Wilson, 2 N. H. 291; Stearns v. Burnham, 5 Greenl. 261.

⁴ Clark v. Conner, 2 Strobb. 346; 1 Robinson's Practice (new ed.), 317.

⁵ Mineral Point R. R. Co. v. Barron, 83 Ill. 367.

⁶ Nicolls v. Rodgers, 2 Paine C. C. 437.

⁷ Jones v. Hook, 2 Rand. 303; British Linen Co. v. Drummond, 10 B. & C. 903; Byles on Bills [*389], 572.

⁸ Power v. Hathaway, 43 Barb. 214; Bulger v. Roche, 11 Pick. 36; Putnam v. Dike, 13 Gray, 535; Estes v. Kyle, Meigs, 34; Huber v. Steirer, 2 Cr. & M. 629; *contra*, Harrison v. Stacy, 6 Rob. (La.) 15; Goodman v. Munks, 8 Port. (Ala.) 89.

to the remedy, is held by foreign law to be extinguished. Such extinction might operate by comity everywhere.¹

§ 885. The necessity of selecting the form of action according to the law of the forum has been well illustrated in the United States in a number of cases where the instrument sued upon was deemed a specialty where made, and a simple contract where the suit was brought; or *vice versa*. Thus in some of the States a scroll attached to the promisor's name is the same as a common law seal; and covenant or debt would be the proper remedy in the State where the promise was made, assumpsit not lying on a sealed instrument. And, moreover, by the local law the defendant could not plead want of consideration, because of the instrument being sealed. But if suit were brought in a State where a scroll is not recognized as a seal, it has been repeatedly held, that assumpsit would be the proper remedy, and that want of consideration might be pleaded.² And the converse has been also held, that although where made the instrument might be a simple promissory note, yet if where suit was brought it was regarded as a specialty, the appropriate action of debt or covenant should be brought, and the sanctity attached to seals would be imputed to it.³

§ 886. At one time it was held that the extent of the remedy was to be determined by the law of the place of contract, and where suit was brought in England upon a French contract, upon which by the laws of France no arrest could be made, it was held that the defendant could not in England be held to bail;⁴ but the contrary doctrine is now well settled.⁵

¹ Williams v. Jones, 13 East, 439.

² Bank United States v. Donally, 8 Pet. 361; Le Roy v. Beard, 8 How. 451; Williams v. Haynes, 27 Iowa, 251; Douglas v. Oldham, 6 N. H. 150; Andrews v. Herriott, 4 Cow. 508; Warren v. Lynch, 5 Johns. 239; Steele v. Curle, 4 Dana, 381; 1 Robinson's Practice (new ed.) 319.

³ Thrasher v. Everhart, 3 Gill & J. 234.

⁴ Melun v. Fitzjames, 1 B. & P. 138; Talleyrand v. Boulanger, 3 Ves. Jr. 447.

⁵ De la Vega v. Vianna, 1 B. & Ad. 284; Smith v. Spinolla, 2 Johns. 198; Sicard v. Whale, 11 Johns. 194; Peck v. Hozier, 14 Johns. 346; Hindley v. Marean, 3 Mason, 90; White v. Canfield, 7 Johns. 117.

§ 887. *Questions of evidence* appertain to the remedy, and consequently are controlled by the law of the forum. "Whether a witness is competent or not; whether a certain matter requires to be proved by writing or not; whether certain evidence proves a certain fact or not—this is to be determined by the law of the country where the question arises, where the remedy is sought to be enforced, and where the court sits to enforce it," is the language of Lord Brougham.¹ Accordingly, evidence was admitted in Connecticut to show that a blank indorsement was made for collection only, although by the laws of New York, where the indorsement was made, such evidence was inadmissible.² Upon an analogous principle, it has been held in England that as the statute of frauds does not make agreements void, but only prevents their being enforced by action, a parol agreement not to be performed within a year, though made in France, and valid there, could not be enforced in England.³

The certificate of a foreign notary of demand and notice as to a note, though evidence by the law of the place of payment, would be excluded unless admissible by the law of the place where suit is brought.⁴

§ 888. The *lex fori* undoubtedly applies to the admissibility and credibility of witnesses;⁵ but as to the number of attesting witnesses necessary to the validity of a writing, the law of the place where the writing was made would control on the ground *locus regit actum*.⁶ And where the objection is not to the competency of evidence, but to its effect, the law of the place of contract should prevail. Thus a parol acceptance could only be proved by parol evidence, and therefore if valid where made, it would be unreasonable to reject it because by the *lex fori* an acceptance must be in writing.⁷

¹ Bain v. Whitehaven, &c. R. R. Co. 3 H. L. Cas. 1; Wharton Conflict of Laws, § 768; Story Conf. Laws, § 635; Phillimore, IV, 662.

² Downer v. Chesebrough, 36 Conn. 39.

³ Leroux v. Brown, 12 C. B. 801; 14 E. L. & Ex. 247; Byles on Bills [*390], 573.

⁴ Wharton, § 769.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Kirtland v. Wauzer, 2 Duer, 277.

⁷ Mason v. Dousay, 35 Ill. 424.

§ 889. So the effect of the transaction in fixing the relations of the parties is determined by the *lex loci contractus*. Thus, if by the *lex loci contractus* the purchaser acquires the note as a *bona fide* holder, not subject to the defense of a prior payment, such payment cannot be pleaded, although the *lex fori* would permit it.¹ And whether or not the proprietor of the bill or note is a *bona fide* holder, is to be determined by the *lex loci contractus*—that is, the place of payment.²

§ 890. *In respect to set-off* it is laid down by text writers, and by the courts of common law, that a set-off to any action allowed by the local law is to be treated as a part of the remedy; and that, therefore, it is admissible in claims between persons belonging to different States or countries, although it may not be admissible by the law of the country where the debt which is sued was contracted.³ The same principle applies to the mode of attacking consideration. When the *lex fori* allows a plea of want of consideration in a suit on an obligation, which by the *lex loci contractus* was sealed, and to which by such latter law no such plea could be offered, the *lex fori* controls.⁴ So as to other legal and equitable defenses, where the very contract itself does not exclude them, they are to be controlled by the *lex fori*.⁵ Statutes providing certain exemptions from levy and sale upon execution affect the remedy, and those of the forum prevail.⁶

§ 891. *The courts can take no judicial notice of the laws of another country.*—When relied upon, they must be proved as facts, and otherwise it will be presumed that they are the same as the laws of the forum in which suit is brought.⁷ Thus,

¹ Harrison v. Edwards, 12 Vt. 651.

² Allen v. Bratton, 47 Miss. 129.

³ Gibbs v. Howard, 2 N. H. 296; Bank of Gallipolis v. Trimble, 6 B. Mon. 600; Story Conf. of Laws, § 575; Wharton Conf. of Laws, § 788; Mineral Point R. R. Co. v. Barron, 83 Ill. 366.

⁴ Wharton, § 788.

⁵ Bliss v. Houghton, 13 N. H. 126.

⁶ Mineral Point R. R. Co. v. Barron, 83 Ill. 367.

⁷ Hunt v. Johnson, 44 N. Y. 27; Dunn v. Adams, 1 Ala. 529; Fouke v. Fleming, 13 Md. 392; Whidden v. Seelye, 40 Me. 247; Legg v. Legg, 8 Mass. 100; Bean v. Briggs, 4 Iowa, 467; Harper v. Hampton, 1 Harr. & J. 687; Bernard v.

the law as to the rate of damages will be presumed to be the same where the bill is drawn in one country, and is sued on in another;¹ and where by the law of the forum a contract made on Sunday is void, it will be presumed that a foreign contract made on Sunday is void also.² So it will be presumed, where the law of the forum authorizes an indorsee to sue before exhausting recourse against the maker, that the law of the place of the contract is likewise.³ But there is this exception to the rule—that where countries have once belonged to the same government, the courts after the separation will adopt a presumption suitable to the case, and most frequently presume the continued existence of pre-existing laws.⁴

§ 892. There are some cases which are consistent with the doctrines above stated, and which seem to qualify the rule given by the limitation that a contract entered into in another State will not be presumed illegal there, although illegal by the law of the forum. Thus, in New York, where a minor under twenty-one years of age could not enter into a contract, the maker of a note executed in Jamaica was sued, and proved that he was under twenty-one years of age. But the law of

Barry, 1 Greene (Iowa), 388; *Martin v. Martin*, 1 Smed. & M. 176; *Kuenzi v. Elvers*, 14 La. Ann. 391; *Hill v. Wilker*, 41 Ga. 449; *Byles on Bills* (Sharswood's ed.), 573, 574; 1 *Robinson's Practice* (new ed.) 230.

¹ *Kuenzi v. Elvers*, 14 La. Ann. 391, *Merrick, C. J.*, saying: "On the trial of these cases no evidence was offered of the laws of Brazil where the bills were drawn. The defendants have paid the amounts specified on the face of the bills, and the only question submitted to this court for its determination is, whether or not the plaintiffs can recover damages at the rate of ten per cent., as allowed by our statute on bills of exchange drawn in Louisiana on foreign countries, and there protested for non-payment or non-acceptance."

"The bills drawn in Brazil (although against a shipment of coffee to this city), were payable in London, and are governed by the laws of Brazil, the country where they were drawn. *Story on Bills* 397. But the record does not furnish us any proof of those laws. In the absence of proof, the laws of that country, in reference to bills drawn there upon other foreign countries, must be presumed to be the same as our own, and the damages claimed must be allowed."

² *Hill v. Wilker*, 41 Ga. 449.

³ *Bean v. Briggs*, 4 Iowa, 467; *Bernard v. Barry*, 1 Greene (Iowa), 389.

⁴ *Dickinson v. Hoomes*, 8 Grat. 408; *Arayo v. Currill*, 1 La. 541; 1 *Robinson's Practice* (new ed.) 230.

Jamaica as to infancy was not proved. Kent, C. J., said: "As the defendant did not prove what the law of Jamaica was on the subject, he did not make out his defense, and the plaintiff is entitled to judgment."¹ The like view obtained in a similar case in England.² So in Mississippi, where a note was executed in Vicksburg, payable in New Orleans, Louisiana, bearing interest at ten per cent. Six per cent. was the lawful rate of interest in Mississippi, where suit was brought. The action was sustained, there being no proof as to the laws of Louisiana.³

SECTION VI.

LEX LOCI REI SITÆ.

§ 893. Real estate is controlled in respect to the validity and form of conveyance by the *lex loci rei sitæ*—that is, by the law of the place where it is situated. And while the *lex loci contractus* determines the nature and effect of a negotiable instrument, when it is secured by a mortgage on real estate, it becomes important in some cases to ascertain the law of the place of the mortgage, as there may arise a conflict between it and the law of the place where the negotiable paper was executed, or is made payable.

§ 894. The question has been much litigated in the United States, as to what law applies when a mortgage is given as security for a loan, and the mortgage is in one State, and the place of payment of the loan in another. "The true test is, was the mortgage merely a collateral security, the money being employed in another State, and under other laws,

¹ Thompson v. Ketchum, 8 Johns. 192 (1811).

² Male v. Roberts, 3 Esp. N. P. 163 (1800). Suit to recover upon contract made in Scotland. Plea, infancy; Lord Eldon said: "I hold myself not warranted in saying that such a contract is void by the law of Scotland, because it is void by the law of England. The law of the country where the contract arose should govern the contract; and what that law is, should be given in evidence to me as a fact."

³ Martin v. Martin, 1 Sm. & M. 177, 178 (1843), Clayton, J.: "The presumption is, that the parties have not violated the law by their contract."

or was the money employed on the land for which the mortgage was given? If the former be the case, then the law of the place where the money was actually used, and not that of the mortgage, applies.¹ If the latter, then the law of the place where the mortgage is situate must prevail.”² Where money was borrowed, and the note made payable in New York, but dated in Nebraska, where a mortgage to secure it was executed on land, the mortgage was held to be a mere incident of the loan, and the transaction being usurious by New York law, it was held void.³

SECTION VII.

BY WHAT LAW THE LIABILITY OF THE MAKER, ACCEPTOR, DRAWER AND INDORSER IS DETERMINED.

§ 895. *In the first place, as to the maker of a note.*—The maker's liabilities are controlled by the law of the place where the note is executed, unless it be payable elsewhere, in which case he will be deemed to have had reference to the law of such place, and it will control his obligation. If by the law of the place of making, equitable defenses are admissible in the maker's favor, no subsequent indorsement in another place where the rule is different can preclude him from making them.⁴

Accordingly, it has been held, that the maker of a note

¹ De Wolf v. Johnson, 10 Wheat. 383; Newman v. Kerson, 10 Wis. 333; Kennedy v. Knight, 21 Wis. 340; Davis v. Clemson, 6 McLean, 622; Atwater v. Walker, 1 C. E. Green, 42.

² Wharton Conf. of Laws, § 510; Arnold v. Potter, 22 Iowa, 194; Chapman v. Robinson, 6 Paige, 627; Goddard v. Sawyer, 9 Allen, 78; Pine v. Smith, 11 Gray, 38; Fitch v. Remer, 8 Am. Law Reg. 654.

In an old case a bond was executed in Ireland for a debt contracted in England. It bore Irish interest, which was held valid because it constituted a security on lands situated in Ireland. Connor v. Bellamont, 2 Atk. 381; Story Conf. of Laws, § 305.

³ Sands v. Smith, 1 Neb. 108.

⁴ Wilson v. Lazier, 11 Gratt. 482; Chartres v. Cairnes, 16 Mart. (La.) 1; Yeatman v. Cullen, 5 Blackf. 241; Stacy v. Baker, 1 Scammon, 417; Brabston v. Gibson 8 How. 263.

made and indorsed in Mississippi, where the maker was entitled to the benefit of all defenses against an indorsee which he could have made against the payee before notice of the indorsement, could avail himself of such defense in a suit brought in another State where a different rule prevailed.¹ And the converse has also been held, that where a note was made between parties resident in New York, and there negotiated while current, but paid by the maker before maturity, was afterward sued upon in Vermont by a *bona fide* holder for value and without notice, the maker could not avail himself of the defense of payment which was not good according to the law of New York, although by the law of Vermont in force at the time of such payment it would have been a good defense to the action.²

§ 896. *In the second place, as to the acceptor of a bill.*—The acceptor of a bill occupies a position analogous to that of the maker of a note, and his acceptance is a contract to pay the amount at the place where the acceptance is made, if the bill be in terms there payable, or inferentially so from being silent as to the place of payment.³ The address of the bill to the drawee at a particular place generally indicates the place of his acceptance, and of payment; but if the bill be expressly payable elsewhere, then the place of payment determines the acceptor's liabilities.⁴ Thus if a bill be drawn in Massachusetts, by a drawer there resident, upon a drawee in New York, and no place of payment be mentioned, it would be presumably payable in New York and be governed by the laws of that State.⁵ And, if a merchant promise to

¹ Brabston v. Gibson, 9 How. 263.

² Harrison v. Edwards, 12 Vt. 648.

³ Musson v. Lake, 4 How. 262; Duerson's Adm'r v. Alsop, 27 Grat. 241.

⁴ Freese v. Brownell, 35 N. J. L. R. (6 Vroom), 286; Bright v. Judson, 47 Barb. 29; Everett v. Vendryes, 19 N. Y. 436; Frazier v. Warfield, 9 Smedes & M. 220; Bainbridge v. Wilcocks, 1 Bald. 536; Don v. Lipman, 5 Clarke & F. 1; Cooper v. Earl of Waldergrave, 2 Beav. 282; see Barney v. Newcomb, 9 Cush. 46; Byles on Bills (Sharswood's ed.) 568.

⁵ Ibid.; Worcester Bank v. Wells, 8 Met. 107; Lewis v. Owen, 4 B. & Ald. 654; Lizardi v. Cohen, 3 Gill, 430; Todd v. Bank of Ky. 3 Bush. (Ky.) 626; Freese v. Brownell, 36 N. J. L. R. 285; see *post*, § 898.

accept a bill drawn on him by a merchant of another country, it is to be deemed a contract of the place where the acceptance is to be made.¹

§ 897. Sometimes letters of credit are written in one country by which the letter writer becomes liable to accept bills in another country; or to accept them in the same country payable in another country. In the first instance, the engagement to make the acceptance must be construed as an engagement to accept according to the laws of the country where the acceptance is to be made. And although the acceptance would not be valid unless made in accordance with the laws of the place where made, the promise to accept contained in the letter of credit (while it might not operate as an acceptance) would be held valid in the judicial tribunals of the civilized world, and enforced equally in one country as in another as a subsisting contract, the breach of which would entitle the injured party to complete redress for all the damage sustained by him.² But in Ohio a different view has been taken, apparently under the peculiar circumstances of the case, the Court saying: "The letter, indeed, is dated New Orleans (Louisiana), and the acceptances were to be there; but the contract was closed in Cincinnati (Ohio); the bills were to be drawn and endorsed there; the money upon them to be obtained, and the produce brought there. With such a state of facts we suppose that Ohio furnishes the law of the contract."³

§ 898. *In the third place, as to the drawer of a bill, and the fourth place, as to the indorser of a bill or note.*—The contract of the drawer of a bill and of the indorser of a bill or note is very different in its nature from that of the maker or acceptor. Thus, if a merchant in New York draw a bill on another in Richmond, Virginia, requiring him to pay a certain amount without specifying any place of payment, the drawee

¹ Boyce v. Edwards, 4 Pet. 111.

² Russell v. Wiggin, 2 Story, 230; Carnegie v. Morrison, 2 Metc. (Mass.) 397; Bissell v. Lewis, 4 Mich. 459; see Barney v. Newcomb, 9 Cush. 46.

³ Lonsdale v. Lafayette Bank. 18 Ohio (old series), 142 (1849).

will, if he accepts, be bound to pay the amount in Richmond that being implied by the address of the bill to him at that place. But it does not follow that the new drawer would be himself bound to pay the amount of the bill in Richmond in the event of dishonor for non-payment by the acceptor. His undertaking is not to pay it in Richmond himself, but a guaranty that it shall be paid there by the drawee, and a further undertaking that if not so paid by the drawee, he will pay the amount in New York, provided the bill be only presented, and he has received due notice of its dishonor. In other words, the drawer of a bill does not bind himself to pay it specially where the acceptor is impliedly or expressly called on to pay it; but his contract is to pay generally, and is consequently construed to be a contract to pay at the place where the bill is drawn.¹ Accordingly, where a resident in Demerara drew a bill in favor of another resident there, payable in London, upon C., a resident in Scotland, and C. accepted it payable "at Payne and Smith's, in London;" it was held that the contract of the drawer was to be governed by the law of Demerara, and that the Dutch-Roman law there in force applied to this obligation. And T. Pemberton Leigh, Chancellor, said:² "It is argued that this bill being drawn payable in London, not only the acceptor, but the drawer must be held to have contracted with reference to the English law. This argument, however, appears to us to be founded on a misapprehension of the obligation which the drawer and indorser of a bill incurs. The drawer, by his contract, undertakes that the drawee shall accept, and shall afterward pay the bill according to its tenor at the place and domicile of the drawee. If this contract of the drawer be broken by the drawee, either by non-acceptance or non-pay-

¹ Freese v. Brownell, 35 N. J. L. 286; Everett v. Vendryes, 19 N. Y. 436; Hunt v. Standart, 15 Ind. 33; Raymond v. Holmes, 11 Texas, 55; Kuenzi v. Elvers, 14 La. Ann. 391; Lennig v. Ralston, 11 Har. 137 (23 Penn. St. R.); Price v. Page, 24 Mo. 67; Bonedon v. Page, 24 Mo. 595; Page v. Page, 24 Mo. 596; Bank U. S. v. U. S. 2 How. 711.

² Allen v. Kemble, 6 Moore P. C. 314 (1848).

ment, the drawer is liable for payment of the bill, not where the bill is to be paid by the drawee, but where he, the drawer, made his contract, with his interest, damages and costs, as the law of the country where he made the contract may allow."

So, where a bill was drawn in California where the rate of interest was twenty-five per cent., on a drawee in Washington City, where the rate was six per cent., it was held that the drawee was bound for the rate of interest at the place where the bill was drawn.¹

And so where, by the laws of Mississippi, a bill was drawn, the drawer may set up want or failure of consideration between himself and the payee, although sued by an innocent holder for value and without notice, such defense has been held admissible, although, by the laws of Louisiana, where the drawee resided and on which the bill was drawn, such defense was not available.²

§ 899. The indorser of a bill or note is regarded, in like manner, as undertaking to pay at the place where his indorsement is made, in the event of dishonor and due notice, for the reason that he is, in effect, the drawer of a new bill at the place where, and the time when, he makes the indorsement,

¹ *Gibbs v. Tremont*, 20 Eng. L. & Eq. 555; 9 Exch. 25. To same effect see *Crawford v. Branch Bank*, 6 Ala. N. S. 15; *Bailey v. Heald*, 17 Texas, 102. *Contra*, Indorser liable for interest according to law of place in which bill is drawn, *Mullen v. Morris*, 2 Barr, 87.

² *Wood v. Gibbs' Adm'r*, 35 Miss. 560. In *Musson v. Lake*, 4 How. 262, where a bill drawn and indorsed in Mississippi was accepted in Louisiana, where the acceptors resided, the U. S. Supreme Court said: "So far as their (the acceptors') liabilities are concerned, they were governed by the law of Louisiana. But the drawer and indorsers resided in Mississippi; the bill was drawn and indorsed there, and their liabilities, if any, occurred there." And due diligence to recover of the drawer and indorsers was to be controlled, it was held by the laws of the latter State. See *Roquette v. Overman*, 16 Q. B. L. R. 525 (1875), (quoted *post*, § 970 a), and *Duerson's Adm'r v. Alsop*, 27 Grat. 241 (1876), wherein it is said by Staples, J.: "The decision (in *Roquette v. Overman*) is based upon the idea, chiefly, that as the liability of the indorser is to be measured by that of the acceptor whose surety he is, it followed that an indorser residing in England might be reached by a law of France, through the medium of the acceptor who resided in France." And he adds that the decision is in direct conflict with that in *Musson v. Lake* above quoted.

and is not considered as merely adopting the date of place and time of the bill or note which he indorses. And he is bound by the law of the place of indorsement,¹ even though the bill or note be expressly payable elsewhere.² "For," says

¹ *Cook v. Litchfield*, 5 Seld. 280 (1853); 5 Sandf. 320; *Williams v. Wade*, 1 Metc. (Mass.) 82; *Dow v. Rowell*, 12 N. H. 49; *Dundas v. Bowler*, 3 McLean, 400; *Aymar v. Sheldon*, 12 Wend. 443; *Slocum v. Pomeroy*, 6 Cranch, S. C. 221; *National Bank of Michigan v. Green*, 33 Iowa, 140; *Short v. Trabue*, 4 Metc. (Ky.) 299; *Trabue v. Short*, 18 La. Ann. 257; *Trabue v. Short*, 5 Cold. 293; *Yeatman v. Cullen*, 5 Blackf. 240; *Edwards on Bills*, 185; *Greathead v. Walton*, 40 Conn. 226; *Clanton v. Barnes*, 50 Ala. 403.

² *Trabue v. Short*, 18 La. Ann. 257 (1866). The note was made in Kentucky, payable to the order of the payees at their office in New Orleans, Louisiana, and was indorsed in Kentucky. The indorsers were sued in Louisiana, where they were domiciled. The Court said: "The defense is, that the contract of indorsement having been made in Kentucky, the liability of defendants as indorsers is governed by the law of that State, according to which a remote assignor of a note is not primarily liable to the holder, and the immediate assignor is only liable for the consideration received, with six per cent., and the holder cannot make him liable without first prosecuting the payor with diligence, which is not shown to have been done. * * * The general rule is that the form and effect of public and private written instruments are governed by the laws of the place where they are passed or executed, unless it is expressed that they are to have effect in another country; and the question is presented: Does the fact that the note sued on is payable to the defendants at their office in this city make them liable, under the laws of Louisiana, upon their indorsement made in Kentucky?"

"Every indorsement, accommodation or otherwise, is essentially an original contract, equivalent to a new note or bill in favor of the holder and the acceptor or obligor. 12 M. 185; 11 Whart. 213, 341; Story on Notes, § 155.

"The agreement or obligation of defendants as indorsers having been entered into in Kentucky, without expressing a different place of performance, must, under the above general rule, be regulated by the law of Kentucky. The fact that the payors reside where the note is payable does not amount to such a designation of the place of performance as to take it out of the general rule. The parties, at the time of making the indorsements, were all in Kentucky, and are presumed by law to have contracted with reference to the laws of that State. See Story on Conflict of Laws, § 316 b; 6 Cranch, 221; 8 N. S. 21.

"Doubtless the defendants may be sued at their domicile, but the obligation of their indorsement and the duties of the holders are governed by the law of Kentucky, where the indorsement was made. Such was the ruling in the case of *Duncan v. Sparrow*, 3 Ky. 167, which was a suit upon a note made in Louisiana and payable in Mississippi." To same effect, see *Artisans' Bank v. Park Bank*, 41 Barb. 602 (1864). *Short v. Trabue*, 4 Metc. (Ky.) 299; *Trabue v. Short*, 5 Cold. 293 (1858); *Hunt v. Standart*, 15 Ind. 35 (1860); *Loury's Adm'r v. Western Bank*, 7 Ala. N. S. 120; *Holbrook v. Vibbard*, 2 Scam. 465; *Currier v. Lockwood*, 40 Conn. 349.

the Court, in the case in Tennessee, cited below, where the note was indorsed in Kentucky, "the fact that the note is payable in Louisiana is not enough. That is the maker's undertaking; but the indorser's contract is separate and distinct; and being made without any view of performance under the laws of Louisiana, it must be governed both upon principle and authority by the laws of Kentucky, where it was made."¹ Therefore, each of several and successive indorsers of a bill or note may contract several and different liabilities, each being bound according to the law of the place where his indorsement was made. Thus, if a bill be drawn or note made in one State and indorsed successively in several others, the indorser in one State may be merely liable as a surety;² in another, he may not be liable until the holder has exhausted his remedy against the acceptor or maker;³ while, in a third, he may be liable according to the general principle of the law merchant, immediately upon due notice of dishonor.⁴

§ 900. In a leading case on this subject, it was said by Shaw, C. J.:⁵ "The note declared on being made in Illinois, both parties residing there at the time, and it also being indorsed in Illinois, we think that the contract created by that indorsement must be governed by the law of that State. The law in question does not affect the remedy, but goes to create, limit and modify the contract effected by the fact of indorsement. In that which gives force and effect to the contract, and imposes restrictions and modifications upon it, the law of the place of contract must prevail when another is not looked to as a place of performance. Suppose it were shown that, by the law of Illinois, the indorsement of a note by the payee merely transferred the legal interest in the note to the indorsee, so as to enable him to sue in his own name, but

¹ Trabue v. Short, 5 Cold. 293.

² Ingersoll v. Long, 4 Dev. & Bat. 293.

³ Hunt v. Standart, 15 Ind. 33; Violett v. Patton, 5 Cranch. 142; Howell v. Wilson, 2 Blackf. 418; Williams v. Wade, 1 Metc. 82; Slocum v. Pomeroy, 6 Cranch, 221; Trabue v. Short, 18 La. Ann. 257.

⁴ McDonald v. Bailey, 14 Me. 101.

⁵ Williams v. Wade, 1 Metc. 82.

imposed no conditional obligation on the indorser to pay, it would hardly be contended that an action could be brought here, upon such an indorsement, if the indorser should happen to be found here, because, by our law, such an indorsement, if made here, would render the indorser conditionally liable to pay the note.

“By the law of Illinois, the indorser is liable only after a judgment obtained against the maker; and as no such judgment appears to have been obtained on this note, the condition upon which alone the plaintiff may sue is not complied with, and therefore the action cannot be maintained.”

§ 901. This doctrine, that the drawer and indorser are bound according to the law of the place of drawing or indorsing, although sustained by great weight of opinion, and an overwhelming current of authorities, has not escaped criticism and dissent, and rests, as it seems to us, rather upon the sanction of decisions than upon clearly and well defined principles. If A., in New York, draws a bill on B., in Richmond, directing him to pay \$1,000 at the First National Bank in Raleigh, North Carolina, he thereby guarantees to C., the payee, that the money shall be there paid by B. on the day of its maturity. He is as clearly bound as B. is, although secondarily, that the money shall be paid at the time and at the place named. If either tenders the amount at the time and place, it would be a good tender. And although A.'s liability is contingent upon due notice of dishonor, the liability is nevertheless for breach of his contract that B. should pay at Raleigh. He has contracted that the amount shall be there paid by the hand of B., and yet his contract is regarded as being governed by the law of New York; while B.'s contract to pay by his own hand is governed by the laws of North Carolina. This seems to us an inconsistency of the law; and while the doctrine is now perhaps too well settled to be disturbed, it does not bear the test of searching analysis. In Indiana,¹ it was at one time

¹ *Shanklin v. Cooper*, 8 Ind. 42 (1816). The note was executed, and made payable in New York, and indorsed to the plaintiff in Indiana. Blackford, J.,

boldly denied, though subsequently established,¹ and Chancellor Kent has expressed his dissatisfaction with it.² Professor Parsons thinks it would be a better rule if the place of payment should be generally adopted as governing the liability of all parties, except with regard to damages, &c., and whatever may be properly regarded as belonging to remedy, which depends upon the *lex fori*.³

§ 902. Whether or not the transferrer is liable as indorser or assignor must be determined by the law of the place where the transfer is made. The United States Supreme Court has said: "An instrument may be negotiable in one State which may yet be incapable of negotiability by the laws of another State, and the remedy must be in the courts of the latter on such instrument."⁴ Therefore, if a note negotiable by the laws of Maryland be transferred in Virginia or West Virginia, where it is not negotiable (not being payable at a particular bank), the transferrer is not an indorser in the sense of the law merchant, but an assignor, and cannot be sued until recourse against the maker has been

said: "We consider the indorsement to be a contract which must be governed by the law of the place where the note is payable, without regard to the place where the indorsement was actually made. The maker of the note before us bound himself to pay it in New York to the payee or order, and the payee, by the indorsement, directed him to pay it, at the same place, to the indorsee. The indorser is, indeed, the drawer of a bill of exchange, in which the maker of the note is the acceptor, and the indorsee the payee; and it is payable where the note is payable. The indorsement in the present case, therefore, if made in this State, stands on the same ground with a bill of exchange drawn here and payable in New York, and there can be no doubt but that the contract of the drawer of such a bill would be governed by the law of New York."

¹ Hunt v. Standart, 15 Ind. 33 (1830); Mox v. State Bank, 13 Ind. 521. In Raymond v. Holmes, 11 Tex. 60, it is said by Lipscomb, J.: "It would seem, that if it be true, that the drawer and every indorser undertakes that the bill shall be paid at the place of payment named in the bill, it would be difficult, on principle, to reconcile the distinction between such undertaking, and any other contract for performance at a particular place, where the law is different from the *lex loci contractus*. But the American doctrine has acquired the force of authority, and uniformity must be observed on this question."

² 2 Kent Com. 459, 460; and see Mullen v. Morris, 2 Barr, 87.

³ 2 Parsons N. & B. 347.

⁴ Bank U. S. v. Donnally, 8 Pet. 361; see 2 Parsons N. & B. 352.

exhausted.¹ So if a note drawn in Ohio, where, being payable at bank, it is negotiable, be transferred in Kentucky, where such a note is not negotiable, the indorser in Kentucky is not technically such, but only an assignor.²

SECTION VIII.

BY WHAT LAW THE VALIDITY AND EFFECT OF TRANSFER AND THE RIGHTS OF THE HOLDER ARE DETERMINED.

§ 903. Questions have arisen whether negotiable notes and bills, made in one country, are transferable in other countries, so as to found a right of action in the holder against the other parties.³ It has been held in England that the statute of Anne, which makes promissory notes payable to order or bearer negotiable, applies as well to foreign as to inland promissory notes; and, therefore, that a note made in Scotland and indorsed (whether in England or Scotland did not appear) could be sued in England by the indorsee against the maker.⁴ And that a promissory note payable to bearer, made in England and transferred in France, could be likewise sued by the holder.⁵ And this, although by the law of France mere delivery would be inoperative.⁶

§ 904. Very many other interesting questions arise in respect to the liabilities, rights and remedies of parties to negotiable instruments when they have been drawn, made or accepted in one country and have been transferred by indorsement or assignment in another. In the *first* place, suppose a note transferred in the country where made, so as to vest title in the transferee, does such transfer have the same efficacy where suit is brought? It has been held not. Thus in Illinois, it appears it was necessary that a note payable to A. or bearer should be transferred by indorsement, so as to

¹ Nichols Ex. v. Porter, 2 Hagans (W. Va.) 13.

² Carlisle v. Chambers, 4 Bush (Ky.) 269.

³ Story on Bills, § 171.

⁴ Milne v. Graham, 1 Barn. & C. 192.

⁵ De la Chaumette v. Bank of England, 2 B. & Ad. 385; 9 B. & C. 208.

⁶ Ibid.; Byles on Bills (Sharswood's ed.) [*385], 569.

vest a title in the holder. The note sued on was made and transferred in New York without indorsement, and it was held that the transferee could sue in Illinois, but it would not follow that he could do so in his own name.¹ And it seems that the law of the forum would generally determine in whose name the suit should be brought.²

§ 905. In the *second* place, suppose the instrument is made in one country, and is transferred in another, in a way valid by the law of the country where it was made, but not so by the law of the place where it was transferred. In such a case, as between the transferrer and transferee, it would doubtless be regarded that suit could not be anywhere sustained. But as between the transferee and the maker or acceptor, the law of the place of contract would prevail. This was well illustrated in a Scotch case. In Scotland, a bill or note is transferable by indorsement when payable to A. B. simply, without the negotiable words "to the bearer" or "or order" being added. And the note in question was made in Scotland, and indorsed in England, where such a note is not negotiable. Upon the maker being sued in Scotland, it was held that suit could be maintained, and Lord Medwyn said: "It is often said, and truly, that by indorsation a new contract is created; and I was puzzled, at one time, with the circumstance that the indorsation in the present case was by an Englishman to an Englishman, and executed in England; and it appeared difficult for me to conceive how such a contract could be validly entered into in a country where such an indorsation was not valid, so as not to constitute a right in favor of the one, or an obligation against the other. But although it might be consistent with principle to allow the law of the place where the indorsement was made to regulate its effect between indorser and indorsee, as between the indorsee and the maker no new contract is created, the contract between them remaining the same original contract, regulated by the *lex loci contractus*; the indorsee is merely substituted

¹ Roosa v. Crist, 17 Ill. 450.

² Harper v. Butler, 2 Pet. 239.

in the place of the original payee, and the maker remains under the same liability he contracted at the time he made the note, which was to pay to the payee or to the holder by indorsement; and he cannot object to the form of the transfer, if it be made according to the law which gives its character, and regulates the quality of the note—that is, in the present case, according to the law of Scotland.”¹

§ 906. It appears now to be settled that each holder has the same rights against the acceptor or maker as the original payee, though the intermediate indorsements were executed abroad, and were inoperative by the foreign law, while good by the law of the place of the acceptor's or maker's contract. Thus, on a bill payable to order, drawn, accepted and payable in England, an indorsee can maintain an action against the acceptor in England, though such action could not be maintained in France, and though the indorser and indorsee were, at the time of the indorsement, which was made in France, residents of and domiciled in France.² On the other hand, when, by the law to which the defendant's contract is subject, the indorsements are defective, he cannot be sued on them in a foreign court. Thus, where a promissory note was made in France, and indorsed in blank by the payee in that country, the maker and payee, both at the time of making and indorsing the note being domiciled there, it was held that as no action could have been maintained upon it in the French courts of law, in the name of the indorsee, the indorsement, according to the law of France, operating as a procuration only and not as a transfer, so no action could be maintained by him in England.³

§ 907. Again, in the *third* place: Suppose a note not negotiable by the law of the place where made, but negotia-

¹ Robertson v. Burdekin, 1 Ross Lead. Cases, 812; Wharton's Conflict of Laws, § 452.

² Lebel v. Tucker, 2 Q. B. 77 (1867), s. c. 8 Best & Smith, 830; Wharton's Conflict of Laws, § 454.

³ Trimbey v. Vignier, 4 M. & Scott, 695; 1 Bing. N. C. 151; 6 C. & P. 25; Wharton's Conflict of Laws, § 455.

ble by the law of the place where indorsed. In such a case the right of action by the indorsee against the maker would be governed by the law of the forum.¹ It would seem that in the country where the note was made, suit could not be sustained by the indorsee against the maker, because inconsistent with its laws. But in the country of the indorsement the same reason would not apply; and if the maker used terms of negotiability in his contract, capable of binding him to the indorsee, there would not seem to be any solid objection to giving the contract its full effect there. Thus, it has been held, that where a note was made in Connecticut payable to order, but by the laws of that State was not negotiable, and was indorsed in New York, where it was negotiable, the indorsee suing in New York could recover against the maker.² But if there were no words of negotiability in the note, it might be different.³ And as a general principle, it may be stated, that if the instrument be not assignable at all in its inception, the laws of no other country would enlarge the contract, and give title against the debtor, to any assignee against his consent.⁴

SECTION IX.

BY WHAT LAW THE FORMALITIES IN RESPECT TO PRESENTMENT, PROTEST AND NOTICE ARE GOVERNED.

§ 908. In order to charge the drawer or indorser, the holder must exercise due diligence in presenting the bill to the drawee, or acceptor, and the note to the maker; and as the acts necessary to constitute a due presentment are to be done at the place upon which the bill is drawn, or at which the bill or note is payable, they must be governed by the law of the place upon which it is drawn, or at which it is payable, as the case may be. Thus, if a bill were drawn by

¹ 2 Parsons N. & B. 353.

² *Lodge v. Phelps*, 1 Johns. Cas. 139; 2 Caines Cas. 321.

³ *Story on Conflict of Laws*, § 253 a; *Story on Bills*, § 175.

⁴ *Talleyrand v. Boulanger*, 8 Ves. Jr. 447.

a merchant in New York, payable at thirty days' sight, upon a merchant in London, England, it should be presented for acceptance, according to the law of England; and should be presented for payment at maturity, also according to the law of England, as it would be there payable.¹ But if the bill were drawn in like manner in New York upon London, with the exception that it was drawn and accepted payable at a particular place in New York, or in France, then the law of England would control the presentment for acceptance, and the law of New York, or France, the presentment for and demand of payment. Accordingly, the question whether or not the bill should have grace would be determined by the law of the place of payment; and also, if allowable, in how many days grace should consist. In France no grace is allowable, while in England and the United States, it is generally three days. But it ranges in different places from three to thirty days, and in each case the law of the particular place would determine.²

§ 909. *The protest*.—When a foreign bill is dishonored, it is necessary that it should be protested, and the protest should be made at the time, in the manner, and by the persons prescribed in the place where the bill is refused acceptance or payment, as the case may be. The bill might be drawn in New York upon England, and might be indorsed in Pennsylvania and in Maryland, in Germany and in France. But only one protest would be necessary, and that should be made according to the laws of England, where the bill is payable. To hold otherwise would subject the holder to the necessity of making five different protests conformably to

¹ Rothschild v. Currie, 1 Ad. & El. N. S. 434 (1 E. C. L. R. 428); approved in Phillips v. Im. Thurn. 1 C. P. L. R. 463. See also Rouquette v. Overman, 10 Q. B. L. R. 525 (14 Moak's English R. 330; Todd v. Neal's Adm'r, 49 Ala. 266.

² Bank of Washington v. Triplett, 1 Pet. 25; Bowen v. Newell, 3 Ker. 290; Vidal v. Thompson, 11 Mart. (La.) 23; Goddin v. Shipley, 7 B. Mon. 575; Bryant v. Edson, 8 Vt. 325; Bank of Orange Co. v. Colby, 12 N. H. 520; Aymar v. Sheldon, 12 Wend. 439; Rothschild v. Currie, 1 Ad. & E. N. S. 43; (41 E. C. L. R. 428). See *ante*, §§ 622, 623; Bowen v. Newell, 13 N. Y. 290; Jewell v. Wright, 30 N. Y. 264.

the laws of the five different places in which the parties to be charged signed as drawer or indorsers, provided there were as many different styles of protest required. The doctrine on this subject is well settled,¹ and it is not until the question of notice arises that any conflict of authority presents itself.

§ 910. *Notice*.—In respect to notice, it has been distinguished from the presentment and protest in an often quoted American case,² in which it is held that it must conform to the law of the place where the drawing or indorsement occurs, in order to charge the drawer or any particular indorser, on the ground that the nature and extent of the liabilities of the drawer or indorser are to be determined according to the law of the place where the bill is drawn or indorsement made, and that the mode and time of notice constitute an implied condition of the contract.

In the case referred to, the bill was drawn in the French island of Martinique, on parties at Bordeaux, France. It was indorsed by the payee in New York to the plaintiffs, and was protested for non-acceptance in France. The contract of the drawer, according to the French law, was, that if the holder should present it within a year, and it should be protested for non-acceptance, and notice given, he would give security to pay it, and pay it if default were made in the payment by the drawee, after protest for non-payment and notice. Suit being brought in New York after notice of non-acceptance, without any protest for or notice of non-payment, it was held that the law of New York controlled the contract of indorsement there made, and that the defendant,

¹ *Townsley v. Sumrall*, 2 Pet. 170; *Carter v. Union Bank*, 7 Humph. 548; *Raymond v. Holmes*, 11 Tex. 54; *Snow v. Perkins*, 2 Mich. 238; *Ticknor v. Roberts*, 11 La. 16; *Bank of Rochester v. Gray*, 2 Hill (N. Y.) 227; *Aymar v. Sheldon*, 12 Wend. 444; *Ross v. Bedell*, 5 Duer, 462; *Williams v. Putnam*, 14 N. H. 543; 1 *Robinson's Practice* (new ed.), 79; *Whart. Conf. of Laws*, §§ 699 a, 402; 2 *Parsons N. & B.* 344, 345; *Story Conf. of Laws*, § 360; *Story on Bills*, §§ 138, 176; *Todd v. Neal's Adm'r*, 49 Ala. 266.

² *Aymar v. Sheldon*, 12 Wend. 444; see also *Williams v. Putnam*, 14 N. H. 543; *Story on Bills*, § 285; *Snow v. Perkins*, 2 Mich. 238.

having received notice according to New York law, was liable to the plaintiff.¹ This case impliedly determines that if the law of France, where the bill was payable, had been followed, the holder could not have recovered; and it is quoted with approbation by Story, in his treatises on Bills and Notes, and on the Conflict of Laws.² It has also been followed, though with evident reluctance, in Texas.³

§ 911. But in England the question of notice has been considered to be on the same footing as that of demand and protest, and if it be in accordance with the law of the place where the dishonor of which notice is given occurs, it is sufficient. Nor will notice, according to any other law, suffice.⁴

¹ Mr. Justice Nelson saying: "Upon the principle that the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined by the law of the place to which they had reference in making the contract, there are some steps which the holder must take according to the law of the place in which the bill is drawn. It must be presented for payment when due, having regard to the amount of days of grace there, as the drawee is under obligation to pay only according to such calculation; and it is, therefore, to be presumed that the parties had reference to it. So the protest must be according to the same law, which is not only convenient, but grows out of the necessity of the case. The notice, however, must be given according to the law of the place where the contract of the drawer or indorser, as the case may be, was made, such being an implied condition." So in *Allen v. Merchants' Bank*, 22 Wend. 215 (overruling same case, 15 Wend. 482), where a bill was drawn on New York in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, it was held that a failure by the notary to give notice of non-acceptance was fatal, although by the law of Pennsylvania such notice was not necessary.

² Story on Bills, §§ 285, 296; Story on Notes, § 339.

³ *Raymond v. Holmes*, 11 Tex. 55.

⁴ *Rothschild v. Currie*, 1 Ad. & El. N. S. 43 (41 E. C. L. R. 428). In this case it appeared that a bill was drawn in England upon a house in Paris, France, by whom it was accepted, in favor of the defendant, a payee in England; and was expressed to be payable in Paris, and indorsed to the plaintiff in England. Upon its dishonor for non-payment notice was given to the plaintiff in England, which notice was good according to French law, but too late according to the English law. The notice was transmitted the same day by the plaintiff to the defendant. In an action in England, by the English indorsee against the payee and indorser, the Court of Queen's Bench held, that the bill being payable in France, the French law as to notice of dishonor transmitted from France to England must prevail. In *Hirschfeld v. Smith*, L. R. 1 C. P. 350 (1866), Erle, C. J., said: "Due notice is such notice as can be reasonably required under the circumstances; and the reasonableness of the notice proved in evidence is a question of law, depending on the facts of each particular case, and such facts are for the

In this view high legal authorities concur,¹ and the reasoning upon which it rests seems to us unanswerable. It is undoubtedly true that the nature and extent of the liability of the drawer, or of any indorser, when it is once fixed, is determined by the law of the place of his contract; but we cannot see that that fact at all alters or concerns the conditions to be complied with by the holder in order to fix his liability. The contract of indorsement is a bilateral contract between the indorser and the holder, that he will pay the bill drawn upon a foreign land, provided that the holder will exercise due diligence in presenting the bill, and demanding payment of the drawee or acceptor at the place upon which the bill is drawn, or where it is payable, and in protesting it

jury. In the course of practice rules have been recognized by the judges, and so have become law; see the judgments of Grove, J., Lawrence, J., and Le Blanc, J., in *Darbishire v. Parker*, 6 East, 2. If, by the law of the place where the bill is payable, there are regulations for giving notice of dishonor, in order to make indorsers liable to the holder, a presumption is raised that notice according to those regulations is all that the indorser should require."

"The indorser of a bill accepted payable in France promises to pay in the event of dishonor in France and notice thereof. By his contract he must be taken to know the law of France relating to the dishonor of bills; and notice of dishonor is a portion of that law. Then, although his contract is regulated by the law of England relating to indorsement, and although he may not be liable unless reasonable notice of dishonor has been sent to him, yet the notice of dishonor according to the law of France may be, and, we think, ought to be, deemed reasonable notice according to the law of England, and be sufficient in England to entitle the plaintiff to recover according to that law."

"It is reasonable to hold that the foreign holder should have time to make good his right of recourse against all the parties to the bill, in whatever country they may be. Here the holder was a Frenchman, in France. The indorsement to him was by the plaintiff, a Frenchman, in France. The indorsement to the plaintiff was by the defendant, an Englishman, in England; and the indorsement to that Englishman by Lion, the payee, may have been in any country. The inconvenience would be great if the holder was bound to know the place of each indorsement, and the law of that place relating to notice of dishonor, and to give notice accordingly, on pain, in case of mistake, of losing his remedy; whereas there would be great convenience to the holder if notice valid according to the law of the place should be held to be reasonable notice for each of the countries of each of the parties, unless an exceptional case should give occasion for an exception." See *Redfield & Bigelow's Lead. Cases*, 713 *et seq.*

¹ 2 Parsons N. & B. 344, 345, and 340, note j; Byles on Bills (Sharswood's ed.), 567; 1 Robinson's Practice (new ed.), 80; *Todd v. Neal's Adm'r*, 49 Ala. 263.

in the event of dishonor, and giving him due notice. Now, the payment is to be made by the indorser at the place of his indorsement; that is, the place where his part of the contract is to be performed, and by the laws of which it is accordingly to be governed. But the acts constituting due diligence, which the holder contracts to perform, are to be performed at the place where the non-payment, which is to be protested and notified, occurs, and consequently they are to be defined and governed by its laws. It is simply a case in which each party contracts to do different things, at different places, and which fall severally and respectively under the laws of the place at which they are to be done.

§ 912. To hold otherwise than in accordance with these views would involve the law respecting notice in great perplexities. In the case of a bill drawn in Massachusetts upon a drawee in France, and indorsed successively in Pennsylvania and Maryland, Austria and England, the notice would have to conform to the law of Massachusetts in order to charge the drawer, and to the laws of the four different States and countries in order to charge the successive indorsers respectively. The holder in France, perhaps a bank for collection, might thus be under an intolerable burden; for notaries, and other officials and agents could not be presumed to know the laws of foreign countries, and, indeed, it might be a matter of the greatest difficulty to ascertain them, even were counsel consulted.

If the law of France were complied with in respect to the drawer and all the indorsers, we should say that it was sufficient for all purposes. If the holder in France only notified the English indorser, then the latter would have to notify the German indorser and his antecedents by English law, for in England his due diligence would have to be exercised, and so on, each successive party would have to act by the law of his own land.¹

¹ See 2 Parsons N. & B. 345.

SECTION X.

REVENUE LAWS OF OTHER COUNTRIES.—LAW APPLICABLE TO STAMPS
UPON NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.

§ 913. It is frequently laid down as a general rule that one country will not regard the revenue laws of another country,¹ and it is applied to maintain the doctrine that a bill or note which, according to the law of the State or country where it is made, requires a stamp in order to its validity, will nevertheless be regarded as valid in another State or country where suit is brought. But this rule is by no means universally conceded, and Story refers to it in terms of strong reprobation, declaring that "sound morals would seem to point to a very different conclusion," and citing with approval the view of Pothier that the doctrine is "inconsistent with good faith, and the just duties of nations to each other."² The general rule that the formalities, proofs and authentications of a contract must conform to the laws of the place where it is made, is conceded, and why such an exception as this should be made to it, which not only involves departure from a principle wise in itself, but also in the particular instance leads to the countenancing of frauds upon, and evasions of the fiscal laws of another people—is to us entirely undiscernible.

§ 914. The true view of this subject seems to us to be this: that if the bill or note be absolutely void according to the law of the place where it is made, unless it be stamped, then it is void everywhere; but if the *lex loci contractus* only declares that it shall not be admissible in evidence, then the regulation is regarded as merely a rule of evidence, and has no force or effect beyond the confines of the State or

¹ Byles on Bills (Sharswood's ed.), 563; 2 Parsons N. & B. 318, 321, 330; 1 Robinson's Practice (new ed.), 62; Ludlow v. Van Rensselaer, 1 Johns. 94; Lambert v. Jones, 2 Pat. & Heath, 144; James v. Catherwood, 2 Dow. & R. 190; Skinner v. Tinker, 34 Barb. 333; note held valid in New York though without stamp required by laws of Cuba, where note was made.

² Story on Bills, §§ 136, 137.

country whose laws enact it. Some of the English cases do not recognize this discrimination between contracts declared void and those which were only inadmissible in evidence;¹ but the later English as well as the later American cases adopt it as sound doctrine,² and it meets the approval of such text-writers as Story,³ Wharton, Phillimore and Westlake.

"It is now clear," says Phillimore, "that if by the foreign law the want of a stamp renders the contract void, it cannot be enforced in this country."

§ 915. When a contract is made in one country to be performed in another, and by the laws of the latter a stamp is required to render it valid, the question arises whether it is governed by the *lex solutionis* or the *lex loci contractus*, as to the stamp. Here the general rule is applicable, that, as to the form, validity, interpretation and effect of the contract, it is to be governed by the laws of the place of performance; but its mere form and authentication by the *lex loci contractus*. And accordingly, it has been held that a stamp in such cases is not necessary.⁴ This view is, as we think, sustainable also upon the ground that, in such cases of international transactions, the parties are entitled to elect by what law they will be governed, and that they will be presumed to have elected the law of the place by the laws of which their contract is valid, *ut res magis valeat, quam pereat*.⁵

¹ Wynne v. Jackson, 2 Russ. 251; James v. Catherwood, 2 Dow. & Ry. 190.

² Fant v. Miller, 17 Grat. 47; Alves v. Hodgson, 7 T. R. 241; Clegg v. Levy, 3 Camp. 166; Bristow v. Sequeville, 5 Exch. 279; Rolfe, B., saying: "I agree that if for want of a stamp a contract made in a foreign country is void, it cannot be enforced here." See Lambert v. Jones, 2 Pat. & Heath, 144.

³ Story on Bills, § 137; Wharton's Conflict of Laws, §§ 685, 688; Phillimore, IV, 608; Westlake, Art. 176; see Parsons N. & B. 320.

⁴ Vidal v. Thompson, 11 Mart. (La.) 23, the Court saying: "An instrument, as to its form and the formalities attending its execution, must be tested by the laws of the place where it is made; but the laws and usages of the place of the obligation of which it is evidence is to be fulfilled must regulate the performance." Story Conf. of Laws, § 318; Story on Bills, § 159; 2 Parsons N. & B. 331.

⁵ See Wharton Conf. of Laws, §§ 698 *et seq.*, and *infra*, § 922.

SECTION XI.

LAW APPLICABLE TO THE CURRENCY OF PAYMENT, AND INTEREST AND DAMAGES.

§ 916. The first inquiry is to ascertain where the money, according to the contract, is payable;¹ and then the proper rule in all cases would seem to be to allow that sum in the currency of the country where suit is brought which shall approximate most nearly to the amount to which the party is entitled in the country where the debt is payable, calculated by the real par, and not by the nominal par of exchange.² Thus, suppose, to use the illustration of Story, that a debt of £100 sterling is contracted in England, and is there payable, and afterward a suit was brought in the United States to recover the amount, the par of exchange, fixed by law, is to estimate the pound sterling at four dollars and forty-four cents. But the rate of exchange on bills drawn in the United States on England is generally at from eight to ten per cent. advance on the same amount. And accordingly, in order to replace in England the amount there borrowed and there payable, would require a larger amount than four dollars and forty-four cents for every pound sterling which should have been there paid. The judgment should, therefore, be for an amount sufficient to enable the plaintiff to purchase the allotted amount of English currency at the place of performance;³ for otherwise the defendant, who had broken his contract, would profit by its breach, and the plaintiff who had already suffered by his default, would suffer still further.

¹ *Benners v. Clements*, 58 Penn. 24.

² *Cash v. Kennon*, 11 Ves. 314, where Lord Eldon held that if a man agree to pay £100 in London on a certain day, he ought to have that sum there on that day; and if he fails in that contract, wherever the creditor sues him, the law of that country ought to give him just as much as he would have had if the contract had been performed. See, also, *Delegal v. Naylor*, 7 Bing. 460; *Lanusse v. Barker*, 3 Wheat. 101; *Grant v. Healy*, 3 Sum. 523; *Lee v. Wilcocks*, 5 Serg. & R. 48; *Story on Bills*, § 151; *Story Conf. of Laws*, §§ 308-311; *Wharton Conf. of Laws*, § 514; 2 *Parsons N. & B.* 370.

³ *Ibid.*

§ 917. This is the doctrine which obtains in the Court of King's Bench, where, in an action for a debt payable in Jamaica, but sued in England, it was held that the amount should be ascertained by adding the rate of exchange to the par value, if above it; and so, *vice versa*, by deducting it when the exchange is below the par.¹ And it is clearly the only doctrine consonant with justice. But in some of the United States, it is held, that the parties can only recover according to the par of exchange as established by law, and not according to the actual rate of exchange necessary to remit the amount to the foreign country where the debt is payable.²

§ 918. *Interest and damages*.—The rate of interest which a bill of exchange or promissory note, or other contract bears, when no rate is specified, and the question whether or not it shall bear interest, are both determinable by the law of the place where it is expressly or impliedly to be paid.³ Thus, if a note be made in Canada, where the rate of interest is six per cent., payable in England, where the rate is five per cent., the note will bear only the English interest of five per cent.⁴ And so, it would seem, that if a bill were drawn in New York upon London, and were there accepted generally, so that constructively it would be payable in London, and default were made in payment, the acceptor would be bound to pay English interest, for his contract is like that of the maker of a note.⁵ But the drawer would be liable for New York interest.⁶ If no place of payment be specified, the in-

¹ Scott v. Bevan, 2 Barn. & Ad. 78. But Lord Tenterden expressed doubt as to the correctness of the judgment.

² Schofield v. Day, 20 Johns 102; Martin v. Franklin, 4 Johns. 125; Adams v. Cordis, 8 Pick. 280. But this case excepts bills of exchange.

³ Campbell v. Nichols, 33 N. J. (4 Vroom), 81; Austin v. Imus, 23 Vt. 286; Arnott v. Redferne, 2 Car. & P. 88; Montgomery v. Budge, 3 Dow. & C. 297; De Wolf v. Johnson, 10 Wheat. 367; Consequa v. Willings, 1 Pet. C. C. 225; Andrews v. Pond, 13 Pet. 65.

⁴ Scofield v. Day, 20 Johns. 102; see also Davis v. Coleman, 7 Ired. 424; Summers v. Mills, 21 Tex. 77; Braynard v. Marshall, 8 Pick. 194; Boyce v. Edwards, 4 Pet. 111; Hawley v. Sloo, 12 La. Ann. 815; Hunt's Ex. v. Hall, 37 Ala. 702; Peck v. Mayo, 14 Vt. 33; Thompson v. Powles, 2 Sim. 194.

⁵ 2 Parsons N. & B. 376.

⁶ Gibbs v. Tremont, 20 E. L. & Eq. 553

strument will carry interest according to the law of the place where the drawing, making, indorsement or acceptance may have been made.¹

§ 919. Where the note in terms bears interest, it is as much a part of the debt as the principal;² and if the rate of interest be changed by statute after the note is made, it will nevertheless bear the rate expressly stipulated for.³ When interest is not expressly payable, the law of the place of payment, if it allow interest, silently fixes the rate; and though the note be expressed to be payable "without interest," interest may nevertheless be allowed as damages.⁴ The law of the forum will fix the rate of interest, unless it be affirmatively shown that a different law applies.⁵

§ 920. But the drawer of a bill and the indorser of a bill or note stand upon a very different footing. If the bill be drawn by a drawer in one State or country, for a debt payable there, upon a person in another country, and, being non-accepted, an action is brought against the drawer, the plaintiff is only entitled to the rate of interest of the country where the bill was drawn, and not to that of the country in which he resides or in which the drawee was requested to pay it.⁶ This is on the ground which has been already ex-

¹ Smith v. Smith, 2 Johns. 235.

² Fake v. Eddy, 15 Wend. 76; Gordon v. Phelps, 7 J. J. Marsh. 619.

³ Lee v. Davis, 1 A. K. Marsh. 397. ⁴ Healy v. Gorman, 3 Green (N. J.), 328.

⁵ Jaffray v. Dennis, 2 Wash. C. C. 253; Wood v. Corl, 4 Metc. 203; Aymar v. Sheldon, 12 Wend. 221; Ballingalls v. Gloster, 3 East, 481.

⁶ Crawford v. Branch Bank, 6 Ala. N. S. 15; Bailey v. Heald, 17 Tex. 102; Bank United States v. United States, 2 How. 711; Gibbs v. Fremont, 20 Eng. L. & Eq. 555; 9 Exch. 25, Alderson, B., saying: "The general rule in all cases like the present is, that the *lex loci contractus* is to govern in the construction of the instrument, but that applies only when the contract is not express; if it is special, it must be construed according to the express terms in which it is framed. Now, a bill drawn on a third person, in discharge of a present debt, is, in truth, an offer by the drawer, that if the payee will give time for payment, he will give an order on his debtor to pay a given sum at a given time and place. The payee agrees to accept this order, and to give the time, with a proviso that if the acceptor does not pay, and he, the payee, or the holder of the bill, gives notice to the drawer of that default, the drawer shall pay him the amount specified in the bill, and lawful interest. This is, then, the contract between the parties. If the

plained, that the place where the drawee or acceptor should pay is not considered that at which the drawer or indorser must pay in the event of his default. Their contract is to pay, upon receiving notice of dishonor, at the place where they respectively entered into the contract. In Vermont it has been held that the indorser is liable for interest according to the law of the place where the note is payable.¹ It has also been held in that State, that where a farm situated there

interest be expressly, or by necessary implication, specified on the face of the bill, then the interest is governed by the terms of the contract itself; but if not, it seems to follow the rate of interest of the place where the contract is made. So if the mode of performing it be expressly or impliedly specified, as was the case of *Rothschild v. Currie*. In the case of a bill drawn at A., it, *prima facie*, bears interest as a debt at A. would, if nothing else appeared; but if that bill be indorsed at B., the indorser is a new drawer, and it may be a question whether this indorsement is a new drawing of a bill at B., or only a new drawing of the same bill—that is, a bill expressly made at A. In the former case it would carry interest at the rate at B.; in the latter at the rate at A.; and on this subject we find a difference of opinion in the books—Mr. Justice Story, in his *Conflict of Laws*, § 314, maintaining the former, and Pardessus, *Droit du Commerce*, art. 1500, maintaining the latter opinion. But this case is a contract at San Francisco, by which the defendant there offers to pay to the payee, in discharge of a debt due there, the payment at Washington, by the acceptor thereof, of a given sum. That sum is not paid. The defendant's original liability then revives on notice of dishonor duly given to him, and the defendant has become liable to pay, as he was liable at the first. At first he was clearly to have paid the money at San Francisco, and if he did not, he would have been liable to pay interest at the usual rate in California for a period as long as the debt remained unpaid; and that is the amount which he ought to pay now. This point was expressly ruled in *Allen v. Kemble*. It was also so ruled in *Congan v. Bankes*. And this is not to be left to the jury, for it depends on the rule of law. The amount of interest at each place is to be so left; so is the question whether any damage has been sustained by non-payment of interest at all—for these are questions of fact. Here the jury have found interest was due, and that there was damage which ought to be recovered in the shape of interest. They also have found what the usual rate of such interest is at Washington, and what the usual rate of such interest is in California; but which rate is to be adopted by them is, so we think, a question purely of law for the direction of the judge to the jury. We think the direction in this case should have been, that the California rate of interest should be adopted by them, inasmuch as the contract was made in California; and therefore this rule must be absolute, to enter the verdict for the plaintiffs, with 19 per cent. additional interest to the 6 per cent. already allowed."

But, *contra*, that drawer is liable for interest according to place of payment. See *Mullen v. Morris*, 2 Barr, 87; *Harick v. Andrews*, 9 Por. (Ala.) 10.

¹ *Peck v. Mayo*, 14 Vt. 33.

was sold, and notes given in New York, they would bear Vermont interest, as the payee resided there and the land was there located.¹

§ 921. The rule applicable to interest applies as well to what is distinctly termed "damages." Each party, drawer, indorser and acceptor, is liable according to the place where the bill is drawn, indorsed or accepted. Thus, where a bill was drawn in Barbadoes by a merchant there upon drawees in Liverpool, England, and was indorsed by the defendant in Alexandria, Virginia, and it appeared that the damages allowed in Barbadoes was ten per cent., and in Virginia fifteen per cent., the indorser's contract was held to be governed by Virginia law, and fifteen per cent. allowed.² It was implied that the drawer would be liable for damages by the law of Barbadoes where the bill was drawn. The doctrine of the text on this subject is well settled.³ It follows that the various parties may be bound for different measures of damages.⁴ Professor Parsons says "this seems to us to arise from the clear rule that remedy depends upon the forum."⁵ The subject is more fully considered elsewhere, in the Chapter on Re-exchange and Damages.⁶ Sureties are only secondarily liable, and they are liable for what their principal has bound himself. Therefore, if the rate of interest be legal in the State or country of the principal where the contract is to be performed, the surety will be bound for it, although in his own State or country it would be illegal and excessive.⁷

§ 922. *Election of law of place as to interest.*—We have already seen that if a contract is void where made, it is void everywhere; and that although it be valid where made, yet

¹ Austin v. Imus, 23 Vt. 286. See De Wolf v. Johnson, 10 Wheat. 367; Stewart v. Ellice, 2 Paige, 604.

² Slocum v. Pomery, 6 Cranch, 221.

³ Hendricks v. Franklin, 4 Johns. 119; Hicks v. Brown, 12 Johns. 142; Hazell v. Kean, 4 Yeates, 19; Prentiss v. Savage, 13 Mass. 20; Gibbs v. Fremont, 9 Exch. 25.

⁴ Ibid.; 2 Parsons N. & B. 346, 372, 373; Story Confli. of Laws, § 314.

⁵ 2 Parsons N. & B. 342, note k.

⁶ Chapter XLV, vol 2.

⁷ Backhouse v. Selden, 29 Grat. 586.

if involving moral turpitude or injury to another nation or its citizens, such nation will not recognize or enforce it. There are some contracts, however, which would be illegal if all the parties resided or contracted either in the State where it is made or where it is to be performed, which are nevertheless recognized and enforced, if valid either in the one place or the other; and of this nature are contracts to pay interest at rates, which, by the law of one place or the other, would be usurious and void. In such cases, the intention of the parties is effectuated, as a concession to trade and commerce between nations; and if the transaction is in itself not immoral, the rate of interest authorized either by the country where the contract is made or to be performed is allowed to prevail. Thus, it has been held that a promissory note, made in Louisiana, bearing ten per cent. interest, which was legal in that State, would not be usurious, but valid, although payable in New York, where all contracts to pay more than seven per cent. interest are usurious.¹ And the like view has been recognized and adopted in numerous cases, and may be regarded as a recognized principle of English and American jurisprudence.²

§ 923. In like manner, although the rate of interest be greater than that allowed at the place where the contract is made, it will not be usurious if allowable at the place of payment, the parties having the right of election as to the laws of the place by which their contract is to be governed.³

It would seem that Story dissents from this doctrine in

¹ *De Peau v. Humphreys*, 20 Mart. (La.) 1.

² *Potter v. Tallman*, 35 Barb. 162; *Bank of Georgia v. Lewin*, 45 Barb. 340; *Richards v. Globe Bank*, 12 Wis. 692; *Vliet v. Camp*, 13 Wis. 198; *Berrien v. Wright*, 26 Barb. 208; *Chapman v. Robertson*, 6 Paige, Ch. 627; *Edwards on Bills*, 133; *Miller v. Tiffany*, 1 Wall. 310; *Kilgore v. Dempsey*, 25 Ohio St. 413.

³ *Thompson v. Powles*, 2 Sim. 194; *Harvey v. Archbald*, 1 Ry. & Moo. 184; *Andrews v. Pond*, 13 Pet. 65; *Chapman v. Robertson*, 6 Paige, 627; *Van Schaick v. Edwards*, 2 Johns. Cas. 355; where a note made in Massachusetts and payable in New York was held valid, although the interest by Massachusetts law was usurious; *Jacks v. Nichols*, 5 Barb. 38 (overruling 3 Sand. Ch. 313, and affirming 1 Seld. 178); *Healy v. Gorman*, 3 Green (N. J.) 328; *Miller v. Tiffany*, 1 Wall. 310; *Kilgore v. Dempsey*, 25 Ohio St. 413.

his work on the Conflict of Laws,¹ but in that on Bills of Exchange he recognizes it, and cites with approval cases which adopt it;² and the most approved text writers generally follow the adjudicated cases.³

Where a party temporarily in New York, where the rate of interest is seven per cent., made a note bearing twenty per cent. interest, which was valid by Texas law, and dated it "Matagorda, Texas," it was held legal and valid, the date showing it was intended to be governed by Texas law.⁴

§ 924. If the bill or note bear usurious interest both by the law of the place where made and of the place where payable, the law of the place where made will govern as to the legal consequences of usury, and the effects imposed by way of penalties.⁵ But a bill or note cannot be made payable in a particular place where the rate of interest is higher than at the place where the contract is made, for the mere purpose of creating a liability for the higher rate of interest; for such an arrangement would be a mere shift or screen to avoid the statutes against usury.⁶ The doctrine is advanced, however, that if the money is really obtained for use at a particular place, the rate of interest allowable at that place may be charged, although the bill or note be both made and payable within another State.⁷ This is certainly carrying comity very far.

It was held at one time, in New York, that if by the law of the place of making, and also of payment, there be usurious interest charged, the instrument cannot be negotiated within another State where it is not usurious, and thus become valid;⁸ but now the doctrine obtains there, that if made or accepted for accommodation in one State, and there payable, the instru-

¹ Story on Conflict of Laws, § 292.

² Story on Bills, §§ 148, 149.

³ Whart. Conf. of Laws, § 507; 2 Parsons N. & B. 336, 337, 338, 378, 379; Edwards on Bills, 717, 718.

⁴ Bullard v. Thompson, 35 Tex. 318.

⁵ Andrews v. Pond, 13 Pet. 65; De Wolf v. Johnson, 10 Wheat, 367; Mix v. Madison Ins. Co. 11 Ind. 117.

⁶ De Wolf v. Johnson, 10 Wheat. 367.

⁷ Wharton's Conflict of Laws, § 508.

⁸ Jewell v. Wright, 30 N. Y. 260.

ment may, nevertheless, be negotiated in another State at a rate of interest not usurious there, although usurious in the State of the accommodation making or acceptance, it being presumed that it was intended by the accommodation parties that the instrument might be so used by the party accommodated.¹ But it makes no difference that the rate of interest is usurious at the place of negotiation if not so at the place of making or payment.²

§ 925. In the cases hitherto cited, the transaction is supposed to be *bona fide*. If a mere shift to cover usury, it will be void, though otherwise it would be valid. Thus, where a bill was drawn in New York payable in Alabama, and was for an antecedent debt, and a larger discount was taken from the bill than allowed by the law of either State for the supposed difference of exchange, the United States Supreme Court considered the real question to be as to the *bona fides* of the transaction.³ It seems that the law of the place where the note is made will govern as to the legal consequences of usury when it is usurious by the law of that place and by the law of the place of payment also.⁴ In respect to interest as well as to other liabilities, the place of delivery controls the law of the contract between the parties.⁵ Where the law of the place of payment prohibits corporations from pleading usury, but its bonds were tainted with usury by the law of the place where made, as well as by that of the place of payment, it has been held that in a suit brought in the State where they were made, usury might be pleaded.⁶

¹ First National Bank of N. Y. v. Morris, 1 Hun, 680 (8 N. Y. S. C. R.)

² Hackettstown Nat. Bank v. Rea, 64 Barb. 178.

³ Andrews v. Pond, 13 Pet. 65.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Cook v. Litchfield, 5 Sand. 330. See Comr's of Craven Co. v. A. & N. C. R. R. Co. 77 N. C. 289.

⁶ Comr's of Craven Co. v. A. & N. C. R. R. Co. 77 N. C. 289.

APPENDIX.

See Text, p. 64, Vol. I.

FORMS OF BILLS AND NOTES.

1. USUAL FORM OF BILLS.

\$500.

New York, 31 March, 1876.

On demand (or at sight—or ten days after sight—or thirty days after date) please pay to JOHN B. ASTOR, or order (or bearer), five hundred dollars, value received, and charge the same to my account.

Cornelius Vanderbilt.

*To Thomas A. Scott, Esq.,
Philadelphia.*

2. Form of Foreign Bill Drawn in set of Three.

\$500.

New York, 31 March, 1876.

Sixty days after date, please pay to BAKER, VOORHIS & Co., or order, five hundred dollars,—this our first of exchange, second and third not paid.

Harper Brothers,

*To Messrs. T. & T. Clark,
Edinburgh, Scotland.*

See Text, pp. 97-100.

3. Usual Form of Negotiable Promissory Note in England.

£500.

London, 31 March, 1876.

Two months after date (or at any other specified time), I promise to pay to BARING BROS., or order (or bearer), five hundred pounds, value received.

J. P. Benjamin.

See Text, pp. 5, 87, 89.

4. Usual Form in many of the States is same as above. In New York a common form is:

\$500. *New York, 31 March, 1876.*

Value received, I promise to pay WM. BUTLER DUNCAN, or order, five hundred dollars on demand.

Jay Gould.

5. Form of Joint Note.

\$500. *New York, 31 March, 1876.*

On demand, we promise to pay WM. BUTLER DUNCAN, or order, five hundred dollars, value received.

Cornelius Vanderbilt.

Jay Gould.

See Text, p. 83.

6. Form of Joint and Several Note.

\$500. *New York, 31 March, 1876.*

One month after date, I promise to pay (or we jointly and severally promise to pay) JOHN B. ASTOR, or order, five hundred dollars, value received.

Cornelius Vanderbilt.

Jay Gould.

See Text, pp. 83, 84.

7. Form of Note in Common Use in Indiana.

\$500.

Terre Haute, Ind., 31 March, 1876.

Sixty days after date, I promise to pay to the order of DANIEL W. VOORHEES, at National State Bank of Terre Haute, five hundred dollars, for value received, without any relief from valuation or appraisement laws, with interest at 10 per cent. per annum after maturity, and 5 per cent. attorney's fees if suit be instituted on this note. The drawers and indorsers, severally, waive presentment for payment, protest and notice of protest of non-payment of this note.

M. C. Herr.

See Text, pp. 52, 55.

8. Form of Negotiable Note in Virginia.

\$500.

Lynchburg, Va., 31 March, 1876.

Sixty days after date, I promise to pay to EDWARD S. GREGORY, or order, without offset, negotiable and payable at The First National Bank of Lynchburg, Virginia (homestead and all other exemptions waived by the maker and each indorser), five hundred dollars, for value received.

E. D. Goggin.

See Text, p. 80.

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